That the Question of Natural Theology is to Be Discussed with Those Philosophers Who Sought a More Excellent Wisdom.

Chapter 1.—That the Question of Natural Theology is to Be Discussed with Those Philosophers Who Sought a More Excellent Wisdom.

Caput I. De quaestione naturalis theologiae cum philosophis excellentioris scientiae discutienda.

We shall require to apply our mind with far greater intensity to the present question than was requisite in the solution and unfolding of the questions handled in the preceding books; for it is not with ordinary men, but with philosophers that we must confer concerning the theology which they call natural. For it is not like the fabulous, that is, the theatrical; nor the civil, that is, the urban theology: the one of which displays the crimes of the gods, whilst the other manifests their criminal desires, which demonstrate them to be rather malign demons than gods. It is, we say, with philosophers we have to confer with respect to this theology,—men whose very name, if rendered into Latin, signifies those who profess the love of wisdom. Now, if wisdom is God, who made all things, as is attested by the divine authority and truth, then the philosopher is a lover of God. But since the thing itself, which is called by this name, exists not in all who glory in the name,—for it does not follow, of course, that all who are called philosophers are lovers of true wisdom,—we must needs select from the number of those with whose opinions we have been able to acquaint ourselves by reading, some with whom we may not unworthily engage in the treatment of this question. For I have not in this work undertaken to refute all the vain opinions of the philosophers, but only such as pertain to theology, which Greek word we understand to mean an account or explanation of the divine nature. Nor, again, have I undertaken to refute all the vain theological opinions of all the philosophers, but only of such of them as, agreeing in the belief that there is a divine nature, and that this divine nature is concerned about human affairs, do nevertheless deny that the worship of the one unchangeable God is sufficient for the obtaining of a blessed life after death, as well as at the present time; and hold that, in order to obtain that life, many gods, created, indeed, and appointed to their several spheres by that one God, are to be worshipped. These approach nearer to the truth than even Varro; for, whilst he saw no difficulty in extending natural theology in its entirety even to the world and the soul of the world, these acknowledge God as existing above all that is of the nature of soul, and as the Creator not only of this visible world, which is often called heaven and earth, but also of every soul whatsoever, and as Him who gives blessedness to the rational soul,—of which kind is the human soul,—by participation in His own unchangeable and incorporeal light. There is no one, who has even a slender knowledge of these things, who does not know of the Platonic philosophers, who derive their name from their master Plato. Concerning this Plato, then, I will briefly state such things as I deem necessary to the present question, mentioning beforehand those who preceded him in time in the same department of literature.

Nunc intentiore nobis opus est animo multo quam erat in superiorum solutione quaestionum et explicatione librorum. De theologia quippe, quam naturalem uocant, non cum quibuslibet hominibus (non enim fabulosa est uel ciuilis, hoc est uel theatrica uel urbana; quarum altera iactitat deorum crimina, altera indicat deorum desideria criminosiora ac per hoc malignorum potius daemonum quam deorum), sed cum philosophis est habenda conlatio; quorum ipsum nomen si Latine interpretemur, amorem sapientiae profitetur. Porro si sapientia Deus est, per quem facta sunt omnia, sicut diuina auctoritas ueritasque monstrauit, uerus philosophus est amator Dei. Sed quia res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, non est in omnibus, qui hoc nomine gloriantur (neque enim continuo uerae sapientiae sunt amatores quicumque appellantur philosophi): profecto ex omnibus, quorum sententias ex litteris nosse potuimus, eligendi sunt cum quibus non indigne quaestio ista tractetur. Neque enim hoc opere omnes omnium philosophorum uanas opiniones refutare suscepi, sed eas tantum, quae ad theologian pertinent, quo uerbo Graeco significari intellegimus de diuinitate rationem siue sermonem; nec eas omnium, sed eorum tantum, qui cum et esse diuinitatem et humana curare consentiant, non tamen sufficere unius incommutabilis Dei cultum ad uitam adipiscendam etiam post mortem beatam, sed multos ab illo sane uno conditos adque institutos ob eam causam colendos putant. Hi iam etiam Varronis opinionem ueritatis propinquitate transcendunt; si quidem ille totam theologian naturalem usque ad mundum istum uel animam eius extendere potuit, isti uero supra omnem animae naturam confitentur Deum, qui non solum mundum istum uisibilem. qui saepe caeli et terrae nomine nuncupatur, sed etiam omnem omnino animam fecerit, et qui rationalem et intellectualem. cuius generis anima humana est, participatione sui luminis incommutabilis et incorporei beatam facit. Hos philosophos Platonicos appellatos a Platone doctore uocabulo deriuato nullus, qui haec uel tenuiter audiuit, ignorat. De hoc igitur Platone, quae necessaria praesenti quaestioni existimo, breuiter adtingam, prius illos commemorans, qui eum in eodem genere litterarum tempore praecesserunt.

Chapter 2.—Concerning the Two Schools of Philosophers, that Is, the Italic and Ionic, and Their Founders.

Caput II. De duobus philosophorum generibus. id est Italico et Ionico, eorumque auctoribus.

As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose language holds a more illustrious place than any of the languages of the other nations, history mentions two schools of philosophers, the one called the Italic school, originating in that part of Italy which was formerly called Magna Græcia; the other called the Ionic school, having its origin in those regions which are still called by the name of Greece. The Italic school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos, to whom also the term “philosophy” is said to owe its origin. For whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the laudable manner in which they regulated their lives were called sages, Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed, replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be the height of arrogance to profess oneself a sage. The founder of the Ionic school, again, was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were styled the “seven sages,” of whom six were distinguished by the kind of life they lived, and by certain maxims which they gave forth for the proper conduct of life. Thales was distinguished as an investigator into the nature of things; and, in order that he might have successors in his school, he committed his dissertations to writing. That, however, which especially rendered him eminent was his ability, by means of astronomical calculations, even to predict eclipses of the sun and moon. He thought, however, that water was the first principle of things, and that of it all the elements of the world, the world itself, and all things which are generated in it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however, which, when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded Anaximander, his pupil, who held a different opinion concerning the nature of things; for he did not hold that all things spring from one principle, as Thales did, who held that principle to be water, but thought that each thing springs from its own proper principle. These principles of things he believed to be infinite in number, and thought that they generated innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them. He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual process of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one continuing for a longer or shorter period of time, according to the nature of the case; nor did he, any more than Thales, attribute anything to a divine mind in the production of all this activity of things. Anaximander left as his successor his disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of things to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air. Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a divine mind was the productive cause of all things which we see, and said that all the various kinds of things, according to their several modes and species, were produced out of an infinite matter consisting of homogeneous particles, but by the efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also, another pupil of Anaximenes, said that a certain air was the original substance of things out of which all things were produced, but that it was possessed of a divine reason, without which nothing could be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his disciple Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of homogeneous particles, of which each particular thing was made, but that those particles were pervaded by a divine mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal bodies, namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united and separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have been the disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato’s account it is that I have given this brief historical sketch of the whole history of these schools.

Quantum enim adtinet ad litteras Graecas, quae lingua inter ceteras gentium clarior habetur, duo philosophorum genera traduntur: unum Italicum ex ea parte Italiae, quae quondam magna Graecia nuncupata est; alterum Ionicum in eis terris, ubi et nunc Graecia nominatur. Italicum genus auctorem habuit Pythagoram Samium, a quo’ etiam ferunt ipsum philosophiae nomen exortum. Nam cum antea sapientes appellarentur, qui modo quodam laudabilis uitae aliis praestare uidebantur, iste interrogatus, quid profiteretur, philosophum se esse respondit, id est studiosum uel amatorem sapientiae; quoniam sapientem profiteri adrogantissimum uidebatur. Ionici uero generis princeps fuit Thales Milesius, unus illorum septem, qui sunt appellati sapientes. Sed illi sex uitae genere distinguebantur et quibusdam praeceptis ad bene uiuendum adcommodatis; iste autem Thales, ut successores etiam propagaret, rerum naturam scrutatus suasque disputationes litteris mandans eminuit maximeque admirabilis extitit, quod astrologiae numeris conprehensis defectus solis et lunae etiam praedicere potuit. Aquam tamen putauit rerum esse principium et hinc omnia elementa mundi ipsumque mundum et quae in eo gignuntur existere. Nihil autem huic operi, quod mundo considerato tam mirabile aspicimus, ex diuina mente praeposuit. Huic successit Anaximander, eius auditor, mutauitque de rerum natura opinionem. Non enim ex una re, sicut Thales ex umore, sed ex suis propriis principiis quasque res nasci putauit. Quae rerum principia singularum esse credidit infinita, et innumerabiles mundos gignere et quaecumque in eis oriuntur; eosque mundos modo dissolui, modo iterum gigni existimauit, quanta quisque aetate sua manere potuerit; nec ipse aliquid diuinae menti in his rerum operibus tribuens. Iste Anaximenen discipulum et successorem reliquit, qui omnes rerum causas aeri infinito dedit, nec deos negauit aut tacuit; non tamen ab ipsis aerem factum, sed ipsos ex aere ortos credidit. Anaxagoras uero êius auditor harum rerum omnium, quas uidemus, effectorem diuinum animum sensit et dixit ex infinita materia, quae constaret dissimilibus inter se particulis rerum omnium, similibus quibusque suis et propriis singula fieri, sed animo faciente diuino. Diogenes quoque Anaximenis alter auditor, aerem quidem dixit rerum esse materiam, de qua omnia fierent; sed eum esse compotem diuinae rationis, sine qua nihil ex eo fieri posset. Anaxagorae successit auditor eius Archelaus. Etiam ipse de particulis inter se similibus, ‘quibus singula quaeque fierent, ita putauit constare omnia, ut inesse etiam mentem diceret, quae corpora aeterna, id est illas particulas, coniungendo et dissipando ageret omnia. Socrates huius discipulus fuisse perhibetur, magister Platonis, propter quem breuiter cuncta ista recolui.

Chapter 3.—Of the Socratic Philosophy.

Caput III. De Socratica disciplina.

Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the entire effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of manners, all who went before him having expended their greatest efforts in the investigation of physical, that is, natural phenomena. However, it seems to me that it cannot be certainly discovered whether Socrates did this because he was wearied of obscure and uncertain things, and so wished to direct his mind to the discovery of something manifest and certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining of a blessed life,—that one great object toward which the labor, vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been directed,—or whether (as some yet more favorable to him suppose) he did it because he was unwilling that minds defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves upward to divine things. For he saw that the causes of things were sought for by them,—which causes he believed to be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the one true and supreme God,—and on this account he thought they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification of the life by good morals, in order that the mind, delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might raise itself upward by its native vigor to eternal things, and might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the causes of all created natures. It is evident, however, that he hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness of style and argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating urbanity, the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought that they knew this or that,—sometimes confessing his own ignorance, and sometimes dissimulating his knowledge, even in those very moral questions to which he seems to have directed the whole force of his mind. And hence there arose hostility against him, which ended in his being calumniously impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however, that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned him, did publicly bewail him,—the popular indignation having turned with such vehemence on his accusers, that one of them perished by the violence of the multitude, whilst the other only escaped a like punishment by voluntary and perpetual exile.

Socrates ergo primus uniuersam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur, cum ante illum omnes magis physicis, id est naturalibus, rebus perscrutandis operam maximam inpenderent. Non mihi autem uidetur posse ad liquidum colligi, utrum Socrates, ut hoc faceret, taedio rerum obscurarum et incertarum ad aliquid apertum et certum reperiendum animum intenderit, quod esset beatae uitae necessarium, propter quam unam omnium philosophorum inuigilasse ac laborasse uidetur industria, an uero, sicut de illo quidam beneuolentius suspicantur, nolebat inmundos terrenis cupiditatibus animos se extendere in diuina conari. Quando quidem ab eis causas rerum uidebat inquiri, quas primas adque summas non nisi in unius ac summi Dei uoluntate esse credebat; unde non eas putabat nisi mundata mente posse conprehendi; et ideo purgandae bonis moribus uitae censebat instandum, ut deprimentibus libidinibus exoneratus animus naturali uigore in aeterna se adtolleret naturamque incorporei et incommutabilis luminis, ubi causae omnium factarum naturarum stabiliter uiuunt, intellegentiae puritate conspiceret. Constat eum tamen inperitorum stultitiam scire se aliquid opinantium etiam in ipsis moralibus quaestionibus, quo totum animum intendisse uidebatur, uel confessa ignorantia sua uel dissimulata scientia lepore mirabili disserendi et acutissima urbanitate agitasse adque uersasse. Unde et concitatis inimicitiis calumniosa criminatione damnatus morte multatus est. Sed eum postea illa ipsa, quae publice damnauerat, Atheniensium ciuitas publice luxit, in duos accusatores eius usque adeo populi indignatione conuersa, ut unus eorum obpressus ni multitudinis interiret, exilio autem uoluntario adque perpetuo poenam similem alter euaderet.

Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death, Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy, who vied with one another in desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which concern the chief good (summum bonum), the possession of which can make a man blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates, where he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and then demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he held to be the chief good, every one took from these disputations what pleased him best, and every one placed the final good in whatever it appeared to himself to consist. Now, that which is called the final good is that at which, when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so diverse were the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning this final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with respect to the followers of one master) some placed the chief good in pleasure, as Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes. Indeed, it were tedious to recount the various opinions of various disciples.

Tam praeclara igitur uitae mortisque fama Socrates reliquit plurimos suae philosophiae sectatores, quorum certatim studium fuit in quaestionum moralium disceptatione uersari, ubi agitur de summo bono, quo fieri homo beatus potest. Quod in Socratis disputationibus, dum omnia mouet adserit destruit, quoniam non euidenter apparuit, quod cuique placuit inde sumserunt et ubi cuique uisum est constituerunt finem boni. Finis autem boni appellatur, quo quisque cum peruenerit beatus est. Sic autem diuersas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt, ut (quod uix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent uoluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam uirtutem, sicut Antisthenes. Sic alii adque alii aliud adque aliud opinati sunt, quos commemorare longum est.

Chapter 4.—Concerning Plato, the Chief Among the Disciples of Socrates, and His Threefold Division of Philosophy.

Caput IV. De praecipuo inter Socratis discipulos Platone, qui omnem philosophiam triplici partitione distinxit.

But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who shone with a glory which far excelled that of the others, and who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By birth, an Athenian of honorable parentage, he far surpassed his fellow-disciples in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a wonderful degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every place famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians whatever they held and taught as important; and from Egypt, passing into those parts of Italy which were filled with the fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with the greatest facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with the grace and politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplative,—the active part having reference to the conduct of life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure truth,—Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative part, on which he brought to bear all the force of his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He then divides it into three parts,—the first moral, which is chiefly occupied with action; the second natural, of which the object is contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates between the true and the false. And though this last is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is contemplation, nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the office of investigating the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite division is not contrary to that which made the study of wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts,—that is, what he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all intelligences,—it would be a question too long to discuss, and about which we ought not to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly affected the well-known method of his master Socrates, namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions, it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on various matters, any more than it is to discover what were the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve of,—opinions sometimes favorable to the true religion, which our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it, as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of one God or of many, as it relates to the truly blessed life which is to be after death. For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated. Of which three things, the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain, through that which is most excellent in him, to that which excels all things,—that is, to the one true and absolutely good God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no exercise profits,—let Him be sought in whom all things are secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right to us.

Sed inter discipulos Socratis, non quidem inmerito, excellentissima gloria claruit, qua omnino ceteros obscuraret, Plato. Qui cum esset Atheniensis honesto aput suos loco natus et ingenio mirabili longe suos condiscipulos anteiret, parum tamen putans perficiendae philosophiae sufficere se ipsum ac Socraticam disciplinam, quam longe ac late potuit peregrinatus est, quaquauersum eum alicuius nobilitatae scientiae percipiendae fama rapiebat. Itaque et in Aegypto didicit quaecumque magna illic habebantur adque docebantur, et inde in eas Italiae partes ueniens, ubi Pythagoreorum fama celebrabatur, quidquid Italicae philosophiae tunc florebat, auditis eminentioribus in ea doctoribus facillime conprehendit. Et quia magistrum Socratem singulariter diligebat, eum loquentem faciens fere in omnibus sermonibus suis etiam illa, quae uel ab aliis didicerat, uel ipse quanta potuerat intellegentia uiderat, cum illius lepore et moralibus disputationibus temperauit. Itaque cum studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione uersetur, unde una pars eius actiua, altera contemplatiua dici potest (quarum actiua ad agendam uitam, id est ad mores instituendos pertinet, contemplatiua autem ad conspiciendas naturae causas et sincerissimam ueritatem): Socrates in actiua excelluisse memoratur; Pythagoras uero magis contemplatiuae, quibus potuit intellegentiae uiribus, institisse. Proinde Plato utrumque iungendo philosophiam perfecisse laudatur, quam in tres partes distribuit: unam moralem, quae maxime in actione uersatur; alteram naturalem, quae contemplationi deputata est; tertiam rationalem, qua uerum disterminatur a falso. Quae licet utrique, id est actioni et contemplationi, sit necessaria, maxime tamen contemplatio perspectionem sibi uindicat ueritatis. Ideo haec tripertitio non est contraria illi distinctioni, qua intellegitur omne studium sapientiae in actione et contemplatione consistere. Quid autem in his uel de his singulis partibus Plato senserit, id est, ubi finem omnium actionum, ubi causam omnium naturarum, ubi lumen omnium rationum esse cognouerit uel crediderit, disserendo explicare et longum esse arbitror et temere adfirmandum esse non arbitror. Cum enim magistri sui Socratis, quem facit in suis uoluminibus disputantem, notissimum morem dissimulandae scientiae uel opinionis suae seruare adfectat, quia et illi iste mos placuit, factum est ut etiam ipsius Platonis de rebus magnis sententiae non facile perspici possint. Ex his tamen, quae aput eum leguntur, siue quae dixit, siue quae ab aliis dicta esse narrauit adque conscripsit, quae sibi placita uiderentur, quaedam commemorari et operi huic inseri oportet a nobis, uel ubi suffragatur religioni uerae, quam fides nostra suscipit ac defendit, uel ubi ei uidetur esse contrarius, quantum ad istam de uno Deo et pluribus pertinet quaestionem, propter uitam, quae post mortem futura est, ueraciter beatam. Fortassis enim qui Platonem ceteris philosophis gentium longe recteque praelatum acutius adque ueracius intellexisse ac secuti esse fama celebriore laudantur, aliquid tale de Deo sentiunt, ut in illo inueniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intellegendi et ordo uiuendi; quorum trium unum ad naturalem, alterum ad rationalem, tertium ad moralem partem intellegitur pertinere. Si enim homo ita creatus est, ut per id, quod in eo praecellit, adtingat illud, quod cuncta praecellit, id est unum uerum optimum Deum, sine quo nulla natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit, nullus usus expedit: ipse quaeratur, ubi nobis seria sunt omnia; ipse cernatur, ubi nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi nobis recta sunt omnia.

Chapter 5.—That It is Especially with the Platonists that We Must Carry on Our Disputations on Matters of Theology, Their Opinions Being Preferable to Those of All Other Philosophers.

Caput V. Quod de theologia cum Platonicis potissimum disceptandum sit, quorum opinioni omnium philosophorum postponenda sint dogmata.

If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates, knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through fellowship with Him in His own blessedness, why discuss with the other philosophers? It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men with the crimes of the gods; and that civil theology also, in which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring to be honored by the errors of men, and by filling the minds of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of their worship, whilst they themselves found in the spectators of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle,—a theology in which, whatever was honorable in the temple, was defiled by its mixture with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever was base in the theatre was vindicated by the abominations of the temples. To these philosophers also the interpretations of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those rites have not the signification which he would have men believe is attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even if they had this signification, still those things ought not to be worshipped by the rational soul as its god which are placed below it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference. The same must be said of those writings pertaining to the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which, when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were burned by order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with all honor, let us mention as belonging to the same rank as these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high priest. In this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas and Romulus or even Hercules, and Æsculapius and Liber, born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any other mortals who have been deified, but even the principal gods themselves, to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions, alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts to identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are shown to have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity between this case and that of Numa; for the priest being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly begged of Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter which conveyed these communications to her. Let these two theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to the Platonic philosophers, who have recognized the true God as the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only, but to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material; as Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that is to say, of minute corpuscules; and many others whom it is needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless bodies, were the cause and principle of all things. For some of them—as, for instance, the Epicureans—believed that living things could originate from things without life; others held that all things living or without life spring from a living principle, but that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from a material principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that is, one of the four material elements of which this visible world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the maker of the world and of all things contained in it,—that it was in fact God. These and others like them have only been able to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to sense have vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within themselves something which they could not see: they represented to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without, even when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of them. But this representation in thought is no longer a body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of the mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body; and the faculty which judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object judged of. This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which it beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is composed. And if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been staggered by the great changeableness of the soul,—an attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature,—but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, “Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable.” In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable.

Si ergo Plato Dei huius imitatorem cognitorem amatorem dixit esse sapientem, cuius participatione sit beatus, quid opus est excutere ceteros? Nulli nobis quam isti propius accesserunt. Cedat eis igitur non solum theologia illa fabulosa deorum criminibus oblectans animos inpiorum, nec solum etiam illa ciuilis, ubi inpuri daemones terrestribus gaudiis deditos populos deorum nomine seducentes humanos errores tamquam suos diuinos honores habere uoluerunt, ad spectandos suorum criminum ludos cultores suos tamquam ad suum cultum studiis inmundissimis excitantes et sibi delectabiliores ludos de ipsis spectatoribus exhibentes (ubi si qua uelut honesta geruntur in templis, coniuncta sibi theatrorum obscenitate turpantur, et quaecumque turpia geruntur in theatris, comparata sibi templorum foeditate laudantur), et ea, quae Varro ex his sacris quasi ad caelum et terram rerumque mortalium semina et actus interpretatus est (quia nec ipsa illis ritibus significantur, quae ipse insinuare conatur, et ideo ueritas conantem non sequitur; et si ipsa essent, tamen animae rationali ea, quae infra illam naturali ordine constituta sunt, pro deo suo colenda non essent, nec sibi debuit praeferre tamquam deos eas res, quibus ipsam praetulit uerus Deus), et ea, quae Numa Pompilius re uera ad sacra eius modi pertinentia secum sepeliendo curauit abscondi et aratro eruta senatus iussit incendi. (In eo genere sunt etiam illa, ut aliquid de Numa mitius suspicemur, quae Alexander Macedo scribit ad matrem sibi a magno antistite sacrorum Aegyptiorum quodam Leone patefacta, ubi non Picus et Faunus et Aeneas et Romulus uel etiam Hercules et Aesculapius et Liber Semela natus et Tyndaridae fratres et si quos alios ex mortalibus pro dis habent, sed ipsi etiam maiorum gentium di, quos Cicero in Tusculanis tacitis nominibus uidetur adtingere, Iuppiter, Iuno, Saturnus, Vulcanus, Vesta et alii plurimi, quos Varro conatur ad mundi partes siue elementa transferre, homines fuisse produntur. Timens enim et ille quasi reuelata mysteria petens admonet Alexandrum, ut, cum ea matri conscripta insinuauerit, flammis iubeat concremari.) Non solum ergo ista, quae duae theologiae, fabulosa continet et ciuilis, Platonicis philosophis cedant, qui uerum Deum et rerum auctorem et ueritatis inlustratorem et beatitudinis largitorem esse dixerunt; sed alii quoque philosophi, qui corporalia naturae principia corpori deditis mentibus opinati sunt, cedant his tantis et tanti Dei cognitoribus uiris, ut Thales in umore, Anaximenes in aere, Stoici in igne, Epicurus in atomis, hoc est minutissimis corpusculis, quae nec diuidi nec sentiri queunt, et quicumque alii, quorum enumeratione inmorari non est necesse, siue simplicia siue coniuncta corpora, siue uita carentia siue uiuentia, sed tamen corpora, causam principiumque rerum esse dixerunt. Nam quidam eorum a rebus non uiuis res uiuas fieri posse crediderunt, sicut Epicurei; quidam uero a uiuente quidem et uiuentia et non uiuentia, sed tamen a corpore corpora. Nam Stoici ignem, id est corpus unum ex his quattuor elementis, quibus uisibilis mundus hic constat, et uiuentem et sapientem et ipsius mundi fabricatorem adque omnium, quae in eo sunt, eumque omnino ignem deum esse putauerunt. Hi et ceteri similes eorum id solum cogitare potuerunt, quod cum eis corda eorum obstricta carnis sensibus fabulata sunt. In se quippe habebant quod non uidebant, et aput se imaginabantur quod foris uiderant, etiam quando non uidebant, sed tantummodo cogitabant. Hoc autem in conspectu talis cogitationis iam non est corpus, sed similitudo corporis; illud autem, unde uidetur in animo haec similitudo corporis, nec corpus est nec similitudo corporis; et unde uidetur adque utrum pulchra an deformis sit iudicatur, profecto est melius quam ipsa quae iudicatur. Haec mens hominis et rationalis animae natura est, quae utique corpus non est, si iam illa corporis similitudo, cum in animo cogitantis aspicitur adque iudicatur, nec ipsa corpus est. Non est ergo nec terra nec aqua, nec aer nec ignis, quibus quattuor corporibus, quae dicuntur quattuor elementa, mundum corporeum uidemus esse conpactum. Porro si noster animus corpus non est, quo modo Deus creator animi corpus est? Cedant ergo et isti, ut dictum est, Platonicis; cedant et illi, quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, uerum tamen eiusdem naturae, cuius ille est, animos nostros esse putauerunt; ita non eos mouit tanta mutabilitas animae, quam Dei naturae tribuere nefas est. Sed dicunt: Corpore mutatur animae natura, nam per se ipsa incommutabilis est. Poterant isti dicere: corpore aliquo uulneratur caro, nam per se ipsa inuulnerabilis est. Prorsus quod mutari non potest, nulla re potest, ac per hoc quod corpore mutari potest, aliqua re potest et ideo incommutabile recte dici non potest.

Chapter 6.—Concerning the Meaning of the Platonists in that Part of Philosophy Called Physical.

Caput VI. De Platonicorum sensu in ea parte philosophiae. quae physica nominatur.

These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels,—all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness and this simplicity, that all things must have been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been made by none. For they have considered that whatever is is either body or life, and that life is something better than body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of life intelligible. Therefore they have preferred the intelligible nature to the sensible. We mean by sensible things such things as can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body; by intelligible things, such as can be understood by the sight of the mind. For there is no corporeal beauty, whether in the condition of a body, as figure, or in its movement, as in music, of which it is not the mind that judges. But this could never have been, had there not existed in the mind itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without noise of voice, without space and time. But even in respect of these things, had the mind not been mutable, it would not have been possible for one to judge better than another with regard to sensible forms. He who is clever, judges better than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is unskillful, he who is practised than he who is unpractised; and the same person judges better after he has gained experience than he did before. But that which is capable of more and less is mutable; whence able men, who have thought deeply on these things, have gathered that the first form is not to be found in those things whose form is changeable. Since, therefore, they saw that body and mind might be more or less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they could have no existence, they saw that there is some existence in which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore not admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most rightly believed was the first principle of things which was not made, and by which all things were made. Therefore that which is known of God He manifested to them when His invisible things were seen by them, being understood by those things which have been made; also His eternal power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things have been created. We have said enough upon that part of theology which they call physical, that is, natural.

Viderunt ergo isti philosophi, quos ceteris non inmerito fama adque gloria praelatos uidemus, nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt quaerentes Deum. Viderunt, quidquid mutabile eat. non esse summum Deum, et ideo animam omnem mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt quaerentes summum Deum. Deinde uiderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua est, quidquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui uere est, quia incommutabiliter est. Ac per hoc siue uniuersi mundi corpus figuras qualitates ordinatumque motum et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram et quaecumque corpora in eis sunt, siue omnem uitam, uel quae nutrit et continet, qualis est in arboribus, uel quae et hoc habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus, uel quae et haec habet et intellegit, qualis est in hominibus, uel quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget, sed tantum continet sentit intellegit, qualis est in angelis, nisi ab illo esse non posse, qui simpliciter est; quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud uiuere, quasi possit esse non uiuens; nec aliud illi est uiuere, aliud intellegere, quasi possit uiuere non intellegens; nec aliud illi est intellegere, aliud beatum esse, quasi possit intellegere non beatus; sed quod illi est uiuere, intellegere, beatum esse, hoc est illi esse. Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse. Considerauerunt enim, quidquid est, uel corpus esse uel uitam, meliusque aliquid uitam esse quam corpus, speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intellegibilem uitae. Proinde intellegibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae uisu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt; intellegibilia, quae conspectu mentis intellegi. Nulla est enim pulchritudo corporalis siue in statu corporis, sicut est figura, siue in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua non animus iudicet. Quod profecto non posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec species, sine tumore molis, sine strepitu uocis, sine spatio uel loci uel temporis. Sed ibi quoque nisi mutabilis esset, non alius alio melius de specie sensibili iudicaret; melius ingeniosior quam tardior, melius peritior quam inperitior, melius exercitatior quam minus exercitatus, et idem ipse unus, cum proficit, melius utique postea quam prius. Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. Unde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt non esse in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilis esse conuincitur. Cum igitur in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent, si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: uiderunt esse aliquid ubi prima esset incommutabilis et ideo nec conparabilis; adque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset et ex quo facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, manifestauit eis ipse, cum ab eis inuisibilia eius per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspecta sunt: sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas; a quo etiam uisibilia et temporalia cuncta creata sunt. Haec de illa parte, quam physicam, id est naturalem, nuncupant, dicta sint.

Chapter 7.—How Much the Platonists are to Be Held as Excelling Other Philosophers in Logic, i.e. Rational Philosophy.

Caput VII. Quanto excellentiores ceteris in logica, id est rationali philosophia, Platonici sint habendi.

Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of that which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be it from us to compare them with those who attributed to the bodily senses the faculty of discriminating truth, and thought, that all we learn is to be measured by their untrustworthy and fallacious rules. Such were the Epicureans, and all of the same school. Such also were the Stoics, who ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation which they so ardently love, called by them dialectic, asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions (ἒννοιαι) of those things which they explicate by definition. And hence is developed the whole plan and connection of their learning and teaching. I often wonder, with respect to this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise; for by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty, by what eyes of the flesh have they seen wisdom’s comeliness of form? Those, however, whom we justly rank before all others, have distinguished those things which are conceived by the mind from those which are perceived by the senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor attributing to them anything beyond their competency. And the light of our understandings, by which all things are learned by us, they have affirmed to be that selfsame God by whom all things were made.

Quod autem adtinet ad doctrinam, ubi uersatur pars altera, quae ab eis logica, id est rationalis, uocatur: absit ut his conparandi uideantur qui posuerunt iudicium ueritatis in sensibus corporis eorumque infidis et fallacibus regulis omnia, quae discuntur, metienda esse censuerunt, ut Epicurei et quicumque alii tales, ut etiam ipsi Stoici, qui cum uehementer amauerint sollertiam disputandi, quam dialecticam nominant, a corporis sensibus eam ducendam putarunt, hinc adseuerantes animum concipere notiones, quas appellant Ivvoiac, earum rerum scilicet quas definiendo explicant; hinc propagari adque conecti totam discendi docendique rationem. Ubi ego multum mirari soleo, cum pulchros dicant non esse nisi sapientes, quibus sensibus corporis istam pulchritudinem uiderint, qualibus oculis carnis formam sapientiae decusque conspexerint. Hi uero, quos merito ceteris anteponimus, discreuerunt ea, quae mente conspiciuntur, ab his, quae sensibus adtinguntur, nec sensibus adimentes quod possunt, nec eis dantes ultra quam possunt. Lumen autem mentium esse dixerunt ad discenda omnia eundem ipsum Deum, a quo facta sunt omnia.

Chapter 8.—That the Platonists Hold the First Rank in Moral Philosophy Also.

Caput VIII. Quod etiam in morali philosophia Platonici obtineant principatum.

The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief good,—that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore, according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others, from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they believed that from either of these two, or from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things, which they call extrinsic,—as honor, glory, wealth, and the like,—have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from the whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only to three dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God,—which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.

Reliqua est pars moralis, quam Graeco uocabulo dicunt ethicam, ubi quaeritur de summo bono, quo referentes omnia quae agimus, et quod non propter aliud, sed propter se ipsum adpetentes idque adipiscentes nihil, quo beati simus, ulterius requiramus. Ideo quippe et finis est dictus, quia propter hunc cetera uolumus, ipsum autem non nisi propter ipsum. Hoc ergo beatificum bonum alii a corpore, alii ab animo, alii ab utroque homini esse dixerunt. Videbant quippe ipsum hominem constare ex animo et corpore et ideo ab alterutro istorum duorum aut ab utroque bene sibi esse posse credebant, finali quodam bono, beati essent, quo cuncta quae agebant referrent adque id quo referendum esset non ultra quaererent. Unde illi, qui dicuntur addidisse tertium genus bonorum, quod appellatur extrinsecus, sicuti est honor gloria pecunia et si quid huius modi, non sic addiderunt, ut finale esset, id est propter se ipsum adpetendum, sed propter aliud; bonumque esse hoc genus bonis, malum autem malis. Ita bonum hominis qui uel ab animo uel a corpore uel ab utroque expetiuerunt, nihil aliud quam ab homine expetendum esse putauerunt; sed qui id adpetiuerunt a corpore, a parte hominis deteriore; qui uero ab animo, a parte meliore; qui autem ab utroque, a toto homine. Siue ergo a parte qualibet siue a toto, non nisi ab homine. Nec istae differentiae, quoniam tres sunt, ideo tres, sed multas dissensiones philosophorum sectasque fecerunt, quia et de bono corporis et de bono animi et de bono utriusque diuersi diuersa opinati sunt. Cedant igitur omnes illis philosophis, qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem fruentem corpore uel fruentem animo, sed fruentem Deo: non sicut corpore uel se ipso animus aut sicut amico amicus, sed sicut luce oculus, si aliquid ab his ad illa similitudinis adferendum est, quod quale sit, si Deus ipse adiuuerit, alio loco, quantum per nos fieri poterit, apparebit. Nunc satis sit commemorare Platonem determinasse finem boni esse secundum uirtutem uiuere et ei soli euenire posse, qui notitiam Dei habeat et imitationem nec esse aliam ob causam beatum; ideoque non dubitat hoc esse philosophari, amare Deum, cuius natura sit incorporalis. Unde utique colligitur tunc fore beatum studiosum sapientiae (id enim est philosophus), cum frui Deo coeperit. Quamuis enim non continuo beatus sit, qui eo fruitur quod amat (multi enim amando ea, quae amanda non sunt, miseri sunt et miseriores cum fruuntur): nemo tamen beatus est, qui eo quod amat non fruitur. Nam et ipsi, qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos putant amando, sed fruendo. Quisquis ergo fruitur eo, quod amat, uerumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserrimus negat? Ipsum autem uerum ac summum bonum Plato dicit Deum, unde uult esse philosophum amatorem Dei, ut, quoniam philosophia ad beatam uitam tendit, fruens Deo sit beatus qui Deum amauerit.