2.39. Therefore, if that is so, we will include despots in the people, and men of small means, if they are thrifty, in the rich.I am forced to agree once more, cried Euthydemus, evidently by my stupidity. I am inclined to think I had better hold my tongue, or I shall know nothing at all presently. And so he went away very dejected, disgusted with himself and convinced that he was indeed a slave.
2.39. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐὰν οἰκονομικοὶ ὦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔφη· ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι.
2.40. Now many of those who were brought to this pass by Socrates, never went near him again and were regarded by him as mere blockheads. But Euthydemus guessed that he would never be of much account unless he spent as much time as possible with Socrates. Henceforward, unless obliged to absent himself, he never left him, and even began to adopt some of his practices. Socrates, for his part, seeing how it was with him, avoided worrying him, and began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge that he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent.
2.40. πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῇσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακοτέρους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη· ἔνια δὲ καὶ ἐμιμεῖτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν. ὁ δʼ, ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν διετάραττεν, ἁπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.
3.1. Skill in speaking and efficiency in affairs, therefore, and ingenuity, were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence. For he believed that those faculties, unless accompanied by prudence, increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief.
3.1. τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικοὺς καὶ μηχανικοὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τούτων ᾤετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι. τοὺς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.
3.2. In the first place, then, he tried to make his companions prudent towards the gods. Accordingly he discoursed on this topic at various times, as those who were present used to relate. The following conversation between him and Euthydemus I heard myself.
3.2. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλους οὕτως ὁμιλοῦντι παραγενόμενοι διηγοῦντο· ἐγὼ δέ, ὅτε πρὸς Εὐθύδημον τοιάδε διελέγετο, παρεγενόμην.
3.3. Tell me, Euthydemus, he began, has it ever occurred to you to reflect on the care the gods have taken to furnish man with what he needs? No, indeed it has not, replied Euthydemus. Well, no doubt you know that our first and foremost need is light, which is supplied to us by the gods? Of course; since without light our eyes would be as useless as if we were blind. And again, we need rest; and therefore the gods grant us the welcome respite of night. Yes, for that too we owe them thanks.
3.3. εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη ποτέ σοι ἐπῆλθεν ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὡς ἐπιμελῶς οἱ θεοὶ ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δέονται κατεσκευάκασι; καὶ ὅς, μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλʼ οἶσθά γʼ, ἔφη, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν φωτὸς δεόμεθα, ὃ ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ παρέχουσι; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, ὅ γʼ εἰ μὴ εἴχομεν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς τυφλοῖς ἂν ἦμεν ἕνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀναπαύσεώς γε δεομένοις ἡμῖν νύκτα παρέχουσι κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον.
3.4. And since the night by reason of her darkness is dim, whereas the sun by his brightness illuminates the hours of the day and all things else, have they not made stars to shine in the night, that mark the watches of night for us, and do we not thereby satisfy many of our needs? That is so. Moreover, the moon reveals to us not only the divisions of the night, but of the month too. Certainly.
3.4. πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο χάριτος ἄξιον. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἥλιος φωτεινὸς ὢν τάς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας ἡμῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα σαφηνίζει, ἡ δὲ νὺξ διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὴ εἶναι ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστίν, ἄστρα ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἀνέφηναν, ἃ ἡμῖν τῆς νυκτὸς τὰς ὥρας ἐμφανίζει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ ὧν δεόμεθα πράττομεν; ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε σελήνη οὐ μόνον τῆς νυκτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ μέρη φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιεῖ.
3.5. Now, seeing that we need food, think how they make the earth to yield it, and provide to that end appropriate seasons which furnish in abundance the diverse things that minister not only to our wants but to our enjoyment. Truly these things too show loving-kindness.
3.5. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τὸ δʼ, ἐπεὶ τροφῆς δεόμεθα, ταύτην ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναδιδόναι καὶ ὥρας ἁρμοττούσας πρὸς τοῦτο παρέχειν, αἳ ἡμῖν οὐ μόνον ὧν δεόμεθα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα παρασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς εὐφραινόμεθα;
3.6. Think again of their precious gift of water, that aids the earth and the seasons to give birth and increase to all things useful to us and itself helps to nourish our bodies, and mingling with all that sustains us, makes it more digestible, more wholesome, and more palatable: and how, because we need so much of it, they supply it without stint. That too shows design at work.
3.6. πάνυ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα φιλάνθρωπα. τὸ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἡμῖν παρέχειν οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξιον, ὥστε συμφύειν τε καὶ συναύξειν τῇ γῇ καὶ ταῖς ὥραις πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα ἡμῖν, συντρέφειν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς καὶ μιγνύμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς εὐκατεργαστότερά τε καὶ ὠφελιμώτερα καὶ ἡδίω ποιεῖν αὐτά, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλείστου δεόμεθα τούτου, ἀφθονέστατον αὐτὸ παρέχειν ἡμῖν; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, προνοητικόν.
3.7. Think again of the blessing of fire, our defence against cold and against darkness, our helpmate in every art and all that man contrives for his service. In fact, to put it shortly, nothing of any account that is useful to the life of man is contrived without the aid of fire. This too is a signal token of loving-kindness.
3.7. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ πορίσαι ἡμῖν, ἐπίκουρον μὲν ψύχους, ἐπίκουρον δὲ σκότους, συνεργὸν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ πάντα ὅσα ὠφελείας ἕνεκα ἄνθρωποι κατασκευάζονται; ὡς γὰρ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἀξιόλογον ἄνευ πυρὸς ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον χρησίμων κατασκευάζονται. ὑπερβάλλει, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο φιλανθρωπίᾳ.
3.8. Think again how the sun, when past the winter solstice, approaches, ripening some things and withering others, whose time is over; and having accomplished this, approaches no nearer, but turns away, careful not to harm us by excess of heat; and when once again in his retreat he reaches the point where it is clear to ourselves, that if he goes further away, we shall be frozen with the cold, back he turns once more and draws near and revolves in that region of the heavens where he can best serve us. Yes, verily, these things do seem to be done for the sake of mankind.
3.8. τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπειδὰν ἐν χειμῶνι τράπηται, προσιέναι τὰ μὲν ἁδρύνοντα, τὰ δὲ ξηραίνοντα, ὧν καιρὸς διελήλυθε, καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενον μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω προσιέναι, ἀλλʼ ἀποτρέπεσθαι φυλαττόμενον μή τι ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων βλάψῃ, καὶ ὅταν αὖ πάλιν ἀπιὼν γένηται ἔνθα καὶ ἡμῖν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι, εἰ προσωτέρω ἄπεισιν, ἀποπαγησόμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ ψύχους, πάλιν αὖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ προσχωρεῖν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἔνθα ὢν μάλιστʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ ἡμᾶς ὠφελοίη; νὴ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἔοικεν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γιγνομένοις.
3.9. And again, since it is evident that we could not endure the heat or the cold if it came suddenly, the sun’s approach and retreat are so gradual that we arrive at the one or the other extreme imperceptibly. For myself, exclaimed Euthydemus, I begin to doubt whether after all the gods are occupied in any other work than the service of man. The one difficulty I feel is that the lower animals also enjoy these blessings.
3.9. τὸ δʼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ὑπενέγκαιμεν οὔτε τὸ καῦμα οὔτε τὸ ψῦχος, εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο, οὕτω μὲν κατὰ μικρὸν προσιέναι τὸν ἥλιον, οὕτω δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπιέναι, ὥστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἑκάτερα τὰ ἰσχυρότατα καθισταμένους; ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἤδη τοῦτο σκοπῶ, εἰ ἄρα τί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτι καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα τούτων μετέχει.
3.10. Yes, replied Socrates, and is it not evident that they too receive life and food for the sake of man? For what creature reaps so many benefits as man from goats and sheep and horses and oxen and asses and the other animals? He owes more to them, in my opinion, than to the fruits of the earth. At the least they are not less valuable to him for food and commerce; in fact a large portion of mankind does not use the products of the earth for food, but lives on the milk and cheese and flesh they get from live stock. Moreover, all men tame and domesticate the useful kinds of animals, and make them their fellow-workers in war and many other undertakings. There too I agree with you, seeing that animals far stronger than man become so entirely subject to him that he puts them to any use he chooses.
3.10. οὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀνατρέφεται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ζῷον αἰγῶν τε καὶ οἰῶν καὶ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὄνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύει ὅσα ἄνθρωποι; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, πλείω ⟨ἢ⟩ τῶν φυτῶν· τρέφονται γοῦν καὶ χρηματίζονται οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ ἀπʼ ἐκείνων· πολὺ δὲ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένοις εἰς τροφὴν οὐ χρῆται, ἀπὸ δὲ βοσκημάτων γάλακτι καὶ τυρῷ καὶ κρέασι τρεφόμενοι ζῶσι· πάντες δὲ τιθασεύοντες καὶ δαμάζοντες τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζῴων εἴς τε πόλεμον καὶ εἰς ἄλλα πολλὰ συνεργοῖς χρῶνται. ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι καὶ τοῦτʼ, ἔφη· ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἰσχυρότερα ἡμῶν οὕτως ὑποχείρια γιγνόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται.
3.11. Think again of the multitude of things beautiful and useful and their infinite variety, and how the gods have endowed man with senses adapted for the perception of every kind, so that there is nothing good that we cannot enjoy; and again, how they have implanted in us the faculty of reasoning, whereby we are able to reason about the objects of our perceptions and to commit them to memory, and so come to know what advantage every kind can yield, and devise many means of enjoying the good and driving away the bad;
3.11. τὸ δʼ, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, διαφέροντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐστί, προσθεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰσθήσεις ἁρμοττούσας πρὸς ἕκαστα, διʼ ὧν ἀπολαύομεν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τὸ δὲ καὶ λογισμὸν ἡμῖν ἐμφῦσαι, ᾧ περὶ ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα λογιζόμενοί τε καὶ μνημονεύοντες καταμανθάνομεν ὅπῃ ἕκαστα συμφέρει, καὶ πολλὰ μηχανώμεθα, διʼ ὧν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύομεν καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἀλεξόμεθα·
3.12. and think of the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them, to enact laws and to administer states. Truly, Socrates, it does appear that the gods devote much care to man. Yet again, in so far as we are powerless of ourselves to foresee what is expedient for the future, the gods lend us their aid, revealing the issues by divination to inquirers, and teaching them how to obtain the best results. With you, Socrates, they seem to deal even more friendly than with other men, if it is true that, even unasked, they warn you by signs what to do and what not to do.
3.12. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, διʼ ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδίδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα; παντάπασιν ἐοίκασιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ θεοὶ πολλὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ καί, ᾗ ἀδυνατοῦμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων, ταύτῃ αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν συνεργεῖν, διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα καὶ διδάσκοντας ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο; σοὶ δʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μή.
3.13. Yes, and you will realise the truth of what I say if, instead of waiting for the gods to appear to you in bodily presence, you are content to praise and worship them because you see their works. Mark that the gods themselves give the reason for doing so; for when they bestow on us their good gifts, not one of them ever appears before us gift in hand; and especially he who co-ordinates and holds together the universe, wherein all things are fair and good, and presents them ever unimpaired and sound and ageless for our use, and quicker than thought to serve us unerringly, is manifest in his supreme works, and yet is unseen by us in the ordering of them.
3.13. ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλʼ ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς. ἐννόει δὲ ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν· οἵ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ διδόντες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασι, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι, καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῆ τε καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ ἀγήρατα παρέχων, θᾶττον δὲ νοήματος ὑπηρετοῦντα ἀναμαρτήτως, οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.
3.14. Mark that even the sun, who seems to reveal himself to all, permits not man to behold him closely, but if any attempts to gaze recklessly upon him, blinds their eyes. And the gods’ ministers too you will find to be invisible. That the thunderbolt is hurled from heaven, and that he overwhelms all on whom he falls, is evident, but he is seen neither coming nor striking nor going. And the winds are themselves invisible, yet their deeds are manifest to us, and we perceive their approach. Moreover, the soul of man, which more than all else that is human partakes of the divine, reigns manifestly within us, and yet is itself unseen. For these reasons it behoves us not to despise the things that are unseen, but, realising their power in their manifestations, to honour the godhead.
3.14. ἐννόει δʼ ὅτι καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι Ἥλιος οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλʼ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεάσασθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας δὲ τῶν θεῶν εὑρήσεις ἀφανεῖς ὄντας· κεραυνός τε γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ἄνωθεν ἀφίεται, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι οἷς ἂν ἐντύχῃ πάντων κρατεῖ, ὁρᾶται δʼ οὔτʼ ἐπιὼν οὔτʼ ἐγκατασκήψας οὔτε ἀπιών· καὶ ἄνεμοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐχ ὁρῶνται, ἃ δὲ ποιοῦσι φανερὰ ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ προσιόντων αὐτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἥ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδʼ αὐτή. ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.
3.15. Socrates, replied Euthydemus, that I will in no wise be heedless of the godhead I know of a surety. But my heart fails me when I think that no man can ever render due thanks to the gods for their benefits.
3.15. ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἀμελήσω τοῦ δαιμονίου, σαφῶς οἶδα· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀθυμῶ, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὰς τῶν θεῶν εὐεργεσίας οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι.
3.16. Nay, be not down-hearted, Euthydemus; for you know that to the inquiry, How am I to please the gods? the Delphic god replies, Follow the custom of the state; and everywhere, I suppose, it is the custom that men propitiate the gods with sacrifices according to their power. How then can a man honour the gods more excellently and more devoutly than by doing as they themselves ordain?
3.16. ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται· νόμῳ πόλεως· νόμος δὲ δήπου πανταχοῦ ἐστι κατὰ δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεοὺς ἀρέσκεσθαι. πῶς οὖν ἄν τις κάλλιον καὶ εὐσεβέστερον τιμῴη θεοὺς ἤ, ὡς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν;
3.17. Only he must fall no whit short of his power. For when he does that, it is surely plain that he is not then honouring the gods. Therefore it is by coming no whit short of his power in honouring the gods that he is to look with confidence for the greatest blessing. For there are none from whom a man of prudence would hope for greater things than those who can confer the greatest benefits, nor can he show his prudence more clearly than by pleasing them. And how can he please them better than by obeying them strictly?
3.17. ἀλλὰ χρὴ τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως μηδὲν ὑφίεσθαι· ὅταν γάρ τις τοῦτο ποιῇ, φανερὸς δήπου ἐστὶ τότε οὐ τιμῶν θεούς. χρὴ οὖν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. οὐ γὰρ παρʼ ἄλλων γʼ ἄν τις μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοίη ἢ παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδʼ ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τούτοις ἀρέσκοι· ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς;
3.18. Thus by precept and by example alike he strove to increase in his companions Piety and Prudence.
3.18. τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων τε καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν εὐσεβεστέρους τε καὶ σωφρονεστέρους τοὺς συνόντας παρεσκεύαζεν.
4.1. Again, concerning Justice he did not hide his opinion, but proclaimed it by his actions. All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all. When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself.
4.1. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἣν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο, ἰδίᾳ τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καὶ ὠφελίμως χρώμενος καὶ κοινῇ ἄρχουσί τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι προστάττοιεν πειθόμενος καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν, καὶ ὅτε ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος οὐκ ἐπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῖς νόμοις ἠναντιώθη τοιαύτῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ δήμου ἣν οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον ὑπομεῖναι·
4.3. And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal.
4.3. καὶ ὅτε οἱ τριάκοντα προσέταττον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τι, οὐκ ἐπείθετο· τοῖς τε γὰρ νέοις ἀπαγορευόντων αὐτῶν μὴ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ προσταξάντων ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαγεῖν τινα ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, μόνος οὐκ ἐπείσθη, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτῷ προστάττεσθαι·
4.4. Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favour with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favourable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather than to live through violating them.
4.4. καὶ ὅτε τὴν ὑπὸ Μελήτου γραφὴν ἔφευγε, τῶν ἄλλων εἰωθότων ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις πρὸς χάριν τε τοῖς δικασταῖς διαλέγεσθαι καὶ κολακεύειν καὶ δεῖσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἀφιεμένων, ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.
4.5. Such views frequently found expression in his conversations with different persons; I recollect the substance of one that he had with Hippias of Elis concerning Justice. Hippias, who had not been in Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or riding, you know where to send him to learn the craft: some indeed declare that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn Justice yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to go for a teacher.
4.5. καὶ ἔλεγε δὲ οὕτως καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους μὲν πολλάκις, οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα. διὰ χρόνου γὰρ ἀφικόμενος ὁ Ἱππίας Ἀθήναζε παρεγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι πρός τινας, ὡς θαυμαστὸν εἴη τό, εἰ μέν τις βούλοιτο σκυτέα διδάξασθαί τινα ἢ τέκτονα ἢ χαλκέα ἢ ἱππέα, μὴ ἀπορεῖν ὅποι ἂν πέμψας τούτου τύχοι, [φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίους ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδαξόντων·] ἐὰν δέ τις βούληται ἢ αὐτὸς μαθεῖν τὸ δίκαιον ἢ υἱὸν ἢ οἰκέτην διδάξασθαι, μὴ εἰδέναι ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼν τύχοι τούτου.
4.6. When Hippias heard this, How now? he cried in a tone of raillery, still the same old sentiments, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago? Yes, Hippias, he replied, always the same, and — what is more astonishing — on the same topics too! You are so learned that I daresay you never say the same thing on the same subjects.I certainly try to say something fresh every time. Do you mean, about what you know?
4.6. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἱππίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν, ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃ δέ γε τούτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δʼ ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.
4.7. For example, in answer to the question, How many letters are there in “Socrates” and how do you spell it? do you try to say something different now from what you said before? Or take figures: suppose you are asked if twice five are ten, don’t you give the same answer now as you gave before? About letters and figures, Socrates, I always say the same thing, just like you. As for Justice, I feel confident that I can now say that which neither you nor anyone else can contradict.
4.7. ἀμέλει, ἔφη, πειρῶμαι καινόν τι λέγειν ἀεί. πότερον, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπίστασαι; οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων ἐάν τις ἔρηταί σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἐστίν, ἄλλα μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλα δὲ νῦν πειρᾷ λέγειν; ἢ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ τὰ δὶς πέντε δέκα ἐστίν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἀποκρίνει; περὶ μὲν τούτων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σύ, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μέντοι τοῦ δικαίου πάνυ οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε σὺ οὔτʼ ἂν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναιτʼ ἀντειπεῖν.
4.8. Upon my word, you mean to say that you have made a great discovery, if jurymen are to cease from voting different ways, citizens from disputing and litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their claims, cities from quarrelling about their rights and making war; and for my part, I don’t see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about your great discovery.
4.8. νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν ηὑρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δʼ οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζοντες, παύσονται δʼ αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως ἂν ἀπολειφθείην σου πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τηλικοῦτον ἀγαθὸν ηὑρηκότος.
4.9. But I vow you shall not hear unless you first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it’s enough that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about anything. Indeed, Hippias!
4.9. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσῃ, πρίν γʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφήνῃ, ὅ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δʼ οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός.
4.10. Haven’t you noticed that I never cease to declare my notions of what is just? And how can you call that an account? I declare them by my deeds, anyhow, if not by my words. Don’t you think that deeds are better evidence than words? Yes, much better, of course; for many say what is just and do what is unjust; but no one who does what is just can be unjust.
4.10. τί δέ, ὦ Ἱππία; ἔφη, οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἃ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμενος; καὶ ποῖος δή σοι, ἔφη, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λόγῳ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον εἶναι; πολύ γε νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη· δίκαια μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες πολλοὶ ἄδικα ποιοῦσι, δίκαια δὲ πράττων οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἄδικος εἴη.
4.11. Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act? I have not. To abstain from what is unjust is just, don’t you think? Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavouring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do.
4.11. ᾔσθησαι οὖν πώποτέ μου ἢ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος ἢ συκοφαντοῦντος ἢ φίλους ἢ πόλιν εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἄδικον πράττοντος; οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἡγῇ; δῆλος εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, ὅ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἃ πράττουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ἀλλʼ ἃ μὴ πράττουσι, ταῦτα λέγεις.
4.12. Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was sufficient proof of Justice. But, if you don’t think so, see whether you like this better: I say that what is lawful is just. Do you mean, Socrates, that lawful and just are the same thing? I do.
4.12. ἀλλʼ ᾤμην ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖν ἱκανὸν δικαιοσύνης ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι. εἰ δέ σοι μὴ δοκεῖ, σκέψαι ἐὰν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκῃ· φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι. ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι;
4.13. Because I don’t see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just. Does the expression “laws of a state” convey a meaning to you? It does. And what do you think they are? Covenants made by the citizens whereby they have enacted what ought to be done and what ought to be avoided. Then would not that citizen who acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he who transgresses them act unlawfully? Yes, certainly. And would not he who obeys them do what is just, and he who disobeys them do what is unjust? Certainly. Then would not he who does what is just be just, and he who does what is unjust be unjust? Of course. Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts unlawfully is unjust.
4.13. ἔγωγε, ἔφη. οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαί σου ὁποῖον νόμιμον ἢ ποῖον δίκαιον λέγεις. νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γιγνώσκεις; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. καὶ τίνας τούτους νομίζεις; ἃ οἱ πολῖται, ἔφη, συνθέμενοι ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις πειθόμενος, ἄδικα δʼ ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια πράττων δίκαιος, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικος; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὁ μὲν ἄρα νόμιμος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄνομος ἄδικος.
4.14. Laws, said Hippias, can hardly be thought of much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them often reject and amend them. Yes, said Socrates, and after going to war, cities often make peace again. To be sure. Then is there any difference, do you think, between belittling those who obey the laws on the ground that the laws may be annulled, and blaming those who behave well in the wars on the ground that peace may be made? Or do you really censure those who are eager to help their fatherland in the wars? No, of course not.
4.14. καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, νόμους δʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὕς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; καὶ γὰρ πόλεμον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλάκις ἀράμεναι πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται. καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. διάφορον οὖν τι οἴει ποιεῖν, ἔφη, τοὺς τοῖς νόμοις πειθομένους φαυλίζων, ὅτι καταλυθεῖεν ἂν οἱ νόμοι, ἢ εἰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις εὐτακτοῦντας ψέγοις, ὅτι γένοιτʼ ἂν εἰρήνη; ἢ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ταῖς πατρίσι προθύμως βοηθοῦντας μέμφῃ; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
4.15. Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian now — have you realised that he would not have made Sparta to differ from other cities in any respect, had he not established obedience to the laws most securely in her? Among rulers in cities, are you not aware that those who do most to make the citizens obey the laws are the best, and that the city in which the citizens are most obedient to the laws has the best time in peace and is irresistible in war?
4.15. Λυκοῦργον δὲ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καταμεμάθηκας, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τὴν Σπάρτην ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μάλιστα ἐνειργάσατο αὐτῇ; τῶν δὲ ἀρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι, οἵτινες ἂν τοῖς πολίταις αἰτιώτατοι ὦσι τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, οὗτοι ἄριστοί εἰσι, καὶ πόλις, ἐν ᾗ μάλιστα οἱ πολῖται τοῖς νόμοις πείθονται, ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε ἄριστα διάγει καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν;
4.16. And again, agreement is deemed the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens shall promise under oath to agree, and everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choirs, not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may like the same things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness; but without agreement no city can be made a good city, no house can be made a prosperous house.
4.16. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἵ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὀμνύουσι τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον· οἶμαι δʼ ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδʼ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδʼ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἱρῶνται, οὐδʼ ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδωνται, ἀλλʼ ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται. τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταταί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται· ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὔτʼ ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη οὔτʼ οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη.
4.17. And how is the individual citizen less likely to incur penalties from the state, and more certain to gain honour than by obeying the laws? How less likely to be defeated in the courts or more certain to win? Whom would anyone rather trust as guardian of his money or sons or daughters? Whom would the whole city think more trustworthy than the man of lawful conduct? From whom would parents or kinsfolk or servants or friends or fellow-citizens or strangers more surely get their just rights? Whom would enemies rather trust in the matter of a truce or treaty or terms of peace? Whom would men rather choose for an ally? And to whom would allies rather entrust leadership or command of a garrison, or cities? Whom would anyone more confidently expect to show gratitude for benefits received? Or whom would one rather benefit than him from whom he thinks he will receive due gratitude? Whose friendship would anyone desire, or whose enmity would he avoid more earnestly? Whom would anyone less willingly make war on than him whose friendship he covets and whose enmity he is fain to avoid, who attracts the most friends and allies, and the fewest opponents and enemies?
4.17. ἰδίᾳ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἄν τις ἧττον ὑπὸ πόλεως ζημιοῖτο, πῶς δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον τιμῷτο, ἢ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείθοιτο; πῶς δʼ ἂν ἧττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡττῷτο ἢ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον νικῴη; τίνι δʼ ἄν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἢ χρήματα ἢ υἱοὺς ἢ θυγατέρας; τίνα δʼ ἂν ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἡγήσαιτο τοῦ νομίμου; παρὰ τίνος δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν ἢ γονεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ οἰκέται ἢ φίλοι ἢ πολῖται ἢ ξένοι; τίνι δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἀνοχὰς ἢ σπονδὰς ἢ συνθήκας περὶ εἰρήνης; τίνι δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ νομίμῳ σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίγνεσθαι; τῷ δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν ἢ φρουραρχίαν ἢ πόλεις; τίνα δʼ ἄν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν νόμιμον; ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἄν τις εὐεργετήσειεν ἢ παρʼ οὗ χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι νομίζει; τῷ δʼ ἄν τις βούλοιτο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἢ τῷ ἧττον ἐχθρός; τῷ δʼ ἄν τις ἧττον πολεμήσειεν ἢ ᾧ μάλιστα μὲν φίλος εἶναι βούλοιτο, ἥκιστα δʼ ἐχθρός, καὶ ᾧ πλεῖστοι μὲν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι βούλοιντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δʼ ἐχθροὶ καὶ πολέμιοι;
4.18. So, Hippias, I declare lawful and just to be the same thing. If you are of the contrary opinion, tell me. Upon my word, Socrates, answered Hippias, I don’t think my opinion is contrary to what you have said about Justice.
4.18. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποδείκνυμαι νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· σὺ δʼ εἰ τἀναντία γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε. καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ μοι δοκῶ τἀναντία γιγνώσκειν οἷς εἴρηκας περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.
4.19. Do you know what is meant by “unwritten laws,” Hippias? Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country. Could you say that men made them? Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language? Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose? I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods.
4.19. ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, νόμους; τούς γʼ ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομιζομένους. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἵ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται θεοὺς σέβειν.
4.20. Is not the duty of honouring parents another universal law? Yes, that is another. And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents? No, I don’t think that is a law of God. Why so? Because I notice that some transgress it.
4.20. οὐκοῦν καὶ γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ μήτε γονέας παισὶ μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν; οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος θεοῦ νόμος εἶναι. τί δή; ἔφη. ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰσθάνομαί τινας παραβαίνοντας αὐτόν.
4.21. Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence.
4.21. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλά, ἔφη, παρανομοῦσιν· ἀλλὰ δίκην γέ τοι διδόασιν οἱ παραβαίνοντες τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους, ἣν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ διαφυγεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων κειμένους νόμους ἔνιοι παραβαίνοντες διαφεύγουσι τὸ δίκην διδόναι, οἱ μὲν λανθάνοντες, οἱ δὲ βιαζόμενοι.
4.22. And pray what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another? The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty can men incur when they beget children than begetting them badly?
4.22. καὶ ποίαν, ἔφη, δίκην, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δύνανται διαφεύγειν γονεῖς τε παισὶ καὶ παῖδες γονεῦσι μιγνύμενοι; τὴν μεγίστην νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη· τί γὰρ ἂν μεῖζον πάθοιεν ἄνθρωποι τεκνοποιούμενοι τοῦ κακῶς τεκνοποιεῖσθαι;
4.23. How do they beget children badly then, if, as may well happen, the fathers are good men and the mothers good women? Surely because it is not enough that the two parents should be good. They must also be in full bodily vigour: unless you suppose that those who are in full vigour are no more efficient as parents than those who have not yet reached that condition or have passed it. Of course that is unlikely. Which are the better then? Those who are in full vigour, clearly. Consequently those who are not in full vigour are not competent to become parents? It is improbable, of course. In that case then, they ought not to have children? Certainly not. Therefore those who produce children in such circumstances produce them wrongly? I think so. Who then will be bad fathers and mothers, if not they? I agree with you there too.
4.23. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κακῶς οὗτοι τεκνοποιοῦνται, οὕς γε οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐξ ἀγαθῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι; ὅτι νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐ μόνον ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ τοὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων παιδοποιουμένους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζοντας τοῖς σώμασιν. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ὅμοια τὰ σπέρματα εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων τοῖς τῶν μήπω ἀκμαζόντων ἢ τῶν παρηκμακότων; ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ εἰκὸς ὅμοια εἶναι. πότερα οὖν, ἔφη, βελτίω; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, τὰ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων. τὰ τῶν μὴ ἀκμαζόντων ἄρα οὐ σπουδαῖα; οὐκ εἰκὸς μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οὕτω γε οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιεῖσθαι; οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε οὕτω παιδοποιούμενοι ὡς οὐ δεῖ παιδοποιοῦνται; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. τίνες οὖν ἄλλοι, ἔφη, κακῶς ἂν παιδοποιοῖντο, εἴ γε μὴ οὗτοι; ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.
4.24. Again, is not the duty of requiting benefits universally recognised by law? Yes, but this law too is broken. Then does not a man pay forfeit for the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends and the necessity of hunting those who hate him? Or is it not true that, whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most assiduously? Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better legislator than man.
4.24. τί δέ; τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντευεργετεῖν οὐ πανταχοῦ νόμιμόν ἐστι; νόμιμον, ἔφη· παραβαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ τοῦτο παραβαίνοντες δίκην διδόασι, φίλων μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἔρημοι γιγνόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ μισοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἀναγκαζόμενοι διώκειν; ἢ οὐχ οἱ μὲν εὖ ποιοῦντες τοὺς χρωμένους ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀντευεργετοῦντες τοὺς τοιούτους διὰ μὲν τὴν ἀχαριστίαν μισοῦνται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ μάλιστα λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι τούτους μάλιστα διώκουσι; νὴ τὸν Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θεοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἔοικε· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὰς τιμωρίας ἔχειν βελτίονος ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον νομοθέτου δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι.
4.25. Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is otherwise? Not what is otherwise — of course not; for if a god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator can do so. Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful. By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company.
4.25. πότερον οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγῇ τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν ἢ ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων; οὐκ ἄλλα μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος γέ τις τὰ δίκαια νομοθετήσειεν, εἰ μὴ θεός. καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει. τοιαῦτα λέγων τε καὶ πράττων δικαιοτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.
5.1. He did also try to make his companions efficient in affairs, as I will now show. For holding that it is good for anyone who means to do honourable work to have self-control, he made it clear to his companions, in the first place, that he had been assiduous in self-discipline; moreover, in his conversation he exhorted his companions to cultivate self-control above all things.
5.1. ὡς δὲ καὶ πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω. νομίζων γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλόν τι πράξειν, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς φανερὸς ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἠσκηκὼς αὑτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπετο πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς συνόντας πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν.
5.2. Thus he bore in mind continually the aids to virtue, and put all his companions in mind of them. I recall in particular the substance of a conversation that he once had with Euthydemus on self-control. Tell me, Euthydemus, he said, do you think that freedom is a noble and splendid possession both for individuals and for communities? Yes, I think it is, in the highest degree.
5.2. ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χρησίμων αὐτός τε διετέλει μεμνημένος καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομιμνῄσκων· οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Εὐθύδημον περὶ ἐγκρατείας τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἆρα καλὸν καὶ μεγαλεῖον νομίζεις εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει κτῆμα ἐλευθερίαν; ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα, ἔφη.
5.3. Then do you think that the man is free who is ruled by bodily pleasures and is unable to do what is best because of them? By no means. Possibly, in fact, to do what is best appears to you to be freedom, and so you think that to have masters who will prevent such activity is bondage? I am sure of it.
5.3. ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι; ἥκιστα, ἔφη. ἴσως γὰρ ἐλευθέριον φαίνεταί σοι τὸ πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, εἶτα τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς κωλύσοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις;