10.9. The armies were divided as follows: to one of the consuls the army which Gaius Claudius had had as consul in the preceding year, to the other consul that which Quintus Claudius had had as propraetor; and these were of two legions each.
10.9. praetores exinde sortiti sunt M. Caecilius Metellus urbanam, Q. Mamilius peregrinam, C. Seruilius Siciliam, Ti. Claudius Sardiniam. exercitus ita diuisi: consulum alteri quem C. Claudius prioris anni consul, alteri quem Q. Claudius propraetor—eae binae legiones erant—habuisset exercitum: in Etruria duas uolonum legiones a C.
10.11. In Etruria Marcus Livius as proconsul, with his command continued for one year, was to take the two legions of slave-volunteers from Gaius Terentius, the propraetor;
10.11. Terentio propraetore M. Liuius proconsul, cui prorogatum in annum imperium erat, acciperet, et Q.
10.12. and it was decreed that Quintus Mamilius, handing over his judicial duties to his colleague, should have command of Gaul with the army which Lucius Porcius, the praetor, had commanded; and he was ordered to lay waste the lands of the Gauls who had revolted to the Carthaginians upon the coming of Hasdrubal.
10.12. Mamilius ut collegae iurisdictione tradita Galliam cum exercitu cui L. Porcius praetor praefuerat obtineret decretum est, iussusque populari agros Gallorum qui ad Poenos sub aduentum Hasdrubalis defecissent.
10.13. The defence of Sicily was given to Gaius Servilius with the two legions from Cannae, just as Gaius Mamilius had held it.
10.13. C. Seruilio cum Cannensibus duabus legionibus, sicut C. Mamilius tenuerat, Sicilia tuenda data.
10.14. From Sardinia the old army which Aulus Hostilius had commanded was withdrawn. A new legion which Tiberius Claudius should take across with him was enrolled by the consuls.
10.14. ex Sardinia uetus exercitus, cui A. Hostilius praefuerat, deportatus; nouam legionem quam Ti. Claudius traiceret secum consules conscripserunt.
10.15. Military authority was continued for the year for Quintus Claudius, to have Tarentum as his assignment, and for Gaius Hostilius Tubulus, who was to have Capua.
10.15. Q. Claudio ut Tarentum, C. Hostilio Tubulo ut Capuam prouinciam haberet prorogatum in annum imperium est.
10.16. Marcus Valerius, the proconsul, who had been in charge of the defence of the entire seacoast of Sicily, was ordered to turn over thirty ships to Gaius Servilius, the praetor, and to return to the city with all the rest of his fleet.
10.16. M. Ualerius proconsul, qui tuendae circa Siciliam maritimae orae praefuerat, triginta nauibus C. Seruilio praetori traditis cum cetera omni classe redire ad urbem iussus.
11.1. In the state perturbed by so critical a moment in the war, since men attributed to the gods the causes of everything fortunate and unfortunate, many portents were reported: that at Tarracina the temple of Jupiter, at Satricum that of Mater Matuta, had been struck by lightning.
11.1. in ciuitate tanto discrimine belli sollicita cum omnium secundorum aduersorumque causas in deos uerterent, multa prodigia nuntiabantur:
11.2. The people of Satricum were no less alarmed by two serpents that glided into the temple of Jupiter, actually through the doorway. From Antium it was reported that ears of grain appeared to the reapers to be blood-stained.
11.2. Tarracinae Iouis aedem, Satrici Matris Matutae de caelo tactam; Satricanos haud minus terrebant in aedem Iouis foribus ipsis duo perlapsi angues; ab Antio nuntiatum est cruentas spicas metentibus uisas esse;
11.3. At Caere a pig had been born with two heads and a lamb that was at the same time male and female; and at Alba they said that two suns were seen, and at Fregellae that light had appeared in the night;
11.3. Caere porcus biceps et agnus mas idem feminaque natus erat; et Albae duo soles uisos ferebant et nocte Fregellis lucem obortam;
11.4. and an ox was said to have spoken in the country about Rome, and the altar of Neptune in the Flaminian Circus to have been dripping with sweat;
11.4. et bos in agro Romano locutus et ara Neptuni multo manasse sudore in circo Flaminio dicebatur; et aedes Cereris Salutis Quirini de caelo tactae.
11.5. and the temples of Ceres and Salus and Quirinus to have been struck by lightning. The consuls were bidden to expiate the prodigies with full-grown victims and to have a single day of prayer observed.
11.5. prodigia consules hostiis maioribus procurare iussi et supplicationem unum diem habere—ea ex senatus consulto facta —:
11.6. Both orders were carried out in accordance with the decree of the senate. More terrifying to men than all the prodigies, whether reported from outside or seen in the city, was the extinction of the fire in the Temple of Vesta; and the Vestal who had been on duty that night was scourged by order of Publius Licinius, the pontifex.
11.6. plus omnibus aut nuntiatis peregre aut uisis domi prodigiis terruit animos hominum ignis in aede Uestae exstinctus, caesaque flagro est Uestalis cuius custodia eius noctis fuerat iussu P. Licini pontificis.
11.7. Although the thing had happened without a portent from the gods but by a mortal's negligence, it was nevertheless decided that it should be expiated by full-grown victims and that a day of prayer at the Temple of Vesta should be observed.
11.7. id quamquam nihil portendentibus dis ceterum neglegentia humana acciderat, tamen et hostiis maioribus procurari et supplicationem ad Uestae haberi placuit. priusquam proficiscerentur consules ad bellum moniti a senatu sunt ut in agros reducendae plebis curam haberent:
11.8. Before the consuls should leave for the field they were reminded by the senate that they should take care to restore the common people to their farms. By the favour of the gods the war had been removed, they said, from the city of Rome and from Latium, and it was possible to live on the farms without fear; it was illogical to give more attention to the cultivation of Sicily than of Italy.
11.8. deum benignitate summotum bellum ab urbe Romana et Latio esse et posse sine metu in agris habitari; minime conuenire Siciliae quam Italiae colendae maiorem curam esse. sed res haudquaquam erat populo facilis et liberis cultoribus bello absumptis et inopia seruitiorum et pecore direpto uillisque dirutis aut incensis;
11.9. But it was no easy matter for the people, since free farmers had been wiped out by the war, and there was a scarcity of slaves, while cattle had been stolen and farm-houses demolished or burned.
11.9. magna tamen pars auctoritate consulum compulsa in agros remigrauit.
11.10. A large proportion of the rustics, however, were constrained by the authority of the consuls to move back to their farms. The occasion for bringing up the matter had been the complaints of representatives of Placentia and Cremona that their territory was being raided and laid waste by neighbouring Gauls, and that a large part of their colonists had scattered, and that now they had sparsely peopled cities and land desolated and deserted.
11.10. mouerant autem huiusce rei mentionem Placentinorum et Cremonensium legati querentes agrum suum ab accolis Gallis incursari ac uastari, magnamque partem colonorum suorum dilapsam esse, et iam infrequentes se urbes, agrum uastum ac desertum habere.
11.11. Mamilius, the praetor, was ordered to protect the colonies from the enemy. The consuls in accordance with a decree of the senate proclaimed that all citizens of Cremona and Placentia should return to their colonies before a fixed date.
11.11. Mamilio praetori mandatum ut colonias ab hoste tueretur: consules ex senatus consulto edixerunt ut qui ciues Cremonenses atque Placentini essent ante certam diem in colonias reuerterentur. principio deinde ueris et ipsi ad bellum profecti sunt.
11.12. Then at the beginning of spring they also set out for the field. Quintus Caecilius, the consul, received his army from Gaius Nero; Lucius Veturius took his from Quintus Claudius, the propraetor, and recruited it with fresh soldiers whom he had himself enrolled.
11.12. Q. Caecilius consul exercitum ab C. Nerone, L. Ueturius a Q. Claudio propraetore accepit, nouisque militibus quos ipse conscripserat suppleuit.
11.13. The consuls led their army into the territory of Consentia and ravaged it far and wide. When the column was now laden with booty, they were so harried by Bruttians and Numidian spearmen in a narrow pass that not only the booty but also the troops were in danger. However, there was more commotion than battle; and sending the booty in advance the legions without loss made their way out into arable country.
11.13. in Consentinum agrum consules exercitum duxerunt, passimque depopulati, cum agmen iam graue praeda esset, in saltu angusto a Bruttiis iaculatoribusque Numidis turbati sunt ita ut non praeda tantum sed armati quoque in periculo fuerint. maior tamen tumultus quam pugna fuit, et praemissa praeda incolumes legiones in loca culta euasere.
11.15. Thence the consuls set out for Lucania. That entire nation returned without a struggle to its allegiance to the Roman people.
11.15. inde in Lucanos profecti; ea sine certamine tota gens in dicionem populi Romani rediit.
12.1. With Hannibal there was no campaigning that year. For neither did he invite attack, owing to his very recent wound, a blow national as well as personal, nor did the Romans provoke him so long as he remained inactive; such power they believed to be present in that one commander, even though everything else round him crashed.
12.1. cum Hannibale nihil eo anno rei gestum est. nam neque ipse se obtulit in tam recenti uolnere publico priuatoque neque lacessierunt quietum Romani; tantam inesse uim etsi omnia alia circa eum ruerent in uno illo duce censebant.
12.2. And I am inclined to think he was more marvellous in adversity than in success. For here he was, carrying on war in the enemy's land for thirteen years, so far from home with varying fortune, having an army not made up of his own citizens but a mixture of the offscourings of all nations, men who had in common no law, no custom, no language, differing from each other in bearing, in garb, in their arms, differing as to religious rites, sacred observances, one might almost say as to their gods.
12.2. ac nescio an mirabilior aduersis quam secundis rebus fuerit, quippe qui cum in hostium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab domo, uaria fortuna bellum gereret, exercitu non suo ciuili sed mixto ex conluuione omnium gentium, quibus non lex,
12.4. Yet he somehow bound them together by a single bond, so that no outbreak ensued among the men themselves nor any mutiny against their general. Yet in the enemy's country both money to pay them and supplies were often wanting —deficiencies which in the previous Punic war had given rise to many unspeakable acts on the part of commanders and soldiers.
12.4. non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia uestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope di essent, ita quodam uno uinculo copulauerit eos ut nulla nec inter ipsos nec aduersus ducem seditio exstiterit, cum et pecunia saepe in stipendium et commeatus in hostium agro deesset, quorum inopia priore Punico bello multa infanda inter duces militesque commissa fuerant.
12.6. Certainly after the destruction of Hasdrubal's army with its commander-and on them he had rested all his hope of victory —, when by retiring into the remote land of the Bruttii he had given up the rest of Italy, who would not find it a marvel that there was no outbreak in his camp?
12.6. post Hasdrubalis uero exercitum cum duce in quibus spes omnis reposita uictoriae fuerat deletum cedendoque in angulum Bruttium cetera Italia concessum, cui non uideatur mirabile nullum motum in castris factum?
12.7. For added to everything else was this also, that he had no hope even of feeding his army except from the Bruttian region; and even supposing all of it to be under cultivation, it was nevertheless too small to feed so large an army.
12.7. nam ad cetera id quoque accesserat ut ne alendi quidem exercitus nisi ex Bruttio agro spes esset, qui ut omnis coleretur exiguus tamen tanto alendo exercitui erat;
12.8. Moreover a great part of the young men, drawn off from the farming of the land, had been claimed instead by the war and by their custom of training soldiers through brigandage, a practice viciously inbred in their nation.
12.8. tum magnam partem iuuentutis abstractam a cultu agrorum bellum occupauerat et mos uitio etiam insitus genti per latrocinia militiam exercendi;
12.9. Furthermore, nothing was being sent from home, since they were concerned about their hold upon Spain, as though everything was succeeding in Italy. In Spain the campaign was having an issue in part the same, in part very different: the same in that the Carthaginians, vanquished in battle with the loss of a general, had been forced to the farthest coast of Spain, even to the Ocean;
12.9. nec ab domo quicquam mittebatur, de Hispania retinenda sollicitis tamquam omnia prospera in Italia essent. in Hispania res quadam ex parte eandem fortunam, quadam longe disparem habebant;
12.10. on the other hand different in that Spain, owing to the nature of the country and its people, was better adapted not merely than Italy but than any other part of the world to preparing for another war.
12.10. eandem quod proelio uicti Carthaginienses duce amisso in ultimam Hispaniae oram usque ad Oceanum compulsi erant, disparem autem quod Hispania non quam Italia modo sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat locorum hominumque ingeniis.
12.12. In consequence, though the first of the provinces, at least of those on the mainland, to be entered by the Romans, it has been the last of all to be completely conquered, and not until our own times under the command and auspices of Augustus Caesar.
12.12. itaque ergo prima Romanis inita prouinciarum, quae quidem continentis sint, postrema omnium nostra demum aetate ductu auspicioque Augusti Caesaris perdomita est.
12.13. There Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, being the greatest and most distinguished general after the Barca family in that war, had at that time returned from Gades in the hope of renewing the war. After conducting levies in Farther Spain with the help of Mago the son of Hamilcar, he armed about fifty thousand infantry and four thousand five hundred cavalry.
12.13. ibi tum Hasdrubal Gisgonis, maximus clarissimusque eo bello secundum Barcinos dux, regressus ab Gadibus rebellandi spe, adiuuante Magone Hamilcaris filio dilectibus per ulteriorem Hispaniam habitis ad quinquaginta milia peditum, quattuor milia et quingentos equites armauit.
12.14. As to the cavalry forces there is substantial agreement among the authorities, but some writers state that seventy thousand foot-soldiers were brought to the city of Silpia.
12.14. de equestribus copiis ferme inter auctores conuenit: peditum septuaginta milia quidam adducta ad Silpiam urbem scribunt.
12.15. There in open plains the two Carthaginian generals established themselves, resolved not to refuse a battle.
12.15. ibi super campos patentes duo duces Poeni ea mente ne detractarent certamen consederunt.
13.1. Scipio, when the news reached him that they had got together so large an army, thought that with Roman legions alone he would be no match for such a multitude unless barbarian auxiliaries should confront them, at least for appearance' sake. Yet he felt that these must not compose so large a part of his forces that by changing sides —which had been the cause of disaster to his father and uncle —they might decide the outcome.
13.1. Scipio cum ad eum fama tanti comparati exercitus perlata esset, neque Romanis legionibus tantae se parem multitudini ratus ut non in speciem saltem opponerentur barbarorum auxilia, neque in iis tamen tantum uirium ponendum ut mutando fidem, quae cladis causa fuisset patri patruoque,
13.3. Accordingly he sent Silanus in advance to Culchas, who ruled over twenty-eight towns, in order to receive from him the cavalry and infantry which he had promised to enlist during the winter. Then Scipio himself set out from Tarraco, and gathering up as he went a moderate number of auxiliaries from the allies dwelling near the road, he arrived at Castulo.
13.3. magnum momentum facerent, praemisso Silano ad Culcham, duodetriginta oppidis regnantem, ut equites peditesque ab eo quos se per hiemem conscripturum pollicitus erat acciperet, ipse ab Tarracone profectus protinus ab sociis qui accolunt uiam modica contrahendo auxilia Castulonem peruenit.
13.5. Thither Silanus brought auxiliaries, three thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. From there Scipio advanced to the city of Baecula with the entire army, forty-five thousand legionaries and allies, infantry and cavalry.
13.5. eo adducta ab Silano auxilia, tria milia peditum et quingenti equites. inde ad Baeculam urbem processum cum omni exercitu ciuium, sociorum, peditum equitumque quinque et quadraginta milibus.
13.6. As they were pitching camp Mago and Masinissa with all their cavalry attacked them and would have thrown the men working on the fortifications into confusion, had not cavalry concealed by Scipio behind a hill favourably situated for the purpose unexpectedly charged them in their disorder.
13.6. castra ponentes eos Mago et Masinissa cum omni equitatu adgressi sunt, turbassentque munientes ni abditi post tumulum opportune ad id positum ab Scipione equites improuiso in effusos incurrissent.
13.7. These horsemen at the very beginning of the battle put to flight the most active and those who had been the first to ride up close to the earthwork and even among the men at work. With the rest, who had advanced under their standards and in marching order, the battle was more protracted and for a long time indecisive.
13.7. ii promptissimum quemque et proxime uallum atque in ipsos munitores primum inuectum uixdum proelio inito fuderunt: cum ceteris, qui sub signis atque ordine agminis incesserant, longior et diu ambigua pugna fuit.
13.8. But when light cohorts at first drawn off from the outposts, and then soldiers withdrawn from work on the fortifications and ordered to take up arms, came up in increasing number, and fresh to assist the weary, while by this time a long column of men under arms was dashing out from camp into battle, Carthaginians and Numidians thereupon faced about in unmistakable retreat.
13.8. sed cum ab stationibus primum expeditae cohortes, deinde ex opere deducti milites atque arma capere iussi plures usque et integri fessis subirent magnumque iam agmen armatorum a castris in proelium rueret, terga haud dubie uertunt Poeni Numidaeque.
13.9. And at first they were retiring by troops, while their ranks were not at all broken on account of fear or haste. Then when the Roman fell more fiercely upon their rear and the attack could not be withstood, no longer mindful of their ranks, they scattered in flight hither and thither, each taking the shortest way.
13.9. et primo turmatim abibant, nihil propter pauorem festinationemue confusis ordinibus; dein, postquam acrius ultimis incidebat Romanus neque sustineri impetus poterat, nihil iam ordinum memores passim qua cuique proximum fuit in fugam effunduntur.
13.10. And although the spirit of the Romans was notably higher in consequence of that battle and that of the enemy notably lowered, still for some days following there was never any respite from sudden attacks by cavalry and light-armed.
13.10. et quamquam eo proelio aliquantum et Romanis aucti et deminuti hostibus animi erant, tamen nunquam per aliquot insequentes dies ab excursionibus equitum leuisque armaturae cessatum est.
14.1. When his forces had been sufficiently tested by these skirmishes, Hasdrubal was the first to lead his troops out into battle-line; then the Roman also went forward.
14.1. ubi satis temptatae per haec leuia certamina uires sunt, prior Hasdrubal in aciem copias eduxit, deinde et Romani processere;
14.2. But each of the two lines stood drawn up in front of its earthwork, and when neither side had begun the battle and the day was now nearing sunset, the troops were led back into camp, first by the Carthaginian and then by the Roman. The same thing happened for a number of days.
14.2. sed utraque acies pro uallo stetit instructa, et cum ab neutris pugna coepta esset, iam die ad occasum inclinante a Poeno prius, deinde ab Romano in castra copiae reductae. hoc idem per dies aliquot factum.
14.3. Always the first to lead his troops out of camp, the first to sound the recall for his men weary of standing still, would be the Carthaginian. From neither side was there a charge, or a missile hurled, or any raising of a shout.
14.3. prior semper Poenus copias castris educebat, prior fessis stando signum receptui dabat; ab neutra parte procursum telumue missum aut uox ulla orta.
14.4. The centre was held on one side by the Romans, on the other by the Carthaginians combined with Africans, the wings by their allies, and for both armies these were Spanish troops.
14.4. mediam aciem hinc Romani illinc Carthaginienses mixti Afris, cornua socii tenebant—erant autem utrisque Hispani—; pro cornibus ante Punicam aciem elephanti castellorum procul speciem praebebant.
14.5. In front of the wings, in advance of the Punic line of battle, the elephants presented from a distance the appearance of forts.
14.5. iam hoc in utrisque castris sermonis erat, ita ut instructi stetissent pugnaturos; medias acies, Romanum Poenumque, quos inter belli causa esset, pari robore animorum armorumque concursuros.
14.6. Already it was common talk in both camps that they were to fight in the formation in which they had stood; that the centres, the Roman and Carthaginian troops, between whom lay the cause of the war, would clash, evenly matched in spirit and in arms.
14.6. Scipio ubi hoc obstinate credi animaduertit, omnia de industria in eum diem quo pugnaturus erat mutauit.
14.7. When Scipio observed that this was a persistent belief, he deliberately changed everything for the day on which he was to give battle. At evening he passed a written order through the camp that before daybreak the horses should be cared for and the men have breakfast, that the horsemen under arms should keep their mounts bridled and saddled. It was not yet quite daylight when he sent all his cavalry with the light-armed against the Punic outposts.
14.7. tesseram uesperi per castra dedit ut ante lucem uiri equique curati pransi essent, armatus eques frenatos instratosque teneret equos. uixdum satis certa luce equitatum omnem cum leui armatura in stationes Punicas immisit; inde confestim ipse cum graui agmine legionum procedit, praeter opinionem destinatam suorum hostiumque Romano milite cornibus firmatis, sociis in mediam aciem acceptis.
14.10. Immediately afterwards he himself with the heavy column of the legions went forward, and contrary to the fixed idea of his own men and of the enemy, he formed strong wings of his Roman soldiers, while the allies were taken into the centre.
14.10. Hasdrubal clamore equitum excitatus ut ex tabernaculo prosiluit tumultumque ante uallum et trepidationem suorum et procul signa legionum fulgentia plenosque hostium campos uidit, equitatum omnem extemplo in equites emittit;
14.11. When Hasdrubal, who was aroused by the shouts of the horsemen, sprang out of his tent and saw the uproar outside his earthwork and the excitement among his men, and in the distance the gleaming standards of the legions and the plain filled with the enemy, he forthwith sent out all his cavalry against the horsemen. As for himself, he marched out of the camp with the infantry column, and in drawing up his line made no change from the customary order.
14.11. ipse cum peditum agmine castris egreditur, nec ex ordine solito quicquam acie instruenda mutat. equitum iam diu anceps pugna erat nec ipsa per se decerni poterat quia pulsis, quod prope in uicem fiebat, in aciem peditum tutus receptus erat;
14.13. The cavalry engagement had long been uncertain, and by itself it could not be decisive because when repulsed —and this repeatedly happened almost by turns —they could safely retire into the infantry line.
14.13. sed ubi iam haud plus quingentos passus acies inter sese aberant, signo receptui dato Scipio patefactisque ordinibus equitatum omnem leuemque armaturam in medium acceptam diuisamque in partes duas in subsidiis post cornua locat.
14.14. But when the lines of battle were not more than half a mile apart, Scipio sounding the recall and opening his ranks admitted all the cavalry and the light-armed into the centre; and dividing them into two sections he posted them as a reserve behind the wings.
14.14. inde ubi incipiendae iam pugnae tempus erat, Hispanos— ea media acies fuit—presso gradu incedere iubet;
14.15. Then, when it was now time to begin the battle, he ordered the Spaniards —they formed the centre of the line-to advance at a slow pace. From the right wing —for he was himself in command there —he sent a message to Silanus and Marcius that they should prolong their wing towards the left, just as they had seen him pressing to the right, and with the light infantry and cavalry should engage the enemy before the centres could come together.
14.15. ipse e dextro cornu—ibi namque praeerat—nuntium ad Silanum et Marcium mittit ut cornu extenderent in sinistram partem quemadmodum se tendentem ad dextram uidissent, et cum expeditis peditum equitumque prius pugnam consererent cum hoste quam coire inter se mediae acies possent. ita diductis cornibus cum ternis peditum cohortibus ternisque equitum turmis, ad hoc uelitibus, citato gradu in hostem ducebant sequentibus in obliquum aliis;
14.18. Thus extending the wings, with three cohorts of infantry and three troops of cavalry on each wing, and with skirmishers in addition, they led at a rapid pace against the enemy, while the rest followed them obliquely. In the centre was a curve where the Spanish units were more slowly advancing. By this time the wings were already engaged, while the main strength of the enemy's line, the veteran Carthaginians and Africans, had not yet come within range, and did not dare to dash towards the wings to help the combatants, for fear of exposing the centre to the enemy directly advancing.
14.18. sinus in medio erat, qua segnius Hispanorum signa incedebant. et iam conflixerant cornua cum quod roboris in acie hostium erat, Poeni ueterani Afrique, nondum ad teli coniectum uenissent, neque in cornua ut adiuuarent pugnantes discurrere auderent ne aperirent mediam aciem uenienti ex aduerso hosti. cornua ancipiti proelio urgebantur; eques leuisque armatura ltacgt uelites circumductis alis in latera incurrebant: cohortes a fronte urgebant ut abrumperent cornua a cetera acie; et cum ab omni parte haudquaquam par pugna erat, tum quod turba Baliarium tironumque Hispanorum Romano Latinoque militi obiecta erat. et procedente iam die uires etiam deficere Hasdrubalis exercitum coeperant, oppressos matutino tumultu coactosque priusquam cibo corpora firmarent raptim in aciem exire; et ad id sedulo diem extraxerat Scipio ut sera pugna esset; nam ab septima demum hora peditum signa cornibus incucurrerunt;
15.4. The wings were being hard pressed by a double attack; cavalry and light-armed and skirmishers with enclosing wings were charging into their flanks, while the cohorts were pressing them in front, endeavouring to cut off the wings from the rest of the battle-line. XV. And not only was the battle in general far from being evenly matched, but especially because the horde of Baliares and Spanish recruits had been made to face Roman and Latin soldiers.
15.4. ad medias acies aliquanto serius peruenit pugna, ita ut prius aestus a meridiano sole laborque standi sub armis et simul fames sitisque corpora adficerent quam manus cum hoste consererent.
15.5. Besides, as the day now wore on their strength also began to fail Hasdrubal's soldiers, who had been surprised by an early morning onslaught and compelled to go out into line in haste before they could take food to sustain them.
15.5. itaque steterunt scutis innixi. iam super cetera elephanti etiam tumultuoso genere pugnae equitum uelitumque et leuis armaturae consternati e cornibus in mediam aciem sese intulerant.
15.6. And Scipio had deliberately dragged out the day, in order that the battle might be belated. For it was not until the seventh hour that the infantry units charged the wings.
15.6. fessi igitur corporibus animisque rettulere pedem, ordines tamen seruantes haud secus quam si imperio ducis cederet integra acies.
15.7. The battle reached the centre of the lines considerably later, so that the heat of the midday sun and the strain of standing under arms, and at the same time hunger and thirst, weakened their bodies before they engaged the enemy. Accordingly they stood resting on their shields. By this time, in addition to everything else, the elephants also took fright at the skirmishing tactics of cavalry and skirmishers and light-armed and had shifted from the wings into the centre. Weakened therefore in body and spirit the men retreated, keeping their ranks nevertheless, just as if by order of the general the line was giving way intact.
15.7. sed cum eo ipso acrius ubi inclinatam sensere rem uictores se undique inueherent, nec facile impetus sustineri posset quamquam retinebat obsistebatque cedentibus Hasdrubal ab tergo esse colles tutumque receptum si modice se reciperent clamitans, tamen uincente metu uerecundiam cum proximus quisque hostem cederet, terga extemplo data, atque in fugam sese omnes effuderunt. ac primo consistere signa in radicibus collium ac reuocare in ordines militem coeperant cunctantibus in aduersum collem erigere aciem Romanis; deinde ut inferri impigre signa uiderunt, integrata fuga in castra pauidi compelluntur.
15.10. But when the victors, on seeing that the tide of battle had turned, for that reason charged with more spirit from all sides, and it was not easy to withstand their attack, although Hasdrubal tried to hold his men back and confronted them as they gave way, shouting to them again and again that in the rear there were hills and a safe refuge if they retired slowly.
15.10. nec procul uallo Romanus aberat; cepissetque tanto impetu castra nisi ex uehementi sole, qualis inter graues imbre nubes effulget, tanta uis aquae deiecta esset ut uix in castra sua receperint se uictores, quosdam etiam religio ceperit ulterius quicquam eo die conandi.
15.11. Nevertheless, as fear overcame their respect for him and those nearest to the enemy were falling, at once they faced about and all took to flight. And at first the standard-bearers began to halt at the foot of the hills and to call the soldiers back into their ranks, while the Romans hesitated to advance their line up the hill. Then when the enemy saw the standards coming bravely on, they resumed their flight and were driven panic-stricken into camp. Not far from the earthwork were the Romans; and by such momentum they would have captured the camp if, after a blazing sun, such as shines out in the midst of clouds heavy with rain, there had not been so extraordinary a downpour that the victors with difficulty retired to their camp, and had not some been beset by scruples also against any further attempt that day.
15.11. Carthaginienses, quamquam fessos labore ac uolneribus nox imberque ad necessariam quietem uocabat, tamen quia metus et periculum cessandi non dabat tempus prima luce oppugnaturis hostibus castra, saxis undique circa ex propinquis uallibus congestis augent uallum, munimento sese quando in armis parum praesidii foret defensuri;
15.13. The Carthaginians, although night and pouring rain invited them to needed rest, being weak from exertion and wounds, nevertheless, because fear and danger gave them no time to be idle when the enemy would attack the camp at daybreak, raised their earthwork by gathering stones from near-by valleys all round, intending to defend themselves by a fortification, since in their arms they would have no sufficient protection. But the desertion of their allies made flight seem safer than delay.
15.13. sed transitio sociorum fuga ut tutior mora uideretur fecit. principium defectionis ab Attene regulo Turdetanorum factum est; is cum magna popularium manu transfugit; inde duo munita oppida cum praesidiis tradita a praefectis Romano;
15.15. Defection began with Attenes, prince of the Turdetani, who deserted with a large force of his tribesmen. Then two fortified towns were handed over with their garrisons to the Roman by their commanders. And for fear the mischief might spread farther, now that men were once disposed to change sides, Hasdrubal moved his camp in the silence of the following night. Scipio, when men on outpost duty reported at daylight that the enemy had left, sent his cavalry ahead and ordered the standards to advance.
15.15. et ne latius inclinatis semel ad defectionem animis serperet res, silentio proximae noctis Hasdrubal castra mouet. Scipio, ut prima luce qui in stationibus erant rettulerunt profectos hostes, praemisso equitatu signa ferri iubet;
16.2. The column also marched at such a pace that, if they had directly followed the enemy's track, they would undoubtedly have overtaken them. They believed the guides that there was another shorter road to the river Baetis, by which they might attack the enemy while crossing over.
16.2. adeoque citato agmine ducti sunt ut, si uia recta uestigia sequentes issent, haud dubie adsecuturi fuerint: ducibus est creditum breuius aliud esse iter ad Baetim fluuium ut transeuntes adgrederentur.
16.3. Hasdrubal, finding the passage of the river closed, turned aside towards the Ocean, and henceforward, scattering like fugitives, away they went. Thus he put a considerable distance between himself and the Roman legions.
16.3. Hasdrubal clauso transitu fluminis ad Oceanum flectit, et iam inde fugientium modo effusi abibant; itaque ab legionibus Romanis aliquantum interualli fecit.
16.4. Cavalry and light-armed, dashing upon them now from the rear, now on the flanks, kept wearing them out and delaying them. But when in view of the numerous clashes the standards came to a halt and the men were engaged now with cavalry, now with skirmishers and auxiliary infantry, the legions came up.
16.4. eques leuisque armatura nunc ab tergo nunc ab lateribus occurrendo fatigabat morabaturque, sed cum ad crebros tumultus signa consisterent et nunc equestria nunc cum uelitibus auxiliisque peditum proelia consererent, superuenerunt legiones.
16.6. Thereafter it was no longer a battle but a slaughter as of cattle, until the general, himself now approving their flight, escaped to the nearest hills with some six thousand half-armed men. The rest were slain or captured.
16.6. inde non iam pugna sed trucidatio uelut pecorum fieri donec ipse dux fugae auctor in proximos colles cum sex millibus ferme semermium euasit; ceteri caesi captique.
16.7. The Carthaginians hastily fortified an improvised camp on a very high hill and from it they defended themselves without difficulty, since the enemy had tried in vain to come up the steep slope.
16.7. castra tumultuaria raptim Poeni tumulo editissimo communiuerunt, atque inde cum hostis nequiquam subire iniquo adscensu conatus esset haud difficulter sese tutati sunt.
16.8. But in an exposed situation which furnished nothing a siege was scarcely endurable even for a few days. Accordingly there were repeated desertions to the enemy. Finally the general himself sent for ships — the sea was not far away —and leaving his army by night he escaped to Gades.
16.8. sed obsidio in loco nudo atque inopi uix in paucos dies tolerabilis erat; itaque transitiones ad hostem fiebant. postremo dux ipse nauibus accitis—nec procul inde aberat mare—nocte relicto exercitu Gades perfugit.
16.9. Scipio, learning of the flight of the enemy's general, left Silanus ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry to besiege the camp.
16.9. Scipio fuga ducis hostium audita decem milia peditum mille equites relinquit Silano ad castrorum obsidionem;
16.10. With the rest of the forces he himself returned to Tarraco in seventy days' marches, hearing the cases of chiefs and states as he proceeded, in order to bestow rewards according to the real worth of their services.
16.10. ipse cum ceteris copiis septuagensimis castris, protinus causis regulorum ciuitatiumque cognoscendis ut praemia ad ueram meritorum aestimationem tribui possent, Tarraconem rediit.
16.11. After his departure Masinissa conferred secretly with Silanus, then crossed over to Africa with a few of his countrymen, in order that in changing his policy he might count upon the obedience of his nation also. The reason for his sudden change was not so clear then as was later the evidence furnished by a loyalty unswerving down to extreme age, that even at that time he had not acted without a reasonable ground.
16.11. post profectionem eius Masinissa cum Silano clam congressus, ut ad noua consilia gentem quoque suam oboedientem haberet cum paucis popularibus in Africam traiecit, non tam euidenti eo tempore subitae mutationis causa quam documento post id tempus constantissimae ad ultimam senectam fidei ne tum quidem eum sine probabili causa fecisse.
16.13. Mago then reached Gades on the ships sent back by Hasdrubal. The rest, abandoned by their generals, were scattered, some by desertion, others by flight, among the neighbouring states; no force remained which was notable for its numbers or its strength.
16.13. Mago inde remissis ab Hasdrubale nauibus Gades petit; ceteri deserti ab ducibus, pars transitione, pars fuga dissipati per proximas ciuitates sunt, nulla numero aut uiribus manus insignis.
16.14. So much in general for the manner in which under the command and auspices of Publius Scipio the Carthaginians were driven out of Spain in the fourteenth year from the beginning of the war, the fifth after Publius Scipio received his province and army.
16.14. hoc maxime modo ductu atque auspicio P. Scipionis pulsi Hispania Carthaginienses sunt, quarto decimo anno post bellum initum, quinto quam P. Scipio prouinciam et exercitum accepit.
16.15. Not much later Silanus returned to Scipio at Tarraco, reporting the war at an end.
16.15. haud multo post Silanus debellatum referens Tarraconem ad Scipionem rediit.
17.1. Lucius Scipio with many noble captives was sent to Rome to announce the conquest of Spain.
17.1. L. Scipio cum multis nobilibus captiuis nuntius receptae Hispaniae Romam est missus.
17.2. And while everyone else was publishing the fact abroad with great rejoicing and high praise, the one man who had accomplished it was insatiable in his craving for merit and well-earned distinction. He considered the conquest of Spain insignificant compared with all that he had imagined in his high-minded hopes.
17.2. et cum ceteri laetitia gloriaque ingenti eam rem uolgo ferrent, unus qui gesserat, inexplebilis uirtutis ueraeque laudis, paruum instar eorum quae spe ac magnitudine animi concepisset receptas Hispanias ducebat.
17.3. Already his eye was upon Africa and the greater Carthage and the glory of such a war, as if accumulated to bring him honour and a name.
17.3. iam Africam magnamque Carthaginem et in suum decus nomenque uelut consummatam eius belli gloriam spectabat.
17.4. Accordingly, thinking that he must already make preparations and gain the goodwill of kings and tribes, he decided first to sound King Syphax.
17.4. itaque praemoliendas sibi ratus iam res conciliandosque regum gentiumque animos, Syphacem primum regem statuit temptare.
17.5. He was the king of the Masaesulians. A tribe bordering on the Mauri, the Masaesulians directly face the region of Spain in which lies New Carthage.
17.5. Masaesuliorum is rex erat. Masaesulii, gens adfinis Mauris, in regionem Hispaniae maxime qua sita Noua Carthago est spectant.
17.6. At that time the king had a treaty with the Carthaginians; and Scipio, thinking it would have for Syphax no more weight and sanctity than is usual for barbarians, with whom loyalty depends upon success, sent Gaius Laelius as an envoy to him with gifts.
17.6. foedus ea tempestate regi cum Carthaginiensibus erat, quod haud grauius ei sanctiusque quam uolgo barbaris, quibus ex fortuna pendet fides, ratus fore, oratorem ad eum C.
17.7. Delighted with these, and since at that time the situation was everywhere favourable for the Romans but for the Carthaginians unfavourable in Italy and now quite hopeless in Spain, the barbarian indicated that he would accept the friendship of the Romans; that for its confirmation he would neither give nor receive a pledge except in the actual presence of the Roman commander.
17.7. Laelium cum donis mittit. quibus barbarus laetus et quia res tum prosperae ubique Romanis, Poenis in Italia aduersae in Hispania nullae iam erant, amicitiam se Romanorum accipere adnuit: firmandae eius fidem nec dare nec accipere nisi cum ipso coram duce Romano.
17.9. So Laelius, having received from the king a promise to this effect only, that for the visit safety would be assured, returned to Scipio.
17.9. ita Laelius in id modo fide ab rege accepta tutum aduentum fore, ad Scipionem redit.
17.10. A factor of great importance in every respect for a man planning an attack upon Africa was Syphax, the richest king in that land and one who had already gained experience even of the Carthaginians in war, while boundaries of his kingdom were also well situated with reference to Spain in being separated from it by a narrow strait only.
17.10. magnum in omnia momentum Syphax adfectanti res Africae erat, opulentissimus eius terrae rex, bello iam expertus ipsos Carthaginienses, finibus etiam regni apte ad Hispaniam quod freto exiguo dirimuntur positis.
17.11. Consequently Scipio thought the matter deserved to be pursued even at a great risk, since it was otherwise impossible. Leaving Lucius Marcius at Tarraco and Marcus Silanus at New Carthage —to which he had come by land in long stages from Tarraco —that they might defend Spain, he himself sailed with Gaius Laelius and two quinqueremes from (New) Carthage. Using oars for the most part over a calm sea, while at times a gentle wind lent its help, he crossed over to Africa.
17.11. dignam itaque rem Scipio ratus quae, quoniam non aliter posset, magno periculo peteretur, L. Marcio Tarracone M. Silano Carthagine Noua, quo pedibus ab Tarracone itineribus magnis ierat, ad praesidium Hispaniae relictis ipse cum C. Laelio duabus quinqueremibus ab Carthagine profectus tranquillo mari plurimum remis, interdum et leni adiuuante uento, in Africam traiecit.
17.13. It so chanced that at the very same time Hasdrubal, who had been forced out of Spain and had sailed into the harbour with seven triremes and cast anchor, was bringing his ships to the shore when the two quinqueremes were sighted. No one had any doubt that they belonged to the enemy, and that they could be surprised by superior numbers before they entered the harbour. But they caused nothing more than uproar and excitement both among soldiers and sailors, as they made ready their arms and ships all to no purpose.
17.13. forte ita incidit ut eo ipso tempore Hasdrubal, pulsus Hispania, septem triremibus portum inuectus, ancoris positis terrae applicaret naues cum conspectae duae quinqueremes, haud cuiquam dubio quin hostium essent opprimique a pluribus priusquam portum intrarent possent, nihil aliud quam tumultum ac trepidationem simul militum ac nautarum nequiquam armaque et naues expedientium fecerunt.
17.15. For the sails, catching a slightly stronger wind from the open sea, brought the quinqueremes into the harbour before the Carthaginians could weigh anchor.
17.15. percussa enim ex alto uela paulo acriori uento prius in portum intulerunt quinqueremes quam Poeni ancoras molirentur;
17.16. Nor did anyone dare to make further disturbance in the king's harbour. So first Hasdrubal and then Scipio and Laelius disembarked and went to the king.
17.16. nec ultra tumultum ciere quisquam in regio portu audebat. ita in terram prior Hasdrubal, mox Scipio et Laelius egressi ad regem pergunt.
18.1. To Syphax it seemed a splendid thing —as indeed it was —that the generals of the two richest peoples of that time had come on the same day to ask for peace and friendship from him.
18.1. magnificumque id Syphaci—nec erat aliter—uisum duorum opulentissimorum ea tempestate duces populorum uno die suam pacem amicitiamque petentes uenisse.
18.2. He invited both of them to be his guests, and inasmuch as chance had ordained that they should be under one roof and in the same dwelling, he tried to draw them into a conference to put an end to their quarrels. Scipio indeed stated that neither as a private citizen had he any hatred toward the Carthaginian which might be ended by a conference, nor as regarded the state could he treat with an enemy without an order from the senate.
18.2. utrumque in hospitium inuitat, et quoniam fors eos sub uno tecto esse atque ad eosdem penates uoluisset, contrahere in conloquium dirimendarum simultatium causa est conatus, Scipione abnuente aut priuatim sibi ullum cum Poeno odium esse quod conloquendo finiret, aut de re publica quicquam se cum hoste agere iniussu senatus posse.
18.4. When the king kept insisting that he consent to come to the same feast for fear one of his guests should seem to have been excluded from his table, Scipio did not decline, and they dined together in the king's house.
18.4. illud magno opere tendente rege, ne alter hospitum exclusus mensa uideretur, ut in animum induceret ad easdem uenire epulas haud abnuit, cenatumque simul apud regem est;
18.5. On the same couch even, since the king would have it so, Scipio and Hasdrubal reclined.
18.5. eodem etiam lecto Scipio atque Hasdrubal quia ita cordi erat regi accubuerunt.
18.6. Moreover, such was the genial manner of Scipio, such his inborn cleverness in meeting every situation, that by his eloquent mode of address he won not Syphax only, the barbarian unacquainted with Roman ways, but his own bitterest enemy as well.
18.6. tanta autem inerat comitas Scipioni atque ad omnia naturalis ingenii dexteritas ut non Syphacem modo, barbarum insuetumque moribus Romanis, sed hostem etiam infestissimum facunde adloquendo sibi conciliarit.
18.7. Hasdrubal plainly showed that when he met him face to face, Scipio seemed even more marvellous than in his achievements in war, and that he did not doubt Syphax and his kingdom would soon be in the power of the Romans;
18.7. mirabiliorem sibi eum congresso coram uisum prae se ferebat quam bello rebus gestis, nec dubitare quin Syphax regnumque eius iam in Romanorum essent potestate;
18.8. such skill did the man possess in winning men over.
18.8. eam artem illi uiro ad conciliandos animos esse.
18.9. And so, he said, it was not so essential for the Carthaginians to inquire how their Spanish provinces had been lost as to consider how they were still to hold Africa.
18.9. itaque non quo modo Hispaniae amissae sint quaerendum magis Carthaginiensibus esse quam quo modo Africam retineant cogitandum.
18.10. It was not as a traveller, nor as one who idles along beautiful shores, that so great a Roman general had left a newly subdued province, had left his armies, and with only two ships had crossed over to Africa and entrusted himself to an enemy's land, to a king's power, to a man's untested honour; on the contrary he was cherishing a hope of conquering Africa.
18.10. non peregrinabundum neque circa amoenas oras uagantem tantum ducem Romanum, relicta prouincia nouae dicionis relictis exercitibus, duabus nauibus in Africam traiecisse et commisisse sese in hostilem terram, in potestatem regiam, in fidem inexpertam, sed potiundae Africae spem adfectantem.
18.11. It had long been Scipio's constant reflection, his open complaint, he added, that he was not waging war in Africa, as Hannibal was in Italy.
18.11. hoc eum iam pridem uolutare in animo, hoc palam fremere quod non quemadmodum Hannibal in Italia sic Scipio in Africa bellum gereret.
18.12. Scipio, after making a treaty with Syphax, set sail from Africa, and tossed in open sea by unsteady winds, mostly violent, he reached the harbour of New Carthage on the fourth day.
18.12. Scipio, foedere icto cum Syphace, profectus ex Africa dubiisque et plerumque saeuis in alto iactatus uentis die quarto Nouae Carthaginis portum tenuit.
19.1. Although the Spanish provinces were having a respite from a Carthaginian war, still it was evident that on account of a guilty conscience certain states were quiet out of fear rather than because of loyalty. Most conspicuous both for size and guilt among these were Iliturgi and Castulo.
19.1. Hispaniae sicut a bello Punico quietae erant, ita quasdam ciuitates propter conscientiam culpae metu magis quam fide quietas esse apparebat, quarum maxime insignes et magnitudine et noxa Iliturgi et Castulo erant.
19.2. Although in favourable times its citizens had been allies, Castulo, after the Scipios had been slain with their armies, had revolted to the Carthaginians. The men of Iliturgi, by betraying and slaying those who from that disaster had fled to them for refuge, had added a crime also to their revolt.
19.2. Castulo, cum prosperis rebus socii fuissent, post caesos cum exercitibus Scipiones defecerat ad Poenos: Iliturgitani prodendis qui ex illa clade ad eos perfugerant interficiendisque scelus etiam defectioni addiderant.
19.3. On Scipio's first coming, when the Spanish provinces were wavering, vengeance upon those states would have been deserved but not politic.
19.3. in eos populos primo aduentu cum dubiae Hispaniae essent merito magis quam utiliter saeuitum foret:
19.4. Now, however, since in a time of peace the moment for exacting the penalty seemed to have arrived, he summoned Lucius Marcius from Tarraco and sent him with a third of his forces to lay siege to Castulo. He himself with the rest of the army reached Iliturgi in about five stages.
19.4. tunc iam tranquillis rebus quia tempus expetendae poenae uidebatur uenisse, accitum ab Tarracone L. Marcium cum tertia parte copiarum ad Castulonem oppugnandum mittit, ipse cum cetero exercitu quintis fere ad Iliturgin castris peruenit.
19.5. The gates had been closed and everything disposed and prepared to resist an attack. So true was it that consciousness of what they knew they had deserved had meant as much for them as a declaration of war.
19.5. clausae erant portae omniaque instructa et parata ad oppugnationem arcendam; adeo conscientia quid se meritos scirent pro indicto eis bello fuerat.
19.6. With this point also Scipio opened his speech of encouragement to his soldiers, saying that the Spaniards by closing their gates had themselves shown what they had deserved to fear. Consequently, he said, they must wage war against them with much more animosity than against the Carthaginians.
19.6. hinc et hortari milites Scipio orsus est: ipsos claudendo portas indicasse Hispanos quid ut timerent meriti essent. itaque multo infestioribus animis cum eis quam cum Carthaginiensibus bellum gerendum esse;
19.7. With these it was a contest almost devoid of anger in pursuit of power and glory; from the Iliturgians they must exact the penalty for treachery and cruelty and crime.
19.7. quippe cum illis prope sine ira de imperio et gloria certari, ab his perfidiae et crudelitatis et sceleris poenas expetendas.
19.8. The time had come for them to avenge the atrocious slaughter of their comrades and the perfidy which would have been brought to bear against themselves if in flight they had reached the same city. It was time also for them by a severe example to ordain that no one should ever account a Roman citizen or soldier in any misfortune as fair game for ill treatment.
19.8. euenisse tempus quo et nefandam commilitonum necem et in semet ipsos, si eodem fuga delati forent, instructam fraudem ulciscerentur, et in omne tempus graui documento sancirent ne quis unquam Romanum ciuem militemque in ulla fortuna opportunum iniuriae duceret.
19.9. Immediately after this exhortation from their general the officers, thoroughly aroused, issued ladders to men picked out of one maniple after another, and dividing the army so that Laelius as lieutenant should command one half, they attacked the city in two places at the same time, causing a double alarm.
19.9. ab hac cohortatione ducis incitati scalas electis per manipulos uiris diuidunt, partitoque exercitu ita ut parti alteri Laelius praeesset legatus, duobus simul locis ancipiti terrore urbem adgrediuntur.
19.10. It was not a single commander or a number of leading men that urged the citizens gallantly to defend the city, but their own fear due to consciousness of guilt.
19.10. non dux unus aut plures principes oppidanos, sed suus ipsorum ex conscientia culpae metus ad defendendam impigre urbem hortatur.
19.11. They remembered and reminded one another also that the aim was their punishment, not victory; that when every man perished what mattered most was whether he did so in battle and in the line, where the fortune of the fray, making no distinctions, often lifted up the defeated and dashed down the victor, or whether later, when their city was in ashes and ruins, there before the faces of their captured wives and children, after enduring every outrage and indignity, they breathed their last under the scourge and in chains.
19.11. et meminerant et admonebant alios supplicium ex se non uictoriam peti: ubi quisque mortem oppeteret, id referre, utrum in pugna et in acie, ubi Mars communis et uictum saepe erigeret et adfligeret uictorem, an postmodo cremata et diruta urbe, ante ora captarum coniugum liberorumque, inter uerbera et uincula, omnia foeda atque indigna passi exspirarent.
19.13. Accordingly not merely those of military age or men alone, but women and children also helped beyond their powers of mind and body, bringing up weapons for the fighting men and carrying stones for the builders up to the wall.
19.13. igitur non militaris modo aetas aut uiri tantum, sed feminae puerique super animi corporisque uires adsunt, pugnantibus tela ministrant, saxa in muros munientibus gerunt.
19.14. The stake was not freedom only, which whets the courage of brave men alone, but all had before their eyes extreme penalties and a hideous death. Bravery was kindled by emulation in toil and danger and by the mere sight of one another.
19.14. non libertas solum agebatur, quae uirorum fortium tantum pectora acuit, sed ultima omnibus supplicia et foeda mors ob oculos erat. accendebantur animi et certamine laboris ac periculi atque ipso inter se conspectu.
19.15. And so the battle was begun with such heat that that famous army, the conqueror of all Spain, was repeatedly beaten back from the walls by the young men of a single town and thrown into disorder in an inglorious battle. When Scipio saw this, he was afraid that, owing to so many vain attempts made by his men, the enemy's spirits might be cheered and his own soldiers lose heart.
19.15. itaque tanto ardore certamen initum est ut domitor ille totius Hispaniae exercitus ab unius oppidi iuuentute saepe repulsus a muris haud satis decoro proelio trepidaret.
19.16. Thinking that he must himself make the attempt and claim a share in the danger, he berated the soldiers for their cowardice, ordered ladders to be brought up, and threatened that if the rest hesitated he would climb up himself.
19.16. id ubi uidit Scipio, ueritus ne uanis tot conatibus suorum et hostibus cresceret animus et segnior miles fieret, sibimet conandum ac partem periculi capessendam esse ratus increpita ignauia militum ferri scalas iubet et se ipsum si ceteri cunctentur escensurum minatur.
19.17. Already at no small risk he had come close to the walls when from all sides an outcry was made by the soldiers, who were concerned for their commander and began to set up ladders in many places at the same time; and on the other side Laelius pressed the attack.
19.17. iam subierat haud mediocri periculo moenia cum clamor undique ab sollicitis uicem imperatoris militibus sublatus, scalaeque multis simul partibus erigi coeptae;