--- title: "Summa Theologica, First Half" author: "Thomas Aquinas" translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province" languages: [en] shelf: "Medieval" section: 890 of 1210 url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/890/ cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, First Half, section 890. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/890/" --- # Summa Theologica, First Half *Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province* God and creation, human action, law and grace, then faith, hope, charity and justice. ## 890. II–II · Q. 23, Art. 4: Whether charity is a special virtue? Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/890/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/890/#p-N [¶0] Whether charity is a special virtue? [¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that "virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue. [¶2] Objection 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue. [¶3] Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love" is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue. [¶4] On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue. [¶5] I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (FS, Q 18, A 2; FS, Q 54, A 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (FS, Q 27, A 1), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue. [¶6] Reply to Objection 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA 7,8). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence. [¶7] Reply to Objection 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue. [¶8] Reply to Objection 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity." ### II–II · Q. 23, Art. 5: Whether charity is one virtue? [¶10] Whether charity is one virtue? [¶11] Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity---God and our neighbor---which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue. [¶12] Objection 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q 17, A 6; FS, Q 54, A 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue. [¶13] Objection 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species. [¶14] On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness. [¶15] I answer that, Charity, as stated above (A 1) is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12). [¶16] Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species. [¶17] Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake. [¶18] Reply to Objection 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first. [¶19] Reply to Objection 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.