---
title: "Summa Theologica, Second Half"
author: "Thomas Aquinas"
translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province"
languages: [en]
shelf: "Medieval"
section: 722 of 935
url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/722/
cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, Second Half, section 722. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/722/"
---

# Summa Theologica, Second Half

*Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province*

Courage and temperance, the states of life, then Christ, the sacraments and the last things.

## 722. Supp. · Q. 47, Art. 4: Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses  compulsion?

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/722/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/722/#p-N

[¶0] Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?

[¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one who wills it not.

[¶2] Objection 2: Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.

[¶3] On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.

[¶4] I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is not lame."

[¶5] Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.

[¶6] Reply to Objection 2: Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.

### Supp. · Q. 47, Art. 5: Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

[¶8] Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

[¶9] Objection 1: It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.

[¶10] Objection 2: Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like consent makes no marriage.

[¶11] On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.

[¶12] I answer that, The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals (Q 43, A 1). But if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow---and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present in their causes---or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it makes no marriage.

[¶13] This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.