---
title: "History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι"
author: "Thucydides"
translator: "Richard Crawley"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 33 of 42
url: https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/33/
cite: "Thucydides, tr. Richard Crawley, History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι, section 33. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/33/"
---

# History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι

*Thucydides, tr. Richard Crawley*

The war between Athens and Sparta, told by an Athenian general who lived through it: the funeral oration, the plague, the Melian dialogue, Sicily.

> Greek: ed. Henry Stuart Jones, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0003.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Richard Crawley, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0003.tlg001.perseus-eng6). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 33. Book VII · chapters 1–21

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/33/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/33/#p-N

[¶0] 1.1. After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more correct information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible for an army arriving by Epipolae to effect an entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera, and taking with them the Himeraeans and any others that might agree to join them, go to Syracuse by land.

> Greek: 1.1. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Πυθὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος, ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὰς ναῦς, παρέπλευσαν ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους· καὶ πυνθανόμενοι σαφέστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς πω ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν, ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτ’ ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἐσπλεῦσαι, εἴτ’ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἐς Ἱμέραν πρῶτον πλεύσαντες καὶ αὐτούς τε ἐκείνους καὶ στρατιὰν ἄλλην προσλαβόντες, οὓς ἂν πείθωσι, κατὰ γῆν ἔλθωσιν.

[¶1] 1.2. Finally they determined to sail for Himera, especially as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait, and after touching at Rhegium and Messina, came to Himera.

> Greek: 1.2. καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱμέρας πλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν οὔπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, ἃς ὁ Νικίας ὅμως πυνθανόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι ἀπέστειλεν. φθάσαντες δὲ τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην περαιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ, καὶ σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ἱμέραν.

[¶2] 1.3. Arrived there, they persuaded the Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves but to provide arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had drawn ashore at Himera; and they sent and appointed a place for the Selinuntines to meet them with all their forces.

> Greek: 1.3. ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄντες τούς τε Ἱμεραίους ἔπεισαν ξυμπολεμεῖν καὶ αὐτούς τε ἕπεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν (τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν Ἱμέρᾳ), καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἀπαντᾶν πανστρατιᾷ ἔς τι χωρίον.

[¶3] 1.4. A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now ready to join them with much greater alacrity, owing to the recent death of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighborhood and friendly to Athens, and owing also to the vigor shown by Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon.

> Greek: 1.4. πέμψειν δέ τινα αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινές, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν,καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως δοκοῦντος ἥκειν.

[¶4] 1.5. Gylippus now took with him about seven hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only having arms, a thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his march for Syracuse.

> Greek: 1.5. καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε σφετέρων ναυτῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν τοὺς ὡπλισμένους ἑπτακοσίους μάλιστα, Ἱμεραίους δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατὸν καὶ Σελινουντίων τέ τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας καὶ Γελῴων ὀλίγους, Σικελῶν τε ἐς χιλίους τοὺς πάντας, ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Συρακούσας·

[¶5] 2.1. Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive; and one of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single ship, was the first to reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to consider whether they should not put an end to the war. This he prevented, and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been despatched by the Lacedaemonians to take the command.

> Greek: 2.1. οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι ταῖς τε ἄλλαις ναυσὶν ὡς εἶχον τάχους ἐβοήθουν καὶ Γογγύλος, εἷς τῶν Κορινθίων ἀρχόντων, μιᾷ νηὶ τελευταῖος ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου, καὶ καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆές τε ἄλλαι ἔτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος ὁ Κλεανδρίδου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλάντων ἄρχων.

[¶6] 2.2. Upon this the Syracusans took courage, and immediately marched out with all their forces to meet Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand.

> Greek: 2.2. καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθὺς πανστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτόν.

[¶7] 2.3. Meanwhile Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed his army in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the Syracusans against the Athenian lines.

> Greek: 2.3. ὁ δὲ Ἰέτας τότε τι τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν Σικελῶν ἑλὼν καὶ ξυνταξάμενος ὡς ἐς μάχην ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς· καὶ ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

[¶8] 2.4. His arrival chanced at a critical moment. The Athenians had already finished a double wall of six or seven furlongs to the great harbor, with the exception of a small portion next to the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in the remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea, stones had been laid ready for building for the greater part of the distance, and some points had been left half finished, while others were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed been great.

> Greek: 2.4. ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἀπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν (τοῦτο δ’ ἔτι ᾠκοδόμουν), τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελέλειπτο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.

[¶9] 3.1. Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which they had been at first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and the Syracusans, formed in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a short distance off and sent on a herald to tell them that if they would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days' time, he was willing to make a truce accordingly.

> Greek: 3.1. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγὺς κήρυκα προσπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἑτοῖμος εἶναι σπένδεσθαι.

[¶10] 3.2. The Athenians treated this proposition with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer. After this both sides began to prepare for action.

> Greek: 3.2. οἱ δ’ ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο ἀλλήλοις ὡς ἐς μάχην.

[¶11] 3.3. Gylippus, observing that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily fall into line, drew off his troops more into the open ground, while Nicias did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the citadel of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night there.

> Greek: 3.3. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσομένους, ἐπανῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ’ ἡσύχαζε πρὸς τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει. ὡς δ’ ἔγνω ὁ Γύλιππος οὐ προσιόντας αὐτούς, ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν καλουμένην, καὶ αὐτοῦ ηὐλίσαντο.

[¶12] 3.4. On the following day he led out the main body of his army, and drawing them up in order of battle before the walls of the Athenians to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, despatched a strong force against Fort Labdalum and took it, and put all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not being within sight of the Athenians.

> Greek: 3.4. τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ἄγων τὴν μὲν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν ἄλλοσε, μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον αἱρεῖ, καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον.

[¶13] 3.5. On the same day an Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbor was captured by the Syracusans.

> Greek: 3.5. καὶ τριήρης τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἁλίσκεται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦσα τῷ λιμένι.

[¶14] 4.1. After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, in order that the Athenians, unless they could hinder the work, might be no longer able to invest them.

> Greek: 4.1. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποτειχίσαι.

[¶15] 4.2. Meanwhile the Athenians, having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night and attacked it.

> Greek: 4.2. καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ τεῖχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος (ἦν γάρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενές) νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπῄει πρὸς αὐτό.

[¶16] 4.3. However, the Athenians who happened to be bivouacking outside took the alarm and came out to meet him, upon seeing which he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians now built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the works, at the stations assigned to them.

> Greek: 4.3. οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι) ὡς ᾔσθοντο, ἀντεπῇσαν· ὁ δὲ γνοὺς κατὰ τάχος ἀπήγαγε τοὺς σφετέρους πάλιν. ἐποικοδομήσαντες δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑψηλότερον αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτῃ ἐφύλασσον, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα ἤδη διέταξαν, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἕκαστοι φρουρεῖν.

[¶17] 4.4. Nicias also determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory over against the city, which juts out and narrows the mouth of the great harbor. He thought that the fortification of this place would make it easier to bring in supplies, as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less distance, near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged, upon every movement of the enemy's navy, to put out against them from the bottom of the great harbor. Besides this, he now began to pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing that the coming of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land.

> Greek: 4.4. τῷ δὲ Νικίᾳ ἐδόκει τὸ Πλημμύριον καλούμενον τειχίσαι· ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως, ἥπερ προύχουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθείη, ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι· δι’ ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι, ἤν τι ναυτικῷ κινῶνται. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμῳ, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἧκεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα.

[¶18] 4.5. Accordingly, he conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in which he placed most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the larger craft and men-of-war.

> Greek: 4.5. διακομίσας οὖν στρατιὰν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐξετείχισε τρία φρούρια· καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τά τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ὥρμει καὶ αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες.

[¶19] 4.6. This was the first and chief occasion of the losses which the crews experienced. The water which they used was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors could not go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country; a third of the enemy's cavalry being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians at Plemmyrium.

> Greek: 4.6. ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο· τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο· τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ ἐτετάχατο.

[¶20] 4.7. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

> Greek: 4.7. ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας ὁ Νικίας· καὶ πέμπει ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν εἴκοσι ναῦς, αἷς εἴρητο περί τε Λοκροὺς καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας ναυλοχεῖν αὐτάς.

[¶21] 5.1. Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the stones which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the same time constantly led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed them in order of battle in front of the lines, the Athenians forming against him.

> Greek: 5.1. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσεν ἐξάγων αἰεὶ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο.

[¶22] 5.2. At last he thought that the moment was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the lines, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use;

> Greek: 5.2. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε τῷ Γυλίππῳ καιρὸς εἶναι, ἦρχε τῆς ἐφόδου· καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων, ᾗ τῆς ἵππου τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν.

[¶23] 5.3. and the Syracusans and their allies were defeated and took up their dead under truce, while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylippus called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was not theirs but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters.

> Greek: 5.3. καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τροπαῖον στησάντων, ὁ Γύλιππος ξυγκαλέσας τὸ στράτευμα οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ἁμάρτημα ἐκείνων, ἀλλ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι· τῆς γὰρ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ τάξει ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν ποιήσας ἀφελέσθαι· νῦν οὖν αὖθις ἐπάξειν.

[¶24] 5.4. He would now, therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged them to remember that in material force they would be fully a match for their opponents, while with respect to moral advantages, it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of overcoming Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that accompanied them, and of driving them out of the country.

> Greek: 5.4. καὶ διανοεῖσθαι οὕτως ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ὡς τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἕξοντας, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς Ἰώνων καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

[¶25] 6.1. After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians were of opinion that even if the Syracusans should not wish to offer battle, it was necessary for them to prevent the building of the cross wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point of their own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no difference whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or never fought at all. They accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans.

> Greek: 6.1. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν, αὖθις ἐπῆγεν αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐθέλοιεν μάχης ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι μὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τεῖχος (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτὴν ἡ ἐκείνων τείχισις, καί, εἰ προέλθοι, ταὐτὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι), ἀντεπῇσαν οὖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.

[¶26] 6.2. Gylippus led out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications than on the former occasion, and so joined battle; posting his horse and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space, where the works of the two walls terminated.

> Greek: 6.2. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ’ ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ᾗ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον.

[¶27] 6.3. During the engagement the cavalry attacked and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them; and the rest of the Athenian army was in consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong within their lines.

> Greek: 6.3. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἱππῆς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπερ κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν· καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα νικηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα.

[¶28] 6.4. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall up to the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their power any longer to stop them, and depriving them, even if victorious in the field, of all chance of investing the city for the future.

> Greek: 6.4. καὶ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι.

[¶29] 7.1. After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbor under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian ships on guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder of the cross wall.

> Greek: 7.1. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαθοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν (ἦρχε δ’ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους.

[¶30] 7.2. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the war altogether.

> Greek: 7.2. καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ᾤχετο, καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου.

[¶31] 7.3. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements;

> Greek: 7.3. πρέσβεις τε ἄλλοι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπεστάλησαν, ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι περαιωθῇ τρόπῳ ᾧ ἂν ἐν ὁλκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλως ὅπως ἂν προχωρῇ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων.

[¶32] 7.4. while the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly confident.

> Greek: 7.4. οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.

[¶33] 8.1. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were in a critical position, and that unless speedily recalled or strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety.

> Greek: 8.1. ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν.

[¶34] 8.2. He feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not report the truth, and so though it best to write a letter, to insure that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the case.

> Greek: 8.2. φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

[¶35] 8.3. His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary danger.

> Greek: 8.3. καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾤχοντο φέροντες, οὓς ἀπέστειλε, τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι’ ἑκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

[¶36] 9.1. At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched in concert with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against Amphipolis, and failing to take it brought some galleys round into the Strymon, and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at Himeraeum. Summer was now over.

> Greek: 9.1. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἷλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἱμεραίου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[¶37] 10.1. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias, reaching Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to them, and answered any questions that were asked them, and delivered the letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows:— ‘Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many other letters; it is now time for you to become equally familiar with our present condition, and to take your measures accordingly.

> Greek: 10.1. τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἥκοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νικίου ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο αὐτοῖς εἶπον, καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα ἀπεκρίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν. ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε. ‘τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε· νῦν δὲ καιρὸς οὐχ ἧσσον μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν βουλεύσασθαι.

[¶38] 11.2. We had defeated in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which we now occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained from Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle with him we were victorious; in the battle on the following day we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry and darters, and compelled to retire within our lines.

> Greek: 11.2. κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλέοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ’ οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν καὶ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἷσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν, ἦλθε Γύλιππος Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν ἔχων ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν. καὶ μάχῃ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ νικᾶται ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ ἱππεῦσί τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐς τὰ τείχη.

[¶39] 11.3. We have now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue the work of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use even of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past our lines, thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until this cross wall be attacked by a strong force and captured.

> Greek: 11.3. νῦν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ δυναίμεθ’ ἂν χρήσασθαι ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ)· οἱ δὲ παρῳκοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἕλῃ.

[¶40] 11.4. So that the besieger in name has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality; as we are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any distance into the country.

> Greek: 11.4. ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.

[¶41] 12.1. Besides this, an embassy has been despatched to Peloponnese to procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, partly in the hope of inducing those that are at present neutral to join him in the war, partly of bringing from his allies additional contingents for the land forces and material for the navy.

> Greek: 12.1. ‘πεπόμφασι δὲ καὶ ἐς Πελοπόννησον πρέσβεις ἐπ’ ἄλλην στρατιάν, καὶ ἐς τὰς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεις Γύλιππος οἴχεται, τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων ξυμπολεμεῖν ὅσαι νῦν ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν καὶ στρατιὰν ἔτι πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικοῦ παρασκευήν, ἢν δύνηται, ἄξων.

[¶42] 12.2. For I understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines with their land forces and with their fleet by sea.

> Greek: 12.2. διανοοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν πειρᾶν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

[¶43] 12.3. You must none of you be surprised that I say by sea also. They have discovered that the length of the time we have now been in commission has rotted our ships and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness of our crews and the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of our navy has departed.

> Greek: 12.3. καὶ δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ὅπερ κἀκεῖνοι πυνθάνονται, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤκμαζε καὶ τῶν νεῶν τῇ ξηρότητι καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων τῇ σωτηρίᾳ· νῦν δὲ αἵ τε νῆες διάβροχοι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἤδη θαλασσεύουσαι, καὶ τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται.

[¶44] 12.4. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and careen them, because, the enemy's vessels being as many or more than our own, we are constantly anticipating an attack.

> Greek: 12.4. τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψύξαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπάλους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους τὰς τῶν πολεμίων οὔσας αἰεὶ προσδοκίαν παρέχειν ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται.

[¶45] 12.5. Indeed, they may be seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the initiative; and not having to maintain a blockade, they have greater facilities for drying their ships.

> Greek: 12.5. φανεραὶ δ’ εἰσὶν ἀναπειρώμεναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀποξηρᾶναι τὰς σφετέρας μᾶλλον ἐξουσία· οὐ γὰρ ἐφορμοῦσιν ἄλλοις.

[¶46] 13.1. This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of ships to spare, and were freed from our present necessity of exhausting all our strength upon the blockade. For it is already difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were we to relax our vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible.

> Greek: 13.1. ἡμῖν δ’ ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις ὥσπερ νῦν πάσαις φυλάσσειν· εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι.

[¶47] 13.2. The losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry; the loss of our previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against us, and the strength of the enemy's resistance; such of them as were pressed into the service take the first opportunity of departing to their respective cities; such as were originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and large gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing themselves of one or other of the various facilities of escape which the magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in trade themselves and prevail upon the captains to take Hyccaric slaves on board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency of our navy.

> Greek: 13.2. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων· οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν,οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται (πολλὴ δ’ ἡ Σικελία), εἰσὶ δ’ οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορευόμενοι ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφῄρηνται.

[¶48] 14.1. Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its prime is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on her way and keep the rowing in time is small.

> Greek: 14.1. ἐπισταμένοις δ’ ὑμῖν γράφω ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος καὶ ὀλίγοι τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν.

[¶49] 14.2. But by far my greatest trouble is, that holding the post which I do, I am prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many quarters, but are compelled to depend both for supplying the crews in service and for making good our losses upon the men whom we brought with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are incapable of supplying us.

> Greek: 14.2. τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἐμοὶ κωλῦσαι τῷ στρατηγῷ (χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι) καὶ ὅτι οὐδ’ ὁπόθεν ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα τὰς ναῦς ἔχομεν, ὃ τοῖς πολεμίοις πολλαχόθεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἀφ’ ὧν ἔχοντες ἤλθομεν τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα γίγνεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ νῦν οὖσαι πόλεις ξύμμαχοι ἀδύνατοι Νάξος καὶ Κατάνη.

[¶50] 14.3. There is only one thing more wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to relieve us from our present condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow.

> Greek: 14.3. εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεται ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ᾧ τ’ ἐσμὲν καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους χωρῆσαι, διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν [ὁ πόλεμος ].

[¶51] 14.4. I might, it is true, have written to you something different and more agreeable than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is desirable for you to know the real state of things here before taking your measures. Besides I know that it is your nature to love to be told the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by the result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.

> Greek: 14.4. ‘τούτων ἐγὼ ἡδίω μὲν ἂν εἶχον ὑμῖν ἕτερα ἐπιστέλλειν, οὐ μέντοι χρησιμώτερά γε, εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι. καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον, ἤν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοῖον ἐκβῇ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡγησάμην τὸ ἀληθὲς δηλῶσαι.

[¶52] 15.1. Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers have ceased to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them. But you are to reflect that a general Sicilian coalition is being formed against us; that a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese, while the force we have here is unable to cope even with our present antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or to send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a large sum of money, and some one to succeed me, as a disease in the kidneys unfits me for retaining my post.

> Greek: 15.1. καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐφ’ ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε· ἐπειδὴ δὲ Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται καὶ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς, βουλεύεσθε ἤδη ὡς τῶν γ’ ἐνθάδε μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων, ἀλλ’ ἢ τούτους μεταπέμπειν δέον ἢ ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν καὶ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα, ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν παραμένειν.

[¶53] 15.2. I have, I think, some claim on your indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you much good service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the commencement of spring and without delay as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer interval; and unless you attend to the matter the former will be here before you, while the latter will elude you as they have done before.’

> Greek: 15.2. ἀξιῶ δ’ ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· καὶ γὰρ ὅτ’ ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα. ὅτι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε, ὡς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δι’ ὀλίγου ποριουμένων, τὰ δ’ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σχολαίτερον μέν, ὅμως δ᾽, ἢν μὴ προσέχητε τὴν γνώμην, τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται.’

[¶54] 16.1. Such were the contents of Nicias' letter. When the Athenians had heard it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the allies.

> Greek: 16.1. ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπιστολὴ τοσαῦτα ἐδήλου, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες αὐτῆς τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προσείλοντο Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον, ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροίη, στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην ἐψηφίσαντο πέμπειν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων.

[¶55] 16.2. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the army that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of them;

> Greek: 16.2. καὶ ξυνάρχοντας αὐτῷ εἵλοντο Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους. καὶ τὸν μὲν Εὐρυμέδοντα εὐθὺς περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινὰς ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ δέκα νεῶν, ἄγοντα εἴκοσι 〈καὶ ἑκατὸν〉 τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὅτι ἥξει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν ἔσται·

[¶56] 17.1. but Demosthenes stayed behind to organize the expedition, meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy infantry at home.

> Greek: 17.1. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν ἔκπλουν ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ποιησόμενος, στρατιάν τε ἐπαγγέλλων ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ χρήματα αὐτόθεν καὶ ναῦς καὶ ὁπλίτας ἑτοιμάζων.

[¶57] 17.2. The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to prevent any one crossing over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese.

> Greek: 17.2. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, ὅπως φυλάσσοιεν μηδένα ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν περαιοῦσθαι.

[¶58] 17.3. For the Corinthians, filled with confidence by the favorable alteration in Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the envoys upon their arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before sent out had not been without its use, were now preparing to despatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnese.

> Greek: 17.3. οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἧκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίω ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, καὶ ἐν ὁλκάσι παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοί τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πέμψοντες·

[¶59] 17.4. The Corinthians also named a fleet of twenty-five vessels, intending to try the result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, and meanwhile to make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder the departure of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye upon the galleys thus arrayed against them.

> Greek: 17.4. ναῦς τε οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐπλήρουν, ὅπως ναυμαχίας τε ἀποπειράσωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ φυλακήν, καὶ τὰς ὁλκάδας αὐτῶν ἧσσον οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι κωλύοιεν ἀπαίρειν, πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν ἀντίταξιν τῶν τριήρων τὴν φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι.

[¶60] 18.1. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of Attica, in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war.

> Greek: 18.1. παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον.

