--- title: "Summa Theologica, Second Half" author: "Thomas Aquinas" translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province" languages: [en] shelf: "Medieval" section: 4 of 935 url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/4/ cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, Second Half, section 4. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/4/" --- # Summa Theologica, Second Half *Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province* Courage and temperance, the states of life, then Christ, the sacraments and the last things. ## 4. II–II · Q. 120, Art. 2: Whether 'epikeia' is a part of justice? Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/4/#p-N [¶0] Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice? [¶1] Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as stated above (Q 58, A 7), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. [¶2] Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now "epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i.e. "above," and {dikaion}, i.e. "just." Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice. [¶3] Objection 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice. [¶4] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a kind of justice." [¶5] I answer that, As stated above (Q 48), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident. [¶6] Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of "epikeia." Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human actions. [¶7] Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then "epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it. [¶8] Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice. [¶9] Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term {epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. ### II–II · Question 121: Of Piety (two Articles) [¶11] OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES) [¶12] We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: [¶13] (1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost? [¶14] (2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it? ### II–II · Q. 121, Art. 1: Whether piety is a gift? [¶16] Whether piety is a gift? [¶17] Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above (FS, Q 68, A 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q 101, A 3). Therefore piety is not a gift. [¶18] Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above (FS, Q 68, A 8). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety. [¶19] Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above (FS, Q 68, A 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q 30, A 1]. Therefore piety is not a gift. [¶20] On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.] [¶21] I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q 68, A 1; FS, Q 69, AA 1,3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. [¶22] Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father. [¶23] Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion. [¶24] Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.