What Apuleius the Platonist Thought Concerning the Manners and Actions of Demons.

Chapter 16.—What Apuleius the Platonist Thought Concerning the Manners and Actions of Demons.

Caput XVI. Quid de moribus adque actionibus daemonum Apuleius Platonicus senserit.

The same Apuleius, when speaking concerning the manners of demons, said that they are agitated with the same perturbations of mind as men; that they are provoked by injuries, propitiated by services and by gifts, rejoice in honors, are delighted with a variety of sacred rites, and are annoyed if any of them be neglected. Among other things, he also says that on them depend the divinations of augurs, soothsayers, and prophets, and the revelations of dreams, and that from them also are the miracles of the magicians. But, when giving a brief definition of them, he says, “Demons are of an animal nature, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time.” “Of which five things, the three first are common to them and us, the fourth peculiar to themselves, and the fifth common to therewith the gods.” But I see that they have in common with the gods two of the first things, which they have in common with us. For he says that the gods also are animals; and when he is assigning to every order of beings its own element, he places us among the other terrestrial animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore, if the demons are animals as to genus, this is common to them, not only with men, but also with the gods and with beasts; if they are rational as to their mind, this is common to them with the gods and with men; if they are eternal in time, this is common to them with the gods only; if they are passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men only; if they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature, for so also are the beasts; in being rational as to mind, they are not above ourselves, for so are we also; and as to their being eternal as to time, what is the advantage of that if they are not blessed? for better is temporal happiness than eternal misery. Again, as to their being passive in soul, how are they in this respect above us, since we also are so, but would not have been so had we not been miserable? Also, as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set on that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above every body? and therefore religious worship, which ought to be rendered from the soul, is by no means due to that thing which is inferior to the soul. Moreover, if he had, among those things which he says belong to demons, enumerated virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirmed that they have those things in common with the gods, and, like them, eternally, he would assuredly have attributed to them something greatly to be desired, and much to be prized. And even in that case it would not have been our duty to worship them like God on account of these things, but rather to worship Him from whom we know they had received them. But how much less are they really worthy of divine honor,—those aerial animals who are only rational that they may be capable of misery, passive that they may be actually miserable, and eternal that it may be impossible for them to end their misery!

De moribus ergo daemonum cum idem Platonicus loqueretur, dixit eos eisdem quibus homines animi perturbationibus agitari, inritari iniuriis, obsequiis donisque placari, gaudere honoribus, diuersis sacrorum ritibus oblectari et in eis si quid neglectum fuerit commoueri. Inter cetera etiam dicit ad eos pertinere diuinationes augurum, aruspicum, uatum adque somniorum; ab his quoque esse miracula magorum. Breuiter autem eos definiens ait daemones esse genere animalia, animo passiua, mente rationalia, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna; horum uero quinque tria priora illis esse quae nobis, quartum proprium, quintum eos cum dis habere commune. Sed uideo trium superiorum, quae nobiscum habent, duo etiam cum dis habere. Animalia quippe esse dicit et deos, suaque cuique elementa distribuens in terrestribus animalibus nos posuit cum ceteris quae in terra uiuunt et sentiunt, in aquatilibus pisces et alia natatilia, in aeriis daemones, in aetheriis deos. Ac per hoc quod daemones genere sunt animalia, non solum eis cum hominibus, uerum etiam cum dis pecoribusque commune est; quod mente rationalia, cum dis et hominibus; quod tempore aeterna, cum dis solis; quod animo passiua, cum hominibus solis; quod corpore aeria, ipsi sunt soli. Proinde quod genere sunt animalia, non est magnum, quia hoc sunt et pecora; quod mente rationalia, non est supra nos, quia sumus et nos; quod tempore aeterna, quid boni est, si non beata? Melior est enim temporalis felicitas quam misera aeternitas. Quod animo passiua, quo modo supra nos est, quando et nos hoc sumus, nec ita esset, nisi miseri essemus? Quod corpore aeria, quanti aestimandum est, cum omni corpori praeferatur animae qualiscumque natura, et ideo religionis cultus, qui debetur ex animo, nequaquam debeatur ei rei, quae inferior est animo? Porro si inter illa, quae daemonum esse dicit, adnumeraret uirtutem, sapientiam, felicitatem et haec eos diceret habere cum dis aeterna adque communia, profecto aliquid diceret exoptandum magnique pendendum; nec sic eos tamen propter haec tamquam Deum colere deberemus, sed potius ipsum, a quo haec illos accepisse nossemus. Quanto minus nunc honore diuino aeria digna sunt animalia, ad hoc rationalia ut misera esse possint, ad hoc passiua ut misera sint, ad hoc aeterna ut miseriam finire non possint!

Chapter 17.—Whether It is Proper that Men Should Worship Those Spirits from Whose Vices It is Necessary that They Be Freed.

Caput XVII. An dignum sit eos spiritus ab homine coli, a quorum uitiis eum oporteat liberari.

Wherefore, to omit other things, and confine our attention to that which he says is common to the demons with us, let us ask this question: If all the four elements are full of their own animals, the fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the earth of mortal ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by the whirlwinds and tempests of passions?—for the Greek word παθος means perturbation, whence he chose to call the demons “passive in soul,” because the word passion, which is derived from πάθος, signified a commotion of the mind contrary to reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of demons which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears in beasts, it is not perturbation, because it is not contrary to reason, of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or misery which is the cause of these perturbations in the case of men, for we are not yet blessed in the possession of that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at last, when we shall be set free from our present mortality. But the gods, they say, are free from these perturbations, because they are not only eternal, but also blessed; for they also have the same kind of rational souls, but most pure from all spot and plague. Wherefore, if the gods are free from perturbation because they are blessed, not miserable animals, and the beasts are free from them because they are animals which are capable neither of blessedness nor misery, it remains that the demons, like men, are subject to perturbations because they are not blessed but miserable animals. What folly, therefore, or rather what madness, to submit ourselves through any sentiment of religion to demons, when it belongs to the true religion to deliver us from that depravity which makes us like to them! For Apuleius himself, although he is very sparing toward them, and thinks they are worthy of divine honors, is nevertheless compelled to confess that they are subject to anger; and the true religion commands us not to be moved with anger, but rather to resist it. The demons are won over by gifts; and the true religion commands us to favor no one on account of gifts received. The demons are flattered by honors; but the true religion commands us by no means to be moved by such things. The demons are haters of some men and lovers of others, not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment, but because of what he calls their “passive soul;” whereas the true religion commands us to love even our enemies. Lastly, the true religion commands us to put away all disquietude of heart and agitation of mind, and also all commotions and tempests of the soul, which Apuleius asserts to be continually swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why, therefore, except through foolishness and miserable error shouldst thou humble thyself to worship a being to whom thou desirest to be unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou pay religious homage to him whom thou art unwilling to imitate, when it is the highest duty of religion to imitate Him whom thou worshippest?

Quapropter, ut omittam cetera et hoc solum pertractem, quod nobiscum daemones dixit habere commune, id est animi passiones, si omnia quattuor elementa suis animalibus plena sunt, inmortalibus ignis et aer, mortalibus aqua et terra, quaero quur animi daemonum passionum turbelis et tempestatibus agitentur. Perturbatio est enim, quae Graece πάϑος dicitur; unde illa uoluit uocare animo passiua, quia uerbum de uerbo πάϑος passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem. Quur ergo sunt ista in animis daemonum, quae in pecoribus non sunt? Quoniam si quid in pecore simile apparet, non est perturbatio, quia non est contra rationem, qua pecora carent. In hominibus autem ut sint istae perturbationes, facit hoc stultitia uel miseria; nondum enim sumus in illa perfectione sapientiae beati, quae nobis ab hac mortalitate liberatis in fine promittitur. Deos uero ideo dicunt istas pel’turbationes non perpeti, quia non solum aeterni, uerum etiam beati sunt. Easdem quippe animas rationales etiam ipsos habere perhibent, sed ab omni labe ac peste purissimas. Quam ob rem si propterea di non perturbantur, quod animalia sunt beata, non misera, et propterea pecora non perturbantur, quod animalia sunt, quae nec beata possunt esse nec misera: restat ut daemones sicut homines ideo perturbentur, quod animalia sunt non beata, sed misera. [XVII.] Qua igitur insipientia uel potius amentia per aliquam religionem daemonibus subdimur, cum per ueram religionem ab ea uitiositate, in qua illis sumus similes, liberemur? Cum enim daemones, quod et iste Apuleius, quamuis eis plurimum parcat et diuinis honoribus dignos censeat, tamen cogitur confiteri, ira instigentur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ne ira instigemur, sed ei potius resistamus. Cum daemones donis inuitentur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ne cuiquam donorum acceptione faueamus. Cum daemones honoribus mulceantur, nobis uera religio praecipit, ut talibus nullo modo moueamur. Cum daemones quorundam hominum osores, quorundam amatores sint, non prudenti tranquilloque iudicio, sed animo ut appellat ipse passiuo, nobis uera religio praecipit, ut nostros etiam diligamus inimicos. Postremo omnem motum cordis et salum mentis omnesque turbelas et tempestates animi, quibus daemones aestuare adque fluctuare adserit, nos uera religio deponere iubet. Quae igitur causa est nisi stultitia errorque mirabilis, ut ei te facias uenerando humilem, cui te cupias uiuendo dissimilem; et religione colas, quem imitari nolis, cum religionis summa sit imitari quem colis?

Chapter 18.—What Kind of Religion that is Which Teaches that Men Ought to Employ the Advocacy of Demons in Order to Be Recommended to the Favor of the Good Gods.

Caput XVIII. Qualis religio sit, in qua docetur, quod homines, ut commendentur dis bonis, daemonibus uti debeant aduocatis.

In vain, therefore, have Apuleius, and they who think with him, conferred on the demons the honor of placing them in the air, between the ethereal heavens and the earth, that they may carry to the gods the prayers of men, to men the answers of the gods: for Plato held, they say, that no god has intercourse with man. They who believe these things have thought it unbecoming that men should have intercourse with the gods, and the gods with men, but a befitting thing that the demons should have intercourse with both gods and men, presenting to the gods the petitions of men, and conveying to men what the gods have granted; so that a chaste man, and one who is a stranger to the crimes of the magic arts, must use as patrons, through whom the gods may be induced to hear him, demons who love these crimes, although the very fact of his not loving them ought to have recommended him to them as one who deserved to be listened to with greater readiness and willingness on their part. They love the abominations of the stage, which chastity does not love. They love, in the sorceries of the magicians, “a thousand arts of inflicting harm,” which innocence does not love. Yet both chastity and innocence, if they wish to obtain anything from the gods, will not be able to do so by their own merits, except their enemies act as mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not attempt to justify the fictions of the poets, and the mockeries of the stage. If human modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not only to love shameful things, but even to think that they are pleasing to the divinity, we can cite on the other side their own highest authority and teacher, Plato.

Frustra igitur eis Apuleius, et quicumque ita sentiunt, hunc detulit honorem, sic eos in aere medios inter aetherium caelum terramque constituens, ut, quoniam nullus deus miscetur homini, quod Platonem dixisse perhibent, isti ad deos perferant preces hominum et inde ad homines inpetrata quae poscunt. Indignum enim putauerunt qui ista crediderunt misceri homines dis et deos hominibus; dignum autem misceri daemones et dis et hominibus, hinc petita qui adlegent, inde concessa qui adportent; ut uidelicet homo castus et ab artium magicarum sceleribus alienus eos patronos adhibeat, per quos illum di exaudiant, qui haec amant, quae ille non amando fit dignior, quem facilius et libentius exaudire debeant. Amant quippe illi scaenicas turpitudines, quas non amat pudicitia; amant in maleficiis magorum ‘mille nocendi artes,’ quas non amat innocentia. Ergo et pudicitia et innocentia si quid ab dis inpetrare uoluerit, non poterit suis meritis nisi suis interuenientibus inimicis. Non est quod iste poetica figmenta et theatrica ludibria iustificare conetur. Habemus contra ista magistrum eorum et tantae aput eos auctoritatis Platonem, si pudor humanus ita de se male meretur, ut non solum diligat turpia, uerum etiam diuinitati existimet grata.

Chapter 19.—Of the Impiety of the Magic Art, Which is Dependent on the Assistance of Malign Spirits.

Caput XIX. De inpietate artis magicae, quae patrocinio nititur spirituum malignorum.

Moreover, against those magic arts, concerning which some men, exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight to boast, may not public opinion itself be brought forward as a witness? For why are those arts so severely punished by the laws, if they are the works of deities who ought to be worshipped? Shall it be said that the Christians have or dained those laws by which magic arts are punished? With what other meaning, except that these sorceries are without doubt pernicious to the human race, did the most illustrious poet say,

Porro aduersus magicas artes, de quibus quosdam nimis infelices et nimis inpios etiam gloriari libet, nonne ipsam publicam lucem testem citabo? Quur enim tam grauiter ista plectuntur seueritate legum, si opera sunt numinum colendorum? An forte istas leges Christiani instituerunt, quibus artes magicae puniuntur?

“By heaven, I swear, and your dear life,

Secundum quem alium sensum, nisi quod haec maleficia generi humano perniciosa esse non dubium est, ait poeta clarissimus: Testor, cara, deos et te, germana, tuumque Dulce caput, magicas inuitam accingier artes?

Unwillingly these arms I wield,

And take, to meet the coming strife,

Enchantment’s sword and shield.”

And that also which he says in another place concerning magic arts,

“I’ve seen him to another place transport the standing corn,”

has reference to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to be transferred to another by these arts which this pestiferous and accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that, among the laws of the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient laws of the Romans, there was a law written which appointed a punishment to be inflicted on him who should do this? Lastly, was it before Christian judges that Apuleius himself was accused of magic arts? Had he known these arts to be divine and pious, and congruous with the works of divine power, he ought not only to have confessed, but also to have professed them, rather blaming the laws by which these things were prohibited and pronounced worthy of condemnation, while they ought to have been held worthy of admiration and respect. For by so doing, either he would have persuaded the judges to adopt his own opinion, or, if they had shown their partiality for unjust laws, and condemned him to death notwithstanding his praising and commending such things, the demons would have bestowed on his soul such rewards as he deserved, who, in order to proclaim and set forth their divine works, had not feared the loss of his human life. As our martyrs, when that religion was charged on them as a crime, by which they knew they were made safe and most glorious throughout eternity, did not choose, by denying it, to escape temporal punishments, but rather by confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness, put to shame the law by which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation. But there is extant a most copious and eloquent oration of this Platonic philosopher, in which he defends himself against the charge of practising these arts, affirming that he is wholly a stranger to them, and only wishing to show his innocence by denying such things as cannot be innocently committed. But all the miracles of the magicians, who he thinks are justly deserving of condemnation, are performed according to the teaching and by the power of demons. Why, then, does he think that they ought to be honored? For he asserts that they are necessary, in order to present our prayers to the gods, and yet their works are such as we must shun if we wish our prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask, what kind of prayers of men does he suppose are presented to the good gods by the demons? If magical prayers, they will have none such; if lawful prayers, they will not receive them through such beings. But if a sinner who is penitent pour out prayers, especially if he has committed any crime of sorcery, does he receive pardon through the intercession of those demons by whose instigation and help he has fallen into the sin he mourns? or do the demons themselves, in order that they may merit pardon for the penitent, first become penitents because they have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the demons; for had this been the case, they would never have dared to seek for themselves divine honors. For how should they do so who desired by penitence to obtain the grace of pardon; seeing that such detestable pride could not exist along with a humility worthy of pardon?

Illud etiam, quod alio loco de his artibus dicit: Adque satas alio uidi traducere messes, eo quod hac pestifera scelerataque doctrina fructus alieni in alias terras transferri perhibentur, nonne in duodecim tabulis, id est Romanorum antiquissimis legibus, Cicero commemorat esse conscriptum et ei, qui hoc fecerit, supplicium constitutum? Postremo Apuleius ipse numquid aput Christianos iudices de magicis artibus accusatus est? Quas utique sibi obiectas si diuinas et pias esse nouerat et diuinarum potestatum operibus congruas, non solum eas confiteri debuit, sed etiam profiteri, leges culpans potius, quibus haec prohiberentur et damnanda putarentur, quae haberi miranda et ueneranda oporteret. Ita enim uel sententiam suam persuaderet iudicibus, uel, si illi secundum iniquas leges saperent eumque talia praedicantem adque laudantem morte multarent, digna animae illius daemones dona rependerent, pro quorum diuinis operibus praedicandis humanam uitam sibi adimi non timeret; sicut martyres nostri, cum eis pro crimine obiceretur Christiana religio, qua nouerant se fieri saluos et gloriosissimos inaeternum, non eam negando temporales poenas euadere delegerunt, sed potius confitendo profitendo praedicando et pro hac omnia fideliter fortiterque tolerando et cum pia securitate moriendo leges, quibus prohibebatur, erubescere conpulerunt mutarique fecerunt. Huius autem philosophi Platonici copiosissima et disertissima extat oratio, qua crimen artium magicarum a se alienum esse defendit seque aliter non uult innocentem uideri nisi ea negando, quae non possunt ab innocente committi. At omnia miracula magorum, quos recte sentit esse damnandos, doctrinis fiunt et operibus daemonum, quos uiderit quur censeat honorandos, eos necessarios adserens perferendis ad deos precibus nostris, quorum debemus opera deuitare, si ad Deum uerum preces nostras uolumus peruenire. Deinde quaero, quales preces hominum dis bonis per daemones adlegari putat, magicas an licitas? Si magicas, nolunt tales; si licitas, nolunt per tales. Si autem peccator paenitens preces fundit, maxime si aliquid magicum admisit, itane tandem illis intercedentibus accipit ueniam, quibus inpellentibus aut fauentibus se cecidisse plangit in culpam? an et ipsi daemones, ut possint paenitentibus mereri indulgentiam, priores agunt, quod eos deceperint, paenitentiam? Hoc nemo umquam de daemonibus dixit, quia, si ita esset, nequaquam sibi auderent diuinos honores expetere, qui paenitendo desiderarent ad gratiam ueniae peruenire. Ibi enim est detestanda superbia, hic humilitas miseranda.

Chapter 20.—Whether We are to Believe that the Good Gods are More Willing to Have Intercourse with Demons Than with Men.

Caput XX. An credendum sit quod di boni libentius daemonibus quam hominibus misceantur.

But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the demons to mediate between the gods and men, that they may offer the prayers of men, and bring back the answers from the gods? and if so, what, pray, is that cause, what is that so great necessity? Because, say they, no god has intercourse with man. Most admirable holiness of God, which has no intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse with an arrogant demon! which has no intercourse with a penitent man, and yet has intercourse with a deceiving demon! which has no intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the divine nature, and yet has intercourse with a demon feigning divinity! which has no intercourse with a man seeking pardon, and yet has intercourse with a demon persuading to wickedness! which has no intercourse with a man expelling the poets by means of philosophical writings from a well-regulated state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting from the princes and priests of a state the theatri cal performance of the mockeries of the poets! which has no intercourse with the man who prohibits the ascribing of crime to the gods, and yet has intercourse with a demon who takes delight in the fictitious representation of their crimes! which has no intercourse with a man punishing the crimes of the magicians by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a demon teaching and practising magical arts! which has no intercourse with a man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse with a demon lying in wait for the deception of a man!

At enim urgens causa et artissima cogit daemones medios inter deos et homines agere, ut ab hominibus adferant desiderata, et a dis referant inpetrata. Quaenam tandem ista causa est et quanta necessitas? Quia nullus, inquiunt, Deus miscetur homini. Praeclara igitur sanctitas Dei, qui non miscetur homini supplicanti, et miscetur daemoni adroganti; non miscetur homini paenitenti, et miscetur daemoni decipienti; non miscetur homini confugienti ad diuinitatem, et miscetur daemoni fingenti diuinitatem; non miscetur homini petenti indulgentiam, et miscetur daemoni suadenti nequitiam; non miscetur homini per philosophicos libros poetas de bene instituta ciuitate pellenti, et miscetur daemoni a principibus et pontificibus ciuitatis per scaenicos ludos poetarum ludibria requirenti; non miscetur homini deorum crimina fingere prohibenti, et miscetur daemoni se falsis deorum criminibus oblectanti; non miscetur homini magorum scelera iustis legibus punienti, et miscetur daemoni magicas artes docenti et inplenti; non miscetur homini imitationem daemonis fugienti, et miscetur daemoni deceptionem hominis aucupanti.

Chapter 21.—Whether the Gods Use the Demons as Messengers and Interpreters, and Whether They are Deceived by Them Willingly, or Without Their Own Knowledge.

Caput XXI. An daemonibus nuntiis et interpretibus di utantur fallique se ab eis aut ignorent aut uelint.

But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity, so unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned about human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom! what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they say, are all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst, on the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that they have supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the gods may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through whom, when necessary, they may succor men; and it is on account of this office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of mind. O mournful necessity, or shall I not rather say detestable and vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature! For if the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and thence understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can it be ignorant of our actions. But I would they would tell me whether the demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets concerning the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which they themselves take in them; or whether they have concealed both, and have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect to this whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as their own lust, which is injurious to the gods; or whether they have concealed Plato’s opinion, according to which he was unwilling that the gods should be defamed with falsely alleged crimes through the impious license of the poets, whilst they have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness, which make them love theatrical plays, in which the infamous deeds of the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these four alternatives, and let them consider how much evil any one of them would require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the first, they must then confess that it was not possible for the good gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted in their injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from them, through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on account of their nearness to themselves. If they shall choose the second, and shall say that both these things are concealed by the demons, so that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato’s most religious law and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can the gods know to any profit with respect to human affairs through these mediating demons, when they do not know those things which are decreed, through the piety of good men, for the honor of the good gods against the lust of evil demons? But if they shall choose the third, and reply that these intermediary demons have communicated, not only the opinion of Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the gods, hearing both and knowing both, not only permit the approach of those malign demons, who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods and the religion of Plato, but also, through these wicked demons, who are near to them, send good things to the good Plato, who is far away from them; for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of the elements, that they can come into contact with those by whom they are accused, but not with him by whom they are defended,—knowing the truth on both sides, but not being able to change the weight of the air and the earth. There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse than the rest. For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have made known the calumnious fictions of the poets concerning the immortal gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries of the theatres, and their own most ardent lust after, and most sweet pleasure in these things, whilst they have concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to be removed from a well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are now compelled, through such messengers, to know the evil doings of the most wicked beings, that is to say, of the messengers themselves, and are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the former are for the injury, but these latter for the honor of the gods themselves?

Sed nimirum tantae huius absurditatis et indignitatis est magna necessitas, quod scilicet deos aetherios humana curantes quid terrestres homines agerent utique lateret, nisi daemones aerii nuntiarent; quoniam aether longe a terra est alteque suspensus, aer uero aetheri terraeque contiguus.s o mirabilem sapientiam! Quid aliud de dis isti sentiunt, quos omnes optimos uolunt, nisi eos et humana curare, ne cultu uideantur indigni, et propter elementorum distantiam humana nescire, ut credantur daemones necessarii et ob hoc etiam ipsi putentur colendi, per quos di possint et quid in rebus humanis agatur addiscere et ubi oportet hominibus subuenire? Hoc si ita est, dis istis bonis magis notus est daemon per corpus uicinum quam homo per animum bonum.s o multum dolenda necessitas, an potius inridenda uel detestanda uanitas, ne sit uana diuinitas! Si enim animo ab obstaculo corporis libero animum nostrum uidere di possunt, non ad hoc indigent daemonibus nuntiis; si autem animorum indicia corporalia. qualia sunt locutio uultus motus, per corpus suum aetherii di sentiunt et inde colligunt quid etiam daemones nuntient, possunt et mendaciis daemonum decipi. Porro si deorum diuinitas a daemonibus non potest falli, eadem diuinitate quod agimus non potest ignorari. Vellem autem mihi isti dicerent, utrum dis daemones nuntiauerint de criminibus deorum poetica Platoni displicere figmenta et sibi ea placere celauerint, an utrumque occultauerint deosque esse maluerint totius rei huius ignaros, an utrumque indicauerint, et religiosam erga deos Platonis prudentiam et in deos iniuriosam libidinem suam, an sententiam quidem Platonis, qua noluit deos per inpiam licentiam poetarum falsis criminibus infamari, ignotam dis esse uoluerint, suam uero nequitiam, qua ludos scaenicos amant, quibus illa deorum dedecora celebrantur, prodere non erubuerint uel timuerint. Horum quattuor. quae interrogando proposui, quodlibet eligant et in quolibet eorum quantum mali de dis bonis opinentur adtendant. Si enim primum elegerint, confessuri sunt non licuisse dis bonis habitare cum bono Platone, quando eorum iniurias prohibebat, et habitasse cum daemonibus malis, quando eorum iniuriis exultabant, cum di boni hominem bonum longe a se positum non nisi per malos daemones nossent, quos uicinos nosse non possent. Si autem secundum elegerint et utrumque occultatum a daemonibus dixerint, ut di omnino nescirent et Platonis religiosissimam legem et daemonum sacrilegam delectationem: quid in rebus humanis per internuntios daemones di nosse utiliter possunt, quando illa nesciunt, quae in honorem bonorum deorum religione bonorum hominum contra libidinem malorum daemonum decernuntur? Si uero tertium elegerint et non solum sententiam Platonis deorum iniurias prohibentem, sed etiam daemonum nequitiam deorum iniuriis exultantem per eosdem daemones nuntios dis innotuisse responderint: hoc nuntiare est an insultare? et di utrumque sic audiunt, sic utrumque cognoscunt, ut non solum malignos daemones deorum dignitati et Platonis religioni contraria cupientes adque facientes a suo accessu non arceant, uerum etiam per illos malos propinquos Platoni bono longinquo dona transmittant? sic enim eos elementorum quasi catenata series conligauit, ut illis, a quibus criminantur, coniungi possint, huic, a quo defenduntur, non possint, utrumque scientes, sed aeris et terrae transmutare pondera non ualentes. Iam, quod reliquum est, si quartum elegerint, peius est ceteris. Quis enim ferat, si poetarum de dis inmortalibus criminosa figmenta et theatrorum indigna ludibria suamque in his omnibus ardentissimam cupiditatem et suauissimam uoluptatem dis daemones nuntiauerunt, et quod Plato philosophica grauitate de optima re publica haec omnia censuit remouenda tacuerunt; ut iam di boni per tales nuntios nosse cogantur mala pessimorum, nec aliena, sed eorundem nuntiorum, adque his contraria non sinantur nosse bona philosophorum, cum illa sint in iniuriam, ista in honorem ipsorum deorum?