24. Antonius was at that time at Brundisium; and having confidence in the valour of his soldiers, he protected with fascines and screens about sixty row-boats belonging to his large ships, and, putting picked men on board, stationed them singly at various places along the coast, and gave orders that two triremes which he had caused to be built at Brundisium should go out to the mouth of the harbour under the pretence of exercising the rowers. When Libo saw them advance so boldly he sent five quadriremes against them, hoping that they could be intercepted. On their approaching our ships, our veteran crews began to retreat to the harbour, while the foe, impelled by their zeal, incautiously followed. Then suddenly, the signal being given, the Antonian row-boats threw themselves on the foe from every side, and at the first onset captured one of these quadriremes with its rowers and fighting men and compelled the rest to a discreditable flight. In addition to this loss they were prevented from watering by horsemen stationed by Antonius along the sea-coast, and Libo, moved by this need and by his disgrace, departed from Brundisium and abandoned the blockade of our men.
24. Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisii; is virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter LX cratibus pluteisque contexit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit navesque triremes duas, quas Brundisii faciendas curaverat, per causam exercendorum remigum ad fauces portus prodire iussit. Has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset, sperans intercipi posse, quadriremes V ad eas misit. Quae cum navibus nostris appropinquassent, nostri veterani in portum refugiebant: illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur. Iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt primoque impetu unam ex his quadriremibus cum remigibus defensoribusque suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt. Ad hoc detrimentum accessit, ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. Qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.
25. Many months had now passed and winter was far advanced, yet his ships and legions did not come to Caesar from Brundisium. And in fact some opportunities for this seemed to Caesar to have been passed over, since steady winds had often blown by which, in his opinion, they should without fail have set their course. And the further this period of time extended the more keen were the officers of the enemy’s fleet in their vigilance, and the greater confidence they had of stopping him. They were upbraided, too, by frequent letters from Pompeius urging them to hinder the rest of his forces, since they had not stopped Caesar on his first arrival, and every day they were expecting a more difficult season for transport, as the winds were slackening. Moved by these considerations, Caesar wrote in severer terms to his partisans at Brundisium, that when they got a suitable wind they should not let slip the opportunity of sailing, whether they were able to direct their course to the shores of the Apolloniates or to those of the Labeates, and run their ships ashore there. These places were mostly out of the range of observation of the enemy’s fleet, because they did not venture to trust themselves too far from the harbours.
25. Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. Ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur, quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus necessario committendum existimabam Quantoque eius amplius processerat temporis, tanto erant alacriores ad custodias, qui classibus praeerant, maioremque fiduciam prohibendi habebant, et crebris Pompei litteris castigabantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohibuissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent, duriusque cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis exspectabant. Quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos severius scripsit, nacti idoneum ventum ne occasionem navigandi dimitterent, sive ad litora Apolloniatium sive ad Labeatium cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent. Haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant, quod se longius a portibus committere non audebant Illi adhibita audacia et virtute administrantibus M.
26. Displaying audacity and valour, with M. Antonius and Fufius Calenus directing operations, and the soldiers themselves giving much encouragement and refusing no danger for Caesar’s safety, they weigh anchor with a south wind, and on the second day sail past Apollonia. When they had been seen from the mainland, Coponius, who was at Dyrrachium in command of the Rhodian fleet, leads his ships out of port, and when on the wind falling light he had now approached near our force, the same south wind rose again and served to protect our side. Yet he did not on that account desist from his attempt, but kept hoping that even the violence of the storm could be overcome by the toil and perseverance of the sailors, and though we had been carried past Dyrrachium by the strong force of the wind, he none the less kept pursuing us. Our men, though experiencing the kindness of fortune, nevertheless feared an attack by the fleet in case the wind should drop. Coming to a harbour named Nymphaeum, three miles beyond Lissus, a harbour which was protected from the south-west wind but was not safe from the south, they took their ships in there, reckoning the danger from the storm less than that from the enemy’s fleet. And as soon as they entered there, by an incredible piece of luck the south wind which had blown for two days changed into a south-west wind.
26. Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortantibus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus nacti austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apolloniam praetervehuntur. Qui eum essent ex continenti visi, Coponius, qui Dyrrachii classi Rhodiae praeerat, naves ex portu educit, et cum iam nostris remissiore vento appropinquasset, idem auster increbuit nostrisque praesidio fuit. Neque vero ille ob eam causam conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum etiam vim tempestatis superari posse sperabat praetervectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo secius sequebatur. Nostri usi fortunae beneficio tamen impetum classis timebant, si forte ventus remisisset. Nacti portum, qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum III, eo naves introduxerunt (qui portus ab Africo tegebatur, ab austro non erat tutus) leviusque tempestatis quam classis periculum aestimaverunt Quo simulatque introitum est, incredibili felicitate auster, qui per biduum flaverat, in Africum se vertit.
27. Herein might be seen the sudden shifting of fortune. Those who had lately been in fear for themselves were now sheltered by a perfectly safe harbour; those who had brought peril on our ships were forced to fear peril for themselves. And so by the change of circumstances the rough weather protected our ships and shattered the Rhodian vessels, so that the decked ships, numbering sixteen, were all without exception crushed and utterly wrecked; and of the large number of rowers and fighting men, some were dashed on the rocks and killed, others were dragged off by our men. All these Caesar saved and sent back home.
27. Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre licuit. Qui modo sibi timuerant, hos tutissimus portus recipiebat; qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant, de suo timere cogebantur. Itaque tempore commutato tempestas et nostros texit et naves Rhodias afflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes, constratae numero XVI, eliderentur et naufragio interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque numero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris detraheretur; quos omnes conservatis Caesar domum dimisit.
28. Two of our ships, overtaken by night owing to the slow progress of their course, not knowing what position the rest had taken, anchored opposite Lissus, and Otacilius Crassus, who was in command of Lissus, was preparing to capture these by sending against them a number of row-boats and other small craft; at the same time he was treating for the surrender of their crews, and promising them freedom from injury if they surrendered. One of these ships had taken on board two hundred and twenty men of the legion of recruits, the other rather less than two hundred from the veteran legion. Herein might be learnt what security men derive from strength of mind. For the recruits, terrified by the number of the ships and exhausted by the rough water and seasickness, after receiving a solemn pledge that the enemy would do them no harm, surrendered themselves to Otacilius; and all of them, when brought to him, are most cruelly massacred before his eyes in violation of the sanctity of his oath. But the men of the veteran legion, though equally distressed by the discomforts of the storm and the bilge-water, considered it their duty to relax nothing of their pristine valour, and, having spun out the first part of the night by treating of terms and making a pretence at surrender, compel their helmsman to run the ship aground, and themselves finding a suitable spot, finished the rest of the night there; and at early dawn, when about four hundred horsemen, who were guarding that part of the sea-coast, and others who had followed them under arms from the garrison, were sent against them by Otacilius, they defended themselves, and after slaying some of the foe retired unhurt on our force.
28. Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noctem coniectae, cum ignorarent, quem locum reliquae cepissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constiterunt. Has scaphis minoribusque navigiis compluribus immissis Otacilius Crassus, qui Lissi praeerat, expugnare parabat; simul de deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollicebatur. Harum altera navis CCXX e legione tironum sustulerat, altera ex veterana paulo minus CC. Hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidii in animi firmitudine. Tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et salo nauseaque confecti iureiurando accepto, nihil eis nocituros hostes, se Otacilio dediderunt; qui omnes ad eum producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu crudelissime interficiuntur. At veteranae legionis milites, item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiis, neque ex pristina virtute remittendum aliquid putaverunt, et tractandis condicionibus et simulatione deditionis extracta primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem eicere cogunt, ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis partem ibi confecerunt et luce prima missis ad eos ab Otacilio equitibus, qui eam partem orae maritimae asservabant, circiter CCCC, quique eos armati ex praesidio secuti sunt,se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis incolumes se ad nostros receperunt, Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibusque rebus iuvit.
29. After this had taken place the corporation of Roman citizens who were in occupation of Lissus, a town which Caesar had previously made over to them and for the fortification of which he had arranged, admitted Antonius and assisted him in* every way. Otacilius, fearing for himself, flies from the town and makes his way to Pompeius. Antonius, having disembarked all his forces, the sum of which consisted of three veteran legions and one of recruits and eight hundred cavalry, sends back most of his ships to Italy to transport the rest of his horse and foot, but leaves his pontoons, a kind of Gallic ship, at Lissus, intending that, if Pompeius, thinking Italy unguarded, should transport his army thither, as it was generally expected that he would, Caesar might have some means of going in pursuit; and he hastily sends him messages stating in what districts he had disembarked his army and what number of troops he had conveyed across.
29. Otacilius sibi timens ex oppido fugit et ad Pompeium pervenit. Expositos omnibus copiis Antonius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum uniusque tironum et equitum nece, plerasque naves in Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transportandos, pontones, quod est genus navium Gallicarum, Lissi relinquit, hoc consilio, ut si forte Pompeius vacuam existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum facultatem haberet, nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit, quibus regionibus exercitum exposuisset et quid militum transvexisset.
30. Caesar and Pompeius become aware of this almost simultaneously. For they had themselves seen the ships sailing past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, as they had directed their march by land to follow them; but for the first few days they did not know whither their course had carried them. And when they had found this out they each adopted different plans, Caesar to unite himself as quickly as possible with Antonius, Pompeius to confront the approaching enemy on their march, in case he might be able to attack them unawares from an ambuscade; and on the same day they each led out their forces from their permanent camps, quitting the River Apsus, Pompeius secretly by night, Caesar openly by day. But Caesar had the longer journey up stream, with a larger circuit, to enable him to cross by a ford; Pompeius, since he had not to cross the river, his route being open, hastened by forced marches towards Antonius, and on learning of his approach, finding a suitable spot, stationed his forces there and kept all his men in camp, forbidding fires to be lighted that his arrival might be kept more secret. These facts are immediately reported to Antonius through some Greeks. He sent messengers to Caesar and kept his men one day in camp; on the next day Caesar reached him. On learning of his arrival, Pompeius, to escape being shut in by two armies, quits that spot and with all his forces arrives at Asparagium, a town of the Dyrrachians, and there pitches his camp in a suitable place.
30. Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. Nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi, ut iter secundum eas terra direxerant, sed quo essent eae delatae, primus diebus ignorabant. Cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt: Caesar, ut quam primum se eum Antonio coniungeret; Pompeius, ut venientibus in itinere se opponeret, si imprudentes ex insidiis adoriri posset,eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt: Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdiu. Sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius, adverso flumine, ut vado transire posset; Pompeius, quia expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit atque eum ubi appropinquare cognovit, idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit suosque omnes in castris continuit ignesque fieri prohibuit, quo occultior esset eius adventus. Haec ad Antonium statim per Graecos deferuntur. Ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit; altero die ad eum pervenit Caesar. Cuius adventu cognito Pompeius, ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.
31. About this time Scipio, having incurred some losses near Mount Amanus, had styled himself Imperator. After doing this he had requisitioned large sums of money from the communities and the despots, and had also exacted from the tax-farmers of his province the amount owing for two years, and had borrowed in advance from the same persons the amount due for the following year, and had levied horsemen from the whole province: When these were collected, leaving in his rear the neighbouring Parthian enemy who a little before had slain the commander, M. Crassus, and had kept M. Bibulus closely invested, he had withdrawn his legions and cavalry from Syria. And as the province had fallen into a state of great anxiety and fear about a Parthian war, and remarks were heard from the soldiers that if they were being led against an enemy they would go, but that against a citizen and a consul they would not bear arms, he conducted his legions to Pergamum and the richest cities for winter quarters and bestowed on them very large bounties, and with the object of encouraging the men allowed them to pi under the towns.
31. His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat. Quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias, item a publicanis suae provinciae debitam biennii pecuniam exegerat et ab eisdem insequentis anni mutuam praeceperat equitesque toti provinciae imperaverat. Quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones equitesque ex Syria deduxerat. Summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset, ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur, sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos, deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.
32. Meanwhile sums of money, requisitioned with the utmost harshness, were being exacted throughout the province. Many kinds of extortion, moreover, were specially devised to glut their avarice. A tribute was imposed on every head of slaves and children; pillar-taxes, door-taxes, corn, soldiers, arms, rowers, engines, freightage, were requisitioned; any mode of exaction, provided a name could be found for it, was deemed a sufficient excuse for compelling contributions. Men armed with military power were set not merely over cities but almost over every hamlet and stronghold. Among these he who had acted with the greatest harshness and cruelty was accounted the best of men and the best of citizens. The province was full of lictors and military authorities, crammed with prefects and extortioners, who apart from the moneys requisitioned had an eye also to their own private gain; for they gave out that, having been driven from home and country, they were in need of all necessaries, so that by a respectable plea they might cover up the foulest action. Added to this there was the heaviest usury, as usually happens in war, money being exacted from the whole population; and in these proceedings a postponement of the day of payment was termed a free gift. Consequently, in these two years the debt of the province was multiplied. Yet none the less on that account were fixed sums of money exacted from the Roman citizens of the province, not individually, but by separate corporations and communities, and they tried to make out that these sums were being taken as loans in accordance with a decree of the senate; from the tax-farmers they demanded the tax of the following year as an advance loan, as they had done in Syria.
32. Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. Multa praeterea generatim ad avaritiam excogitabantur. In capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria, ostiaria, frumentum, milites, arma, remiges, tormenta, vecturae imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur. Non solum urbibus, sed paene vicis castellisque singulis cum imperio praeficiebantur. Qui horum quid acerbissime crudelissimeque fecerat, is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. Erat plena lictorum et imperiorum provincia, differta praefectis atque exactoribus: qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant; dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus necessariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent. Accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis; quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. Itaque aes alienum provinciae eo biennio multiplicatum est. Neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae, sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatusconsulto exigi dictitabant; publicanis, ut in Syria fecerant, insequentis anni vectigal promutuum.
33. Moreover, at Ephesus Scipio gave orders that sums of money deposited there in former times should be removed from the temple of Diana. And a certain date having been appointed for this transaction, when they had come to the shrine and with them a number of men of the senatorial order whom Scipio had invited, a dispatch is handed him from Pompeius stating that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions, that Scipio was to make haste to come to him with his army and to put everything else aside. On receipt of this dispatch he dismisses those whom he had invited, and himself begins to prepare for his journey into Macedonia, and a few days later he set out. This circumstance secured the safety of the money at Ephesus.
33. Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. Certaque eius rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus ordinis senatorii, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem: properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque posthaberet. His litteris acceptis quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus. Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.
34. Caesar, after his junction with the army of Antonius, removing from Oricum the legion which he had stationed there to protect the sea-coast, thought that he ought to try to win over the provinces and to make a further advance. On the arrival of envoys from Thessaly and Aetolia to promise that if he sent a garrison the townships of these nations would do his bidding, he sent into Thessaly L. Cassius Longinus with the legion of recruits, called the Twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse; into Aetolia, G. Calvisius Sabinus with five cohorts and a few horsemen; and he gave them special instructions, as the districts were close at hand, to provide for the corn supply. He ordered Gn. Domitius Calvinus to go into Macedonia with two legions, the Eleventh and Twelfth, and five hundred horsemen; and in that part of this province which was called Free, Menedemus, the leading man of those districts, being sent as an envoy announced a remarkable enthusiasm on the part of all his countrymen.
34. Caesar Antonii exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico legione, quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat, temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum existimabat et, cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent, qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur XXVII, atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent, hortatus est. Cn. Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, XI et XII, et equitibus D in Macedoniam proficisci iussit; cuius provinciae ab ea parte, quae libera appellabatur, Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legatus omnium suorum excellens studium,profitebatur.
35. Of these officers Calvisius was received on his arrival with the utmost goodwill of all the Aetolians, and having expelled the garrisons of the foe from Calydon and Naupactus gained possession of the whole of Aetolia. Cassius arrived with his legion in Thessaly; here, since there were two factions, he met with a divergence of feeling among the towns: Hegesaretos, a man of long-established influence, favoured the cause of Pompeius; Petraeus, a youth of the highest rank, energetically supported Caesar with his own and his people’s resources.
35. Ex his Calvisius primo adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate, praesidiis adversariorum Calydone et Naupacto eiectis, omni Aetolia potitus est. Cassius in Thessaliam eum legione pervenit. Hic eum essent factiones duae, varia voluntate civitatum utebatur: Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat; Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adulescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem enixe iuvabat.
36. And at the same time Domitius comes into Macedonia; and when crowded embassies from the townships had begun to gather together to meet him, the news was brought that Scipio was close at hand with his legions, arousing much expectation and rumour among the people generally; for in a novel conjuncture rumour usually outstrips truth. Scipio, lingering nowhere in Macedonia, made his way to Domitius with great speed, and when about twenty miles oft suddenly turned aside to Thessaly to Cassius Longinus. This he did so hastily that news of his presence and of his coming was brought simultaneously, and in order that he might march with the greater expedition he left M. Favonius at the River Aliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to protect the baggage of the legions, and ordered a stronghold to be fortified there. At the same time the cavalry of King Cotys, which had been in the habit of frequenting the borders of Thessaly, sped to the camp of Cassius. Then Cassius, smitten with fear when he learnt of the approach of Scipio and saw the horsemen whom he supposed to be Scipio’s, turned towards the mountains which enclose Thessaly, and from these parts began to direct his course towards Ambracia. But Scipio, hurrying in pursuit, was followed by letters from M. Favonius saying that Domitius was close by with his legions, and that he could not hold the post in which he had been stationed without the aid of Scipio. Receiving this dispatch, Scipio changes his purpose and his route: he ceases to follow Cassius and hastens to bear aid to Favonius. And so, continuing his march by day and night, he reached him at so opportune a moment that at the very same time the dust of the Domitian army was seen and the first advance guard of Scipio appeared in view. Thus the energy of Domitius brought safety to Cassius, and the speed of Scipio to Favonius.
36. Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit; et eum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent, nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem, cum legionibus, magna opinione et fama omnium; nam plerumque in novitate rem fama antecedit. Hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu tetendit ad Domitium et, cum ab eo milia passuum XX afuisset, subito se ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. Hoc adeo celeriter fecit, ut simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur, et quo iter expeditius faceret, M. Favonium ad flumen Aliacmonem, quod Macedoniam a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus VIII praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit castellumque ibi muniri iussit. Eodem tempore equitatus regis Cotyis ad castra Cassii advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam esse consuerat. Tum timore perterritus Cassius cognito Scipionis adventu visisque equitibus, quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit, qui Thessaliam cingunt, atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter facere coepit. At Scipionem properantem sequi litterae sunt consecutae a M. Favonio, Domitium cum legionibus adesse neque se praesidium, ubi constitutus esset, sine auxilio Scipionis tenere posse. Quibus litteris acceptis consilium Scipio iterque commutat; Cassium sequi desistit, Favonio auxilium ferre contendit. Itaque dic ac nocte continuato itinere ad cum pervenit, tam opportuno tempore, ut simul Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur, et primi antecursores Scipionis viderentur. Ita Cassio industria Domitii, Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem attulit.
37. Scipio, after halting for two days in his permanent camp by the River Aliacmon, which flowed between him and the camp of Domitius, on the third day at early dawn takes his army across by the ford, and after pitching a camp, on the morning of the next day draws up his forces before the front of the camp. Then Domitius also thought it his duty not to hesitate to advance his legions and fight a pitched battle. But, though there was a plain about two miles broad between the two camps, Domitius pushed forward his line close under Scipio’s camp, but Scipio persisted in not moving away from his rampart. And yet, though the troops of Domitius were with difficulty held in, a pitched battle was avoided, and mainly because a stream with difficult banks situated just under Scipio’s camp hindered the advance of our men. When Scipio perceived their zeal and keenness for fighting, suspecting that on the next day he would either be compelled to fight against his will or would confine himself to his camp with great discredit after the great expectation that his coming had aroused, his rash advance came to an ignominious end. Without even the proclamation for breaking up camp, he crossed the river by night and returned to the same part from which he had come and there pitched his camp on a natural elevation near the river. After the interval of a few days, he posted a cavalry ambuscade by night in the place in which our men on previous days had been in the habit of collecting fodder; and when Q. Varus, prefect of cavalry under Domitius, had come according to his daily practice, they suddenly rose up from their ambuscade. But our men stoutly withstood their attack, and, each quickly returning to his own rank, the whole body then took the aggressive and charged the enemy. After killing about eighty of them and putting the rest to flight, they returned to the camp with the loss of two men.
37. Scipio biduum castris stativis moratus ad flumen, quod inter eum et Domitii castra fluebat, Aliacmonem, tertio die prima luce exercitum vado traducit et castris positis postero die mane copias ante frontem castrorum instruit. Domitius tum quoque sibi dubitandum non putavit, quin productis legionibus proelio decertaret. Sed cum esset inter bina castra campus circiter milium passuum II, Domitius castris Scipionis aciem suam subiecit; ille a vallo non discedere perseveravit. Ac tamen aegre retentis Domitianis militibus est factum, ne proelio contenderetur, et maxime, quod rivus difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Scipionis progressus nostrorum impediebat. Quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio, suspicatus fore, ut postero die aut invitus dimicare cogeretur aut magna cum infamia castris se contineret, qui magna exspectatione venisset,temere progressus turpem habuit exitum et noctu ne conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transit atque in eandem partem, ex qua venerat, redit ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit. Paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum collocavit, (pio in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri pabulari consueverant; et eum cotidiana consuetudine Qu. Varus, praefectus equitum Domitii, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis consurrexerunt. Sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines rediit, atque ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt; ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.
38. After these events Domitius, hoping that Scipio could be enticed out to fight, pretended to be shifting his camp under the stress of want of provisions, and when the order to strike camp had been proclaimed according to military custom, he advanced three miles and stationed his whole army and cavalry in a suitable and secret spot. Scipio, fully prepared for pursuit, sent forward a great part of his horse to explore the route of Domitius and discover his position. And when they had advanced and the first squadrons had entered the ambuscade, the neighing of the horses having caused suspicion, they began to retire to their own men; and those who were following them, seeing their hasty retirement, halted. Our men, when their ambush was discovered, that they might not have to wait in vain for the rest, caught and cut off two squadrons. Among these was M. Opimius, prefect of horse; all the rest of the men they either slew or led captive to Domitius.
38. His rebus gestis Domitius, sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse, simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere, vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum III loco idoneo et occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque collocavit. Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitum magnam partem ad explorandum iter Domitii et cognoscendum praemisit. Qui cum essent progressi, primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspicione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur celerem eorum receptum conspicati restiterunt. Nostri, cognitis insidiis, ne frustra reliquos exspectaret, duas nacti turmas exceperunt (in his fuit M. Opimius, praefectus equitum), reliquos omnes aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.
39. Having removed the garrisons from the sea-shore, as explained above, Caesar left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, entrusting to them the custody of the warships which he had brought over from Italy. The legate Acilius Caninus was placed in charge of this duty and of the town. He withdrew our ships into the inner port behind the town, moored them to the shore, and sank a merchant-ship to block the mouth of the port and attached to it another ship, on which he constructed a tower, setting it just opposite the entrance of the harbour. This he filled with soldiers, and gave it them to hold against all unforeseen risks.
39. Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, ni cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit, quas ex Italia traduxerat. Huic officio oppidoque Acilius Caninus legatus praeerat. Is naves nostras interiorem in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit; super quam turrim effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnes repentinos casus tradidit.
40. On learning of these proceedings the young Gn. Pompeius, who was in command of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum and by great efforts drew off the submerged ship with a windlass and a number of ropes; and attacking the second ship, which had been stationed by Acilius to guard it, with a number of vessels on which he had constructed towers of equal height, fighting as he was from a higher position and always sending up fresh combatants in place of the exhausted, and in other directions assailing the walls of the town at once by ladders from the land and with his fleet, so as to keep apart the forces of the foe, he thus overcame our men by sheer hard work and overwhelming showers of missiles. And having driven off the fighting men, who were all picked up by boats and escaped, he took the ship by assault, and at the same time gained possession in the other direction of the projecting natural breakwater which had almost made an island of the town, and drew across into the inner harbour four biremes, placing rollers under them and propelling them by crowbars. And so attacking from either side the warships which were empty and fastened to the shore, he drew off four of them and burned the rest. Having finished this business, he left behind D. Laelius, whom he had taken from the Asiatic fleet. This officer proceeded to prevent stores from Byllis and Amantia from being imported into the town. He himself went to Lissus and attacked thirty merchant-vessels which had been left by M. Antonius within the port and burned them all. He attempted to storm Lissus, which was defended by the Roman citizens belonging to that corporation and by the soldiers whom Caesar had sent there as a garrison, and after staying for three days and having lost a few men in the siege, he left the district without effecting anything.
40. Quibus cognitis rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navim remulco multisque contendens funibus adduxit atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, ut ex superiore pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis submittens et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans, uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit, deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis excepti refugerant, eam navem expugnavit, eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiectam, (piae paene insulam oppidum effecerat, et IIII biremes subiectis scutulis impulsas vectibus in interiorem portum traduxit. Ita ex utraque parte naves longas aggressus, quae erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit, reliquas incendit. Hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Bullide atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohibebat. Ipse Lissum profectus naves onerarias XXX a M. Antonio relictas intra portum aggressus omnes incendit; Lissum expugnare conatus defendentibus civibus Romanis, qui eius conventus erant, militibusque, quos praesidii causa miserat Caesar, triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta inde discessit.
41. Caesar, as soon as he knew that Pompeius was at Asparagium, set out to the same place with his army, and after storming on the way the town of the Parthini in which Pompeius had a garrison, reached Pompeius on the third day, and pitched his camp close to him, and on the following day, leading out all his forces, drew them up in battle array and gave Pompeius the chance of fighting a pitched battle. On observing that he kept in his position, he withdrew his army to the camp, considering it necessary to form a different plan. So on the next day he set out in full force for Dyrrachium, taking a wide circuit by a difficult and narrow route, in the hope that Pompeius could be either driven to Dyrrachium or cut off from it, because he had collected there all his provisions and his whole war equipment. And so it happened. For Pompeius, at first failing to understand his plan, because he saw him setting out by a route that led away from that district, thought that he had gone away because he had been compelled to do so by scarcity of food supply. Afterwards receiving information through his scouts, he shifted his camp the next day, hoping to be able to confront him by a shorter route. Caesar, suspecting that this would happen and having exhorted his men to bear their toil with an equal mind, staying his march only for a short period during the night, arrived in the morning at Dyrrachium, when for the first time the line of Pompeius was seen afar off, and there pitched his camp.
41. Caesar, postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in itinere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium habebat, tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompeio fecit. Ubi illum suis locis se tenere animadvertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit. Itaque postero dic omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficili angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans Pompeium aut Dyrrachium compelli aut ab eo intercludi posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparatum eo contulisset; ut accidit. Pompeius enim primo ignorans eius consilium, quod diverso ab ea regione itinere profectum videbat, angustiis rei frumentariae compulsum discessisse existimabat; postea per exploratores certior factus postero dic castra movit, breviore itinere se occurrere ei posse sperans. Quod fore suspicatus Caesar militesque adhortatus, ut aequo animo laborem ferrent, parvam partem noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium venit, cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur, atque ibi castra posuit.
42. Pompeius, being cut off from Dyrrachium, on failing to gain his purpose adopts the next best plan and entrenches a camp on a lofty spot called Petra, which allows a moderately good approach for ships and protects them from certain winds. He gives orders for some of his warships to meet there, and for corn and stores to be brought in from Asia and from all the districts that he held. Caesar, thinking that the war was going to be unduly prolonged, and despairing of his supplies from Italy, because all the shores were being held with such vigilance by the Pompeians, and his own fleets which he had constructed in the winter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy were slow in coming, sent Q. Tillius and the legate L. Canuleius into Epirus in order to get provisions, and because these districts were some distance off he established granaries in certain places and apportioned the neighbouring communities their respective shares in the carriage of corn. He also gave orders that all the corn that there was should be sought and collected at Lissus, among the Parthini, and in all the fortified posts. This was of very small amount, partly from the nature of the land, because the district is rugged and hilly and the people generally use imported corn, and also because Pompeius had foreseen this and had at an earlier date treated the Parthini as spoils of war, and, hunting for all their corn by ransacking and digging up their houses, had carried it off by means of his horsemen to Petra.
42. Pompeius interclusus Dyrrachio, ubi propositum tenere non potuit, secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem atque eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit. Eo partem navium longarum convenire, frumentum commeatumque ah Asia atque omnibus regionibus, quas tenebat, comportari imperat. Caesar longius bellum ductum iri existimans et de Italicis commeatibus desperans, quod tanta diligentia omnia litora a Pompeianis tenebantur, classesque ipsius, quas hieme in Sicilia, Gallia, Italia fecerat, morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium et L. Canuleium legatum misit, quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus descripsit. Item Lisso Parthinisque et omnibus castellis quod esset frumenti conquiri iussit. Id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providerat et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites comportarat.
43. On learning of these things, Caesar forms a plan to suit the nature of the ground. Round Pompeius’ camp there were very many lofty and rugged hills. These he first occupied with garrisons and erected strong forts on them. Then, according to the indications afforded by the nature of each locality, by drawing a line of works from fort to fort he proceeded to invest Pompeius, with these objects in view: first, that as he had a scanty supply of provisions and Pompeius had a large preponderance of cavalry, he might be able to bring in for his army corn and stores from any direction at less risk; and also that he might prevent Pompeius from foraging and might make his cavalry useless for active operations; and, thirdly, that he might diminish the moral influence on which Pompeius seemed chiefly to rely among foreign nations, when the report should have spread throughout the world that he was being beleaguered by Caesar and did not dare to fight a pitched battle.
43. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit ex loci natura. Erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. Hos primum praesidiis tenuit castellaque ibi communit. Inde, ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat, ex castello in castellum perducta munitione circumvallare Pompeium instituit, haec spectans, quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat, quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul, uti pabulatione Pompeium prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio, ut auctoritatem qua ille maxime apud exteras nationes niti videbatur, minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset, illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.
44. Pompeius was unwilling to go far from the sea and Dyrrachium because he had placed there his whole war material, pikes, armour, catapults, and was bringing up, by sea, corn for his army, nor could he put a stop to Caesar’s works except by choosing to fight a pitched battle, which he had decided should not be done at that time. The only remaining course was to adopt a desperate method of warfare by occupying as many hills as possible, by holding with garrisons the widest extent of land possible, and by keeping Caesar’s forces as far extended as he could; and this was done. By making twenty-four redoubts he embraced a circuit of fifteen miles, and within this he foraged; and in this district there were a number of hand-sown crops with which he could meanwhile feed his animals. And just as our men by a continuous line of fortifications took measures to prevent the Pompeians from breaking out anywhere and attacking us in the rear, so the enemy made an unbroken line of defence in the interior of the space so that our men should not be able to enter any part of it and surround them from the rear. They, however, outstripped us in the work, being superior in numbers and having a shorter interior circuit to complete. Whenever Caesar had to occupy any spot, although Pompeius had decided not to try to prevent it with his whole armed force and fight a pitched battle, yet he kept sending up, in suitable positions, archers and slingers, of whom he had a great number, and many of our men were wounded. A great dread of the arrows fell on them, and to avoid the missiles nearly all the soldiers had made themselves jerkins or other protections out of felt, quilt, or hide.
44. Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatum belli, tela, arma, tormenta ibi collocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat, nisi proelio decertare vellet; quod eo tempore statuerat non esse faciendum. Relinquebatur, ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque copias, quam maxime posset, distineret; idque accidit. Castellis enim XXIIII effectis XV milia passuum circuitu amplexus hoc spatio pabulabatur; multaque erant intra eum locum manu sata, quibus interim iumenta pasceret. Atque ut nostri perpetua munitione providebant, ne quo loco erumperent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur, ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones efficiebant, ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a tergo circumvenire possent. Sed illi operibus vincebant, quod et numero militum praestabat et interiore spatio minorem circuitum habebant. Quaecunque erant loca Caesari capienda, etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et dimicare non constituerat, tamen suis locis sagittariis funditoresque mittebat, quorum magnum habebat numerum, multique ex nostris vulnerabantur, magnusque incesserat timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent.
45. In occupying positions each strove with the utmost energy: Caesar to confine Pompeius within the narrowest limits, Pompeius to occupy as many hills as he could in the widest possible circuit; and for this reason frequent skirmishes took place. In one of these, when Caesar’s Ninth Legion had occupied a certain post and had begun to fortify it, Pompeius occupied a hill near and opposite to it and began to hinder our men in their work; and since on one side Caesar’s position admitted of an almost level approach, he first of all threw round a force of archers and slingers, and then, sending up a great multitude of light-armed men and putting forward his engines, he began to hinder the works; nor was it easy for our men at one and the same time to stand on the defensive and to fortify. Caesar, on seeing that in every direction his men were being wounded, ordered them to retire and to quit the position. The way of retreat lay down a slope. The enemy, however, pressed on all the more keenly, and did not allow our men to retire, because they appeared to be abandoning the position under the influence of fear. It was at this time that Pompeius is said to have made the boastful remark to his friends that he did not object to be considered a worthless commander if Caesar’s legions should succeed in retiring, without the most serious loss, from the place to which they had rashly advanced.
45. In occupandis praesidiis magna VI uterque nitebatur: Caesar, ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret; Pompeius, ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu occuparet, crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. In his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupavisset et munire coepisset, huic loco propinquum et contrarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere prohibere coepit et, cum una ex parte prope aequum aditum haberet, primum sagittariis funditoribusque circumiectis, postea levius armaturae magna multitudine missa tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediebat; neque erat facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. Caesar, cum suos ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere. Erat per declive receptus. Illi autem hoc acrius instabant neque regredi nostros patiebantur, quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur. Dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse: non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese recepissent inde, quo temere essent progressae.