3. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the term “gentle” is concerned with the pain that arises from passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. And in our diagram we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless man; for these are perhaps the most usual words to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo insulting treatment readily and meet slights with humility; since as opposed to feeling the pain that we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time. And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly, too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of people, and with many people, while the slavish man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also some body who is at the middle point in the inequality. Since, therefore, both those states of character are wrong, it is clear that the state midway between them is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow-tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those with whom it ought. So that since the best state of character in regard to those feelings is gentleness, Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the gentle man would be midway between the harsh man and the slavish man.
3. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρᾶον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πώς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μηδʼ ἐφʼ ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ μόλις, τῷ δʼ ἠρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, ὁ καὶ θᾶττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ ὅτʼ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δʼ ἀνδραποδώδης τοὐναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφότεραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκεῖναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὔθʼ ὑστερίζει οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ καὶ πραότης ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.
4. Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal, and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I mean by “as he ought,” both in this and in the other cases, is “as right principle directs”). And since the two former characters consist in excess and deficiency, and where there are extremes there is also a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single best for each kind of action, a single thing, it necessarily follows that liberality is a middle state between prodigality and meanness as regards getting and parting with wealth. But the terms “wealth” and “art of wealth” we use in two senses, since one way of using an article of property, for example a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself, another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses do employ it as a shoe. The covetous man is the party whose interest centers on money, and money is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use. But the mean man might be even prodigal in regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth, inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks necessities, but the liberal man gives his superfluity. And of these classes themselves there are species designated as exceeding or deficient in respect of parts of the matter concerned: for example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer are mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skinflint is he who is very excited about small sums; also the man who offends by way of meanness is a false reckoner and a cheat. Similarly “prodigal” includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in unregulated spending and the reckless man who is prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of calculation.
4. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσει μὲν πάσῃ μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δʼ ἀμφότερα ἧττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος, ὁ δʼ ἄμφω ὡς δεῖ ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκεῖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατα εἰσί, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἓν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἴδει τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ χρῆσις τοῦ κτήματος ἐστίν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ ἱματίου, ἣ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῷ χρήσαιτο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρῆται γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσπουδακώς, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεως ἐστίν· ὁ δʼ ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν διώκει· ὁ δʼ ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δʼ ἐλευθέριος τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἴδη λέγονται διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προΐεσθαι, αἰσχροκερδὴς δʼ ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, παραλογιστὴς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητὴς ὁ ἄδικος κατʼ ἀνελευθερίαν. καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην.
5. On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must define its characteristic from the attributes of the great-spirited man. For just as in the other cases of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity up to a point, are not noticed to differ when they advance further, the same has happened about greatness of spirit. Hence sometimes the opposite characters claim the same quality, for instance the extravagant man claims to be the same as the liberal, the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave; for they are concerned with the same things, and also are neighbors up to a point, as the brave man can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but the former in one way and the latter in another, and that makes a very great difference. And we use the term “great-spirited” according to the designation of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man seems to resemble both the proud man and the magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go with all the virtues also. For it is praiseworthy to judge great and small goods rightly; and those goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses the best state of character in relation to such pleasures, and greatness of spirit is the best. And the virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the greater and the smaller good, just as the wise man and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with it, or it goes with all the virtues. Again, it is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great: for example, courage makes a man disdainful of dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not always formidable; and the sober-minded man disdains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal man wealth. But the reason why this is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of his caring about few things and those great ones, and not about whatever somebody else thinks. And a great-spirited man would consider more what one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his defence. And a feeling thought to be specially characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain. On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of human interest, honor, life, wealth, he is thought to care nothing about any of them except honor; it would grieve him to be dishonored and ruled by someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain honor. Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent, on the ground that to be specially concerned about honor and to be disdainful of the multitude and of reputation do not go together. But in saying this we must distinguish. Honor is small or great in two ways: it differs in being conferred either by many ordinary people or by persons of consideration, and again it differs in what it is conferred for, since its greatness does not depend only on the number or the quality of those who confer it, but also on its being honorable; and in reality those offices and other good things are honorable and worthy of serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is no goodness without greatness; owing to which each of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in regard to the things with which that virtue is concerned, as we said. But nevertheless there is a single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue must be termed great-spirited in a special sense. And since there are certain goods which are in some cases honorable and in others not, according to the distinction made before, and of goods of this sort some are truly great and others small, and some men deserve and claim the former, it is among these men that the great-spirited man must be looked for. And there are necessarily four varieties of claim: it is possible to deserve great things and to claim them as one’s desert; and there are small things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is possible—one man may be of such a character that although deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held in high honor, and another man though deserving great things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what does not correspond to one’s deserts. And he also is blameworthy who though worthy of such things does not deem himself worthy to partake of them although they are available for him. But there is left here the man who is the opposite of both of these, who being worthy of great things claims them as his desert, and is of such a character as to deem himself worthy: he is praiseworthy, and he is in the middle between the two. Since, therefore, greatness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the choice and the employment of honor and of the other good things that are esteemed, and not in relation to useful things, and since we assign this to the great-spirited man, and since also at the same time the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that even greatness of spirit must be a middle state. And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of great things though they are not we call vain), and the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself worthy of great things when one is worthy of them is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think himself worthy of anything great although he possesses qualities which would justly make him considered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited); so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle state between vanity and smallness of spirit. But the fourth of the persons in our classification is neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy of great things; owing to which he is not the opposite of the man of great spirit. Yet thinking oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy of small things might be thought the opposite of thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is worthy of great ones; but he is not opposite to the great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy either, for his character is as reason bids, and in nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for both claim as their desert the things that they are worthy of. And he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he is worthy of; whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small? For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things, or of still less. Hence nobody would call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold office and submitting to authority if he is a resident alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth and attached great importance to office.
5. περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ⟨ἃ⟩ κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταὐτὸ συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοροι μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασύς, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ὧδε ὃ δʼ ὧδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρῖναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν. δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτʼ εἶναι μεγάλα, ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι ἡδέα. ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δʼ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὥστε ἕπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν ἕπεσθαι πάσαις. ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἑκάστη δʼ ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικοὺς ποιεῖ τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ ἑνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστʼ εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπηθήσοιτʼ ἂν ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς. ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἡ τιμὴ διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους ποιεῖν ἑκάστη, περὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐστί τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δʼ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατʼ ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ τούτων ἔνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλόψυχος. τετραχῶς δʼ ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δʼ ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὃ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίη ἂν μικρῶν ἑαυτόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δʼ ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός (ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν), ψεκτὸς δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν· λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετὸς καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ χρῆσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὕτη ἐπαινετωτάτη· δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἂν εἴη, τῶν δʼ ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα χαυνότης (τοὺς τοιούτους γὰρ χαύνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων οἴονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων διʼ ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦτο, μὴ ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος, περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχ⟨ον⟩ ὢν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον ⟨μικρῶν⟩ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι δʼ ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει)· καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτοὺς ἄμφω)· καὶ ὃ μὲν γένοιτʼ ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει γὰρ ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ [ἂν] μεγάλων ἀξιῶν χαῦνος ἦν, ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλʼ ὑπείκει· ἀλλʼ εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.
6. The Magnificent Man also (except in a case when we are using the term metaphorically) is not concerned with any and every action and purposive choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure there is no magnificence, for it is what is appropriate in ornament, and ornament does not result from any chance expenditure, but consists in going beyond the merely necessary. Therefore the magnificent man is the man who purposively chooses the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and who even on the occasion of a pleasure of this nature aims at this sort of moderation. There is no name denoting the man who likes spending to excess and inappropriately; however the persons whom some people call tasteless and swaggering have a certain affinity to him. For instance if a rich man spending money on the wedding of a favorite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort of arrangements that would be fitting when entertaining abstainers, he is shabby, while one who entertains guests of that sort after the manner of a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the swaggerer; but he that entertains suitably and as reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable. But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favorite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would have been for Cimon. But he who is casual in regard to the question of suitability is not in any of these classes. Similarly in regard to liberality: a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.
6. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μή που κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλʼ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὴ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔχει τινὰ γειτνίασιν, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας. οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὤν, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἑστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπής, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ διʼ ἐξουσίαν ὅμοιος τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατʼ ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατʼ ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος κατʼ ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον) καὶ περὶ ὃ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δʼ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν [ὃ] οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἐπʼ ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἔστι γάρ τις οὔτʼ ἐλευθέριος οὔτʼ ἀνελεύθερος.
7. Generally speaking the other praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect of an emotion: for instance, the envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of character after which they are named— Envy means being pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy at undeserved adversities; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity. Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness: the man who pays regard to nobody’s opinion is shameless, he who regards everybody’s is bashful, he who regards the opinion of those who appear good is modest. Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity and Flattery; the man who accommodates himself readily to his associates’ desires in everything is a flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the best, is friendly. Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays no regard at all to another but is contemptuous is self-willed; he who regards another in everything and is inferior to everybody is obsequious; he who regards another in some things but not in others, and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is dignified. The truthful and sincere man, called “downright,” is midway between the dissembler and the charlatan. He that wittingly makes a false statement against himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, he that exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer’s phrase “sagacious”; and in general the one is a lover of truth and the others lovers of falsehood. Wittiness also is a middle state, and the witty man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on principle,—that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the quality to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce things of this sort), these kinds of wit differ from one another, but both are middle states; for a man who can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure to a person of good judgement even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good. All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each of them is an emotion. But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said in what follows, each virtue exists both naturally and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought. Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the actions that spring from it affect another person), and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to temperance (owing to which people even define temperance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and false are respectively wise and foolish. And the mean is more opposed to the extremes than the extremes are to one another, because the mean does not occur in combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the mean contains both extremes. The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way of deficiency. The causes of this are partly the two first mentioned, rarity (for example, the rarity of people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which we are more prone seems more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that the extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in relation to boldness and extravagance in relation to liberality. We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.
7. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δʼ ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί. οἷον ὁ φθονερὸς καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος. καθʼ ἃς γὰρ ἕξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατʼ ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δʼ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων. φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἁπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτʼ ἀκολουθῶν μήτʼ ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος. σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός. ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω καθʼ αὑτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δʼ ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθʼ Ὅμηρον πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὃ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὃ δὲ φιλοψευδής. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου. ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφὴν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὃ μὲν μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄγροικος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται, ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως. δεῖ δʼ οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δʼ εὐτράπελος. ἡ δʼ ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἥ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἣν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δʼ ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστι τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιονδί, ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἣ δʼ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφʼ ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται ⟨ὁ⟩ εὖ κρίνων, κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δʼ ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ ⟨μὴ⟩ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιῳοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ. πᾶσαι δʼ αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δʼ ἀρεταί, οὐδʼ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν καθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδὼς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δʼ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὃ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὃ δʼ ἄφρων. ἔστι δʼ ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετʼ οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετʼ ἀλλήλων καί εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ὦσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίγνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα. αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλʼ ὁτὲ μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν. αἴτια δὲ τά τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφʼ ὃ ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἧττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον.