---
title: "Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα"
author: "Xenophon"
translator: "Edgar Carew Marchant"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 12 of 12
url: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/12/
cite: "Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant, Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα, section 12. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/12/"
---

# Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα

*Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant*

Recollections of Socrates by one of the young men who followed him.

> Greek: ed. Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0032.tlg002, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0032.tlg002.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 12. Book IV · chapters 5–8

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/12/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/12/#p-N

[¶0] 5.4. You feel sure then that the incontinent are bond slaves? Of course, naturally. And do you think that the incontinent are merely prevented from doing what is most honourable, or are also forced to do what is most dishonourable? I think that they are forced to do that just as much as they are prevented from doing the other.

> Greek: 5.4. παντάπασί γʼ, ἔφη. παντάπασιν ἄρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἶναι; νὴ τὸν Δίʼ εἰκότως. πότερα δέ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύεσθαι μόνον τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν ἢ καὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τὰ αἴσχιστα ποιεῖν; οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη, δοκοῦσι ταῦτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ ἐκεῖνα κωλύεσθαι.

[¶1] 5.5. What sort of masters are they, in your opinion, who prevent the best and enforce the worst? The worst possible, of course. And what sort of slavery do you believe to be the worst? Slavery to the worst masters, I think. The worst slavery, therefore, is the slavery endured by the incontinent? I think so.

> Greek: 5.5. ποίους δέ τινας δεσπότας ἡγῇ τοὺς τὰ μὲν ἄριστα κωλύοντας, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα ἀναγκάζοντας; ὡς δυνατὸν νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, κακίστους. δουλείαν δὲ ποίαν κακίστην νομίζεις εἶναι; ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπόταις. τὴν κακίστην ἄρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν;

[¶2] 5.6. As for Wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don’t you think that incontinence prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them, by drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception of good and evil that they choose the worse instead of the better? That does happen.

> Greek: 5.6. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἀκρασία εἰς τοὐναντίον αὐτοὺς ἐμβάλλειν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι προσέχειν τε τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι καὶ καταμανθάνειν αὐτὰ κωλύειν, ἀφέλκουσα ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, καὶ πολλάκις αἰσθανομένους τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἐκπλήξασα ποιεῖν τὸ χεῖρον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἱρεῖσθαι; γίγνεται τοῦτʼ, ἔφη.

[¶3] 5.7. With Prudence, Euthydemus, who, shall we say, has less to do than the incontinent? For I presume that the actions prompted by prudence and incontinence are exact opposites? I agree with that too. To caring for what is right is there any stronger hindrance, do you think, than incontinence? Indeed I do not. And do you think there can be aught worse for a man than that which causes him to choose the harmful rather than the useful, and persuades him to care for the one and to be careless of the other, and forces him to do the opposite of what prudence dictates? Nothing.

> Greek: 5.7. σωφροσύνης δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίνι ἂν φαίημεν ἧττον ἢ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ προσήκειν; αὐτὰ γὰρ δήπου τὰ ἐναντία σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκρασίας ἔργα ἐστίν. ὁμολογῶ καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. τοῦ δʼ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὧν προσήκει οἴει τι κωλυτικώτερον εἶναι ἀκρασίας; οὔκουν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. τοῦ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ὠφελούντων τὰ βλάπτοντα προαιρεῖσθαι ποιοῦντος καὶ τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐκείνων δὲ ἀμελεῖν πείθοντος καὶ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζοντες οἴει τι ἀνθρώπῳ κάκιον εἶναι;

[¶4] 5.8. And is it not likely that self-control causes actions the opposite of those that are due to incontinence? Certainly. Then is not the cause of the opposite actions presumably a very great blessing? Yes, presumably. Consequently we may presume, Euthydemus, that self-control is a very great blessing to a man? We may presume so, Socrates.

> Greek: 5.8. οὐδέν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τὴν ἀκρασίαν εἰκὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίαν εἶναι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἴτιον εἰκὸς ἄριστον εἶναι; εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἔοικεν ἄρʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐγκράτεια εἶναι;

[¶5] 5.9. Has it ever occurred to you, Euthydemus —? What? That though pleasure is the one and only goal to which incontinence is thought to lead men, she herself cannot bring them to it, whereas nothing produces pleasure so surely as self-control? How so? Incontinence will not let them endure hunger or thirst or desire or lack of sleep, which are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting and sleeping, after a time of waiting and resistance until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction; and thus she prevents them from experiencing any pleasure worthy to be mentioned in the most elementary and recurrent forms of enjoyment. But self-control alone causes them to endure the sufferings I have named, and therefore she alone causes them to experience any pleasure worth mentioning in such enjoyments. What you say is entirely true.

> Greek: 5.9. εἰκότως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐκεῖνο δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἤδη πώποτε ἐνεθυμήθης; ποῖον; ἔφη. ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, ἐφʼ ἅπερ μόνα δοκεῖ ἡ ἀκρασία τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν, αὐτὴ μὲν οὐ δύναται ἄγειν, ἡ δʼ ἐγκράτεια πάντων μάλιστα ἥδεσθαι ποιεῖ. πῶς; ἔφη. ἡ μὲν ἀκρασία οὐκ ἐῶσα καρτερεῖν οὔτε λιμὸν οὔτε δίψος οὔτε ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν οὔτε ἀγρυπνίαν, διʼ ὧν μόνων ἔστιν ἡδέως μὲν φαγεῖν τε καὶ πιεῖν καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι, ἡδέως δʼ ἀναπαύσασθαί τε καὶ κοιμηθῆναι, περιμείναντας καὶ ἀνασχομένους, ἕως ἂν ταῦτα ὡς ἔνι ἥδιστα γένηται, κωλύει τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις τε καὶ συνεχεστάτοις ἀξιολόγως ἥδεσθαι· ἡ δʼ ἐγκράτεια μόνη ποιοῦσα καρτερεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα μόνη καὶ ἥδεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[¶6] 5.10. Moreover, the delights of learning something good and excellent, and of studying some of the means whereby a man knows how to regulate his body well and manage his household successfully, to be useful to his friends and city and to defeat his enemies — knowledge that yields not only very great benefits but very great pleasures — these are the delights of the self-controlled; but the incontinent have no part in them. For who, should we say, has less concern with these than he who has no power of cultivating them because all his serious purposes are centred in the pleasures that lie nearest?

> Greek: 5.10. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, διʼ ὧν ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ ἐχθρῶν κρατήσειεν, ἀφʼ ὧν οὐ μόνον ὠφέλειαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μέγισται γίγνονται, οἱ μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι πράττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δʼ ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενὸς μετέχουσι. τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἧττον φήσαιμεν τῶν τοιούτων προσήκειν, ἢ ᾧ ἥκιστα ἔξεστι ταῦτα πράττειν, κατεχομένῳ ἐπὶ τῷ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὰς ἐγγυτάτω ἡδονάς;

[¶7] 5.11. Socrates, said Euthydemus, I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form. Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil.

> Greek: 5.11. καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν ὡς ἀνδρὶ ἥττονι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν πάμπαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρετῆς προσήκει. τί γὰρ διαφέρει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄνθρωπος ἀκρατὴς θηρίου τοῦ ἀμαθεστάτου; ὅστις γὰρ τὰ μὲν κράτιστα μὴ σκοπεῖ, τὰ ἥδιστα δʼ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἂν διαφέροι τῶν ἀφρονεστάτων βοσκημάτων; ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.

[¶8] 5.12. And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word “discussion,” according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting, discussing things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership and skill in discussion.

> Greek: 5.12. καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους· ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἕτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

[¶9] 6.1. I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is. To go through all his definitions would be an arduous task. I will say only enough to indicate his method of analysis.

> Greek: 6.1. ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτʼ ἔληγε. πάντα μὲν οὖν ᾗ διωρίζετο πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἴη διεξελθεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

[¶10] 6.2. His analysis of Piety — to take that first — was more or less as follows: Tell me, Euthydemus, what sort of thing is Piety, in your opinion? A very excellent thing, to be sure, he replied. Can you say what sort of man is pious? He who worships the gods, I think. May a man worship the gods according to his own will and pleasure? No, there are laws to be observed in worshipping the gods!

> Greek: 6.2. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ εὐσεβείας ὧδέ πως ἐσκόπει· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ποῖόν τι νομίζεις εὐσέβειαν εἶναι; καὶ ὅς, κάλλιστον νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ὁποῖός τις ὁ εὐσεβής ἐστιν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῶν. ἔξεστι δὲ ὃν ἄν τις βούληται τρόπον τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; οὐκ ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶ καθʼ οὓς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν.

[¶11] 6.3. Then will not he who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods? I think so. Then does he who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge, and not otherwise? He does indeed. And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought, and not otherwise? I think so.

> Greek: 6.3. οὐκοῦν ὁ τοὺς νόμους τούτους εἰδὼς εἰδείη ἂν ὡς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν; οἶμαι ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ εἰδὼς ὡς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν οὐκ ἄλλως οἴεται δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ὡς οἶδεν; οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. ἄλλως δέ τις θεοὺς τιμᾷ ἢ ὡς οἴεται δεῖν;

[¶12] 6.4. Then will he who knows what is lawful about the gods worship the gods lawfully? Certainly. Then does not he who worships lawfully worship as he ought? Of course. Yes, but he who worships as he ought is pious? Certainly. Shall we therefore rightly define the pious man as one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods? I at any rate think so.

> Greek: 6.4. οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς νομίμως ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τιμῴη; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε νομίμως τιμῶν ὡς δεῖ τιμᾷ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὁ δέ γε ὡς δεῖ τιμῶν εὐσεβής ἐστι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ὁ ἄρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡμῖν εὐσεβὴς ὡρισμένος εἴη; ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

[¶13] 6.5. In dealing with men, again, may one do as one chooses? No, in the case of men too there are laws of conduct. Then do not those who observe them in their dealings with one another behave as they ought? Of course. And do not they who behave as they ought behave well? Certainly. And do not they who behave well towards men act well in human affairs? Presumably. And do not those who obey the laws do what is just? Certainly.

> Greek: 6.5. ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἆρα ἔξεστιν ὃν ἄν τις τρόπον βούληται χρῆσθαι; οὐκ ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τούτους [ὁ εἰδὼς ἅ] ἐστι νόμιμα καθʼ ἃ δεῖ [πως] ἀλλήλοις χρῆσθαι[, νόμιμος ἂν εἴη]. οὐκοῦν οἱ κατὰ ταῦτα χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ὡς δεῖ χρῶνται; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν οἵ γε ὡς δεῖ χρώμενοι καλῶς χρῶνται; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καλῶς χρώμενοι καλῶς πράττουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα; εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοι δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσι;

[¶14] 6.6. Do you know what sort of things are called just? The things that the laws command. Consequently those who do what the laws command do both what is just and what they must do? Of course. And are not they who do what is just, just men? I think so. Do you think then, that any obey the laws without knowing what the laws command? I do not. And knowing what they must do, do you suppose that any think they must not do it? I don’t think so. Do you know of any who do, not what they think they must do, but something else? I do not. Consequently those who know what is lawful concerning men do what is just? Certainly. But are not they who do what is just, just men? Exactly. At last, then, we may rightly define just men as those who know best what is just concerning men? I think so. And what of Wisdom?

> Greek: 6.6. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. δίκαια δὲ ἔφη, οἶσθα ὁποῖα καλεῖται; ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα ποιοῦντες ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι δίκαιά τε ποιοῦσι καὶ ἃ δεῖ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσιν; οἴομαι ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. οἴει οὖν τινας πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις μὴ εἰδότας ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν; οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἴει τινὰς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν; οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. οἶδας δέ τινας ἄλλα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἃ οἴονται δεῖν; οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα εἰδότες οὗτοι τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦσι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσι; τίνες γὰρ ἄλλοι; ἔφη. ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε ἄρα ὁριζοίμεθα ὁριζόμενοι δικαίους εἶναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

[¶15] 6.7. How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise about what they know, or are some wise about what they do not know? About what they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise about the things he doesn’t know? The wise, then, are wise by knowledge? How else can a man be wise if not by knowledge? Do you think that wisdom is anything but that by which men are wise? No. It follows that Wisdom is Knowledge? I think so. Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things? Of course not — nor even a fraction of them. So an all-wise man is an impossibility? Of course, of course. Consequently everyone is wise just in so far as he knows? I think so.

> Greek: 6.7. σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαιμεν εἶναι; εἰπέ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι, ἢ εἰσί τινες ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται σοφοί; ἃ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις, ἅ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμῃ σοφοί εἰσι; τίνι γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τις εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ; ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἴει εἶναι ἢ ᾧ σοφοί εἰσιν; οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; οὐδὲ μὰ Δίʼ ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἶναι; μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

[¶16] 6.8. Now to seek the Good, Euthydemus: is this the way? What do you mean? Does it seem to you that the same thing is useful to everyone? No. In fact, what is useful to one may sometimes be hurtful to another, don’t you think? Assuredly. Should you call anything good except what is useful? No. Consequently what is useful is good for him to whom it is useful? I think so.

> Greek: 6.8. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, καὶ τἀγαθὸν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί; πῶς; ἔφη. δοκεῖ σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔμοιγε. τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλῳ ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίοτε ἄλλῳ βλαβερὸν εἶναι; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ἄλλο δʼ ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

[¶17] 6.9. Consider the Beautiful: can we define it in any other way? Or is it possible to name a beautiful body, for instance, or vessel, or anything else that you know to be beautiful for all purposes? Of course not. Then does the beauty in using anything consist in using it for just that purpose for which that particular thing is useful? Certainly. And is a thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use that particular thing? For no other purpose whatever. The useful, then, is beautiful for any purpose for which it is useful? I think so. Next comes Courage, Euthydemus.

> Greek: 6.9. τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχοιμεν ἄν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν; ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ὀνομάζεις καλὸν ἢ σῶμα ἢ σκεῦος ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν, ὃ οἶσθα πρὸς πάντα καλὸν ὄν; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. καλὸν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἕκαστον ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο, ἔφη. τὸ χρήσιμον ἄρα καλόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

[¶18] 6.10. Do you think it a beautiful thing? I prefer to say very beautiful. So you think Courage useful for no mean purposes? Of course — or rather, for the greatest. Then do you think that in the pressure of terrors and dangers it is useful to be ignorant of them? By no means. So those who feel no fear of such things because they are ignorant of them are not courageous? Of course not, for in that case many madmen and cowards would be courageous. What of those who are afraid when there is no ground for fear? Still less, of course. Then do you think that those who are good in the presence of terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who are bad are cowards? Certainly.

> Greek: 6.10. ἀνδρείαν δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἆρα τῶν καλῶν νομίζεις εἶναι; κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. χρήσιμον ἄρα οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα νομίζεις τὴν ἀνδρείαν; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα μὲν οὖν. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι πρὸς τὰ δεινά τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά; ἥκιστά γʼ, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα μὴ φοβούμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε τῶν τε μαινομένων καὶ τῶν δειλῶν ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν. τί δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοικότες; ἔτι γε νὴ Δίʼ ἧττον, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρείους ἡγῇ εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς δειλούς;

[¶19] 6.11. And do you think that any are good in the presence of such things, except those who can deal with them well? None but these. And bad, except such as deal badly with them? These and none others. Then do both classes behave as they think they must? How can they behave otherwise? Then do those who cannot behave well know how they must behave? Surely not. So those who know how they must behave are just those who can? Yes, only they. Well now, do those who are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such things? I think not. So those who behave badly are utterly mistaken? Presumably. It follows that those who know how to deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who utterly mistake the way are cowards? That is my opinion.

> Greek: 6.11. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ἀγαθοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζεις ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐκ ἀλλὰ τούτους, ἔφη. κακοὺς δὲ ἄρα τοὺς οἵους τούτοις κακῶς χρῆσθαι; τίνας γὰρ ἄλλους; ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν ἕκαστοι χρῶνται ὡς οἴονται δεῖν; πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως; ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἴσασιν ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι; οὐ δήπου γε, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες ὡς δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οὗτοι καὶ δύνανται; μόνοι γʼ, ἔφη. τί δέ; οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες ἆρα κακῶς χρῶνται τοῖς τοιούτοις; οὐκ οἴομαι, ἔφη. οἱ ἄρα κακῶς χρώμενοι διημαρτήκασιν; εἰκός γʼ, ἔφη. οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί; ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη.

[¶20] 6.12. Kingship and despotism, in his judgment, were both forms of government, but he held that they differed. For government of men with their consent and in accordance with the laws of the state was kingship; while government of unwilling subjects and not controlled by laws, but imposed by the will of the ruler, was despotism. And where the officials are chosen among those who fulfil the requirements of the laws, the constitution is an aristocracy: where rateable property is the qualification for office, you have a plutocracy: where all are eligible, a democracy.

> Greek: 6.12. βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα. καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δʼ ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δʼ ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

[¶21] 6.13. Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear, asserting but not proving, that so and so was wiser or an abler politician or braver or what not, he would lead the whole discussion back to the definition required, much in this way:

> Greek: 6.13. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι ἢ πολιτικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδέ πως·

[¶22] 6.14. Do you say that your man is a better citizen than mine? I do indeed. Then why didn’t we first consider what is the function of a good citizen? Let us do so. In financial administration, then, is not the better man he who makes the city wealthier? Certainly. And in war he who makes her stronger than her rivals? Of course. And on an embassy he who turns enemies into friends? Presumably. And in debate he who puts down strife and produces harmony? I think so. By this process of leading back the argument even his adversay came to see the truth clearly.

> Greek: 6.14. φῂς σὺ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι ὃν σὺ ἐπαινεῖς ἢ ὃν ἐγώ; φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. τί οὖν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστιν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου; ποιῶμεν τοῦτο. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν χρημάτων διοικήσει κρατοίη ἂν ὁ χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιῶν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἐν δέ γε πολέμῳ ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἐν δὲ πρεσβείᾳ ἆρʼ ὃς ἂν φίλους ἀντὶ πολεμίων παρασκευάζῃ; εἰκός γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερὸν ἐγίγνετο τἀληθές.

[¶23] 6.15. Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that gained general assent, holding this to be the only sure method. Accordingly, whenever he argued, he gained a greater measure of assent from his hearers than any man I have known. He said that Homer gave Odysseus the credit of being “a safe speaker” because he had a way of leading the discussion from one acknowledged truth to another.

> Greek: 6.15. ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε. ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

[¶24] 7.1. I think that I have said enough to show that Socrates stated his own opinion plainly to those who consorted with him: I will now show that he also took pains to make them independent in doing the work that they were fitted for. For I never knew a man who was so careful to discover what each of his companions knew. Whatever it befits a gentleman to know he taught most zealously, so far as his own knowledge extended; if he was not entirely familiar with a subject, he took them to those who knew.

> Greek: 7.1. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι· ὅτι δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελεῖτο, νῦν τοῦτο λέξω. πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα μάλιστα ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὧν δὲ προσήκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι μὲν αὐτὸς εἰδείη, πάντων προθυμότατα ἐδίδασκεν· ὅτου δὲ αὐτὸς ἀπειρότερος εἴη, πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἦγεν αὐτούς.

[¶25] 7.2. He also taught them how far a well-educated man should make himself familiar with any given subject. For instance, he said that the study of geometry should be pursued until the student was competent to measure a parcel of land accurately in case he wanted to take over, convey or divide it, or to compute the yield; and this knowledge was so easy to acquire, that anyone who gave his mind to mensuration knew the size of the piece and carried away a knowledge of the principles of land measurement.

> Greek: 7.2. ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρι ὅτου δέοι ἔμπειρον εἶναι ἑκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον. αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανός τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι· οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν ὥστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τήν τε γῆν ὁπόση ἐστὶν εἰδέναι καὶ ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι.

[¶26] 7.3. He was against carrying the study of geometry so far as to include the more complicated figures, on the ground that he could not see the use of them. Not that he was himself unfamiliar with them, but he said that they were enough to occupy a lifetime, to the complete exclusion of many other useful studies.

> Greek: 7.3. τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσσυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν. ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοίη ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν· ἔφη δὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.

[¶27] 7.4. Similarly he recommended them to make themselves familiar with astronomy, but only so far as to be able to find the time of night, month and year, in order to use reliable evidence when planning a journey by land or sea, or setting the watch, and in all other affairs that are done in the night or month or year, by distinguishing the times and seasons aforesaid. This knowledge, again, was easily to be had from night hunters and pilots and others who made it their business to know such things.

> Greek: 7.4. ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν ἕνεκα πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἢ νυκτὸς ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἔχειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ῥᾴδια εἶναι μαθεῖν παρά τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ταῦτα εἰδέναι.

[¶28] 7.5. But he strongly deprecated studying astronomy so far as to include the knowledge of bodies revolving in different courses, and of planets and comets, and wearing oneself out with the calculation of their distance from the earth, their periods of revolution and the causes of these. Of such researches, again he said that he could not see what useful purpose they served. He had indeed attended lectures on these subjects too; but these again, he said, were enough to occupy a lifetime to the complete exclusion of many useful studies.

> Greek: 7.5. τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς πλάνητάς τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γνῶναι, καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὰς περιόδους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδʼ ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν.

[¶29] 7.6. In general, with regard to the phenomena of the heavens, he deprecated curiosity to learn how the deity contrives them: he held that their secrets could not be discovered by man, and believed that any attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal must be displeasing to them. He said that he who meddles with these matters runs the risk of losing his sanity as completely as Anaxagoras, who took an insane pride in his explanation of the divine machinery.

> Greek: 7.6. ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δʼ ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

[¶30] 7.7. For that sage, in declaring the sun to be fire, ignored the facts than men can look at fire without inconvenience, but cannot gaze steadily at the sun; that their skin is blackened by the sun’s rays, but not by fire. Further, he ignored the fact that sunlight is essential to the health of all vegetation, whereas if anything is heated by fire it withers. Again, when he pronounced the sun to be a red-hot stone, he ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither glows nor can resist it long, whereas the sun shines with unequalled brilliance for ever.

> Greek: 7.7. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἠγνόει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥᾳδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὔ· ἠγνόει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ἠγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὢν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος πάντα τὸν χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὢν διαμένει.

[¶31] 7.8. He also recommended the study of arithmetic. But in this case as in the others he recommended avoidance of vain application; and invariably, whether theories or ascertained facts formed the subject of his conversation, he limited it to what was useful.

> Greek: 7.8. ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν. καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι.

[¶32] 7.9. He also strongly urged his companions to take care of their health. You should find out all you can, he said, from those who know. Everyone should watch himself throughout his life, and notice what sort of meat and drink and what form of exercise suit his constitution, and how he should regulate them in order to enjoy good health. For by such attention to yourselves you can discover better than any doctor what suits your constitution.

> Greek: 7.9. προέτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας παρά τε τῶν εἰδότων μανθάνοντας ὅσα ἐνδέχοιτο, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα ἢ τί πῶμα ἢ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ, καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότατʼ ἂν διάγοι· τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἰατρὸν τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα [αὑτοῦ].

[¶33] 7.10. When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom was unable to give he advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel.

> Greek: 7.10. εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα διʼ ὧν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σημαίνουσιν οὐδέποτʼ ἔρημον ἔφη γίγνεσθαι συμβουλῆς θεῶν.

[¶34] 8.1. As for his claim that he was forewarned by “the deity” what he ought to do and what not to do, some may think that it must have been a delusion because he was condemned to death. But they should remember two facts. First, he had already reached such an age, that had he not died then, death must have come to him soon after. Secondly, he escaped the most irksome stage of life and the inevitable diminution of mental powers, and instead won glory by the moral strength revealed in the wonderful honesty and frankness and probity of his defence, and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death.

> Greek: 8.1. εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἴεται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστʼ, εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἶτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀχθεινότατόν τε τοῦ βίου καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντες τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται ἀπέλιπεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην ἐπιδειξάμενος εὔκλειαν προσεκτήσατο, τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δικαιότατα εἰπὼν καὶ τὴν κατάγνωσιν τοῦ θανάτου πραότατα καὶ ἀνδρωδέστατα ἐνέγκας.

[¶35] 8.2. In fact it is admitted that there is no record of death more nobly borne. For he was forced to live for thirty days after the verdict was given, because it was the month of the Dêlia, and the law did not allow any public execution to take place until the sacred embassy had returned from Delos. During this interval, as all his intimate acquaintances could see, he continued to live exactly as before; and, in truth, before that time he had been admired above all men for his cheerfulness and serenity.

> Greek: 8.2. ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ οὐδένα πω τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων κάλλιον θάνατον ἐνεγκεῖν. ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνὸς εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἐᾶν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἕως ἂν ἡ θεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ, καὶ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἅπασι τοῖς συνήθεσι φανερὸς ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ἀλλοιότερον διαβιοὺς ἢ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον· καίτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθέν γε πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα ἐθαυμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως τε καὶ εὐκόλως ζῆν.

[¶36] 8.3. How, then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced? What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed?

> Greek: 8.3. καὶ πῶς ἄν τις κάλλιον ἢ οὕτως ἀποθάνοι; ἢ ποῖος ἂν εἴη θάνατος καλλίων ἢ ὃν κάλλιστά τις ἀποθάνοι; ποῖος δʼ ἂν γένοιτο θάνατος εὐδαιμονέστερος τοῦ καλλίστου; ἢ ποῖος θεοφιλέστερος τοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου;

[¶37] 8.4. I will repeat what Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, told me about him. When Meletus had actually formulated his indictment, he said, Socrates talked freely in my presence, but made no reference to the case. I told him that he ought to be thinking about his defence. His first remark was, Don’t you think that I have been preparing for it all my life? And when I asked him how, he said that he had been constantly occupied in the consideration of right and wrong, and in doing what was right and avoiding what was wrong, which he regarded as the best preparation for a defence.

> Greek: 8.4. λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱππονίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἔφη γάρ, ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου λέγειν αὐτῷ ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται. τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅπως, εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται ἢ διασκοπῶν μὲν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι.

[¶38] 8.5. Then I said, Don’t you see, Socrates, that the juries in our courts are apt to be misled by argument, so that they often put the innocent to death, and acquit the guilty? Ah, yes, Hermogenes, he answered, but when I did try to think out my defence to the jury, the deity at once resisted.

> Greek: 8.5. αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον.

[¶39] 8.6. Strange words, said I; and he, Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don’t you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness.

> Greek: 8.6. καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· θαυμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸν δέ, θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν οὔτε βέλτιον οὔθʼ ἥδιον ἐμαυτοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται.

[¶40] 8.7. And to this day that has been my experience; and mixing with others and closely comparing myself with them, I have held without ceasing to this opinion of myself. And not I only, but my friends cease not to feel thus towards me, not because of their love for me (for why does not love make others feel thus towards their friends?), but because they think that they too would rise highest in goodness by being with me.

> Greek: 8.7. ἃ ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ᾐσθανόμην ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω διατετέλεκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ γιγνώσκων· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοῦντες οὕτως ἂν εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οἴονται ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι.

[¶41] 8.8. But if I am to live on, haply I may be forced to pay the old man’s forfeit — to become sand-blind and deaf and dull of wit, slower to learn, quicker to forget, outstripped now by those who were behind me. Nay, but even were I unconscious of the change, life would be a burden to me; and if I knew, misery and bitterness would surely be my lot.

> Greek: 8.8. εἰ δὲ βιώσομαι πλείω χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον καὶ διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον ἀποβαίνειν καὶ ἐπιλησμονέστερον, καὶ ὧν πρότερον βελτίων ἦν, τούτων χείρω γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ μὲν ἀβίωτος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη χεῖρόν τε καὶ ἀηδέστερον ζῆν;

[¶42] 8.9. But now, if I am to die unjustly, they who unjustly kill me will bear the shame of it. For if to do injustice is shameful, whatever is unjustly done must surely bring shame. But to me what shame is it that others fail to decide and act justly concerning me?

> Greek: 8.9. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀδίκως ἀποθανοῦμαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀδίκως ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρόν ἐστι, πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν; ἐμοὶ δὲ τί αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἑτέρους μὴ δύνασθαι περὶ ἐμοῦ τὰ δίκαια μήτε γνῶναι μήτε ποιῆσαι;

[¶43] 8.10. I see that posterity judges differently of the dead according as they did or suffered injustice. I know that men will remember me too, and, if I die now, not as they will remember those who took my life. For I know that they will ever testify of me that I wronged no man at any time, nor corrupted any man, but strove ever to make my companions better.

> Greek: 8.10. ὁρῶ δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις οὐχ ὁμοίαν καταλειπομένην τῶν τε ἀδικησάντων καὶ τῶν ἀδικηθέντων. οἶδα δʼ ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐὰν νῦν ἀποθάνω, οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνασιν· οἶδα γὰρ ἀεὶ μαρτυρήσεσθαί μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἠδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ χείρω ἐποίησα, βελτίους δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συνόντας. τοιαῦτα μὲν πρὸς Ἑρμογένην τε διελέχθη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

[¶44] 8.11. This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.

> Greek: 8.11. τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω.