---
title: "Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα"
author: "Xenophon"
translator: "Edgar Carew Marchant"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 10 of 12
url: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/10/
cite: "Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant, Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα, section 10. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/10/"
---

# Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα

*Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant*

Recollections of Socrates by one of the young men who followed him.

> Greek: ed. Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0032.tlg002, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0032.tlg002.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 10. Book IV · chapters 1–2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/10/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/10/#p-N

[¶0] 1.1. Socrates was so useful in all circumstances and in all ways, that any observer gifted with ordinary perception can see that nothing was more useful than the companionship of Socrates, and time spent with him in any place and in any circumstances. The very recollection of him in absence brought no small good to his constant companions and followers; for even in his light moods they gained no less from his society than when he was serious.

> Greek: 1.1. οὕτω δὲ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντὶ πράγματι καὶ πάντα τρόπον ὠφέλιμος, ὥστε τῷ σκοπουμένῳ τοῦτο καὶ [εἰ] μετρίως αἰσθανομένῳ φανερὸν εἶναι ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελιμώτερον ἦν τοῦ Σωκράτει συνεῖναι καὶ μετʼ ἐκείνου διατρίβειν ὁπουοῦν καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν πράγματι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι μὴ παρόντος οὐ μικρὰ ὠφέλει τοὺς εἰωθότας τε αὐτῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκεῖνον. καὶ γὰρ παίζων οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ σπουδάζων ἐλυσιτέλει τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι.

[¶1] 1.2. Thus he would often say he was “in love”; but clearly his heart was set not on those who were fair to outward view, but on those whose souls excelled in goodness. These excellent beings he recognised by their quickness to learn whatever subject they studied, ability to remember what they learned, and desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and estate and tactful dealing with men and the affairs of men. For education would make such beings not only happy in themselves, and successful in the management of their households, but capable of conferring happiness on their fellow-men and on states alike. His method of approach varied.

> Greek: 1.2. πολλάκις γὰρ ἔφη μὲν ἄν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερὸς δʼ ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὥραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος. ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ [ἂν] μάθοιεν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων διʼ ὧν ἔστιν οἶκόν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτούς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν.

[¶2] 1.3. To those who thought themselves possessed of natural endowments and despised learning, he explained that the greater the natural gifts, the greater is the need of education; pointing out that thoroughbreds by their spirit and mettle develop into serviceable and splendid creatures, if they are broken in as colts, but if unbroken, prove intractable and sorry jades; and high-bred puppies, keen workers and good tacklers of game, make first-rate hounds and useful dogs, if well trained, but, if untrained, turn out stupid, crazy, disobedient brutes. It is the same with human beings.

> Greek: 1.3. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐπὶ πάντας ᾔει, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἰομένους φύσει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, μαθήσεως δὲ καταφρονοῦντας ἐδίδασκεν ὅτι αἱ ἄρισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται, ἐπιδεικνύων τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας, εἰ μὲν ἐκ νέων δαμασθεῖεν, εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους γιγνομένους, εἰ δὲ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιντο, δυσκαθεκτοτάτους καὶ φαυλοτάτους· καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς θήρας καὶ χρησιμωτάτας, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας ματαίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας.

[¶3] 1.4. The most highly gifted, the youths of ardent soul, capable of doing whatever they attempt, if educated and taught their duty grow into excellent and useful men; for manifold and great are their good deeds. But untrained and untaught, these same become utterly evil and mischievous; for without knowledge to discern their duty, they often put their hand to vile deeds, and through the very grandeur and vehemence of their nature, they are uncontrollable and intractable: therefore manifold and great are their evil deeds.

> Greek: 1.4. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας καὶ ἐξεργαστικωτάτους ὧν ἂν ἐγχειρῶσι, παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· πλεῖστα γὰρ καὶ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζεσθαι· ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· κρίνειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπισταμένους ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, πολλάκις πονηροῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι, μεγαλείους δὲ καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας δυσκαθέκτους τε καὶ δυσαποτρέπτους εἶναι, διʼ ὃ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι.

[¶4] 1.5. Those who prided themselves on riches and thought they had no need of education, supposing that their wealth would suffice them for gaining the objects of their wishes and winning honour among men, he admonished thus. Only a fool, he said, can think it possible to distinguish between things useful and things harmful without learning: only a fool can think that without distinguishing these he will get all he wants by means of his wealth and be able to do what is expedient: only a simpleton can think that without the power to do what is expedient he is doing well and has made good or sufficient provision for his life: only a simpleton can think that by his wealth alone without knowledge he will be reputed good at something, or will enjoy a good reputation without being reputed good at anything in particular.

> Greek: 1.5. τοὺς δʼ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας καὶ νομίζοντας οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι παιδείας, ἐξαρκέσειν δὲ σφίσι τὸν πλοῦτον οἰομένους πρὸς τὸ διαπράττεσθαί τε ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐφρένου λέγων ὅτι μῶρος μὲν εἴη, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ μαθὼν τά τε ὠφέλιμα καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ τῶν πραγμάτων διαγνώσεσθαι, μῶρος δʼ, εἴ τις μὴ διαγιγνώσκων μὲν ταῦτα, διὰ δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν βούληται ποριζόμενος οἴεται δυνήσεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν, ἠλίθιος δʼ, εἴ τις μὴ δυνάμενος τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν εὖ τε πράττειν οἴεται καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον αὐτῷ [ἢ] καλῶς ἢ ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἠλίθιος δὲ καὶ εἴ τις οἴεται διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, δόξειν τι ἀγαθὸς εἶναι ἤ, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι δοκῶν, εὐδοκιμήσειν.

[¶5] 2.1. I will now show his method of dealing with those who thought they had received the best education, and prided themselves on wisdom. He was informed that Euthydemus, the handsome, had formed a large collection of the works of celebrated poets and professors, and therefore supposed himself to be a prodigy of wisdom for his age, and was confident of surpassing all competitors in power of speech and action. At present, Socrates observed, he did not enter the Market-place owing to his youth, but when he wanted to get anything done, he would be found sitting in a saddler’s shop near the Market. So, to make an opening, Socrates went to this shop with some of his companions. At the first visit, one of them asked:

> Greek: 2.1. τοῖς δὲ νομίζουσι παιδείας τε τῆς ἀρίστης τετυχηκέναι καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ὡς προσεφέρετο νῦν διηγήσομαι. καταμαθὼν γὰρ Εὐθύδημον τὸν καλὸν γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τε νομίζοντα διαφέρειν τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐν σοφίᾳ καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα πάντων διοίσειν τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν, πρῶτον μέν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτὸν διὰ νεότητα οὔπω εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσιόντα, εἰ δέ τι βούλοιτο διαπράξασθαι, καθίζοντα εἰς ἡνιοποιεῖόν τι τῶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ᾔει τῶν μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ τινας ἔχων.

[¶6] 2.2. Was it by constant intercourse with some wise man or by natural ability that Themistocles stood out among his fellow-citizens as the man to whom the people naturally looked when they felt the want of a great leader? In order to set Euthydemus thinking, Socrates said: If in the minor arts great achievement is impossible without competent masters, surely it is absurd to imagine that the art of statesmanship, the greatest of all accomplishments, comes to a man of its own accord.

> Greek: 2.2. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πυνθανομένου τινὸς πότερον Θεμιστοκλῆς διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν ἢ φύσει τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλέπειν τὴν πόλιν, ὁπότε σπουδαίου ἀνδρὸς δεηθείη, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδημον εὔηθες ἔφη εἶναι τὸ οἴεσθαι τὰς μὲν ὀλίγου ἀξίας τέχνας μὴ γίγνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνευ διδασκάλων ἱκανῶν, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἔργων μέγιστον ὄν, ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

[¶7] 2.3. Some time afterwards, meeting Euthydemus again, he saw that he was reluctant to join the circle and anxious not to betray any admiration for the wisdom of Socrates: Well, gentlemen, said he, when our friend Euthydemus has attained his full powers, and some question of policy is before the Assembly, he won’t be backward in offering advice: that is obvious from his behaviour. I fancy he has prepared a noble exordium to his addresses, with due care not to give the impression that he is indebted to anyone for his knowledge. No doubt he will begin his speech with this introduction:

> Greek: 2.3. πάλιν δέ ποτε παρόντος τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἀποχωροῦντα τῆς συνεδρίας καὶ φυλαττόμενον μὴ δόξῃ τὸν Σωκράτην θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὅτι μέν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Εὐθύδημος οὑτοσὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, τῆς πόλεως λόγον περί τινος προτιθείσης, οὐκ ἀφέξεται τοῦ συμβουλεύειν, εὔδηλον ἐξ ὧν ἐπιτηδεύει· δοκεῖ δέ μοι καλὸν προοίμιον τῶν δημηγοριῶν παρασκευάσασθαι φυλαττόμενος μὴ δόξῃ μανθάνειν τι παρά του. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι λέγειν ἀρχόμενος ὧδε προοιμιάσεται·

[¶8] 2.4. Men of Athens, I have never yet learnt anything from anyone, nor when I have been told of any man’s ability in speech and in action, have I sought to meet him, nor have I been at pains to find a teacher among the men who know. On the contrary, I have constantly avoided learning anything of anyone, and even the appearance of it. Nevertheless I shall recommend to your consideration anything that comes into my head.

> Greek: 2.4. “παρʼ οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν ἔμαθον, οὐδʼ ἀκούων τινὰς εἶναι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ἱκανοὺς ἐζήτησα τούτοις ἐντυχεῖν, οὐδʼ ἐπεμελήθην τοῦ διδάσκαλόν τινά μοι γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀναντία· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φεύγων οὐ μόνον τὸ μανθάνειν τι παρά τινος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαι. ὅμως δὲ ὅ τι ἂν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐπίῃ μοι συμβουλεύσω ὑμῖν.”

[¶9] 2.5. This exordium might be adapted so as to suit candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain: Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians, and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless I ask you to appoint me to the office of a physician, and I will endeavour to learn by experimenting on you. The exordium set all the company laughing.

> Greek: 2.5. ἁρμόσειε δʼ ἂν οὕτω προοιμιάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἰατρικὸν ἔργον λαβεῖν· ἐπιτήδειόν γʼ ἂν αὐτοῖς εἴη τοῦ λόγου ἄρχεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν· “παρʼ οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην ἔμαθον, οὐδʼ ἐζήτησα διδάσκαλον ἐμαυτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν ἰατρῶν οὐδένα· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φυλαττόμενος οὐ μόνον τὸ μαθεῖν τι παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαι μεμαθηκέναι τὴν τέχνην ταύτην. ὅμως δέ μοι τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἔργον δότε· πειράσομαι γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μανθάνειν.” πάντες οὖν οἱ παρόντες ἐγέλασαν ἐπὶ τῷ προοιμίῳ.

[¶10] 2.6. Now when it became evident that Socrates had gained the attention of Euthydemus, but that Euthydemus still avoided breaking silence himself, and thought that he assumed an air of prudence by remaining dumb, Socrates wanted to put an end to that affectation. How strange it is, he said, that those who want to play the harp or the flute, or to ride or to get skill in any similar accomplishment, work hard at the art they mean to master, and not by themselves but under the tuition of the most eminent professors, doing and bearing anything in their anxiety to do nothing without their teachers’ guidance, just because that is the only way to become proficient: and yet, among those who want to shine as speakers in the Assembly and as statesmen, there are some who think that they will be able to do so on a sudden, by instinct, without training or study.

> Greek: 2.6. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἤδη μὲν οἷς ὁ Σωκράτης λέγοι προσέχων, ἔτι δὲ φυλαττόμενος αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι καὶ νομίζων τῇ σιωπῇ σωφροσύνης δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι, τότε ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος αὐτὸν παῦσαι τούτου, θαυμαστὸν γάρ, ἔφη, τί ποτε οἱ βουλόμενοι κιθαρίζειν ἢ αὐλεῖν ἢ ἱππεύειν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι πειρῶνται ὡς συνεχέστατα ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται δυνατοὶ γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ καθʼ ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάντα ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑπομένοντες ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀξιόλογοι γενόμενοι· τῶν δὲ βουλομένων δυνατῶν γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ νομίζουσί τινες ἄνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας αὐτόματοι ἐξαίφνης δυνατοὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔσεσθαι.

[¶11] 2.7. Yet surely these arts are much the harder to learn; for many more are interested in them and far fewer succeed. Clearly then these arts demand a longer and more intense application than the others.

> Greek: 2.7. καίτοι γε τοσούτῳ ταῦτα ἐκείνων δυσκατεργαστότερα φαίνεται, ὅσῳπερ πλειόνων περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένων ἐλάττους οἱ κατεργαζόμενοι γίγνονται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἐπιμελείας δέονται πλείονος καὶ ἰσχυροτέρας οἱ τούτων ἐφιέμενοι ἢ οἱ ἐκείνων.

[¶12] 2.8. For a time, then, Socrates continued to talk in this strain, while Euthydemus listened. But on finding him more tolerant of his conversation and more attentive, Socrates went alone to the saddler’s; and when Euthydemus had taken a seat beside him, he said: Tell me, Euthydemus, am I rightly informed that you have a large collection of books written by the wise men of the past, as they are called? By Zeus, yes, Socrates, answered he, and I am still adding to it, to make it as complete as possible.

> Greek: 2.8. κατʼ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκούοντος Εὐθυδήμου τοιούτους λόγους ἔλεγε Σωκράτης· ὡς δʼ ᾔσθετο αὐτὸν ἑτοιμότερον ὑπομένοντα, ὅτε διαλέγοιτο, καὶ προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ἡνιοποιεῖον, παρακαθεζομένου δʼ αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, πολλὰ γράμματα συνῆχας τῶν λεγομένων σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γεγονέναι; καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, νὴ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἔτι γε συνάγω, ἕως ἂν κτήσωμαι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι πλεῖστα.

[¶13] 2.9. By Hera, retorted Socrates, I do admire you for valuing the treasures of wisdom above gold and silver. For you are evidently of opinion that, while gold and silver cannot make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue. Now Euthydemus was glad to hear this, for he guessed that in the opinion of Socrates he was on the road to wisdom.

> Greek: 2.9. νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄγαμαί γέ σου, διότι οὐκ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου προείλου θησαυροὺς κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ σοφίας· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι νομίζεις ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον οὐδὲν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἀρετῇ πλουτίζειν τοὺς κεκτημένους. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔχαιρεν ἀκούων ταῦτα, νομίζων δοκεῖν τῷ Σωκράτει ὀρθῶς μετιέναι τὴν σοφίαν. ὁ δὲ καταμαθὼν αὐτὸν ἡσθέντα τῷ ἐπαίνῳ τούτῳ, τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγεις τὰ γράμματα;

[¶14] 2.10. But Socrates, aware that he was pleased with his approbation, went on to say: Tell me, Euthydemus, what kind of goodness do you want to get by collecting these books? And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give, Possibly you want to be a doctor? he guessed: Medical treatises alone make a large collection. Oh no, not at all. But perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well-stored mind for that too. No, indeed I don’t. Well, perhaps you want to be a good mathematician, like Theodorus? No, not that either. Well, perhaps you want to be an astronomer? And as he again said no, Perhaps a rhapsodist, then? They tell me you have a complete copy of Homer. Oh no, not at all; for your rhapsodists, I know, are consummate as reciters, but they are very silly fellows themselves. Then Socrates exclaimed:

> Greek: 2.10. ἐπεὶ δὲ διεσιώπησεν ὁ Εὐθύδημος σκοπῶν ὅ τι ἀποκρίναιτο, πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἆρα μὴ ἰατρός; ἔφη· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐστι συγγράμματα. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι; γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ. οὔκουν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴ γεωμέτρης ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἔφη, γενέσθαι ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεόδωρος; οὐδὲ γεωμέτρης, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀστρολόγος, ἔφη, βούλει γενέσθαι; ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἠρνεῖτο, ἀλλὰ μὴ ῥαψῳδός; ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τὰ Ὁμήρου σέ φασιν ἔπη πάντα κεκτῆσθαι. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη· τοὺς γάρ τοι ῥαψῳδοὺς οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας.

[¶15] 2.11. Surely, Euthydemus, you don’t covet the kind of excellence that makes good statesmen and managers, competent rulers and benefactors of themselves and mankind in general? Yes, I do, Socrates, answered Euthydemus, that kind of excellence I greatly desire. Why, cried Socrates, it is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet, for it belongs to kings and is dubbed “kingly.” However, he added, have you reflected whether it be possible to excel in these matters without being a just man? Yes, certainly; and it is, in fact, impossible to be a good citizen without justice.

> Greek: 2.11. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· οὐ δήπου, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφίεσαι, διʼ ἣν ἄνθρωποι πολιτικοὶ γίγνονται καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ ἄρχειν ἱκανοὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, σφόδρα γʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς δέομαι. νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγίστης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης· ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη καὶ καλεῖται βασιλική. ἀτάρ, ἔφη, κατανενόηκας, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα γενέσθαι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι.

[¶16] 2.12. Then tell me, have you got that? Yes, Socrates, I think I can show myself to be as just as any man. And have just men, like carpenters, their works? Yes, they have. And as carpenters can point out their works, should just men be able to rehearse theirs? Do you suppose, retorted Euthydemus, that I am unable to rehearse the works of justice? Of course I can, — and the works of injustice too, since there are many opportunities of seeing and hearing of them every day.

> Greek: 2.12. τί οὖν; ἔφη, σὺ δὴ τοῦτο κατείργασαι; οἶμαί γʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἧττον φανῆναι δίκαιος. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, τῶν δικαίων ἐστὶν ἔργα ὥσπερ τῶν τεκτόνων; ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες ἔχουσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ἐπιδεῖξαι, οὕτως οἱ δίκαιοι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχοιεν ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι; μὴ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ἔγωγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα ἔστι καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τοιαῦτα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν.

[¶17] 2.13. I propose, then, that we write J in this column and I in that, and then proceed to place under these letters, J and I, what we take to be the works of justice and injustice respectively. Do so, if you think it helps at all. Having written down the letters as he proposed, Socrates went on:

> Greek: 2.13. βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, γράψωμεν ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν δέλτα, ἐνταυθοῖ δὲ ἄλφα, εἶτα ὅ τι μὲν ἂν δοκῇ ἡμῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργον εἶναι, πρὸς τὸ δέλτα τιθῶμεν, ὅ τι δʼ ἂν τῆς ἀδικίας, πρὸς τὸ ἄλφα; εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, προσδεῖν τούτων, ποίει ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης γράψας ὥσπερ εἶπεν, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ψεύδεσθαι;

[¶18] 2.14. Lying occurs among men, does it not? Yes, it does. Under which heading, then, are we to put that? Under the heading of injustice, clearly. Deceit, too, is found, is it not? Certainly. Under which heading will that go? Under injustice again, of course. What about doing mischief? That too. Selling into slavery? That too. Then we shall assign none of these things to justice, Euthydemus? No, it would be monstrous to do so.

> Greek: 2.14. ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. ποτέρωσε οὖν, ἔφη, θῶμεν τοῦτο; δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν ἔστι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. τοῦτο οὖν ποτέρωσε θῶμεν; καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. τί δὲ τὸ κακουργεῖν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι; καὶ τοῦτο. πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων κείσεται, ὦ Εὐθύδημε;

[¶19] 2.15. Now suppose a man who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, shall we say that he acts unjustly? Oh no! We shall say that his actions are just, shall we not? Certainly. And what if he deceives the enemy when at war? That too is just. And if he steals and plunders their goods, will not his actions be just? Certainly; but at first I assumed that your questions had reference only to friends. Then everything that we assigned to injustice should be assigned to justice also? Apparently.

> Greek: 2.15. δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη. τί δʼ; ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὰν πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσηται, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἀδικεῖν; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. δίκαια δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ φήσομεν; καὶ μάλα. τί δʼ; ἐὰν ἐξαπατᾷ πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; δίκαιον, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. ἐὰν δὲ κλέπτῃ τε καὶ ἁρπάζῃ τὰ τούτων, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σε τὸ πρῶτον ὑπελάμβανον πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μόνον ταῦτα ἐρωτᾶν. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἂν εἴη;

[¶20] 2.16. Then I propose to revise our classification, and to say: It is just to do such things to enemies, but it is unjust to do them to friends, towards whom one’s conduct should be scrupulously honest. By all means.

> Greek: 2.16. ἔοικεν, ἔφη. βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω θέντες διορισώμεθα πάλιν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ἄδικον, ἀλλὰ δεῖν πρός γε τούτους ὡς ἁπλούστατον εἶναι;

[¶21] 2.17. Now suppose that a general, seeing that his army is downhearted, tells a lie and says that reinforcements are approaching, and by means of this lie checks discouragement among the men, under which heading shall we put this deception? Under justice, I think. Suppose, again, that a man’s son refuses to take a dose of medicine when he needs it, and the father induces him to take it by pretending that it is food, and cures him by means of this lie, where shall we put this deception? That too goes on the same side, I think. And again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression, and, for fear that he may make away with himself, one takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading shall we put that now? That too goes under justice, of course.

> Greek: 2.17. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. τί οὖν; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς ὁρῶν ἀθύμως ἔχον τὸ στράτευμα ψευσάμενος φήσῃ συμμάχους προσιέναι καὶ τῷ ψεύδει τούτῳ παύσῃ τῆς ἀθυμίας τοὺς στρατιώτας, ποτέρωθι τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην θήσομεν; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐὰν δέ τις υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ δεόμενον φαρμακείας καὶ μὴ προσιέμενον φάρμακον ἐξαπατήσας ὡς σιτίον τὸ φάρμακον δῷ καὶ τῷ ψεύδει χρησάμενος οὕτως ὑγιᾶ ποιήσῃ, ταύτην αὖ τὴν ἀπάτην ποῖ θετέον; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὸ αὐτό. τί δʼ; ἐάν τις, ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ὄντος φίλου, δείσας μὴ διαχρήσηται ἑαυτόν, κλέψῃ ἢ ἁρπάσῃ ἢ ξίφος ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, τοῦτο αὖ ποτέρωσε θετέον; καὶ τοῦτο νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

[¶22] 2.18. You mean, do you, that even with friends straightforward dealing is not invariably right? It isn’t, indeed! I retract what I said before, if you will let me. Why, I’m bound to let you; it’s far better than getting our lists wrong.

> Greek: 2.18. λέγεις, ἔφη, σὺ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἅπαντα δεῖν ἁπλοίζεσθαι; μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ μετατίθεμαι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ἔξεστι. δεῖ γέ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξεῖναι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς τιθέναι.

[¶23] 2.19. But now, consider deception practised on friends to their detriment: we mustn’t overlook that either. Which is the more unjust deception in that case, the intentional or unintentional? Nay, Socrates, I have lost all confidence in my answers; for all the opinions that I expressed before seem now to have taken an entirely different form. Still I venture to say that the intentional deception is more unjust than the unintentional.

> Greek: 2.19. τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπὶ βλάβῃ, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλίπωμεν ἄσκεπτον, πότερος ἀδικώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ ἑκὼν ἢ ὁ ἄκων; ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μὲν ἔγωγε πιστεύω οἷς ἀποκρίνομαι· καὶ γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν πάντα νῦν ἄλλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ μοι, ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ τότε ᾤμην· ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι ἀδικώτερον εἶναι τὸν ἑκόντα ψευδόμενον τοῦ ἄκοντος.

[¶24] 2.20. Do you think there is a doctrine and science of the just, as there is of letters? Yes. Which, in your judgment, is the more literate, the man who intentionally blunders in writing and reading, or the man who blunders unintentionally? The one who blunders intentionally, I presume; for he can always be accurate when he chooses. May we not say, then, that the intentional blunderer is literate and the unintentional is illiterate? Indeed we must. And which knows what is just, the intentional liar and deceiver, or the unintentional? The intentional, clearly. You say, then, as I understand, that he who knows letters is more literate than he who is ignorant of them? YesAnd he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know? Apparently; but here again I don’t feel sure of my own meaning.

> Greek: 2.20. δοκεῖ δέ σοι μάθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι ὥσπερ τῶν γραμμάτων; ἔμοιγε. πότερον δὲ γραμματικώτερον κρίνεις, ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράφῃ καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ ἢ ὃς ἂν ἄκων; ὃς ἂν ἑκών, ἔγωγε· δύναιτο γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὰ ποιεῖν. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράφων γραμματικὸς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ ἄκων ἀγράμματος; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τὰ δίκαια δὲ πότερον ὁ ἑκὼν ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐξαπατῶν οἶδεν ἢ ὁ ἄκων; δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἑκών. οὐκοῦν γραμματικώτερον μὲν τὸν ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου φῂς εἶναι; ναί. δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου; φαίνομαι· δοκῶ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως λέγειν.

[¶25] 2.21. Now come, what do you think of the man who wants to tell the truth, but never sticks to what he says; when he shows you the way, tells you first that the road runs east, then that it runs west; and when he casts up figures, makes the total now larger, now smaller? Why, I think he shows that he doesn’t know what he thought he knew.

> Greek: 2.21. τί δὲ δή, ὃς ἂν βουλόμενος τἀληθῆ λέγειν μηδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγῃ, ἀλλʼ ὁδόν τε φράζων τὴν αὐτὴν τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἕω, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς ἑσπέραν φράζῃ, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενος τὸν αὐτὸν τοτὲ μὲν πλείω, τοτὲ δʼ ἐλάττω ἀποφαίνηται, τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; δῆλος νὴ Δίʼ εἶναι ὅτι ἃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ οἶδεν.

[¶26] 2.22. Are you aware that some people are called slavish? Yes. To what do they owe the name, to knowledge or to ignorance? To ignorance, obviously. To ignorance of the smiths’ trade, shall we say? Certainly not. Ignorance of carpentry perhaps? No, not to that either. Of cobbling? No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish. Then is this name given to those who are ignorant of the beautiful and good and just? That is my opinion.

> Greek: 2.22. οἶσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδώδεις καλουμένους; ἔγωγε. πότερον διὰ σοφίαν ἢ διʼ ἀμαθίαν; δῆλον ὅτι διʼ ἀμαθίαν. ἆρʼ οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύειν ἀμαθίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν; οὐ δῆτα. ἀλλʼ ἄρα διὰ τὴν τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι; οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτην. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σκυτεύειν; οὐδὲ διʼ ἓν τούτων, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον· οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι τῶν γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπισταμένων ἀνδραποδώδεις εἰσίν. ἆρʼ οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδότων τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτʼ ἐστίν;

[¶27] 2.23. Then we must strain every nerve to escape being slaves. Upon my word, Socrates, I did feel confident that I was a student of a philosophy that would provide me with the best education in all things needful to one who would be a gentleman. But you can imagine my dismay when I realise that in spite of all my pains I am even incapable of answering a question about things that one is bound to know, and yet find no other way that will lead to my improvement. Hereupon Socrates exclaimed:

> Greek: 2.23. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ διατειναμένους φεύγειν ὅπως μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὦμεν. ἀλλὰ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ ᾤμην φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν διʼ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ἐνόμιζον παιδευθῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἀνδρὶ καλοκαγαθίας ὀρεγομένῳ· νῦν δὲ πῶς οἴει με ἀθύμως ἔχειν, ὁρῶντα ἐμαυτὸν διὰ μὲν τὰ προπεπονημένα οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα χρὴ εἰδέναι, ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα ἣν ἂν πορευόμενος βελτίων γενοίμην;

[¶28] 2.24. Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi? Yes, certainly; twice. Then did you notice somewhere on the temple the inscription “Know thyself”? I did. And did you pay no heed to the inscription, or did you attend to it and try to consider who you were? Indeed I did not; because I felt sure that I knew that already; for I could hardly know anything else if I did not even know myself.

> Greek: 2.24. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· εἰς Δελφοὺς δὲ ἤδη πώποτε ἀφίκου; καὶ δίς γε νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη. κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅστις εἴης; μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνυ τοῦτό γε ᾤμην εἰδέναι· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ᾔδειν, εἴ γε μηδʼ ἐμαυτὸν ἐγίγνωσκον.

[¶29] 2.25. And what do you suppose a man must know to know himself, his own name merely? Or must he consider what sort of a creature he is for human use and get to know his own powers; just as those who buy horses don’t think that they know the beast they want to know until they have considered whether he is docile or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, and generally how he stands in all that makes a useful or a useless horse? That leads me to think that he who does not know his own powers is ignorant of himself.

> Greek: 2.25. πότερα δέ σοι δοκεῖ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, ὅστις τοὔνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον οἶδεν, ἢ ὅστις, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἵππους ὠνούμενοι οὐ πρότερον οἴονται γιγνώσκειν ὃν ἂν βούλωνται γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωνται πότερον εὐπειθής ἐστιν ἢ δυσπειθής, καὶ πότερον ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ἀσθενής, καὶ πότερον ταχὺς ἢ βραδύς, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἵππου χρείαν ἐπιτήδειά τε καὶ ἀνεπιτήδεια ὅπως ἔχει, οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν; οὕτως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν.

[¶30] 2.26. Is it not clear too that through self-knowledge men come to much good, and through self-deception to much harm? For those who know themselves, know what things are expedient for themselves and discern their own powers and limitations. And by doing what they understand, they get what they want and prosper: by refraining from attempting what they do not understand, they make no mistakes and avoid failure. And consequently through their power of testing other men too, and through their intercourse with others, they get what is good and shun what is bad.

> Greek: 2.26. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ φανερόν, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὸ εἰδέναι ἑαυτοὺς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πάσχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν πλεῖστα κακά; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδότες ἑαυτοὺς τά τε ἐπιτήδεια ἑαυτοῖς ἴσασι καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσιν ἅ τε δύνανται καὶ ἃ μή· καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες πορίζονταί τε ὧν δέονται καὶ εὖ πράττουσιν, ὧν δὲ μὴ ἐπίστανται ἀπεχόμενοι ἀναμάρτητοι γίγνονται καὶ διαφεύγουσι τὸ κακῶς πράττειν· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους δυνάμενοι δοκιμάζειν καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων χρείας τά τε ἀγαθὰ πορίζονται καὶ τὰ κακὰ φυλάττονται.

[¶31] 2.27. Those who do not know and are deceived in their estimate of their own powers, are in the like condition with regard to other men and other human affairs. They know neither what they want, nor what they do, nor those with whom they have intercourse; but mistaken in all these respects, they miss the good and stumble into the bad.

> Greek: 2.27. οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες, ἀλλὰ διεψευσμένοι τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως, πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τἆλλα ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα ὁμοίως διάκεινται, καὶ οὔτε ὧν δέονται ἴσασιν οὔτε ὅ τι πράττουσιν οὔτε οἷς χρῶνται, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων διαμαρτάνοντες τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀποτυγχάνουσι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι.

[¶32] 2.28. Furthermore, those who know what they do win fame and honour by attaining their ends. Their equals are glad to have dealings with them; and those who miss their objects look to them for counsel, look to them for protection, rest on them their hopes of better things, and for all these reasons love them above all other men.

> Greek: 2.28. καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὅ τι ποιοῦσιν, ἐπιτυγχάνοντες ὧν πράττουσιν, εὔδοξοί τε καὶ τίμιοι γίγνονται· καὶ οἵ τε ὅμοιοι τούτοις ἡδέως χρῶνται, οἵ τε ἀποτυγχάνοντες τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσι τούτους ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ προΐστασθαί γε αὑτῶν τούτους, καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα πάντων μάλιστα τούτους ἀγαπῶσιν.

[¶33] 2.29. But those who know not what they do, choose amiss, fail in what they attempt and, besides incurring direct loss and punishment thereby, they earn contempt through their failures, make themselves ridiculous and live in dishonour and humiliation. And the same is true of communities. You find that whenever a state, in ignorance of its own power, goes to war with a stronger people, it is exterminated or loses its liberty.

> Greek: 2.29. οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδότες ὅ τι ποιοῦσι, κακῶς τε αἱρούμενοι καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν ἀποτυγχάνοντες, οὐ μόνον ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ζημιοῦνταί τε καὶ κολάζονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδοξοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα καὶ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται καὶ καταφρονούμενοι καὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι ζῶσιν. ὁρᾷς δὲ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ὅσαι ἂν ἀγνοήσασαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν κρείττοσι πολεμήσωσιν, αἱ μὲν ἀνάστατοι γίγνονται, αἱ δʼ ἐξ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλαι.

[¶34] 2.30. Socrates, answered Euthydemus, you may rest assured that I fully appreciate the importance of knowing oneself. But where should the process of self-examination begin? I look to you for a statement, please.

> Greek: 2.30. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον εἶναι τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν, οὕτως ἴσθι· ὁπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι ἐθελήσαις ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

[¶35] 2.31. Well, said Socrates, I may assume, I take it, that you know what things are good and what are evil? Of course, for if I don’t know so much as that, I must be worse than a slave. Come then, state them for my benefit. Well, that’s a simple matter. First health in itself is, I suppose, a good, sickness an evil. Next the various causes of these two conditions — meat, drink, habits — are good or evil according as they promote health or sickness.

> Greek: 2.31. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὁποῖά ἐστι πάντως που γιγνώσκεις; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ταῦτα οἶδα, καὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἂν εἴην. ἴθι δή, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐξήγησαι αὐτά. ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν κακόν· ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν καὶ ποτὰ καὶ βρωτὰ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν φέροντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν κακά.

[¶36] 2.32. Then health and sickness too must be good when their effect is good, and evil when it is evil. But when can health possibly be the cause of evil, or sickness of good? Why, in many cases; for instance, a disastrous campaign or a fatal voyage: the able-bodied who go are lost, the weaklings who stay behind are saved. True; but you see, in the successful adventures too the able-bodied take part, the weaklings are left behind. Then since these bodily conditions sometimes lead to profit, and sometimes to loss, are they any more good than evil? No, certainly not; at least so it appears from the argument.

> Greek: 2.32. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθὰ ἂν εἴη, ὅταν δὲ κακοῦ, κακά. πότε δʼ ἄν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν κακοῦ αἴτιον γένοιτο, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν ἀγαθοῦ; ὅταν νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχρᾶς καὶ ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλωνται, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἀσθένειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὠφελίμων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἀσθένειαν ἀπολείπονται. ταῦτα οὖν, ἔφη, ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελοῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα, μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά ἐστιν; οὐδὲν μὰ Δία φαίνεται κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

[¶37] 2.33. But wisdom now, Socrates, — that at any rate is indisputably a good thing; for what is there that a wise man would not do better than a fool? Indeed! have you not heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom, and was forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country and his liberty, and essaying to escape with his son, lost the boy and could not save himself, but was carried off to the barbarians and again lived as a slave there? That is the story, of course. And have you not heard the story of Palamedes? Surely, for all the poets sing of him, how that he was envied for his wisdom and done to death by Odysseus. Another well-known tale! And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on account of their wisdom, and haled off to the great King’s court, and live in slavery there?

> Greek: 2.33. ἀλλʼ ἥ γέ τοι σοφία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθόν ἐστι· ποῖον γὰρ ἄν τις πρᾶγμα οὐ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφὸς ὢν ἢ ἀμαθής; τί δέ; τὸν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μίνω διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἠναγκάζετο ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τόν τε παῖδα ἀπώλεσε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδυνήθη σωθῆναι, ἀλλʼ ἀπενεχθεὶς εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους πάλιν ἐκεῖ ἐδούλευε; λέγεται νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, ταῦτα. τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται. λέγεται καὶ ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἴει διὰ σοφίαν ἀνασπάστους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύειν;

[¶38] 2.34. Happiness seems to be unquestionably a good, Socrates. It would be so, Euthydemus, were it not made up of goods that are questionable. But what element in happiness can be called in question? None, provided we don’t include in it beauty or strength or wealth or glory or anything of the sort. But of course we shall do that. For how can anyone be happy without them?

> Greek: 2.34. κινδυνεύει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφιλογώτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. εἴ γε μή τις αὐτό, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐξ ἀμφιλόγων ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη. τί δʼ ἄν, ἔφη, τῶν εὐδαιμονικῶν ἀμφίλογον εἴη; οὐδέν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν ἢ καί τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία προσθήσομεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἄνευ τούτων εὐδαιμονοίη;

[¶39] 2.35. Then of course we shall include the sources of much trouble to mankind. For many are ruined by admirers whose heads are turned at the sight of a pretty face; many are led by their strength to attempt tasks too heavy for them, and meet with serious evils: many by their wealth are corrupted, and fall victims to conspiracies; many through glory and political power have suffered great evils.

> Greek: 2.35. νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ἄρα, ἐξ ὧν πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ κάλλος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὡραίοις παρακεκινηκότων διαφθείρονται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν μείζοσιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντες οὐ μικροῖς κακοῖς περιπίπτουσι, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι ἀπόλλυνται, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ δόξαν καὶ πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μεγάλα κακὰ πεπόνθασιν.

[¶40] 2.36. Well now, if I am at fault in praising even happiness, I confess I know not what one should ask for in one’s prayers. But perhaps you never even thought about these things, because you felt so confident that you knew them. However, as the state you are preparing yourself to direct is governed by the people, no doubt you know what popular government is? I think so, certainly.

> Greek: 2.36. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γε μηδὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὀρθῶς λέγω, ὁμολογῶ μηδʼ ὅ τι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὔχεσθαι χρὴ εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι οὐδʼ ἔσκεψαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης παρασκευάζῃ προεστάναι, δῆλον ὅτι δημοκρατίαν γε οἶσθα τί ἐστι.

[¶41] 2.37. Then do you suppose it possible to know popular government without knowing the people? Indeed I don’t. And do you know, then, what the people consists of? I think so. Of what do you suppose it to consist? The poorer classes, I presume. You know the poor, then? Of course I do. And you know the rich too? Yes, just as well as the poor. What kind of men do you call poor and rich respectively? The poor, I imagine, are those who have not enough to pay for what they want; the rich those who have more than enough.

> Greek: 2.37. πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δυνατὸν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδότα δῆμον; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔμοιγε. καὶ δῆμον ἄρʼ οἶσθα τί ἐστιν; οἶμαι ἔγωγε. καὶ τί νομίζεις δῆμον εἶναι; τοὺς πένητας τῶν πολιτῶν ἔγωγε. καὶ τοὺς πένητας ἄρα οἶσθα; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους οἶσθα; οὐδέν γε ἧττον ἢ καὶ τοὺς πένητας. ποίους δὲ πένητας καὶ ποίους πλουσίους καλεῖς; τοὺς μέν, οἶμαι, μὴ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντας εἰς ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν πένητας, τοὺς δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν πλουσίους.

[¶42] 2.38. Have you observed, then, that some who have very little not only find it enough, but even manage to save out of it, whereas others cannot live within their means, however large? Yes, certainly — thanks for reminding me — I know, in fact, of some despots even who are driven to crime by poverty, just like paupers.

> Greek: 2.38. καταμεμάθηκας οὖν ὅτι ἐνίοις μὲν πάνυ ὀλίγα ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρκεῖ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιοῦνται ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ οὐχ ἱκανά ἐστι; καὶ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὀρθῶς γάρ με ἀναμιμνῄσκεις, οἶδα [γὰρ] καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἳ διʼ ἔνδειαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν.