7. From an unseasonable regard to divination, we omit many duties; for what can the diviner contemplate besides death, danger, sickness, and such matters? When it is necessary, then, to expose one’s self to danger for a friend, or even a duty to die for him, what occasion have I for divination? Have not I a diviner within, who has told me the essence of good and evil, and who explains to me the indications of both? What further need, then, have I of signs or auguries? Can I tolerate the other diviner, when he says, “This is for your interest”? For does he know what is for my interest? Does he know what good is? Has he learned the indications of good and evil, as he has those of the victims? If so, he knows the indications likewise of fair and base, just and unjust. You may predict to me, sir, what is to befall me,—life or death, riches or poverty. But whether these things are for my interest or not, I shall not inquire of you. “Why?” Because you cannot even give an opinion about points of grammar; and do you give it here, in things about which all men differ and dispute? Therefore the lady who was going to send a month’s provision to Gratilla, in *her banishment, made a right answer to one who told her that Domitian would seize it. “I had rather,” said she, “that he should seize it, than I not send it.” What, then, is it that leads us so often to divination? Cowardice; the dread of events. Hence we flatter the diviners. “Pray, sir, shall I inherit my father’s estate?” “Let us see; let us sacrifice upon the occasion.” “Nay, sir, just as fortune pleases.” Then if he predicts that we shall inherit it, we give him thanks, as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence of this is, that they impose upon us. What, then, is to be done? We should come without previous desire or aversion; as a traveller inquires the road of the person he meets, without any desire for that which turns to the right hand, more than for that to the left; for he wishes for neither of these, but only for that road which leads him properly. Thus we should come to God as to a guide,—just as we make use of our eyes; not persuading them to show us one object rather than another, but receiving such as they present to us. But now we conduct the augury with fear and trembling, and in our invocations to God, entreat him: “Lord, have mercy upon me, suffer me to come off safe.” Foolish man! would you have anything then but what is best? And what is best but what pleases God? Why would you then, so far as in you lies, corrupt your judge and seduce your adviser?
7. διὰ τὸ ἀκαίρως μαντεύεσθαι πολλοὶ καθήκοντα πολλὰ παραλείπομεν. τί γὰρ ὁ μάντις δύναται πλέον ἰδεῖν θανάτου ἢ κινδύνου ἢ νόσου ἢ ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων; ἂν οὖν δέῃ κινδυνεῦσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καθήκῃ, ποῦ μοι καιρὸς ἔτι μαντεύεσθαι; οὐκ ἔχω τὸν μάντιν ἔσω τὸν εἰρηκότα μοι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸν ἐξηγημένον τὰ σημεῖα ἀμφοτέρων; τί οὖν ἔτι χρείαν ἔχω τῶν σπλάγχνων ἢ τῶν οἰωνῶν; ἀλλʼ ἀνέχομαι λέγοντος ἐκείνου συμφέρει σοι; τί γάρ ἐστι συμφέρον οἶδεν; τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν οἶδεν; μεμάθηκεν ὥσπερ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν σπλάγχνων οὕτως σημεῖα τίνα ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; εἰ γὰρ τούτων οἶδεν σημεῖα, καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οἶδεν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων. ἄνθρωπε, σύ μοι λέγε τί σημαίνεται, ζωὴ ἢ θάνατος, πενία ἢ πλοῦτος· πότερον δὲ συμφέρει ταῦτα ἢ ἀσύμφορά ἐστιν, σοῦ μέλλω πυνθάνεσθαι; διὰ τί ἐν γραμματικοῖς οὐ λέγεις; ἐνθάδʼ οὖν, ὅπου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλανώμεθα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχόμεθα; διὰ τοῦτο ἡ γυνὴ καλῶς εἶπεν ἡ πέμψαι θέλουσα τῇ Γρατίλλῃ ἐξωρισμένῃ τὸ πλοῖον τῶν ἐπιμηνίων κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται αὐτὰ Δομιτιανὸς μᾶλλον θέλω, φησίν, ἵνʼ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ ἀφέληται ἢ ἵνʼ ἐγὼ μὴ πέμψω. τί οὖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ οὕτω συνεχῶς μαντεύεσθαι ἄγει; ἡ δειλία, τὸ φοβεῖσθαι τὰς ἐκβάσεις. διὰ τοῦτο κολακεύομεν τοὺς μάντεις· κληρονομήσω, κύριε, τὸν πατέρα; ἴδωμεν· ἐπεκθυσώμεθα. ναί, κύριε, ὡς ἡ τύχη θέλει. εἶτʼ ἂν εἴπῃ κληρονομήσεις, ὡς παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὴν κληρονομίαν εἰληφότες εὐχαριστοῦμεν αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο κἀκεῖνοι λοιπὸν ἐμπαίζουσιν ἡμῖν. τί οὖν; δεῖ δίχα ὀρέξεως ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ὡς ὁ ὁδοιπόρος πυνθάνεται παρὰ τοῦ ἀπαντήσαντος, ποτέρα[ν] τῶν ὁδῶν φέρει, οὐκ ἔχων ὄρεξιν πρὸς τὸ τὴν δεξιὰν μᾶλλον φέρειν ἢ τὴν ἀριστεράν· οὐ γὰρ τούτων τινὰ ἀπελθεῖν θέλει, ἀλλὰ τὴν φέρουσαν. οὕτως ἔδει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔρχεσθαι ὡς ὁδηγόν, ὡς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμεθα, οὐ παρακαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἵνα τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν δεικνύωσιν, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἐνδείκνυνται τούτων τὰς φαντασίας δεχόμενοι. νῦν δὲ τρέμοντες τὸ ὀρνιθάριον κρατοῦμεν καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ· κύριε, ἐλέησον· ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν. ἀνδράποδον, ἄλλο γάρ τι θέλεις ἢ τὸ ἄμεινον; ἄλλο οὖν τι ἄμεινον ἢ τὸ τῷ θεῷ δοκοῦν; τί τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ διαφθείρεις τὸν κριτήν, παράγεις τὸν σύμβουλον;
8. God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What then is the essence of God,—flesh? By no means. An estate? Fame? By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of good. For do you seek that quality in a plant? No. Or in a brute? No. If, then, you seek it only in a rational subject, why do you seek it anywhere but in what distinguishes that from things irrational? Plants make no voluntary use of things, and therefore you do not apply the term of good to them. Good, then, implies such use. And nothing else? If so, you may say that good and-happiness and unhappiness belong to mere animals. But this you do not say, and you are right; for, how much soever they have the use of things, they have not the intelligent use, and with good reason; for they are made to be subservient to others, and not of primary importance. Why was an ass made? Was it as being of primary importance? No; but because we had need of a back able to carry burdens. We had need too that he should be capable of locomotion; therefore he had the voluntary use of things added, otherwise he could not have moved. But here his endowments end; for, if an understanding of that use had been likewise added, he would not, in reason, have been subject to us, nor have done us these services, but would have been like and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the essence of good in that without which you cannot say that there is good in anything? What then? Are not all these likewise the works of the gods? They are; but not primary existences, nor parts of the gods. But you are a primary existence. You are a distinct portion of the essence of God, and contain a certain part of him in yourself. Why then are you ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you consider whence you came? Why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat, and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women, when you are conversing, when you are exercising, when you are disputing, do not you know that it is the Divine you feed, the Divine you exercise? You carry a God about with you, poor wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you of gold or silver? It is within yourself that you carry him; and you do not observe that you profane him by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If the mere external image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do; and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus,—insensible of your own nature, and at enmity with God? Why, then, are we afraid, when we send a young man from the school into active life, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with women; that he should either debase himself by slovenliness, or clothe himself too finely? Knows he not the God within him? Knows he not in what company he goes? It is provoking to hear him say [to his instructor], “wish to have you with me.” Have you not God? Do you seek any other, while you have him? Or will He tell you any other things than these? If you were a statue of Phidias. as Zeus or Athena, you would remember both yourself and the artist; and if you had any sense, you would endeavor to be in no way unworthy of him who formed you, nor of yourself; nor to appear in an unbecoming manner to spectators. And are you now careless how you appear when you are the workmanship of Zeus himself? And yet, what comparison is there, either between the artists, or the things they have formed? What work of any artist has conveyed into its structure those very faculties which are shown in shaping it? Is it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, or ivory? And the Athena of Phidias, when its hand is once extended, and a Victory placed in it, remains in that attitude forever. But the works of God are endowed with motion, breath, the powers of use and judgment. Being, then, the work of such an artist, will you dishonor him, especially when he hath not only formed you, but given your guardianship to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonor the trust? If God had committed some orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He has delivered yourself to your care; and says, “had no one fitter to be trusted than you; preserve this person for me, such as he is by nature,—modest, faithful, noble, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil.” And will you not preserve him? But it will be said: “What need of this lofty look, and dignity of face?” I answer, that I have not yet so much dignity as the case demands; for I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and accepted. I still fear my own weakness. Let me but take courage a little, and then you shall see such a look, and such an appearance, as I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious countenance? Heaven forbid! For Olympian Zeus doth not haughtily lift his brow, but keeps a steady countenance, as becomes him who is about to say,—My promise is irrevocable, sure. Such will I show myself to you; faithful, modest, noble, tranquil. “What, and immortal too, and exempt from age and sickness?” No. But sickening and dying as becomes the divine within me. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do it. Shall I show you the muscular training of a philosopher? “What muscles are those?” A will undisappointed, evils avoided, powers duly exerted, careful resolutions, unerring decisions. These you shall see.
8. ὁ θεὸς ὠφέλιμος· ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον. εἰκὸς οὖν, ὅπου ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀγρός; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη; μὴ γένοιτο. νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπεί τοι μή τι αὐτὴν ἐν φυτῷ ζητεῖς; οὔ. μή τι ἐν ἀλόγῳ; οὔ. ἐν λογικῷ οὖν ζητῶν τί ἔτι ἀλλαχοῦ ζητεῖς ἢ ἐν τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα; τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν· διὰ τοῦτο οὐ λέγεις ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖται οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν χρήσεως φαντασιῶν. ἆρά γε μόνης; εἰ γὰρ μόνης, λέγε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν. νῦν δʼ οὐ λέγεις καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ παρακολούθησίν γε τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰκότως. ὑπηρετικὰ γὰρ γέγονεν ἄλλοις, οὐκ αὐτὰ προηγούμενα. ὁ ὄνος ἐπεὶ γέγονεν μή τι προηγουμένως; οὔ· ἀλλʼ ὅτι νώτου χρείαν. εἴχομεν βαστάζειν τι δυναμένου. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία καὶ περιπατοῦντος αὐτοῦ χρείαν εἴχομεν· διὰ τοῦτο προσείληφε καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι φαντασίαις· ἄλλως γὰρ περιπατεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο. καὶ λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ που πέπαυται. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτός που προσειλήφει παρακολούθησιν τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ λόγον οὐκέτʼ ἂν ἡμῖν ὑπετέτακτο οὐδὲ τὰς χρείας ταύτας παρεῖχεν, ἀλλʼ ἦν ἂν ἴσος ἡμῖν καὶ ὅμοιος. οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ ζητεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὗ μὴ παρόντος ἐπʼ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων θέλεις λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν; τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστι θεῶν ἔργα κἀκεῖνα; ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ προηγούμενα οὐδὲ μέρη θεῶν. σὺ δὲ προηγούμενον εἶ, σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ· ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀγνοεῖς σου τὴν συγγένειαν; τί οὐκ οἶδας, πόθεν ἐλήλυθας; οὐ θέλεις μεμνῆσθαι, ὅταν ἐσθίῃς, τίς ὢν ἐσθίεις καὶ τίνα τρέφεις; ὅταν συνουσίᾳ χρῇ, τίς ὢν χρῇ; ὅταν ὁμιλίᾳ; ὅταν γυμνάζῃ, ὅταν διαλέγῃ, οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι θεὸν τρέφεις, θεὸν γυμνάζεις; θεὸν περιφέρεις, τάλας, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς. δοκεῖς με λέγειν ἀργυροῦν τινα ἢ χρυσοῦν ἔξωθεν; ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν καὶ μολύνων οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ἀκαθάρτοις μὲν διανοήμασι, ῥυπαραῖς δὲ πράξεσι. καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαις τι τούτων ποιεῖν ὧν ποιεῖς. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐφορῶντος πάντα καὶ ἐπακούοντος οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ταῦτα ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ ποιῶν, ἀναίσθητε τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως καὶ θεοχόλωτε; λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τί φοβούμεθα ἐκπέμποντες νέον ἐπί τινας πράξεις ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃ τι, μὴ ἄλλως φάγῃ, μὴ ἄλλως συνουσιάσῃ, μὴ ταπεινώσῃ αὐτὸν ῥάκη περιτεθέντα, μὴ ἐπάρῃ κομψὰ ἱμάτια; οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν αὑτοῦ θεόν, οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν, μετὰ τίνος ἀπέρχεται. ἀλλʼ ἀνεχόμεθα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ σὲ ἤθελον ἔχειν; ἐκεῖ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἔχεις; εἶτʼ ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἔχων; ἢ ἄλλα σοι ἐρεῖ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ταῦτα; ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄγαλμα ἦς τὸ Φειδίου, ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ ὁ Ζεύς, ἐμέμνησο ἂν καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ εἴ τινα αἴσθησιν εἶχες, ἐπειρῶ ἂν μηδὲν [ἂν] ἀνάξιον ποιεῖν τοῦ κατασκευάσαντος μηδὲ σεαυτοῦ μηδʼ ἐν ἀπρεπεῖ σχήματι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὁρῶσι· νῦν δέ σε ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀμελεῖς οἷόν τινα δείξεις σεαυτόν; καὶ τί ὁ τεχνίτης τῷ τεχνίτῃ ὅμοιος ἢ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῷ κατασκευάσματι; καὶ ποῖον ἔργον τεχνίτου εὐθὺς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἃς ἐμφαίνει διὰ τῆς κατασκευῆς; οὐχὶ λίθος ἐστὶν ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ ἐλέφας; καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ Φειδίου ἅπαξ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὴν Νίκην ἐπʼ αὐτῆς δεξαμένη ἕστηκεν οὕτως ὅλῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ κινούμενα, ἔμπνοα, χρηστικὰ φαντασιῶν, δοκιμαστικά. τούτου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατασκεύασμα ὢν καταισχύνεις αὐτό; τί δʼ; ὅτι οὐ μόνον σε κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ ἐπίστευσεν καὶ παρακατέθετο, οὐδὲ τούτου μεμνήσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταισχυνεῖς τὴν ἐπιτροπήν; εἰ δέ σοι ὀρφανόν τινα ὁ θεὸς παρέθετο, οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠμέλεις; παραδέδωκέ σοι σεαυτὸν καὶ λέγει οὐκ εἶχον ἄλλον πιστότερόν σου· τοῦτόν μοι φύλασσε τοιοῦτον οἷος πέφυκεν, αἰδήμονα, πιστόν, ὑψηλόν, ἀκατάπληκτον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀτάραχον. εἶτα σὺ οὐ φυλάσσεις; ἀλλʼ ἐροῦσιν· πόθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὀφρῦν ἐνήνοχεν καὶ σεμνοπροσωπεῖ; οὔπω κατʼ ἀξίαν. ἔτι γὰρ οὐ θαρρῶ οἷς ἔμαθον καὶ συγκατεθέμην· ἔτι τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φοβοῦμαι. ἐπεί τοι ἄφετέ με θαρρῆσαι καὶ τότε ὄψεσθε βλέμμα οἷον δεῖ καὶ σχῆμα οἷον δεῖ, τότε ὑμῖν δείξω τὸ ἄγαλμα, ὅταν τελειωθῇ, ὅταν στιλπνωθῇ. τί δοκεῖτε; ὀφρῦν; μὴ γένοιτο. μὴ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ ὀφρῦν ἀνέσπακεν; ἀλλὰ πέπηγεν αὐτοῦ τὸ βλέμμα, οἷον δεῖ εἶναι τοῦ ἐροῦντος οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδʼ ἀπατηλόν. τοιοῦτον ὑμῖν δείξω ἐμαυτόν, πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, γενναῖον, ἀτάραχον. μή τι οὖν ἀθάνατον ἀγήρων, μή τι ἄνοσον; ἀλλʼ ἀποθνῄσκοντα θείως, νοσοῦντα θείως. ταῦτα ἔχω, ταῦτα δύναμαι· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα οὔτʼ ἔχω οὔτε δύναμαι. δείξω ὑμῖν νεῦρα φιλοσόφου. ποῖα νεῦρα; ὄρεξιν ἀναπότευκτον, ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον, ὁρμὴν καθήκουσαν, πρόθεσιν ἐπιμελῆ, συγκατάθεσιν ἀπρόπτωτον. ταῦτα ὄψεσθε.
9. It were no slight attainment, could we merely fulfil what the nature of man implies. For what is man? A rational and mortal being. Well; from what are we distinguished by reason? From wild beasts. From what else? From sheep, and the like. Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed. In what do we act like cattle? When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being. When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk? Into wild beasts. And further, some of us are wild beasts of a larger size; others little mischievous vermin, such as suggest the proverb, Let me rather be eaten by a lion. By all these means, that is destroyed which the nature of man implies. For when is a conjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies. So then the sustaining of such a proposition consists in this, that its several parts remain a series of truths. When is a disjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies. When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog, preserved in existence? While each fulfils what its nature implies. Where is the wonder, then, that manhood should be preserved or destroyed in the same manner? All things are preserved and improved by exercising their proper functions; as a carpenter, by building; a grammarian, by grammar; but if he permit himself to write ungrammatically, his art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest ones destroy him; faithful actions preserve the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, the contrary actions heighten the contrary characters. Thus the practice of immodesty develops an immodest character; knavery, a knavish one; slander, a slanderous one; anger, an angry one; and fraud, a covetous one. For this reason, philosophers advise us not to be contented with mere learning, but to add meditation likewise, and then practice. For we have been long accustomed to perverse actions, and have practised upon wrong opinions. If, therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right opinions, we shall be nothing more than expositors of the abstract doctrines of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the rules of art, upon good and evil?—“That some things are good, some evil, and others indifferent; the good include the virtues and all things appertaining; the evil comprise the contrary; and the indifferent include riches, health, reputation;” and then, if while we are saying all this, there should happen some more than ordinary noise, or one of the by-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed,—merely from your lips? Why, then, do you confound the remedies which might be useful to others? Why do you trifle on the most important subjects? It is one thing to hoard up provision in a storehouse, and another to eat it. What is eaten is assimilated, digested, and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, color, breath. Whatever is hoarded is ready indeed, whenever you desire to show it; but is of no further use to you than in the mere knowledge that you have it. For what difference does it make whether you discourse on these doctrines, or those of the heterodox? Sit down and comment skilfully on Epicurus, for instance; perhaps you may comment more profitable than himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you act like a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you see on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew, but only acts like one. But, when he assumes the sentiments of one who has been baptized and circumcised, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our profession, may be Jews in name, but are in reality something else. We are inconsistent with our own discourse; we are far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves on knowing. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man implies, we are ready to assume besides so vast a weight as that of a philosopher. As if a person, incapable of lifting ten pounds, should endeavor to heave the same stone with Ajax.
9. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τυχὸν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; — ζῷον, φησί, λογικὸν θνητόν. — εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα; — τῶν θηρίων. — καὶ τίνων ἄλλων; — τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. — ὅρα οὖν μή τί πως ὡς θηρίον ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπώλεσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐπλήρωσας τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν. ὅρα μή τι ὡς πρόβατον· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τίνα οὖν ποιοῦμεν ὡς πρόβατα; ὅταν τῆς γαστρὸς ἕνεκα, ὅταν τῶν αἰδοίων, ὅταν εἰκῇ, ὅταν ῥυπαρῶς, ὅταν ἀνεπιστρέπτως, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; ἐπὶ τὰ πρόβατα. τί ἀπωλέσαμεν; τὸ λογικόν. ὅταν μαχίμως καὶ βλαβερῶς καὶ θυμικῶς καὶ ὠστικῶς, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν ἡμῶν μεγάλα θηρία εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ θηρίδια κακοήθη καὶ μικρά, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν λέων με καὶ φαγέτω. διὰ πάντων δὲ τούτων ἀπόλλυται ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελία. πότε γὰρ σῴζεται συμπεπλεγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ, ὥστε σωτηρία συμπεπλεγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀληθῶν συμπεπλέχθαι. πότε διεζευγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ. πότε αὐλοί, πότε λύρα, πότε ἵππος, πότε κύων; τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὡσαύτως μὲν σῴζεται, ὡσαύτως δʼ ἀπόλλυται; αὔξει δʼ ἕκαστον καὶ σῴζει τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα· τὸν τέκτονα τὰ τεκτονικά, τὸν γραμματικὸν τὰ γραμματικά. ἂν δʼ ἐθίσῃ γράφειν ἀγραμμάτως, ἀνάγκη καταφθείρεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὴν τέχνην. οὕτως τὸν μὲν αἰδήμονα σῴζει τὰ αἰδήμονα ἔργα, ἀπολλύει δὲ τὰ ἀναιδῆ· τὸν δὲ πιστὸν τὰ πιστὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπολλύει. καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους πάλιν ἐπαύξει τὰ ἐναντία· τὸν ἀναίσχυντον ἀναισχυντία, τὸν ἄπιστον ἀπιστία, τὸν λοίδορον λοιδορία, τὸν ὀργίλον ὀργή, τὸν φιλάργυρον αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. διὰ τοῦτο παραγγέλλουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι μόνῳ τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτην προσλαμβάνειν, εἶτα ἄσκησιν. πολλῷ γὰρ χρόνῳ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν εἰθίσμεθα καὶ τὰς ὑπολήψεις τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς ὀρθαῖς χρηστικὰς ἔχομεν. ἂν οὖν μὴ καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς χρηστικὰς ποιήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσόμεθα ἀλλοτρίων δογμάτων. ἄρτι γὰρ τίς ἡμῶν οὐ δύναται τεχνολογῆσαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα· ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν ἀρετῶν· κακὰ τὰ δʼ ἐναντία· ἀδιάφορα δὲ πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, δόξα. εἶτʼ ἂν μεταξὺ λεγόντων ἡμῶν ψόφος μείζων γένηται ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις καταγελάσῃ ἡμῶν, ἐξεπλάγημεν. ποῦ ἐστιν, φιλόσοφε, ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔλεγες; πόθεν αὐτὰ προφερόμενος ἔλεγες; ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν αὐτόθεν. τί οὖν ἀλλότρια βοηθήματα μολύνεις; τί κυβεύεις περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἰς ταμιεῖον ἀποθέσθαι ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ φαγεῖν. τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες, ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὔχροια, εὔπνοια. τὰ ἀποκείμενα ὅταν μὲν θελήσῃς ἐκ προχείρου λαβὼν δεῖξαι δύνασαι, ἀπʼ αὐτῶν δέ σοι ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ δοκεῖν ὅτι ἔχεις. τί γὰρ διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων; τεχνολόγει νῦν καθίσας τὰ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τάχα ἐκείνου χρηστικώτερον τεχνολογήσεις. τί οὖν Στωικὸν λέγεις σεαυτόν, τί ἐξαπατᾷς τοὺς πολλούς, τί ὑποκρίνῃ Ἰουδαῖον ὢν Ἕλλην; οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς ἕκαστος λέγεται Ἰουδαῖος, πῶς Σύρος, πῶς Αἰγύπτιος; καὶ ὅταν τινὰ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἴδωμεν, εἰώθαμεν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν Ἰουδαῖος, ἀλλʼ ὑποκρίνεται. ὅταν δʼ ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾑρημένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς παραβαπτισταί, λόγῳ μὲν Ἰουδαῖοι, ἔργῳ δʼ ἄλλο τι, ἀσυμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ λέγομεν, ἐφʼ οἷς ὡς εἰδότες αὐτὰ ἐπαιρόμεθα. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι δυνάμενοι προσλαμβάνομεν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τηλικοῦτο φορτίον οἷον εἴ τις δέκα λίτρας ἆραι μὴ δυνάμενος τὸν τοῦ Αἴαντος λίθον βαστάζειν ἤθελεν.
10. Consider who you are. In the first place, a man; that is, one who recognizes nothing superior to the faculty of free will, but all things as subject to this; and this itself as not to be enslaved or subjected to anything. Consider, then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts; you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the universe, and a part of it; not a subordinate, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the Divine economy, and of considering the connections of things. What then does the character of a citizen imply? To hold no private interest; to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but rather like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if it were possible for a wise and good man to foresee what was to happen, he might co-operate in bringing on himself sickness, and death, and mutilation, being sensible that these things are appointed in the order of the universe; and that the whole is superior to a part. and the city to the citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to hold to what is more agreeable to our choice, for this too is a part of our birthright. Remember next, that perhaps you are a son, and what does this character imply? To esteem everything that is his, as belonging to his father; in every instance to obey him; not to revile him to any one; not to say or do anything injurious to him; to give way and yield in everything, co-operating with him to the utmost of his power. After this, know likewise, that you are a brother too; and that to this character it belongs to make concessions, to be easily persuaded, to use gentle language, never to claim for yourself any non-essential thing, but cheerfully to give up these to be repaid by a larger share of things essential. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper. How great an advantage gained! If, beside this, you are a senator of any city, demean yourself as a senator; if a youth, as a youth; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties; but, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you that you have forgotten who you are, and what is your name. If you were a smith, and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another, in that case? If, instead of a man,—a gentle, social creature,—you have become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting, have you lost nothing? Is it only the loss of money which is reckoned damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which damages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage; and yet, if you part with honor, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter Yet the first may be lost by some cause external and inevitable; but the last only by our own fault. There is no shame in not having or in losing the one; but either not to have or to lose the other is equally shameful and reproachful and unhappy. What does the debauchee lose? Manhood. What does he lose who made him such? Many things, but manhood also. What does an adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste character; the good neighbor. What does an angry person lose? A coward? Each loses his portion. No one is wicked without some loss or damage. Now if, after all, you treat the loss of money as the only damage, all these are unhurt and uninjured. Nay, they may be even gainers; as, by such practices, their money may possibly be increased. But consider; if you refer everything to money, then a man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yes, say you; he is maimed in his body. Well, but does he who loses his sense of smell itself lose nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul which benefits the possessor, and which it is an injury to lose? “Of what sort do you mean?” Have we not a natural sense of honor? “We have.” Does he who loses this suffer no damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Does he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural fidelity; no natural affection; no natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects still safe and uninjured? “What, then; shall not I injure him who has injured me?” Consider first what injury is; and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For, if both good and evil lie in the will, see whether what you say does not amount to this: “Since he has hurt himself by injuring me, shall I not hurt myself by injuring him?” Why do we not make to ourselves some such representation as this? Are we hurt when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions, and are we not at all hurt when our will is depraved? He who has erred, or injured another, has indeed no pain in his head; nor loses an eye, nor a leg, nor an estate; and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether our will be habitually humble and faithful, or shameless and unfaithful, we regard as a thing indifferent, except only in the discussions of the schools. In that case, all the improvement we make reaches only to words; and beyond them is absolutely nothing.
10. σκέψαι τίς εἶ. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ τὰ ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δʼ ἀδούλευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον. σκόπει οὖν, τίνων κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον. κεχώρισαι θηρίων, κεχώρισαι προβάτων. ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἓν τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων· παρακολουθητικὸς γὰρ εἶ τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς ἐπιλογιστικός. τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου; μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς βουλεύεσθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ἡ χεὶρ ἢ ὁ ποὺς λογισμὸν εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἄλλως ὥρμησαν ἢ ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐπανενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ὅτι εἰ προῄδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα, συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου. νῦν δʼ ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν, καθήκει τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο γεγόναμεν. μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υ ἱὸς εἶ. τίς τούτου τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία; πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρός, πάντα ὑπακούειν, μηδέποτε ψέξαι πρός τινα μηδὲ βλαβερόν τι αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι, ἐξίστασθαι ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ παραχωρεῖν συνεργοῦντα κατὰ δύναμιν. μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφὸς εἶ. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ὀφείλεται παραχώρησις, εὐπείθεια, εὐφημία, μηδέποτʼ ἀντιποιήσασθαί τινος πρὸς [ἑ]αὐτὸν τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, ἀλλʼ ἡδέως ἐκεῖνα προίεσθαι, ἵνʼ ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς πλέον ἔχῃς. ὅρα γὰρ οἷόν ἐστιν ἀντὶ θίδρακος, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην κτήσασθαι, ὅση ἡ πλεονεξία. μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτὴς πόλεώς τινος, ὅτι βουλευτής· εἰ νέος, ὅτι νέος· εἰ πρεσβύτης, ὅτι πρεσβύτης· εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα. ἐὰν δʼ ἀπελθὼν ψέγῃς σου τὸν ἀδελφόν, λέγω σοι ἐπελάθου, τίς εἶ καὶ τί σοι ὄνομα. εἶτα εἰ μὲν χαλκεὺς ὢν ἐχρῶ τῇ σφύρᾳ ἄλλως, ἐπιλελησμένος ἂν ἦς τοῦ χαλκέως· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐπελάθου καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένου, οὐδὲν ἀντʼ οὐδενὸς ἠλλάχθαι φανεῖ σεαυτῷ; εἰ δʼ ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου, ἡμέρου ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ, θηρίον γέγονας βλαβερόν, ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν, οὐδὲν ἀπολώλεκας; ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε κέρμα ἀπολέσαι, ἵνα ζημιωθῆς, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἀπώλεια ζημιοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; εἶτα γραμματικὴν μὲν ἀποβαλὼν ἢ μουσικὴν ζημίαν ἂν ἡγοῦ τὴν ἀπώλειαν αὐτῆς· εἰ δʼ αἰδῶ καὶ καταστολὴν καὶ ἡμερότητα ἀποβαλεῖς, οὐδὲν ἡγῇ τὸ πρᾶγμα; καίτοι ἐκεῖνα μὲν παρʼ ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρʼ ἡμᾶς· καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὔτʼ ἔχειν καλόν ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἀπολλύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἀπολλύειν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον καὶ ἀτύχημα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ τὰ τοῦ κιναίδου πάσχων; τὸν ἄνδρα. ὁ δὲ διατιθείς; πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς δʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸν ἄνδρα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ μοιχεύων; τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἐγκρατῆ, τὸν κόσμιον, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν γείτονα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος; ἄλλο τι. ὁ φοβούμενος; ἄλλο τι. οὐδεὶς δίχα ἀπωλείας καὶ ζημίας κακός ἐστιν. λοιπὸν εἰ τὴν ζημίαν ζητεῖς ἐν κέρματι, πάντες οὗτοι ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀζήμιοι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ὠφελούμενοι καὶ κερδαίνοντες, ὅταν διά τινος τούτων τῶν ἔργων κέρμα αὐτοῖς προσγένηται. ὅρα δʼ εἰ ἐπὶ κερμάτιον πάντα ἀνάγεις, ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁ τὴν ῥῖνά σοι ἀπολλύων ἔσται βεβλαμμένος. — ναί, φησίν, κεκολόβωται γὰρ τὸ σῶμα. — ἄγε, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀσφρασίαν αὐτὴν ἀπολωλεκὼς οὐδὲν ἀπολλύει; ψυχῆς οὖν δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, ἣν ὁ μὲν κτησάμενος ὠφελεῖται, ὁ δʼ ἀποβαλὼν ζημιοῦται; — ποίαν καὶ λέγεις; — οὐδὲν ἔχομεν αἰδῆμον φύσει; — ἔχομεν. — ὁ τοῦτο ἀπολλύων οὐ ζημιοῦται, οὐδενὸς στερίσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλει τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν; οὐκ ἔχομεν φύσει τι πιστόν, φύσει στερκτικόν, φύσει ὠφελητικόν, ἀλλήλων φύσει ἀνεκτικόν; ὅστις οὖν εἰς ταῦτα περιορᾷ ζημιούμενον ἑαυτόν, οὗτος ᾖ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀζήμιος; τί οὖν; μὴ βλάψω τὸν βλάψαντα; — πρῶτον μὲν ἰδού, τί ἐστι βλάβη καὶ μνήσθητι ὧν ἤκουσας παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὡσαύτως ἐν προαιρέσει, βλέπε μὴ τοιοῦτʼ ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτὸν ἔβλαψεν πρὸς ἐμέ τι ἄδικον ποιήσας, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν μὴ βλάψω πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἄδικόν τι ποιήσας; τί οὖν οὐ τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ἀλλʼ ὅπου τι σωματικὸν ἐλάττωμα ἢ εἰς κτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ ἡ βλάβη, ὅπου εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐδεμία βλάβη; οὔτε γὰρ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀλγεῖ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἢ ἀδικήσας οὔτε τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὔτε τὸ ἰσχίον οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν ἀπολλύει. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐθέλομεν ἢ ταῦτα· τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ π[ρ]ότερον αἰδήμονα καὶ πιστὴν ἕξομεν ἢ ἀναίσχυντον καὶ ἄπιστον, οὐδʼ ἐγγὺς διαφερόμεθα πλὴν μόνον ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων. τοιγαροῦν μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων προκόπτομεν, ἔξω δʼ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον.
11. The beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle; of a diesis, or a semitone, in music; but we learn each of these things by some artistic instruction. Hence, they who do not understand them do not assume to understand them. But who ever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence, we all make use of the terms, and endeavor to apply our impressions to particular cases. “Such a one hath acted well, not. well; right, not right; is unhappy, is happy; is just, is unjust.” Which of us refrains from these terms? Who defers the use of them till he has learnt it, as those do who are ignorant of lines and sounds? The reason of this is, that we come instructed in some degree by nature upon these subjects; and from this beginning, we go on to add self-conceit. “For why,” say you, “should I not know what fair or base is? Have I not the idea of it?” You have. “Do I not apply this idea to the particular instance?” You do. “Do I not apply it rightly, then?” Here lies the whole question; and here arises the self-conceit. Beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed, by applying them improperly, to reach the very position most questionable. For, if they knew how to apply them also, they would be all but perfect. If you think that you know how to apply your general principles to particular cases, tell me on what you base this application. “Upon its seeming so to me.” But it does not seem so to another; and does not ne too think that he makes a right application? “He does.” Is it possible, then, that each of you should rightly apply your principles, on the very subjects about which your opinions conflict? “It is not.” Have you anything to show us, then, for this application, beyond the fact of its seeming so to you? And does a madman act any otherwise than seems to him right? Is this, then, a sufficient criterion for him too? “It is not.” Come, therefore, to some stronger ground than seeming. “What is that?” The beginning of philosophy is this: the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a careful examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights; like a square, for distinguishing straight and crooked. This is the beginning of philosophy. Is it possible that all things which seem right to all persons are so? Can things contradictory be right? We say not all things; but all that seem so to us. And why more to you than to the Syrians or Egyptians; than to me, or to any other man? Not at all more. Therefore, what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing; for even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance, but for everything we find some rule. And is there, then, in the present case no rule preferable to what seems? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery? There must be some rule. And why do we not seek and discover it, and, when we have discovered, ever after make use of it, without fail, so as not even to move a finger without it? For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their madness who make use of no other measure but their own perverted way of thinking. Afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of general principles, properly applied to particulars. Thus, what is the subject that falls under our inquiry? Pleasure. Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide, and to which we may trust? Yes. Is it fit to trust to anything unstable? No. Is pleasure, then, a stable thing? No. Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good? Yes. Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine, and fix the rules; and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.
11. ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας παρά γε τοῖς ὡς δεῖ καὶ κατὰ θύραν ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. ὀρθογωνίου μὲν γὰρ τριγώνου ἢ διέσεως ἡμιτονίου οὐδεμίαν φύσει ἔννοιαν ἥκομεν ἔχοντες, ἀλλʼ ἔκ τινος τεχνικῆς παραλήψεως διδασκόμεθα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες αὐτὰ οὐδʼ οἴονται εἰδέναι. ἀγαθοῦ δὲ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ πρέποντος καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ προσήκοντος καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντος καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ ὅ τι οὐ δεῖ ποιῆσαι τίς οὐκ ἔχων ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν ἐλήλυθεν; διὰ τοῦτο πάντες χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἐφαρμόζειν πειρώμεθα τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις. καλῶς ἐποίησεν, δεόντως, οὐ δεόντως· ἠτύχησεν, εὐτύχησεν· ἄδικός ἐστιν, δίκαιός ἐστιν. τίς ἡμῶν φείδεται τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων; τίς ἡμῶν ἀναβάλλεται τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν μέχρι μάθῃ καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὰς γραμμὰς ἢ τοὺς φθόγγους οἱ οὐκ εἰδότες; τούτου δʼ αἴτιον τὸ ἥκειν ἤδη τινὰ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως κατὰ τὸν τόπον ὥσπερ δεδιδαγμένους, ἀφʼ ὧν ὁρμώμενοι καὶ τὴν οἴησιν προσειλήφαμεν. —διὰ γάρ, φησίν, οὐκ οἶδα ἐγὼ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν; οὐκ ἔχω ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ; — ἔχεις. — οὐκ ἐφαρμόζω τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους; — ἐφαρμόζεις. — οὐ καλῶς οὖν ἐφαρμόζω; — ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ ζήτημα πᾶν καὶ οἴησις ἐνταῦθα προσγίνεται. ἀφʼ ὁμολογουμένων γὰρ ὁρμώμενοι τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον προάγουσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταλλήλου ἐφαρμογῆς. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἐκέκτηντο, τί ἐκώλυεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι τελείους; νῦν δʼ ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς ὅτι καὶ καταλλήλως ἐφαρμόζεις τὰς προλήψεις τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, εἰπέ μοι, πόθεν τοῦτο λαμβάνεις; — ὅτι δοκεῖ μοι. — τουτὶ οὖν ᾧτινι οὐ δοκεῖ, καὶ οἴεται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς· ἢ οὐκ οἴεται; — οἴεται. — δύνασθε οὖν περὶ ὧν τὰ μαχόμενα δοξάζετε ἀμφότεροι καταλλήλως ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις; — οὐ δυνάμεθα. — ἔχεις οὖν δεῖξαί τι ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὰς ἐφαρμόζειν ἄμεινον ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν σοι; ὁ δὲ μαινόμενος ἄλλα τινὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τὰ δοκοῦντά οἱ καλά; κἀκείνῳ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον; — οὐκ ἀρκεῖ. — ἐλθὼν οὖν ἐπί τι ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν τί τοῦτό ἐστιν ἴδʼ ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας· αἴσθησις μάχης τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζήτησις τοῦ παρʼ ὃ γίνεται ἡ μάχη καὶ κατάγνωσις καὶ ἀπιστία πρὸς τὸ ψιλῶς δοκοῦν, ἔρευνα δέ τις περὶ τὸ δοκοῦν εἰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ καὶ εὕρεσις κανόνος τινός, οἷον ἐπὶ βαρῶν τὸν ζυγὸν εὕρομεν, οἷον ἐπὶ εὐθέων καὶ στρεβλῶν τὴν στάθμην. — τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας; πάντα καλῶς ἔχει τὰ δοκοῦντα ἅπασι; — καὶ πῶς δυνατὸν τὰ μαχόμενα καλῶς ἔχειν; οὐκοῦν οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα. τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Σύροις, τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Αἰγυπτίοις, τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα ἢ τὰ τῷ δεῖνι; — οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. — οὐκ ἄρα ἀρκεῖ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ βαρῶν ἢ μέτρων ψιλῇ τῇ ἐμφάσει ἀρκούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κανόνα τινὰ ἐφʼ ἑκάστου εὕρομεν. ἐνταῦθʼ οὖν οὐδεὶς κανὼν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; — ἔστιν οὖν. — καὶ διὰ τί οὐ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνευρίσκομεν καὶ ἀνευρόντες λοιπὸν ἀπαραβάτως χρώμεθα δίχα αὐτοῦ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτείνοντες; τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐστὶν ὃ εὑρεθὲν ἀπαλλάσσει μανίας τοὺς μόνῳ τῷ δοκεῖν μέτρῳ πάντων χρωμένους, ἵνα λοιπὸν ἀπό τινων γνωρίμων καὶ διευκρινημένων ὁρμώμενοι χρώμεθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους διηρθρωμέναις ταῖς προλήψεσι. τίς ὑποπέπτωκεν οὐσία περὶ ἧς ζητοῦμεν;— ἡδονή. — ὕπαγε αὐτὴν τῷ κανόνι, βάλε εἰς τὸν ζυγόν. τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐφʼ ᾧ θαρρεῖν ἄξιον καὶ ᾧ πεποιθέναι; — δεῖ. — ἀβεβαίῳ οὖν τινι θαρρεῖν ἄξιον; — οὔ. — μή τι οὖν βέβαιον ἡ ἡδονή; — οὔ. — ἆρον οὖν καὶ βάλε ἔξω ἐκ τοῦ ζυγοῦ καὶ ἀπέλασον τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀγαθῶν μακράν. εἰ δʼ οὐκ ὀξυβλεπτεῖς καὶ ἕν σοι ζυγὸν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, φέρε ἄλλο. ἐπὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι; — ναί. — ἐφʼ ἡδονῇ οὖν παρούσῃ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι; βλέπε μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι ἄξιον· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι σε οὐδὲ τοῦ ζυγοῦ ἄξιον ἡγήσομαι. οὕτως κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἵσταται τῶν κανόνων ἡτοιμασμένων· καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ βεβαιοῦν τοὺς κανόνας, τὸ δʼ ἤδη χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις τοῦτο τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν.