20.2. To the Praenestine soldiers the Roman senate voted double pay and exemption from service for five years. Though rewarded for their courage with the gift of Roman citizenship, they made no change.
20.2. Praenestinis militibus senatus Romanus duplex stipendium et quinquennii militiae uacationem decreuit; ciuitate cum donarentur ob uirtutem, non mutauerunt.
20.3. As to the fate of the Perusians the report is less clear, since no light has been thrown upon it either by any record of their own or by a decree of the Romans.
20.3. Perusinorum casus obscurior fama est, quia nec ipsorum monumento ullo est illustratus nec decreto Romanorum.
20.4. At the same time the Petelini, who alone among the Bruttians had remained in the friendship of Rome, were being attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who were holding the region, but also by the rest of the Bruttians for not making common cause with them.
20.4. eodem tempore Petelinos, qui uni ex Bruttiis manserant in amicitia Romana, non Carthaginienses modo qui regionem obtinebant sed Bruttii quoque ceteri ob separata ab se consilia oppugnabant.
20.5. Unable to withstand these dangers, the Petelini sent legates to Rome to ask for a garrison. The prayers of the legates and their tears —for when ordered to shift for themselves they gave way to tearful complaints before the entrance of the Senate House —stirred great compassion among senators and people.
20.5. quibus cum obsistere malis nequirent Petelini, legatos Romam ad praesidium petendum miserunt. quorum preces lacrimaeque—in questus enim flebiles, cum sibimet ipsi consulere iussi sunt, sese in uestibulo curiae profuderunt—ingentem misericordiam patribus ac populo mouerunt, consultique iterum a M.
20.6. And when consulted a second time by Marcus Aemilius, a praetor, the senators, after surveying all the resources of the empire, were compelled to admit that they themselves no longer had any means to protect distant allies. They ordered them to return home, and having fulfilled their obligation to the last, to shift for themselves for the future as best the situation permitted.
20.6. Aemilio praetore patres circumspectis omnibus imperii uiribus fateri coacti nihil iam longinquis sociis in se praesidii esse, redire domum fideque ad ultimum expleta consulere sibimet ipsos in reliquum ltprogt praesenti fortuna iusserunt.
20.7. When this outcome of the embassy was reported at Petelia, such dejection and fear unexpectedly seized their senate that some proposed to flee, each taking any possible road, and to abandon the city, while others, since they had been deserted by their old allies, proposed to join the rest of the Bruttians and through them to surrender to Hannibal.
20.7. haec postquam renuntiata legatio Petelinis est, tantus repente maeror pauorque senatum eorum cepit ut pars profugiendi qua quisque posset ac deserendae urbis auctores essent, pars, quando deserti a ueteribus sociis essent, adiungendi se ceteris Bruttiis ac per eos dedendi Hannibali.
20.9. But those who thought nothing should be done hastily or rashly, and that they should deliberate again, prevailed.
20.9. uicit tamen ea pars quae nihil raptim nec temere agendum consulendumque de integro censuit.
20.10. When the matter was brought up in less excitement the following day, the optimates carried their point, that they should bring in everything from the farms and strengthen the city and the walls.
20.10. relata postero die per minorem trepidationem re tenuerunt optimates ut conuectis omnibus ex agris urbem ac muros firmarent.
21.1. About the same time letters from Sicily and Sardinia were brought to Rome. First to be read in the senate were those from Sicily and Titus Otacilius, the propraetor, reporting that Publius Furius, the praetor, had come with his fleet from Africa to Lilybaeum; that Furius himself had been seriously wounded and his life was in the utmost danger;
21.1. per idem fere tempus litterae ex Sicilia Sardiniaque Romam allatae. priores ex Sicilia T. Otacili propraetoris in senatu recitatae sunt: P. Furium praetorem cum classe ex Africa Lilybaeum uenisse; ipsum grauiter saucium in discrimine ultimo uitae esse; militi ac naualibus sociis neque stipendium neque frumentum ad diem dari neque unde detur esse;
21.3. that neither pay nor grain was being furnished to the soldiers and the crews at the proper date, and they had no means of doing so; that he strongly urged that both be sent as soon as possible, and that they send a successor chosen, if they saw fit, from the number of the new praetors. Much the same facts in regard to pay and grain were reported from Sardinia by Aulus Cornelius Mammula, the propraetor. To each the reply was that there was nothing on hand to send, and they were ordered to provide for their own fleets and armies.
21.3. magno opere suadere ut quam primum ea mittantur, sibique, si ita uideatur, ex nouis praetoribus successorem mittant. eademque ferme de stipendio frumentoque ab A. Cornelio Mammula propraetore ex Sardinia scripta. responsum utrique non esse unde mitteretur, iussique ipsi classibus atque exercitibus suis consulere. T. Otacilius ad unicum subsidium populi Romani, Hieronem, legatos cum misisset, in stipendium quanti argenti opus fuit et sex mensum frumentum accepit; Cornelio in Sardinia ciuitates sociae benigne contulerunt. et Romae quoque propter penuriam argenti triumuiri mensarii rogatione M. Minucii tribuni plebis facti, L. Aemilius Papus, qui consul censorque fuerat, et M. Atilius Regulus, qui bis consul fuerat, et L. Scribonius Libo, qui tum tribunus plebis erat.
21.7. Titus Otacilius sent legates to Hiero, the mainstay of the Roman people, and received what money was needed for pay, and grain for six months. In Sardinia the allied states made generous contributions to Cornelius. And at Rome besides, on account of the lack of money, three bank-commissioners were named in accordance with a bill of Marcus Minucius, a tribune of the plebs, namely, Lucius Aemilius Papus, who had been consul and censor, and Marcus Atilius Regulus, who had been consul twice, and Lucius Scribonius Libo, who was at that time a tribune of the plebs.
21.7. et duumuiri creati M. et C. Atilii aedem Concordiae, quam L. Manlius praetor uouerat, dedicauerunt; et tres pontifices creati, Q. Caecilius Metellus et Q. Fabius Maximus et Q. Fuluius Flaccus, in locum P. Scantini demortui et L. Aemili Pauli consulis et Q. Aeli Paeti, qui ceciderant pugna Cannensi. cum cetera quae continuis cladibus fortuna minuerat, quantum consiliis humanis adsequi poterant, patres explessent, tandem se quoque et solitudinem curiae paucitatemque conuenientium ad publicum consilium respexerunt;
22.3. And Marcus Atilius and Gaius Atilius, elected duumvirs, dedicated a temple of Concord, which Lucius Manlius had vowed in his praetorship.
22.3. neque enim post L. Aemilium et C. Flaminium censores senatus lectus fuerat, cum tantum senatorum aduersae pugnae, ad hoc sui quemque casus per quinquennium absumpsissent.
22.4. And three pontiffs, Quintus Caecilius Metellus and Quintus Fabius Maximus and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, were elected in place of Publius Scantinius, deceased, and of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, the consul, and Quintus Aelius Paetus, both of whom had fallen in the battle- of Cannae. XXII. After making good, in so far as they could accomplish it by human wisdom, the other losses fortune had caused by a series of disasters, the fathers at last had regard for themselves as well and for the desolate Senate House and the small number that came to the council of state. For since the censorship of Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Flaminius the list of the senate had not been revised, although the defeats and in addition the fate of individuals had in the five years carried off so large a number of senators. Marcus Aemilius, the praetor, raised that question, as all demanded that he should, since the dictator had already gone to the army after the loss of Casilinum.
22.4. cum de ea re M. Aemilius praetor, dictatore post Casilinum amissum profecto iam ad exercitum, exposcentibus cunctis rettulisset, tum Sp. Caruilius cum longa oratione non solum inopiam sed paucitatem etiam ciuium ex quibus in patres legerentur conquestus esset, explendi senatus causa et iungendi artius Latini nominis cum populo Romano magno opere se suadere dixit ut ex singulis populis Latinorum binis senatoribus, ltquibusgt patres Romani censuissent, ciuitas daretur, atque ltindegt in demortuorum locum in senatum legerentur.
22.6. Thereupon Spurius Carvilius, after complaining in a long speech, not of the lack of senators only, but also of the small number of citizens from whom men might be chosen into the senate, said that for the sake of recruiting the senate and of linking the Latins more closely with the Roman people, he strongly urged that citizenship be bestowed upon two senators from each of the Latin states, to be selected by the Roman fathers; and that from this number men be chosen into the senate in place of the deceased members.
22.6. eam sententiam haud aequioribus animis quam ipsorum quondam postulatum Latinorum patres audierunt; et cum fremitus indignantium tota curia esset et praecipue T. Manlius esse etiam nunc eius stirpis uirum diceret ex qua quondam in Capitolio consul minatus esset quem Latinum in curia uidisset eum sua manu se interfecturum, Q.
22.8. The fathers gave no more favourable hearing to this proposal than they had given to a former demand of the Latins themselves. There was a murmur of indignation everywhere in the hall, and in particular Titus Manlius said that there still lived a man of the family to which belonged the consul who on the Capitol had once threatened that he would slay with his own hand any Latin he should see in the Senate House.
22.8. Fabius Maximus nunquam rei ullius alieniore tempore mentionem factam in senatu dicit quam inter tam suspensos sociorum animos incertamque fidem id iactum quod insuper sollicitaret eos;
22.9. Upon that Quintus Fabius Maximus said that never had anything been mentioned in the senate at a more unfavourable moment than this had been broached, in the midst of such unsettled feeling and wavering loyalty among the allies, only to stir them up the more; that that rash utterance of a single man should be drowned by silence on the part of them all; and that, if there was ever any hallowed secret to be left unmentioned in the senate, this above all others must be covered, concealed, forgotten, considered unsaid.
22.9. eam unius hominis temerariam uocem silentio omnium exstinguendam esse et, si quid unquam arcani sanctiue ad silendum in curia fuerit, id omnium maxime tegendum, occulendum, obliuiscendum, pro non dicto habendum esse. ita eius rei oppressa mentio est.
22.10. So mention of the matter was suppressed. It was decided that as dictator, to draw up the list of the senate, a man should be appointed who had previously been censor and was senior to all the other living ex-censors.
22.10. dictatorem, qui censor ante fuisset uetustissimusque ex iis qui uiuerent censoriis esset, creari placuit qui senatum legeret, accirique C. Terentium consulem ad dictatorem dicendum iusserunt.
22.11. And they ordered that Gaius Terentius, the consul, be summoned that he might name a dictator. He returned to Rome by long stages from Apulia, leaving a garrison there; and that night, as was the custom, in accordance with the decree of the senate he named Marcus Fabius Buteo dictator for six months without master of the horse.
22.11. qui ex Apulia relicto ibi praesidio cum magnis itineribus Romam redisset, nocte proxima, ut mos erat, M. Fabium Buteonem ex senatus consulto sine magistro equitum dictatorem in sex menses dixit.
23.1. Fabius mounted the Rostra with his lictors and said that he did not approve of two dictators at the same time, an unprecedented thing, nor of a dictator without master of the horse, nor of conferring a censor's power upon one man, and in fact to the same man a second time, nor of giving the full military authority for six months to a dictator not appointed for the conduct of affairs.
23.1. is ubi cum lictoribus in rostra escendit, neque duos dictatores tempore uno, quod nunquam antea factum esset, probare se dixit, neque dictatorem sine magistro equitum, nec censoriam uim uni permissam et eidem iterum, nec dictatori, nisi rei gerendae causa creato, in sex menses datum imperium.
23.2. He said that he would set a limit to such possible irregularities as the crisis and necessity had occasioned.
23.2. quae immoderata fors, tempus ac necessitas fecerit, iis se modum impositurum;
23.3. For he would not eject from the senate any of those whom Gaius Flaminius and Lucius Aemilius as censors had chosen into the senate, but would order their names merely to be copied and read out, that judgment and decision in regard to the reputation and character of a senator might not rest with one man. And in place of the deceased he would make his choice in such a way that rank should obviously have been preferred to rank, not man to man.
23.3. nam neque senatu quemquam moturum ex iis quos C. Flaminius L. Aemilius censores in senatum legissent; transcribi tantum recitarique eos iussurum, ne penes unum hominem iudicium arbitriumque de fama ac moribus senatoriis fuerit; et ita in demortuorum locum sublecturum ut ordo ordini, non homo homini praelatus uideretur.
23.5. After reading the list of the old senate, he chose in place of the deceased first those who since the censorship of Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Flaminius had held a curule office and had not yet been chosen into the senate, in each case in the order of his election.
23.5. recitato uetere senatu, inde primos in demortuorum locum legit qui post L. Aemilium C. Flaminium censores curulem magistratum cepissent necdum in senatum lecti essent, ut quisque eorum primus creatus erat;
23.6. Then he chose those who had been aediles, tribunes of the people or quaestors; then, from the number of those who had not held offices, the men who had spoils of the enemy affixed to their houses or had received the civic wreath.
23.6. tum legit qui aediles, tribuni plebis, quaestoresue fuerant; tum ex iis qui ltnongt magistratus cepissent, qui spolia ex hoste fixa domi haberent aut ciuicam coronam accepissent.
23.7. Having thus chosen a hundred and seventy-seven into the senate with great approval, he at once abdicated his office and came down from the Rostra a private citizen, after ordering his lictors to leave him.
23.7. ita centum septuaginta septem cum ingenti adprobatione hominum in senatum lectis, extemplo se magistratu abdicauit priuatusque de rostris descendit lictoribus abire iussis, turbaeque se immiscuit priuatas agentium res, tempus hoc sedulo terens ne deducendi sui causa populum de foro abduceret.
23.8. And he mingled with the crowd of those engaged in private business, deliberately killing time, in order not to draw the people away from the forum for the purpose of escorting him. Yet men's attention was not relaxed by that delay, and so in large numbers they escorted him home. The consul returned that night to the army without informing the senate, for fear of being detained in the city to conduct the elections.
23.8. neque tamen elanguit cura hominum ea mora frequentesque eum domum deduxerunt. consul nocte insequenti ad exercitum redit non facto certiore senatu ne comitiorum causa in urbe retineretur.
24.1. On the next day the senate, presided over by Marcus Pomponius, the praetor, decreed that the dictator should be informed by letter that, if he thought it to the public interest, he should come with the master of the horse and the praetor, Marcus Marcellus, for the election of consuls, in order that from them in person the fathers could learn what was the condition of the state and make their plans in accordance with the facts.
24.1. postero die consultus a M. Pomponio praetore senatus decreuit dictatori scribendum uti, si e re publica censeret esse, ad consules subrogandos ueniret cum magistro equitum et praetore M. Marcello, ut ex iis praesentibus noscere patres possent quo statu res publica esset consiliaque ex rebus caperent.
24.2. All of those summoned came, leaving their lieutenants to command the legions.
24.2. qui acciti erant, omnes uenerunt relictis legatis qui legionibus praeessent.
24.3. The dictator spoke briefly and modestly of himself, and then diverted a large share of the glory to the master of the horse, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus; and he ordered the elections at which these consuls were named: Lucius Postumius for the third time, then absent with Gaul as his sphere of action, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was at that time master of the horse and curule aedile.
24.3. dictator de se pauca ac modice locutus in magistrum equitum Ti. Sempronium Gracchum magnam partem gloriae uertit comitiaque edixit, quibus L. Postumius tertium absens, qui tum Galliam prouinciam obtinebat, et Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, qui tum magister equitum et aedilis curulis erat, consules creantur.
24.4. Then the following men were elected as praetors: Marcus Valerius Laevinus for the second time, Appius Claudius Pulcher, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, Quintus Mucius Scaevola.
24.4. praetores inde creati M. Ualerius Laeuinus iterum, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, Q. Fuluius Flaccus, Q. Mucius Scaeuola.
24.5. The dictator, after the election of magistrates, returned to the army and the winter quarters at Teanum, leaving the master of the horse at Rome, in order that he, inasmuch as he was to enter upon office a few days later, might advise with the fathers in regard to enrolling and providing armies for the year.
24.5. dictator creatis magistratibus Teanum in hiberna ad exercitum redit relicto magistro equitum Romae, qui, cum post paucos dies magistratum initurus esset, de exercitibus scribendis comparandisque in annum patres consuleret.
24.6. Just as these measures were being taken, a fresh disaster was reported —for fortune was piling one upon another for that year —namely, that the consul designate, Lucius Postumius, had perished, himself and his army, in Gaul. There was a huge forest, called Litana by the Gauls, by way of which he was about to lead his army.
24.6. cum eae res maxime agerentur, noua clades nuntiata aliam super aliam cumulante in eum annum fortuna, L. Postumium consulem designatum in Gallia ipsum atque exercitum deletos.
24.7. In that forest the Gauls hacked the trees to right and left of the road in such a way that, if not disturbed, they stood, but fell if pushed slightly.
24.7. silua erat uasta—Litanam Galli uocabant— qua exercitum traducturus erat. eius siluae dextra laeuaque circa uiam Galli arbores ita inciderunt ut immotae starent, momento leui impulsae occiderent.
24.8. Postumius had two Roman legions, and had enlisted from the coast of the Upper Sea such numbers of allies that he led twenty-five thousand armed men into the enemy's territory.
24.8. legiones duas Romanas habebat Postumius, sociumque ab supero mari tantum conscripserat ut uiginti quinque milia armatorum in agros hostium induxerit.
24.9. The Gauls had surrounded the very edge of the forest, and when the column entered a defile they pushed against the outermost of the trees that had been hacked near the ground. As these fell, each upon the next tree, which was in itself unsteady and had only a slight hold, piling up from both sides they overwhelmed arms, men and horses, so that hardly ten men escaped.
24.9. Galli oram extremae siluae cum circumsedissent, ubi intrauit agmen saltum, tum extremas arborum succisarum impellunt; quae alia in aliam, instabilem per se ac male haerentem, incidentes ancipiti strage arma, uiros, equos obruerunt, ut uix decem homines effugerent.
24.10. For after very many had been killed by tree-trunks and broken branches, and the rest of the troops were alarmed by the unforeseen calamity, the Gauls under arms, surrounding the whole defile slew them, while but few out of so many were captured, —the men who were making their way to a bridge over a river, but were cut off, since the bridge had by that time been occupied by the enemy.
24.10. nam cum exanimati plerique essent arborum truncis fragmentisque ramorum, ceteram multitudinem inopinato malo trepidam Galli saltum omnem armati circumsedentes interfecerunt paucis e tanto numero captis, qui pontem fluminis petentes obsesso ante ab hostibus ponte interclusi sunt.
24.11. There Postumius fell fighting with all his might to avoid capture. Spoils taken from his body and the severed head of the general were carried in triumph by the Boians to the temple which is most revered in their land.
24.11. ibi Postumius omni ui ne caperetur dimicans occubuit. spolia corporis caputque praecisum ducis Boii ouantes templo quod sanctissimum est apud eos intulere.
24.12. Then after cleaning the head they adorned the skull with gold according to their custom. And it served them as a sacred vessel from which to pour libations at festivals and at the same time as a drinking cup for the priests and keepers of the temple.
24.12. purgato inde capite, ut mos iis est, caluam auro caelauere, idque sacrum uas iis erat quo sollemnibus libarent poculumque idem sacerdoti esset ac templi antistitibus.
24.13. The booty also meant no less to the Gauls than the victory. For although a large part of the cattle had been crushed by fallen trees, still everything else was found strewn the whole length of the column of the slain, since nothing was scattered by flight.
24.13. praeda quoque haud minor Gallis quam uictoria fuit; nam etsi magna pars animalium strage siluae oppressa erat, tamen ceterae res, quia nihil dissipatum fuga est, stratae per omnem iacentis agminis ordinem inuentae sunt.
25.1. When this disaster was reported, the city was for many days in such alarm that, in view of the stillness, like that of night, produced throughout the city by the closing of the shops, the senate charged the aediles with the duty of going about the city and ordering that shops be opened and the appearance of public mourning removed from the city.
25.1. hac nuntiata clade cum per dies multos in tanto pauore fuisset ciuitas ut tabernis clausis uelut nocturna solitudine per urbem acta senatus aedilibus negotium daret ut urbem circumirent aperirique tabernas et maestitiae publicae speciem urbi demi iuberent, tum Ti.
25.2. And then Tiberius Sempronius held a session of the senate; and he comforted the fathers, and urged that men who had not given way to the catastrophe at Cannae should not lose heart in the face of lesser disasters.
25.2. Sempronius senatum habuit consolatusque patres est, et adhortatus ne qui Cannensi ruinae non succubuissent ad minores calamitates animos summitterent:
25.3. So far as concerned the Carthaginian enemy and Hannibal, he said that, if only coming events should prove favourable, as he hoped, a Gallic war could be both safely neglected and postponed, and punishment for that treachery would be in the power of the gods and of the Roman people.
25.3. quod ad Carthaginienses hostes Hannibalemque attineret, prospera modo essent, sicut speraret, futura, Gallicum bellum et omitti tuto et differri posse ultionemque eam fraudis in deorum ac populi Romani potestate fore:
25.4. It was in regard to the Carthaginian enemy and the armies with which to carry on that war that they must deliberate and debate.
25.4. de hoste Poeno exercitibusque, per quos id bellum gereretur, consultandum atque agitandum.
25.5. He himself first stated what number of infantry and cavalry, of citizens and allies, were in the dictator's army. Then Marcellus set forth the total of his forces.
25.5. ipse primum quid peditum equitumque, quid ciuium, quid sociorum in exercitu esset dictatoris, disseruit; tum Marcellus suarum copiarum summam exposuit.
25.6. As to what troops were in Apulia with the consul Gaius Terentius, those who knew were questioned; and no method of making up consular armies strong enough for so great a war was found. And so, although righteous indignation goaded them, it was decided that Gaul should be left out of account that year. The dictator's army was assigned to the consul.
25.6. quid in Apulia cum C. Terentio consule esset a peritis quaesitum est nec unde duo consulares exercitus satis firmi ad tantum bellum efficerentur inibatur ratio. itaque Galliam, quamquam stimulabat iusta ira, omitti eo anno placuit. exercitus dictatoris consuli decretus est.
25.7. As for the army of Marcus Marcellus, it was voted that those of them who were survivors of the rout at Cannae should be transported to Sicily and serve there so long as there should be war in Italy;
25.7. de exercitu M. Marcelli, qui eorum ex fuga Cannensi essent, in Siciliam eos traduci atque ibi militare donec in Italia bellum esset placuit;
25.8. also that from the dictator's legions all the least efficient soldiers should be sent away to the same province, with no definite term of service except that of the campaigns fixed by law.
25.8. eodem ex dictatoris legionibus reici militem minimi quemque roboris nullo praestituto militiae tempore nisi quod stipendiorum legitimorum esset.
25.9. The two city legions were assigned to the other consul, to be elected in place of Lucius Postumius; and it was voted that he be elected as soon as possible with due regard to the auspices;
25.9. duae legiones urbanae alteri consuli, qui in locum L. Postumi suffectus esset, decretae sunt eumque, cum primum saluis auspiciis posset, creari placuit;
25.10. further, that two legions be summoned as soon as might be from Sicily, and that from them the consul to whom the city legions fell should take as many soldiers as he needed;
25.10. legiones praeterea duas primo quoque tempore ex Sicilia acciri, atque inde consulem, cui legiones urbanae euenissent, militum sumere quantum opus esset;
25.11. also that the command of Gaius Terentius, the consul, should be extended for one year and no reduction made in the army which he had for the defence of Apulia.
25.11. C. Terentio consuli prorogari in annum imperium neque de eo exercitu quem ad praesidium Apuliae haberet quicquam minui.
26.1. During these operations and these preparations in Italy the war in Spain was no less active, but up to that time more successful for the Romans.
26.1. dum haec in Italia geruntur apparanturque, nihilo segnius in Hispania bellum erat sed ad eam diem magis prosperum Romanis.
26.2. Publius and Gnaeus Scipio had divided the forces between them, so that Gnaeus should carry on the war on land, Publius with the fleet; and Hasdrubal, commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians, since he could not fully depend upon either arm of his forces, remained far from the enemy, being protected by distance and position, until, in answer to pleas urgent and long-continued, four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry were sent from Africa to reinforce him.
26.2. P. et Cn. Scipionibus inter se partitis copias ut Gnaeus terra, Publius nauibus rem gereret, Hasdrubal, Poenorum imperator, neutri parti uirium satis fidens, procul ab hoste interuallo ac locis tutus tenebat se, quoad multum ac diu obtestanti quattuor milia peditum et quingenti equites in supplementum missi ex Africa sunt.
26.3. Then, with hopes at last renewed, he moved his camp nearer to the enemy, and he too ordered that a fleet should be built and equipped, in order to protect the islands and the sea-coast.
26.3. tum refecta tandem spe, castra propius hostem mouit classemque et ipse instrui pararique iubet ad insulas maritimamque oram tutandam.
26.4. In the very flush of renewed operations he met a blow in the desertion of the commanders of his ships, who, being severely reprimanded after their abandonment of the fleet at the Hiberus in their fright, had never since been entirely loyal either to the general or to the cause of Carthage. These deserters had made trouble in the tribe of the Tartesii, and at their instigation a number of cities had rebelled. One city had even been stormed by them.
26.4. in ipso impetu mouendarum de integro rerum perculit eum praefectorum nauium transitio, qui post classem ad Hiberum per pauorem desertam grauiter increpiti nunquam deinde satis fidi aut duci aut Carthaginiensium rebus fuerant. fecerant hi transfugae motum in Tartesiorum gente, desciuerantque his auctoribus urbes aliquot;
26.5. It was against this tribe that the war was now diverted from the Romans, and Hasdrubal, having entered the territory of the enemy with a hostile army, resolved to attack a noble in command of the Tartesii, Chalbus, who with a strong army was keeping to his camp before the walls of a city captured a few days before.
26.5. una etiam ab ipsis ui capta fuerat. in eam gentem uersum ab Romanis bellum est, infestoque exercitu Hasdrubal ingressus agrum hostium pro captae ante dies paucos urbis moenibus Chalbum, nobilem Tartesiorum ducem, cum ualido exercitu castris se tenentem, adgredi statuit.
26.7. Therefore Hasdrubal, sending the light-armed in advance, to draw out the enemy to battle, scattered part of his cavalry over the farms to ravage them and to capture stragglers. There was confusion at the camp and at the same time flight and slaughter in the country around.
26.7. praemissa igitur leui armatura quae eliceret hostes ad certamen, equitum partem ad populandum per agros passim dimisit ltetgt ut palantes exciperent.
26.8. Then, after they had made their way from all sides back to the camp by different roads, fear was so suddenly banished from their hearts that they had sufficient spirit not only to defend the fortifications but also to attack the enemy. Accordingly they sallied out of the camp in a column, dancing, as is their custom; and their sudden boldness inspired alarm in the enemy, who a little before had been the aggressor.
26.8. simul et ad castra tumultus erat et per agros fugaque et caedes; deinde undique diuersis itineribus cum in castra se recepissent, adeo repente decessit animis pauor ut non ad munimenta modo defendenda satis animorum esset sed etiam ad lacessendum proelio hostem.
26.9. And so Hasdrubal likewise led his forces up a very steep hill, further defended by a river in front.
26.9. erumpunt igitur agmine e castris, tripudiantes more suo, repentinaque eorum audacia terrorem hosti paulo ante ultro lacessenti incussit.
26.10. Also he got back the light-armed who had been sent ahead and the scattered cavalry to the same position. Unable to put sufficient confidence in either the hill or the river, he strongly fortified his camp with an earthwork.
26.10. itaque et ipse Hasdrubal in collem satis arduum, flumine etiam obiecto tutum, copias subducit et praemissam leuem armaturam equitesque palatos eodem recipit, nec aut colli aut flumini satis fidens, castra uallo permunit.
26.11. While fear was shifting thus from one side to the other, a number of engagements took place, and the Numidian horseman was no match for the Spaniard, nor the Moorish dart-thrower for the man with the wicker shield, the Spaniard in both cases being an equal in speed and quite superior in spirit and strength.
26.11. in hoc alterno pauore certamina aliquot sunt contracta; nec Numida Hispano eques par fuit nec iaculator Maurus caetrato, uelocitate pari, robore animi uiriumque aliquantum praestanti.
27.1. After the Tartesii had repeatedly failed to draw the Carthaginian out to battle by facing his camp, and it was also not easy to assault the camp, they took by storm the city of Ascua, to which Hasdrubal, on entering the land of the enemy, had brought grain and other supplies;
27.1. postquam neque elicere Poenum ad certamen obuersati castris poterant neque castrorum oppugnatio facilis erat, urbem Ascuam, quo fines hostium ingrediens Hasdrubal frumentum commeatusque alios conuexerat, ui capiunt omnique circa agro potiuntur;
27.2. and they gained possession of all the country around.
27.2. nec iam aut in agmine aut in castris ullo imperio contineri.
27.3. And they could no longer be restrained by any authority either on the march or in camp. Hasdrubal, perceiving that this carelessness came, as usually happens, from success, exhorted his soldiers to attack the enemy while dispersed and in no formation, and coming down from the hill he proceeded to their camp in battle order.
27.3. quam ubi neglegentiam ex re, ut fit, bene gesta oriri senserat Hasdrubal, cohortatus milites ut palatos sine signis hostes adgrederentur, degressus colle pergit ire acie instructa ad castra.
27.4. When his approach was reported by messengers fleeing wildly from the watch-towers and guard-posts, they shouted “To arms!”
27.4. quem ut adesse tumultuose nuntii refugientes ex speculis stationibusque attulere, ad arma conclamatum est.
27.5. Snatching up arms, each man for himself, without commanders, without orders, in no units or formations, they dashed into battle. Already the first men had engaged, while some charged in separate masses and others had not yet left the camp.
27.5. ut quisque arma ceperat, sine imperio, sine signo, incompositi, inordinati in proelium ruunt. iam primi conseruerant manus, cum alii cateruatim currerent, alii nondum e castris exissent;
27.6. Nevertheless they at first frightened the enemy by sheer audacity. Then, as stragglers advancing against dense ranks, finding no safety in small numbers, they looked to one another for help; and, beaten back from every side, they formed a circle. And as they crowded bodies against bodies and touched arms to arms, they were forced into close quarters. Having hardly room enough to move their weapons, they were encircled by the enemy, and the slaughter continued until late in the day.
27.6. tamen primo ipsa audacia terruere hostem; deinde rari in confertos inlati, cum paucitas parum tuta esset, respicere alii alios et undique pulsi coire in orbem, et, dum corpora corporibus applicant armaque armis iungunt, in artum compulsi, cum uix mouendis armis satis spatii esset, corona hostium cincti ad multum diei caeduntur;
27.8. A very small part of them sallied out and made for the woods and the mountains. In no less alarm the camp was abandoned, and on the next day the whole tribe surrendered. Yet not for long did the tribe abide by the agreement.
27.8. exigua pars eruptione facta siluas ac montes petit. parique terrore et castra sunt deserta et uniuersa gens postero die in deditionem uenit. nec diu in pacto mansit;
27.9. For soon came the order from Carthage that Hasdrubal should at the first opportunity lead his army into Italy. And the spreading of this news throughout Spain made nearly all incline to the side of the Romans.
27.9. nam subinde ab Carthagine allatum est ut Hasdrubal primo quoque tempore in Italiam exercitum duceret, quae uolgata res per Hispaniam omnium ferme animos ad Romanos auertit.
27.10. Accordingly Hasdrubal at once sent a letter to Carthage, showing what a loss the mere report of his departure had caused; that if he were actually to leave the country, Spain would belong to the Romans before he should cross the Hiberus.
27.10. itaque Hasdrubal extemplo litteras Carthaginem mittit, indicans quanto fama profectionis suae damno fuisset: si uero inde pergeret, priusquam Hiberum transiret Romanorum Hispaniam fore;
27.11. For besides the lack of both an army and a general to leave in his place, so able were the Roman generals that they could scarcely be resisted if the forces were evenly matched.
27.11. nam praeterquam quod nec praesidium nec ducem haberet quem relinqueret pro se, eos imperatores esse Romanos quibus uix aequis uiribus resisti possit.
27.12. And so, if they had any regard for Spain, they should send him a successor with a strong army. Even if all should go well, that man would still find it no peaceful province.
27.12. itaque si ulla Hispaniae cura esset, successorem sibi cum ualido exercitu mitterent; cui si omnia prospere euenirent, non tamen otiosam prouinciam fore.
28.1. Though this letter at first greatly stirred the senate, nevertheless, since concern for Italy was older and stronger, no change was made either in regard to Hasdrubal or to his forces.
28.1. eae litterae quamquam primo admodum mouerunt senatum, tamen, quia Italiae cura prior potiorque erat, nihil de Hasdrubale neque de copiis eius mutatum est:
28.2. But Himilco was sent with a complete army and an enlarged fleet to hold and defend Spain by land and sea.
28.2. Himilco cum exercitu iusto et aucta classe ad retinendam terra marique ac tuendam Hispaniam est missus.
28.3. After transporting his land and naval forces, Himilco fortified a camp, beached his ships and surrounded them with an earthwork. Then he himself with picked horsemen, making his way with all possible speed, and with equal alertness through the wavering and the hostile tribes, reached Hasdrubal.
28.3. qui ut pedestres naualesque copias traiecit, castris communitis nauibusque subductis et uallo circumdatis cum equitibus delectis ipse, quantum maxime accelerare poterat, per dubios infestosque populos iuxta intentus ad Hasdrubalem peruenit.
28.4. After setting forth the decrees and instructions of the senate, and being himself informed in turn how the war in Spain must be conducted, he went back to his own camp, being protected by his quickness more than anything else, since he had left each place before the enemy could agree upon action.
28.4. cum decreta senatus mandataque exposuisset atque edoctus fuisset ipse in uicem quemadmodum tractandum bellum in Hispania foret, retro in sua castra rediit, nulla re quam celeritate tutior, quod undique abierat antequam consentirent.
28.5. Hasdrubal, before breaking camp, exacted money from all the tribes under his rule, knowing well that Hannibal had repeatedly bought the right of passage, and that he had Gallic auxiliaries only by hiring them;
28.5. Hasdrubal priusquam moueret castra pecunias imperat populis omnibus suae dicionis, satis gnarus Hannibalem transitus quosdam pretio mercatum nec auxilia Gallica aliter quam conducta habuisse;
28.6. but that if he had set out on so long a march without funds, he would scarcely have made his way to the Alps.
28.6. inopem tantum iter ingressum uix penetraturum ad Alpes fuisse. pecuniis igitur raptim exactis ad Hiberum descendit.
28.7. Therefore he exacted money in haste and came down to the Hiberus. When news of the decrees of the Carthaginians and Hasdrubal's expedition reached the Roman commanders, both dropped everything, and uniting their forces prepared to meet and resist his efforts, thinking that if Hannibal, who was himself an enemy Italy could scarcely endure, should be joined by Hasdrubal as a general and by an army from Spain, that would be the end of the Roman power.
28.7. decreta Carthaginiensium et Hasdrubalis iter ubi ad Romanos sunt perlata, omnibus omissis rebus ambo duces iunctis copiis ire obuiam coeptis atque obsistere parant, rati, si Hannibali, uix per se ipsi tolerando Italiae hosti, Hasdrubal dux atque Hispaniensis exercitus esset iunctus, illum finem Romani imperii fore.
28.9. Troubled by these apprehensions, they concentrated their troops at the Hiberus, crossed the river, and after protracted deliberation, whether to pitch camp near that of the enemy or to be satisfied with keeping him from his projected march by attacking allies of the Carthaginians, they prepared to attack a city which had its name Hibera from the river near by, the richest city of the region at that time.
28.9. his anxii curis ad Hiberum contrahunt copias et transito amne, cum diu consultassent utrum castra castris conferrent an satis haberent sociis Carthaginiensium oppugnandis morari ab itinere proposito hostem, urbem a propinquo flumine Hiberam appellatam, opulentissimam ea tempestate regionis eius, oppugnare parant.
28.11. On learning this Hasdrubal, instead of bringing aid to his allies, proceeded likewise to attack a city which had recently surrendered to the Romans.
28.11. quod ubi sensit Hasdrubal, pro ope ferenda sociis pergit ire ipse ad urbem deditam nuper in fidem Romanorum oppugnandam.
28.12. Thus the siege already begun was abandoned by the Romans and the war directed against Hasdrubal himself.
28.12. ita iam coepta obsidio omissa ab Romanis est et in ipsum Hasdrubalem uersum bellum.
29.1. They had their camps five miles apart for a few days, not without skirmishes, but without drawing up lines of battle.
29.1. quinque milium interuallo castra distantia habuere paucos dies nec sine leuibus proeliis nec ut in aciem exirent:
29.2. Finally on one and the same day, as though by agreement, the signal for battle was raised on both sides and with all their forces they went down into the plain. The Roman line stood in triple ranks.
29.2. tandem uno eodemque die uelut ex composito utrimque signum pugnae propositum est atque omnibus copiis in campum descensum.
29.3. Some of the light-armed were posted in the intervals between the maniples in advance of the standards, some placed behind the standards.
29.3. triplex stetit Romana acies; uelitum pars inter antesignanos locata, pars post signa accepta; equites cornua cinxere.
29.4. Cavalry covered the wings. Hasdrubal made a strong centre of Spanish troops; on the right wing he placed Carthaginians, on the left Africans and mercenary auxiliaries. Of the cavalry he stationed the Numidians on the wing of the Carthaginian infantry, the rest on that of the Africans.
29.4. Hasdrubal mediam aciem Hispanis firmat; in cornibus, dextro Poenos locat, laeuo Afros mercenariorumque auxilia; equitum Numidas Poenorum peditibus, ceteros Afris, pro cornibus apponit.
29.5. And not all of his Numidians were placed on the right wing, but only those who, taking two horses apiece after the manner of performers, had the custom of leaping armed from the tired horse to the fresh, often in the very heat of battle; such was the agility of the men, and so well-trained their breed of horses.
29.5. nec omnes Numidae in dextro locati cornu sed quibus desultorum in modum binos trahentibus equos inter acerrimam saepe pugnam in recentem equum ex fesso armatis transultare mos erat; tanta uelocitas ipsis tamque docile equorum genus est.
29.6. While they were standing in this array, the hopes of the generals on the two sides were fairly balanced; for there was also not much superiority for the one army or the other either in the number or the type of its soldiers.
29.6. cum hoc modo instructi starent, imperatorum utriusque partis haud ferme dispares spes erant; nam ne multum quidem aut numero aut genere militum hi aut illi praestabant; militibus longe dispar animus erat.
29.7. But the spirit of the soldiers was far from being matched. For the Romans, although fighting far from their country, had been easily persuaded by their generals that they were fighting in defence of Italy and the city of Rome. And so, as men whose return to their native land would depend upon the issue of that battle, they had made up their minds to win or die.
29.7. Romanis enim, quamquam procul a patria pugnarent, facile persuaserant duces pro Italia atque urbe Romana eos pugnare; itaque, uelut quibus reditus in patriam ltingt eo discrimine pugnae uerteretur, obstinauerant animis uincere aut mori.
29.8. The other battle-line had men less firmly resolved. For the majority were Spaniards, who preferred to be vanquished in Spain, rather than as victors to be dragged to Italy.
29.8. minus pertinaces uiros habebat altera acies; nam maxima pars Hispani erant, qui uinci in Hispania quam uictores in Italiam trahi malebant.
29.9. Therefore at the first clash, when they had barely hurled their javelins, the centre fell back, and, as the Romans advanced with a great charge, retreated. On the wrings, however, there was more spirited fighting.
29.9. primo igitur concursu, cum uix pila coniecta essent, rettulit pedem media acies inferentibusque se magno impetu Romanis uertit terga. nihilo segnius ltingt cornibus proelium fuit.
29.10. On the one hand the Carthaginians pressed them hard, on the other hand the Africans; and it was a double conflict against men presumed to have been surrounded.
29.10. hinc Poenus, hinc Afer urget, et uelut in circumuentos proelio ancipiti pugnant;
29.11. But, although the whole Roman line had by this time crowded into the centre, it had sufficient strength to force apart the wings of the enemy.
29.11. sed cum in medium tota iam coisset Romana acies, satis uirium ad dimouenda hostium cornua habuit.
29.12. Thus there were two battles in opposite directions. In both the Romans were unquestionably victorious, since, once the centre had been routed, they were superior both in the numbers and in the strength of their men.
29.12. ita duo diuersa proelia erant. utroque Romani, ut qui pulsis iam ante mediis et numero et robore uirorum praestarent, haud dubie superant.
29.13. A great number of men were slain there, and if the Spaniards had not fled in such confusion when the battle had scarcely begun, very few out of that entire line would have survived.
29.13. magna uis hominum ibi occisa et, nisi Hispani uixdum conserto proelio tam effuse fugissent, perpauci ex tota superfuissent acie.
29.14. The cavalry were not engaged at all, since, as soon as the Mauri and the Numidians saw the centre giving way, they at once abandoned the wings, exposed by their wild flight as they drove the elephants also before them.
29.14. equestris pugna nulla admodum fuit, quia, simul inclinatam mediam aciem Mauri Numidaeque uidere, extemplo fuga effusa nuda cornua elephantis quoque prae se actis deseruere.
29.15. Hasdrubal, after waiting for the final outcome of the battle, escaped with a few men out of the midst of the slaughter. His camp the Romans captured and plundered.
29.15. et Hasdrubal usque ad ultimum euentum pugnae moratus e media caede cum paucis effugit. castra Romani cepere atque diripuere.
29.16. That battle brought to the Roman side all that still wavered in Spain, and Hasdrubal had left to him no hope, not only of leading his army over into Italy, but not even of remaining with any safety in Spain.
29.16. ea pugna si qua dubia ltingt Hispania erant Romanis adiunxit, Hasdrubalique non modo in Italiam traducendi exercitus sed ne manendi quidem satis tuto in Hispania spes reliqua erat.
29.17. When these facts were generally known at Rome through the letter of the Scipios, people rejoiced, not so much over the victory, as that Hasdrubal's crossing into Italy had been prevented.
29.17. quae posteaquam litteris Scipionum Romae uolgata sunt, non tam uictoria quam prohibito Hasdrubalis in Italiam transitu laetabantur.
30.1. While these things were going on in Spain, Petelia, in the land of the Bruttii, was taken by Himilco, Hannibal's prefect, some months after the siege began.
30.1. dum haec in Hispania geruntur, Petelia in Bruttiis aliquot post mensibus quam coepta oppugnari erat ab Himilcone praefecto Hannibalis expugnata est.
30.2. That victory cost the Carthaginians much blood and many wounds, and starvation more than any assault overpowered the besieged.
30.2. multo sanguine ac uolneribus ea Poenis uictoria stetit nec ulla magis uis obsessos quam fames expugnauit.
30.3. For after they had consumed their food-supply in cereals and flesh, the familiar and the unfamiliar, of four-footed beasts of every kind, they finally lived on hides and grasses and roots and tender bark and leaves stripped off. And they were not overpowered until they had no strength left to stand on the walls and bear arms.
30.3. absumptis enim frugum alimentis carnisque omnis generis quadrupedum suetae ltinsuetaegtque postremo coriis herbisque et radicibus et corticibus teneris strictisque foliis uixere nec ante quam uires ad standum in muris ferendaque arma deerant expugnati sunt.
30.5. Having taken Petelia, the Carthaginian led his troops across to Consentia, and as it was less obstinately defended, he received its surrender within a few days.
30.5. recepta Petelia Poenus ad Consentiam copias traducit, quam minus pertinaciter defensam intra paucos dies in deditionem accepit.
30.6. About the same time an army of the Bruttians also besieged Croton, a Greek city formerly rich in arms and men, but even then so crushed by many great disasters that, including all ages, less than two thousand citizens remained.
30.6. iisdem ferme diebus et Bruttiorum exercitus Crotonem, Graecam urbem, circumsedit, opulentam quondam armis uirisque, tum iam adeo multis magnisque cladibus adflictam ut omnis aetatis minus duo milia ciuium superessent.
30.7. And so the enemy easily gained possession of the city bereft of its defenders. Only the citadel was still held, and to it some, in the uproar of a captured city, made their escape out of the midst of slaughter.
30.7. itaque urbe a defensoribus uasta facile potiti hostes sunt: arx tantum retenta, in quam inter tumultum captae urbis e media caede quidam effugere.
30.8. And Locri went over to the Bruttians and Carthaginians, the populace having been betrayed by the leading men.
30.8. et Locrenses desciuere ad Bruttios Poenosque prodita multitudine a principibus.
30.9. Regium alone in that region remained loyal to the Romans and to the very last independent. The same trend of feeling reached Sicily also, and even the house of Hiero did not hold aloof entirely from the revolt.
30.9. Regini tantummodo regionis eius et in fide erga Romanos et potestatis suae ad ultimum manserunt.