46. Caesar, fearing for the retreat of his men, ordered hurdles to be carried to the furthest point of the hill and to be set up fronting the foe to bar their way, and within these a ditch of moderate width to be drawn athwart their path, the men being under cover, and the place to be made as difficult as possible in every direction. He himself drew up his slingers in suitable places to serve as a protection to our men in their retreat. When these arrangements were finished he ordered the legion to be withdrawn. The Pompeians then began with all the more insolence and audacity to press and close in on our men, and in order to cross the ditches overthrew the hurdles that had been set up as a defence against them. And Caesar, on observing this, fearing lest his men should appear to have been flung back rather than withdrawn and a more serious loss should be incurred, exhorted his men about midway down the slope, by the mouth of Antonius, who was in command of that legion, and ordered the signal to be given with the clarion and the enemy to be charged. The men of the Ninth with prompt and unanimous resolution hurled their pikes and, breaking into a run from the lower ground and charging up the hill, drove the Pompeians headlong and compelled them to turn their backs in flight; the overturned hurdles and the uprights planted in their way and the ditches that had been drawn across proved a great hindrance to them in their retreat. But our men, who considered it sufficient to depart without disaster, when several of the enemy had been killed and five in all of their own comrades lost, retired with the utmost quietness and, halting a little on this side of that spot, included in their lines some other hills and completed their defensive works.
46. Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum tumulum contra hostem proferri et adversas Iocari, intra has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus obduci iussit locumque in omnes partes quam maxime impediri. Ipse idoneis Iocis funditores instruxit, ut praesidio nostris se recipientibus essent. His rebus comparatis legionem reduci iussit. Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius nostros premere et instare coeperunt cratesque pro munitione obiectas propulerunt, ut fossas transcenderant. Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, veritus, ne non reducti, sed reiecti viderentur, maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni praeerat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum fieri iussit. Milites legionis vim subito conspirati pila coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incitati cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertere coegerunt; quibus ad recipiendum crates deiectae longumque obiecti et institutae fossae magno impedimento fuerunt. Nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento discedere, compluribus interfectis V omnino suorum amissis quietissime se receperunt pauloque citra eum locum aliis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.
47. The method of warfare was new and unprecedented, both on account of the large number of redoubts, the wide space covered, the great defensive works, and the whole system of blockade, as well as in other respects. For whenever one army has attempted to blockade another, it is when they have attacked a discomfited and weakened foe, overcome in battle or demoralized by some reverse, and have thus hemmed them in, being themselves superior in number of horse and foot; while the motive of the blockade has usually been to prevent the foe from getting supplies. But on this occasion Caesar with an inferior number of men was hemming in fresh and uninjured forces, the enemy having an abundant supply of all necessaries. For every day a large number of ships was gathering from every quarter to bring up stores, nor could any wind blow without their having a favourable course from some direction. But Caesar himself was in extreme straits, all the corn far and wide having been used up. Nevertheless the men bore these hardships with exemplary patience. For they bore in mind that they had endured these same hardships the year before in Spain and by their toil and patience had concluded a very serious war. They remembered that at Alesia they had endured great privation, still greater at Avaricum, and had come off victors over very important nations. When barley was offered them they did not refuse it, or vegetables; whereas meat, of which there was a very large supply from Epirus, they held in high favour. v Some of the men who had been unemployed found also a kind of root called “chara,” which, when mixed with milk, greatly assuaged their need.
47. Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castellorum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto obsidionis genere, tum etiam reliquis rebus. Nam quicumque alterum obsidere conati sunt, perculsos atque infirmos hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut aliqua offensione permotos continuerunt, cum ipsi numero equitum militumque praestaret; causa autem obsidionis haec fere esse consuevit, ut frumento hostes prohiberent. At tum integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum numero continebat, cum illi omnium rerum copia abundarent; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat, quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent. Ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe lateque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. Sed tamen haec singulari patientia milites ferebant. Recordabantur enim eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpessos labore et patientia maximum bellum confecisse, meminerant ad Alesiam magnam se inopiam perpessos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum gentium victores discessisse. Non illi hordeum eum daretur, non legumina recusabant; pecus vero cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.
48. They made this up into something resembling bread, and there was a large supply of it. When the Pompeians in conversation taunted our men with hunger they used to throw at them loaves made of this, to reduce their expectations.
48. Est autem genus radicis inventum ab eis, qui fuerant vacui ab operibus, quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. Id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant. Eius erat magna copia. Ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant, ut spem eorum minuerent.
49. Now the corn was already beginning to ripen, and the mere hope served to lighten the pinch, because they were confident that they would soon have abundance; and remarks were frequently heard from the men in their talks while on sentry duty that they would feed on bark from the trees before they would let Pompeius slip from their hands. Moreover, they were glad to learn from deserters that though the cavalry horses of the enemy were being kept alive, the rest of their animals had perished, and that the men themselves were experiencing bad health, both by reason of the cramped space and the foul stench from the multitude of corpses and their daily toils, as they were unaccustomed to work, and were, also troubled by an extreme scarcity of water. For all the streams and all the rivulets which ran to the sea Caesar had either diverted or blocked by great works; and as the district was hilly and rugged he had dammed the narrow defiles by sinking piles into the ground and heaping up the earth, so as to keep in the water. So the foe were necessarily compelled to keep to the low and marshy ground and to dig wells, and this labour was an addition to their daily work. These springs, however, were at a considerable distance from some of the forts and quickly dried up in the hot weather. On the other hand, Caesar’s army enjoyed excellent health and an abundant supply of water, and abounded with every kind of provision except grain, and for this they saw a better season daily approaching and a greater hope set before them through the ripening of the corn.
49. Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant, atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat, quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant; crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur, prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. Libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari, reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona, eum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia affectos. Omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et aspera, angustias vallium sublicis in terram demissis praesaepserat terramque aggesserat, ut aquam contineret. Itaque illi necessario loca sequi demissa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogebantur atque hunc laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant; qui tamen fontes a quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus exarescebant. At Caesaris exercitus optima valetudine summaque aquae copia utebatur, tum commeatus omni genere praeter frumentum abundabat; quibus cotidie melius succedere tempus maioremque spem maturitate frumentorum proponi videbant.
50. In a novel kind of warfare novel methods of waging it were invented by each side. When the enemy had observed from the fires that our cohorts were lying out at night by the earthworks, silently advancing in a body they used to discharge arrows within the crowded mass and then hastily retire to their comrades. Our men, taught by experience, discovered the following remedies for these emergencies, to light fires in one place … Meanwhile P.
50. In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi rationes reperiebantur. Illi, cum animadvertissent ex ignibus noctu cohortes nostras ad munitiones excubare, silentio aggressi universi intra multitudinem sagittas coniciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. Quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiebant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent...
51. Sulla, whom Caesar at his departure had put in charge of his camp, being informed of this came to the support of the cohort with two legions; and by his arrival the Pompeians were easily repulsed. In fact, they could not endure the sight or the onset of our men, and when the first of them had been overthrown the rest turned to flight and abandoned the position. But when our men followed, Sulla recalled them lest they should go too far in pursuit. Many people, however, think that if he had chosen to pursue more vigorously the war might have been finished that day. But his policy does not seem deserving of censure. For the duties of a legate and of a commander are different: the one ought to do everything under direction, the other should take measures freely in the general interest. Sulla, having been left by Caesar in charge of the camp, was contented with the liberation of his men, and did not choose to fight a pitched battle, a course which in any case admitted possibly of some reverse, in order that he might not be thought to have taken on himself the duties of a commander. As to the Pompeians, their situation caused them great difficulty in retreating; for, having advanced from unfavourable ground, they had halted on the top: if they were to withdraw by the slope they feared the pursuit of our men from the higher ground, nor was there much time left before sunset, since in the hope of finishing the business they had prolonged the action almost till nightfall. So Pompeius, of necessity and adapting his plans to the emergency, occupied a certain hill which was so far removed from our fort that a missile discharged from a catapult could not reach it. In this place he sat down and entrenched it, and kept all his forces confined there.
51. Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens castris praefecerat Caesar, auxilio cohorti venit cum legionibus duabus; cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani. Neque vero conspectum aut impetum nostrorum tulerunt, primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cesserunt. Sed insequentes nostros, ne longius prosequerentur; Sulla revocavit. At plerique existimant, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finire. Cuius consilium reprehendendum non videtur. Aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. Sulla a Caesare in castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit, quae res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum, ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem afferebat. Nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant; si per declive sese reciperent, nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur; neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat; spe enim conficiendi negotii prope in noctem rem duxerant. Ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumulum quendam occupavit, qui tantum aberat a nostro castello, ut telum tormento missum adigi non posset. Hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.
52. At the same time there was fighting in two other places besides, for Pompeius had made attempts on several redoubts with the object of keeping our force equally scattered, so that succour might not be brought from the nearest garrisons. In one place Volcatius Tullus sustained with three cohorts the attack of a legion and drove it from its position; in the other the Germans went out of our lines, and after killing a number of men retired in safety to their comrades.
52. Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est: nam plura castella Pompeius pariter distinendae manus causa temptaverat, ne ex proximis praesidiis succurri posset. Uno loco Volcatius Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit; altero Germani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.
53. Thus six battles having taken place in one day, three at Dyrrachium and three at the outworks, when account was taken of them all we found that about two thousand in number of the Pompeians had fallen, and very many reservists and centurions— among them was Valerius Flaccus, son of the Lucius who had governed Asia as praetor—and that six military standards had been brought in. Of our men not more than twenty were lost in all the battles. But in the redoubt there was not a single one of the men who was not wounded, and four centurions out of one cohort lost their eyes. Wishing to produce a proof of their labour and peril, they counted out to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been discharged at the redoubt, and when the shield of the centurion Scaeva was brought to him one hundred and twenty holes were found in it. For his services to himself and to the republic Caesar, having presented him with two hundred thousand sesterces and eulogized him, announced that he transferred him from the eighth cohort to the post of first centurion of the first cohort, for it was certain that the redoubt had been to a great extent preserved by his aid, and he afterwards presented the cohort in amplest measure with double pay, grain, clothing, bounties, and military gifts.
53. Ita uno die vi proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones, eum horum omnium ratio haberetur, ad duorum milium numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiebamus, evocatos centurionesque complures (in eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus, L. filius, eius, qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat); signaque sunt militaria sex relata. Nostri non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum, quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium afferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CXX. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritus et de re publica, donatum milibus CC collaudatumque ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit (eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat) cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit.
54. Pompeius, having added strong defences by night, erected towers on the following days, and having carried his works to a height of fifteen feet, protected that part of his camp with mantlets; and after a lapse of five days, chancing on a second dark night, he blocked all the gates of the camp, setting obstacles to hinder the foe, and at the beginning of the third watch led his army out in silence and betook himself to his old entrenchments.
54. Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres exstruxit, et in altitudinem pedum XV effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit, et quinque intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et ad impediendum obicibus obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in antiquas munitiones recepit.
55. On every day in succession Caesar led out his army to level ground in battle array so as to bring his legions almost close up to the camp of Pompeius, in case he should choose to fight a pitched battle; and his front rank was only so far from the rampart that a weapon could not be cast at it from a catapult. Pompeius, however, in order to maintain his credit and reputation, arranged his army in front of his camp, but in such a way that his third line rested on the rampart, while the whole army when drawn up could be protected by javelins thrown from the rampart.
55. Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret; tantumque a vallo eius prima acies aberat, uti ne telum tormento adigi posset. Pompeius autem, ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret, sic pro castris exercitum constituebat, ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo coniectis protegi posset.
56. Aetolia, Acarnania, and the Amphilochi having been recovered through Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have shown, Caesar thought that he ought to make an attempt on Achaea and advance a little further. And so he sent Q. Calenus thither, associating with him Sabinus and Cassius with some cohorts. On their arrival becoming known, Rutilius Lupus, who, on commission from Pompeius, was in charge of Achaea, determined to block approach to the Isthmus so as to prevent Fufius from entering Achaea. Calenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus with the goodwill of the communities themselves, and took some towns by storm. The rest of the communities he endeavoured to win over to friendship with Caesar by sending round embassies. Such were mainly the occupations in which Fufius was engaged.
56. Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphilochis per Cassium Longinum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, receptis temptandam sibi Achaiam ac paulo longius progrediendum existimabat Caesar. Itaque eo Calenum misit eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. Quorum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaiam missus a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit, ut Achaia Fufium prohiberet. Calenus Delphos, Thebas, Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatium recepit, nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit, reliquas civitates circummissis legationibus amicitia Caesari conciliare studebat. In his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.
57. While this was going on in Achaea and at Dyrrachium, and when it was known that Scipio had come into Macedonia, Caesar, mindful of his long-established custom, sends to him their common friend A. Clodius, who had been originally brought to his notice by an introduction from Scipio and whom he had been in the habit of regarding as one of his intimates. To him he gives a letter and instructions to carry to Scipio, of which this was the purport: that, having made every effort on behalf of peace, he thought that the fact that nothing had been done was the fault of those whom he had wished to be the prime movers in the matter, because they feared to carry his instructions to Pompeius at an inopportune time. Scipio was a man of such authority that he could not only express with freedom what his judgment approved, but could also to a large extent compel and control one who was going astray; moreover he commanded an army in his own name, so that in addition to authority he also possessed strength to coerce. If he should do this everyone would put down to his sole credit the tranquillity of Italy, the peace of the provinces, the safety of the empire. Clodius carries these instructions to him, and though on the first few days he apparently met with a ready hearing, on subsequent days he is not admitted to a conference, because Scipio had been censured by Favonius, as we found out afterwards when the war was over; and so he returned to Caesar without having effected anything.
57. Haec cum in Achaia atque apud Dyrrachium gererentur, Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret, non oblitus pristini instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat. Huic dat litteras mandataque ad cum; quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc effecisse: hoc arbitrari vitio factum eorum, quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere quae probasset exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellere atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet. Quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relaturos. Haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditus reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur, castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiebamus, infectaque re sese ad Caesarem recepit.
58. To keep the Pompeian cavalry more easily in check at Dyrrachium and to prevent them from foraging, Caesar fortified with large works the two approaches, which, as we have shown, were narrow, and planted forts at these spots. When Pompeius found out that no advantage was gained by the cavalry, after a few days’ interval he fetches them back again by sea to his own quarters within the entrenchments. There was a great scarcity of provisions, so much so that they fed their horses on leaves stripped from the trees and on the soft powdered roots of reeds, for they had used up the crops that had been sown within the entrenchments. They were gradually forced to bring up fodder from Corcyra and Acarnania, with a long sea passage intervening, and as the supply of this was deficient, to supplement it with barley and by these devices to keep their horses alive. But when not only the barley and other fodder and the herbs that had been everywhere cut down began to fail, but even the foliage from the trees, the horses being rendered useless by emaciation, Pompeius thought that he ought to attempt something in the way of a sortie.
58. Caesar, quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet, aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operibus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. Pompeius, ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit, paucis intermissis diebus rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recipit. Erat summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent (frumenta enim, quae fuerant intra munitiones sata, consumpserat); cogebantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare, quodque erat eius rei minor copia, hordeo adaugere atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare. Sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae, sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.
59. There were with Caesar, among his horsemen, two Allobrogian brothers, Raucillus and Egus, sons of Adbucillus, who had held the chieftainship in the state for many years, men of singular valour, whose very able and valiant co-operation Caesar had enjoyed in all his Gallic wars. He had bestowed on them for these reasons offices of great dignity in their own homes, had arranged that they should be chosen on the senate out of due course, had assigned to them lands in Gaul taken from the enemy and large prizes of money, and had raised them from poverty to wealth. These men, on account of their worth, were not only held in honour by Caesar, but were also regarded with affection in the army; but, relying on Caesar’s friendship and puffed up with stupid and barbarous arrogance, they began to despise their countrymen and fraudulently to appropriate the pay of the cavalry and to divert the whole of the plunder to their own homes. Deeply stirred by this conduct, the men approached Caesar in a body and openly complained of their wrong-doings, and added to their other complaints that they were in the habit of sending in a false return of the number of the cavalry in order that they might appropriate their pay.
59. Erant apud Caesarem in equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Raucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii, qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimique erat usus. His domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. Hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant, sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur; sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertebant. Quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt falsum ab his equitum numerum deferri, quorum stipendium averterent.
60. Caesar, thinking that this was not the time for punishment and overlooking much in consideration of their valour, postponed the whole matter, but privately he took the offenders to task for having made profit out of the cavalry and urged them to expect everything from his friendship, and to judge from his past good offices what they had still to hope for. The occurrence, however, brought on them great obloquy and contempt in the sight of all, and they understood that this was so not merely from the reproaches of others but also from the judgment of their intimates and from their own conscience. Influenced by this sense of shame and thinking, perhaps, that they were being reserved for punishment on a future occasion rather than let off free, they determined to quit us and hazard a new fortune and make trial of new friendships. And having conferred with a few of their clients, to whom they ventured to submit such an enterprise, they first attempted to kill G. Volusenus, the prefect of horse, as was ascertained afterwards when the war was over, that they might be seen to have deserted to Pompeius with some service to show. But when this seemed rather difficult and no opportunity of carrying it out was afforded, they borrowed as large sums as possible, just as if it was their intention to satisfy their comrades and restore their defalcations, and having bought up a number of horses, they crossed over to Pompeius with those whom they had made the participators of their plans.
60. Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit; illos secreto castigavit, quod quaestui equites haberent, monuitque, ut ex sua amicitia omnia exspectaret et ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua sperarent. Magnam tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnes attulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectationibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant. Quo pudore adducti et fortasse non se liberari, sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati discedere a nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerunt. Et cum paucis collocuti clientibus suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, primum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum interficere, ut postea bello confecto cognitum est, ut cum munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompeium viderentur; postquam id difficilius visum est neque facultas perficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati, proinde ac si suis satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt cum eis, quos sui consilii participes habebant.
61. And as they were born in a respectable position and were bountifully supplied, and had come with a great retinue and many animals, and were regarded as brave men and had been held in honour by Caesar, and as the occurrence was novel and out of the ordinary course, he conducted them round all his garrisons for purposes of display. For before that time no one, either of foot or horse, had changed sides from Caesar to Pompeius, though men were deserting almost every day from Pompeius to Caesar, and the troops levied in Epirus and Aetolia and from all the regions which were in Caesar’s occupation were going over as a rule in mass. But these men having an acquaintance with everything, whether there was any lack of completeness in the lines of investment, or whether anything was thought lacking by men of considerable experience in warfare, and after observation of the times of occurrences and the distance between localities, and the varying watchfulness at the outposts, according to the diversities of natural temperament or zeal on the part of the several officers in charge of affairs—all these things they reported to Pompeius.
61. Quos Pompeius, quod erant honesto loco nati et instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Caesarem fuerant, quodque novum et praeter consuetudinem acciderat, omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque ostentavit. Nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regionum omnium, quae a Caesare tenebantur. Sed hi cognitis omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat, seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum, custodiarum varia diligentia animadversa, prout cuiusque eorum, qui negotiis praeerant, aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerunt.
62. Having ascertained these facts and having already planned a sortie, as we have shown, he orders his men to make protective coverings of osier for their helmets and to collect material for earthworks. When these were provided he embarks by night a large number of light-armed men and archers with all the material on board row-boats and merchant-vessels, and about midnight he leads sixty cohorts drawn from his largest camp and outposts to that part of the entrenchments which extended to the sea and was the furthest removed from Caesar’s largest camp. To the same place he sends his ships, which, as we explained, had on board the material and the light-armed troops, and the warships which he had at Dyrrachium, and issues orders stating what he wishes each man to do. At these entrenchments Caesar had his quaestor Lentulus Marcellinus posted with the Ninth Legion, and as he was in unsatisfactory health, he had sent up Fulvius Postumus to assist him.
62. Quibus ille' cognitis rebus eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. His paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit, quae pertinebant ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberant. Eodem naves, quas demonstravimus, aggere et levis armaturae militibus completis, quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat, mittit et, quid a quoque fieri velit, praecipit. Ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem eum legione vim positum habebat. Huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem submiserat.
63. There was in that place a ditch fifteen feet wide and a rampart ten feet high facing the enemy, and the earthwork of this rampart was also ten feet in breadth. And at an interval of six hundred feet from this there was a second stockade facing in the other direction, with a rampart of rather lower elevation. For on the preceding days Caesar, fearing lest our men should be hemmed in by the fleet, had constructed a double stockade in this spot, so that in case of an attack on both sides it might be possible to hold out. But the magnitude of the works and the continuous toil of every day, since he had taken in entrenchments of seventeen miles circuit, did not allow opportunity of completion. And so he had not yet completed the cross stockade facing the sea to join these two lines. This fact was known to Pompeius, who had been informed of it by the Allobrogian deserters, and it had caused our men great inconvenience. For two cohorts of the Ninth Legion being on sentry duty by the sea, the Pompeians suddenly approached at early dawn; at the same time soldiers conveyed round on shipboard began to hurl javelins at the outer stockade, the ditches were being filled up with earth, the Pompeian legionaries, having brought up ladders, were terrifying the defenders of the inner line with engines of every kind and missiles, and a great multitude of archers were being thrown around them on every side. But the osier coverings placed on their helmets protected them to a great extent from the blows of stones, which were the only weapon our men had. And so when our men were being hard pressed in every way and with difficulty holding their ground, the defect, mentioned above, of the line of entrenchment became observable, and between the two stockades, where the work was not yet finished, the Pompeians, disembarking, took our men in the rear on both sides and, dislodging them from each line, compelled them to take to flight.
63. Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat: ab eo intermisso spatio pedum DC alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humiliore paulo munitione. Hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, duplicem eo loco fecerat vallum, ut, si ancipiti proelio dimicaretur, posset resisti. Sed operum magnitudo et continens omnium dierum labor, quod milium passuum in circuitu XVII munitiones erat complexus, perficiendi spatium non dabat. Itaque contra mare transversum vallum, qui has duas munitiones coniungeret, nondum perfecerat. Quae res nota erat Pompeio delata per Allobrogas perfugas, magnumque nostris attulerat incommodum. Nam ut ad mare duo cohortes nonae legionis excubuerant, accessere subito prima luce Pompeiani; simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorem vallum tela iaciebant, fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legionarii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormentis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant, magnaque multitudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur. Multum autem ab ictu lapidum, quod unum nostris erat telum, viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant. Itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque aegre resisterent animadversum est vitium munitionis, quod supra demonstratum est, atque inter duos vallos, qua perfectum opus non erat, Pompeiani navibus expositi in aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque munitione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt.
64. On the announcement of this sudden attack Marcellinus sends up some cohorts from the camp to the support of our suffering troops. And these, seeing them fleeing, could not strengthen them by their coming and themselves failed to sustain the onset of the enemy. And so every additional reinforcement that was sent up was demoralized by the fright of the fugitives and increased the terror and the peril; for retreat was hindered by the multitude of men. An eagle-bearer who had been seriously wounded in this battle and whose strength was now failing, seeing our horsemen, exclaimed: “This eagle in my life I defended with great care for many years, and now, dying, I restore it to Caesar with the same loyalty. Do not, I beseech, suffer a military disgrace to take place, which has never happened before in Caesar’s army, and convey it to him in safety.” By this chance the eagle was preserved, though all the centurions of the first cohort were slain except the senior centurion of the second maniple.
64. Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes subsidio nostris laborantibus submittit ex castris; quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. Itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidii, id corruptum timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat; hominum enim multitudine receptus impediebatur. In eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset affectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur, conspicatus equites nostros, “hanc ego,” inquit, “et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. Nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferte.” Hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.
65. Already the Pompeians, after great slaughter of our men, were approaching the camp of Marcellinus, causing no slight terror in the rest of the cohorts, when M. Antonius, who held the nearest position among the outposts, after receiving the news was seen coming down with twelve cohorts from the higher ground. His arrival checked the Pompeians and encouraged our men, so that they recovered themselves from their extreme fear. And not long after Caesar, signalling by smoke from one redoubt to another, according to his previous custom, brought down some cohorts from the garrisons and came to the same place. And having learnt of the loss sustained, on observing that Pompeius had gone out of his lines and was entrenching a camp near the sea so as to be able to get fodder freely and to have none the less a way of approach for his ships, he changed his tactics, since he had failed to gain his purpose, and ordered his men to entrench a camp close to Pompeius.
65. Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabat non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius, qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata cum cohortibus XII descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. Cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex maximo timore colligeret. Neque multo post Caesar significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo, deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex praesidiis eodem venit. Qui cognito detrimento cum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum, castra secundum mare munire, ut libere pabulari posset nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli, quoniam propositum non tenuerat, castra iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.
66. When this entrenchment was finished it was noticed by Caesar’s scouts that certain cohorts, enough to seem equivalent to a legion, were behind the wood and were being led to the old camp. The position of the camp was this: on the preceding days Caesar’s Ninth Legion, after it had confronted the Pompeian forces and was investing them (as we have shown) with earthworks, encamped in that spot. This camp bordered on a wood and was not more than three hundred paces from the sea. Afterwards changing his plans for certain reasons, Caesar transferred his camp a little beyond that spot, and after a few days’ interval Pompeius had occupied the same camp, and as he was likely to have several legions in that place he had abandoned the inner rampart and had added a larger entrenchment. So the smaller camp included in a larger one took the place of a redoubt and citadel. Also from the left corner of his camp he had drawn a line of entrenchments to the river, about four hundred paces long, in order that his men might get water with more freedom from risk. But he, too, changing his plan for certain reasons which it is not necessary to mention, had quitted that place. So for many days the camp had remained empty; as for the earthworks, they were all intact.
66. Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est a speculatoribus Caesaris, cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci. Castrorum sic situs erat. Superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio, cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco posuit. Haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius a mari passibus CCC aberant. Post mutato consilio quibusdam de causis Caesar paulo ultra eum locum castra transtulit, paucisque intermissis diebus eadem Pompeius occupaverat et, quod eo loco plures erat legiones habiturus, relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. Ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque arcis locum obtinebant. Item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus CCCC, quo liberius a periculo milites aquarentur. Sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. Ita complures dies inania manserant castra; munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.
67. The scouts reported to Caesar that the standards of the legion had been borne thither. They assured him that the same thing had been seen from some of the higher redoubts. This place was about five hundred paces from the new camp of Pompeius. Caesar, hoping to be able to crush this legion and anxious to repair the loss of that day, left two cohorts at the work to give an appearance of fortifying. Himself taking a divergent route in the utmost secrecy, he led out in double line towards Pompeius’ legion and the smaller camp the remaining cohorts, numbering thirty-three, among which was the Ninth Legion, which had suffered the loss of many centurions and a diminution of the rank and file. Nor did his original idea fail him. For he arrived before Pompeius could be aware of it, and though the defences of the camp were large, yet by attacking quickly with the left wing, where he himself was, he drove the Pompeians from the rampart. Beams studded with spikes barred the gates. Here there was fighting for a while, our men attempting to break in, the others defending their camp, Titus Pulio, by whose aid we have said that the army of G. Antonius was betrayed, leading the fighting with the utmost bravery at that spot. Nevertheless our men won by their endurance, and cutting down the beams burst first into the larger camp, then also into the fort which was included within the larger camp, whither the legion when routed had retired for shelter. There they slew a few men who continued the struggle.
67. Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiarunt. Hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. Is locus aberat a novis Pompei castris circiter passus quingentos. Hanc legionem sperans Caesar se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diei detrimentum sarcire, reliquit in opere cohortes duas, quae speciem munitionis praeberet; ipse diverso itinere quam potuit occultissime reliquas cohortes, numero XXXIII, in quibus erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque militum numero, ad legionem Pompei castraque minora duplici acie eduxit. Neque eum prima opinio fefellit. Nam et pervenit prius, quam Pompeius sentire posset, et tametsi erant munitiones castrorum magnae, tamen sinistro cornu, ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo deturbavit. Erat I obiectus portis ericius. Hic paulisper est pugnatum, cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra defenderet, fortissime Tito Pulione, cuius opera proditum exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, eo loco propugnante. Sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt excisoque ericio primo in maiora castra, post etiam in castellum, quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruperunt, quo pulsa legio sese receperat, et nonnullos ibi repugnantes interfecerunt.
68. But fortune, which has great influence in affairs generally and especially in war, produces by a slight disturbance of balance important changes in human affairs; and so it happened then. The cohorts of Caesar’s right wing in their ignorance of the locality followed up the entrenchment which, as we have explained above, extended from the camp to the river, looking for the gate, and supposing that these lines were a part of the camp. And when they observed that they only served to connect the camp with the river they threw down the defences, no one opposing them, and crossed over, and our whole cavalry followed the cohorts.
68. Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. Munitionem, quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus, dextri Caesaris cornui cohortes ignorantia loci sunt secutae, cum portam quaererent castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. Quod cum esset animadversum coniunctam esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.
69. Meanwhile, a fairly long interval of time had elapsed, and the news having reached Pompeius, he withdrew five legions from their work and led them to the relief of his men; and at the same time his cavalry approached our horsemen, and his serried ranks came into the view of our men who had occupied the camp. At once everything was changed. The Pompeian legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy succour, attempted resistance by the decuman gate, and taking the aggressive began to attack our men. Caesar’s cavalry, fearing for its retreat, as it was mounting by a narrow track over the earthworks, began to flee. The right wing, cut off from the left, observing the panic among the cavalry, to avoid being overwhelmed within the defences began to withdraw by the part of the rampart which it had levelled; and many of these men, fearing that they might get involved in the cramped space, flung themselves from the ten-foot rampart into the fosses, and when the first were crushed the rest tried to attain safety and a way of escape over their bodies. On the left wing the soldiers, seeing from the rampart the approach of Pompeius and the flight of their own men, fearing that they might be cut off in the narrow space, as they had the enemy both inside and outside the camp, took counsel for themselves, retreating by the way by which they had come; and every place was full of disorder, panic, and flight, so much so that when Caesar grasped the standards of the fugitives and bade them halt, some without slackening speed fled at full gallop, others in their fear even let go their colours, nor did a single one of them halt.
69. Interim Pompeius hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata V legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit, eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat, et acies instructa a nostris, qui castra occupaverunt, cernebatur, omniaque sunt subito mutata. Legio Pompeiana celeris spe subsidii confirmata ab decumana porta resistere conabatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. Equitatus Caesaris, quod angusto itinere per aggeres ascendebat, receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat: Dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur, ea parte, quam proruerat, sese recipiebat, ac plerique ex his, ne in angustias inciderent, ex X pedum munitione se in fossas praecipitabant, primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. Sinistro cornu milites, cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti, ne angustiis intercluderentur, cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem, quo venerant, recepto sibi consulebant, omniaque erant tumultus, timoris, fugae plena, adeo ut, cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet, alii admissis equis eodem cursu confugerent, alii metu etiam signa dimitterem, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.
70. The only relief that came to mitigate these great disasters, preventing the destruction of the whole army, was the fact that Pompeius, fearing, I suppose, an ambuscade, since these events had happened contrary to his expectation, for a little while before he had seen his men fleeing from the camp, did not venture for a long time to approach the lines, and his horsemen were hindered in their pursuit by the narrowness of the passages, especially as they were occupied by Caesar’s troops. So have small events often turned the scale of fortune for good or evil. For the lines which were drawn from the camp to the river interrupted the victory of Caesar, which when once Pompeius’ camp had been stormed was all but assured, and the same circumstance by checking the speed of the pursuers brought safety to our men.
70. His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant, quo minus omnis deleretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens, credo, quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius, qui paulo ante ex castris fugientes suos conspexerat, munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat, equitesque eius angustis spatiis atque his ab Caesaris militibus occupatis ad insequendum tardabantur. Ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. Munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt, eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.