---
title: "History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι"
author: "Thucydides"
translator: "Richard Crawley"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 5 of 42
url: https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/5/
cite: "Thucydides, tr. Richard Crawley, History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι, section 5. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/5/"
---

# History of the Peloponnesian War · Ἱστορίαι

*Thucydides, tr. Richard Crawley*

The war between Athens and Sparta, told by an Athenian general who lived through it: the funeral oration, the plague, the Melian dialogue, Sicily.

> Greek: ed. Henry Stuart Jones, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0003.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Richard Crawley, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0003.tlg001.perseus-eng6). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 5. Book I · chapters 102–126

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thucydides-peloponnesian-war/5/#p-N

[¶0] 102.1. The Lacedaemonians meanwhile finding the war against the rebels in Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon.

> Greek: 102.1. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ ἐμηκύνετο ὁ πόλεμος, ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· οἱ δ’ ἦλθον Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ.

[¶1] 102.2. The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by assault.

> Greek: 102.2. μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκίας μακρᾶς καθεστηκυίας τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο· βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἷλον τὸ χωρίον.

[¶2] 102.3. The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon them as of alien extraction, began to fear that if they remained, they might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the allies, without declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had now no need of them.

> Greek: 102.3. καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς στρατείας πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ χωρίον βίᾳ οὐχ ἡλίσκετο, δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν, καὶ ἀλλοφύλους ἅμα ἡγησάμενοι, μή τι, ἢν παραμείνωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πεισθέντες νεωτερίσωσι, μόνους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

[¶3] 102.4. But the Athenians, aware that their dismissal did not proceed from the more honorable reason of the two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of having done nothing to merit such treatment from the Lacedaemonians; and the instant that they returned home they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance with the Thessalians.

> Greek: 102.4. οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔγνωσαν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίονι λόγῳ ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλά τινος ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν, εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείοις τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη.

[¶4] 103.1. Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years' resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set foot in it again:

> Greek: 103.1. οἱ δ’ ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς· ἢν δέ τις ἁλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δοῦλον.

[¶5] 103.2. any one who might hereafter be found there was to be the slave of his captor. It must be known that the Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome.

> Greek: 103.2. ἦν δέ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἱκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἰθωμήτα ἀφιέναι.

[¶6] 103.3. So they went forth with their children and their wives, and being received by Athens from the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians.

> Greek: 103.3. ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατ’ ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατῴκισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ᾑρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων.

[¶7] 103.4. The Athenians received another addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens.

> Greek: 103.4. προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὅρων πολέμῳ κατεῖχον· καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ᾠκοδόμησαν Μεγαρεῦσι τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐς Νίσαιαν καὶ ἐφρούρουν αὐτοί. καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦδε τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἤρξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι.

[¶8] 104.1. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his head-quarters at Marea, the town above Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King Artaxerxes, and placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to his assistance.

> Greek: 104.1. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων γενόμενος Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγάγετο.

[¶9] 104.2. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon which they happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their own and their allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea into the Nile, and making themselves masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis, addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is called White Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined the rebellion.

> Greek: 104.2. οἱ δέ (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὑτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων) ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ὃ καλεῖται Λευκὸν τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν· ἐνῆσαν δὲ αὐτόθι Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποστάντες.

[¶10] 105.1. Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon Haliae, were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious.

> Greek: 105.1. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβᾶσιν ἐς Ἁλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐναυμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλείᾳ Πελοποννησίων ναυσί, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι.

[¶11] 105.2. Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens, and there was a great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and Aeginetans, each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy's ships, and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son of Stroebus.

> Greek: 105.2. πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ᾽ Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινητῶν, καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέροις παρῆσαν, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ναῦς ἑβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, Λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦντος.

[¶12] 105.3. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred heavy infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that with a large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help the Megarians without raising the siege of Aegina.

> Greek: 105.3. ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι Αἰγινήταις ἐς μὲν τὴν Αἴγιναν τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορίνθιοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἔσεσθαι Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν ἔν τε Αἰγίνῃ ἀπούσης στρατιᾶς πολλῆς καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ· ἢν δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, ἀπ’ Αἰγίνης ἀναστήσεσθαι αὐτούς.

[¶13] 105.4. But the Athenians, instead of moving the army of Aegina, raised a force of the old and young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of Myronides.

> Greek: 105.4. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος.

[¶14] 105.5. After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that they had gained the victory.

> Greek: 105.5. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ.

[¶15] 105.6. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest.

> Greek: 105.6. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον) ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν· οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι, ἡμέραις ὕστερον δώδεκα μάλιστα ἐλθόντες ἀνθίστασαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τούς τε τὸ τροπαῖον ἱστάντας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν.

[¶16] 106.1. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road, dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all round it, and no way out.

> Greek: 106.1. οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καί τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἔς του χωρίον ἰδιώτου, ᾧ ἔτυχεν ὄρυγμα μέγα περιεῖργον καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἔξοδος.

[¶17] 106.2. Being acquainted with the place, the Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry, and placing the light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its retreat home.

> Greek: 106.2. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε εἶργον τοῖς ὁπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ’ οἴκου.

[¶18] 107.1. About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea, that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus.

> Greek: 107.1. ἤρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τό τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ.

[¶19] 107.2. Meanwhile the Phocians made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the Lacedaemonians, containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, commanding for King Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of their allies. After compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions, they began their retreat.

> Greek: 107.2. καὶ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιὸν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἐρινεόν, καὶ ἑλόντων ἓν τῶν πολισμάτων τούτων, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Νικομήδους τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως νέου ὄντος ἔτι ἡγουμένου ἐβοήθησαν τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ἑαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὁμολογίᾳ ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν.

[¶20] 107.3. The route by sea, across the Crissaean gulf, exposed them to the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across Geraneia seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae. For the pass was a difficult one, and was always guarded by the Athenians; and, in the present instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that they meant to dispute their passage.

> Greek: 107.3. καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτούς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἔμελλον κωλύσειν· διὰ δὲ τῆς Γερανείας οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγὰς πορεύεσθαι. δύσοδός τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεία καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσειν.

[¶21] 107.4. So they resolved to remain in Boeotia, and to consider which would be the safest line of march. They had also another reason for this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given them by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the reign of democracy and the building of the long walls.

> Greek: 107.4. ἔδοξε δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς περιμείνασι σκέψασθαι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορεύσονται. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δῆμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα.

[¶22] 107.5. Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand Argives and the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong.

> Greek: 107.5. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὡς ἕκαστοι· ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι.

[¶23] 107.6. The march was prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss how to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to overthrow the democracy.

> Greek: 107.6. νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ διέλθωσιν ἐπεστράτευσαν αὐτοῖς, καί τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ.

[¶24] 107.7. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians during the battle.

> Greek: 107.7. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, οἳ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

[¶25] 108.1. The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both sides victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

> Greek: 108.1. γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐν Τανάγρᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολύς.

[¶26] 108.2. After entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled the walls of the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls.

> Greek: 108.2. καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἐλθόντες καὶ δενδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διὰ Γερανείας καὶ Ἰσθμοῦ· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρᾳ καὶ ἑξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ μάχῃ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Ταναγραίων τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν.

[¶27] 108.4. This was followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions; they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future.

> Greek: 108.4. ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

[¶28] 108.5. The Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon Sicyon defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

> Greek: 108.5. καὶ Πελοπόννησον περιέπλευσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων πόλιν εἷλον καὶ Σικυωνίους ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

[¶29] 109.1. Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of war.

> Greek: 109.1. οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν.

[¶30] 109.2. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the king sent Megabyzus, a Persian, to Lacedaemon with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt.

> Greek: 109.2. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους.

[¶31] 109.3. Finding that the matter made no progress, and that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt.

> Greek: 109.3. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ προυχώρει καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλοῦτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου πέμπει ἄνδρα Πέρσην μετὰ στρατιᾶς πολλῆς·

[¶32] 109.4. Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months. At last, draining the canal of its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched over on foot and captured it.

> Greek: 109.4. ὃς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τούς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξήλασε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλῃσε καὶ ἐπολιόρκει ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ἓξ μῆνας, μέχρι οὗ ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλῃ τὸ ὕδωρ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς νήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἤπειρον, καὶ διαβὰς εἷλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ.

[¶33] 110.1. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished.

> Greek: 110.1. οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἓξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα· καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλοντο.

[¶34] 110.2. And thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the king, except Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyptians.

> Greek: 110.2. Αἴγυπτος δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλὴν Ἀμυρταίου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως· τοῦτον δὲ διὰ μέγεθός τε τοῦ ἕλους οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, καὶ ἅμα μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ἕλειοι.

[¶35] 110.3. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified.

> Greek: 110.3. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Λιβύων βασιλεύς, ὃς τὰ πάντα ἔπραξε περὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς ἀνεσταυρώθη.

[¶36] 110.4. Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy, most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being saved by retreat.

> Greek: 110.4. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ξυμμαχίδος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔσχον κατὰ τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας, οὐκ εἰδότες τῶν γεγονότων οὐδέν· καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε γῆς ἐπιπεσόντες πεζοὶ καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης Φοινίκων ναυτικὸν διέφθειραν τὰς πολλὰς τῶν νεῶν, αἱ δ’ ἐλάσσους διέφυγον πάλιν.

[¶37] 110.5. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

> Greek: 110.5. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[¶38] 111.1. Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected anything.

> Greek: 111.1. ἐκ δὲ Θεσσαλίας Ὀρέστης ὁ Ἐχεκρατίδου υἱὸς τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως φεύγων ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν· καὶ παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ὄντας ξυμμάχους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον. καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον), τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ εἷλον, οὐδ’ ἄλλο προυχώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχοντες ἄπρακτοι.

[¶39] 111.2. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was now theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the Achaeans, and sailing across, marched against and laid siege to Oeniadae in Acarnania.

> Greek: 111.2. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον χίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς ἐπιβάντες (εἶχον δ’ αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγάς) παρέπλευσαν ἐς Σικυῶνα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἀποβάντες Σικυωνίων τοὺς προσμείξαντας μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

[¶40] 111.3. Failing however to take it, they returned home. Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years.

> Greek: 111.3. καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἷλόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου. ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπονδαὶ γίγνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις.

[¶41] 112.2. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon.

> Greek: 112.2. καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὑτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος.

[¶42] 112.3. Sixty of these were detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions.

> Greek: 112.3. καὶ ἑξήκοντα μὲν νῆες ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἔπλευσαν, Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν.

[¶43] 112.4. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and being victorious on both elements departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt.

> Greek: 112.4. Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὑπὲρ Σαλαμῖνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίοις καὶ Κίλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεζομάχησαν ἅμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου καὶ αἱ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου νῆες πάλιν [αἱ] ἐλθοῦσαι μετ’ αὐτῶν.

[¶44] 112.5. After this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and becoming masters of the temple at Delphi, placed it in the hands of the Delphians. Immediately after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple, and placed it in the hands of the Phocians.

> Greek: 112.5. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς· καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.

[¶45] 113.1. Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia, being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians marched against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made slaves of the inhabitants, and leaving a garrison, commenced their return.

> Greek: 113.1. καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὁπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες.

[¶46] 113.2. On their road they were attacked at Coronaea, by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and others who were of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some killed, others taken captive.

> Greek: 113.2. πορευομένοις δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Λοκροὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον.

[¶47] 113.3. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty providing for the recovery of the men;

> Greek: 113.3. καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ’ ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται.

[¶48] 113.4. and the exiled Boeotians returned, and with all the rest regained their independence.

> Greek: 113.4. καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

[¶49] 114.1. This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens. Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to the island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the exception of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in all haste from Euboea.

> Greek: 114.1. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον Εὔβοια ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους στρατιᾷ Ἀθηναίων ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ φρουροὶ Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρέων, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐς Νίσαιαν ἀπέφυγον· ἐπαγαγόμενοι δὲ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρῆς. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας.

[¶50] 114.2. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further returned home.

> Greek: 114.2. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε ἐσβαλόντες ἐδῄωσαν Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγουμένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου.

[¶51] 114.3. The Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans they expelled from their homes, and occupied their territory themselves.

> Greek: 114.3. καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον.

[¶52] 115.1. Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the posts which they occupied in Peloponnese, Nisaea Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia.

> Greek: 115.1. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ’ Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων.

[¶53] 115.2. In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints against the Samians. In this they were joined by certain private persons from Samos itself, who wished to revolutionize the government.

> Greek: 115.2. ἕκτῳ δὲ ἔτει Σαμίοις καὶ Μιλησίοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης, καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐλασσούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ’ Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν.

[¶54] 115.3. Accordingly the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy; took hostages from the Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in the island returned home.

> Greek: 115.3. πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἴσους δὲ ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆμνον, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν.

[¶55] 115.4. But some of the Samians had not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent. Making an agreement with the most powerful of those in the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed over to Samos.

> Greek: 115.4. τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἳ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ’ ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ξυνθέμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ Πισσούθνῃ τῷ Ὑστάσπου ξυμμαχίαν, ὃς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε ξυλλέξαντες ἐς ἑπτακοσίους διέβησαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐκκλέψαντες ἐκ Λήμνου τοὺς αὑτῶν ἀπέστησαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας οἳ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισσούθνῃ, ἐπί τε Μίλητον εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύειν.

[¶56] 115.5. Their first step was to rise on the commons, most of whom they secured, their next to steal their hostages from Lemnos; after which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison left with them and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them. As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under the command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were transports, as they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with the Athenians.

> Greek: 115.5. ξυναπέστησαν δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ᾔσθοντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἑκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο (ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν), τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγίᾳ τῇ νήσῳ Σαμίων ναυσὶν ἑβδομήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ εἴκοσι στρατιώτιδες (ἔτυχον δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ Μιλήτου πλέουσαι), καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι.

[¶57] 116.2. Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five Chian and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the superiority by land invested the city with three walls; it was also invested from the sea.

> Greek: 116.2. ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα.

[¶58] 116.3. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence having been brought in of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to the aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and others had left the island with five ships to bring them.

> Greek: 116.3. Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν ᾤχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν· ᾤχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Στησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.

[¶59] 117.1. But in the meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on the camp, which they found unfortified. Destroying the look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating such as were being launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own seas for fourteen days, and carried in and carried out what they pleased.

> Greek: 117.1. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμιοι ἐξαπιναίως ἔκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τάς τε προφυλακίδας ναῦς διέφθειραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἡμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα, καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἃ ἐβούλοντο.

[¶60] 117.2. But on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh reinforcements afterwards arrived—forty ships from Athens with Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels from Chios and Lesbos.

> Greek: 117.2. ἐλθόντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλῄσθησαν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὕστερον προσεβοήθησαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ἅγνωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆες, εἴκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τληπολέμου καὶ Ἀντικλέους, ἐκ δὲ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου τριάκοντα.

[¶61] 117.3. After a brief attempt at fighting, the Samians, unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine months' siege, and surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls, gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the expenses of the war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.

> Greek: 117.3. καὶ ναυμαχίαν μέν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι. ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπήκοοι εἶναι.

[¶62] 118.1. After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the events that served as a pretext for the present war.

> Greek: 118.1. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε Κερκυραϊκὰ καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικὰ καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη.

[¶63] 118.2. All these actions of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the present war.

> Greek: 118.2. ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου· ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ᾔρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἢν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.

[¶64] 118.3. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god whether it would be well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether invoked or uninvoked.

> Greek: 118.3. αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται· ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος.

[¶65] 119.1. Still they wished to summon their allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come too late to save Potidaea; they were present also on this occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:— ‘Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but have assembled us here for that purpose.

> Greek: 119.1. αὖθις δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐβούλοντο ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ ξυνόδου γενομένης οἵ τε ἄλλοι εἶπον ἃ ἐβούλοντο, κατηγοροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀξιοῦντες γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρότερον ἑκάστων ἰδίᾳ ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδιότες περὶ τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ μὴ προδιαφθαρῇ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ τελευταῖοι ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

[¶66] 120.1. We say their duty, for supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common welfare in return for the special honors accorded to them by all in other ways.

> Greek: 120.1. ‘τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι αἰτιασαίμεθα ὡς οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐψηφισμένοι τὸν πόλεμόν εἰσι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς τοῦτο νῦν ξυνήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰ ἴδια ἐξ ἴσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται.

[¶67] 120.2. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The states more inland and out of the highway of communication should understand that if they omit to support the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply involved in this discussion.

> Greek: 120.2. ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοι μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἐνηλλάγησαν οὐχὶ διδαχῆς δέονται ὥστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς· τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατῳκημένους εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἢν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἕξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὡραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὧν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἠπείρῳ δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέχεσθαι δέ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόοιντο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ αὑτῶν οὐχ ἧσσον νῦν βουλεύεσθαι.

[¶68] 120.3. For these reasons they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured, returning to an understanding on a favorable opportunity: in fact, they are neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to take an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace.

> Greek: 120.3. δι’ ὅπερ καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ’ εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μέν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικουμένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παρασχὸν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ μήτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίᾳ ἐπαίρεσθαι μήτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι.

[¶69] 120.4. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose to which you cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions from success in war is to forget how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated.

> Greek: 120.4. ὅ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν τάχιστ’ ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη τῆς ῥᾳστώνης τὸ τερπνὸν δι’ ὅπερ ὀκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὅ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχίᾳ πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται θράσει ἀπίστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος.

[¶70] 120.5. For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes failure.

> Greek: 120.5. πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη· ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοῖα τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δέους δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

[¶71] 121.1. To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is under the pressure of injury, and with adequate grounds of complaint; and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist.

> Greek: 121.1. ‘ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνώμεθα Ἀθηναίους, καταθησόμεθα αὐτὸν ἐν καιρῷ.

[¶72] 121.2. We have many reasons to expect success,—first, superiority in numbers and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the monies at Olympia and Delphi.

> Greek: 121.2. κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας, ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων·

[¶73] 121.3. A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money.

> Greek: 121.3. δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ’ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία· ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν.

[¶74] 121.4. A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be removed by our practice.

> Greek: 121.4. μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται· εἰ δ’ ἀντίσχοιεν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε εὐψυχίᾳ δήπου περιεσόμεθα. ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ· ὃ δ’ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμῃ προύχουσι, καθαιρετὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτῃ.

[¶75] 121.5. The money required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity, and see employed for our own ruin.

> Greek: 121.5. χρήματα δὲ ὥστε ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἴσομεν· ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅμα σῴζεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.

[¶76] 122.1. We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster.

> Greek: 122.1. ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὖσα τῶν προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἄν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον· ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ’ ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει.

[¶77] 122.2. Let us also reflect that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbors, it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens, that is a match for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members; so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and simple;

> Greek: 122.2. ‘ἐνθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἑκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἱ διαφοραί, οἰστὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντάς τε ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι ἱκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἔτι δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἁθρόοι καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἕκαστον ἄστυ μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀμυνούμεθα αὐτούς, δίχα γε ὄντας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἧσσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινόν τῳ ἀκοῦσαι, ἴστω οὐκ ἄλλο τι φέρουσαν ἢ ἄντικρυς δουλείαν·

[¶78] 122.3. a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down sole rulers.

> Greek: 122.3. ὃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθῆναι αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάσδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν ᾧ ἢ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐῶμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ’ ἐν μιᾷ μονάρχους ἀξιοῦμεν καταλύειν.

[¶79] 122.4. And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances,—a feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called, not contemptuous but contemptible.

> Greek: 122.4. καὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπήλλακται, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἣ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται.

[¶80] 123.1. There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty. No, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part from interest.

> Greek: 123.1. τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τί δεῖ μακρότερον ἢ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ξυμφέρει αἰτιᾶσθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν (πάτριον γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι), καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἄρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ ὀλίγον προφέρετε (οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτήθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι), ἀλλὰ θαρσοῦντας ἰέναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρήσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης ξυναγωνιουμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὠφελίᾳ.

[¶81] 123.2. You will not be the first to break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by resistance but by aggression.

> Greek: 123.2. σπονδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ἅς γε καὶ ὁ θεὸς κελεύων πολεμεῖν νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ἠδικημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε· λύουσι γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀμυνόμενοι, ἀλλ’ οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες.

[¶82] 124.1. Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals. Delay not, therefore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves, like disaster in the near future for the rest.

> Greek: 124.1. ‘ὥστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῇ τάδε παραινούντων, εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδεάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὖσι Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένοις, οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοὐναντίον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἤδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽, εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μέν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες, μὴ πολὺ ὕστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν·

[¶83] 124.2. Delay not, fellow allies, but convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded. Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger.

> Greek: 124.2. ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες· ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιοῦται, ἀφ’ ἡσυχίας δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνον.

[¶84] 124.3. We must believe that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes who are now enslaved.’Such were the words of the Corinthians.

> Greek: 124.3. καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι,παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν.’ τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον.

[¶85] 125.1. The Lacedaemonians having now heard all give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for war.

> Greek: 125.1. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἀφ’ ἁπάντων ἤκουσαν γνώμην, ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἅπασιν ὅσοι παρῆσαν ἑξῆς, καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει· καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν.

[¶86] 125.2. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.

> Greek: 125.2. δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ ἐδόκει ἑκάστοις ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέλλησιν. ὅμως δὲ καθισταμένοις ὧν ἔδει ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δέ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄρασθαι φανερῶς.

[¶87] 126.1. This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them.

> Greek: 126.1. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσιν.

[¶88] 126.2. The first Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess; the history of which is as follows.

> Greek: 126.2. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἄγος ἦν τοιόνδε.

[¶89] 126.3. In former generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara.

> Greek: 126.3. Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατός, ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως ἀνδρός, ὃς κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει Μεγάρων.

[¶90] 126.4. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus.

> Greek: 126.4. χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν.

[¶91] 126.5. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant, thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games.

> Greek: 126.5. ὁ δὲ παρά τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναπείσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐπῆλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, νομίσας ἑορτήν τε τοῦ Διὸς μεγίστην εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ τι προσήκειν Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότι.

[¶92] 126.6. Whether the grand festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz. the Diasia. It is celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt.

> Greek: 126.6. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἡ μεγίστη ἑορτὴ εἴρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις Διάσια ἃ καλεῖται Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶ θύουσι πολλὰ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλ’ 〈ἁγνὰ〉 θύματα ἐπιχώρια), δοκῶν δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ.

[¶93] 126.7. As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel.

> Greek: 126.7. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθησάν τε πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐπολιόρκουν.

[¶94] 126.8. But as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political functions were discharged by the nine archons.

> Greek: 126.8. χρόνου δὲ ἐγγιγνομένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν· τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον.