Whether Generation Should Have Taken Place Even in Paradise Had Man Not Sinned, or Whether There Should Have Been Any Contention There Between Chastity and Lust.

Chapter 23.—Whether Generation Should Have Taken Place Even in Paradise Had Man Not Sinned, or Whether There Should Have Been Any Contention There Between Chastity and Lust.

Caput XXIII. an etiam in paradiso generandum fuisset, si nemo peccasset, uel utrum contra aestum libidinis pugnatura illic fuisset ratio castitatis.

But he who says that there should have been neither copulation nor generation but for sin, virtually says that man’s sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints. For if these two by not sinning should have continued to live alone, because, as is supposed, they could not have begotten children had they not sinned, then certainly sin was necessary in order that there might be not only two but many righteous men. And if this cannot be maintained without absurdity, we must rather believe that the number of the saints fit to complete this most blessed city would have been as great though no one had sinned, as it is now that the grace of God gathers its citizens out of the multitude of sinners, so long as the children of this world generate and are generated.

Quisquis autem dicit non fuisse coituros nec generaturos, nisi peccassent, quid dicit, nisi propter numerositatem sanctorum necessarium hominis fuisse peccatum? Si enim non peccando soli remanerent, quia, sicut putant, nisi peccassent, generare non possent: profecto ut non soli duo iusti homines possent esse, sed multi, necessarium peccatum fuit. Quod si credere absurdum est, illud potius est credendum, quod sanctorum numerus quantus conplendae illi sufficit beatissimae ciuitati, tantus existeret, etsi nemo peccasset, quantus nunc per Dei gratiam de multitudine colligitur peccatorum, quo usque filii saeculi huius generant et generantur.

And therefore that marriage, worthy of the happiness of Paradise, should have had desirable fruit without the shame of lust, had there been no sin. But how that could be, there is now no example to teach us. Nevertheless, it ought not to seem incredible that one member might serve the will without lust then, since so many serve it now. Do we now move our feet and hands when we will to do the things we would by means of these members? do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants of the will, both in our own case and in that of others, and especially of artisans employed in mechanical operations, by which the weakness and clumsiness of nature become, through industrious exercise, wonderfully dexterous? and shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will, so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award of disobedience, had been awanting? Did not Cicero, in discussing the difference of governments in his De Republica, adopt a simile from human nature, and say that we command our bodily members as children, they are so obedient; but that the vicious parts of the soul must be treated as slaves, and be coerced with a more stringent authority? And no doubt, in the order of nature, the soul is more excellent than the body; and yet the soul commands the body more easily than itself. Nevertheless this lust, of which we at present speak, is the more shameful on this account, because the soul is therein neither master of itself, so as not to lust at all, nor of the body, so as to keep the members under the control of the will; for if they were thus ruled, there should be no shame. But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should resist its authority. For in the resistance experienced by the soul in the other emotions there is less shame, because the resistance is from itself, and thus, when it is conquered by itself, itself is the conqueror, although the conquest is inordinate and vicious, because accomplished by those parts of the soul which ought to be subject to reason, yet, being accomplished by its own parts and energies, the conquest is, as I say, its own. For when the soul conquers itself to a due subordination, so that its unreasonable motions are controlled by reason, while it again is subject to God, this is a conquest virtuous and praiseworthy. Yet there is less shame when the soul is resisted by its own vicious parts than when its will and order are resisted by the body, which is distinct from and inferior to it, and dependent on it for life itself.

Et ideo illae nuptiae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent. Sed quo modo id fieri posset, nunc non est quo demonstretur exemplo. Nec ideo tamen incredibile debet uideri etiam illud unum sine ista libidine uoluntati potuisse seruire, cui tot membra nunc seruiunt. An uero manus et pedes mouemus, cum uolumus, ad ea quae his membris agenda sunt, sine ullo renisu, tanta facilitate, quanta et in nobis et in aliis uidemus, maxime in artificibus quorumque operum corporalium, ubi ad exercendam infirmiorem tardioremque naturam agilior accessit industria; et non credimus ad opus generationis filiorum, si libido non fuisset, quae peccato inoboedientiae retributa est, oboedienter hominibus ad uoluntatis nutum similiter ut cetera potuisse illa membra seruire? Nonne Cicero in libris de re publica, cum de imperiorum differentia disputaret et huius rei similitudinem ex natura hominis adsumeret, ut filiis dixit imperari corporis membris propter oboediendi facilitatem; uitiosas uero animi partes ut seruos asperiore imperio coherceri? Et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus imperat corpori facilius quam sibi. Verum tamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis erubescenda extitit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat, nec omni modo corpori, ut pudenda membra uoluntas potius quam libido commoueat; quod si ita esset, pudenda non essent. Nunc uero pudet animum resisti sibi a corpore, quod ei natura inferiore subiectum est. In aliis quippe adfectionibus cum sibi resistit, ideo minus pudet, quia, cum a se ipso uincitur, ipse se uincit; etsi inordinate adque uitiose, quia ex his partibus, quae rationi subici debent, tamen a partibus suis ac per hoc, ut dictum est, a se ipso uincitur. Nam cum ordinate se animus uincit, ut inrationabiles motus eius menti rationique subdantur, si tamen et illa Deo subdita est, laudis adque uirtutis est. Minus tamen pudet, cum sibi animus ex uitiosis suis partibus non obtemperat, quam cum ei corpus, quod alterum ab illo est adque infra illum est et cuius sine illo natura non uiuit, uolenti iubentique non cedit.

But so long as the will retains under its authority the other members, without which the members excited by lust to resist the will cannot accomplish what they seek, chastity is preserved, and the delight of sin foregone. And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will. The field of generation should have been sown by the organ created for this purpose, as the earth is sown by the hand. And whereas now, as we essay to investigate this subject more exactly, modesty hinders us, and compels us to ask pardon of chaste ears, there would have been no cause to do so, but we could have discoursed freely, and without fear of seeming obscene, upon all those points which occur to one who meditates on the subject. There would not have been even words which could be called obscene, but all that might be said of these members would have been as pure as what is said of the other parts of the body. Whoever, then, comes to the perusal of these pages with unchaste mind, let him blame his disposition, not his nature; let him brand the actings of his own impurity, not the words which necessity forces us to use, and for which every pure and pious reader or hearer will very readily pardon me, while I expose the folly of that scepticism which argues solely on the ground of its own experience, and has no faith in anything beyond. He who is not scandalized at the apostle’s censure of the horrible wickedness of the women who “changed the natural use into that which is against nature,” will read all this without being shocked, especially as we are not, like Paul, citing and censuring a damnable uncleanness, but are explaining, so far as we can, human generation, while with Paul we avoid all obscenity of language.

Sed cum alia membra retinentur uoluntatis imperio, sine quibus illa, quae contra uoluntatem libidine concitantur, id quod adpetunt inplere non possunt, pudicitia custoditur, non amissa, sed non permissa delectatione peccati. Hunc renisum, hanc repugnantiam, hanc uoluntatis et libidinis rixam uel certe ad uoluntatis sufficientiam libidinis indigentiam procul dubio, nisi culpabilis inoboedientia poenali inoboedientia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent, sed uoluntati membra, ut cetera, ita cuncta seruirent. Ita genitale aruum uas in hoc opus creatum seminaret, ut nunc terram manus, et quod modo de hac re nobis uolentibus diligentius disputare uerecundia resistit et conpellit ueniam honore praefato a pudicis auribus poscere, quur id fieret nulla causa esset, sed in omnia, quae de huius modi membris sensum cogitantis adtingerent, sine ullo timore obscenitatis liber sermo ferretur. nec ipsa uerba essent, quae uocarentur obscena, sed quidquid inde diceretur, tam honestum esset, quam de aliis cum loquimur corporis partibus. Quisquis ergo ad has litteras inpudicus accedit, culpam refugiat, non naturam; facta denotet suae turpitudinis, non uerba nostrae necessitatis; in quibus mihi facillime pudicus et religiosus lector uel auditor ignoscit, donec infidelitatem refellam, non de fide rerum inexpertarum, sed de sensu expertarum argumentantem. Legit enim haec sine offensione, qui non exhorret apostolum horrenda feminarum flagitia reprehendentem, quae inmutauerunt naturalem usum in eum usum, qui est contra naturam, praecipue quia nos non damnabilem obscenitatem nunc, sicut ille, commemoramus adque reprehendimus, sed in explicandis, quantum possumus, humanae generationis effectibus uerba tamen, sicut ille, obscena uitamus.

Chapter 24.—That If Men Had Remained Innocent and Obedient in Paradise, the Generative Organs Should Have Been in Subjection to the Will as the Other Members are.

Caput XXIV. Quod insontes homines et merito oboedientiae in paradiso permanentes ita genitalibus membris usuri fuissent ad generationem prolis, sicut ceteris ad arbitrium uoluntatis.

The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited by lust. For we move at will not only those members which are furnished with joints of solid bone, as the hands, feet, and fingers, but we move also at will those which are composed of slack and soft nerves: we can put them in motion, or stretch them out, or bend and twist them, or contract and stiffen them, as we do with the muscles of the mouth and face. The lungs, which are the very tenderest of the viscera except the brain, and are therefore carefully sheltered in the cavity of the chest, yet for all purposes of inhaling and exhaling the breath, and of uttering and modulating the voice, are obedient to the will when we breathe, exhale, speak, shout, or sing, just as the bellows obey the smith or the organist. I will not press the fact that some animals have a natural power to move a single spot of the skin with which their whole body is covered, if they have felt on it anything they wish to drive off,—a power so great, that by this shivering tremor of the skin they can not only shake off flies that have settled on them, but even spears that have fixed in their flesh. Man, it is true, has not this power; but is this any reason for supposing that God could not give it to such creatures as He wished to possess it? And therefore man himself also might very well have enjoyed absolute power over his members had he not forfeited it by his disobedience; for it was not difficult for God to form him so that what is now moved in his body only by lust should have been moved only at will.

Seminaret igitur prolem uir, susciperet femina genitalibus membris, quando id opus esset et quantum opus esset, uoluntate motis, non libidine concitatis. Neque enim ea sola membra mouemus ad nutum, quae conpactis articulata sunt ossibus, sicut manus et pedes et digitos, uerum etiam illa, quae mollibus remissa sunt neruis, cum uolumus, mouemus agitando et porrigendo producimus et torquendo flectimus et constringendo duramus, sicut ea sunt, quae in ore ac facie, quantum potest, uoluntas mouet. Pulmones denique ipsi omnium, nisi medullarum, mollissimi uiscerum et ob hoc antro pectoris communiti, ad spiritum ducendum ac remittendum uocemque emittendam seu modificandam, sicut folles fabrorum uel organorum, flantis, respirantis, loquentis, clamantis, cantantis seruiunt uoluntati. Omitto quod animalibus quibusdam naturaliter inditum est, ut tegmen, quo corpus omne uestitur, si quid in quocumque loco eius senserint abigendum, ibi tantum moueant, ubi sentiunt, nec solum insidentes muscas, uerum etiam haerentes hastas cutis tremore discutiant. Numquid quia id non potest homo, ideo Creator quibus uoluit animantibus donare non potuit? Sic ergo et ipse homo potuit oboedientiam etiam inferiorum habere membrorum, quam sua inoboedientia perdidit. Neque enim Deo difficile fuit sic illum condere, ut in eius carne etiam illud non nisi eius uoluntate moueretur, quod nunc nisi libidine non mouetur.

We know, too, that some men are differently constituted from others, and have some rare and remarkable faculty of doing with their body what other men can by no effort do, and, indeed, scarcely believe when they hear of others doing. There are persons who can move their ears, either one at a time, or both together. There are some who, without moving the head, can bring the hair down upon the forehead, and move the whole scalp backwards and forwards at pleasure. Some, by lightly pressing their stomach, bring up an incredible quantity and variety of things they have swallowed, and produce whatever they please, quite whole, as if out of a bag. Some so accurately mimic the voices of birds and beasts and other men, that, unless they are seen, the difference cannot be told. Some have such command of their bowels, that they can break wind continuously at pleasure, so as to produce the effect of singing. I myself have known a man who was accustomed to sweat whenever he wished. It is well known that some weep when they please, and shed a flood of tears. But far more incredible is that which some of our brethren saw quite recently. There was a presbyter called Restitutus, in the parish of the Calamensian Church, who, as often as he pleased (and he was asked to do this by those who desired to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), on some one imitating the wailings of mourners, became so insensible, and lay in a state so like death, that not only had he no feeling when they pinched and pricked him, but even when fire was applied to him, and he was burned by it, he had no sense of pain except afterwards from the wound. And that his body remained motionless, not by reason of his self-command, but because he was insensible, was proved by the fact that he breathed no more than a dead man; and yet he said that, when any one spoke with more than ordinary distinctness, he heard the voice, but as if it were a long way off. Seeing, then, that even in this mortal and miserable life the body serves some men by many remarkable movements and moods beyond the ordinary course of nature, what reason is there for doubting that, before man was involved by his sin in this weak and corruptible condition, his members might have served his will for the propagation of offspring without lust? Man has been given over to himself because he abandoned God, while he sought to be self-satisfying; and disobeying God, he could not obey even himself. Hence it is that he is involved in the obvious misery of being unable to live as he wishes. For if he lived as he wished, he would think himself blessed; but he could not be so if he lived wickedly.

Nam et hominum quorundam naturas nouimus multum ceteris dispares et ipsa raritate mirabiles nonnulla ut uolunt de corpore facientium, quae alii nullo modo possunt et audita uix credunt. Sunt enim, qui et aures moueant uel singulas uel ambas simul. Sunt qui totam caesariem capite inmoto, quantum capilli occupant, deponunt ad frontem reuocantque cum uolunt. Sunt qui eorum quae uoratterint incredibiliter plurima et uaria paululum praecordiis contrectatis tamquam de sacculo quod placuerit integerimum proferunt. Quidam uoces auium pecorumque et aliorum quorumlibet hominum sic imitantur adque exprimunt, ut, nisi uideantur, discerni omnino non possint. Nonnulli ab imo sine putore ullo ita numerosos pro arbitrio sonitus edunt, ut ex illa etiam parte cantare uideantur. Ipse sum expertus sudare hominem solere, cum uellet. Notum est quosdam flere, cum uolunt, adque ubertim lacrimas fundere. Iam illud multo est incredibilius, quod plerique fratres memoria recentissima experti sunt. Presbyter fuit quidam Restitutus nomine ifl paroecia Calamensis ecclesiae. Quando ei placebat (rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis, qui rem mirabilem coram scire cupiebant), ad imitatas quasi lamentantis cuiuslibet hominis uoces ita se auferebat a sensibus et iacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solum uellicantes adque pungentes minime sentiret, sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur admoto sine ullo doloris sensu nisi postmodum ex uulnere; non autem obnitendo, sed non sentiendo non mouere corpus eo probabatur, quod tamquam in defuncto nullus inueniebatur anhelitus; hominum tamen uoces, si - clarius loquerentur, tamquam de longinquo se audire postea referebat. Cum itaque corpus etiam nunc quibusdam, licet in carne corruptibili hanc aerumnosam ducentibus uitam, ita in plerisque motionibus et adfectionibus extra usitatum naturae modum mirabiliter seruiat: quid causae est, ut non credamus ante inoboedientiae peccatum corruptionisque supplicium ad propagandam prolem sine ulla libidine seruire uoluntati humanae humana membra potuisse? Donatus est itaque homo sibi, quia deseruit Deum placendo sibi, et non oboediens Deo non potuit oboedire nec sibi. Hinc euidentior miseria, qua homo non uiuit ut uult. Nam si ut uellet uiueret, beatum se putaret; sed nec sic tamen esset, si turpiter uiueret.

Chapter 25.—Of True Blessedness, Which This Present Life Cannot Enjoy.

Caput XXV. De uera beatitudine, quam temporalis uita non obtinet.

However, if we look at this a little more closely, we see that no one lives as he wishes but the blessed, and that no one is blessed but the righteous. But even the righteous himself does not live as he wishes, until he has arrived where he cannot die, be deceived, or injured, and until he is assured that this shall be his eternal condition. For this nature demands; and nature is not fully and perfectly blessed till it attains what it seeks. But what man is at present able to live as he wishes, when it is not in his power so much as to live? He wishes to live, he is compelled to die. How, then, does he live as he wishes who does not live as long as he wishes? or if he wishes to die, how can he live as he wishes, since he does not wish even to live? Or if he wishes to die, not because he dislikes life, but that after death he may live better, still he is not yet living as he wishes, but only has the prospect of so living when, through death, he reaches that which he wishes. But admit that he lives as he wishes, because he has done violence to himself, and forced himself not to wish what he cannot obtain, and to wish only what he can (as Terence has it, “Since you cannot do what you will, will what you can”), is he therefore blessed because he is patiently wretched? For a blessed life is possessed only by the man who loves it. If it is loved and possessed, it must necessarily be more ardently loved than all besides; for whatever else is loved must be loved for the sake of the blessed life. And if it is loved as it deserves to be,—and the man is not blessed who does not love the blessed life as it deserves,—then he who so loves it cannot but wish it to be eternal. Therefore it shall then only be blessed when it is eternal.

Quamquam si diligentius adtendamus, nisi beatus non uiuit ut uult, et nullus beatus nisi iustus. Sed etiam ipse iustus non uiuet ut uult, nisi eo peruenerit, ubi mori falli offendi omnino non possit eique sit certum ita semper futurum. Hoc enim natura expetit, nec plene adque perfecte beata erit nisi adepta quod expetit. Nunc uero quis hominum potest ut uult uiuere, quando ipsum uiuere non est in potestate? Viuere enim uult, mori cogitur. Quo modo ergo uiuit ut uult, qui non uiuit quamdiu uult? Quod si mori uoluerit, quo modo potest ut uult uiuere, qui non uult uiuere? Et si ideo mori uelit, non quo nolit uiuere, sed ut post mortem melius uiuat: nondum ergo ut uult uiuit, sed cum ad id quod uult moriendo peruenerit. Verum ecce uiuat ut uult, quoniam sibi extorsit sibique imperauit non uelle quod non potest, adque hoc uelle quod potest, sicut ait Terentius: Quoniam non potest id fieri quod uis, Id uelis quod possis: num ideo beatus est, quia patienter miser est? Beata quippe uita si non amatur, non habetur. Porro si amatur et habetur, ceteris omnibus rebus excellentius necesse est ametur, quoniam propter hanc amandum est quidquid aliud amatur. Porro si tantum amatur, quantum amari digna est (non enim beatus est, a quo ipsa beata uita non amatur ut digna est): fieri non potest, ut eam, qui sic amat, non aeternam uelit. Tunc igitur beata erit, quando aeterna erit. -

Chapter 26.—That We are to Believe that in Paradise Our First Parents Begat Offspring Without Blushing.

Caput XXVI. Quod felicitas in paradiso uiuentium sine erubescendo adpetitu generandi officium credenda sit inplere potuisse.

In Paradise, then, man lived as he desired so long as he desired what God had commanded. He lived in the enjoyment of God, and was good by God’s goodness; he lived without any want, and had it in his power so to live eternally. He had food that he might not hunger, drink that he might not thirst, the tree of life that old age might not waste him. There was in his body no corruption, nor seed of corruption, which could produce in him any unpleasant sensation. He feared no inward disease, no outward accident. Soundest health blessed his body, absolute tranquillity his soul. As in Paradise there was no excessive heat or cold, so its inhabitants were exempt from the vicissitudes of fear and desire. No sadness of any kind was there, nor any foolish joy; true gladness ceaselessly flowed from the presence of God, who was loved “out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.” The honest love of husband and wife made a sure harmony between them. Body and spirit worked harmoniously together, and the commandment was kept without labor. No languor made their leisure wearisome; no sleepiness interrupted their desire to labor. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum, absit ut suspicemur, non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo: sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra qua cætera, et sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est; quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet; ita tunc potuisse utero conjugis salva integritate feminei genitalis virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salva ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe via posset illud injici, qua hoc potest ejici. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret: sic ad fœtandum et concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque conjungeret. We speak of things which are now shameful, and although we try, as well as we are able, to conceive them as they were before they became shameful, yet necessity compels us rather to limit our discussion to the bounds set by modesty than to extend it as our moderate faculty of discourse might suggest. For since that which I have been speaking of was not experienced even by those who might have experienced it,—I mean our first parents (for sin and its merited banishment from Paradise anticipated this passionless generation on their part),—when sexual intercourse is spoken of now, it suggests to men’s thoughts not such a placid obedience to the will as is conceivable in our first parents, but such violent acting of lust as they themselves have experienced. And therefore modesty shuts my mouth, although my mind conceives the matter clearly. But Almighty God, the supreme and supremely good Creator of all natures, who aids and rewards good wills, while He abandons and condemns the bad, and rules both, was not destitute of a plan by which He might people His city with the fixed number of citizens which His wisdom had foreordained even out of the condemned human race, discriminating them not now by merits, since the whole mass was condemned as if in a vitiated root, but by grace, and showing, not only in the case of the redeemed, but also in those who were not delivered, how much grace He has bestowed upon them. For every one acknowledges that he has been rescued from evil, not by deserved, but by gratuitous goodness, when he is singled out from the company of those with whom he might justly have borne a common punishment, and is allowed to go scathless. Why, then, should God not have created those whom He foresaw would sin, since He was able to show in and by them both what their guilt merited, and what His grace bestowed, and since, under His creating and disposing hand, even the perverse disorder of the wicked could not pervert the right order of things?

Viuebat itaque homo in paradiso sicut uolebat, quamdiu hoc uolebat quod Deus iusserat; uiuebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus; uiuebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper uiuere habens in potestate. Cibus aderat ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, lignum uitae ne illum senecta dissolueret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore uel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus aut frigus, sic in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate uel timore accidebat bonae uoluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. Gaudium uerum perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, adque inter se coniugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque uigilia et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat inuitum. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo, sed eo uoluntatis nutu mouerentur membra illa quo cetera, et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Neque enim quia experientia probari non potest, ideo credendum non est, quando illas corporis partes non ageret turbidus calor, sed spontanea potestas, sicut opus esset, adhiberet, ita tunc potuisse utero coniugis salua integritate feminei genitalis uirile semen inmitti, sicut nunc potest eadem integritate salua ex utero uirginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Eadem quippe uia posset illud inici, qua hoc potest eici. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis inpulsus feminea uiscera relaxaret, sic ad fetandum et concipiendum non libidinis adpetitus, sed uoluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. De rebus loquimur nunc pudendis et ideo, quamuis, antequam earum puderet, quales esse potuissent coniciamus ut possumus, tamen necesse est, ut nostra disputatio magis frenetur ea, quae nos reuocat, uerecundia, quam eloquentia, quae nobis parum subpetit, adiuuetur. Nam cum id quod dico nec ipsi experti fuerint, qui experiri potuerunt (quoniam praeoccupante peccato exilium de paradiso ante meruerunt, quam sibi in opere serendae propaginis tranquillo arbitrio conuenirent), quo modo nunc, cum ista commemorantur, sensibus occurrit humanis nisi experientia libidinis turbidae, non coniectura placidae uoluntatis? Hinc est quod inpedit loquentem pudor, etsi non deficiat ratio cogitantem. Verum tamen urnnipotenti Deo, summo ac summe bono creatori omnium naturarum, uoluntatum autem bonarum adiutori et remuneratori. malarum autem relictori et damnatori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, quo certum numerum ciuium in sua sapientia praedestinatum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae ciuitatis inpleret, non eos iam meritis, quando quidem uniuersa massa tamquam in uitiata radice damnata est, sed gratia discernens et liberatis non solum de ipsis, uerum etiam de non liberatis, quid eis largiatur, ostendens. Non enim debita, sed gratuita bonitate tunc se quisque agnoscit erutum malis, cum ab eorum hominum consortio fit inmunis, cum quibus illi iusta esset poena communis. Quur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos esse praesciuit, quando quidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset ostendere, nec sub illo creatore ac dispositore peruersa inordinatio delinquentium rectum peruerteret ordinem rerum?

Chapter 27.—Of the Angels and Men Who Sinned, and that Their Wickedness Did Not Disturb the Order of God’s Providence.

Caput XXVII. De peccatoribus, et angelis et hominibus, quorum peruersitas non perturbat prouidentiam.

The sins of men and angels do nothing to impede the “great works of the Lord which accomplish His will.” For He who by His providence and omnipotence distributes to every one his own portion, is able to make good use not only of the good, but also of the wicked. And thus making a good use of the wicked angel, who, in punishment of his first wicked volition, was doomed to an obduracy that prevents him now from willing any good, why should not God have permitted him to tempt the first man, who had been created upright, that is to say, with a good will? For he had been so constituted, that if he looked to God for help, man’s goodness should defeat the angel’s wickedness; but if by proud self-pleasing he abandoned God, his Creator and Sustainer, he should be conquered. If his will remained upright, through leaning on God’s help, he should be rewarded; if it became wicked, by forsaking God, he should be punished. But even this trusting in God’s help could not itself be accomplished without God’s help, although man had it in his own power to relinquish the benefits of divine grace by pleasing himself. For as it is not in our power to live in this world without sustaining ourselves by food, while it is in our power to refuse this nourishment and cease to live, as those do who kill themselves, so it was not in man’s power, even in Paradise, to live as he ought without God’s help; but it was in his power to live wickedly, though thus he should cut short his happiness, and incur very just punishment. Since, then, God was not ignorant that man would fall, why should He not have suffered him to be tempted by an angel who hated and envied him? It was not, indeed, that He was unaware that he should be conquered. but because He foresaw that by the man’s seed, aided by divine grace, this same devil himself should be conquered, to the greater glory of the saints. All was brought about in such a manner, that neither did any future event escape God’s foreknowledge, nor did His foreknowledge compel any one to sin, and so as to demonstrate in the experience of the intelligent creation, human and angelic, how great a difference there is between the private presumption of the creature and the Creator’s protection. For who will dare to believe or say that it was not in God’s power to prevent both angels and men from sinning? But God preferred to leave this in their power, and thus to show both what evil could be wrought by their pride, and what good by His grace.

Proinde peccatores, et angeli et homines, nihil agunt, quo inpediantur magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius, quoniam qui prouidenter adque omnipotenter sua cuique distribuit, non solum bonis, uerum etiam malis bene uti nouit. Ac per hoc propter meritum primae malae uoluntatis ita damnato adque obdurato angelo malo, ut iam bonam uoluntatem ulterius non haberet, bene utens Deus quur non permitteret, ut ab illo primus homo, qui rectus, hoc est bonae uoluntatis, creatus fuerat, tentaretur? Quando quidem sic erat institutus, ut, si de adiutorio Dei fideret bonus homo, malum angelum uinceret; si autem creatorem adque adiutorem Deum superbe sibi placendo de’ sereret, uinceretur; meritum bonum habens in adiuta diuinitus uoluntate recta, malum uero in deserente Deum uoluntate peruersa. Quia et ipsum fidere de adiutorio Dei non quidem posset sine adiutorio Dei, nec tamen ideo ab his diuinae gratiae beneficiis sibi placendo recedere non habebat in potestate. Nam sicut in hac carne uiuere sine adiumentis alimentorum in potestate non est, non autem in ea uiuere in potestate est, quod faciunt qui se ipsos necant: ita bene uiuere sine adiutorio Dei etiam in paradiso non erat in potestate; erat autem in potestate male uiuere, sed beatitudine non permansura et poena iustissima secutura. Cum igitur huius futuri casus humani Deus non esset ignarus, quur eum non sineret inuidi angeli malignitate tentari? nullo modo quidem quod uinceretur incertus, sed nihilo minus praescius quod ab eius semine adiuto sua gratia idem ipse diabolus fuerat sanctorum gloria maiore uincendus. Ita factum est, ut nec Deum aliquid futurorum lateret, nec praesciendo quemquam peccare conpelleret et, quid interesset inter propriam cuiusque praesumtionem et suam tuitionem, angelicae et humanae rationali creaturae consequenti experientia demonstraret. Quis enim audeat credere aut dicere, ut neque angelus neque homo caderet, in Dei potestate non fuisse? Sed hoc eorum potestati maluit non auferre adque ita, et quantum mali eorum superbia et quantum boni sua gratia ualeret, ostendere.

Chapter 28.—Of the Nature of the Two Cities, the Earthly and the Heavenly.

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the other says to its God, “Thou art my glory, and the lifter up of mine head.” In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, “I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength.” And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God “glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise,”—that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,—“they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, “and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever.” But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, “that God may be all in all.”

Fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemtum Dei, caelestem uero amor Dei usque ad contemtum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria. Illa in gloria sua exaltat caput suum; haec dicit Deo suo: Gloria mea et exaltans caput meum. Illi in principibus eius uel in eis quas subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac seruiunt inuicem in caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. Illa in suis potentibus diligit uirtutem suam; haec dicit Deo suo: Diligam te, Domine, uirtus mea. Ideoque in illa sapientes eius secundum hominem uiuentes aut corporis aut animi sui bona aut utriusque sectati sunt, aut qui potuerunt cognoscere Deum, non ut Deum honorauerunt aut gratias egerunt, sed euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes (id est dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia sese extollentes) stulti facti sunt et inmutauerunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et uolucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium (ad huiusce modi enim simulacra adoranda uel duces populorum uel sectatores fuerunt), et coluerunt adque seruierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula; in hac autem nulla est hominis sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur uerus Deus, id expectans praemium in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, uerum etiam angelorum, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus.

Book XV.

Liber XV

Argument—Having treated in the four preceding books of the origin of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, Augustin explains their growth and progress in the four books which follow; and, in order to do so, he explains the chief passages of the sacred history which bear upon this subject. In this fifteenth book he opens this part of his work by explaining the events recorded in Genesis from the time of Cain and Abel to the deluge.