---
title: "Summa Theologica, Second Half"
author: "Thomas Aquinas"
translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province"
languages: [en]
shelf: "Medieval"
section: 921 of 935
url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/921/
cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, Second Half, section 921. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/921/"
---

# Summa Theologica, Second Half

*Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province*

Courage and temperance, the states of life, then Christ, the sacraments and the last things.

## 921. Supp. · Q. 98, Art. 2: Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/921/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-second-half/921/#p-N

[¶0] Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?

[¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned ever consent to the evil they have done." Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.

[¶2] Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

[¶3] Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. FP, Q 64, A 2]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.

[¶4] Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things" (Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc.

[¶5] On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: 'Saying within themselves, repenting']."

[¶6] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more.

[¶7] I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

[¶8] Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

[¶9] Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.

[¶10] Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the punishment.

[¶11] Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (QQ 83, qu. 36): "We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain."

### Supp. · Q. 98, Art. 3: Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?

[¶13] Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?

[¶14] Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7): "Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all."

[¶15] Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8): "Preference supposes election." But "not to be" is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the damned than "to be."

[¶16] Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now "not to be" is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore "not to be" is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

[¶17] On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men . . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them."

[¶18] Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): "O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.: 'patience']." Much more, therefore, is "not to be" desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.

[¶19] I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat. 26:24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and (Jer. 20:14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate reason [*Cf. FP, Q 5, A 2, ad 3].

[¶20] Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be" and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.

[¶21] Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already.

[¶22] Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be."