---
title: "Summa Theologica, First Half"
author: "Thomas Aquinas"
translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province"
languages: [en]
shelf: "Medieval"
section: 507 of 1210
url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/507/
cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, First Half, section 507. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/507/"
---

# Summa Theologica, First Half

*Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province*

God and creation, human action, law and grace, then faith, hope, charity and justice.

## 507. I–II · Q. 28, Art. 6: Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/507/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/507/#p-N

[¶0] Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?

[¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Q 26, A 2). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.

[¶2] Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.

[¶3] Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.

[¶4] On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."

[¶5] I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q 1, A 2 ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.

[¶6] Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.

[¶7] Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A 5; Q 27, A 4) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

[¶8] Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (Q 29, A 2).

### I–II · Question 29: Of Hatred (six Articles)

[¶10] OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

[¶11] We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

[¶12] (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?

[¶13] (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?

[¶14] (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?

[¶15] (4) Whether a man can hate himself?

[¶16] (5) Whether a man can hate the truth?

[¶17] (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?