---
title: "Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα"
author: "Xenophon"
translator: "Edgar Carew Marchant"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 3 of 12
url: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/3/
cite: "Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant, Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/3/"
---

# Memorabilia · Ἀπομνημονεύματα

*Xenophon, tr. Edgar Carew Marchant*

Recollections of Socrates by one of the young men who followed him.

> Greek: ed. Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0032.tlg002, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Edgar Carew Marchant, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0032.tlg002.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Book I · chapters 3–7

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/xenophon-memorabilia/3/#p-N

[¶0] 3.15. Concerning eating and drinking then and carnal indulgence such were his views, and he thought that a due portion of pleasure would be no more lacking to him than to those who give themselves much to these, and that much less trouble would fall to his lot.

> Greek: 3.15. περὶ μὲν δὴ βρώσεως καὶ πόσεως καὶ ἀφροδισίων οὕτω κατεσκευασμένος ἦν καὶ ᾤετο οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον ἀρκούντως ἥδεσθαι τῶν πολλὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις πραγματευομένων, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ πολὺ ἔλαττον.

[¶1] 4.1. If any hold the opinion expressed in some written and spoken criticisms of Socrates that are based on inference, and think, that though he was consummate in exhorting men to virtue, he was an incompetent guide to it, let them consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he chastised those who thought themselves omniscient, but his daily talks with his familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving his companions.

> Greek: 4.1. εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν, σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντʼ οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.

[¶2] 4.2. I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of those who did so, he said: Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom? I do, he answered.

> Greek: 4.2. λέξω δὲ πρῶτον ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.

[¶3] 4.3. Tell us their names. In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis.

> Greek: 4.3. καὶ ὅς, λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦξιν.

[¶4] 4.4. Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings? Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance. Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature’s existence, and obvious that another’s serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design? Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design.

> Greek: 4.4. πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἴδωλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι ἢ οἱ ζῷα ἔμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; πολὺ νὴ Δία οἱ ζῷα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχῃ τινί, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων ὅτου ἕνεκα ἔστι καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα.

[¶5] 4.5. Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odours again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them?

> Greek: 4.5. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς διʼ ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν ὥσθʼ ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δὲ ὥστʼ ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δʼ ἂν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων καὶ δριμέων καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνειργάσθη;

[¶6] 4.6. Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design? No, of course not.

> Greek: 4.6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τάδε προνοίας ἔργοις ἐοικέναι, τὸ ἐπεὶ ἀσθενὴς μέν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, βλεφάροις αὐτὴν θυρῶσαι, ἅ, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῇ χρῆσθαί τι δέῃ, ἀναπετάννυται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ συγκλείεται, ὡς δʼ ἂν μηδὲ ἄνεμοι βλάπτωσιν, ἡθμὸν βλεφαρίδας ἐμφῦσαι, ὀφρύσι τε ἀπογεισῶσαι τὰ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὡς μηδʼ ὁ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἱδρὼς κακουργῇ· τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν πάσας φωνάς, ἐμπίμπλασθαι δὲ μήποτε· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρόσθεν ὀδόντας πᾶσι ζῴοις οἵους τέμνειν εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους οἵους παρὰ τούτων δεξαμένους λεαίνειν· καὶ στόμα μέν, διʼ οὗ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τὰ ζῷα εἰσπέμπεται, πλησίον ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ῥινῶν καταθεῖναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἀποχωροῦντα δυσχερῆ, ἀποστρέψαι τοὺς τούτων ὀχετοὺς [καὶ ἀπενεγκεῖν] ᾗ δυνατὸν προσωτάτω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτα οὕτω προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα ἀπορεῖς πότερα τύχης ἢ γνώμης ἔργα ἐστίν;

[¶7] 4.7. When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving creator. What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death? Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures.

> Greek: 4.7. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζῴου τεχνήμασι. τὸ δὲ ἐμφῦσαι μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τεκνοποιίας, ἐμφῦσαι δὲ ταῖς γειναμέναις ἔρωτα τοῦ ἐκτρέφειν, τοῖς δὲ τραφεῖσι μέγιστον μὲν πόθον τοῦ ζῆν, μέγιστον δὲ φόβον τοῦ θανάτου; ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε μηχανήμασί τινος ζῷα εἶναι βουλευσαμένου.

[¶8] 4.8. Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity?

> Greek: 4.8. σὺ δὲ σαυτῷ δοκεῖς τι φρόνιμον ἔχειν; ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἴει φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι· νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα διʼ ἀφροσύνην τινά, ὡς οἴει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν;

[¶9] 4.9. Yes; for I don’t see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this world. Neither do you see your own soul, which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance. Here Aristodemus exclaimed:

> Greek: 4.9. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τοὺς κυρίους, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων τοὺς δημιουργούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σαυτοῦ σύγε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲν γνώμῃ, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις.

[¶10] 4.10. Really, Socrates, I don’t despise the godhead. But I think it is too great to need my service. Then the greater the power that deigns to serve you, the more honour it demands of you.

> Greek: 4.10. καὶ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, οὔτοι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι ⟨ἢ⟩ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ⟨ὂν⟩ ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό.

[¶11] 4.11. I assure you, that if I believed that the gods pay any heed to man, I would not neglect them. Then do you think them unheeding? In the first place, man is the only living creature that they have caused to stand upright; and the upright position gives him a wider range of vision in front and a better view of things above, and exposes him less to injury. Secondly, to grovelling creatures they have given feet that afford only the power of moving, whereas they have endowed man with hands, which are the instruments to which we chiefly owe our greater happiness.

> Greek: 4.11. εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. ἔπειτʼ οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἳ πρῶτον μὲν μόνον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης καὶ προορᾶν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι καὶ τὰ ὕπερθεν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι καὶ ἧττον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ στόμα ἐνεποίησαν· ἔπειτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἳ τὸ πορεύεσθαι μόνον παρέχουσιν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἳ τὰ πλεῖστα οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμὲν ἐξεργάζονται.

[¶12] 4.12. Again, though all creatures have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by them to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and express all our wants to one another. Once more, for all other creatures they have prescribed a fixed season of sexual indulgence; in our case the only time limit they have set is old age.

> Greek: 4.12. καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζῴων ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος ἀρθροῦν τε τὴν φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἃ βουλόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις δοῦναι περιγράψαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν.

[¶13] 4.13. Nor was the deity content to care for man’s body. What is of yet higher moment, he has implanted in him the noblest type of soul. For in the first place what other creature’s soul has apprehended the existence of gods who set in order the universe, greatest and fairest of things? And what race of living things other than man worships gods? And what soul is more apt than man’s to make provision against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to relieve sickness and promote health, to acquire knowledge by toil, and to remember accurately all that is heard, seen, or learned?

> Greek: 4.13. οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε. τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζῴου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ᾔσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φῦλον ἄλλο ἢ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ἢ ψύχη ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκπονῆσαι, ἢ ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι;

[¶14] 4.14. For is it not obvious to you that, in comparison with the other animals, men live like gods, by nature peerless both in body and in soul? For with a man’s reason and the body of an ox we could not carry out our wishes, and the possession of hands without reason is of little worth. Do you, then, having received the two most precious gifts, yet think that the gods take no care of you? What are they to do, to make you believe that they are heedful of you?

> Greek: 4.14. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ τἆλλα ζῷα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; οὔτε γὰρ βοὸς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην ἐδύνατʼ ἂν πράττειν ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθʼ ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δʼ ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει. σὺ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκὼς οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν;

[¶15] 4.15. I will believe when they send counsellors, as you declare they do, saying, Do this, avoid that. But when the Athenians inquire of them by divination and they reply, do you not suppose that to you, too, the answer is given? Or when they send portents for warning to the Greeks, or to all the world? Are you their one exception, the only one consigned to neglect?

> Greek: 4.15. ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ φὴς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς φράζωσιν, οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς φράζειν αὐτούς, οὐδʼ ὅταν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τέρατα πέμποντες προσημαίνωσιν, οὐδʼ ὅταν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες ἐν ἀμελείᾳ κατατίθενται;

[¶16] 4.16. Or do you suppose that the gods would have put into man a belief in their ability to help and harm, if they had not that power; and that man throughout the ages would never have detected the fraud? Do you not see that the wisest and most enduring of human institutions, cities and nations, are most god-fearing, and that the most thoughtful period of life is the most religious?

> Greek: 4.16. οἴει δʼ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατωμένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον οὐδέποτʼ ἂν αἰσθέσθαι; οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολυχρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, θεοσεβέστατά ἐστι, καὶ αἱ φρονιμώταται ἡλικίαι θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται;

[¶17] 4.17. Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god’s eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god’s thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once.

> Greek: 4.17. ὠγαθέ, ἔφη, κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν ⟨τῷ⟩ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

[¶18] 4.18. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things.

> Greek: 4.18. ἂν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύων γιγνώσκεις τοὺς ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας καὶ χαριζόμενος τοὺς ἀντιχαριζομένους καὶ συμβουλευόμενος καταμανθάνεις τοὺς φρονίμους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν θεῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνῃς θεραπεύων, εἴ τί σοι θελήσουσι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις συμβουλεύειν, γνώσει τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥσθʼ ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι [αὐτούς].

[¶19] 4.19. To me at least it seemed that by these sayings he kept his companions from impiety, injustice, and baseness, and that not only when they were seen by men, but even in solitude; since they ever felt that no deed of theirs could at any time escape the gods.

> Greek: 4.19. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων οὐ μόνον τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ὁπότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῷντο, ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπότε ἐν ἐρημίᾳ εἶεν, ἐπείπερ ἡγήσαιντο μηδὲν ἄν ποτε ὧν πράττοιεν θεοὺς διαλαθεῖν.

[¶20] 5.1. But if Self-control too is a fair and noble possession, let us now consider whether he led men up to that virtue by discourse like the following: My friends, if we were at war and wanted to choose a leader most capable of helping us to save ourselves and conquer the enemy, should we choose one whom we knew to be the slave of the belly, or of wine, or lust, or sleep? How could we expect that such an one would either save us or defeat the enemy?

> Greek: 5.1. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε· ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου βουλοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφʼ οὗ μάλιστʼ ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σῳζοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἆρʼ ὅντινα [ἂν] αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρὸς ἢ οἴνου ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἢ πόνου ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν αἱροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείημεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι;

[¶21] 5.2. Or if at the end of our life we should wish to appoint a guardian to educate our boys or protect our girls or to take care of our goods, should we think a loose liver a trustworthy man to choose? Should we entrust live stock or storehouses or the management of works to a vicious slave? Should we be willing to take as a gift a page or an errandboy with such a character?

> Greek: 5.2. εἰ δʼ ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθά τῳ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παῖδας ἄρρενας παιδεῦσαι ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἆρʼ ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦθʼ ἡγησόμεθα τὸν ἀκρατῆ; δούλῳ δʼ ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκήματα ἢ ταμιεῖα ἢ ἔργων ἐπιστασίαν; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγοραστὴν τοιοῦτον ἐθελήσαιμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν;

[¶22] 5.3. Surely then, if we should refuse a vicious slave, the master must look to it that he does not grow vicious himself? For whereas the covetous, by robbing other men of their goods, seem to enrich themselves, a vicious man reaps no advantage from the harm he does to others. If he is a worker of mischief to others, he brings much greater mischief on himself, if indeed the greatest mischief of all is to ruin not one’s home merely, but the body and the soul.

> Greek: 5.3. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθʼ ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δʼ ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακουργότερος, εἴ γε κακουργότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν·

[¶23] 5.4. In social intercourse what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul?

> Greek: 5.4. ἐν συνουσίᾳ δὲ τίς ἂν ἡσθείη τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τὰς πόρνας ἀγαπῶντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἑταίρους; ἆρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα, ἡγησάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπῖδα, ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάσασθαι;

[¶24] 5.5. For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation.

> Greek: 5.5. τίς γὰρ ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ μάθοι τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ μελετήσειεν ἀξιολόγως; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δουλεύων αἰσχρῶς διατεθείη καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ εὐκτὸν εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιούτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως ὁ τοιοῦτος σωθείη.

[¶25] 5.6. Such were his words; but his own self-control was shown yet more clearly by his deeds than by his words. For he kept in subjection not only the pleasures of the body, but those too that money brings, in the belief that he who takes money from any casual giver puts himself under a master and endures the basest form of slavery.

> Greek: 5.6. τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν ἐκράτει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν χρημάτων, νομίζων τὸν παρὰ τοῦ τυχόντος χρήματα λαμβάνοντα δεσπότην ἑαυτοῦ καθιστάναι καὶ δουλεύειν δουλείαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον αἰσχράν.

[¶26] 6.1. It is due to him that a conversation he had with Antiphon the Sophist should not go unrecorded. Antiphon came to Socrates with the intention of drawing his companions away from him, and spoke thus in their presence.

> Greek: 6.1. ἄξιον δʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἃ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστὴν διελέχθη μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε·

[¶27] 6.2. Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add to one’s store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic.

> Greek: 6.2. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ᾤμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέναι. ζῇς γοῦν οὕτως ὡς οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότῃ διαιτώμενος μείνειε· σῖτά τε σιτῇ καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς.

[¶28] 6.3. Besides you refuse to take money, the mere getting of which is a joy, while its possession makes one more independent and happier. Now the professors of other subjects try to make their pupils copy their teachers: if you too intend to make your companions do that, you must consider yourself a professor of unhappiness.

> Greek: 6.3. καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἃ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ τοὺς συνόντας διαθήσεις, νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι.

[¶29] 6.4. To this Socrates replied: Antiphon, you seem to have a notion that my life is so miserable, that I feel sure you would choose death in preference to a life like mine. Come then, let us consider together what hardship you have noticed in my life.

> Greek: 6.4. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε· δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὑπειληφέναι με οὕτως ἀνιαρῶς ζῆν, ὥστε πέπεισμαι σὲ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ἂν ἑλέσθαι ἢ ζῆν ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ἴθι οὖν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ᾔσθησαι τοῦ ἐμοῦ βίου.

[¶30] 6.5. Is it that those who take money are bound to carry out the work for which they get a fee, while I, because I refuse to take it, am not obliged to talk with anyone against my will? Or do you think my food poor because it is less wholesome than yours or less nourishing? or because my viands are harder to get than yours, being scarcer and more expensive? or because your diet is more enjoyable than mine? Do you not know that the greater the enjoyment of eating the less the need of sauce; the greater the enjoyment of drinking, the less the desire for drinks that are not available?

> Greek: 6.5. πότερον ὅτι τοῖς μὲν λαμβάνουσιν ἀργύριον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῦτο ἐφʼ ᾧ ἂν μισθὸν λάβωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι; ἢ τὴν δίαιτάν μου φαυλίζεις ὡς ἧττον μὲν ὑγιεινὰ ἐσθίοντος ἐμοῦ ἢ σοῦ, ἧττον δὲ ἰσχὺν παρέχοντα; ἢ ὡς χαλεπώτερα πορίσασθαι τὰ ἐμὰ διαιτήματα τῶν σῶν διὰ τὸ σπανιώτερά τε καὶ πολυτελέστερα εἶναι; ἢ ὡς ἡδίω σοι ἃ σὺ παρασκευάζῃ ὄντα ἢ ἐμοὶ ἃ ἐγώ; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὄψου δεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἥδιστα πίνων ἥκιστα τοῦ μὴ παρόντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ποτοῦ;

[¶31] 6.6. As for cloaks, they are changed, as you know, on account of cold or heat. And shoes are worn as a protection to the feet against pain and inconvenience in walking. Now did you ever know me to stay indoors more than others on account of the cold, or to fight with any man for the shade because of the heat, or to be prevented from walking anywhere by sore feet?

> Greek: 6.6. τά γε μὴν ἱμάτια οἶσθʼ ὅτι οἱ μεταβαλλόμενοι ψύχους καὶ θάλπους ἕνεκα μεταβάλλονται, καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὰ λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας κωλύωνται πορεύεσθαι· ἤδη οὖν ποτε ᾔσθου ἐμὲ ἢ διὰ ψῦχος μᾶλλόν του ἔνδον μένοντα, ἢ διὰ θάλπος μαχόμενόν τῳ περὶ σκιᾶς, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας οὐ βαδίζοντα ὅπου ἂν βούλωμαι;

[¶32] 6.7. Do you not know that by training, a puny weakling comes to be better at any form of exercise he practises, and gets more staying power, than the muscular prodigy who neglects to train? Seeing then that I am always training my body to answer any and every call on its powers, do you not think that I can stand every strain better than you can without training?

> Greek: 6.7. οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἀσθενέστατοι τῷ σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελησάντων κρείττους τε γίγνονται πρὸς ἃ ἂν μελετῶσι καὶ ῥᾷον αὐτὰ φέρουσιν; ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει, τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ τὰ συντυγχάνοντα μελετῶντα καρτερεῖν, πάντα ῥᾷον φέρειν σοῦ μὴ μελετῶντος;

[¶33] 6.8. For avoiding slavery to the belly or to sleep and incontinence, is there, think you, any more effective specific than the possession of other and greater pleasures, which are delightful not only to enjoy, but also because they arouse hopes of lasting benefit? And again, you surely know that while he who supposes that nothing goes well with him is unhappy, he who believes that he is successful in farming or a shipping concern or any other business he is engaged in is happy in the thought of his prosperity.

> Greek: 6.8. τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδʼ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἴει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχειν τούτων ἡδίω, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίδας παρέχοντα ὠφελήσειν ἀεί; καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ ἄλλʼ ὅ τι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ὡς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται.

[¶34] 6.9. Do you think then that out of all this thinking there comes anything so pleasant as the thought: “I am growing in goodness and I am making better friends?” And that, I may say, is my constant thought. Further, if help is wanted by friends or city, which of the two has more leisure to supply their needs, he who lives as I am living or he whose life you call happy? Which will find soldiering the easier task, he who cannot exist without expensive food or he who is content with what he can get? Which when besieged will surrender first, he who wants what is very hard to come by or he who can make shift with whatever is at hand?

> Greek: 6.9. οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέῃ, ποτέρῳ ἡ πλείων σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ἢ τῷ ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις διαιτωμένῳ; στρατεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἂν ῥᾷον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν ἢ ᾧ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκοίη; ἐκπολιορκηθείη δὲ πότερος ἂν θᾶττον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν δεόμενος ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥᾴστοις ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκούντως χρώμενος;

[¶35] 6.10. You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.

> Greek: 6.10. ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δʼ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.

[¶36] 6.11. In another conversation with Socrates Antiphon said: Socrates, I for my part believe you to be a just, but by no means a wise man. And I think you realise it yourself. Anyhow, you decline to take money for your society. Yet if you believed your cloak or house or anything you possess to be worth money, you would not part with it for nothing or even for less than its value.

> Greek: 6.11. πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοί σε δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττῃ. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών.

[¶37] 6.12. Clearly, then, if you set any value on your society, you would insist on getting the proper price for that too. It may well be that you are a just man because you do not cheat people through avarice; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth anything.

> Greek: 6.12. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾤου τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενός γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος.

[¶38] 6.13. To this Socrates replied: Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one’s beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. So is it with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutors of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman.

> Greek: 6.13. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρʼ ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς [ὥσπερ πόρνους] ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δὲ ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

[¶39] 6.14. That is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy for a good horse or dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another. For my part, when I heard these words fall from his lips, I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen.

> Greek: 6.14. ἐγὼ δʼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρʼ ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν· καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα· καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι γιγνώμεθα. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν ἄγειν.

[¶40] 6.15. On yet another occasion Antiphon asked him: How can you suppose that you make politicians of others, when you yourself avoid politics even if you understand them? How now, Antiphon? he retorted, should I play a more important part in politics by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?

> Greek: 6.15. καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν, πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἡγεῖται πολιτικοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δʼ οὐ πράττει τὰ πολιτικά, εἴπερ ἐπίσταται· ποτέρως δʼ ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττοιμι ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;

[¶41] 7.1. Let us next consider whether by discouraging imposture he encouraged his companions to cultivate virtue. For he always said that the best road to glory is the way that makes a man as good as he wishes to be thought. And this was how he demonstrated the truth of this saying:

> Greek: 7.1. ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὲ εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὡς οὐκ εἴη καλλίων ὁδὸς ἐπʼ εὐδοξίαν ἢ διʼ ἧς ἄν τις ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο γένοιτο, ⟨ὃ⟩ καὶ δοκεῖν βούλοιτο. ὅτι δʼ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν, ὧδʼ ἐδίδασκεν·

[¶42] 7.2. Suppose a bad flute-player wants to be thought a good one, let us note what he must do. Must he not imitate good players in the accessories of the art? First, as they wear fine clothes and travel with many attendants, he must do the same. Further, seeing that they win the applause of crowds, he must provide himself with a large claque. But, of course, he must never accept an engagement, or he will promptly expose himself to ridicule as an incompetent player and an impostor to boot. And so, what with incurring heavy expense and gaining nothing, and bringing disgrace on himself as well, he will make his life burdensome, unprofitable and ridiculous.

> Greek: 7.2. ἐνθυμώμεθα γάρ, ἔφη, εἴ τις μὴ ὢν ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς δοκεῖν βούλοιτο, τί ἂν αὐτῷ ποιητέον εἴη. ἆρʼ οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης μιμητέον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητάς; καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκεύη τε καλὰ κέκτηνται καὶ ἀκολούθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτα ποιητέον· ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοὶ ἐπαινοῦσι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον γε οὐδαμοῦ ληπτέον, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὢν καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐλητὴς κακός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών. καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν δαπανῶν, μηδὲν δʼ ὠφελούμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κακοδοξῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἐπιπόνως τε καὶ ἀλυσιτελῶς καὶ καταγελάστως βιώσεται;

[¶43] 7.3. So too if a man who is not a general or a pilot wanted to be thought a good one, let us imagine what would happen to him. If his efforts to seem proficient in these duties failed to carry conviction, would not his failure be galling to him? if they succeeded, would not his success be still more disastrous? for it is certain that if a man who knew nothing about piloting a ship or commanding an army were appointed to such work, he would lose those whom he least wanted to lose and would bring ruin and disgrace on himself.

> Greek: 7.3. ὣς δʼ αὔτως εἴ τις βούλοιτο στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς μὴ ὢν φαίνεσθαι ἢ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοῶμεν τί ἂν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὲν ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα πράττειν μὴ δύναιτο πείθειν, τοῦτʼ εἴη λυπηρόν, εἰ δὲ πείσειεν, ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κυβερνᾶν κατασταθεὶς ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἢ στρατηγεῖν ἀπολέσειεν ἂν οὓς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς ἂν καὶ κακῶς ἀπαλλάξειεν.

[¶44] 7.4. By similar reasoning he would show how unprofitable is a reputation for wealth or courage or strength when it is undeserved. Tasks beyond their powers, he would say, are laid on the incompetent, and no mercy is shown to them when they disappoint the expectation formed of their capability.

> Greek: 7.4. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πλούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν μὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτελὲς ἀπέφαινε· προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας ἱκανοὺς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὐκ ἂν τυγχάνειν.

[¶45] 7.5. The man who persuades you to lend him money or goods and then keeps them is without doubt a rogue; but much the greatest rogue of all is the man who has gulled his city into the belief that he is fit to direct it. For my part I thought that such talks did discourage imposture among his companions.

> Greek: 7.5. ἀπατεῶνα δʼ ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν οὐδʼ εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῖ λαβὼν ἀποστεροίη, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ὅστις μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὢν ἐξηπατήκοι πείθων ὡς ἱκανὸς εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.