Concerning that Philosophy Which Has Come Nearest to the Christian Faith.

Chapter 9.—Concerning that Philosophy Which Has Come Nearest to the Christian Faith.

Caput IX. De ea philosophia, quae ad ueritatem fidei Christianae propius accessit.

Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the supreme God, that He is both the maker of all created things, the light by which things are known, and the good in reference to which things are to be done; that we have in Him the first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness of life,—whether these philosophers may be more suitably called Platonists, or whether they may give some other name to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men of the Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include the Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and all who may have held like opinions; and, lastly, whether also we include all who have been held wise men and philosophers among all nations who are discovered to have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or of other nations,—we prefer these to all other philosophers, and confess that they approach nearest to us.

Quicumque igitur philosophi de Deo summo et uero ista senserunt, quod et rerum creatarum sit effector et lumen cognoscendarum et bonum agendarum, quod ab illo nobis sit et principium naturae et ueritas doctrinae et felicitas uitae, siue Platonici adcommodatius nuncupentur, siue quodlibet aliud sectae suae nomen inponant; siue tantummodo Ionici generis, qui in eis praecipui fuerunt, ista senserint, sicut idem Plato et qui eum bene intellexerunt; siue etiam Italici, propter Pythagoram et Pythagoreos et si qui forte alii eiusdem sententiae indidem fuerunt; siue aliarum quoque gentium qui sapientes uel philosophi habiti sunt, Atlantici Libyes, Aegyptii, Indi, Persae, Chaldaei, Scythae, Galli, Hispani aliqui reperiuntur, qui hoc uiderint ac docuerint: eos omnes ceteris anteponimus eosque nobis propinquiores fatemur.

Chapter 10.—That the Excellency of the Christian Religion is Above All the Science of Philosophers.

Caput X. Quae sit inter philosophicas artes religiosi excellentia Christiani.

For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of Platonists, and may not even know that there have existed two schools of philosophers speaking the Greek tongue, to wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is nevertheless not so deaf with respect to human affairs, as not to know that philosophers profess the study, and even the possession, of wisdom. He is on his guard, however, with respect to those who philosophize according to the elements of this world, not according to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned by the precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has been said, “Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy and vain deceit, according to the elements of the world.” Then, that he may not suppose that all philosophers are such as do this, he hears the same apostle say concerning certain of them, “Because that which is known of God is manifest among them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, also His eternal power and Godhead.” And, when speaking to the Athenians, after having spoken a mighty thing concerning God, which few are able to understand, “In Him we live, and move, and have our being,” he goes on to say, “As certain also of your own have said.” He knows well, too, to be on his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For where it has been said by him, “that God has manifested to them by those things which are made His invisible things, that they might be seen by the understanding,” there it has also been said that they did not rightly worship God Himself, because they paid divine honors, which are due to Him alone, to other things also to which they ought not to have paid them,—“because, knowing God, they glorified Him not as God: neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things;”—where the apostle would have us understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning this we will dispute with them afterwards. With respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we prefer them to all others namely, concerning the one God, the author of this universe, who is not only above every body, being incorporeal, but also above all souls, being incorruptible—our principle, our light, our good. And though the Christian man, being ignorant of their writings, does not use in disputation words which he has not learned,—not calling that part of philosophy natural (which is the Latin term), or physical (which is the Greek one), which treats of the investigation of nature; or that part rational, or logical, which deals with the question how truth may be discovered; or that part moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good is to be sought, and evil to be shunned,—he is not, therefore, ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God that we have that nature in which we are made in the image of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves, and that grace through which, by cleaving to Him, we are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things, and endeavoring to discover the right mode of learning and of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides the cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at which felicity is to be drunk. All philosophers, then, who have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are better known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily than other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue, have given them greater celebrity and notoriety.

Quamuis enim homo Christianus litteris tantum ecclesiasticis eruditus Platonicorum forte nomen ignoret, nec utrum duo genera philosophorum extiterint in Graeca lingua, Ionicorum et Italicorum, sciat: non tamen ita surdus est in rebus humanis, ut nesciat philosophos uel studium sapientiae uel ipsam sapientiam profiteri. Cauet eos tamen, qui secundum elementa huius mundi philosophantur, non secundum Deum, a quo ipse factus est mundus. Admonetur enim praecepto apostolico fideliterque audit quod dictum est: Cauete ne quis uos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum elementa mundi. Deinde ne omnes tales esse arbitretur, audit ab eodem apostolo dici de quibusdam: Quia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestauit. Inuisibilia enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas, et ubi Atheniensibus loquens, cum rem magnam de Deo dixisset et quae a paucis possit intellegi, quod in illo u i u i m u s et mouemur et sumus, adiecit et ait: Sicut et uestri quidam dixerunt. Nouit sane etiam ipsos, in quibus errant, cauere; ubi enim dictum est, quod per ea, quae facta sunt, Deus illis manifestauit intellectu conspicienda inuisibilia sua: ibi etiam dictum est non illos ipsum Deum recte coluisse, quia et aliis rebus, quibus non oportebat, diuinos honores illi uni tantum debitos detulerunt: Quoniam cognoscentes Deum non sicut Deum glorificauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est cor insipiens eorum. Dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium; ubi et Romanos et Graecos et Aegyptios. qui de sapientiae nomine gloriati sunt, fecit intellegi. Sed de hoc cum istis post modum disputabimus. In quo autem nobis consentiunt de uno Deo huius uniuersitatis auctore, qui non solum super omnia corpora est incorporeus, uerum etiam super omnes animas incorruptibilis, principium nostrum, lumen nostrum, bonum nostrum, in hoc eos ceteris anteponimus. Nec, si litteras eorum Christianus ignorans uerbis, quae non didicit, in disputatione non utitur, ut uel naturalem Latine uel physicam Graece appellet eam partem, in qua de naturae inquisitione tractatur. et rationalem siue logicam, in qua quaeritur quonam modo ueritas percipi possit, et moralem uel ethicam, in qua de moribus agitur bonorumque finibus adpetendis malorumque uitandis, ideo nescit ab uno uero Deo adque optimo et naturam nobis esse, qua facti ad eius imaginem sumus, et doctrinam, qua eum nosque nouerimus, et gratiam, qua illi cohaerendo beati simus. Haec itaque causa est quur istos ceteris praeferamus, quia, cum alii philosophi ingenia sua studiaque contriuerint in requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi adque uiuendi, isti Deo cognito reppererunt ubi esset et causa constitutae uniuersitatis et lux percipiendae ueritatis et fons bibendae felicitatis. Siue ergo isti Platonici siue quicumque alii quarumlibet gentium philosophi de Deo ista sentiunt, nobiscum sentiunt. Sed ideo cum Platonicis magis agere placuit hanc causam, quia eorum sunt litterae notiores. Nam et Graeci, quorum lingua in gentibus praeminet, eas magna praedicatione celebrarunt, et Latini permoti earum uel excellentia uel gloria, ipsas libentius didicerunt adque in nostrum eloquium transferendo nobiliores clarioresque fecerunt.

Chapter 11.—How Plato Has Been Able to Approach So Nearly to Christian Knowledge.

Caput XI. Unde Plato eam intellegentiam potuerit adquirere, qua Christianae scientiae propinquauit.

Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder when they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning God, in which they recognize considerable agreement with the truth of our religion. Some have concluded from this, that when he went to Egypt he had heard the prophet Jeremiah, or, whilst travelling in the same country, had read the prophetic scriptures, which opinion I myself have expressed in certain of my writings. But a careful calculation of dates, contained in chronological history, shows that Plato was born about a hundred years after the time in which Jeremiah prophesied, and, as he lived eighty-one years, there are found to have been about seventy years from his death to that time when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, requested the prophetic scriptures of the Hebrew people to be sent to him from Judea, and committed them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew the Greek tongue, to be translated and kept. Therefore, on that voyage of his, Plato could neither have seen Jeremiah, who was dead so long before, nor have read those same scriptures which had not yet been translated into the Greek language, of which he was a master, unless, indeed, we say that, as he was most earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, he also studied those writings through an interpreter, as he did those of the Egyptians,—not, indeed, writing a translation of them (the facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy in return for munificent acts of kindness, though fear of his kingly authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but learning as much as he possibly could concerning their contents by means of conversation. What warrants this supposition are the opening verses of Genesis: “In the beginning God made the heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible, and without order; and darkness was over the abyss: and the Spirit of God moved over the waters.” For in the Timæus, when writing on the formation of the world, he says that God first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that he assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain resemblance to the statement, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.” Plato next speaks of those two intermediary elements, water and air, by which the other two extremes, namely, earth and fire, were mutually united; from which circumstance he is thought to have so understood the words, “The Spirit of God moved over the waters.” For, not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by those scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought that the four elements are spoken of in that place, because the air also is called spirit. Then, as to Plato’s saying that the philosopher is a lover of God, nothing shines forth more conspicuously in those sacred writings. But the most striking thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: “I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you;” as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not,—a truth which Plato zealously held, and most diligently commended. And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in that book where it is said, “I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, who is sent me unto you.”

Mirantur autem quidam nobis in Christi gratia sociati, cum audiunt uel legunt Platonem de Deo ista sensisse, quae multum congruere ueritati nostrae religionis agnoscunt. Unde nonnulli putauerunt eum, quando perrexit in Aegyptum, Hieremiam audisse prophetam uel scripturas propheticas in eadem peregrinatione legisse; quorum quidem opinionem in quibusdam libris meis posui. Sed diligenter subputata temporum ratio, quae chronica historia continetur, Platonem indicat a tempore, quo prophetauit Hieremias, centum ferme annos postea natum fuisse; qui cum octoginta et unum uixisset, ab anno mortis eius usque ad id tempus, quo Ptolomaeus rex Aegypti scripturas propheticas gentis Hebraeorum de Iudaea poposcit et per septuaginta uiros Hebraeos, qui etiam Graecam linguam nouerant, interpretandas habendasque curauit, anni reperiuntur ferme sexaginta. Quapropter in illa peregrinatione sua Plato nec Hieremiam uidere potuit tanto ante defunctum, nec easdem scripturas legere, quae nondum fuerant in Graecam linguam translatae, qua ille pollebat; nisi forte, quia fuit acerrimi studii, sicut Aegyptias, ita et istas per interpretem didicit, non ut scribendo transferret (quod Ptolomaeus pro ingenti beneficio, qui a regia potestate etiam timeri poterat, meruisse perhibetur, sed ut conloquendo quid continerent, quantum capere posset, addisceret. Hoc ut existimetur, illa suadere uidentur indicia, quod liber geneseos sic incipit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Terra autem erat inuisibilis et inconposita, et tenebrae [erant] super abyssum, et spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam; in Timaeo autem Plato, quem librum de mundi constitutione conscripsit, Deum dicit in illo opere terram primo ignemque iunxisse. Manifestum est autem, quod igni tribuat caeli locum: habet ergo haec sententia quandam illius similitudinem, qua dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Deinde illa duo media, quibus interpositis sibimet haec extrema copularentur, aquam dicit et aerem; unde putatur sic intellexisse quod scriptum est: spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam. Parum quippe adtendens quo more soleat illa scriptura appellare spiritum Dei, quoniam et aer spiritus dicitur, quattuor opinatus elementa loco illo commemorata uideri potest Deinde quod Plato dicit amatorem Dei esse philosophum, nihil sic illis sacris litteris flagrat; et maxime illud (quod et me plurimum adducit, ut paene adsentiar Platonem illorum librorum expertem non fuisse), quod, cum ad sanctum Moysen ita uerba Dei per angelum perferantur, ut quaerenti quod sit nomen eius, qui eum pergere praecipiebat ad populum Hebraeum ex Aegypto liberandum, respondeatur: Ego sum qui sum, et dices filiis Israel: Qui est, misit me ad uos, tamquam in eius conparatione, qui uere est quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt non sint, uehementer hoc Plato tenuit et diligentissime commendauit. Et nescio utrum hoc uspiam reperiatur in libris eorum, qui ante Platonem fuerunt, nisi ubi dictum est: Ego sum qui sum, et dices eis: Qui est, misit me ad uos.

Chapter 12.—That Even the Platonists, Though They Say These Things Concerning the One True God, Nevertheless Thought that Sacred Rites Were to Be Performed in Honor of Many Gods.

Caput XII. Quod etiam Platonici, licet de uno uero Deo bene senserint, multis tamen dis sacra facienda censuerint.

But we need not determine from what source he learned these things,—whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: “Because that which is known of God, has been manifested among them, for God hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead.” From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the natural theology,—the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect,—so called because they were in the habit of walking about during their disputations,—and though he had, through the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister’s son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honor of many gods.

Sed undecumque ille ista didicerit, siue praecedentibus eum ueterum libris siue potius, quo modo dicit apostolus, quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis; Deus enim illis manifestauit; inuisibilia enim eius a constitutione mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et diuinitas: nunc non inmerito me Platonicos philosophos elegisse cum quibus agam, quod in ista quaestione, quam modo suscepimus, agitur de naturali theologia, utrum propter felicitatem, quae post mortem futura est, uni Deo an pluribus sacra facere oporteat, satis, ut existimo, exposui. Ideo quippe hos potissimum elegi, quoniam de uno Deo qui fecit caelum et terram, quanto melius senserunt, tanto ceteris gloriosiores et inlustriores habentur, in tantum aliis praelati iudicio posterorum, ut, cum Aristoteles, Platonis discipulus, uir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem inpar, sed multos facile superans, cum sectam Peripateticam condidisset, quod deambulans disputare consueuerat, plurimosque discipulos praeclara fama excellens uiuo adhuc praeceptore in suam haeresim congregasset, post mortem uero Platonis Speusippus, sororis eius filius, et Xenocrates, dilectus eius discipulus, in scholam eius, quae Academia uocabatur, eidem successissent adque ob hoc et ipsi et eorum successores Academici appellarentur, recentiores tamen philosophi nobilissimi, quibus Plato sectandus placuit, noluerint se dici Peripateticos aut Academicos, sed Platonicos. Ex quibus sunt ualde nobilitati Graeci Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyrius; in utraque autem lingua, id est et Graeca et Latina, Apuleius Afer extitit Platonicus nobilis. Sed hi omnes et ceteri eius modi et ipse Plato dis plurimis esse sacra facienda putauerunt.

Chapter 13.—Concerning the Opinion of Plato, According to Which He Defined the Gods as Beings Entirely Good and the Friends of Virtue.

Caput XIII. De sententia Platonis, qua definiuit deos non esse nisi bonos amicosque uirtutum.

Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from us, nevertheless with respect to this particular point of difference, which I have just stated, as it is one of great moment, and the question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods they think that sacred rites are to be performed,—to the good or to the bad, or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not one of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case (for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by sacred rites in order that they may not harm us, but the good gods are to be invoked in order that they may assist us. For there are no bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honor of such rites is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who love scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them among divine things, and that they be exhibited in their honor? The power of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things proves that they are bad. For it is well-known what Plato’s opinion was concerning scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves, because they have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what character, therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself about those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated in their own honor.

Quamquam ergo a nobis et in aliis multis rebus magnisque dissentiant, in hoc tamen, quod modo posui, quia neque parua res est et inde nunc quaestio est, primum ab eis quaero, quibus dis istum cultum exhibendum arbitrentur, utrum bonis an malis an et bonis et malis. Sed habemus Platonis sententiam dicentis omnes deos bonos esse nec esse omnino ullum deorum malum. Consequens est igitur, ut bonis haec exhibenda intellegantur; tunc enim dis exhibentur, quoniam nec di erunt, si boni non erunt. Hoc si ita est, (nam de dis quid aliud decet credere?) illa profecto uacuatur opinio, qua nonnulli putant deos malos sacris placandos esse, ne laedant, bonos autem, ut adiuuent, inuocandos. Mali enim nulli sunt di; bonis porro debitus, ut dicunt, honor sacrorum est deferendus. Qui sunt ergo illi, qui ludos scaenicos amant eosque diuinis rebus adiungi et suis honoribus flagitant exhiberi? quorum uis non eos indicat nullos, sed iste adfectus nimirum indicat malos. Quid enim de ludis scaenicis Plato senserit, notum est, cum poetas ipsos, quod tam indigna deorum maiestate adque bonitate carmina conposuerint, censet ciuitate pellendos. Qui sunt igitur isti di, qui de scaenicis ludis cum ipso Platone contendunt? Ille quippe non patitur deos falsis criminibus infamari; isti eisdem criminibus suos honores celebrari iubent.

In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not only demanded base things, but also did cruel things, taking from Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease upon him because he had refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled their commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not think they were to be feared; but, holding to his opinion with the utmost firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with which these gods are delighted because they themselves are impure. But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the second book) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts accompanied with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all other things which are associated with joyfulness. How comes it, then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away those pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods but from the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very gods themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and sportive, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists, therefore, explain these things to us, since, following the opinion of their master, they think that all the gods are good and honorable, and friendly to the virtues of the wise, holding it unlawful to think otherwise concerning any of the gods. We will explain it, say they. Let us then attentively listen to them.

Denique isti cum eosdem ludos instaurari praeciperent, poscentes turpia etiam maligna gesserunt, Tito Latinio auferentes filium et inmittentes morbum, quod eorum abnuisset imperium, eumque morbum retrahentes, cum iussa conplesset; iste autem illos nec tam malos. timendos putat, sed suae sententiae robur constantissime retinens omnes poetarum sacrilegas nugas, quibus illi inmunditiae societate oblectantur, a populo bene instituto remouere non dubitat. Hunc autem Platonem, quod iam in secundo libro commemoraui, inter semideos Labeo ponit. Qui Labeo numina mala uictimis cruentis adque huius modi supplicationibus placari existimat, bona uero ludis et talibus quasi ad laetitiam pertinentibus rebus. Quid est ergo quod semideus Plato non semideis, sed deis, et hoc bonis, illa oblectamenta, quia iudicat turpia, tam constanter audet auferre? Qui sane di refellunt sententiam Labeonis; nam, se in Latinio non lasciuos tantum adque ludibundos, sed etiam saeuos terribilesque monstrarunt. Exponant ergo nobis ista Platonici, qui omnes deos secundum auctoris sui sententiam bonos et honestos et uirtutibus sapientium socios esse arbitrantur aliterque de ullo deorum sentiri nefas habent. Exponimus, inquiunt. Adtente igitur audiamus.

Chapter 14.—Of the Opinion of Those Who Have Said that Rational Souls are of Three Kinds, to Wit, Those of the Celestial Gods, Those of the Aerial Demons, and Those of Terrestrial Men.

Caput XIV. De opinione eorum, qui rationales animas trium generum esse dixerunt, id est in dis caelestibus, in daemonibus aeriis et in hominibus terrenis.

There is, say they, a threefold division of all animals endowed with a rational soul, namely, into gods, men, and demons. The gods occupy the loftiest region, men the lowest, the demons the middle region. For the abode of the gods is heaven, that of men the earth, that of the demons the air. As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so also is that of their natures; therefore the gods are better than men and demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons, both in respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and the difference of their merits. The demons, therefore, who hold the middle place, as they are inferior to the gods, than whom they inhabit a lower region, so they are superior to men, than whom they inhabit a loftier one. For they have immortality of body in common with the gods, but passions of the mind in common with men. On which account, say they, it is not wonderful that they are delighted with the obscenities of the theatre, and the fictions of the poets, since they are also subject to human passions, from which the gods are far removed, and to which they are altogether strangers. Whence we conclude that it was not the gods, who are all good and highly exalted, that Plato deprived of the pleasure of theatric plays, by reprobating and prohibiting the fictions of the poets, but the demons.

Omnium, inquiunt, animalium, in quibus est anima rationalis, tripertita diuisio est, in deos, homines, daemones. Di excelsissimum locum tenent, homines infimum, daemones medium. Nam deorum sedes in caelo est, hominum in terra, in aere daemonum. Sicut eis diuersa dignitas est locorum. ita etiam naturarum. Proinde di sunt hominibus daemonibusque potiores; homines uero infra deos et daemones constituti sunt, ut elementorum ordine, sic differentia meritorum. Daemones igitur medii, quem ad modum dis, quibus inferius habitant, postponendi, ita hominibus, quibus superius, praeferendi sunt. Habent enim cum dis communem inmortalitatem corporum, animorum autem cum hominibus passiones. Quapropter non est mirum, inquiunt, si etiam ludorum obscenitatibus et poetarum figmentis delectantur, quando quidem humanis capiuntur adfectibus, a quibus di longe absunt et modis omnibus alieni sunt. Ex quo colligitur, Platonem poetica detestando et prohibendo figmenta non deos, qui omnes boni et excelsi sunt, priuasse ludorum scaenicorum uoluptate, sed daemones.

Of these things many have written: among others Apuleius, the Platonist of Madaura, who composed a whole work on the subject, entitled, Concerning the God of Socrates. He there discusses and explains of what kind that deity was who attended on Socrates, a sort of familiar, by whom it is said he was admon ished to desist from any action which would not turn out to his advantage. He asserts most distinctly, and proves at great length, that it was not a god but a demon; and he discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato concerning the lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men, and the middle estate of demons. These things being so, how did Plato dare to take away, if not from the gods, whom he removed from all human contagion, certainly from the demons, all the pleasures of the theatre, by expelling the poets from the state? Evidently in this way he wished to admonish the human soul, although still confined in these moribund members, to despise the shameful commands of the demons, and to detest their impurity, and to choose rather the splendor of virtue. But if Plato showed himself virtuous in answering and prohibiting these things, then certainly it was shameful of the demons to command them. Therefore either Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates’ familiar did not belong to this class of deities, or Plato held contradictory opinions, now honoring the demons, now removing from the well-regulated state the things in which they delighted, or Socrates is not to be congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which Apuleius was so ashamed that he entitled his book On the God of Socrates, whilst according to the tenor of his discussion, wherein he so diligently and at such length distinguishes gods from demons, he ought not to have entitled it, Concerning the God, but Concerning the Demon of Socrates. But he preferred to put this into the discussion itself rather than into the title of his book. For, through the sound doctrine which has illuminated human society, all, or almost all men have such a horror at the name of demons, that every one who before reading the dissertation of Apuleius, which sets forth the dignity of demons, should have read the title of the book, On the Demon of Socrates, would certainly have thought that the author was not a sane man. But what did even Apuleius find to praise in the demons, except subtlety and strength of body and a higher place of habitation? For when he spoke generally concerning their manners, he said nothing that was good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no one, when he has read that book, wonders that they desired to have even the obscenity of the stage among divine things, or that, wishing to be thought gods, they should be delighted with the crimes of the gods, or that all those sacred solemnities, whose obscenity occasions laughter, and whose shameful cruelty causes horror, should be in agreement with their passions.

Haec si ita sunt (quae licet aput alios quoque reperiantur, Apuleius tamen Platonicus Madaurensis de hac re sola unum scripsit librum, cuius esse titulum uoluit ‘de deo Socratis’, ubi disserit et exponit, ex quo genere numinum Socrates habebat adiunctum et amicitia quadam conciliatum, a quo perhibetur solitus admoneri, ut desisteret ab agendo, quando id quod agere uolebat, non prospere fuerat euenturum; dicit enim apertissime et copiosissime adserit non illum deum fuisse, sed daemonem, diligenti disputatione pertractans istam Platonis de deorum sublimitate et hominum humilitate et daemonum medietate sententiam) — haec ergo si ita sunt, quonam modo ausus est Plato, etiamsi non dis, quos ab omni humana contagione semouit, certe ipsis daemonibus poetas urbe pellendo auferre theatricas uoluptates, nisi quia hoc pacto admonuit animum humanum, quamuis adhuc in his moribundis membris positum, pro splendore honestatis inpura daemonum iussa contemnere eorumque inmunditiam detestari? Nam si Plato haec honestissime arguit et prohibuit, profecto daemones turpissime poposcerunt adque iusserunt. Aut ergo fallitur Apuleius et non ex isto genere numinum habuit amicum Socrates aut contraria inter se sentit Plato modo daemones honorando, modo eorum delicias a ciuitate bene morata remouendo, aut non est Socrati amicitia daemonis gratulanda, de qua usque adeo et ipse Apuleius erubuit, ut de deo Socratis praenotaret librum, quem secundum suam disputationem, qua deos a daemonibus tam diligenter copioseque discernit, non appellare de deo, sed de daemone Socratis debuit. Maluit autem hoc in ipsa disputatione quam in titulo libri ponere. Ita enim per sanam doctrinam, quae humanis rebus inluxit, omnes uel paene omnes daemonum nomen exhorrent, ut, quisquis ante disputationem Apulei, qua daemonum dignitas commendatur, titulum libri de daemone Socratis legeret, nequaquam illum hominem sanum fuisse sentiret. Quid autem etiam ipse Apuleius quod in daemonibus laudaret inuenit praeter subtilitatem et firmitatem corporum et habitationis altiorem locum? Nam de moribus eorum, cum de omnibus generaliter loqueretur, non solum nihil boni dixit, sed etiam plurimum mali. Denique lecto illo libro prorsus nemo miratur eos etiam scaenicam turpitudinem in rebus diuinis habere uoluisse, et cum deos se putari uelint, deorum criminibus oblectari potuisse, et quidquid in eorum sacris obscena sollemnitate seu turpi crudelitate uel ridetur uel horretur, eorum adfectibus conuenire.

Chapter 15.—That the Demons are Not Better Than Men Because of Their Aerial Bodies, or on Account of Their Superior Place of Abode.

Caput XV. Quod neque propter aeria corpora neque propter superiora habitacula daemones hominibus antecellant.

Wherefore let not the mind truly religious, and submitted to the true God, suppose that demons are better than men, because they have better bodies. Otherwise it must put many beasts before itself which are superior to us both in acuteness of the senses, in ease and quickness of movement, in strength and in long-continued vigor of body. What man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of vision? Who can equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can equal the hare, the stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who can equal in strength the lion or the elephant? Who can equal in length of life the serpents, which are affirmed to put off old age along with their skin, and to return to youth again? But as we are better than all these by the possession of reason and understanding, so we ought also to be better than the demons by living good and virtuous lives. For divine providence gave to them bodies of a better quality than ours, that that in which we excel them might in this way be commended to us as deserving to be far more cared for than the body, and that we should learn to despise the bodily excellence of the demons compared with goodness of life, in respect of which we are better than they, knowing that we too shall have immortality of body,—not an immortality tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is consequent on purity of soul.

Quam ob rem absit ut ista considerans animus ueraciter religiosus et uero Deo subditus ideo arbitretur daemones se ipso esse meliores, quod habeant corpora meliora. Alioquin multas sibi et bestias praelaturus est, quae nos et acrimonia sensuum et motu facillimo adque celerrimo et ualentia uirium et annosissima firmitate corporum uincunt. Quis hominum uidendo aequabitur aquilis et uulturibus? quis odorando canibus? quis uelocitate leporibus, carnis, omnibus auibus? quis multum ualendo leonibus et elephantis? quis diu uiuendo serpentibus, qui etiam deposita tunica senectutem deponere adque in iuuentam redire perhibentur? Sed sicut his omnibus ratiocinando et intellegendo meliores sumus, ita etiam daemonibus bene adque honeste uiuendo meliores esse debemus. Ob hoc enim et prouidentia diuina eis, quibus nos constat esse potiores, data sunt quaedam potiora corporum munera, ut illud, quo eis praeponimur, etiam isto modo nobis commendaretur multo maiore cura excolendum esse quam corpus, ipsamque excellentiam corporalem, quam daemones habere nossemus, prae bonitate uitae, qua illis anteponimur, contemnere disceremus, habituri et nos inmortalitatem corporum, non quam suppliciorum aeternitas torqueat, sed quam puritas praecedat animorum.

But now, as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous to be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit the air, and we the earth, as to think that on that account they are to be put before us; for in this way we put all the birds before ourselves. But the birds, when they are weary with flying, or require to repair their bodies with food, come back to the earth to rest or to feed, which the demons, they say, do not. Are they, therefore, inclined to say that the birds are superior to us, and the demons superior to the birds? But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason why we should think that, on account of their inhabiting a loftier element, the demons have a claim to our religious submission. But as it is really the case that the birds of the air are not only not put before us who dwell on the earth; but are even subjected to us on account of the dignity of the rational soul which is in us, so also it is the case that the demons, though they are aerial, are not better than we who are terrestrial because the air is higher than the earth, but, on the contrary, men are to be put before demons because their despair is not to be compared to the hope of pious men. Even that law of Plato’s, according to which he mutually orders and arranges the four elements, inserting between the two extreme elements—namely, fire, which is in the highest degree mobile, and the immoveable earth—the two middle ones, air and water, that by how much the air is higher up than the water, and the fire than the air, by so much also are the waters higher than the earth,—this law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us not to estimate the merits of animated creatures according to the grades of the elements. And Apuleius himself says that man is a terrestrial animal in common with the rest, who is nevertheless to be put far before aquatic animals, though Plato puts the waters themselves before the land. By this he would have us understand that the same order is not to be observed when the question concerns the merits of animals, though it seems to be the true one in the gradation of bodies; for it appears to be possible that a soul of a higher order may inhabit a body of a lower, and a soul of a lower order a body of a higher.

Iam uero de loci altitudine, quod daemones in aere, nos autem habitamus in terra, ita permoueri, ut hinc eos nobis esse praeponendos existimemus, omnino ridiculum est. Hoc enim pacto nobis et omnia uolatilia praeponimus. At enim uolatilia cum uolando fatigantur uel reficiendum alimentis corpus habent, terram repetunt uel ad requiem uel ad pastum, quod daemones, inquiunt, non faciunt. Numquid ergo placet eis, ut uolatilia nobis, daemones autem etiam uolatilibus antecellant? Quod si dementissimum est opinari, nihil est quod de habitatione superioris elementi dignos esse daemones existimemus, quibus nos religionis adfectu subdere debeamus. Sicut enim fieri potuit, ut aeriae uolucres terrestribus nobis non solum non praeferantur, uerum etiam subiciantur propter rationalis animae, quae in nobis est, dignitatem: ita fieri potuit, ut daemones, quamuis magis aerii sint, terrestribus nobis non ideo meliores sint, quia est aer quam terra superior; sed ideo eis homines praeferendi sint, quoniam spei piorum hominum nequaquam illorum desperatio conparanda est. Nam et illa ratio Platonis, qua elementa quattuor proportione contexit adque ordinat, ita duobus extremis, igni mobilissimo et terrae inmobili, media duo, aerem et aquam, interserens, ut, quanto est aer aquis et aere ignis, tanto et aquae superiores sint terris, satis nos admonet animalium merita non pro elementorum gradibus aestimare. Et ipse quippe Apuleius cum ceteris terrestre animal hominem dicit, qui tamen longe praeponitur animalibus aquatilibus, cum ipsas aquas terris praeponat Plato: ut intellegant, non eundem ordinem tenendum, cum agitur de meritis animarum, qui uidetur esse ordo in gradibus corporum; sed fieri posse, ut inferius corpus anima melior inhabitet deteriorque superius.