69.4. On these conditions they surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.
69.4. ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁμολογήσαντες ἐξῆλθον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τἆλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.
70.1. Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet taken.
70.1. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὤν, ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρασκευαζόμενος. καὶ ὡς ᾔσθετο τῶν τειχῶν τὴν ἅλωσιν, δείσας περί τε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ Πελοποννησίοις καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῇ, πέμπει ἔς τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον (ἔστι δὲ κώμη τῆς Μεγαρίδος ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὄρει τῇ Γερανείᾳ), καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθεν ἑπτακοσίους μὲν καὶ δισχιλίους Κορινθίων ὁπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ τετρακοσίους, Σικυωνίων δὲ ἑξακοσίους, καὶ τοὺς μεθ’ αὑτοῦ ὅσοι ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἰόμενος τὴν Νίσαιαν ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον.
70.2. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army, without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.
70.2. ὡς δὲ ἐπύθετο (ἔτυχε γὰρ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Τριποδίσκον ἐξελθών), ἀπολέξας τριακοσίους τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, προσῆλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἅμα, εἰ δύναιτο, ἔργῳ τῆς Νισαίας πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσελθὼν βεβαιώσασθαι. καὶ ἠξίου δέξασθαι σφᾶς, λέγων ἐν ἐλπίδι εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν.
71.1. However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both parties electing to remain quiet and await the event;
71.1. αἱ δὲ τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβούμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ τοὺς φεύγοντας σφίσιν ἐσαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλῃ, οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δῆμος δείσας ἐπίθηται σφίσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ’ αὑτὴν οὖσα ἐγγὺς ἐφεδρευόντων Ἀθηναίων ἀπόληται, οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἐδόκει ἡσυχάσασι τὸ μέλλον περιιδεῖν.
71.2. each expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their favour. Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army.
71.2. ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἑκάτεροι ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔχειν, οἷς τις εἴη εὔνους, κρατήσασι προσχωρῆσαι· ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα.
72.1. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body.
72.1. ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν, διανενοημένοι μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἤδη ὄντες πανστρατιᾷ Πλαταιᾶσιν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐρρώσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστείλαντες διακοσίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας καὶ ἱππέας ἑξακοσίους τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν.
72.2. The whole army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter.
72.2. παρόντος δὲ ἤδη ξύμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὁπλιτῶν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἑξακισχιλίων, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῶν μὲν ὁπλιτῶν περί τε τὴν Νίσαιαν ὄντων καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ πεδίον ἐσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἔτρεψαν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδεμία βοήθειά πω τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν)·
72.3. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long time, and in which both parties claimed the victory.
72.3. ἀντεπεξελάσαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς χεῖρας ᾖσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολύ, ἐν ᾗ ἀξιοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι οὐχ ἥσσους γενέσθαι.
72.4. The Athenians killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.
72.4. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἵππαρχον τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελάσαντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι [καὶ] ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευσαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων κρατήσαντες ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ βεβαίως οὐδέτεροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.
73.1. After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor.
73.1. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐχώρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὁποτέρων ἡ νίκη ἔσται.
73.2. This attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same time they effectually served their interests at Megara.
73.2. καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχειν, ἅμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἑκόντας ἄρξαι, ἐπειδή γε ἐν φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τίθεσθαι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν·
73.3. For if they had failed to show themselves, they would not have had a chance, but would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without fighting.
73.3. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως· νῦν δὲ κἂν τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.
73.4. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the long walls, and the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless; their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly after waiting for some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states looking upon him as the victor and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle—and receiving them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party in correspondence with the Athenians being paralyzed by the turn things had taken.
73.4. οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες, ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς πλέονας αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος ἕκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρων ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπῆλθον πρότερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὖθις οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθενπερ ὡρμήθησαν. οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχουσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρσοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ δεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.
74.1. Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original destination.
74.1. καὶ ὕστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον τὴν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρεσκεύαζεν, ἵναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμητο·
74.2. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred with the friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and only to consult the real interests of the town.
74.2. οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπ’ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὤφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξῆλθον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολογησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγουσι τοὺς ἐκ Πηγῶν, ὁρκώσαντες πίστεσι μεγάλαις μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύσειν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ ἄριστα.
74.3. However, as soon as they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town— a revolution which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few partisans.
74.3. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἳ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ’ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν.
75.1. The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia,—the place in which the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the place.
75.1. τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, μελλούσης κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀριστείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον (ὁ γὰρ τρίτος αὐτῶν Λάμαχος δέκα ναυσὶν ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσεπεπλεύκει) ὡς ᾐσθάνοντο τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ Ἄναια ἐπὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γένηται, ἔνθα οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τούς τε Πελοποννησίους ὠφέλουν ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ κυβερνήτας πέμποντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει Σαμίους ἐς ταραχὴν καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐδέχοντο· οὕτω δὴ ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων στρατιὰν καὶ πλεύσαντες, μάχῃ τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ χωρίον πάλιν.
75.2. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.
75.2. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσπλεύσας Λάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι ὁρμίσας ἐς τὸν Κάλητα ποταμὸν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς ναῦς ὕδατος ἄνωθεν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος αἰφνιδίου τοῦ ῥεύματος· αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ πεζῇ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Θρᾳκῶν, οἵ εἰσι πέραν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Καλχηδόνα τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποικίαν.
76.1. The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid.
76.1. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν.
76.2. Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue.
76.2. τῷ γὰρ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ ἐκείνῳ τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο, βουλομένων μεταστῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρέψαι· καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ’ ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγουμένου τάδε αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη.
76.3. The seaport town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was to be betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what was formerly called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus), to be put into their hands by another from that town, whose exiles were very active in the business, hiring men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia and close to Phanotis in Phocis.
76.3. Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν (αἱ δὲ Σῖφαί εἰσι τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ Κρισαίῳ κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδιοι)· Χαιρώνειαν δέ, ἣ ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Μινύειον πρότερον καλούμενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἄνδρας ἐμισθοῦντο ἐκ Πελοποννήσου (ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χαιρώνεια ἔσχατον τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοτίδι τῆς Φωκίδος), καὶ Φωκέων μετεῖχόν τινες.
76.4. Meanwhile the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere detained by disturbances at home.
76.4. τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἔδει Δήλιον καταλαβεῖν τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν τετραμμένον Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἅμα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἁθρόοι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κινούμενα.
76.5. Should the enterprise succeed, and Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that even if no revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet with these places in their hands, and the country being harassed by incursions, and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged in them, things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided, it would be possible after a while to settle matters according to their wishes.
76.5. καὶ εἰ κατορθοῖτο ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τειχισθείη, ῥᾳδίως ἤλπιζον, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραυτίκα νεωτερίζοιτό τι τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἐχομένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς γῆς καὶ οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς, οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὲν προσιόντων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὔσης ἁθρόας τῆς δυνάμεως, καταστήσειν αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.
77.1. Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous execution of both these operations.
77.1. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρεσκευάζετο, ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὁπότε καιρὸς εἴη, ἔμελλε στρατεύειν ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προαπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον, ὅπως ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατὸν ξυλλέξας Ἀκαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένας· ἡμέρα δ’ αὐτοῖς εἴρητο ᾗ ἔδει ἅμα ταῦτα πράσσειν.
77.2. Demosthenes on his arrival found Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time appointed.
77.2. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ ὑπό τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηναγκασμένους καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἐκείνῃ πᾶν, ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους στρατεύσας πρῶτον καὶ προσποιησάμενος τἆλλα ἡτοιμάζετο ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας, ὅταν δέῃ, ἀπαντησόμενος.
78.1. About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his army through the country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the Chalcidian Proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march, being accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas.
78.1. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους πορευόμενος ἑπτακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν Τραχῖνι καί, προπέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, ἀξιοῦντος διάγειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιάν, ἦλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς Ἀχαΐας Πάναιρός τε καὶ Δῶρος καὶ Ἱππολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρόφακος πρόξενος ὢν Χαλκιδέων, τότε δὴ ἐπορεύετο.
78.2. It was never very easy to traverse Thessaly without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass without leave through a neighbour's country, was a delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people had always sympathized with the Athenians.
78.2. ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ Λαρίσης Νικονίδας Περδίκκᾳ ἐπιτήδειος ὤν. τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὔπορον ἦν διιέναι ἄνευ ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσί γε ὁμοίως Ἕλλησιν ὕποπτον καθειστήκει τὴν τῶν πέλας μὴ πείσαντας διιέναι· τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις αἰεί ποτε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὔνουν ὑπῆρχεν.
78.3. Indeed if instead of the customary close oligarchy there had been a constitutional government in Thessaly, he would never have been able to proceed; since even as it was, he was met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the opposite party who forbade his further progress, and complained of his making the attempt without the consent of the nation.
78.3. ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί, οὐκ ἄν ποτε προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τἀναντία τούτοις βουλομένων ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐνιπεῖ ποταμῷ ἐκώλυον καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἔφασαν ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον.
78.4. To this his escort answered that they had no intention of taking him through against their will; they were only friends in attendance on an unexpected victor. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants; his arms not being directed against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to prevent the two nations having access to each other's territory, he neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only beg them not to stop him.
78.4. οἱ δὲ ἄγοντες οὔτε ἀκόντων ἔφασαν διάξειν, αἰφνίδιόν τε παραγενόμενον ξένοι ὄντες κομίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς φίλος ὢν ἰέναι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμίοις οὖσι καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνοις ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν, Θεσσαλοῖς τε οὐκ εἰδέναι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχθραν οὖσαν ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων γῇ μὴ χρῆσθαι, νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι), οὐ μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἴργεσθαι.
78.5. With this answer they went away, and he took the advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, before a greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that he set out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium, and from thence to Perrhaebia.
78.5. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δὲ κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι τὸ κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ᾗ ἐκ τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφώρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλόν τε ἐτέλεσε καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀπιδανῷ ποταμῷ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς Περραιβίαν.
78.6. Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus, looking towards Thessaly.
78.6. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἤδη οἱ μὲν τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἀγωγοὶ πάλιν ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ Περραιβοὶ αὐτόν, ὑπήκοοι ὄντες Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δῖον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς, ὃ ὑπὸ τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κεῖται.
79.1. In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.
79.1. τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσσαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρίν τινα κωλύειν παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἀφίκετο ὡς Περδίκκαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Χαλκιδικήν.
79.2. The departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccus, alarmed at the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they would be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus king of the Lyncestians.
79.2. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ηὐτύχει, δείσαντες οἵ τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀφεστῶτες Ἀθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας ἐξήγαγον τὸν στρατόν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδῆς νομίζοντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς πρῶτον ὁρμήσειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (καὶ ἅμα αἱ πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἱ οὐκ ἀφεστηκυῖαι ξυνεπῆγον κρύφα), Περδίκκας δὲ πολέμιος μὲν οὐκ ὢν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, φοβούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ μάλιστα βουλόμενος Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι.
79.3. It had been less difficult for them to get an army to leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at the present moment.
79.3. ξυνέβη δὲ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἐξαγαγεῖν, ἡ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακοπραγία.
80.1. The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to their allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked for it to aid them in revolting.
80.1. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ ἤλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα, εἰ ἀντιπαραλυποῖεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν στρατιάν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλουμένων.
80.2. The Lacedaemonians were also glad to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might encourage them to move.
80.2. καὶ ἅμα τῶν Εἱλώτων βουλομένοις ἦν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μή τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν·
80.3. Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high spirited and the most apt to rebel.
80.3. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν σκαιότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος (αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθειστήκει)· προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γεγενῆσθαι σφίσιν ἄριστοι,κρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώσοντες, πεῖραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγούμενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οἵπερ καὶ ἠξίωσαν πρῶτος ἕκαστος ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι.
80.4. As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever knew how each of them perished.
80.4. καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη.
80.5. The Spartans now therefore gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese.
80.5. καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.
81.1. Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man so thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to be done at Sparta, and whose after service abroad proved of the utmost use to his country.
81.1. αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν (προυθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς), ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον.
81.2. At the present moment his just and moderate conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by treachery; and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war, after the events in Sicily, the present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by experience to some, by hearsay to others, was what mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the Lacedaemonians.
81.2. τό τε γὰρ παραυτίκα ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλά, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἷλε τῶν χωρίων, ὥστε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γίγνεσθαι ξυμβαίνειν τε βουλομένοις, ὅπερ ἐποίησαν, ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου λώφησιν· ἔς τε τὸν χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετὰ τὰ ἐκ Σικελίας πόλεμον ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις, τῶν μὲν πείρᾳ αἰσθομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀκοῇ νομισάντων, μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνεποίει τοῖς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχοις ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
81.3. He was the first who went out and showed himself so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that the rest were like him.
81.3. πρῶτος γὰρ ἐξελθὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐλπίδα ἐγκατέλιπε βέβαιον ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν.
82.1. Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on their allies in that quarter.
82.1. τότε δ’ οὖν ἀφικομένου αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τόν τε Περδίκκαν πολέμιον ποιοῦνται, νομίσαντες αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς παρόδου, καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ ξυμμάχων φυλακὴν πλέονα κατεστήσαντο.
83.1. Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue.
83.1. Περδίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὐθὺς λαβὼν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως στρατεύει ἐπὶ Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Βρομεροῦ Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα ὅμορον ὄντα, διαφορᾶς τε αὐτῷ οὔσης καὶ βουλόμενος καταστρέψασθαι.
83.2. However, when he arrived with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon, this latter having already made overtures intimating his willingness to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, in order to insure his greater zeal in their cause.
83.2. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο τῷ στρατῷ μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς Λύγκου, Βρασίδας λόγοις ἔφη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἀρραβαῖον ξύμμαχον Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιῆσαι. καὶ γάρ τι καὶ Ἀρραβαῖος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἑτοῖμος ὢν Βρασίδᾳ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν· καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν χρῆσθαι.
83.4. Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his bringing many of the places round him into alliance with them; and thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger view of the question of Arrhabaeus.
83.4. ἅμα δέ τι καὶ εἰρήκεσαν τοιοῦτον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Περδίκκου ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν χωρίων ξύμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὥστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου κοινῇ μᾶλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου ἠξίου πράσσειν.
83.5. Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas, maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to parley with Arrhabaeus.
83.5. Περδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἔφη Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καθαιρέτην ὧν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνῃ πολεμίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτοῦ τρέφοντος τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατοῦ ξυνέσται Ἀρραβαίῳ.
83.6. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading the country of Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the support of the army.
83.6. ὁ δὲ ἄκοντος καὶ ἐκ διαφορᾶς ξυγγίγνεται, καὶ πεισθεὶς τοῖς λόγοις ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τρίτον μέρος ἀνθ’ ἡμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδου, νομίζων ἀδικεῖσθαι.
84.1. The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little before vintage.
84.1. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ Ἄκανθον τὴν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτου ἐστράτευσεν.
84.2. The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit, which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say before making a decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before the people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed them as follows:— ‘Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz.
84.2. οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ’ ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἵ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος. ὅμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται· καὶ καταστὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος (ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν) ἔλεγε τοιάδε.
85.1. that we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas. Our delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the speedy downfall of the Athenians and you must not blame us for this, as we are now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to do our best to subdue them.
85.1. ‘ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν· εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπήλθομεν, σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ᾗ διὰ τάχους αὐτοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὑμετέρου κινδύνου ἠλπίσαμεν Ἀθηναίους καθαιρήσειν, μηδεὶς μεμφθῇ· νῦν γάρ, ὅτε παρέσχεν, ἀφιγμένοι καὶ μετὰ ὑμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτούς.
85.3. Meanwhile I am astonished at finding your gates shut against me, and at not meeting with a better welcome.
85.3. θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλῄσει μου τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφῖγμαι.
85.4. We Lacedaemonians thought of you as allies eager to have us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were with you in body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us.
85.4. ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἰόμενοί τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ πρὶν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ἥξειν καὶ βουλομένοις ἔσεσθαι, κίνδυνόν [τε] τοσόνδε ἀνερρίψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἰόντες καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι·
85.5. It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other intentions, and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic freedom.
85.5. ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ ἐναντιώσεσθε τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, δεινὸν ἂν εἴη.
85.6. It is not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I may go people will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to whom I first came—an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men like the Acanthians—refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove that the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that I am here in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an attack from Athens.
85.6. καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἧσσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι, δυσχερὲς ποιούμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ οὓς πρῶτον ἦλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἀξιόχρεων παρεχομένους καὶ ξύνεσιν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἐδέξασθε· καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἕξω πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἢ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρῆσαι τὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσιν, ἀφῖχθαι.
85.7. Yet when I went with the army which I now have to the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at Nisaea.
85.7. καίτοι στρατιᾷ γε τῇδ’ ἣν νῦν [ἐγὼ] ἔχω ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς νηίτῃ γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ στρατῷ ἴσον πλῆθος ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι.
86.1. And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian masters.
86.1. αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους, καὶ ἅμα οὐχ ἵνα ξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ἀπάτῃ προσλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑμῖν δεδουλωμένοις ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχήσοντες.
86.2. I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without hesitation.
86.2. οὔκουν ἀξιῶ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πίστεις γε διδοὺς τὰς μεγίστας, οὐδὲ τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθῆναι, προσχωρεῖν τε ὑμᾶς θαρσήσαντας.
86.3. Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be more tranquil than they.
86.3. καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω.
86.4. I am not come here to help this party or that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave the many to the few or the few to the many.
86.4. οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάσων ἥκω, οὐδὲ ἂν σαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι δουλώσαιμι.
86.5. This would be heavier than a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians instead of being thanked for our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but contrariwise reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no pretensions to honesty;
86.5. χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι.
86.6. as it is more disgraceful for persons of character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery.
86.6. ἀπάτῃ γὰρ εὐπρεπεῖ αἴσχιον τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι πλεονεκτῆσαι ἢ βίᾳ ἐμφανεῖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχύος δικαιώσει, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῇ.
87.1. A matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our interest to act as we say?
87.1. οὕτω πολλὴν περιωπὴν τῶν ἡμῖν ἐς τὰ μέγιστα διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς τοῖς ὅρκοις βεβαίωσιν λάβοιτε ἢ οἷς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει ὁμοίως ὡς εἶπον.
87.2. If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall do so without scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me, first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you, their friends, in the event of your non-adhesion, through the monies that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude.
87.2. ‘εἰ δ’ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊσχομένου ἀδύνατοι μὲν φήσετε εἶναι, εὖνοι δ’ ὄντες ἀξιώσετε μὴ κακούμενοι διωθεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκίνδυνον ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δίκαιόν τε εἶναι, οἷς καὶ δυνατὸν δέχεσθαι αὐτήν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἄκοντα δὲ μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ ἥρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ἥκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δῃῶν πειράσομαι βιάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἔτι νομιῶ, προσεῖναι δέ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ εὔλογον, τῶν μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ εὔνῳ, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ’ Ἀθηναίους βλάπτωνται, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ἵνα μὴ κωλύωνται ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δουλείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι.
87.4. Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians have to free those who do not wish it?
87.4. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως γ’ ἂν τάδε πράσσοιμεν, οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν·
87.5. Empire we do not aspire to: it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the independence that we offer to all.
87.5. οὐδ’ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους περιίδοιμεν.
87.6. Endeavour, therefore, to decide wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes, and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory.’
87.6. πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγωνίσασθε τοῖς τε Ἕλλησιν ἄρξαι πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀίδιον δόξαν καταθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τά τε ἴδια μὴ βλαφθῆναι καὶ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον ὄνομα περιθεῖναι.’
88.1. Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring the independence of the allies whom he might bring over.
88.1. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι,πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὅρκοις οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἦ μὴν ἔσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους οὓς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατόν.
88.2. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example and revolted. Such were the events of this summer.
88.2. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον καὶ Στάγιρος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία ξυναπέστη. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐγένετο.
89.1. It was in the first days of the winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the hands of Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were each to start; and Demosthenes sailing first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians.
89.1. τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει στρατηγοῖς οὖσιν Ἀθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντῆσαι, τὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ἃς ἔδει ἀμφοτέρους στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρότερον πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς ξυμμάχων, ἄπρακτος γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος ὑπὸ Νικομάχου ἀνδρὸς Φωκέως ἐκ Φανοτέως, ὃς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἶπεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ Βοιωτοῖς·
89.2. Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.
89.2. καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων Βοιωτῶν (οὐ γάρ πω Ἱπποκράτης παρελύπει ἐν τῇ γῇ ὤν) προκαταλαμβάνονται αἵ τε Σῖφαι καὶ ἡ Χαιρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ᾔσθοντο οἱ πράσσοντες τὸ ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.
90.1. Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner.
90.1. ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ἤδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφῶν· καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν Δήλιον ἐτείχιζε τοιῷδε τρόπῳ [τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ].
90.2. A trench was dug all round the temple and the consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in.
90.2. τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἔσκαπτον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς παρακαταπηγνύντες, ἄμπελον κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἅμα καὶ πλίνθον ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ᾗ καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν· ἥπερ γὰρ ἦν στοὰ κατεπεπτώκει.
90.3. The work was begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till dinner-time on the fifth, when most of it being now finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home.
90.3. ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτῃ ὡς οἴκοθεν ὥρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάζοντο καὶ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἀρίστου.
90.4. From this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left unfinished.
90.4. ἔπειτα, ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀπετετέλεστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον προαπεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἷον δέκα σταδίους ὡς ἐπ’ οἴκου πορευόμενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ψιλοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν, οἱ δ’ ὁπλῖται θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἡσύχαζον· Ἱπποκράτης δὲ ὑπομένων ἔτι καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ προτείχισμα, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν ἐπιτελέσαι.
91.1. During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns, found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border, when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:— ‘Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals.
91.1. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις ξυνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρῆσαν καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ’ οἴκου, τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἕνδεκα, οὐ ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι εἰσί (μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ὠρωπίας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα), Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ᾽ Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ νομίζων ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι, προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἁθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.
92.1. It was to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to act as enemies do.
92.1. ‘χρῆν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί, μηδ’ ἐς ἐπίνοιάν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ἢν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι καταλάβωμεν αὐτούς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἐλθόντες τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰσὶ δήπου πολέμιοι ἐν ᾧ τε ἂν χωρίῳ καταληφθῶσι καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν.
92.2. And if any one has taken up with the idea in question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get more.
92.2. νυνὶ δ’ εἴ τῳ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μεταγνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθές, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπίῃ, περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλέονος δὲ ὀρεγόμενος ἑκών τινι ἐπέρχεται.
92.3. It is your national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so.
92.3. πάτριόν τε ὑμῖν στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῷ μάλιστα δεῖ.