Of the Justice of the Punishment with Which Our First Parents Were Visited for Their Disobedience.

Chapter 15.—Of the Justice of the Punishment with Which Our First Parents Were Visited for Their Disobedience.

Caput XV. De iustitia retributionis, quam primi homines pro sua inoboedientia receperunt.

Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God,—who had created man; who had made him in His own image; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed him in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of every kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord,—it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual even in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in his pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, doomed in spite of himself to die in body as he had willingly become dead in spirit, condemned even to eternal death (had not the grace of God delivered him) because he had forsaken eternal life. Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided. For as Abraham’s obedience is with justice pronounced to be great, because the thing commanded, to kill his son, was very difficult, so in Paradise the disobedience was the greater, because the difficulty of that which was commanded was imperceptible. And as the obedience of the second Man was the more laudable because He became obedient even “unto death,” so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable because he became disobedient even unto death. For where the penalty annexed to disobedience is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who can sufficiently estimate how great a wickedness it is, in a matter so easy, not to obey the authority of so great a power, even when that power deters with so terrible a penalty?

Quia ergo contemtus est Deus iubens, qui creauerat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno breuissimo adque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera seruitus expediret, se esse Dominum commonebat: iusta damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis, fieret etiam mente carnalis et, qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, Dei iustitia sibi donaretur; nec sic, ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens sub illo, cui peccando consensit, pro libertate, quam concupiuit, duram miseramque ageret seruitutem, mortuus spiritu uolens et corpore moriturus inuitus, desertor aeternae uitae etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. Quisquis huius modi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. Sicut enim Abrahae non inmerito magna oboedientia praedicatur, quia, ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata: ita in paradiso tanto maior inboedientia fuit, quanto id, quod prae-. ceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. Et sicut oboedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est oboediens usque ad mortem: ita inoboedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inoboediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inoboedientiae poena proposita et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non oboedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto terrente supplicio?

In short, to say all in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobedience in that sin? For what else is man’s misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot? For though he could not do all things in Paradise before he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he could do, and therefore he could do all things he wished. But now, as we recognize in his offspring, and as divine Scripture testifies, “Man is like to vanity.” For who can count how many things he wishes which he cannot do, so long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, so long as his mind and his flesh do not obey his will? For in spite of himself his mind is both frequently disturbed, and his flesh suffers, and grows old, and dies; and in spite of ourselves we suffer whatever else we suffer, and which we would not suffer if our nature absolutely and in all its parts obeyed our will. But is it not the infirmities of the flesh which hamper it in its service? Yet what does it matter how its service is hampered, so long as the fact remains, that by the just retribution of the sovereign God whom we refused to be subject to and serve, our flesh, which was subjected to us, now torments us by insubordination, although our disobedience brought trouble on ourselves, not upon God? For He is not in need of our service as we of our body’s; and therefore what we did was no punishment to Him, but what we receive is so to us. And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant, as we have explained, that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves. But sadness is frequently preceded by fear, which is itself in the soul, not in the flesh; while bodily pain is not preceded by any kind of fear of the flesh, which can be felt in the flesh before the pain. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most commonly identified with the name” lust,” though this is the generic word for all desires. For anger itself was defined by the ancients as nothing else than the lust of revenge; although sometimes a man is angry even at inanimate objects which cannot feel his vengeance, as when one breaks a pen, or crushes a quill that writes badly. Yet even this, though less reasonable, is in its way a lust of revenge, and is, so to speak, a mysterious kind of shadow of [the great law of] retribution, that they who do evil should suffer evil. There is therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not. For who could readily give a name to the lust of ruling, which yet has a powerful influence in the soul of tyrants, as civil wars bear witness?

Denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est? Nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit? In paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non nolebat, et ideo poterat omnia quae uolebat; nunc uero sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et diurna scriptura testatur: Homo uanitati similis factus est. Quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? Ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si uoluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo adque ex omnibus partibus oboediret. At enim aliquid caro patitur, quo seruire non sinitur. Quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis Dei, cui subditi seruire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit, quamuis nos Deo non seruiendo molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? Neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos seruitio corporis indigemus, et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. Dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne. Quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima uel dolet uel concupiscit? Sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur uel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus, aut aliquid animae, quod carnis adficit passio, uel aspera, ut faciat dolorem, uel lenis, ut uoluptatem. Sed dolor carnis tantum modo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione. dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. Dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. Voluptatem uero praecedit adpetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis. Nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse quam ulciscendi libidinem ueteres definierunt; quamuis nonnumquam homo, ubi uindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, et male scribentem stilum conlidat uel calamum frangat iratus. Verum et ista licet inrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, ut nescio qua, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retributionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. Sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent. Quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?

Chapter 16.—Of the Evil of Lust,—A Word Which, Though Applicable to Many Vices, is Specially Appropriated to Sexual Uncleanness.

Caput XVI. De libidinis malo, cuius nomen cum multis uitiis congruat, proprie tamen motibus obsceni caloris adscribitur.

Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust not only takes possession of the whole body and outward members, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, “how to possess his vessel in santification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God,” would not prefer, if this were possi ble, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other members serve him for their respective ends? But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the body unmoved.

Cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis excitantur. Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, uerum etiam intrinsecus uindicat totumque commouet hominem animi simul adfectu cum carnis adpetitu coniuncto adque permixto, ut ea uoluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis uoluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius peruenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi uigilia cogitationis obruatur. Quis autem amicus sapientiae sanctorumque gaudiorum coniugalem agens uitam, sed, sicut apostolus monuit, sciens suum uas possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in morbo desiderii, sicut et gentes, quae ignorant Deum, non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare, ut etiam in hoc serendae prolis officio sic eius menti ea, quae ad hoc opus creata sunt, quem ad modum cetera suis quaeque operibus distributa membra seruirent, nutu uoluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata? Sed neque ipsi amatores huius uoluptatis siue ad concubitus coniugales siue ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum uoluerint commouentur; sed aliquando inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore; adque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam lasciuiendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsam diuiditur commotoque animo in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.

Chapter 17.—Of the Nakedness of Our First Parents, Which They Saw After Their Base and Shameful Sin.

Caput XVII. De nuditate primorum hominum, quam post peccatum turpem pudendamque uiderunt.

Justly is shame very specially connected with this lust; justly, too, these members themselves, being moved and restrained not at our will, but by a certain independent autocracy, so to speak, are called “shameful.” Their condition was different before sin. For as it is written, “They were naked and were not ashamed,”—not that their nakedness was unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those members without the will’s consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience of man. For they were not created blind, as the unenlightened vulgar fancy; for Adam saw the animals to whom he gave names, and of Eve we read, “The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes.” Their eyes, therefore were open, but were not open to this, that is to say, were not observant so as to recognize what was conferred upon them by the garment of grace, for they had no consciousness of their members warring against their will. But when they were stripped of this grace, that their disobedience might be punished by fit retribution, there began in the movement of their bodily members a shameless novelty which made nakedness indecent: it at once made them observant and made them ashamed. And therefore, after they violated God’s command by open transgression, it is written: “And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.” “The eyes of them both were opened,” not to see, for already they saw, but to discern between the good they had lost and the evil into which they had fallen. And therefore also the tree itself which they were forbidden to touch was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from this circumstance, that if they ate of it it would impart to them this knowledge. For the discomfort of sickness reveals the pleasure of health. “They knew,” therefore, “that they were naked,”—naked of that grace which prevented them from being ashamed of bodily nakedness while the law of sin offered no resistance to their mind. And thus they obtained a knowledge which they would have lived in blissful ignorance of, had they, in trustful obedience to God, declined to commit that offence which involved them in the experience of the hurtful effects of unfaithfulness and disobedience. And therefore, being ashamed of the disobedience of their own flesh, which witnessed to their disobedience while it punished it, “they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons,” that is, cinctures for their privy parts; for some interpreters have rendered the word by succinctoria. Campestria is, indeed, a Latin word, but it is used of the drawers or aprons used for a similar purpose by the young men who stripped for exercise in the campus; hence those who were so girt were commonly called campestrati. Shame modestly covered that which lust disobediently moved in opposition to the will, which was thus punished for its own disobedience. Consequently all nations, being propagated from that one stock, have so strong an instinct to cover the shameful parts, that some barbarians do not uncover them even in the bath, but wash with their drawers on. In the dark solitudes of India also, though some philosophers go naked, and are therefore called gymnosophists, yet they make an exception in the case of these members and cover them.

Merito huius libidinis maxime pudet, merito et ipsa membra, quae suo quodam, ut ita dixerim, iure, non omni modo ad arbitrium nostrum mouet aut non mouet, pudenda dicuntur, quod ante peccatum hominis non fuerunt. Nam sicut scriptum est: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur, non quod eis sua nuditas esset incognita, sed turpis nuditas nondum erat, quia nondum libido membra illa praeter arbitrium commouebat, nondum ad hominis inoboedientiam redarguendam sua inoboedientia caro quodam modo testimonium perhibebat. Neque enim caeci creati erant, ut inperitum uulgus opinatur; quando quidem et ille uidit animalia, quibus nomina inposuit, et de illa legitur: Vidit mulier quia bonum lignum in escam et quia placet oculis ad uidendum. Patebant ergo oculi eorum, sed ad hoc non erant aperti, hoc est non adtenti, ut cognoscerent quid eis indumento gratiae praestaretur, quando membra eorum uoluntati repugnare nesciebant. Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca inoboedientia plecteretur, extitit in motu corporis quaedam inpudens nouitas, unde esset indecens nuditas, et fecit adtentos reddiditque confusos. Hinc est quod, postea quam mandatum Dei aperta transgressione uiolarunt, scriptum est de illis: Et aperti sunt oculi amborum et agnouerunt quia nudi erant, et consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria. Aperti sunt, inquit, oculi amborum, non ad uidendum, nam et antea uidebant, sed ad discernendum inter bonum quod amiserant et malum quo ceciderant. Unde et ipsum lignum, eo quod istam faceret dignoscentiam, si ad uescendum contra uetitum tangeretur, ex ea re nomen accepit, ut appellaretur lignum sciendi boni et mali. Experta enim morbi molestia euidentior fit etiam iucunditas sanitatis. Cognouerunt ergo quia nudi erant, nudati scilicet ea gratia, qua fiebat ut nuditas corporis nulla eos lege peccati menti eorum repugnante confunderet. Hoc itaque cognouerunt, quod felicius ignorarent, si Deo credentes et oboedientes non committerent, quod eos cogeret experiri infidelitas et inoboedientia quid noceret. Proinde confusi inoboedientia carnis suae, tamquam teste poena inoboedientiae suae, consuerunt folia fici et fecerunt sibi campestria, id est succinctoria genitalium. Nam quidam interpretes […] posuerunt. Porro autem […] latinum quidem uerbum est, sed ex eo dictum, quod iuuenes, qui nudi exercebantur in campo, pudenda operiebant; unde qui ita succincti sunt, campestratos uulgus appellat. Quod itaque aduersus damnatam culpa inoboedientiae uoluntatem libido inoboedienter mouebat, uerecundia pudenter tegebat. Ex hoc omnes gentes, quoniam ab illa stirpe procreatae sunt, usque adeo tenent insitum pudenda uelare, ut quidam barbari illas corporis partes nec in balneis nudas habeant, sed cum earum tegimentis lauent. Per opacas quoque Indiae solitudines, cum quidam nudi philosophentur, unde gymnosophistae nominantur, adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per cetera membrorum carent.

Chapter 18.—Of the Shame Which Attends All Sexual Intercourse.

Caput XVIII. De pudore concubitus non solum uulgaris, sed etiam coniugalis.

Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when un lawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment, these permitted pleasures still shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust, secrecy also is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement. For even shameless men call this shameful; and though they love the pleasure, dare not display it. What! does not even conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children, legitimate and honorable though it be, does it not seek retirement from every eye? Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? The greatest master of Roman eloquence says, that all right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e., desire to be known. This right action, however, has such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen. Who does not know what passes between husband and wife that children may be born? Is it not for this purpose that wives are married with such ceremony? And yet, when this well-understood act is gone about for the procreation of children, not even the children themselves, who may already have been born to them, are suffered to be witnesses. This right action seeks the light, in so far as it seeks to be known, but yet dreads being seen. And why so, if not because that which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting penalty of sin?

Opus uero ipsum, quod libidine tali peragitur, non solum in quibusque stupris, ubi latebrae ad subterfugienda humana iudicia requiruntur, uerum etiam in usu scortorum, quam terrena ciuitas licitam turpitudinem fecit, quamuis id agatur, quod eius ciuitatis nulla lex uindicat, deuitat tamen publicum etiam permissa adque inpunita libido conspectum, et uerecundia naturali habent prouisum lupanaria ipsa secretum faciliusque potuit inpudicitia non habere uincla prohibitionis, quam inpudentia remouere latibula illius foeditatis. Sed hanc etiam ipsi turpes turpitudinem uocant, cuius licet sint amatores, ostentatores esse non audent. Quid? concubitus coniugalis, qui secundum matrimonialium praescripta tabularum procreandorum fit causa liberorum, nonne et ipse quamquam sit licitus et honestus, remotum ab arbitris cubile conquirit? Nonne omnes famulos adque ipsos etiam paranymphos et quoscumque ingredi quaelibet necessitudo permiserat, ante mittit foras, quam uel blandiri coniux coniugi incipiat? Et quoniam, sicut ait etiam quidam ‘Romani maximus auctor eloquii’, omnia recte facta in luce se conlocari uolunt, id est adpetunt sciri: hoc recte factum sic adpetit sciri, ut tamen erubescat uideri. Quis enim nescit, ut filii procreentur, quid inter se coniuges agant? quando quidem ut id agatur, tanta celebritate ducuntur uxores; et tamen cum agitur, unde filii nascantur, nec ipsi filii, si qui inde iam nati sunt, testes fieri permittuntur. Sic enim hoc recte factum ad sui notitiam lucem adpetit animorum, ut tamen refugiat oculorum. Unde hoc, nisi quia sic geritur quod deceat ex natura, ut etiam quod pudeat comitetur ex poena?

Chapter 19.—That It is Now Necessary, as It Was Not Before Man Sinned, to Bridle Anger and Lust by the Restraining Influence of Wisdom.

Caput XIX. Quod partes irae adque libidinis, quae in homine tam uitiose mouentur, ut eas necesse sit frenis sapientiae cohiberi, in illa ante peccatum naturae sanitate non fuerint.

Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man’s righteousness is preserved without a breach. These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions,—that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring,—these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife.

Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui ueritati propius accesserunt, iram adque libidinem uitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide adque inordinate mouerentur ad ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente adque ratione. Quam partem animi tertiam uelut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam, ut illa imperante, istis seruientibus possit in homine iustitia ex omni animi parte seruari. Hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse uitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus, ad quas iniuste mouentur, mens conpescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac reuocet adque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt (sicut iram ad exercendam iustam cohercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium) — hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum uitiosae non erant. Non enim contra rectam uoluntatem ad aliquid mouebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita mouentur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. Quod autem irae opera aliarumque adfectionum in quibusque dictis adque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae adfectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. At uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel ultro uel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo deuitat; magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando iniuste irascitur homini, quam uel unius aspectum et quando iuste miscetur uxori.

Chapter 20.—Of the Foolish Beastliness of the Cynics.

Caput XX. De uanissima turpitudine Cynicorum.

It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the pallium, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob. Human nature, then, is without doubt ashamed of this lust; and justly so, for the insubordination of these members, and their defiance of the will, are the clear testimony of the punishment of man’s first sin. And it was fitting that this should appear specially in those parts by which is generated that nature which has been altered for the worse by that first and great sin,—that sin from whose evil connection no one can escape, unless God’s grace expiate in him individually that which was perpetrated to the destruction of all in common, when all were in one man, and which was avenged by God’s justice.

Hoc illi canini philosophi, hoc est Cynici, non uiderunt, proferentes contra humanam uerecundiam quid aliud quam caninam, hoc est inmundam inpudentemque sententiam? ut scilicet, quoniam iustum est quod fit in uxore, palam non pudeat id agere nec in uico aut platea qualibet coniugalem concubitum deuitare. Vicit tamen pudor naturalis opinionem huius erroris. Nam etsi perhibent, hoc aliquando gloriabundum fecisse Diogenem, ita putantem sectam suam nobiliorem futuram, si in hominum memoria insignior eius inpudentia figeretur, postea tamen a Cynicis fieri cessatum est, plusque ualuit pudor, ut erubescerent homines hominibus, quam error, ut homines canibus esse similes adfectarent. Unde et illum uel illos, qui hoc fecisse referuntur, potius arbitror concumbentium motus dedisse oculis hominum nescientium quid sub pallio gereretur, quam humano premente conspectu potuisse illam peragi uoluptatem. Ibi enim philosophi non erubescebant uideri se uelle concumbere, ubi libido ipsa erubesceret surgere. Et nunc uidemus adhuc esse philosophos Cynicos; hi enim sunt, qui non solum amiciuntur pallio, uerum etiam clauam ferunt; nemo tamen eorum audet hoc facere, quod si aliqui ausi essent, ut non dicam ictibus lapidantium, certe conspuentium saliuis obruerentur. Pudet igitur huius libidinis humanam sine ulla dubitatione naturam, et merito pudet. In eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus subdidit et potestati uoluntatis eripuit, satis ostenditur, quid sit hominis illi primae inoboedientiae retributum; quod in ea parte maxime oportuit apparere, qua generatur ipsa natura, quae illo primo et magno in deterius est mutata peccato; a cuius nexu nullus eruitur, nisi id quod, cum omnes in uno essent, in communem perniciem perpetratum est et Dei iustitia uindicatum, Dei gratia in singulis expietur.

Chapter 21.—That Man’s Transgression Did Not Annul the Blessing of Fecundity Pronounced Upon Man Before He Sinned But Infected It with the Disease of Lust.

Caput XXI. De benedictione multiplicandae fecunditatis humanae ante peccatum data, quam praeuaricatio non ademerit et cui libidinis morbus accesserit.

Far be it, then, from us to suppose that our first parents in Paradise felt that lust which caused them afterwards to blush and hide their nakedness, or that by its means they should have fulfilled the benediction of God, “Increase and multiply and replenish the earth;” for it was after sin that lust began. It was after sin that our nature, having lost the power it had over the whole body, but not having lost all shame, perceived, noticed, blushed at, and covered it. But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the procreation of children might be recognized as part of the glory of marriage, and not of the punishment of sin. But now, men being ignorant of the blessedness of Paradise, suppose that children could not have been begotten there in any other way than they know them to be begotten now, i.e., by lust, at which even honorable marriage blushes; some not simply rejecting, but sceptically deriding the divine Scriptures, in which we read that our first parents, after they sinned, were ashamed of their nakedness, and covered it; while others, though they accept and honor Scripture, yet conceive that this expression, “Increase and multiply,” refers not to carnal fecundity, because a similar expression is used of the soul in the words, “Thou wilt multiply me with strength in my soul;” and so, too, in the words which follow in Genesis, “And replenish the earth, and subdue it,” they understand by the earth the body which the soul fills with its presence, and which it rules over when it is multiplied in strength. And they hold that children could no more then than now be begotten without lust, which, after sin, was kindled, observed, blushed for, and covered; and even that children would not have been born in Paradise, but only outside of it, as in fact it turned out. For it was after they were expelled from it that they came together to beget children, and begot them.

Absit itaque, ut credamus illos coniuges in paradiso constitutos per hanc libidinem, de qua erubescendo eadem membra texerunt, inpleturos fuisse quod in sua benedictione Deus dixit: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram. Post peccatum quippe orta est haec libido; post peccatum eam natura non inpudens amissa potestate, cui corpus ex omni parte seruiebat, sensit adtendit, erubuit ciuitate. Illa uero benedictio nuptiarum, ut coniugati crescerent et multiplicarentur et inplerent terram, quamuis et in delinquentibus manserit, tamen antequam delinquerent data est, ut cognosceretur procreationem filiorum ad gloriam conubii. non ad poenam pertinere peccati. Sed nunc homines, profecto illius quae in paradiso fuit felicitatis ignari, nisi per hoc, quod experti sunt, id est per libidinem, de qua uidemus etiam ipsam honestatem erubescere nuptiarum, non potuisse gigni filios opinantur, alii scripturas diuinas, ubi legitur post peccatum puduisse nuditatis et pudenda esse contecta, prorsus non accipientes, sed infideliter inridentes; alii uero quamuis eas accipiant et honorent, illud tamen quod dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini, non secundum carnalem fecunditatem uolunt intellegi, quia et secundum animam legitur tale aliquid dictum: Multiplicabis me in anima mea in uirtute, ut id, quod in genesi sequitur: Et inplete terram et dominamini eius, terram intellegant carnem, quam praesentia sua inplet anima eiusque maxime dominatur, cum in uirtute multiplicatur; carnales autem fetus sine libidine, quae post peccatum exorta inspecta, confusa uelata est, nec tunc nasci potuisse, sicut neque nunc possunt, nec in paradiso futuros fuisse, sed foris, sicut et factum est. Nam postea quam inde dimissi sunt, ad gignendos filios coierunt eosque genuerunt.

Chapter 22.—Of the Conjugal Union as It Was Originally Instituted and Blessed by God.

Caput XXII. De copula coniugali a Deo primitus instituta adque benedicta.

But we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before man sinned, when He created them male and female,—in other words, two sexes manifestly distinct. And it was this work of God on which His blessing was pronounced. For no sooner had Scripture said, “Male and female created He them,” than it immediately continues, “And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it,” etc. And though all these things may not unsuitably be interpreted in a spiritual sense, yet “male and female” cannot be understood of two things in one man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the very purpose of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth; and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact. It was not of the spirit which commands and the body which obeys, nor of the rational soul which rules and the irrational desire which is ruled, nor of the contemplative virtue which is supreme and the active which is subject, nor of the understanding of the mind and the sense of the body, but plainly of the matrimonial union by which the sexes are mutually bound together, that our Lord, when asked whether it were lawful for any cause to put away one’s wife (for on account of the hardness of the hearts of the Israelites Moses permitted a bill of divorcement to be given), answered and said, “Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.” It is certain, then, that from the first men were created, as we see and know them to be now, of two sexes, male and female, and that they are called one, either on account of the matrimonial union, or on account of the origin of the woman, who was created from the side of the man. And it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to love their own wives in particular.

Nos autem nullo modo dubitamus secundum benedictionem Dei crescere et multiplicari et inplere terram donum esse nuptiarum, quas Deus ante peccatum hominis ab initio constituit, creando masculum et feminam, qui sexus euidens utique in carne est. Huic quippe operi Dei etiam benedictio ipsa subiuncta est. Nam cum scriptura dixisset: Masculum et feminam fecit eos, continuo subdidit: Et benedixit eos Deus dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram et dominamini eius, et cetera. Quae omnia quamquam non inconuenienter possint etiam ad intellectum spiritalem referri, masculum tamen et feminam non sicut simile aliquid etiam in homine uno intellegi potest, quia uidelicet in eo aliud est quod regit, aliud quod regitur; sed sicut euidentissime apparet in diuersi sexus corporibus, masculum et feminam ita creatos, ut prolem generando crescerent et multiplicarentur et inplerent terram, magnae absurditatis est reluctari. Neque enim de spiritu qui imperat et carne quae obtemperat, aut de animo rationali qui regit et inrationali cupiditate quae regitur, aut de uirtute contemplatiua quae excellit et de actiua quae subditur, aut de intellectu mentis et sensu corporis, sed aperte de uinculo coniugali, quo inuicem sibi uterque sexus obstringitur, Dominus interrogatus utrum liceret quacumque causa dimittere uxorem, quoniam propter duritiam cordis Israelitarum Moyses dari permisit libellum repudii, respondit adque ait: Non legistis, quia, qui fecit ab initio, masculum et feminam fecit eos et dixit: Propter hoc dimittet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una? Itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet. Certum est igitur masculum et feminam ita primitus institutos, ut nunc homines duos diuersi sexus uidemus et nouimus, unum autem dici uel propter coniunctionem uel propter originem feminae, quae de masculi latere creata est. Nam et apostolus per hoc primum, quod Deo instituente praecessit, exemplum singulos quosque admonet, ut uiri uxores suas diligant.