[¶61] 18.2. But the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen them.

> Greek: 18.2. μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο.

[¶62] 18.3. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and other places; when upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the Athenians,—the Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now committed the very same offence as they had before done, and had become the guilty party; and they began to be full of ardor for the war.

> Greek: 18.3. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐλῃστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον.

[¶63] 18.4. They spent this winter in sending round to their allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily. Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

> Greek: 18.4. καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχισμόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἅμα ὡς ἀποπέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[¶64] 19.1. In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different cities.

> Greek: 19.1. τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου πρωίτατα δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσέβαλον· ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον.

[¶65] 19.2. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the country, being in sight of Athens.

> Greek: 19.2. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ οὐ πολλῷ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ πεδίῳ καὶ τῆς χώρας τοῖς κρατίστοις ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν ᾠκοδομεῖτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως.

[¶66] 19.3. While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a picked force of Helots and Neodamodes ‘or freedmen), six hundred heavy infantry in all, under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy infantry, commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian.

> Greek: 19.3. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐτείχιζον, οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὁλκάσι τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε Εἱλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν, ξυναμφοτέρων ἐς ἑξακοσίους ὁπλίτας,καὶ Ἔκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ Ἡγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς.

[¶67] 19.4. These were among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians sent off a force of five hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth itself, and partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry at the same time as the Corinthians, under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian.

> Greek: 19.4. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Ταινάρου τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφῆκαν· μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κορίνθιοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμισθωσάμενοι Ἀρκάδων, καὶ ἄρχοντα Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον προστάξαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι διακοσίους ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ τοῖς Κορινθίοις, ὧν ἦρχε Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος.

[¶68] 19.5. Meantime the five-and-twenty vessels manned by Corinth during the winter, lay confronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the heavy infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from Peloponnese; thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned originally, which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from the merchantmen to the galleys.

> Greek: 19.5. αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ τοῦ χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι ἀνθώρμουν ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς, ἕωσπερ αὐτοῖς οὗτοι οἱ ὁπλῖται ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπῆραν· οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπληρώθησαν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὁλκάδας μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν.

[¶69] 20.1. During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with the fortification of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they sent thirty ships round Peloponnese, under Charicles, son of Apollodorus, with instructions to call at Argos and demand a force of their heavy infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At the same time they despatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll, and as many of the islanders as could be raised in the different quarters, drawing upon the other subject allies for whatever they could supply that would be of use for the war.

> Greek: 20.1. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ καὶ τοῦ ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν καὶ Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα, ᾧ εἴρητο καὶ ἐς Ἄργος ἀφικομένῳ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων [τε] ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ἀπέστελλον ἑξήκοντα μὲν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πέντε Χίαις, ὁπλίταις δὲ ἐκ καταλόγου Ἀθηναίων διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις, καὶ νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἑκασταχόθεν οἷόν τ’ ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες.

[¶70] 20.2. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail round with Charicles and to operate with him upon the coasts of Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina and there waited for the remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the Argive troops.

> Greek: 20.2. εἴρητο δ’ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ξυστρατεύεσθαι περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Αἴγιναν προσπλεύσας τοῦ στρατεύματός τε εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν.

[¶71] 21.1. In Sicily about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he had persuaded to join.

> Greek: 21.1. ἐν δὲ τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἦρος καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἧκεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο.

[¶72] 21.2. Calling the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man as many ships as possible, and try their hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in the war not unworthy of the risk.

> Greek: 21.2. καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἔφη χρῆναι πληροῦν ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν· ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατεργάσεσθαι.

[¶73] 21.3. With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the latter had not inherited their naval prowess nor would they retain it for ever; they had been landsmen even to a greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary would seem the most formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralyzing by the boldness of their attack a neighbor often not their inferior in strength, could now be used against them with as good effect by the Syracusans.

> Greek: 21.3. ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδ’ ἐκείνους πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδ’ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους ἂν [αὐτοῖς ] φαίνεσθαι· ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε προύχοντες, τῷ δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν.

[¶74] 21.4. He was convinced also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of which would far outweigh any loss that Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly urged them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea;

> Greek: 21.4. καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη τῷ τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν περιγενησομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας. ἰέναι οὖν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν.