5.20. Then Socrates asked, But what of the Court of the Areopagus, Pericles? Are not its members persons who have won approval? Certainly. Then do you know of any who decide the cases that come before them and perform all their other functions more honourably, more in accordance with law, with more dignity and justice? I am not finding fault with the Areopagus. Then you must not despair of Athenian discipline.
5.20. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δεδοκιμασμένων καθίσταται; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. οἶσθα οὖν τινας, ἔφη, κάλλιον ἢ νομιμώτερον ἢ σεμνότερον ἢ δικαιότερον τάς τε δίκας δικάζοντας καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πράττοντας; οὐ μέμφομαι, ἔφη, τούτοις. οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὡς οὐκ εὐτάκτων ὄντων Ἀθηναίων.
5.21. But, you see, in the army, where good conduct, discipline, submission are most necessary, our people pay no attention to these things. This may be due to the incompetence of the officers. You must have noticed that no one attempts to exercise authority over our harpists, choristers and dancers, if he is incompetent, nor over wrestlers or wrestlers who also box? All who have authority over them can tell where they learned their business; but most of our generals are improvisors.
5.21. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἔφη, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ εὐτακτεῖν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν. ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν τούτοις οἱ ἥκιστα ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν. οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι κιθαριστῶν μὲν καὶ χορευτῶν καὶ ὀρχηστῶν οὐδὲ εἷς ἐπιχειρεῖ ἄρχειν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐδὲ παλαιστῶν οὐδὲ παγκρατιαστῶν; ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ τούτων ἄρχοντες ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ὁπόθεν ἔμαθον ταῦτα ἐφʼ οἷς ἐφεστᾶσι· τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν.
5.22. However, I don’t suppose you are one of this sort. I suppose you can say when you began to learn strategy as well as when you began wrestling. Many of the principles, I think, you have inherited from your father, and many others you have gathered from every source from which you could learn anything useful to a general.
5.22. οὐ μέντοι σέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐγὼ νομίζω εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οἶμαί σε οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὁπότε στρατηγεῖν ἢ ὁπότε παλαίειν ἤρξω μανθάνειν. καὶ πολλὰ μὲν οἶμαί σε τῶν πατρῴων στρατηγημάτων παρειληφότα διασῴζειν, πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν συνηχέναι, ὁπόθεν οἷόν τε ἦν μαθεῖν τι ὠφέλιμον εἰς στρατηγίαν.
5.23. I think, too, that you take much trouble that you may not unconsciously lack any knowledge useful to a general; and if you find that you don’t know anything, you seek out those who have the knowledge, grudging neither gifts nor thanks, that you may learn what you don’t know from them and may have the help of good coaching.
5.23. οἶμαι δέ σε πολλὰ μεριμνᾶν, ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν ὠφελίμων, καὶ ἐάν τι τοιοῦτον αἴσθῃ σεαυτὸν μὴ εἰδότα, ζητεῖν τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ταῦτα, οὔτε δώρων οὔτε χαρίτων φειδόμενον, ὅπως μάθῃς παρʼ αὐτῶν ἃ μὴ ἐπίστασαι καὶ συνεργοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἔχῃς.
5.24. I can see, Socrates, that in saying this you don’t really think I study these things, but you are trying to show me that one who is going to command an army must study all of them; and of course I admit that you are right.
5.24. καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, οὐ λανθάνεις με, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐδʼ οἰόμενός με τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ταῦτα λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἐγχειρῶν με διδάσκειν ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα στρατηγεῖν τούτων ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ.
5.25. Have you observed, Pericles, that our frontier is protected by great mountains extending to Boeotia, through which there are steep and narrow passes leading into our land, and that the interior is cut across by rugged mountains? Certainly.
5.25. ὁμολογῶ μέντοι κἀγώ σοι ταῦτα. τοῦτο δʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Περίκλεις, κατανενόηκας, ὅτι πρόκειται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὄρη μεγάλα, καθήκοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν, διʼ ὧν εἰς τὴν χώραν εἴσοδοι στεναί τε καὶ προσάντεις εἰσί, καὶ ὅτι μέση διέζωται ὄρεσιν ἐρυμνοῖς; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.
5.26. Further, have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, occupying very rugged country in the Great King’s territory and lightly armed, contrive to overrun and damage the King’s territory and to preserve their own freedom? Yes, I have heard so.
5.26. τί δέ; ἐκεῖνο ἀκήκοας, ὅτι Μυσοὶ καὶ Πισίδαι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ κατέχοντες ἐρυμνὰ πάνυ χωρία καὶ κούφως ὡπλισμένοι δύνανται πολλὰ μὲν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν καταθέοντες κακοποιεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ζῆν ἐλεύθεροι; καὶ τοῦτό γʼ, ἔφη, ἀκούω.
5.27. And don’t you think that active young Athenians, more lightly armed and occupying the mountains that protect our country, would prove a thorn in the side of the enemy and a strong bulwark of defence to our people? Socrates, replied Pericles, I think all these suggestions too have a practical value.
5.27. Ἀθηναίους δʼ οὐκ ἂν οἴει, ἔφη, μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας ὡπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις καὶ τὰ προκείμενα τῆς χώρας ὄρη κατέχοντας βλαβεροὺς μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολὴν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι; καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, πάντʼ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.
5.28. Then, since you like them, adopt them, my good fellow. Any part of them that you carry out will bring honour to you and good to the state; and should you fail in part, you will neither harm the state nor disgrace yourself.
5.28. εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα, ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς, ὦ ἄριστε· ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τούτων καταπράξῃς, καὶ σοὶ καλὸν ἔσται καὶ τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν δέ τι αὐτῶν ἀδυνατῇς, οὔτε τὴν πόλιν βλάψεις οὔτε σαυτὸν καταισχυνεῖς.
6.1. Ariston’s son, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the state, though he was less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could check him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucon’s son Charmides, managed to check him.
6.1. Γλαύκωνα δὲ τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, ὅτʼ ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καὶ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο παῦσαι ἑλκόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος καὶ καταγέλαστον ὄντα· Σωκράτης δέ, εὔνους ὢν αὐτῷ διά τε Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ διὰ Πλάτωνα, μόνος ἔπαυσεν.
6.2. For once on meeting him, he stopped him and contrived to engage his attention by saying: Glaucon, have you made up your mind to be our chief man in the state? I have, Socrates. Well, upon my word there’s no more honourable ambition in the world; for obviously, if you gain your object, you will be able to get whatever you want, and you will have the means of helping your friends: you will lift up your father’s house and exalt your fatherland; and you will make a name for yourself first at home, later on in Greece, and possibly, like Themistocles, in foreign lands as well; wherever you go, you will be a man of mark.
6.2. ἐντυχὼν γὰρ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκούειν τοιάδε λέξας κατέσχεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἔφη, προστατεύειν ἡμῖν διανενόησαι τῆς πόλεως; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, καλὸν γάρ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν τοῦτο διαπράξῃ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἔσει αὐτὸς τυγχάνειν ὅτου ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς, ἱκανὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν, ἐπαρεῖς δὲ τὸν πατρῷον οἶκον, αὐξήσεις δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, ὀνομαστὸς δʼ ἔσει πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἴσως δʼ, ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις·
6.3. When Glaucon heard this, he felt proud and gladly lingered. Next Socrates asked, Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honour, is it not obvious that you must benefit your city? Most certainly. Pray don’t be reticent, then; but tell us how you propose to begin your services to the state.
6.3. ὅπου δʼ ἂν ᾖς, πανταχοῦ περίβλεπτος ἔσει. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἀκούων ὁ Γλαύκων ἐμεγαλύνετο καὶ ἡδέως παρέμενε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δῆλον, ὅτι, εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελητέα σοι ἡ πόλις ἐστί; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφη, μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλʼ εἶπον ἡμῖν ἐκ τίνος ἄρξῃ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν.
6.4. As Glaucon remained dumb, apparently considering for the first time how to begin, Socrates said: If you wanted to add to a friend’s fortune, you would set about making him richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer? Certainly.
6.4. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Γλαύκων διεσιώπησεν, ὡς ἂν τότε σκοπῶν ὁπόθεν ἄρχοιτο, ἆρʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ φίλου οἶκον εἰ αὐξῆσαι βούλοιο, πλουσιώτερον αὐτὸν ἐπιχειροίης ἂν ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν πειράσῃ πλουσιωτέραν ποιῆσαι;
6.5. Would she not be richer if she had a larger revenue? Oh yes, presumably. Now tell me, from what sources are the city’s revenues at present derived and what is their total? No doubt you have gone into this matter, in order to raise the amount of any that are deficient and supply any that are lacking. Certainly not, exclaimed Glaucon, I haven’t gone into that.
6.5. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν πλουσιωτέρα γʼ ἂν εἴη προσόδων αὐτῇ πλειόνων γενομένων; εἰκὸς γοῦν, ἔφη. λέξον δή, ἔφη, ἐκ τίνων νῦν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῇ πόλει καὶ πόσαι τινές εἰσι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἔσκεψαι, ἵνα, εἰ μέν τινες αὐτῶν ἐνδεῶς ἔχουσιν, ἐκπληρώσῃς, εἰ δὲ παραλείπονται, προσπορίσῃς. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἐπέσκεμμαι.
6.6. Well, if you have left that out, tell us the expenditure of the city. No doubt you intend to cut down any items that are excessive. The fact is, I haven’t had time yet for that either. Oh, then we will postpone the business of making the city richer; for how is it possible to look after income and expenditure without knowing what they are?
6.6. ἀλλʼ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔφη, παρέλιπες, τάς γε δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἡμῖν εἰπέ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τούτων τὰς περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν διανοῇ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐδὲ πρὸς ταῦτά πω ἐσχόλασα. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πλουσιωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖν ἀναβαλούμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδότα γε τὰ ἀναλώματα καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπιμεληθῆναι τούτων;
6.7. Well, Socrates, one can make our enemies contribute to the city’s wealth. Yes, of course, provided he is stronger than they; but if he be weaker, he may lose what she has got instead. True.
6.7. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, δυνατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀπὸ πολεμίων τὴν πόλιν πλουτίζειν. νὴ Δία σφόδρα γʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν τις αὐτῶν κρείττων ᾖ· ἥττων δὲ ὢν καὶ τὰ ὄντα προσαποβάλοι ἄν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.
6.8. Therefore, in order to advise her whom to fight, it is necessary to know the strength of the city and of the enemy, so that, if the city be stronger, one may recommend her to go to war, but if weaker than the enemy, may persuade her to beware. You are right.
6.8. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, τόν γε βουλευσόμενον, πρὸς οὕστινας δεῖ πολεμεῖν, τήν τε τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδέναι δεῖ, ἵνα, ἐὰν μὲν ἡ τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ᾖ, συμβουλεύῃ ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν δὲ ἥττων τῶν ἐναντίων, εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθῃ.
6.9. First, then, tell us the naval and military strength of our city, and then that of her enemies. No, of course I can’t tell you out of my head. Well, if you have made notes, fetch them, for I should greatly like to hear this. But, I tell you, I haven’t yet made any notes either.
6.9. ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, λέξον ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως τήν τε πεζικὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, εἶτα τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. ἀλλʼ εἰ γέγραπταί σοι, ἔνεγκε, ἔφη· πάνυ γὰρ ἡδέως ἂν τοῦτο ἀκούσαιμι. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ἔφη, οὐδὲ γέγραπταί μοί πω.
6.10. Then we will postpone offering advice about war too for the present. You are new to power, and perhaps have not had time to investigate such big problems. But the defence of the country, now, I feel sure you have thought about that, and know how many of the garrisons are well placed and how many are not, and how many of the guards are efficient and how many are not; and you will propose to strengthen the well-placed garrisons and to do away with those that are superfluous.
6.10. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τήν γε πρώτην ἐπισχήσομεν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν ἄρτι ἀρχόμενος τῆς προστατείας οὔπω ἐξήτακας. ἀλλά τοι περί γε φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας οἶδʼ ὅτι ἤδη σοι μεμέληκε, καὶ οἶσθα ὁπόσαι τε φυλακαὶ ἐπίκαιροί εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσαι μή, καὶ ὁπόσοι τε φρουροὶ ἱκανοί εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσοι μή εἰσι· καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπικαίρους φυλακὰς συμβουλεύσεις μείζονας ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν.
6.11. No, no; I shall propose to do away with them all, for the only effect of maintaining them is that our crops are stolen. But if you do away with the garrisons, don’t you think that anyone will be at liberty to rob us openly? However, have you been on a tour of inspection, or how do you know that they are badly maintained? By guess-work. Then shall we wait to offer advice on this question too until we really know, instead of merely guessing? Perhaps it would be better. Now for the silver mines.
6.11. νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, ἕνεκά γε τοῦ οὕτως αὐτὰς φυλάττεσθαι ὥστε κλέπτεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφέλῃ γʼ, ἔφη, τὰς φυλακάς, οὐκ οἴει καὶ ἁρπάζειν ἐξουσίαν ἔσεσθαι τῷ βουλομένῳ; ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον ἐλθὼν αὐτὸς ἐξήτακας τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς οἶσθα ὅτι κακῶς φυλάττονται; εἰκάζω, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὅταν μηκέτι εἰκάζωμεν, ἀλλʼ ἤδη εἰδῶμεν, τότε συμβουλεύσομεν;
6.12. I am sure you have not visited them, and so cannot tell why the amount derived from them has fallen. No, indeed, I have not been there. To be sure: the district is considered unhealthy, and so when you have to offer advice on the problem, this excuse will serve. You’re chaffing me.
6.12. ἴσως, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, βέλτιον. εἴς γε μήν, ἔφη, τἀργύρεια οἶδʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀφῖξαι, ὥστʼ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅ τι νῦν ἐλάττω ἢ πρόσθεν προσέρχεται αὐτόθεν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἐλήλυθα, ἔφη. καὶ γὰρ νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, λέγεται βαρὺ τὸ χωρίον εἶναι, ὥστε, ὅταν περὶ τούτου δέῃ συμβουλεύειν, αὕτη σοι ἡ πρόφασις ἀρκέσει. σκώπτομαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.
6.13. Ah, but there’s one problem I feel sure you haven’t overlooked: no doubt you have reckoned how long the corn grown in the country will maintain the population, and how much is needed annually, so that you may not be caught napping, should the city at any time be short, and may come to the rescue and relieve the city by giving expert advice about food. What an overwhelming task, if one has got to include such things as that in one’s duties!
6.13. ἀλλʼ ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη, οἶδʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἠμέληκας, ἀλλʼ ἔσκεψαι, πόσον χρόνον ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῖτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδεῖται, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτό γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γενομένη, ἀλλʼ εἰδὼς ἔχῃς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σῴζειν αὐτήν. λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, παμμέγεθες πρᾶγμα, εἴ γε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεήσει.
6.14. But, you know, no one will ever manage even his own household successfully unless he knows all its needs and sees that they are all supplied. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses, and it is difficult to look after so many families at once, you must have tried to make a start by doing something for one, I mean your uncle’s? It needs it; and if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can’t do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can’t carry one talent, it’s absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn’t it?
6.14. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδʼ ἂν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ποτε οἶκον καλῶς τις οἰκήσειεν, εἰ μὴ πάντα μὲν εἴσεται ὧν προσδεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελόμενος ἐκπληρώσει. ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιῶν συνέστηκε, χαλεπὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἅμα τοσούτων οἴκων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἕνα τὸν τοῦ θείου πρῶτον ἐπειράθης αὐξῆσαι; δεῖται δέ. κἂν μὲν τοῦτον δύνῃ, καὶ πλείοσιν ἐπιχειρήσεις· ἕνα δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος ὠφελῆσαι πῶς ἂν πολλούς γε δυνηθείης; ὥσπερ, εἴ τις ἓν τάλαντον μὴ δύναιτο φέρειν, πῶς οὐ φανερὸν ὅτι πλείω γε φέρειν οὐδʼ ἐπιχειρητέον αὐτῷ;
6.15. Well, I could do something for uncle’s household if only he would listen to me. What? You can’t persuade your uncle, and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle, to listen to you?
6.15. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ὠφελοίην ἂν τὸν τοῦ θείου οἶκον, εἴ μοι ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι. εἶτα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸν θεῖον οὐ δυνάμενος πεῖσαι, Ἀθηναίους πάντας μετὰ τοῦ θείου νομίζεις δυνήσεσθαι ποιῆσαι πείθεσθαί σοι;
6.16. Pray take care, Glaucon, that your daring ambition doesn’t lead to a fall! Don’t you see how risky it is to say or do what you don’t understand? Think of others whom you know to be the sort of men who say and do what they obviously don’t understand. Do you think they get praise or blame by it?
6.16. φυλάττου, ἔφη, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅπως μὴ τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἔλθῃς. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς σφαλερόν ἐστι τό, ἃ μὴ οἶδέ τις, ταῦτα ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν; ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσους οἶσθα τοιούτους, οἷοι φαίνονται καὶ λέγοντες ἃ μὴ ἴσασι καὶ πράττοντες, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπαίνου μᾶλλον ἢ ψόγου τυγχάνειν καὶ πότερον θαυμάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ καταφρονεῖσθαι·
6.17. And think of those who understand what they say and what they do. You will find, I take it, that the men who are famous and admired always come from those who have the widest knowledge, and the infamous and despised from the most ignorant.
6.17. ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων ὅ τι τε λέγουσι καὶ ὅ τι ποιοῦσι· καί, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, εὑρήσεις ἐν πᾶσιν ἔργοις τοὺς μὲν εὐδοκιμοῦντάς τε καὶ θαυμαζομένους ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπισταμένων ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ κακοδοξοῦντάς τε καὶ καταφρονουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἀμαθεστάτων.
6.18. Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do. If you enter on a public career with this advantage over others, I should not be surprised if you gained the object of your ambition quite easily.
6.18. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς εὐδοκιμεῖν τε καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, πειρῶ κατεργάσασθαι ὡς μάλιστα τὸ εἰδέναι ἃ βούλει πράττειν· ἐὰν γὰρ τούτῳ διενέγκας τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιχειρῇς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι εἰ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως τύχοις ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς.
7.1. Seeing that Glaucon’s son, Charmides, was a respectable man and far more capable than the politicians of the day, and nevertheless shrank from speaking in the assembly and taking a part in politics, he said: Tell me, Charmides, what would you think of a man who was capable of gaining a victory in the great games and consequently of winning honour for himself and adding to his country’s fame in the Greek world, and yet refused to compete? I should think him a poltroon and a coward, of course.
7.1. Χαρμίδην δὲ τὸν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα καὶ πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ τότε πραττόντων, ὀκνοῦντα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἴ τις ἱκανὸς ὢν τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νικᾶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτός τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι εὐδοκιμωτέραν ποιεῖν μὴ θέλοι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ποῖόν τινα τοῦτον νομίζοις ἂν τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι; δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, μαλακόν τε καὶ δειλόν.
7.2. Then if a man were to shrink from state business though capable of discharging it with advantage to the state and honour to himself, wouldn’t it be reasonable to think him a coward? Perhaps; but why ask me that? Because I fancy that you shrink from work that is within your powers, work in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a hand. What makes you think so?
7.2. εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη, δυνατὸς ὢν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πόλιν αὔξειν καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ὀκνοίη δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δειλὸς νομίζοιτο; ἴσως, ἔφη· ἀτὰρ πρὸς τί με ταῦτʼ ἐρωτᾷς; ὅτι, ἔφη, οἶμαί σε δυνατὸν ὄντα ὀκνεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ὧν ἀνάγκη σοι μετέχειν πολίτῃ γε ὄντι.
7.3. In what sort of work have you discovered my powers? In your intercourse with public men. Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound.
7.3. τὴν δὲ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἐν ποίῳ ἔργῳ καταμαθὼν ταῦτά μου καταγιγνώσκεις; ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἔφη, αἷς σύνει τοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττουσι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τι ἀνακοινῶνταί σοι, ὁρῶ σε καλῶς συμβουλεύοντα, καὶ ὅταν τι ἁμαρτάνωσιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντα.
7.4. A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates. But, you know, a man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd.
7.4. οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι. καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ἀριθμεῖν δυνάμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἢ μόνος ἀριθμεῖ, καὶ οἱ κατὰ μόνας ἄριστα κιθαρίζοντες οὗτοι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει κρατιστεύουσιν.
7.5. But surely you see that bashfulness and timidity come natural to a man, and affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude than in private society? Yes, and I mean to give you a lesson. The wisest do not make you bashful, and the strongest do not make you timid; yet you are ashamed to address an audience of mere dunces and weaklings. Who are they that make you ashamed?
7.5. αἰδῶ δὲ καὶ φόβον, ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἔμφυτά τε ἀνθρώποις ὄντα καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις παριστάμενα; καὶ σέ γε διδάξων, ἔφη, ὥρμημαι· οὔτε τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους αἰδούμενος οὔτε τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους φοβούμενος ἐν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτοις αἰσχύνει λέγειν.
7.6. The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying cheap and selling dear? For these are the people who make up the Assembly.
7.6. πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γναφέας αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς σκυτέας ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας ἢ τοὺς χαλκέας ἢ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορῷ μεταβαλλομένους καὶ φροντίζοντας ὅ τι ἐλάττονος πριάμενοι πλείονος ἀποδῶνται αἰσχύνει; ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων ἡ ἐκκλησία συνίσταται.
7.7. You behave like a man who can beat trained athletes and is afraid of amateurs! You are at your ease when you talk with the first men in the state, some of whom despise you, and you are a far better talker than the ordinary run of politicians; and yet you are shy of addressing men who never gave a thought to public affairs and haven’t learnt to despise you — all because you fear ridicule!
7.7. τί δὲ οἴει διαφέρειν ὃ σὺ ποιεῖς ἢ τῶν ἀσκητῶν ὄντα κρείττω τοὺς ἰδιώτας φοβεῖσθαι; σὺ γὰρ τοῖς πρωτεύουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὧν ἔνιοι καταφρονοῦσί σου, ῥᾳδίως διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων τοῦ τῇ πόλει διαλέγεσθαι πολὺ περιών, ἐν τοῖς μηδεπώποτε φροντίσασι τῶν πολιτικῶν μηδὲ σοῦ καταπεφρονηκόσιν ὀκνεῖς λέγειν, δεδιὼς μὴ καταγελασθῇς.
7.8. Well, don’t you think the Assembly often laughs at sound argument? Yes, and so do the others; and that’s why I am surprised that you, who find it easy to manage them when they do it, think you will be quite unable to deal with the Assembly.
7.8. τί δʼ; ἔφη, οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλάκις οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν ὀρθῶς λεγόντων καταγελᾶν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἕτεροι, ἔφη· διʼ ὃ καὶ θαυμάζω σου εἰ, ἐκείνους, ὅταν τοῦτο ποιῶσι, ῥᾳδίως χειρούμενος, τούτοις μηδένα τρόπον οἴει δυνήσεσθαι προσενεχθῆναι.
7.9. My good man, don’t be ignorant of yourself: don’t fall into the common error. For so many are in such a hurry to pry into other people’s business that they never turn aside to examine themselves. Don’t refuse to face this duty then: strive more earnestly to pay heed to yourself; and don’t neglect public affairs, if you have the power to improve them. If they go well, not only the people, but your friends and you yourself at least as much as they will profit.
7.9. ὠγαθέ, μὴ ἀγνόει σεαυτόν, μηδὲ ἁμάρτανε ἃ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνουσιν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ὡρμηκότες ἐπὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα οὐ τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξετάζειν. μὴ οὖν ἀπορρᾳθύμει τούτου, ἀλλὰ διατείνου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ σαυτῷ προσέχειν. καὶ μὴ ἀμέλει τῶν τῆς πόλεως, εἴ τι δυνατόν ἐστι διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ἔχειν· τούτων γὰρ καλῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ σοὶ φίλοι καὶ αὐτὸς σὺ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα ὠφελήσῃ.
8.1. When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their previous encounter, Socrates, wishing to benefit his companions, answered like a man who is resolved to do what is right, and not like a debater guarding against any distortion of the argument.
8.1. Ἀριστίππου δὲ ἐπιχειροῦντος ἐλέγχειν τὸν Σωκράτην, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τὸ πρότερον ἠλέγχετο, βουλόμενος τοὺς συνόντας ὠφελεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀπεκρίνατο οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ φυλαττόμενοι μή πῃ ὁ λόγος ἐπαλλαχθῇ, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν πεπεισμένοι μάλιστα πράττειν τὰ δέοντα.
8.2. Aristippus asked if he knew of anything good, in order that if Socrates mentioned some good thing, such as food, drink, money, health, strength, or daring, he might show that it is sometimes bad. But he, knowing that when anything troubles us we need what will put an end to the trouble, gave the best answer:
8.2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἤρετο εἴ τι εἰδείη ἀγαθόν, ἵνα, εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν ἢ χρήματα ἢ ὑγίειαν ἢ ῥώμην ἢ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι δὴ τοῦτο κακὸν ἐνίοτε ὄν. ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς ὅτι, ἐάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο ᾗπερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον, ἆρά γε, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν;
8.3. Are you asking me, he said, whether I know of anything good for a fever? No, not that. For ophthalmia? No, nor that. For hunger? No, not for hunger either. Well, but if you are asking me whether I know of anything good in relation to nothing, I neither know nor want to know.
8.3. οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη. ἀλλʼ ὀφθαλμίας; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ λιμοῦ; οὐδὲ λιμοῦ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴ γʼ ἐρωτᾷς με εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν οἶδα ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὔτʼ οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι.
8.4. Again Aristippus asked him whether he knew of anything beautiful: Yes, many things, he replied. All like one another? On the contrary, some are as unlike as they can be. How then can that which is unlike the beautiful be beautiful? The reason, of course, is that a beautiful wrestler is unlike a beautiful runner, a shield beautiful for defence is utterly unlike a javelin beautiful for swift and powerful hurling.
8.4. πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτὸν εἴ τι εἰδείη καλόν, καὶ πολλά, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις; ὡς οἷόν τε μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον καλὸν ἂν εἴη; ὅτι νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, ἔστι μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος καλὸς πρὸς πάλην, ἔστι δὲ ἀσπὶς καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβάλλεσθαι ὡς ἔνι ἀνομοιοτάτη τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι.
8.5. That is the same answer as you gave to my question whether you knew of anything good. You think, do you, that good is one thing and beautiful another? Don’t you know that all things are both beautiful and good in relation to the same things? In the first place, Virtue is not a good thing in relation to some things and a beautiful thing in relation to others. Men, again, are called “beautiful and good” in the same respect and in relation to the same things: it is in relation to the same things that men’s bodies look beautiful and good and that all other things men use are thought beautiful and good, namely, in relation to those things for which they are useful.
8.5. οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνῃ μοι ἢ ὅτε σε ἠρώτησα εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἰδείης. σὺ δʼ οἴει, ἔφη, ἄλλο μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι πρὸς ταὐτὰ πάντα καλά τε κἀγαθά ἐστι; πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθόν, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλόν ἐστιν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλά τε κἀγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται καλά τε κἀγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν εὔχρηστα ᾖ.
8.6. Is a dung basket beautiful then? Of course, and a golden shield is ugly, if the one is well made for its special work and the other badly. Do you mean that the same things are both beautiful and ugly? Of course — and both good and bad.
8.6. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλόν ἐστι; νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη, καὶ χρυσῆ γε ἀσπὶς αἰσχρόν, ἐὰν πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ὁ μὲν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾖ, ἡ δὲ κακῶς. λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι;
8.7. For what is good for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is beautiful for wrestling ugly for running. For all things are good and beautiful in relation to those purposes for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those for which they are ill adapted.
8.7. καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· πολλάκις γὰρ τό γε λιμοῦ ἀγαθὸν πυρετοῦ κακόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθὸν λιμοῦ κακόν ἐστι· πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλὸν πρὸς πάλην αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλὸν πρὸς δρόμον αἰσχρόν· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἐστι πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς.
8.8. Again his dictum about houses, that the same house is both beautiful and useful, was a lesson in the art of building houses as they ought to be. He approached the problem thus: When one means to have the right sort of house, must he contrive to make it as pleasant to live in and as useful as can be?
8.8. καὶ οἰκίας δὲ λέγων τὰς αὐτὰς καλάς τε εἶναι καὶ χρησίμους παιδεύειν ἔμοιγʼ ἐδόκει, οἵας χρή, οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. ἐπεσκόπει δὲ ὧδε· ἆρά γε τὸν μέλλοντα οἰκίαν, οἵαν χρή, ἔχειν τοῦτο δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἡδίστη τε ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι καὶ χρησιμωτάτη ἔσται;
8.9. And this being admitted, Is it pleasant, he asked, to have it cool in summer and warm in winter? And when they agreed with this also, Now in houses with a south aspect, the sun’s rays penetrate into the porticoes in winter, but in summer the path of the sun is right over our heads and above the roof, so that there is shade. If, then, this is the best arrangement, we should build the south side loftier to get the winter sun and the north side lower to keep out the cold winds.
8.9. τούτου δὲ ὁμολογουμένου, οὐκοῦν ἡδὺ μὲν θέρους ψυχεινὴν ἔχειν, ἡδὺ δὲ χειμῶνος ἀλεεινήν; ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμφαῖεν, οὐκοῦν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν βλεπούσαις οἰκίαις τοῦ μὲν χειμῶνος ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὰς παστάδας ὑπολάμπει, τοῦ δὲ θέρους ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν στεγῶν πορευόμενος σκιὰν παρέχει. οὐκοῦν, εἴ γε καλῶς ἔχει ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεσθαι, οἰκοδομεῖν δεῖ ὑψηλότερα μὲν τὰ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, ἵνα ὁ χειμερινὸς ἥλιος μὴ ἀποκλείηται, χθαμαλώτερα δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἄρκτον, ἵνα οἱ ψυχροὶ μὴ ἐμπίπτωσιν ἄνεμοι·
8.10. To put it shortly, the house in which the owner can find a pleasant retreat at all seasons and can store his belongings safely is presumably at once the pleasantest and the most beautiful. As for paintings and decorations, they rob one of more delights than they give. For temples and altars the most suitable position, he said, was a conspicuous site remote from traffic; for it is pleasant to breathe a prayer at the sight of them, and pleasant to approach them filled with holy thoughts.
8.10. ὡς δὲ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅποι πάσας ὥρας αὐτός τε ἂν ἥδιστα καταφεύγοι καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀσφαλέστατα τιθοῖτο, αὕτη ἂν εἰκότως ἡδίστη τε καὶ καλλίστη οἴκησις εἴη· γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ ποικιλίαι πλείονας εὐφροσύνας ἀποστεροῦσιν ἢ παρέχουσι. ναοῖς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδὺ δὲ ἁγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι.
9.1. When asked again whether Courage could be taught or came by nature, he replied: I think that just as one man’s body is naturally stronger than another’s for labour, so one man’s soul is naturally braver than another’s in danger. For I notice that men brought up under the same laws and customs differ widely in daring.
9.1. πάλιν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ἡ ἀνδρεία πότερον εἴη διδακτὸν ἢ φυσικόν, οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον πρὸς τοὺς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν ψυχῆς ἐρρωμενεστέραν πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ φύσει γίγνεσθαι· ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσι τρεφομένους πολὺ διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τόλμῃ.
9.2. Nevertheless, I think that every man’s nature acquires more courage by learning and practice. Of course Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bronze shield and spear and fight Lacedaemonians; and of course Lacedaemonians would not be willing to face Thracians with leather shields and javelins, nor Scythians with bows for weapons.
9.2. νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αὔξεσθαι· δῆλον μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα λαβόντες Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμάχεσθαι· φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτʼ ἂν Θρᾳξὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις οὔτε Σκύθαις τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι.
9.3. And similarly in all other points, I find that human beings naturally differ one from another and greatly improve by application. Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practise what they want to excel in.
9.3. ὁρῶ δʼ ἔγωγε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καὶ φύσει διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ πολὺ ἐπιδιδόντας. ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πάντας χρὴ καὶ τοὺς εὐφυεστέρους καὶ τοὺς ἀμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν.
9.4. Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent.
9.4. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε κἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία σοφούς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι, οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ οἴονται συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν· νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι.
9.5. He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom.
9.5. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλά τε κἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν· οὕτω [καὶ] τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα καλά τε κἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί.
9.6. Madness, again, according to him, was the opposite of Wisdom. Nevertheless he did not identify Ignorance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness. Most men, however, he declared, do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge.
9.6. μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε· τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι. τοὺς μέντοι πολλοὺς ἔφη, ἃ μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀγνοοῦσι, τοὺς διημαρτηκότας τούτων οὐ φάσκειν μαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ διημαρτηκότας ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ γιγνώσκουσι μαινομένους καλεῖν·
9.7. For instance, if a man imagines himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the Wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows to be impossible, they say he’s mad. They don’t think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire love, so they name a great delusion madness.
9.7. ἐάν τε γάρ τις μέγας οὕτως οἴηται εἶναι ὥστε κύπτειν τὰς πύλας τοῦ τείχους διεξιών, ἐάν τε οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὥστʼ ἐπιχειρεῖν οἰκίας αἴρεσθαι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἐπιθέσθαι τῶν πᾶσι δήλων ὅτι ἀδύνατά ἐστι, τοῦτον μαίνεσθαι φάσκειν, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν διαμαρτάνοντας οὐ δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔρωτα καλοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν μανίαν αὐτοὺς καλεῖν.
9.8. Considering the nature of Envy, he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend’s misfortune, nor at an enemy’s good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends’ successes. Some expressed surprise that anyone who loves another should be pained at his success, but he reminded them that many stand in this relation towards others, that they cannot disregard them in time of trouble, but aid them in their misfortune, and yet they are pained to see them prospering. This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools.
9.8. φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὅ τι εἴη, λύπην μέν τινα ἐξηύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τὴν ἐπʼ ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην, ἀλλὰ μόνους ἔφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. θαυμαζόντων δέ τινων εἴ τις φιλῶν τινα ἐπὶ τῇ εὐπραξίᾳ αὐτοῦ λυποῖτο, ὑπεμίμνῃσκεν ὅτι πολλοὶ οὕτω πρός τινας ἔχουσιν, ὥστε κακῶς μὲν πράττοντας μὴ δύνασθαι περιορᾶν, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖν ἀτυχοῦσιν, εὐτυχούντων δὲ λυπεῖσθαι. τοῦτο μέντοι φρονίμῳ μὲν ἀνδρὶ οὐκ ἂν συμβῆναι, τοὺς ἠλιθίους δὲ ἀεὶ πάσχειν αὐτό.
9.9. Considering the nature of Leisure, he said his conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even draught-players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might go and do something better. But nobody has leisure to go from a better to a worse occupation. If anyone does so, he acts wrongly, having no leisure.
9.9. σχολὴν δὲ σκοπῶν, τί εἴη, ποιοῦντας μέν τι τοὺς πλείστους εὑρίσκειν ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς πεττεύοντας καὶ τοὺς γελωτοποιοῦντας ποιεῖν τι· πάντας δὲ τούτους ἔφη σχολάζειν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἰέναι πράξοντας τὰ βελτίω τούτων. ἀπὸ μέντοι τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω ἰέναι οὐδένα σχολάζειν· εἰ δέ τις ἴοι, τοῦτον ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ οὔσης κακῶς ἔφη τοῦτο πράττειν.
9.10. Kings and rulers, he said, are not those who hold the sceptre, nor those who are chosen by the multitude, nor those on whom the lot falls, nor those who owe their power to force or deception; but those who know how to rule.
9.10. βασιλέας δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἱρεθέντας οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρῳ λαχόντας οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασαμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξαπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν.
9.11. For once it was granted that it is the business of the ruler to give orders and of the ruled to obey, he went on to show that on a ship the one who knows, rules, and the owner and all the others on board obey the one who knows: in farming the landowners, in illness the patients, in training those who are in training, in fact everybody concerned with anything that needs care, look after it themselves if they think they know how, but, if not, they obey those who know, and not only when such are present, but they even send for them when absent, that they may obey them and do the right thing. In spinning wool, again, he would point out, the women govern the men because they know how to do it and men do not.
9.11. ὁπότε γάρ τις ὁμολογήσειε τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάττειν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀρχομένου τὸ πείθεσθαι, ἐπεδείκνυεν ἔν τε νηὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιστάμενον ἄρχοντα, τὸν δὲ ναύκληρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἀγρούς, καὶ ἐν νόσῳ τοὺς νοσοῦντας, καὶ ἐν σωμασκίᾳ τοὺς σωμασκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἡγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—· εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις οὐ μόνον παροῦσι πειθομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντας μεταπεμπομένους, ὅπως ἐκείνοις πειθόμενοι τὰ δέοντα πράττωσιν· ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι ὅπως χρὴ ταλασιουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι.
9.12. If anyone objected that a despot may refuse to obey a good counsellor, How can he refuse, he would ask, when a penalty waits on disregard of good counsel? All disregard of good counsel is bound surely to result in error, and his error will not go unpunished.
9.12. εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ταῦτα λέγοι ὅτι τῷ τυράννῳ ἔξεστι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγουσι, καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξείη μὴ πείθεσθαι, ἐπικειμένης γε ζημίας, ἐάν τις τῷ εὖ λέγοντι μὴ πείθηται; ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἄν τις πράγματι μὴ πείθηται τῷ εὖ λέγοντι, ἁμαρτήσεται δήπου, ἁμαρτάνων δὲ ζημιωθήσεται.
9.13. If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal subject, Do you think, he retorted, that he who kills the best of his allies suffers no loss, or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety, or rather swift destruction?
9.13. εἰ δὲ φαίη τις τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀποκτείνοντα, ἔφη, τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν συμμάχων οἴει ἀζήμιον γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὡς ἔτυχε ζημιοῦσθαι; πότερα γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον οἴει σῴζεσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ποιοῦντα ἢ οὕτω καὶ τάχιστʼ ἂν ἀπολέσθαι;