12. What things are to be learned, in order to the right use of reason; the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught; but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give to any one of us whom you will some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he has a little moved the man, if he happens to answer at cross purposes, the questioner knows not how to deal with him any further, but either reviles or laughs at him, and says: “He is an illiterate fellow; there is no making anything of him.” Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, does not revile and ridicule and then leave him, but leads him into the right path. Do you also show your antagonist the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But till you show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own incapacity. How, then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him; and wanted no other witness. Hence he might well say, “I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent; and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone.” For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural impressions so clear, that every one saw and avoided the contradiction. “Does an envious man rejoice?” “By no means; he rather grieves.” (This he moves him to say by proposing the contrary.) “Well, and do you think envy to be a grief caused by evils?” “And who ever envied evils?” (Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief caused by things good.) “Does any one envy those things which are nothing to him?” “No, surely.” Having thus fully drawn out his idea, he then leaves that point, not saying, “Define to me what envy is;” and after he has defined it, “You have defined it wrong; for the definition does not correspond to the thing defined.” There are phrases repulsive and obscure to the illiterate, which yet we cannot dispense with. But we have no capacity at all to move them, by such arguments as might lead them, in following the methods of their own minds, to admit or abandon any position. And from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us who have any modesty give the matter entirely up; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound and are confounded, and at last, reviling and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expression; but to bear patiently with those who reviled him, and thus put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon’s Banquet, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, this is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,—Wisely at once the greatest strife to still.But what then? This is no very safe affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who does it must not do it in a corer, but go to some rich consular senator, for instance, and question him. Pray, sir. can you tell me to whom you intrust your horses? “Yes, certainly.” Is it then to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of horsemanship? “By no means.” To whom do you intrust your gold or your silver or your clothes? “Not to any one indifferently;” And did you ever consider to whom you committed the care of your body? “Yes, surely.” To one skilled in exercise or medicine, I suppose? “Without doubt.” Are these things your chief good, or are you possessed of something better than all of them? “What do you mean?” Something which makes use of these, and deliberates and counsels about each of them. “What, then; do you mean the soul?” You have guessed rightly; for indeed I do mean that. “I do really think it a much better possession than all the rest.” Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this soul? For it is not probable that a person of your wisdom and approved character in the state would carelessly suffer the most excellent thing that belongs to you to be neglected and lost. “No, certainly.” But do you take care of it yourself; and is it done by the instructions of another, or by your own ability?—Here, now, comes the danger that he may first say, “Pray, good sir, what business is that of yours? What are you to me?” Then if you persist in troubling him, he may lift up his hand and give you a box on the ear. I myself was once a great admirer of this method of instruction, till I fell into this kind of adventures.
12. ἃ μὲν δεῖ μαθόντα εἰδέναι χρῆσθαι λόγῳ, ἠκρίβωται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων. περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τελέως ἀγύμναστοί ἐσμεν. δὸς γοῦν ᾧ θέλεις ἡμῶν ἰδιώτην τινὰ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον· καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μικρὰ κινήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἂν παρὰ σκέλος ἀπαντᾷ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκέτι δύναται μεταχειρίσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἢ λοιδορεῖ λοιπὸν ἢ καταγελᾷ καὶ λέγει ἰδιώτης ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι. ὁ δʼ ὁδηγός, ὅταν λάβῃ τινὰ πλανώμενον, ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν δέουσαν, οὐχὶ καταγελάσας ἢ λοιδορησάμενος ἀπῆλθεν. καὶ σὺ δεῖξον αὐτῷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὄψει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ. μέχρι δʼ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ ἐκείνου καταγέλα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνου τῆς ἀδυναμίας τῆς αὑτοῦ. πῶς οὖν ἐποίει Σωκράτης; αὐτὸν ἠνάγκαζεν τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖν, ἄλλου δʼ οὐδενὸς ἐδεῖτο μάρτυρος. τοιγαροῦν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ λέγειν ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν, ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι ἀρκοῦμαι μάρτυρι· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὐκ ἐπιψηφίζω, τὸν δὲ προσδιαλεγόμενον μόνον. οὕτω γὰρ ἐναργῆ ἐτίθει τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν, ὥστε πάνθʼ ὁντιναοῦν συναισθανόμενον τῆς μάχης ἀναχωρεῖν ἀπʼ αὐτῆς. ἆρά γε ὁ φθονῶν χαίρει; — οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λυπεῖται. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησίον. τί δʼ; ἐπὶ κακοῖς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι λύπη ὁ φθόνος; καὶ τί ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ κακῶν; οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ὅτι λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς ὁ φθόνος. τί δέ; φθονοίη ἄν τις τοῖς οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτόν; — οὐδαμῶς. καὶ οὕτως ἐκπεπληρωκὼς τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ διηρθρωκὼς ἀπηλλάσσετο, οὐ λέγων ὅτι ὅρισαί μοι τὸν φθόνον, εἶτα ὁρισαμένου κακῶς ὡρίσω· οὐ γὰρ ἀντακολουθεῖ τῷ κεφαλαιώδει τὸ ὁρικόν· ῥήματα τεχνικὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἰδιώταις φορτικὰ καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητα, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα. ἐξ ὧν δʼ αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐπακολουθῶν ταῖς αὑτοῦ φαντασίαις παραχωρῆσαι δύναιτʼ ἄν τι ἢ ἀθετῆσαι, οὐδαμῶς διὰ τούτων αὐτὸν κινῆσαι δυνάμεθα. καὶ λοιπὸν εἰκότως συναισθανόμενοι ταύτης ἡμῶν τῆς ἀδυναμίας ἀπεχόμεθα τοῦ πράγματος, ὅσοις γʼ ἐστί τι εὐλαβείας. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ εἰκαῖοι συγκαθέντες εἴς τι τοιοῦτον φύρονται καὶ φύρουσι καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λοιδορήσαντες καὶ λοιδορηθέντες ἀπέρχονται. τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ἴδιον Σωκράτους μηδέποτε παροξυνθῆναι ἐν λόγῳ, μηδέποτε λοίδορον προενέγκασθαι μηδέν, μηδέποθʼ ὑβριστικόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιδορούντων ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ παύειν μάχην. εἰ θέλετε γνῶναι, πόσην ἐν τούτῳ δύναμιν εἶχεν, ἀνάγνωτε τὸ Ξενοφῶντος Συμπόσιον καὶ ὄψεσθε πόσας μάχας διαλέλυκεν. διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐν μεγίστῳ ἐπαίνῳ λέλεκται τὸ αἶψά τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν. τί οὖν; οὐ λίαν ἐστὶ νῦν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ῥώμῃ. τὸν γὰρ ποιοῦντα αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ δηλονότι δεήσει ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ προσελθόντα ὑπατικῷ τινι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, πλουσίῳ πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ οὗτος, ᾧ τινι τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παρέδωκας; ἔγωγε. ἆρα τῷ τυχόντι καὶ ἀπείρῳ ἱππικῆς; οὐδαμῶς. τί δʼ; ᾧ τινι τὸ χρυσίον ἢ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ τὴν ἐσθῆτα; οὐδὲ ταῦτα τῷ τυχόντι. τὸ σῶμα δὲ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἤδη τινὶ ἔσκεψαι ἐπιτρέψαι εἰς ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἐμπείρῳ δηλονότι καὶ τούτῳ ἀλειπτικῆς ἢ ἰατρικῆς; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. πότερον ταῦτά σοι τὰ κράτιστά ἐστιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐκτήσω πάντων ἄμεινον; ποῖον καὶ λέγεις; τὸ αὐτοῖς νὴ Δία τούτοις χρώμενον καὶ δοκιμάζον ἕκαστον καὶ βουλευόμενον. ἆρά γε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγεις; ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες· ταύτην γάρ τοι καὶ λέγω. πολὺ νὴ Δία τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτο ἄμεινον δοκῶ μοι κεκτῆσθαι. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμεμέλησαι; οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ χὠς ἔτυχεν εἰκός σε οὕτως σοφὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει δόκιμον τὸ κράτιστον τῶν σεαυτοῦ περιορᾶν ἀμελούμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐπιμεμέλησαι αὐτοῦ; πότερον μαθὼν παρά του ἢ εὑρὼν αὐτός; ὧδε λοιπὸν ὁ κίνδυνος, μὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἴπῃ τί δέ σοι μέλει, βέλτιστε; κύριός μου εἶ; εἶτʼ ἂν ἐπιμείνῃς πράγματα παρέχων, διαράμενος κονδύλους σοι δῷ. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἤμην ποτὲ ζηλωτὴς καὶ αὐτός, πρὶν εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπεσεῖν.
13. When I see any one anxious, I say, what does this man mean? Unless he wanted something or other not in his own power, how could he still be anxious? A musician, for instance, feels no anxiety while he is singing by himself; but when he appears upon the stage he does, even if his voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wishes is not only to sing well, but likewise to gain applause. But this is not in his own power. In short, where his skill lies, there is his courage. Bring any ignorant person, and he does not mind him; but in the point which he neither understands nor has studied, there he is anxious. “What point is that?” He does not understand what a multitude is, nor what the applause of a multitude. He has learnt, indeed, how to sound bass and treble; but what the applause of the many is, and what force it has in life, he neither understands nor has studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble and turn pale. I cannot indeed say that a man is no musician, when I see him afraid; but I can say something else, and indeed many things. And first of all I call him a stranger, and say, this man does not know in what country he is; and though he has lived here so long, he is ignorant of the laws and customs of the state, and what is permitted and what not; nor has he ever consulted any legal adviser, who might tell and explain to him the laws. But no man writes a will without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who knows; nor does he rashly sign a bond, or give security. Yet he indulges his desires and aversions, exerts his pursuits, intentions, and resolutions, without consulting any legal adviser about the matter. “How do you mean, without a legal adviser?” He knows not when he chooses what is not allowed him, and does not choose what is necessary; and he knows not what is his own, and what belongs to others; for if he did know he would never be hindered, would never be restrained, would never be anxious. “How so?” Why, does any one fear things that are not evils? “No.” Does any one fear things that seem evils indeed, but which it is in his own power to prevent? “No, surely.” If, then, the things independent of our will are neither good nor evil, and all things that do depend on will are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us nor given to us unless we please, what room is there left for anxiety? But we are anxious about this paltry body or estate of ours, or about what Caesar thinks, and not at all about anything internal. Are we ever anxious not to take up a false opinion? No; for this is within our own power. Or not to follow any pursuit contrary to nature? No, nor this. When, therefore, you see any one pale with anxiety, just as the physician pronounces from the complexion that such a patient is disordered in the spleen, and another in the liver, so do you likewise say, this man is disordered in his desires and aversions; he cannot walk steadily; he is in a fever. 70r nothing else changes the complexion, or causes trembling, or sets the teeth chattering.He crouching walks, or squats upon his heels. Therefore Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus, felt no anxiety. For over that which he prized, Antigonus had no power; and those things over which he had power, Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt anxiety when he was to meet Zeno, and with reason, for he was desirous to please him; and this was external ambition. But Zeno was not solicitous to please Antigonus; for no one skilful in any art is solicitous to please a person unskilful. “I am solicitous to please you.” For what? Do you know the rules by which one man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good and what a bad man is, and how each becomes such? Why, then, are not you yourself a good man? “In what respect am I not?” Because no good man laments or sighs or groans; no good man turns pale and trembles and says, “How will such a one receive me; how will he hear me?” As he thinks fit, foolish man. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his fault if he receives you ill? “Yes, surely.” And can one person be in fault and another the sufferer? “No.” Why, then, are you anxious about what belongs to others? “Well; but I am anxious how I shall speak to him.” What, then; cannot you speak to him as you will? “But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted.” If you were going to write down the name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted? “By no means.” What is the reason? Is it because you have learned how to write? “Yes.” And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same? “Exactly.” What is the reason? “Because every art gives a certain assurance and confidence on its own ground.” Have you not learned, then, how to speak? And what else did you study at school? “Syllogisms and convertible propositions.” For what purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that but to talk seasonably and discreetly and intelligently, and without flutter or hesitation, and, by means of all this, with courage? “Very true.” When, therefore, you go into the field on horseback, are you anxious on being matched against one who is on foot,—you being practised and he unpractised? “Ay, but the person has power to kill me.” Then speak the truth, O unfortunate! and be not arrogant, nor take the philosopher upon you, nor conceal from yourself who are your masters; but while you are thus to be held by the body, follow the strongest. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to tyrants and judges, and in prison. Diogenes had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. This belonged to those who had studied the matter; who had courage. But do you go where you belong and remain there. Retire into some corner, and there sit and weave syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not in you a man who can rule the city.
13. ὅταν ἀγωνιῶντα ἴδω ἄνθρωπον, λέγω· οὗτος τί ποτε θέλει; εἰ μὴ τῶν οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτῷ τι ἤθελεν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἠγωνία; διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς μόνος μὲν ᾁδων οὐκ ἀγωνιᾷ, εἰς θέατρον δʼ εἰσερχόμενος, κἂν λίαν εὔφωνος ᾖ καὶ καλῶς κιθαρίζῃ· οὐ γὰρ ᾆσαι μόνον θέλει καλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδοκιμῆσαι, τοῦτο δʼ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ. λοιπὸν οὗ μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν, ἐκεῖ τὸ θάρσος· φέρε ὃν θέλεις ἰδιώτην καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστρέφεται· ὅπου δʼ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ ἀγωνιᾷ. τί δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐκ οἶδεν, τί ἐστιν ὄχλος οὐδὲ τί ὄχλου ἔπαινος· ἀλλὰ τὴν νήτην μὲν τύπτειν ἔμαθεν καὶ τὴν ὑπάτην, ἔπαινος δʼ ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν τί ἐστι καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει ἐν βίῳ οὔτε οἶδεν οὔτε μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό. ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν τρέμειν καὶ ὠχριᾶν. κιθαρῳδὸν μὲν οὖν οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδω τινὰ φοβούμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι δύναμαι εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πολλά. καὶ πρῶτον πάντων ξένον αὐτὸν καλῶ καὶ λέγω· οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδεν ποῦ τῆς γῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοσούτου χρόνου ἐπιδημῶν ἀγνοεῖ τοὺς νόμους τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τί ἔξεστι καὶ τί οὐκ ἔξεστιν. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ νομικόν τινα παρέλαβεν πώποτε τὸν ἐροῦντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξηγησόμενον τὰ νόμιμα· ἀλλὰ διαθήκην μὲν οὐ γράφει μὴ εἰδὼς πῶς δεῖ γράφειν ἢ παραλαβὼν τὸν εἰδότα οὐδʼ ἐγγύην ἄλλως σφραγίζεται ἢ ἀσφάλειαν γράφει, ὀρέξει δὲ χρῆται δίχα νομικοῦ καὶ ἐκκλίσει καὶ ὁρμῇ καὶ ἐπιβολῇ καὶ προθέσει. πῶς δίχα νομικοῦ; οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι θέλει τὰ μὴ διδόμενα καὶ οὐ θέλει τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν οὔτε τὰ ἴδια οὔτε τὰ ἀλλότρια. εἰ δέ γʼ ᾔδει, οὐδέποτʼ ἂν ἐνεποδίζετο, οὐδέποτʼ ἐκωλύετο, οὐκ ἂν ἠγωνία. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φοβεῖταί τις οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν μὴ κακῶν; — οὔ. — τί δʼ; ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν μέν, ἐπʼ αὐτῷ δʼ ὄντων ὥστε μὴ συμβῆναι; — οὐδαμῶς. — εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἀπροαίρετα οὔτʼ ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά, τὰ προαιρετικὰ δὲ πάντα ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ οὔτʼ ἀφελέσθαι τις ἡμῶν αὐτὰ δύναται οὔτε περιποιῆσαι ἃ οὐ θέλομεν αὐτῶν, ποῦ ἔτι τόπος ἀγωνίας; ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ σωματίου ἀγωνιῶμεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ κτησιδίου, περὶ τοῦ τί δόξει τῷ Καίσαρι, περὶ τῶν ἔσω δʼ οὐδενός. μή τι περὶ τοῦ μὴ ψεῦδος ὑπολαβεῖν; — οὔ· ἐπʼ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν. — μή τι τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι παρὰ φύσιν; — οὐδὲ περὶ τούτου. — ὅταν οὖν ἴδῃς τινὰ ὠχριῶντα, ὡς ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ χρώματος λέγει τούτου ὁ σπλὴν πέπονθε, τούτου δὲ τὸ ἧπαρ, οὕτως καὶ σὺ λέγε τούτου ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις πέπονθεν, οὐκ εὐοδεῖ, φλεγμαίνει. χρῶμα γὰρ οὐ μεταβάλλει οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὐδὲ τρόμον ποιεῖ οὐδὲ ψόφον τῶν ὀδόντων οὐδὲ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει. διὰ τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν Ἀντιγόνῳ μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν οὐκ ἠγωνία· ἃ γὰρ οὗτος ἐθαύμαζεν, τούτων οὐδενὸς εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος ἐξουσίαν, ὧν δʼ εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐπεστρέφετο οὗτος· Ἀντίγονος δὲ Ζήνωνι μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν ἠγωνία, καὶ εἰκότως· ἤθελε γὰρ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δʼ ἔξω ἔκειτο· οὗτος δʼ ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος τις τεχνίτης τῷ ἀτέχνῳ. ἐγώ σοι ἀρέσαι θέλω; ἀντὶ τίνος; οἶδας γὰρ τὰ μέτρα, καθʼ ἃ κρίνεται ἄνθρωπος ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου; μεμέλ[ετ]ηκέ σοι γνῶναι, τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί κακὸς καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερον γίγνεται; διὰ τί οὖν σὺ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς οὐκ εἶ; — πῶς, φησίν, οὐκ εἰμί; — ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς πενθεῖ οὐδὲ στενάζει, οὐδεὶς οἰμώζει, οὐδεὶς ὠχριᾷ καὶ τρέμει οὐδὲ λέγει πῶς μʼ ἀποδέξεται, πῶς μου ἀκούσει; ἀνδράποδον, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ. τί οὖν σοὶ μέλει περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; νῦν οὐκ ἐκείνου ἁμάρτημά ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀποδέξασθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — δύναται δʼ ἄλλου μὲν εἶναι ἁμάρτημα, ἄλλου δὲ κακόν; — οὔ. — τί οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; — ναί· ἀλλʼ ἀγωνιῶ, πῶς ἐγὼ αὐτῷ λαλήσω. — εἶτʼ οὐκ ἔξεστι γὰρ ὡς θέλεις αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι; — ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ ἐκκρουσθῶ. — μή τι γράφειν μέλλων τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα δέδοικας μὴ ἐκκρουσθῇς; — οὐδαμῶς. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐχ ὅτι μεμελέτηκας γράφειν; — πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — τί δʼ; ἀναγιγνώσκειν μέλλων οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἂν εἶχες; — ὡσαύτως. — τί τὸ αἴτιον; ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη ἰσχυρόν τι ἔχει καὶ θαρραλέον ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῆς. λαλεῖν οὖν οὐ μεμελέτηκας; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐμελέτας ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; — συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας. — ἐπὶ τί; οὐχ ὥστε ἐμπείρως διαλέγεσθαι; τὸ δʼ ἐμπείρως ἐστὶν οὐχὶ εὐκαίρως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ συνετῶς, ἔτι δʼ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τεθαρρηκότως; — ναί. — ἱππεὺς οὖν ὢν εἰς πεδίον ἐληλυθὼς πρὸς πεζὸν ἀγωνιᾶς, ὅπου σὺ μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἀμελέτητός ἐστιν; — ναί· ἀλλὰ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ἀποκτεῖναί με. — λέγε οὖν τὰ ἀληθῆ, δύστηνε, καὶ μὴ ἀλαζονεύου μηδὲ φιλόσοφος εἶναι ἀξίου μηδὲ ἀγνόει σου τοὺς κυρίους, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἂν ἔχῃς ταύτην τὴν λαβὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκολούθει παντὶ τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ. λέγειν δὲ Σωκράτης ἐμελέτα ὁ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους οὕτως διαλεγόμενος, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ὁ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ. λέγειν Διογένης μεμελετήκει ὁ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον οὕτως λαλῶν, ὁ πρὸς Φίλιππον, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς πειρατάς, ὁ πρὸς τὸν ὠνησάμενον αὐτόν … (25, 26) ἐκείνοις, οἷς μεμέλ[ετ]ηκεν, τοῖς θαρροῦσι· σὺ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ σαυτοῦ βάδιζε καὶ ἐκείνων ἀποστῇς μηδέποτε· εἰς τὴν γωνίαν ἀπελθὼν κάθησο καὶ πλέκε συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλῳ πρότεινε· οὐκ ἔστι δʼ ἐν σοὶ πόλεος ἡγεμὼν ἀνήρ.
14. When a certain Roman came to him with his son, and had heard one lesson, “This,” said Epictetus, “is the method of teaching;” and ceased. When the other desired him to go on, he answered, Every art seems tedious, when it is delivered to a person ignorant and unskilful in it. The things performed by the common arts quickly manifest the use for which they were made; and most of them have something attractive and agreeable. Thus the trade of a shoemaker, as one seeks to learn it, is an unpleasant thing; but the shoe is useful, and not unpleasing to the eye. The trade of a smith is extremely unattractive to an ignorant observer; but the work shows the usefulness of the art. You will see this much more strongly in music; for if you stand by while a person is learning, it will appear to you of all sciences the most unpleasant; but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it. So here we take it to be the work of one who studies philosophy, to bring his will into harmony with events; so that none of the things which happen may happen against our inclination, nor those which do not happen be desired by us. Hence they who have settled this point have it in their power never to be disappointed in what they seek, nor to incur what they shun; but to lead their own lives without sorrow, fear, or perturbation, and in society to preserve all the natural or acquired relations of son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, fellow-traveller, ruler, or subject. Something like this is what we take to be the work of a philosopher. It remains to inquire, how it is to be effected. Now, e see that a carpenter becomes a carpenter by learning certain things; and a pilot, by learning certain. things, becomes a pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the present case, merely to be willing to be wise and good; but it is moreover necessary that certain things should be learned. What these things are, is the question. The philosophers say that we are first to learn that there is a God, and that his providence directs the whole; and that it is not merely impossible to conceal from him our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn what the gods are; for such as they are found to be, such must he seek to be to the utmost of his power, who would please and obey them. If the Deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficent, and noble, he must be free, beneficent, and noble likewise, in all his words and actions behaving as an imitator of God. “Whence, then, are we to begin?” If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand words. “So then! I do not understand them now?” No. You do not. “How is it, then, that I use them?” Just as the illiterate use the words of the learned, and as brutes use the phenomena of nature. For use is one thing, and understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever words you please, and let us see whether we understand them or not. “Well; but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who has grown old, and has perhaps served through his three campaigns to a senatorship.” I know it very well. For you now come to me, as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination that there should be anything in which you are deficient? You are rich; and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domestics. Caesar takes notice of you; you have many friends at Rome; you render to all their dues; you know how to requite a favor, and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose, then, I should prove to you that you are deficient in what is most necessary and important to happiness; and that hitherto you have taken care of everything, rather than your duty; and to complete all, that you understand not what God or man, or good or evil, means? That you are ignorant of all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told; but if I prove to you that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended, and go away. And yet what injury have I done you; unless a looking-glass injures a person not handsome, when it shows him to himself such as he is; or unless a physician can be thought to affront his patient, when he says to him: “Do you think, sir, that you are not ill? You have a fever. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water”? Nobody cries out here, “What an intolerable affront!” But if you say to any one: You exhibit feverishness in your desires, and low habits in what you shun; your aims are contradictory, your pursuits not conformable to nature, your opinions rash and mistaken, he presently goes away, and complains that he is affronted. This is the position we assume. As, in a crowded fair, the horses and cattle are brought to be sold, and most men come either to buy or sell; but there are a few who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on, and why in that manner, and who appointed it, and for what purpose,—thus, in this fair [of the world] some, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but fodder. To all of you who busy yourselves about possessions and farms and domestics and public posts, these things are nothing else but mere fodder. But there are some few men among the crowd who are fond of looking on, and considering: “What then, after all, is the world? Who governs it? Has it no governor? How is it possible, when neither a city nor a house can remain, ever so short a time, without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful system should be administered in a fortuitous and disorderly manner? Is there then a governor? Of what sort is he, and how does he govern? And what are we who are under him, and for what designed? Have we some connection and relation to him, or none?” In this manner are the few affected, and apply themselves only to view the fair, and then depart. Well; and they are laughed at by the multitude? Why, so are the lookers-on, by the buyers and sellers; and if the cattle had any apprehension, they too would laugh at such as admired anything but fodder.
14. εἰσελθόντος τινὸς τῶν Ῥωμαικῶν μετὰ υἱοῦ καὶ ἐπακούοντος ἑνὸς ἀναγνώσματος Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀπεσιώπησεν. ἀξιοῦντος δʼ ἐκείνου εὑρεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς Κόπον ἔχει, ἔφη, πᾶσα τέχνη τῷ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῆς, ὅταν παραδιδῶται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τήν τε χρείαν εὐθὺς ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς ὃ γέγονεν καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἔχει τι καὶ ἀγωγὸν καὶ ἐπίχαρι. καὶ γὰρ σκυτεὺς πῶς μὲν μανθάνει τις παρεῖναι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἀτερπές, τὸ δʼ ὑπόδημα χρήσιμον καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλως οὐκ ἀηδές. καὶ τέκτονος ἡ μὲν μάθησις ἀνιαρὰ μάλιστα τῷ ἰδιώτῃ παρατυγχάνοντι, τὸ δʼ ἔργον ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν χρείαν τῆς τέχνης. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ὄψει αὐτό· ἂν γὰρ παρῇς τῷ διδασκομένῳ, φανεῖταί σοι πάντων ἀτερπέστατον τὸ μάθημα, τὰ μέντοι ἀπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡδέα καὶ ἐπιτερπῆ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀκούειν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τι τῶν γινομένων ἀκόντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἐξ οὗ περίεστι τοῖς συστησαμένοις αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν, ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθʼ αὑτὸν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνῶν τηροῦντα τὰς σχέσεις τάς τε φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, τὴν γυναῖκα, τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ἀρχόμενον. τὸ ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα. λοιπὸν ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ ζητοῦμεν, πῶς ἔσται τοῦτο. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι ὁ τέκτων μαθών τινα γίνεται τέκτων, ὁ κυβερνήτης μαθών τινα γίνεται κυβερνήτης. μή ποτʼ οὖν καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ τὸ βούλεσθαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, χρεία δὲ καὶ μαθεῖν τινα; ζητοῦμεν οὖν τίνα ταῦτα. λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι μαθεῖν δεῖ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον· εἶτα ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν. οἷοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνοι εὑρεθῶσιν, τὸν ἐκείνοις ἀρέσοντα καὶ πεισθησόμενον ἀνάγκη πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις· εἰ πιστόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι πιστόν· εἰ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον· εἰ εὐεργετικόν, καὶ τοῦτον εὐεργετικόν· εἰ μεγαλόφρον, καὶ τοῦτον μεγαλόφρονα· ὡς θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. πόθεν οὖν ἄρξασθαι δεῖ;— ἂν συγκαθῇς, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ σε τοῖς ὀνόμασι παρακολουθεῖν. — ὥστʼ ἐγὼ νῦν οὐ παρακολουθῶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν; — οὐ παρακολουθεῖς. — πῶς οὖν χρῶμαι αὐτοῖς; — οὕτως ὡς οἱ ἀγράμματοι ταῖς ἐγγραμμάτοις φωναῖς, ὡς τὰ κτήνη ταῖς φαντασίαις· ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις, ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. εἰ δʼ οἴει παρακολουθεῖν, φέρε ὃ θέλεις ὄνομα καὶ βασανίσωμεν αὑτούς, εἰ παρακολουθοῦμεν. — ἀλλʼ ἀνιαρὸν τὸ ἐξελέγχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἤδη κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ τὰς τρεῖς στρατείας ἐστρατευμένον. — οἶδα κἀγώ. νῦν γὰρ σὺ ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς μηδενὸς δεόμενος. τίνος δʼ ἂν καὶ φαντασθείης ὡς ἐνδέοντος; πλουτεῖς, τέκνα ἔχεις τυχὸν καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ οἰκέτας πολλούς, ὁ Καῖσάρ σε οἶδεν, ἐν Ῥώμῃ πολλοὺς φίλους κέκτησαι, τὰ καθήκοντα ἀποδίδως, οἶδας τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα ἀντευποιῆσαι καὶ τὸν κακῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ποιῆσαι. τί σοι λείπει; ἂν οὖν σοι δείξω, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ μέγιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ὅτι μέχρι δεῦρο πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιμεμέλησαι, καὶ τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῶ· οὔτε τί θεός ἐστιν οἶδας οὔτε τί ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τί ἀγαθὸν οὔτε τί κακόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως ἀνεκτόν, ὅτι δʼ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖς, πῶς δύνασαι ἀνασχέσθαι μου καὶ ὑποσχεῖν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ παραμεῖναι; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἀπαλλάσσῃ χαλεπῶς ἔχων. καίτοι τί σοι ἐγὼ κακὸν πεποίηκα; εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἔσοπτρον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ὅτι δεικνύει αὐτὸν αὐτῷ οἷός ἐστιν· εἰ μὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα [ὅταν αὐτὸν] ὑβρίζει, ὅταν εἴπῃ αὐτῷ ἄνθρωπε, δοκεῖς μηδὲν ἔχειν, πυρέσσεις δέ· ἀσίτησον σήμερον, ὕδωρ πίε· καὶ οὐδεὶς λέγει ὦ δεινῆς ὕβρεως. ἐὰν δέ τινι εἴπῃς αἱ ὀρέξεις σου φλεγμαίνουσιν, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ταπειναί εἰσιν, αἱ ἐπιβολαὶ ἀνομολογούμεναι, αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀσύμφωνοι τῇ φύσει, αἱ ὑπολήψεις εἰκαῖαι καὶ ἐψευσμέναι, εὐθὺς ἐξελθὼν λέγει ὕβρισέν με. τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἡμέτερα ὡς ἐν πανηγύρει. τὰ μὲν κτήνη π[α]ραθησόμενα ἄγεται καὶ οἱ βόες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὠνησόμενοι οἱ δὲ πωλήσοντες· ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι. οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδʼ ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει ταύτῃ· οἱ μέν τινες ὡς κτήνη οὐδὲν πλέον πολυπραγμονοῦσι τοῦ χόρτου· ὅσοι γὰρ περὶ κτῆσιν καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκέτας καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἀναστρέφεσθε, ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χόρτος ἐστίν· ὀλίγοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, τίς αὐτὸν διοικεῖ. οὐδείς; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε πόλιν μὲν ἢ οἶκον μὴ δύνασθαι διαμένειν μηδʼ ὀλιγοστὸν χρόνον δίχα τοῦ διοικοῦντος καὶ ἐπιμελομένου, τὸ δʼ οὕτως μέγα καὶ καλὸν κατασκεύασμα εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οὕτως εὐτάκτως οἰκονομεῖσθαι; ἔστιν οὖν ὁ διοικῶν. ποῖός τις καὶ πῶς ὁ διοικῶν; ἡμεῖς δὲ τίνες ὄντες ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γεγόναμεν καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον; ἆρά γʼ ἔχομέν τινα ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ σχέσιν ἢ οὐδεμίαν; ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἃ πάσχουσιν οὗτοι οἱ ὀλίγοι· καὶ λοιπὸν τούτῳ μόνῳ σχολάζουσι τῷ τὴν πανήγυριν ἱστορήσαντας ἀπελθεῖν. τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ θεαταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπόρων· καὶ εἰ τὰ κτήνη συναίσθησίν τινα εἶχεν, κατεγέλα τῶν ἄλλο τι τεθαυμακότων ἢ τὸν χόρτον.
15. Some, when they hear such discourses as these, “That we ought to be steadfast; that the will is by nature free and unconstrained; and that all else is liable to restraint, compulsion, slavery, and tyranny,” imagine that they must remain immutably fixed to everything which they have determined. But it is first necessary that the determination should be a wise one. I agree that there should be sinews in the body, but such as in a healthy, an athletic body; for if you show me that you exhibit the [convulsed] sinews of a lunatic, and value yourself upon that, I will say to you, Seek a physician, man; this is not muscular vigor, but is really enervation. Such is the distemper of mind in those who hear these discourses in a wrong manner; like an acquaintance of mine, who, for no reason, had determined to starve himself to death. I went the third day, and inquired what was the matter. He answered, “am determined.” Well; but what is your motive? For if your determination be right, we will stay, and assist your departure; but, if unreasonable, change it. “We ought to keep our determinations.” What do you mean, sir? Not all of them; but such as are right. Else, if you should fancy that it is night, if this be your principle, do not change, but persist, and say, “We ought to keep to our determinations.” What do you mean, sir? Not to all of them. Why do you not begin by first laying the foundation, inquiring whether your determination be a sound one or not, and then build your firmness and constancy upon it. For if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation, you must not build; since the greater and more weighty the superstructure, the sooner will it fall. Without any reason, you are withdrawing from us, out of life, a friend, a companion, a fellow-citizen both of the greater and the lesser city; and while you are committing murder, and destroying an innocent person, you say, “We must keep to our determinations.” Suppose, by any means, it should ever come into your head to kill me; must you keep such a determination? With difficulty this person was, however, at last convinced; but there are some at present whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I understand, what before I did not, the meaning of that common saying, that a fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my lot to have a wise, that is. an untractable, fool for my friend. “It is all to no purpose; I am determined.” So are madmen too; but the more strongly they are determined upon absurdities, the more need have they of hellebore. Why will you not act like a sick person, and apply yourself to a physician? “Sir, I am sick. Give me your assistance; consider what I am to do. It is my part to follow your directions.” So say in the present case: “know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn.” “No; but talk to me about other things; for upon this I am determined.” What other things? What is of greater consequence, than to convince you that it is not sufficient to be determined, and to persist? This is the vigor of a madman; not of one in health. “I will die, if you compel me to this.” Why so, man; what is the matter? “am determined.” I have a lucky escape, that it is not your determination to kill me. “I will not be bribed [from my purpose].” Why so? “am determined.” Be assured, that with that very vigor which you now employ to refuse the bribe, you may hereafter have as unreasonable a propensity to take it; and again to say, “am determined.” As, in a distempered and rheumatic body, the humor tends sometimes to one part, sometimes to another; thus it is uncertain which way a sickly mind will incline. But if to its inclination and bent a spasmodic vigor be likewise added, the evil then becomes desperate and incurable.
15. ὅταν ἀκούσωσί τινες τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὅτι βέβαιον εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐλεύθερον φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα κωλυτά, ἀναγκαστά, δοῦλα, ἀλλότρια, φαντάζονται ὅτι δεῖ παντὶ τῷ κριθέντι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀπαραβάτως ἐμμένειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ὑγιὲς εἶναι δεῖ τὸ κεκριμένον. θέλω γὰρ εἶναι τόνους ἐν σώματι, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὑγιαίνοντι, ὡς ἀθλοῦντι· ἂν δέ μοι φρενιτικοῦ τόνους ἔχων ἐνδεικνύῃ[ς] καὶ ἀλαζονεύῃ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς, ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι ἄνθρωπε, ζήτει τὸν θεραπεύσοντα. τοῦτο οὐκ εἰσὶ τόνοι, ἀλλʼ ἀτονία. ἕτερον τρόπον τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πάσχουσιν οἱ παρακούοντες τῶν λόγων τούτων. οἷον καὶ ἐμός τις ἑταῖρος ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἔκρινεν ἀποκαρτερεῖν. ἔγνων ἐγὼ ἤδη τρίτην ἡμέραν ἔχοντος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀποχῆς καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐπυνθανόμην τί ἐγένετο. — κέκρικα, φησίν. — ἀλλʼ ὅμως τί σε ἦν τὸ ἀναπεῖσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔκρινας, ἰδοὺ παρακαθήμεθά σοι καὶ συνεργοῦμεν, ἵνʼ ἐξέλθῃς· εἰ δʼ ἀλόγως ἔκρινας, μετάθου. — τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. — τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ παθὼν ἄρτι ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν, ἄν σοι δοκῇ, μὴ μετατίθεσο, ἀλλʼ ἔμμενε καὶ λέγε ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. [τί ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; οὐ πᾶσιν.] οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν στῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον, τὸ κρίμα σκέψασθαι πότερον ὑγιὲς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιές, καὶ οὕτως λοιπὸν ἐποικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν εὐτονίαν, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν; ἂν δὲ σαπρὸν ὑποστήσῃ καὶ καταπῖπτον, οὐκ οἰκοδόμημά τι ὄν, ὅσῳ δʼ ἂν πλείονα καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ἐπιθῇς, τοσούτῳ θᾶττον [θᾶττον] κατενεχθήσεται. ἄνευ πάσης αἰτίας ἐξάγεις ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν φίλον καὶ συνήθη, τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως πολίτην καὶ τῆς μεγάλης καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς· εἶτα φόνον ἐργαζόμενος καὶ ἀπολλύων ἄνθρωπον μηδὲν ἠδικηκότα λέγεις ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. εἰ δʼ ἐπῆλθέν σοί πώς ποτʼ ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἔδει σε ἐμμένειν τοῖς κριθεῖσιν; ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν μόγις μετεπείσθη. τῶν δὲ νῦν τινας οὐκ ἔστι μεταθεῖναι. ὥστε μοι δοκῶ ὃ πρότερον ἠγνόουν νῦν εἰδέναι, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ λεγόμενον· μωρὸν οὔτε πεῖσαι οὔτε ῥῆξαι ἔστιν. μή μοι γένοιτο φίλον ἔχειν σοφὸν μωρόν. δυσμεταχειριστότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν. κέκρικα. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι· ἀλλʼ ὅσῳ βεβαιότερον κρίνουσι τὰ οὐκ ὄντα, τοσούτῳ πλείονος ἐλλεβόρου δέονται. οὐ θέλεις τὰ τοῦ νοσοῦντος ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν παρακαλεῖν; νοσῶ, κύριε· βοήθησόν μοι. τί με δεῖ ποιεῖν σκέψαι· ἐμόν ἐστι πείθεσθαί σοι. οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθʼ. ἃ δεῖ με ποιεῖν οὐκ οἶδα, ἐλήλυθα δὲ μαθησόμενος. οὔ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μοι λέγε. τοῦτο δὲ κέκρικα. περὶ ποίων ἄλλων; τί γάρ ἐστι μεῖζον ἢ προὐργιαίτερον τοῦ πεισθῆναί σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κεκρικέναι καὶ τὸ μὴ μεταθέσθαι; οὗτοι οἱ μανικοὶ τόνοι, οὐχ ὑγιεινοί. ἀποθανεῖν θέλω, ἄν με τοῦτο ἀναγκάσῃς. διὰ τί, ἄνθρωπε; τί ἐγένετο; κέκρικα. ἐσώθην, ὅτι οὐ κέκρικας ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι. ἀργύριον οὐ λαμβάνω. διὰ τί; κέκρικα. ἴσθι ὅτι ᾧ τόνῳ νῦν χρῇ πρὸς τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν, οὐδὲν κωλύει σε ἀλόγως ποτὲ ῥέψαι πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν καὶ πάλιν λέγειν ὅτι κέκρικα, ὥσπερ ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ποτὲ δʼ ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα ῥέπει τὸ ῥεῦμα. οὕτως καὶ ἀσθενὴς ψυχή, ὅπου μὲν κλίνει, ἄδηλον ἔχει· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τόνος προσῇ τῷ κλίματι τούτῳ καὶ τῇ φορᾷ, τότε γίνεται τὸ κακὸν ἀβοήθητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.
16. Where lies good? In the will. Where evil? In the will. Where neither good nor evil? In things inevitable. What then?
16. ποῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν; — ἐν προαιρέσει. — ποῦ τὸ κακόν; — ἐν προαιρέσει. — ποῦ τὸ οὐδέτερον; — ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις.
Does any one of us remember these lessons out of the schools? Does any one of us study how to answer for himself in the affairs of life, as in common questions? “Is it day?” “Yes.” “Is it night, then?” “No.” “Is the number of stars even?” “cannot tell.” When a bribe is offered you, have you learned to make the proper answer, that it is not a good?
— τί οὖν; μέμνηταί τις ἡμῶν ἔξω τούτων τῶν λόγων; μελετᾷ τις αὐτὸς ἐφʼ αὑτοῦ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων· ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστίν; ναί. τί δέ; νύξ ἐστιν; οὔ. τί δʼ; ἄρτιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
Have you exercised yourself in such answers as these, or only in sophistries? Why do you wonder, then, that you improve in points which you have studied;
ὅταν σοι προφαίνηται ἀργύριον, μεμελέτηκας ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὴν δέουσαν ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν; ἤσκηκας ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἢ πρὸς μόνα· τὰ σοφίσματα;
while in those which you have not studied, there you remain the same? When an orator knows that he has written well, that he has committed to memory what he has written, and that he brings an agreeable voice with him, why is he still anxious?
τί οὖν θαυμάζεις, εἰ, ὅπου μὲν μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖ κρείττων γένῃ σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου δʼ ἀμελετήτως ἔχεις, ἐκεῖ δʼ ὁ αὐτὸς διαμένεις;
Because he is not contented with what he has studied. What does he want then?
ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰδὼς ὅτι γέγραφε καλῶς, ὅτι ἀνείληφε τὰ γεγραμμένα, φωνὴν εἰσφέρων ἡδεῖαν ὅμως ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷ; ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖται τῷ μελετῆσαι.
To be applauded by the audience. He has studied the power of speaking, then; but he has not studied censure and applause. For when did he hear from any one what applause, what censure is?
τί οὖν θέλει[ς]; ἐπαινεθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ δύνασθαι μελετᾶν ἤσκηται, πρὸς ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ ψόγον οὐκ ἤσκηται.
What is the nature of each? What kind of applause is to be sought, and what kind of censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself to study what follows from these lessons? Why do you wonder, then, if, in what he has learned, he excels others;
πότε γὰρ ἤκουσεν παρά τινος, τί ἐστιν ἔπαινος, τί ἐστι ψόγος, τίς ἑκατέρου φύσις; τοὺς ποίους τῶν ἐπαίνων διωκτέον ἢ τοὺς ποίους τῶν ψόγων φευκτέον; πότε δʼ ἐμελέτησεν ταύτην τὴν μελέτην ἀκόλουθον τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις;
but where he has not studied, he is the same with the rest of the world? Just as a musician knows how to play, sings well, and has the proper dress of his profession, yet trembles when he comes upon the stage.
τί οὖν ἔτι θαυμάζεις, εἰ, ὅπου μὲν ἔμαθεν, ἐκεῖ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπου δʼ οὐ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν;
For the first he understands; but what the multitude is, or what mean the clamor and laughter of the multitude, he does not understand.
ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς οἶδεν κιθαρίζειν, ᾁδει καλῶς, στατὸν ἔχει καλὸν καὶ ὅμως εἰσερχόμενος τρέμει· ταῦτα γὰρ οἶδεν, ὄχλος δὲ τί ἐστιν οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδʼ ὄχλου βοὴ οὐδὲ κατάγελως.
Nor does he even know what anxiety itself is; whether it be our own affair, or that of others; or whether it be possible to suppress it, or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up when he makes his exit; but if he is laughed at, the inflation is punctured, and subsides. Thus are we too affected.
ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν τί ἐστιν οἶδεν, πότερον ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀλλότριον, ἔστιν αὐτὸ παῦσαι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐὰν μὲν ἐπαινεθῇ, φυσηθεὶς ἐξῆλθεν· ἐὰν δὲ καταγελασθῇ, τὸ φυσημάτιον ἐκεῖνο ἐκεντήθη καὶ προσεκάθισεν.
What do we admire? Externals. For what do we strive? Externals. And are we then in any doubt why we fear and are anxious? What is the consequence, then, when we esteem the things that are brought upon is to be evils?
τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν. τίνα θαυμάζομεν; τὰ ἐκτός. περὶ τίνα σπουδάζομεν; περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. εἶτʼ ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς φοβούμεθα ἢ πῶς ἀγωνιῶμεν;
We cannot but fear; we cannot but be anxious. And then we say, “Lord God, how shall I avoid anxiety!”
τί οὖν ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα κακὰ ἡγώμεθα; οὐ δυνάμεθα μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα μὴ ἀγωνιᾶν.
Have you not hands, foolish man? Has not God made them for you? You might as well kneel and pray to be cured of your catarrh. Take care of your disease, rather; and do not murmur. Well;
εἶτα λέγομεν κύριε ὁ θεός, πῶς μὴ ἀγωνιῶ; μωρέ, χεῖρας οὐκ ἔχεις; οὐκ ἐποίησέν σοι αὐτὰς ὁ θεός; εὔχου νῦν καθήμενος, ὅπως αἱ μύξαι σου μὴ ῥέωσιν· ἀπόμυξαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐγκάλει.
and has he given you nothing in the present case? Has he not given you patience? Has he not given you magnanimity? Has he not given you fortitude? When you have such hands as these, do you still seek for aid from another?
τί οὖν; ἐνταῦθά σοι οὐδὲν δέδωκεν; οὐ δέδωκέ σοι καρτερίαν, οὐ δέδωκέ σοι μεγαλοψυχίαν, οὐ δέδωκεν ἀνδρείαν; τηλικαύτας ἔχων χεῖρας ἔτι ζητεῖς τὸν ἀπομύξοντα;
But we neither study nor regard these things. For give me but one who cares how he does anything, who does not regard the mete success of anything, but his own manner of acting. Who, when he is walking, regards his own action? Who, when he is deliberating, prizes the deliberation itself, and not the success that is to follow it?
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μελετῶμεν ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἐπιστρεφόμεθα. ἐπεὶ δότε μοι ἕνα, ᾧ μέλει πῶς τι ποιήσῃ, ὃς ἐπιστρέφεται οὐ τοῦ τυχεῖν τινος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ· τίς περιπατῶν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἐπιστρέφεται; τίς βουλευόμενος αὐτῆς τῆς βουλῆς, οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνου περὶ οὗ βουλεύεται;