1.1. These events occurred during the winter; but in the beginning of spring Quinctius summoned Attalus to Elatia, and, wishing to bring under his control the Boeotians, a people whose attitude had thus far been uncertain, he set out through Phocis and encamped five miles from Thebes, which is the capital of Boeotia.
1.1. haec per hiemem gesta; initio autem veris Quinctius Attalo Elatiam excito Boeotorum gentem incertis ad eam diem animis fluctuantem dicionis suae facere cupiens, profectus per Phocidem quinque milia ab Thebis, quod caput est Boeotiae, posuit castra.
1.2. Thence the next day, taking the soldiers of one company and Attalus and the numerous embassies which had come in from all directions, he set out to march towards the city, ordering the hastati of the legion — they amounted to two thousand men — to follow at the distance of a mile.
1.2. inde postero die cum unius signi militibus et Attalo legationibusque, quae frequentes undique convenerant, pergit ire ad urbem, iussis legionis hastatis — ea duo milia militum erant — sequi se mille passuum intervallo distantibus.
1.3. When they had completed about half the march, Antiphilus, the praetor of the Boeotians, met them; the rest of the people from the wall watched the approach of the Roman commander and the king.
1.3. ad medium ferme viae Boeotorum praetor Antiphilus obvius fuit; cetera multitudo e muris adventum imperatoris Romani regisque prospeculabatur.
1.4. Only weapons here and there and a few soldiers were seen around them; the windings of the road and the intervening valleys hid the hastati who were following at a distance.
1.4. rara arma paucique milites circa eos apparebant; hastatos sequentes procul anfractus viarum vallesque interiectae occulebant.
1.5. When Quinctius was close to the city he decreased his pace, as if to show respect to the approaching throng; the real reason for the delay was to allow the hastati time to overtake him.
1.5. cum iam adpropinquaret urbi, velut obviam egredientem turbam salutaret, tardius incedebat; causa erat morae, ut hastati consequerentur.
1.6. The townspeople, since the crowd was gathered in front of the lictor, did not see the rapidly approaching column of armed men until they arrived at the general's quarters.
1.6. oppidani, ante lictorem turba acta, insecutum confestim agmen armatorum non ante, quam ad hospitium imperatoris ventum est, conspexere.
1.7. Then all were dumbfounded, thinking that the city had been betrayed and captured by the treachery of Antiphilus the praetor, and it seemed clear that no opportunity was left the Boeotians for freedom of action in the council which had been called for the next day.
1.7. tum velut prodita dolo Antiphili praetoris urbe captaque obstipuerunt omnes; et apparebat nihil liberae consultationis concilio, quod in diem posterum indictum erat Boeotis, relictum esse.
1.8. They concealed their sorrow, the display of which would have been both fruitless and not without risk.
1.8. texerunt dolorem, quem et nequiquam et non sine periculo ostendissent.
2.1. Attalus opened the discussion in the council. He began with the services of his forefathers and himself, in general to all Greeks and especially to the Boeotians, but being now an old man and too feeble to endure the strain of speaking, he fell silent and collapsed, and while he was being carried out
2.1. in concilio Attalus primus verba fecit. orsus a maiorum suorum suisque et communibus in omnem Graeciam et propriis in Boeotorum gentem meritis, senior iam et infirmior, quam ut contentionem dicendi sustineret, obmutuit et concidit;
2.3. and the report brought back that he had partially lost the use of his limbs, the assembly was adjourned for a time.
2.3. et dum regem auferunt perferuntque parte membrorum captum, paulisper contio intermissa est.
2.4. Aristaenus, praetor of the Achaeans, spoke with the greater effect because he gave the Boeotians the same advice he had previously given the Achaeans.
2.4. Aristaenus inde, Achaeorum praetor, eo cum maiore auctoritate auditus, quod non alia, quam quae Achaeis suaserat, Boeotis suadebat.
2.5. Quinctius himself added a few words, in praise of the loyalty of the Romans rather than of their military strength or material resources.
2.5. pauca ab ipso Quinctio adiecta, fidem magis Romanam quam arma aut opes extollente verbis.
2.6. A motion was then proposed and read by Dicaearchus of Plataea, about forming an alliance with Rome, and since no one dared to speak against it, it was received and carried by the unanimous consent of the Boeotian cities.
2.6. rogatio inde a Plataeensi Dicaearcho lata recitataque de societate cum Romanis iungenda nullo contra dicere audente omnium Boeotiae civitatum suffragiis accipitur iubeturque.
2.7. The meeting then adjourning, Quinctius, having remained in Thebes only as long as the sudden illness of Attalus demanded, when it appeared that the attack did not for the moment imperil his life, but merely weakened his body, left him there to receive the necessary treatment and returned to Elatia, whence he had come;
2.7. concilio dimisso Quinctius, tantum Thebis moratus, quantum Attali repens casus coegit, postquam non vitae praesens periculum vis morbi attulisse sed membrorum debilitatem visa est, relicto eo ad curationem necessariam corporis,
2.9. having brought the Boeotians, as well as the Achaeans before them, - into the confederacy and made the country behind him secure and peaceful, he now turned all his attention towards Philip and what remained of the war.
2.9. Elatiam, unde profectus erat, redit Boeotis quoque, sicut prius Achaeis, ad societatem adscitis et, quoniam tuta ea pacataque ab tergo relinquebantur, omnibus iam cogitationibus in Philippum et quod relicum belli erat conversis.
3.1. Philip, too, seeing that his ambassadors had brought from Rome no indication of peace, at the beginning of spring decided to conduct a levy through all the towns of his kingdom, since he was in great want of young recruits.
3.1. Philippus quoque primo vere, postquam legati ab Roma nihil pacati rettulerant, dilectum per omnia oppida regni habere instituit in magna inopia iuniorum. absumpserant enim per multas iam aetates continua bella Macedonas;
3.3. For the continuous fighting through several generations had exhausted the Macedonians; during his own reign many had fallen in naval battles with the Rhodians and Attalus and in engagements with the Romans on land.
3.3. ipso quoque regnante et navalibus bellis adversus Rhodios Attalumque et terrestribus adversus Romanos ceciderat magnus numerus.
3.4. He therefore enlisted recruits from the age of sixteen, and some who had served their allotted time but still possessed some share of strength were recalled to the colours. He thus filled up his ranks, and ordered a muster of all his troops at Dium about the time of the vernal equinox.
3.4. ita et tirones ab sedecim annis milites scribebat, et emeritis quidam stipendiis, quibus modo quicquam reliqui roboris erat, ad signa revocabantur.
3.5. There he established a base and spent the time of waiting for the enemy in drilling his troops daily.
3.5. ita suppleto exercitu secundum vernum aequinoctium omnis copias Dium contraxit ibique stativis positis exercendo cotidie milite hostem opperiebatur.
3.6. Quinctius also meanwhile had left Elatia and marched to Thermopylae by way of Thronium and Scarphea.
3.6. et Quinctius per eosdem ferme dies ab Elatia profectus praeter Thronium et Scarpheam ad Thermopylas pervenit.
3.7. There he held the Aetolian council, summoned to meet at Heraclea, to determine with how many troops they should follow the Romans to the war.
3.7. ibi concilium Aetolorum Heracleam indictum tenuit consultantium, quantis auxiliis Romanum ad bellum sequerentur.
3.8. Having learned the decision of the allies, he advanced in three days from Heraclea to Xyniae, on the frontier of the Aenianes and Thessalians and made camp and waited for the Aetolian auxiliaries. These made haste, and six hundred infantry and four hundred cavalry arrived, commanded by Phaeneas.
3.8. cognitis sociorum decretis tertio die ab Heraclea Xynias praegressus in confinio Aenianum Thessalorumque positis castris Aetolica auxilia opperiebatur.
3.9. Quinctius broke camp at once, so as to leave no doubt why he had waited. When he had crossed the border into the Phthiotic country, five hundred Gortynii from Crete under the command of Cydas and three hundred from Apollonia, armed in the same fashion, joined him and a little later Amynander arrived with twelve hundred infantry of the Athamanes. Philip learned of the departure of the Romans from Elatia, and since he was in a situation where a contest for supreme power impended, he determined to encourage his troops.
3.9. nihil morati Aetoli sunt; Phaenea duce sescenti pedites cum equitibus quadringentis venerunt. ne dubium esset, quid expectasset, confestim Quinctius movit castra. transgresso in Phthioticum agrum quingenti Gortynii Cretensium duce Cydante et trecenti Apolloniatae haud dispari armatu se coniunxere nec ita multo post Amynander cum Athamanum peditum ducentis et mille.
3.11. After he had repeated many oft-told stories of the brave deeds of their forefathers and also of the martial glory of the Macedonians, he came to the points which at that time were causing them the greatest terror and by which they could be roused to some degree of hopefulness.
3.11. Philippus cognita profectione ab Elatia Romanorum, ut cui de summa rerum adesset certamen, adhortandos milites ratus, multa iam saepe memorata de maiorum virtutibus simul de militari laude Macedonum cum disseruisset, ad ea, quae tum maxime animos terrebant quibusque erigi ad aliquam spem poterant, venit.
4.1. Against the defeat sustained in the narrows at the Aous river he set the triple defeat inflicted at Atrax by the Macedonian phalanx upon the Romans.
4.1. acceptae ad Aoum flumen in angustiis cladi ter a Macedonum phalange ad Atracem vi pulsos Romanos opponebat.
4.2. Even there, when they had failed to hold the passes of Epirus which they commanded, the blame rested first on those who had not maintained careful vigilance, next, in the actual battle, on the light infantry and the mercenaries;
4.2. et illic tamen, abi insessas fauces Epiri non tenuissent, primam culpam fuisse eorum, qui neglegenter custodias servassent, secundam in ipso certamine levis armaturae mercennariorumque militum;
4.3. the Macedonian phalanx, on the other hand, had stood fast even then, and would always stand unconquered when regular battle was joined on level ground.
4.3. Macedonum vero phalangem et tunc stetisse et loco aequo iustaque pugna semper mansuram invictam.
4.4. There were sixteen thousand in the phalanx, the flower of the whole kingdom. In addition, there were two thousand with light shields, whom they call peltasts, and an equal number (two thousand each) of Thracians and Illyrians — Tralles is the name of the tribe — and auxiliary mercenaries from different nationalities to the number of about fifteen hundred and two thousand cavalry.
4.4. decem et sex milia militum haec fuere, robur omne virium eius regni. ad hoc duo milia caetratorum, quos peltastas appellant, Thracumque et Illyriorum — Trallis est nomen genti — par numerus, bina milia erant, et mixti ex pluribus gentibus mercede conducti auxiliares mille ferme et quingenti et duo milia equitum.
4.5. With these forces the king awaited the enemy.
4.5. cum iis copiis rex hostem opperiebatur.
4.6. The Romans had about the same number; it was only in cavalry strength that they were superior, because of the arrival of the Aetolians.
4.6. Romanis ferme par numerus erat; equitum copiis tantum, quod Aetoli accesserant, superabant.
5.1. When Quinctius had moved his camp towards Phthiotic Thebes, he conceived the hope that the city would be betrayed to him by Timon, a leader among this people, and approached it with a few cavalry and light infantry.
5.1. Quinctius ad Thebas Phthioticas castra cum movisset, spem nactus per Timonem, principem civitatis, prodi urbem cum paucis equitum levisque armaturae ad muros successit.
5.2. This hope was so wholly belied that there was not only a battle with forces which sallied forth, but there was even grave danger had not infantry and cavalry, hastily summoned from the camp, arrived in time.
5.2. ibi adeo frustrata spes est, ut non certamen modo cum erumpentibus, sed periculum quoque atrox subiret, ni castris exciti repente pedites equitesque in tempore subvenissent.
5.3. And after nothing of this rashly-formed hope turned out well, he gave up for the present his design of further attacks upon the town.
5.3. et postquam nihil conceptae temere spei succedebat, urbis quidem amplius temptandae in praesentia conatu abstitit;
5.4. And, assured that the king was in Thessaly, but not yet certain of the direction of his march, he ordered soldiers sent out into the country to cut timbers and prepare a stockade.
5.4. ceterum satis gnarus iam in Thessalia regem esse, nondum comperto, quam in regionem venisset, milites per agros dimissos vallum caedere et parare iubet.
5.5. Both Macedonians and Greeks employed a stockade, but in a manner ill adapted to ease of transportation or security in defence;
5.5. vallo et Macedones et Graeci usi sunt, sed usum nec ad commoditatem ferendi nec ad ipsius munitionis firmamentum aptaverunt;
5.6. for they cut trees of too great size and with too many branches for one soldier to carry, especially with his arms, and when they had walled a camp by planting these in front, the destruction of their rampart was easy.
5.6. nam et maiores et magis ramosas arbores caedebant, quam quas ferre cum armis miles posset, et cum castra his ante obiectis saepsissent, facilis molitio eorum valli erat.
5.7. For because the trunks of the great trees were planted far apart and numerous strong branches offered easy holds for the hand, two or at most three young men, if they exerted themselves, would easily pull out a tree, and, this being pulled out, there was at once an opening like a gate, nor was material ready at hand to block it.
5.7. nam et quia rari stipites magnarum arborum eminebant multique et validi rami praebebant, quod recte manu caperetur, duo aut summum tres iuvenes conixi arborem unam evellebant, qua evulsa portae instar extemplo patebat, nec in promptu erat, quod obmolirentur.
5.9. The Roman cuts light forked trees with three or perhaps four branches, as a general rule, - so that each soldier could comfortably carry several at once, with his arms hanging on his back;
5.9. Romanus leves et bifurcos plerosque et trium aut cum plurimum quattuor ramorum vallos caedit, ut et suspensis ab tergo armis ferat pluris simul apte miles;
5.10. and they plant them so close together and interweave the boughs so completely that it is difficult to tell to which branch each trunk is joined or to which trunk each branch belongs;
5.10. et ita densos offigunt inplicantque ramis, ut neque quis cuiusque palmae stipes, neque quae cuiusque stipitis palma sit, pervideri possit;
5.11. moreover, the branches are so sharp as to leave, interlaced, little space for inserting the hand, so that there is nothing that can be grasped and pulled out, since the interwoven branches bind one another together;
5.11. et adeo acuti aliusque per alium inmissi rami locum ad inserendam manum non relincunt, ut neque prehendi, quod trahatur, neque trahi, cum inter se innexi rami vinculum in vicem praebeant, possit;
5.12. and, if one is by chance pulled out, it leaves a small gap and is easily replaced.
5.12. et, si evulsus forte est unus, nec loci multum aperit, et alium reponere perfacile est.
6.1. Quinctius made a short march the next day, the soldiers carrying the stockade with them, so that he was ready to fortify a camp in any place, and when he had halted about six miles from Pherae, he sent out patrols to find out in what part of Thessaly the king was and what he was doing.
6.1. Quinctius postero die vallum secum ferente milite, ut paratus omni loco castris ponendis esset, progressus modicum iter sex ferme milia a Pheris cum consedisset, speculatum, in qua parte Thessaliae hostis esset quidve pararet, misit.
6.3. The king was near Larisa. Being now informed that the Roman had moved from Thebes to Pherae and desiring, for his part, to end the struggle at once, he began to march towards the enemy and encamped about four miles from Pherae.
6.3. circa Larisam erat rex. certior iam factus Romanum ab Thebis Pheras movisse, defungi quam primum et ipse certamine cupiens ducere ad hostem pergit et quattuor milia fere a Pheris posuit castra.
6.4. Thence next day both sides sent out light troops to seize the hills overlooking the town, and these, when they were about equidistant from the ridge which was to be occupied, came to a halt as soon as they espied one another, waiting quietly for the runners whom they had sent back to camp to ask what they were to do, since the enemy had unexpectedly been met.
6.4. inde postero die cum expediti utrimque ad occupandos super urbem tumulos processissent, pari ferme intervallo ab iugo, quod capiendum erat, cum inter se conspecti essent, constiterunt, nuntios in castra remissos, qui, quid sibi, quoniam praeter spem hostis occurrisset, faciendum esset, consulerent, quieti opperientes.
6.6. And on that day indeed they were withdrawn to camp without starting a battle; on the next day there was a cavalry engagement around the same hills, in which, mainly through the help of the Aetolians, the king's forces were defeated and driven back to their camp.
6.6. et illo quidem die nullo inito certamine in castra revocati sunt; postero die circa eosdem tumulos equestre proelium fuit, in quo non minimum Aetolorum opera regii fugati atque in castra compulsi sunt.
6.7. Both sides were greatly hindered in the action by the fact that the country was covered with many trees and gardens, as in suburban districts, while the roads were bordered with hedges and in some places entirely closed.
6.7. magnum utri sque impedimentum ad rem gerendam fuit ager consitus crebris arboribus hortique, ut in suburbanis locis, et coartata itinera maceriis et quibusdam locis interclusa.
6.8. Both commanders therefore reached the same decision, to retire from this country, and as if by agreement both marched in the direction of Scotusa, Philip hoping to find food there, the Roman by his advance to destroy the enemy's grain-supply.
6.8. itaque pariter ducibus consilium fuit excedendi ea regione, et velut ex praedicto ambo Scotusam petierunt, Philippus spe frumentandi inde, Romanus, ut praegressus corrumperet hosti frumenta.
6.9. The two columns marched the whole day, nowhere seeing one another, since there was a continuous range of hills between them. The Romans encamped near Eretria in Phthiotis, Philip on the river Onchestus.
6.9. per diem totum, quia colles perpetuo iugo intererant, nullo conspecta inter se loco agmina ierunt.
6.10. Nor did either army know for certain where the enemy was, even the following day, though Philip encamped near Melambium, as they call it, in the country of Scotusa, and the Romans around Thetideum, in the territory of Pharsalia.
6.10. Romani ad Eretriam Phthiotici agri, Philippus super amnem Onchestum posuit castra. ne postero quidem die, cum Philippus ad Melambium quod vocant Scotusae i agri, Quinctius circa Thetideum Pharsaliae terrae posuisset castra, aut hi aut illi, ubi hostis esset, satis compertum habuerunt.
6.12. The third day a heavy rain, followed by a fog dark as night, kept the Romans in camp in fear of an ambuscade.
6.12. tertio die primo nimbus effusus, dein caligo nocti simillima Romanos metu insidiarum tenuit.
7.1. Philip wished to hurry and so ordered an advance, undeterred by the low-hanging clouds after the rain;
7.1. Philippus maturandi itineris causa, post imbrem nubibus in terram demissis nihil deterritus, signa ferri iussit;
7.2. but so dense a fog obscured the day that the standard-bearers could not see the road nor the soldiers the standards, and the column, straggling along in obedience to the various cries, was as disorderly as if wandering about at night.
7.2. sed tam densa caligo occaecaverat diem, ut neque signiferi viam nec signa milites cernerent, agmen ad incertos clamores vagum velut errore nocturno turbaretur.
7.3. They crossed the hills which are called Cynoscephalae and encamped after leaving there a strong guard of infantry and cavalry.
7.3. supergressi tumulos, qui Cynoscephalae vocantur, relicta ibi statione firma peditum equitumque posuerunt castra.
7.4. Although the Roman had stayed in the same camp near Thetideum, nevertheless he sent out ten troops of cavalry and one thousand infantry to discover where the enemy was, with orders to guard against ambushes, which the darkness would hide, even in open country.
7.4. Romanus eisdem ad Thetideum castris cum se tenuisset, exploratum tamen, ubi hostis esset, decem turmas equitum et mille pedites misit monitos, ut ab insidiis, quas dies obscurus apertis quoque locis tecturus esset, praecaverent.
7.5. When they came to the guarded hills, both forces remained passive, as if struck with a mutual fear; then they sent messengers back to the camps to their commanders, as soon as their panic from this unexpected contact had subsided, and did not longer postpone the fight. The battle began at first with skirmishes of a few scouts in advance, then assumed larger proportions as reinforcements came to the aid of the defeated.
7.5. ubi ventum ad insessos tumulos est, pavore mutuo iniecto velut torpentes quieverunt; dein nuntiis retro in castra ad duces missis, ubi primus terror ab nec opinato visu consedit, non diutius certamine abstinuere.
7.6. In this battle, when the Romans were not holding their own, but kept sending message after message to their commander that they were hard pressed, five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry, mostly Aetolians, under two military tribunes, were speedily sent and restored the unfavorable battle, and as fortune changed the Macedonians, finding themselves in difficulties, begged through messengers for aid from the king.
7.6. principio a paucis procurrentibus lacessita pugna est, deinde subsidiis tuentium pulsos aucta, in qua cum haudquaquam pares Romani alios super alios nuntios ad ducem mitterent premi sese, quingenti equites et duo milia peditum, maxime Aetolorum, cum duobus tribunis militum propere missa rem inclinatam restituerunt,
7.8. But since he had expected anything but a pitched battle that day, on account of the general darkness from the fog, having sent most of his troops of every sort out to forage, he hesitated for a time, not knowing what to do;
7.8. versaque fortuna Macedones laborantes opem regis per nuntios implorabant. sed, ut qui nihil minus illo die propter effusam caliginem quam proelium expectasset, magna parte hominum omnis generis pabulatum missa aliquamdiu inops consilii trepidavit;
7.9. then, as messengers kept urging him, and the fog had now uncovered the ridges of the mountains and he could see the Macedonians crowded together on the highest of a number of hills, defending themselves more with the advantage of position than with arms, thinking that he must at any rate stake everything, lest he suffer the loss of some of his men, left unsupported, he sent Athenagoras, commander of the mercenaries,
7.9. deinde, postquam nuntii instabant, et iam iuga montium detexerat nebula, et in conspectu erant Macedones in tumulum maxime editum inter alios compulsi loco se magis quam armis tutantes, committendam rerum summam in discrimen utcumque ratus, ne partis indefensae iactura fieret,
7.11. with all the auxiliaries except the Thracians and with the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry.
7.11. Athenagoram, ducem mercede militantium, cum omnibus praeter Thracas auxiliis et equitatu Macedonum ac Thessalorum mittit.
7.12. On their arrival the Romans were driven from the ridge and checked their retreat only when they reached more level ground in the valley. The Aetolian cavalry was the greatest safeguard to prevent their utter rout.
7.12. eorum adventu depulsi ab iugo Romani non ante restiterunt, quam in planiorem vallem perventum est.
7.13. At that time their cavalry was by far the best in Greece; in infantry they were inferior to their neighbours.
7.13. ne effusa detruderentur fuga, plurimum in Aetolis equitibus praesidii fuit. is longe tum optimus eques in Graecia erat; pedite inter finitimos vincebantur.
8.1. The news was more encouraging than their success in the battle warranted, since one after another, coming back from the field, shouted out that the Romans were fleeing in terror, and this compelled Philip, though against his will, reluctant, and maintaining that it was a rash undertaking and that he liked neither the place nor the time, to commit his entire force to the action.
8.1. laetior res quam pro successu pugnae nuntiata, cum alii super alios recurrentes ex proelio clamarent fugere pavidos Romanos, invitum et cunctabundum et dicentem … temere fieri, non locum sibi placere, non tempus, perpulit, ut educeret omnes copias in aciem.
8.3. The Roman also did the same, from necessity rather than to seize an opportunity for fighting. The right wing, with the elephants alined in front of the standards, he held in reserve; with the left and all the lightarmed troops he attacked the enemy, reminding them at the same time that they would meet the same Macedonians whom they had driven out and defeated in battle in the passes of Epirus, defended by mountains and rivers, conquering the difficulties of Nature herself, the same Macedonians whom they had previously defeated under the leadership of Publius Sulpicius, when they held the pass to Eordaea;
8.3. idem et Romanus, magis necessitate quam occasione pugnae inductus, fecit. dextrum cornu elephantis ante signa instructis in subsidiis reliquit; laevo cum omni levi armatura in hostem vadit, simul admonens cum iisdem Macedonibus pugnaturos, quos ad Epiri fauces, montibus fluminibusque saeptos, victa naturali difficultate locorum expulissent acieque expugnassent, cum iis, quos P. Sulpicii prius ductu obsidentes in Eordaeam aditum vicissent;
8.5. that the Macedonian kingdom rested on reputation and not on strength, and that even this reputation had at last wholly faded away. By this time they had come up to their men stationed in the lowest part of the valley, who, encouraged by the arrival of the army and the general, renewed the battle, charged, and again drove back the enemy.
8.5. fama stetisse, non viribus Macedoniae regnum; eam quoque famam tandem evanuisse. iam perventum ad suos in ima valle stantes erat, qui adventu exercitus imperatorisque pugnam renovant impetuque facto rursus avertunt hostem.
8.7. - Philip with the peltasts and the right wing of the infantry, the strength of the Macedonian army, which they called the phalanx, advanced on the run to meet the enemy, ordering Nicanor, one of his nobles, to follow at once with the rest of the army.
8.7. Philippus cum caetratis et cornu dextro peditum, robore Macedonici exercitus, quam phalangem vocabant, prope cursu ad hostem vadit; Nicanori, ex purpuratis uni, ut cum reliquis copiis confestim sequatur, imperat.
8.9. At first as he reached the ridge and saw that the battle was over there, with a few weapons and a few corpses of the enemy lying about, and that the Romans had been driven back from there and that the battle was raging near the enemy's camp, he was filled with excessive joy;
8.9. primo, ut in iugum evasit, et iacentibus ibi paucis armis corporibusque hostium proelium eo loco fuisse pulsosque inde Romanos et pugnari prope castra hostium vidit, ingenti gaudio est elatus;
8.10. presently, as his men were retreating, made uncertain by the reversal of fear, he debated in terror whether he should withdraw his men to their own camp;
8.10. mox refugientibus suis et terrore verso paulisper incertus, an in castra reciperet copias, trepidavit;
8.11. then, as the enemy came nearer, when his men were being cut down in flight and could not be rescued unless they were reinforced, and not even he had any safe line of retreat, he was compelled, though his whole force had not come up, to try desperate measures. On the right flank he placed the cavalry and the light infantry who had been in the battle;
8.11. deinde ut adpropinquabat hostis, et praeterquam quod caedebantur aversi nec, nisi defenderentur, servari ne ipsi quidem in tuto iam receptus erat, coactus nondum adsecuta parte suorum periculum summae rerum facere, equites levemque armaturam, qui in proelio fuerant, dextero in cornu locat,
8.13. he ordered the peltasts and the Macedonian phalanx to put aside their spears, the length of which was a hindrance, and to engage with swords. At the same time, to prevent the line from being easily broken through, he diminished the front by half and doubled the depth by extending the files backward, so that the formation was deep rather than wide; he also ordered the troops to lessen intervals, so that man stood close to man and arms to arms.
8.13. caetratos et Macedonum phalangem hastis positis, quarum longitudo impedimento erat, gladiis rem gerere iubet. simul ne facile perrumperetur acies, dimidium de fronte demptum introrsus porrectis ordinibus duplicat, ut longa potius quam lata acies esset; simul et densari ordines iussit, ut vir viro, arma armis iungerentur.
9.1. Quinctius absorbed into his ranks and among the standards the men who had already been engaged and gave the signal with the trumpet.
9.1. Quinctius iis, qui in proelio fuerant, inter signa et ordines acceptis tuba dat signum.
9.2. They say that only rarely at any other time has such a shout been raised at the beginning of a battle, for, as it happened, both armies shouted at once, and not only those who were fighting but also the reserves and those who were just then coming up to the line.
9.2. raro alias tantus clamor dicitur in principio pugnae exortus; nam forte utraque acies simul conclamavere nec solum qui pugnabant sed subsidia etiam quique tum maxime in proelium veniebant.
9.3. On the right flank, the king prevailed easily, mainly because of his position, since he was fighting from higher ground; on the left there was panic and confusion, especially since the part of the phalanx which was in the rear was still coming up;
9.3. dextero cornu rex loci plurimum auxilio, ex iugis altioribus pugnans, vincebat; sinistro tum cum maxime adpropinquante phalangis parte, quae novissimi agminis fuerat, sine ullo ordine trepidabatur;
9.4. the centre, which was nearer the right flank, stood watching the battle there, as if it were a spectacle which did not directly concern them.
9.4. media acies, quae propior dextrum cornu erat, stabat spectaculo velut nihil ad se pertinentis pugnae intenta.
9.5. The phalanx, which had come up in column rather than in line, and in a form more fitted for the march than for battle, had barely reached the saddle.
9.5. phalanx, quae venerat agmen magis quam acies aptiorque itineri quam pugnae, vixdum in iugum evaserat.
9.6. While it was still in disorder, Quinctius, although he saw his men retreating on the right, first sending his elephants against the enemy, attacked, thinking that the defeat of a part would involve the rest. The issue was never in doubt; the Macedonians immediately fled, turning back in terror at the first sight of the beasts.
9.6. in hos incompositos Quinctius, quamquam pedem referentes in dextro cornu suos cernebat, elephantis prius in hostem actis impetum facit, ratus partem profligatam cetera tracturam.
9.7. The others too followed them in their flight, and one of the tribunes of the soldiers, forming a plan to fit the emergency, took the soldiers of twenty companies and, leaving the action where his men were clearly victorious and making a short detour, attacked the enemy's right from behind.
9.7. non dubia res fuit; extemplo terga vertere Macedones, terrore primo bestiarum aversi. et ceteri quidem hos pulsos sequebantur; unus e tribunis militum ex tempore capto consilio, cum viginti signorum militibus, relicta ea parte suorum, quae haud dubie vincebat, brevi circuitu dextrum cornu hostium aversum invadit.
9.9. Any army would have been dismayed by an attack from the rear; but added to the general panic of all in such a crisis was the fact that the heavy and unwieldy Macedonian phalanx could not change front, nor did the soldiers who were falling back a little while before from the front upon men who were by now terrified on their own account permit this. They were at a disadvantage too because of their position, since the ridge from which they had been fighting, when they were pursuing the soldiers who had been driven down the hill, had been given up to the enemy which had been led around behind them.
9.9. nullam aciem ab tergo adortus non turbasset; ceterum ad communem omnium in tali re trepidationem accessit, quod phalanx Macedonum gravis atque immobilis nec circumagere se poterat, nec hoc qui a fronte paulo ante pedem referentes tunc ultro territis instabant patiebantur.
9.11. For a while they were caught between the two lines and slaughtered, then most of them threw away their arms and took to flight. Philip with a few troopers and infantrymen at first held a hill higher than the rest, so as to watch the fortune of his left flank; later, when he beheld the disorderly flight and saw all the ridges round about filled with the gleam of standards and arms, he too left the field.
9.11. ad hoc loco etiam premebantur, quia iugum, ex quo pugnaverant, dum per proclive pulsos insecuntur, tradiderant hosti ad terga sua circumducto. paulisper in medio caesi, deinde omissis plerique armis capessunt fugam. Philippus cum paucis peditum equitumque primo tumulum altiorem inter ceteros cepit, ut specularetur, quae in laeva parte suorum fortuna esset; deinde, postquam fugam effusam animadvertit et omnia circa iuga signis atque armis fulgere, tum et ipse acie excessit. Quinctius cum institisset cedentibus, repente quia erigentes hastas Macedonas conspexerat, quidnam pararent incertus, paulisper novitate rei constituit signa;
10.3. Quinctius, after pressing hard on the retreating enemy, suddenly, because he saw the Macedonians raising their spears, and not knowing what this meant, halted his troops for a moment because of the strangeness of the action.
10.3. deinde, ut accepit hunc morem esse Macedonum tradentium sese, parcere victis in animo habebat.
10.4. Then, when he learned that it was the customary gesture of the Macedonians to indicate their surrender, it was in his mind to spare the vanquished. But the soldiers, ignorant that the fighting was over, so far as the enemy was concerned, and not knowing the general's plans, charged, and killing the first put the rest to flight.
10.4. ceterum ab ignaris militibus, omissam ab hoste pugnam et quid imperator vellet, impetus in eos est factus, et primis caesis ceteri in fugam dissipati sunt.
10.6. The king fled at full speed to Tempe. Then he stopped a day at Gonni to collect any who had survived from the battle. The victorious Romans burst into the enemy's camp in the hope of loot, but found that it had, for the most part, already been plundered by the Aetolians.
10.6. rex effuso cursu Tempe petit. ibi ad Gonnos diem unum substitit ad excipiendos, si qui proelio superessent. Romani victores in castra hostium spe praedae irrumpunt; ea magna iam ex parte direpta ab Aetolis inveniunt.
10.7. On that day eight thousand of the enemy perished, five thousand were captured.
10.7. caesa eo die octo milia hostium, quinque capta. ex victoribus septingenti ferme ceciderunt.
10.8. Of the victors about seven hundred fell. If we trust Valerius Antias, who is prone to increase numbers without restraint, forty thousand of the enemy were slain that day; the prisoners, he says — here his exaggeration is more moderate — numbered five thousand seven hundred, and two hundred and forty-nine standards were taken.
10.8. si Valerio qui credat omnium rerum inmodice numerum augenti, quadraginta milia hostium eo die sunt caesa; capta — ibi modestius mendacium est — quinque milia septingenti, signa militaria ducenta undequinquaginta.
10.9. Claudius too gives the figures as thirty-two thousand killed and four thousand three hundred captured.
10.9. Claudius quoque duo et triginta milia hostium caesa scribit, capta quattuor milia et trecentos.
10.10. I have given my account, not because the numbers are smallest, but because I have followed Polybius, an authority worthy of credence on all matters of Roman history and especially on occurrences in Greece.
10.10. nos non minimo potissimum numero credidimus, sed Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum.
11.1. Philip, having collected the straggling fugitives who had followed his trail after the changing fortunes of the battle-field, sent agents to Larisa to burn the royal records, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Romans, and retired into Macedonia.
11.1. Philippus conlectis ex fuga, qui variis casibus pugnae dissipati vestigia eius secuti fuerant, missisque Larisam ad commentarios regios comburendos, ne in hostium venirent potestatem, in Macedoniam concessit.
11.2. Quinctius sold part of the prisoners and booty and gave part to the soldiers, and marched towards Larisa, still uncertain where the king had gone and what he was planning.
11.2. Quinctius captivis praedaque venumdatis, partim militi concessis Larisam est profectus, hauddum satis gnarus, quam regionem petisset rex quidve pararet.
11.3. There the king's herald met him, ostensibly to ask for a truce, that those who had fallen in the battle might be removed for burial, in reality to ask permission to send an embassy. Both requests were granted by the Roman.
11.3. caduceator eo regius venit, specie ut indutiae essent, donec tollerentur ad sepulturam, qui in acie cecidissent, re vera ad petendam veniam legatis mittendis. utrumque ab Romano impetratum.
11.4. The consul, moreover, added that the king should take heart, a phrase which gave great offence to the Aetolians, who were already swollen with pride and complaining that victory had changed the general: before the battle he had been wont to discuss with the allies all matters great and small, but now they were excluded from all his deliberations, and he decided everything according to his own personal judgment, since he was trying to win a place of private influence with the king, in order that, although the Aetolians had endured the hardships and toils of the war, the Roman might take to himself the credit for the peace and the profits of victory.
11.4. adiecta etiam illa vox, bono animo esse regem ut iuberet, quae maxime Aetolos offendit iam tumentis querentisque mutatum victoria imperatorem: ante pugnam omnia magna parvaque communicare cum sociis solitum; nunc omnium expertes consiliorum esse, suo ipsum arbitrio cuncta agere, cum Philippo iam gratiae privatae locum quaerere, ut dura atque aspera belli Aetoli exhauserint, pacis gratiam et fructum Romanus in se vertat.
11.7. And beyond doubt something of their honourable position had been lost; but they did not see why they should be utterly ignored. They believed that the consul — a man of a soul unconquerable by such cupidity — was eager to receive gifts from the king;
11.7. et haud dubie decesserat iis aliquantum honoris; sed cur neglegerentur, ignorabant. donis regis inminere credebant invicti ab ea cupiditate animi virum;
11.8. but he was in fact angry at the Aetolians, and with just cause, for their insatiable desire for booty and their arrogance in claiming the glory of the victory for themselves, while with their boasting they had offended the ears of everyone, and he saw that with Philip out of the way and the power of the Macedonian kingdom broken the Aetolians would be held the masters of Greece.
11.8. sed et suscensebat non inmerito Aetolis ob insatiabilem aviditatem praedae et arrogantiam eorum, victoriae gloriam in se rapientium, quae vanitate sua omnium aures offendebat, et Philippo sublato, fractis opibus Macedonici regni Aetolos habendos Graeciae dominos cernebat.
11.10. For these reasons he deliberately took many steps to cause them to be and to seem of less moment and importance in the eyes of all men.
11.10. ob eas causas multa sedulo, ut viliores levioresque apud omnis essent et viderentur, faciebat.
12.1. A truce of fifteen days had been granted to the enemy and a conference arranged with the king; but before the time for this arrived, he called a council of the allies and referred to them the terms of peace which they wished to be imposed.
12.1. indutiae quindecim dierum datae hosti erant et cum ipso rege constitutum conloquium; cuius priusquam tempus veniret, in consilium advocavit socios;
12.2. Amynander, - king of the Athamanes, spoke briefly: the peace should be so arranged that Greece, even in the absence of the Romans, should be strong enough to maintain at once peace and liberty.
12.2. rettulit, quas leges pacis placeret dici. Amynander, Athamanum rex, paucis sententiam absolvit: ita componendam pacem esse, ut Graecia etiam absentibus Romanis satis potens tuendae simul pacis libertatisque esset.
12.3. The language of the Aetolians was more harsh; they said, after a brief preface, that the Roman commander was acting correctly and in order in discussing the conditions of peace with those whom he had had as his allies in the war;
12.3. Aetolorum asperior oratio fuit, qui pauca praefati recte atque ordine imperatorem Romanum facere, quod, quos belli socios habuisset, cum iis communicaret pacis consilia;
12.4. but that he was totally wrong if he thought that he would leave either assured peace to the Romans or liberty to the Greeks unless Philip were either killed or dethroned, either of which was easy if he were willing to follow up his good fortune.
12.4. falli autem eum tota re, si aut Romanis pacem aut Graeciae libertatem satis firmam se credat relicturum nisi Philippo aut occiso aut regno pulso; quae utraque proclivia esse, si fortuna uti vellet.
12.5. In reply, Quinctius asserted that the Aetolians neither remembered Roman policy nor employed arguments consistent with themselves.
12.5. ad haec Quinctius negare Aetolos aut moris Romanorum memorem aut sibi ipsis convenientem sententiam dixisse.
12.6. On the one hand, in all previous conferences and conversations they had always spoken of conditions of peace and not of waging a war of extermination; on the other, the Romans, in addition to observing, from remote antiquity, their custom of sparing conquered peoples, had given striking proof of their mercifulness in the peace granted to Hannibal and the Carthaginians.
12.6. et illos prioribus omnibus conciliis conloquiisque de condicionibus pacis semper, non ut ad internecionem bellaretur, disseruisse, et Romanos praeter vetustissimum morem victis parcendi praecipuum clementiae documentum dedisse pace Hannibali et Carthaginiensibus data.
12.8. He would say nothing about the Carthaginians: how many conferences had been held with Philip himself? Never was there any suggestion that he should give up his kingdom. Or, because he had been defeated in battle, did that make war an unpardonable offence?
12.8. omittere se Carthaginienses; cum Philippo ipso quotiens ventum in conloquium? nec umquam, ut cederet regno, actum esse. an, quia victus proelio foret, inexpiabile bellum factum?
12.9. An armed enemy should be met in hostile mood; towards the conquered, the mildest possible attitude was the greatest thing.
12.9. cum armato hoste infestis animis concurri debere; adversus victos mitissimum quemque animum maximum habere.
12.10. The Macedonian kings seemed a menace to Greek liberty; if that kingdom and people were removed, the Thracians, the Illyrians, and then the Gauls, fierce arid untamed peoples, would pour into Macedonia and into Greece.
12.10. libertati Graeciae videri graves Macedonum reges; si regnum gensque tollatur, Thracas, Illyrios, Gallos deinde, gentes feras et indomitas, in Macedoniam se et in Graeciam effusuras.
12.11. They should not, by breaking up all the nearest states, open the way to themselves for larger and more powerful tribes. Then, when Phaeneas, the Aetolian praetor, interrupted, reminding him that if Philip escaped this time he would soon cause a greater war, Quinctius replied, “Cease causing disturbance when we should be deliberating.” “The conditions by which the king will be bound will not be such that he will be able to start a war.”
12.11. ne proxima quaeque amoliendo maioribus gravioribusque aditum ad se facerent. interfanti deinde Phaeneae, praetori Aetolorum, testificantique, si elapsus eo tempore Philippus foret, mox gravius eum rebellaturum, ‘desistite tumultuari’ inquit, ‘ubi consultandum est. non iis condicionibus inligabitur rex, ut movere bellum possit.’
13.1. This council was adjourned, and the next day the king came to the pass which leads to Tempe — this was the place designated for the meeting — and on the third day a full council of the Romans and allies met him.
13.1. hoc dimisso concilio postero die rex ad fauces, quae ferunt in Tempe — is datus erat locus conloquio —, venit; tertio die datur ei Romanorum ac sociorum frequens concilium.
13.3. There Philip conducted himself with great discretion, and conceding voluntarily those points without which peace could not be obtained, rather than having them wrung from him after argument, he said that he accepted all the conditions commanded by the Romans or demanded by the allies in the previous conference, and would submit everything else to the judgment of the senate.
13.3. ibi Philippus perquam prudenter iis, sine quibus pax impetrari non poterat, sua potius voluntate omissis quam altercando extorquerentur, quae priore conloquio aut imperata a Romanis aut postulata ab sociis essent, omnia se concedere, de ceteris senatui permissurum dixit.
13.5. Although he seemed in this way to have sealed the lips of even his bitterest enemies, nevertheless, when all were silent, Phaeneas the Aetolian asked, “Well, Philip, do you restore to us at last Pharsalus and Larisa Cremaste and Echinus and Phthiotic Thebes?”
13.5. quamquam vel inimicissimis omnibus praeclusisse vocem videbatur, Phaeneas tamen Aetolus cunctis tacentibus ‘ quid?
13.6. When Philip replied that there was no reason why they should not receive them, a dispute over Thebes broke out between the Roman commander and the Aetolians;
13.6. nobis’ inquit, ‘Philippe, reddisne tandem Pharsalum et Larisam Cremasten et Echinum et Thebas Phthias?
13.7. for Quinctius maintained that it belonged to the Roman people by the law of war, because at the beginning of the campaign, when the army had been moved against the town and they had been invited to become friends to the Romans at a time when they had full power to break off relations with the king, they had preferred the alliance with the king to that with the Romans;
13.7. ’ cum Philippus nihil morari diceret, quo minus reciperent, disceptatio inter imperatorem Romanum et Aetolos orta est de Thebis; nam eas populi Romani iure belli factas esse Quinctius dicebat, quod integris rebus, exercitu ab se admoto, vocati in amicitiam, cum potestas libera desciscendi ab rege esset, regiam societatem Romanae praeposuissent;
13.9. Phaeneas thought it right and in accordance with the military alliance, that what had belonged to the Aetolians before the war should be returned to them, and said that it had been provided in the original treaty, regarding booty taken in the war, that movables, which could be carried or driven away, should belong to the Romans, and lands and cities should go to the Aetolians.
13.9. Phaeneas et pro societate belli, quae ante bellum habuissent, restitui Aetolis aecum censebat et ita in foedere primo cautum esse, ut belli praeda rerum, quae ferri agique possent, Romanos, ager urbesque captae Aetolos sequerentur.
13.11. To this Quinctius replied, “You yourselves broke the rules laid down in that treaty, at the time you deserted us and made peace with Philip.”
13.11. ‘vos’ inquit ‘ipsi’ Quinctius ‘societatis istius leges rupistis, quo tempore relictis nobis cum Philippo pacem fecistis.
13.12. “But even if that treaty still held, that clause would pertain to cities that had been captured; the Thessalian cities submitted to us of their own accord.”
13.12. quae si maneret, captarum tamen urbium illa lex foret; Thessaliae civitates sua voluntate in dicionem nostram venerunt.’
13.13. These words were received with applause from all the allies, but to the Aetolians they were unpleasant to hear at the moment, and later on they were the cause of war and, as a result of the war, of great slaughter to the Aetolians.
13.13. haec cum omnium sociorum adsensu dicta Aetolis non in praesentia modo gravia auditu, sed mox etiam belli causa magnarumque ex eo cladium iis fuerunt.