2.8. Oh no, but she says things one wouldn’t listen to for anything in the world. Well, how much trouble do you think you have given her by your peevish words and froward acts day and night since you were a little child; and how much pain when you were ill? But I have never yet said or done anything to cause her shame.
2.8. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, ἔφη, λέγει ἃ οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιτο ἀκοῦσαι. σὺ δὲ πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἴει ταύτῃ [δυσάνεκτα] καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκ παιδίου δυσκολαίνων καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δὲ λυπῆσαι κάμνων; ἀλλʼ οὐδεπώποτε αὐτήν, ἔφη, οὔτʼ εἶπα οὔτʼ ἐποίησα οὐδὲν ἐφʼ ᾧ ᾐσχύνθη.
2.9. Now do you really think it harder for you to listen to what she says than for actors when they abuse one another in a tragedy? But an actor, I suppose, doesn’t think that a question put to him will lead to punishment, or that a threat means any harm: and so he makes light of it. And why should you be annoyed? You know well that there is no malice in what your mother says to you; on the contrary, she wishes you to be blessed above all other beings — unless, indeed, you suppose that your mother is maliciously set against you? Oh no, I don’t think that. Then Socrates exclaimed:
2.9. τί δʼ; οἴει, ἔφη, χαλεπώτερον εἶναί σοι ἀκούειν ὧν αὕτη λέγει ἢ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν; ἀλλʼ, οἶμαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε τὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν ἵνα ζημιώσῃ οὔτε τὸν ἀπειλοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν ἵνα κακόν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥᾳδίως φέρουσι. σὺ δʼ εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἃ λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν κακὸν νοοῦσα λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλομένη σοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ὅσα οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ, χαλεπαίνεις; ἢ νομίζεις κακόνουν τὴν μητέρα σοι εἶναι;
2.10. So this mother of yours is kindly disposed towards you; she nurses you devotedly in sickness and sees that you want for nothing; more than that, she prays the gods to bless you abundantly and pays vows on your behalf; and yet you say she is a trial! It seems to me that, if you can’t endure a mother like her, you can’t endure a good thing.
2.10. οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· τοῦτό γε οὐκ οἴομαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σὺ ταύτην, εὔνουν τέ σοι οὖσαν καὶ ἐπιμελομένην ὡς μάλιστα δύναται κάμνοντος ὅπως ὑγιάνῃς τε καὶ ὅπως τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μηδενὸς ἐνδεὴς ἔσει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένην ἀγαθὰ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ εὐχὰς ἀποδιδοῦσαν, χαλεπὴν εἶναι φής; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, εἰ τοιαύτην μὴ δύνασαι φέρειν μητέρα, τἀγαθά σε οὐ δύνασθαι φέρειν.
2.11. Now tell me, is there any other being whom you feel bound to regard? Or are you set on trying to please nobody, and obeying neither general nor other ruler? Of course not!
2.11. εἰπὲ δέ μοι, ἔφη, πότερον ἄλλον τινὰ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; ἢ παρεσκεύασαι μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων πειρᾶσθαι ἀρέσκειν μηδὲ πείθεσθαι μήτε στρατηγῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ ἄρχοντι;
2.12. Do you want to please your neighbour, for instance, so that he may kindle a fire for you at your need, may support you in prosperity, and in case of accident or failure may be ready to hold out a helping hand? Yes, I do. When you find yourself with a travelling companion on land or at sea, or happen to meet anyone, is it a matter of indifference to you whether he prove a friend or an enemy? Or do you think his goodwill worth cultivating? Yes, I do.
2.12. ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἔγωγε, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῷ γείτονι βούλῃ σὺ ἀρέσκειν, ἵνα σοι καὶ πῦρ ἐναύῃ, ὅταν τούτου δέῃ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τέ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ καί, ἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχῃς, εὐνοϊκῶς ἐγγύθεν βοηθῇ σοι; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. τί δέ; συνοδοιπόρον ἢ σύμπλουν, ἢ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἐντυγχάνοις, οὐδὲν ἄν σοι διαφέροι φίλον ἢ ἐχθρὸν γενέσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας οἴει δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι;
2.13. And yet, when you are resolved to cultivate these, you don’t think courtesy is due to your mother, who loves you more than all? Don’t you know that even the state ignores all other forms of ingratitude and pronounces no judgment on them, caring nothing if the recipient of a favour neglects to thank his benefactor, but inflicts penalties on the man who is discourteous to his parents and rejects him as unworthy of office, holding that it would be a sin for him to offer sacrifices on behalf of the state and that he is unlikely to do anything else honourably and rightly? Aye, and if one fail to honour his parents’ graves, the state inquires into that too, when it examines the candidates for office.
2.13. ἔγωγε, ἔφη. εἶτα τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι παρεσκεύασαι, τὴν δὲ μητέρα τὴν πάντων μάλιστά σε φιλοῦσαν οὐκ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται οὐδὲ δικάζει, ἀλλὰ περιορᾷ τοὺς εὖ πεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδόντας, ἐὰν δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ εὐσεβῶς θυόμενα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τούτου θύοντος οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν τούτου πράξαντος; καὶ νὴ Δία ἐάν τις τῶν γονέων τελευτησάντων τοὺς τάφους μὴ κοσμῇ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκιμασίαις.
2.14. Therefore, my boy, if you are prudent, you will pray the gods to pardon your neglect of your mother, lest they in turn refuse to be kind to you, thinking you an ingrate; and you will beware of men, lest all cast you out, perceiving that you care nothing for your parents, and in the end you are found to be without a friend. For, should men suppose you to be ungrateful to your parents, none would think you would be grateful for any kindness he might show you.
2.14. σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσῃ συγγνώμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἴ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μή σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθελήσωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους φυλάξῃ μή σε αἰσθόμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσιν, εἶτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς. εἰ γάρ σε ὑπολάβοιεν πρὸς τοὺς γονέας ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐδεὶς ἂν νομίσειεν εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι.
3.1. On another occasion he found that two brothers, Chaerophon and Chaerecrates, whom he knew well, were quarrelling. On seeing the latter, he cried, Surely, Chaerecrates, you are not one of those who hold that there is more value in goods and chattels than in a brother, when they are senseless but he is sensible; they are helpless but he is helpful; when, moreover, you have many goods, but only one brother.
3.1. Χαιρεφῶντα δέ ποτε καὶ Χαιρεκράτην, ἀδελφὼ μὲν ὄντε ἀλλήλοιν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ γνωρίμω, αἰσθόμενος διαφερομένω, ἰδὼν τὸν Χαιρεκράτην, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐ δήπου καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οἳ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἀδελφούς; καὶ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου, καὶ τῶν μὲν βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ δὲ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ὑπαρχόντων, τοῦ δὲ ἑνός.
3.2. It is strange too that a man should think he loses by his brothers because he cannot have their possessions as well as his own, and yet should not think that he loses by his fellow-citizens because their possessions are not his; and whereas in this case men can reflect that it is better to belong to a community, secure in the possession of a sufficiency, than to dwell in solitude with a precarious hold on all the property of their fellow-citizens, they fail to see that the same principle applies to brothers.
3.2. θαυμαστὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, εἴ τις τοὺς μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ζημίαν ἡγεῖται, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν κέκτηται, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας οὐχ ἡγεῖται ζημίαν, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔχει, ἀλλʼ ἐνταῦθα μὲν δύνανται λογίζεσθαι ὅτι κρεῖττον σὺν πολλοῖς οἰκοῦντα ἀσφαλῶς τἀρκοῦντα ἔχειν ἢ μόνον διαιτώμενον τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικινδύνως πάντα κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦσι·
3.3. Again, those who have the means by servants to relieve them of work, and make friends because they feel the need of help; but they care nothing for their brothers, as though friendship can exist between fellow-citizens, but not between brothers!
3.3. καὶ οἰκέτας μὲν οἱ δυνάμενοι ὠνοῦνται, ἵνα συνεργοὺς ἔχωσι, καὶ φίλους κτῶνται, ὡς βοηθῶν δεόμενοι, τῶν δʼ ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μὲν γιγνομένους φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δὲ οὐ γιγνομένους.
3.4. Yet common parentage and common upbringing are strong ties of affection, for even brute beasts reared together feel a natural yearning for one another. Besides, our fellow-men respect those of us who have brothers more than those who have none, and are less ready to quarrel with them.
3.4. καὶ μὴν πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φῦναι, μέγα δὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ τραφῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντρόφων· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τιμῶσί τε μᾶλλον τοὺς συναδέλφους ὄντας τῶν ἀναδέλφων καὶ ἧττον τούτοις ἐπιτίθενται.
3.5. If only the difference between us were a slight one, Socrates, replied Chaerecrates, it might perhaps be my duty to put up with my brother and not allow trifles to separate us. For a brother who behaves like a brother is, as you say, a blessing; but if his conduct is nothing like that, and is, in fact, just the opposite of what it should be, what is the use of attempting impossibilities?
3.5. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἀλλʼ εἰ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ μέγα εἴη τὸ διάφορον, ἴσως ἂν δέοι φέρειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ μὴ μικρῶν ἕνεκα φεύγειν· ἀγαθὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ἀδελφὸς ὢν οἷον δεῖ· ὁπότε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδέοι καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιώτατον εἴη, τί ἄν τις ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις;
3.6. Does everyone find Chaerophon as disagreeable as you do, Chaerecrates, or do some people think him very pleasant? Ah, Socrates, replied he, this is precisely my reason for hating him: he is pleasant enough to other people, but whenever he is near me, he invariably says and does more to hurt than to help me.
3.6. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· πότερα δέ, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐδενὶ ἀρέσαι δύναται Χαιρεφῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ σοί, ἢ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ἀρέσκει; διὰ τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ μισεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄλλοις μὲν ἀρέσκειν δύναται, ἐμοὶ δὲ ὅπου ἂν παρῇ πανταχοῦ καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ζημία μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν.
3.7. Well now, said Socrates, if you try to manage a horse without knowing the right way, he hurts you. Is it so with a brother? Does he hurt if you try to deal with him when you don’t know the way?
3.7. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ ἵππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μέν, ἐγχειροῦντι δὲ χρῆσθαι ζημία ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἀδελφός, ὅταν τις αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἐγχειρῇ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστί;
3.8. What, exclaimed Chaerecrates, don’t I know how to deal with a brother, when I know how to requite a kind word and a generous deed? But I can’t speak or act kindly to one who tries to annoy me by his words and actions — and what’s more, I won’t try. Chaerecrates, you astonish me!
3.8. πῶς δʼ ἂν ἐγώ, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, ἀνεπιστήμων εἴην ἀδελφῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπιστάμενός γε καὶ εὖ λέγειν τὸν εὖ λέγοντα καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα; τὸν μέντοι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ πειρώμενον ἐμὲ ἀνιᾶν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην οὔτʼ εὖ λέγειν οὔτʼ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πειράσομαι.
3.9. Had you a sheep dog that was friendly to the shepherds, but growled when you came near him, it would never occur to you to get angry, but you would try to tame him by kindness. You say that, if your brother treated you like a brother, he would be a great blessing, and you confess that you know how to speak and act kindly: yet you don’t set yourself to contriving that he shall be the greatest possible blessing to you.
3.9. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, εἰ κύνα μέν, εἴ σοι ἦν ἐπὶ προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὢν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἠσπάζετο, σοὶ δὲ προσιόντι ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὖ ποιήσας πραΰνειν αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φὴς μὲν μέγα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὄντα πρὸς σὲ οἷον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δὲ ὁμολογῶν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ εὖ λέγειν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ.
3.10. I fear, Socrates, that I lack the wisdom to make Chaerophon treat me as he should. And yet, said Socrates, there is no need, so far as I see, of any subtle or strange contriving on your part: I think you know the way to win him and to get his good opinion.
3.10. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, δέδοικα, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼ τοσαύτην σοφίαν ὥστε Χαιρεφῶντα ποιῆσαι πρὸς ἐμὲ οἷον δεῖ. καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ καινὸν δεῖ ἐπʼ αὐτόν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μηχανᾶσθαι, οἷς δὲ καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασαι αὐτὸς οἴομαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἁλόντα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαί σε.
3.11. If you have observed that I know some spell without being conscious of my knowledge, pray tell me at once. Then tell me, now; if you wanted to get an invitation to dine with an acquaintance when he offers sacrifice, what would you do? Of course I should begin by inviting him myself when I offered sacrifice.
3.11. οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, εἴ τι ᾔσθησαί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον ὃ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν. λέγε δή μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι κατάρχοιμʼ ἂν τοῦ αὐτός, ὅτε θύοιμι, καλεῖν ἐκεῖνον.
3.12. And suppose you wanted to encourage one of your friends to look after your affairs during your absence from home, what would you do? Of course I should first undertake to look after his affairs in his absence.
3.12. εἰ δὲ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι πρότερος ἂν ἐγχειροίην ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐκείνου, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίη.
3.13. And suppose you wanted a stranger to entertain you when you visited his city, what would you do? Obviously I should first entertain him when he came to Athens. Yes, and if I wanted him to show himself eager in forwarding the business on which I had come, it is obvious that I should first have to do the same by him.
3.13. εἰ δὲ βούλοιο ξένον ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν, ὁπότε ἔλθοις εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου, τί ἂν ποιοίης; δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτον πρότερος ὑποδεχοίμην ἄν, ὁπότε ἔλθοι Ἀθήναζε· καὶ εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφʼ ἃ ἥκοιμι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο δέοι ἂν πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν.
3.14. It seems that you have long concealed a knowledge of all spells that were ever discovered. Or is it that you hesitate to make a beginning, for fear of disgracing yourself by first showing kindness to your brother? Yet it is generally thought worthy of the highest praise to anticipate the malevolence of an enemy and the benevolence of a friend. So if I thought Chaerophon more capable than you of showing the way to this friendship, I would try to persuade him to take the first step towards an understanding with you. But as things are, I think the enterprise more likely to succeed under your direction. Strange sentiments, these, Socrates!
3.14. πάντʼ ἄρα σύγε τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα ἐπιστάμενος πάλαι ἀπεκρύπτου· ἢ ὀκνεῖς, ἔφη, ἄρξαι, μὴ αἰσχρὸς φανῇς, ἐὰν πρότερος τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὖ ποιῇς; καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φιλίαν ταύτην, ἐκεῖνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ σὲ φίλον ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ μοι σὺ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον ἂν ἐξεργάσασθαι τοῦτο.
3.15. It’s quite unlike you to urge me, the junior, to lead the way! And surely all hold the contrary opinion, that the senior, I mean, should always act and speak first? How so? said Socrates.
3.15. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἄτοπα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ, ὅς γε κελεύεις ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα καθηγεῖσθαι· καίτοι τούτου γε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τἀναντία νομίζεται, τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου.
3.16. Is it not the general opinion that a young man should make way for an older when they meet, offer his seat to him, give him a comfortable bed, let him have the first word? My good friend, don’t hesitate, but take up the task of pacifying your man, and in no time he will respond to your overtures. Don’t you see how keen and frank he is? Low fellows, it is true, yield most readily to gifts, but kindness is the weapon most likely to prevail with a gentleman.
3.16. πῶς; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γὰρ καὶ ὁδοῦ παραχωρῆσαι τὸν νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρῳ συντυγχάνοντι πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καὶ καθήμενον ὑπαναστῆναι καὶ κοίτῃ μαλακῇ τιμῆσαι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπεῖξαι; ὠγαθέ, μὴ ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπραΰνειν, καὶ πάνυ ταχύ σοι ὑπακούσεται· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς φιλότιμός ἐστι καὶ ἐλευθέριος; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἀνθρώπια οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἕλοις ἢ εἰ δοίης τι, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἀνθρώπους προσφιλῶς χρώμενος μάλιστʼ ἂν κατεργάσαιο.
3.17. And what, asked Chaerecrates, if all my efforts lead to no improvement? Well, in that case, I presume you will have shown that you are honest and brotherly, he that he is base and unworthy of kindness. But I am confident that no such result will follow; for I think that, as soon as he is aware of your challenge to this contest, he will be all eagerness to outdo your kind words and actions.
3.17. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος ἐκεῖνος μηδὲν βελτίων γίγνηται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ κινδυνεύσεις ἐπιδεῖξαι σὺ μὲν χρηστός τε καὶ φιλάδελφος εἶναι, ἐκεῖνος δὲ φαῦλός τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξιος εὐεργεσίας; ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν οἶμαι τούτων ἔσεσθαι· νομίζω γὰρ αὐτόν, ἐπειδὰν αἴσθηταί σε προκαλούμενον ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, πάνυ φιλονικήσειν ὅπως περιγένηταί σου καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ εὖ ποιῶν.
3.18. What if a pair of hands refused the office of mutual help for which God made them, and tried to thwart each other; or if a pair of feet neglected the duty of working together, for which they were fashioned, and took to hampering each other? That is how you two are behaving at present.
3.18. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθον, ὥσπερ εἰ τὼ χεῖρε, ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῷ συλλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλοιν ἐποίησεν, ἀφεμένω τούτου τράποιντο πρὸς τὸ διακωλύειν ἀλλήλω, ἢ εἰ τὼ πόδε θείᾳ μοίρᾳ πεποιημένω πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοιν, ἀμελήσαντε τούτου ἐμποδίζοιεν ἀλλήλω.
3.19. Would it not be utterly senseless and disastrous to use for hindrance instruments that were made for help? And, moreover, a pair of brothers, in my judgment, were made by God to render better service one to the other than a pair of hands and feet and eyes and all the instruments that he meant to be used as fellows. For the hands cannot deal simultaneously with things that are more than six feet or so apart: the feet cannot reach in a single stride things that are even six feet apart: and the eyes, though they seem to have a longer range, cannot at the same moment see things still nearer than that, if some are in front and some behind. But two brothers, when they are friends, act simultaneously for mutual benefit, however far parted one from the other.
3.19. οὐκ ἂν πολλὴ ἀμαθία εἴη καὶ κακοδαιμονία τοῖς ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ πεποιημένοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρῆσθαι; καὶ μὴν ἀδελφώ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ μείζονι ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν ἢ χεῖρέ τε καὶ πόδε καὶ ὀφθαλμὼ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἀδελφὰ ἔφυσεν ἀνθρώποις. χεῖρες μὲν γάρ, εἰ δέοι αὐτὰς τὰ πλέον ὀργυιᾶς διέχοντα ἅμα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο, πόδες δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ὀργυιὰν διέχοντα ἔλθοιεν ἅμα, ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξικνεῖσθαι οὐδʼ ἂν τῶν ἔτι ἐγγυτέρω ὄντων τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἅμα καὶ τὰ ὄπισθεν ἰδεῖν δύναιντο· ἀδελφὼ δέ, φίλω ὄντε, καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε πράττετον ἅμα καὶ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν.
4.1. Again, I once heard him give a discourse on friendship that was likely, as I thought, to help greatly in the acquisition and use of friends. For he said that he often heard it stated that of all possessions the most precious is a good and sincere friend. And yet, he said, there is no transaction most men are so careless about as the acquisition of friends.
4.1. ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι πρὸς φίλων κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρείαν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ δὴ πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός· ἐπιμελομένους δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἢ φίλων κτήσεως.
4.2. For I find that they are careful about getting houses and lands and slaves and cattle and furniture, and anxious to keep what they have; but though they tell one that a friend is the greatest blessing, I find that most men take no thought how to get new friends or how to keep their old ones.
4.2. καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ βοσκήματα καὶ σκεύη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾶν ἔφη καὶ τὰ ὄντα σῴζειν πειρωμένους, φίλον δέ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὔτε ὅπως κτήσωνται φροντίζοντας οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες αὐτοῖς σῴζωνται.
4.3. Indeed, if one of their friends and one of their servants fall ill at the same time, I find that some call in the doctor to attend the servant and are careful to provide everything that may contribute to his recovery, whereas they take no heed of the friend. In the event of both dying, they are vexed at losing the servant, but don’t feel that the death of the friend matters in the least. And though none of their other possessions is uncared for and unconsidered, they are deaf to their friends’ need of attention.
4.3. ἀλλὰ καὶ καμνόντων φίλων τε καὶ οἰκετῶν ὁρᾶν τινας ἔφη τοῖς μὲν οἰκέταις καὶ ἰατροὺς εἰσάγοντας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐπιμελῶς παρασκευάζοντας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὀλιγωροῦντας, ἀποθανόντων τε ἀμφοτέρων ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀχθομένους τε καὶ ζημίαν ἡγουμένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδὲν οἰομένους ἐλαττοῦσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδὲν ἐῶντας ἀθεράπευτον οὐδʼ ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δὲ φίλων ἐπιμελείας δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας.
4.4. And besides all this, I find that most men know the number of their other possessions, however great it may be, yet cannot tell the number of their friends, few as they are; and, if they are asked and try to make a list, they will insert names and presently remove them. So much for the thought they give to their friends!
4.4. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων, καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων, τὸ πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δὲ φίλων, ὀλίγων ὄντων, οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυνθανομένοις τοῦτο καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας, οὓς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἔθεσαν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι· τοσοῦτον αὐτοὺς τῶν φίλων φροντίζειν.
4.5. Yet surely there is no other possession that can compare with a good friend. For what horse, what yoke of oxen is so good a servant as the good friend? What slave so loyal and constant? or what possession so serviceable?
4.5. καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ κρείττων φανείη; ποῖος γὰρ ἵππος ἢ ποῖον ζεῦγος οὕτω χρήσιμον ὥσπερ ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος; ποῖον δὲ ἀνδράποδον οὕτως εὔνουν καὶ παραμόνιμον; ἢ ποῖον ἄλλο κτῆμα οὕτω πάγχρηστον;
4.6. The good friend is on the watch to supply whatever his friend wants for building up his private fortune and forwarding his public career. If generosity is called for, he does his part: if fear harasses, he comes to the rescue, shares expenses, helps to persuade, bears down opposition: he is foremost in delighting him when he is prosperous and raising him up when he falls.
4.6. ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευῆς καὶ τῶν κοινῶν πράξεων, καί, ἄν τέ τινα εὖ ποιῆσαι δέῃ, συνεπισχύει, ἄν τέ τις φόβος ταράττῃ, συμβοηθεῖ, τὰ μὲν συναναλίσκων, τὰ δὲ συμπράττων, καὶ τὰ μὲν συμπείθων, τὰ δὲ βιαζόμενος, καὶ εὖ μὲν πράττοντας πλεῖστα εὐφραίνων, σφαλλομένους δὲ πλεῖστα ἐπανορθῶν.
4.7. Of all that a man can do with his hands, see for himself with his eyes, hear for himself with his ears or accomplish with his feet, in nothing is a friend backward in helping. Nevertheless, while some strive to cultivate a tree for its fruit, most bestow but an idle and listless care on their most fruitful possession, the name of which is “friend.”
4.7. ἃ δὲ αἵ τε χεῖρες ἑκάστῳ ὑπηρετοῦσι καὶ ⟨οἱ⟩ ὀφθαλμοὶ προορῶσι καὶ τὰ ὦτα προακούουσι καὶ οἱ πόδες διανύτουσι, τούτων φίλος εὐεργετῶν οὐδενὸς λείπεται· πολλάκις ἃ πρὸ αὑτοῦ τις ἢ οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο ἢ οὐκ εἶδεν ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσεν ἢ οὐ διήνυσε, ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἔνιοι δένδρα μὲν πειρῶνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκεν, τοῦ δὲ παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὃ καλεῖται φίλος, ἀργῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπιμέλονται.
5.1. Again, I once heard him exhort a listener — for so I interpreted his words — to examine himself and to ask how much he was worth to his friends. For he had noticed that one of his companions was neglecting a poverty-stricken friend; so he put a question to Antisthenes in the presence of several others, including the careless friend.
5.1. ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενίᾳ πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν·
5.2. Antisthenes, he said, have friends like servants their own values? For one servant, I suppose, may be worth two minas, another less than half a mina, another five minas, another no less than ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have given a whole talent for a manager of his silver-mine. So I am led to inquire whether friends too may not differ in value.
5.2. ἆρʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν; τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μέν που δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ οὐδʼ ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα· Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου· σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἀξίαι.
5.3. Oh yes, replied Antisthenes, there are men whose friendship I, at any rate, would rather have than two minas: others I should value at less than half a mina: others I would prefer to ten minas: others I would sacrifice any sum and take any trouble to have among my friends.
5.3. ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἂν τὸν μέν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δύο μνᾶς, τὸν δʼ οὐδʼ ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἑλοίμην ἄν, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ πόνων πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι.
5.4. Then if that is so, said Socrates, were it not well that one should ask himself how much he is really worth to his friends, and try to make himself as precious as possible, in order that his friends may not be tempted to betray him? For my part, I often hear complaints of this sort: A friend betrayed me, one whom I regarded as my friend gave me up for the sake of a mina.
5.4. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐξετάζειν τινὰ ἑαυτόν, πόσου ἄρα τυγχάνει τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἧττον αὐτὸν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἔφη, πολλάκις ἀκούων τοῦ μὲν ὅτι προύδωκεν αὐτὸν φίλος ἀνήρ, τοῦ δʼ ὅτι μνᾶν ἀνθʼ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀνήρ, ὃν ᾤετο φίλον εἶναι, τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα σκοπῶ, μή, ὥσπερ ὅταν τις οἰκέτην πονηρὸν πωλῇ καὶ ἀποδίδοται τοῦ εὑρόντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν φίλον, ὅταν ἐξῇ τὸ πλέον τῆς ἀξίας λαβεῖν, ἐπαγωγὸν ᾖ ἀποδίδοσθαι·
5.5. I think over such matters and reflect that, when a man sells a bad slave he takes anything he can get for him; and perhaps it is tempting to sell a bad friend when there is a chance of getting more than he is worth. Good servants, I find, are not offered for sale, nor are good friends betrayed. In the following conversation I thought he gave instruction for testing the qualities that make a man’s friendship worth winning. Tell me, Critobulus, he said, if we wanted a good friend, how should we start on the quest? Should we seek first for one who is no slave to eating and drinking, lust, sleep, idleness? For the thrall of these masters cannot do his duty by himself or his friend. No, of course not. Then you think we should avoid one who is subject to them? I do, certainly.
5.5. τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς οὔτε οἰκέτας πάνυ τι πωλουμένους ὁρῶ οὔτε φίλους προδιδομένους. ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν φίλους ὁποίους ἄξιον κτᾶσθαι φρενοῦν τοιάδε λέγων· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν; ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, ὅστις ἄρχει γαστρός τε καὶ φιλοποσίας καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἀργίας; ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατούμενος οὔτʼ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δύναιτʼ ἂν οὔτε φίλῳ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχομένου ἀφεκτέον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;
6.2. Now what about the spendthrift who is never satisfied, who is always appealing to his neighbours for help, if he receives something, makes no return, if he receives nothing, resents it? Don’t you think he too is a troublesome friend? Certainly. Then we must avoid him too? We must indeed.
6.2. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί γάρ; ἔφη, ὅστις δαπανηρὸς ὢν μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τῶν πλησίον δεῖται, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν μὴ δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ τὸν μὴ διδόντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ οὗτος χαλεπὸς φίλος εἶναι; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου; ἀφεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.
6.3. Again, what about the skilful man of business who is eager to make money, and consequently drives a hard bargain, who likes to receive but is disinclined to repay? So far as I see, he is even worse than the last.
6.3. τί γάρ; ὅστις χρηματίζεσθαι μὲν δύναται, πολλῶν δὲ χρημάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυσσύμβολός ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἥδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ μὴ βούλεται; ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὗτος ἔτι πονηρότερος ἐκείνου εἶναι.
6.4. And what of the man who is such a keen man of business that he has no leisure for anything but the selfish pursuit of gain? We must avoid him too, I think. There is no profit in knowing him. And what of the quarrelsome person who is willing to provide his friends with plenty of enemies? We must shun him too, of course. Suppose that a man is free from all these faults, but stoops to receive kindness with no thought of returning it? There is no profit in him either. But what are the qualities for which we shall try to win a man’s friendship, Socrates? The opposite of these, I suppose.
6.4. τί δʼ; ὅστις διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ; ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· ἀνωφελὴς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῷ χρωμένῳ. τί δέ; ὅστις στασιώδης τέ ἐστι καὶ θέλων πολλοὺς τοῖς φίλοις ἐχθροὺς παρέχειν; φευκτέον νὴ Δία καὶ τοῦτον. εἰ δέ τις τούτων μὲν τῶν κακῶν μηδὲν ἔχοι, εὖ δὲ πάσχων ἀνέχεται, μηδὲν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν; ἀνωφελὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὗτος. ἀλλὰ ποῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι;
6.5. We shall look for one who controls his indulgence in the pleasures of the body, who is truly hospitable and fair in his dealings and eager to do as much for his benefactors as he receives from them, so that he is worth knowing.
6.5. οἶμαι μέν, ὅστις τἀναντία τούτων ἐγκρατὴς μέν ἐστι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὔοικος δὲ καὶ εὐσύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ φιλόνικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις.
6.6. Then how can we test these qualities, Socrates, before intimacy begins? What test do we apply to a sculptor? We don’t judge by what he says, but we look at his statues, and if we see that the works he has already produced are beautiful, we feel confident that his future works will be as good.
6.6. πῶς οὖν ἂν ταῦτα δοκιμάσαιμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι; τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιούς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλʼ ὃν ἂν ὁρῶμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὖ ποιήσειν.
6.7. You mean that anyone whose good works wrought upon his old friends are manifest will clearly prove a benefactor to new friends also? Yes; for when I find that an owner of horses has been in the habit of treating his beasts well I think that he will treat others equally well.
6.7. καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὃς ἂν τοὺς φίλους τοὺς πρόσθεν εὖ ποιῶν φαίνηται, δῆλον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον εὐεργετήσοντα; καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις, ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ὁρῶ τοῖς πρόσθεν καλῶς χρώμενον, τοῦτον κἂν ἄλλοις οἶμαι καλῶς χρῆσθαι.
6.8. Granted! but when we have found a man who seems worthy of our friendship, how are we to set about making him our friend? First we should seek guidance from the gods, whether they counsel us to make a friend of him. And next? Supposing that we have chosen and the gods approve him, can you say how is he to be hunted?
6.8. εἶεν, ἔφη· ὃς δʼ ἂν ἡμῖν ἄξιος φιλίας δοκῇ εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτὸν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. τί οὖν; ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ μὴ ἐναντιῶνται, ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὗτος θηρατέος;
6.9. Surely not like a hare by swift pursuit, nor like birds by cunning, nor like enemies by force. It is no light task to capture a friend against his will, and hard to keep him a prisoner like a slave. Hatred, rather than friendship, comes of that treatment.
6.9. μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας, ὥσπερ ὁ λαγῶς, οὐδʼ ἀπάτῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες, οὐδὲ βίᾳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐχθροί· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἑλεῖν ἐργῶδες· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ δήσαντα κατέχειν, ὥσπερ δοῦλον· ἐχθροὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι γίγνονται ⟨οἱ⟩ ταῦτα πάσχοντες. φίλοι δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.
6.10. But how does friendship come? There are spells, they say, wherewith those who know charm whom they will and make friends of them, and drugs which those who know give to whom they choose and win their love.
6.10. εἶναι μέν τινάς φασιν ἐπῳδάς, ἃς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπᾴδοντες οἷς ἂν βούλωνται φίλους αὐτοὺς ποιοῦνται· εἶναι δὲ καὶ φίλτρα, οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλωνται χρώμενοι φιλοῦνται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν.
6.11. How then can we learn them? You have heard from Homer the spell that the Sirens put on Odysseus. It begins like this:Hither, come hither, renowned Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans.Then did the Sirens chant in this strain for other folk too, Socrates, so as to keep those who were under the spell from leaving them?
6.11. πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα μάθοιμεν ἄν; ἃ μὲν αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἤκουσας Ὁμήρου, ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις·δεῦρʼ ἄγε δή, πολύαινʼ Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν.ταύτην οὖν, ἔφη, τὴν ἐπῳδήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπᾴδουσαι κατεῖχον, ὥστε μὴ ἀπιέναι ἀπʼ αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπᾳσθέντας;
6.12. No, only for those that yearned for the fame that virtue gives. You mean, I take it, that the spell must be fitted to the listener, so that he may not take the praise for mockery. Yes; for to praise one for his beauty, his stature and his strength who is conscious that he is short, ugly and puny, is the way to repel him and make him dislike you more. Do you know any other spells?
6.12. οὐκ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις οὕτως ἐπῇδον. σχεδόν τι λέγεις τοιαῦτα χρῆναι ἑκάστῳ ἐπᾴδειν, οἷα μὴ νομιεῖ ἀκούων τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα καταγελῶντα λέγειν; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐχθίων τʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀπελαύνοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ τὸν εἰδότα ὅτι μικρός τε καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἀσθενής ἐστιν ἐπαινοίη λέγων ὅτι καλός τε καὶ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρός ἐστιν. ἄλλας δέ τινας οἶσθα ἐπῳδάς;
6.13. No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many and put them on the city, and so made her love him. And how did Themistocles make the city love him? Not by spells: no, no; but by hanging some good amulet about her.
6.13. οὐκ ἀλλʼ ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίσταιτο, ἃς ἐπᾴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὑτόν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν φιλεῖν αὑτόν; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἐπᾴδων, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ.
6.14. I think you mean, Socrates, that if we are to win a good man’s friendship, we ourselves must be good in word and deed alike? But you imagined that a bad man could win the friendship of honest men?
6.14. δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἀγαθόν τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν. σὺ δʼ ᾤου, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστοὺς φίλους κτήσασθαι;
6.15. I did, answered Critobulus, for I saw that poor orators have good speakers among their friends, and some who are incapable of commanding an army are intimate with great generals.
6.15. ἑώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ῥήτοράς τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν οὐχ ἱκανοὺς πάνυ στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑταίρους.
6.16. Coming then to the point under discussion, do you know cases of useless persons making useful friends? Assuredly not; but if it is impossible that the bad should gain the friendship of gentlemen, then I am anxious to know whether it is quite easy for a gentleman as a matter of course to be the friend of gentlemen?
6.16. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, καί, περὶ οὗ διαλεγόμεθα, οἶσθά τινας οἳ ἀνωφελεῖς ὄντες ὠφελίμους δύνανται φίλους ποιεῖσθαι; μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτʼ, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι πονηρὸν ὄντα καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς φίλους κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἤδη μέλει μοι, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενόμενον ἐξ ἑτοίμου τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς φίλον εἶναι.
6.17. Your trouble is, Critobulus, that you often find men who do good and shun evil not on friendly terms, but apt to quarrel and treat one another more harshly than worthless fellows.
6.17. ὃ ταράττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολλάκις ἄνδρας καὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ καλὰ πράττοντας καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπεχομένους ὁρᾷς ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι στασιάζοντας ἀλλήλοις καὶ χαλεπώτερον χρωμένους τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων ἀνθρώπων.
6.18. Yes, said Critobulus, and such conduct is not confined to individuals, but even the cities that care most for the right and have least liking for the wrong are often at enmity.
6.18. καὶ οὐ μόνον γʼ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἱ ἰδιῶται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις αἱ τῶν τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελόμεναι καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἥκιστα προσιέμεναι πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας.
6.19. These thoughts make me despair about the acquisition of friends. For I see on the one hand that rogues cannot be friends with one another — for how could the ungrateful, the careless, the selfish, the faithless, the incontinent, form friendships? I feel sure, then, that rogues are by their nature enemies rather than friends.
6.19. ἃ λογιζόμενος πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχω πρὸς τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὁρῶ φίλους ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους εἶναι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἀχάριστοι ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ πλεονέκται ἢ ἄπιστοι ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναιντο φίλοι γενέσθαι; οἱ μὲν οὖν πονηροὶ πάντως ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι πεφυκέναι.
6.20. But then, as you point out, neither can rogues ever join in friendship with honest men, for how can wrongdoers become friendly with those who hate their conduct? And if we must add that the votaries of virtue strive with one another for headship in cities, and envy and hate one another, who then will be friends and where shall loyalty and faithfulness be found?
6.20. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, οὐδʼ ἂν τοῖς χρηστοῖς οἱ πονηροί ποτε συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιοῦντες τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσι φίλοι γένοιντʼ ἄν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὔνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται;
6.21. Ah, Critobulus, but there is a strange complication in these matters. Some elements in man’s nature make for friendship: men need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of the facts, are grateful to one another. But there are hostile elements in men. For, holding the same things to be honourable and pleasant, they fight for them, fall out and take sides. Strife and anger lead to hostility, covetousness to enmity, jealousy to hatred.
6.21. ἀλλʼ ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος.