HERMOTIMUS: Oh, I should know quite easily, Lycinus. In the case of nine competitors, if I find epsilon first or second, I know that the one holding this lot is the one who has the bye.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Καὶ μήν, ὦ Λυκῖνε, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάθοιμι. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἐννέα ἢν τὸ Ε εὕρω πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, οἶδα ὅτι ἔφεδρος ὁ τοῦτο ἔχων ἐστί.
LYCINUS: How, Hermotimus?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Πῶς, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε;
HERMOTIMUS: In this way: two have alpha, and similarly two have beta. Of the remaining four, two have surely drawn gamma and two delta, and four letters have already been used up for eight competitors. So it is clear that only the next letter, epsilon, could be odd, and he who has drawn this one gets the bye.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὕτως· τὸ Α δύο αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν καὶ τὸ Β ὁμοίως δύο, τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων οἱ μὲν τὸ Γ, οἱ δὲ τὸ Δ πάντως ἀνεσπάκασιν καὶ ἀνήλωται ἤδη ἐς τοὺς ἀθλητὰς ὀκτὼ ὄντας τὰ τέτταρα γράμματα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι μόνον ἂν οὕτω περιττὸν εἴη τὸ ἑξῆς γράμμα τὸ Ε, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο ἀνεσπακὼς ἔφεδρός ἐστι.
LYCINUS: Shall I praise you for your intelligence, or would you like me to explain the different view I have of the matter?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Πότερον ἐπαινέσω σε, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, τῆς συνέσεως, ἢ θέλεις ἀντείπω τά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα ὁποῖα ἂν ᾖ;
HERMOTIMUS: Certainly. But I fail to see what reasonable answer you can give to such an argument.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Νὴ Δία. διαπορῶ μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν εὔλογον ἀντειπεῖν ἔχοις πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον.
43. LYCINUS: You have spoken as if the letters are definitely written in order—I mean alpha first, beta second, and so on through the alphabet, until the number of competitors is completed at one of them. I grant that this is so at Olympia. But suppose we choose five letters completely at random—chi, sigma, zeta, kappa, and theta—and we write four of these twice on eight lots, but the zeta only on the ninth, which is going to show us the bye. What will you do if you find the zeta first? How can you pick out the competitor who holds it as the man for the bye, without going to all the others and finding no letter to correspond to it? You cannot, as you were just now, be sure from the alphabetical order.
43. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Σὺ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἑξῆς πάντων γραφομένων γραμμάτων εἴρηκας, οἷον πρώτου τοῦ Α, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ Β καὶ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἄχρι ἂν ἐς ἓν αὐτῶν τελευτήσῃ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ἀθλητῶν· καὶ δίδωμί σοι Ὀλυμπίασιν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. τί δέ, εἰ ἐξελόντες ἀτάκτως πέντε γράμματα ἐξ ἁπάντων, τὸ Χ καὶ τὸ Σ καὶ τὸ Ζ καὶ τὸ Κ καὶ τὸ Θ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέτταρα διπλᾶ ἐπὶ τῶν κλήρων τῶν ὀκτὼ γράφοιμεν, τὸ δὲ Ζ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνάτου, ὃ δὴ καὶ δηλοῦν ἔμελλεν ἡμῖν τὸν ἔφεδρον, τί ποιήσεις πρῶτον εὑρὼν τὸ Ζ; τῷ διαγνώσῃ ἔφεδρον ὄντα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό, ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ πάντας ἐλθὼν εὕρῃς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ συμφωνοῦν; οὐ γὰρ εἶχες ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ τάξει αὐτῶν τεκμαίρεσθαι.
HERMOTIMUS: What you ask is difficult to answer.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Δυσαπόκριτον τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς.
44. LYCINUS: Come now, look at the same question in another way. Suppose we wrote no letters on the lots, but signs and symbols, such as the many that the Egyptians use instead of letters—dog- and lion-headed men. What then? No, let us not use them, queer creatures that they are. No, let us write down simple, uniform symbols with as good a likeness as we can: human beings on two lots, two horses for another two, two cocks and two dogs, and for the ninth let the picture be a lion. Now, if at the beginning we find this lot with the picture of a lion, how will you be able to say that this is the one that gives the bye, unless you go to them all and compare whether another also has a lion?
44. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ἰδοὺ δὴ καὶ ἑτέρως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπισκόπησον. τί γάρ εἰ μηδὲ γράμματα γράφοιμεν ἐπὶ τῶν κλήρων ἀλλά τινα σημεῖα καὶ χαρακτῆρας, οἷα πολλὰ Αἰγύπτιοι γράφουσιν ἀντὶ τῶν γραμμάτων—κυνοκεφάλους τινὰς καὶ λεοντοκεφάλους ἀνθρώπους; ἢ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπείπερ ἀλλόκοτά ἐστι. φέρε δὲ τὰ μονοειδῆ καὶ ἁπλᾶ ἐπιγράψωμεν ὡς οἷόν τε εἰκάσαντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ δυοῖν κλήροιν, δύο ἵππους ἐπὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας δύο καὶ κύνας δύο, τῷ δὲ ἐνάτῳ λέων ἔστω τοὐπίσημον. ἢν τοίνυν τῷ λεοντοφόρῳ τούτῳ κλήρῳ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐντύχῃς, πόθεν ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὸν ἔφεδρον ποιῶν, ἢν μὴ παραθεωρήσῃς ἅπαντας ἐπιὼν εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος λέοντα ἔχει;
HERMOTIMUS: I can give you no answer, Lycinus.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὦ Λυκῖνε.
45. LYCINUS: Of course not; there is no plausible answer. So, if we wish to find either the man who has the sacred chalice or the bye or the man who will best lead us to that city of Corinth, we shall of necessity go to everyone and make our research, trying them carefully, and stripping and comparing. And it will be only with difficulty that we shall find the truth by this means, and if anyone is likely to give me trustworthy advice on which philosophy to pursue, only that man who knows what they all say will be he; the rest will fall short, and I would not put my trust in them, as long as they are unacquainted with even one philosophy—that one might be the best. If someone were to produce a handsome man and say that he was the most handsome of all men, we should certainly not believe him, unless we knew that he had seen all men. This man may well be handsome, but whether the most handsome of all he could not know, since he has not seen them all. And we are looking, not just for something beautiful, but for the most beautiful; and if we do not find it, we shall not think that we have made any progress. For we are not going to be content with any chance beauty. No, we are looking for the supreme beauty, and of that there can only be one.
45. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Εἰκότως· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὐπρόσωπον οὐδέν. ὥστε ἢν ἐθέλωμεν ἢ τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ἱερὰν φιάλην εὑρεῖν ἢ τὸν ἔφεδρον ἢ τὸν ἄριστα ἡγησόμενον ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην τὴν Κόρινθον, ἐπὶ πάντας ἀναγκαίως ἀφιξόμεθα καὶ ἐξετάσομεν ἄκρως πειρώμενοι καὶ ἀποδύοντες καὶ παραθεωροῦντες. μόλις γὰρ ἂν οὕτω τἀληθὲς ἐκμάθοιμεν. καὶ εἴ γέ τις μέλλοι σύμβουλός μοι ἀξιόπιστος ἔσεσθαι φιλοσοφίας πέρι ἥντινα φιλοσοφητέον, οὗτος ἂν εἴη μόνος ὁ τὰ ὑπὸ πασῶν αὐτῶν λεγόμενα εἰδώς, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πιστεύσαιμι αὐτοῖς, ἔστ' ἂν καὶ μιᾶς ἀπείρατοι ὦσι—τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη ἐκείνη εἴη. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις παραστησάμενος καλὸν ἄνθρωπον λέγοι τοῦτον εἶναι κάλλιστον ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων, πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν αὐτῷ ἢν μὴ εἰδῶμεν ὅτι πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἑώρακεν. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος καλός, εἰ δὲ πάντων κάλλιστος οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰδέναι μὴ ἰδὼν ἅπαντας. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ μόνον καλοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καλλίστου δεόμεθα· καὶ ἢν μὴ τοῦτο εὕρωμεν, οὐδὲν ἡμῖν πλέον πεπρᾶχθαι ἡγησόμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἀγαπήσομεν ὁποιῳδήποτε καλῷ ἐντυχόντες, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀκρότατον ζητοῦμεν κάλλος, ὅπερ ἀνάγκη ἓν εἶναι.
46. HERMOTIMUS: True.
46. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἀληθῆ.
LYCINUS: Well then, can you name me a man who has tried every path in philosophy, who knows what Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, Epicurus, and the rest, say, and, finally, has chosen one path out of them all, has proved it genuine, and has learnt by experience that it alone leads straight to happiness? If we found such a person we should stop worrying.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Τί οὖν; ἔχεις μοί τινα εἰπεῖν ἁπάσης ὁδοῦ πεπειραμένον ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ὃς τά τε ὑπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα εἰδὼς τελευτῶν μίαν εἵλετο ἐξ ἁπασῶν ὁδῶν ἀληθῆ τε δοκιμάσας καὶ πείρᾳ μαθὼν ὡς μόνη ἄγει εὐθὺ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας; εἰ γάρ τινα τοιοῦτον εὕροιμεν, παυσόμεθα πράγματα ἔχοντες.
HERMOTIMUS: It would not be easy to discover such a person.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Λυκῖνε, τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα εὑρεῖν.
47. LYCINUS: Then what shall we do, Hermotimus? I do not think that we ought to give up because we have no such guide at the moment. Is it not the best and safest plan for everyone at the beginning to make his own way through every system and examine carefully the doctrines of each?
47. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Τί δὴ οὖν πράξομεν, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε; οὐ γὰρ ἀπαγορευτέον οἶμαι ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς ἡγεμόνος τοιούτου ἔς γε τὸ παρὸν εὐποροῦμεν. ἆρα τόδε πάντων κράτιστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, αὐτὸν ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενον διὰ πάσης προαιρέσεως χωρῆσαι καὶ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἀκριβῶς τὰ ὑπὸ πάντων λεγόμενα;
HERMOTIMUS: That seems to follow. But we must watch lest we meet this stumbling-block in what you said a little before. When we have once committed ourselves and spread the sail, it is not easy to return. How can we travel all the paths, if we are to be held fast in the first, as you say?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἔοικεν ἀπό γε τούτων. πλὴν ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἐναντίον ᾖ ὃ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἔλεγες, ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐπιδόντα ἑαυτὸν καὶ πετάσαντα τὴν ὀθόνην ἀναδραμεῖν αὖθις. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε πάσας ἐπελθεῖν τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ, ὡς φής, κατασχεθησομένῳ;
LYCINUS: I will tell you. We will copy that stratagem of Theseus and take a thread from Ariadne in the play, and then enter every labyrinth. So, by winding it up we shall have no difficulty in getting out.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ἐγώ σοι φράσω. τὸ τοῦ Θησέως ἐκεῖνο μιμησόμεθα καί τι λίνον παρὰ τῆς τραγικῆς Ἀριάδνης λαβόντες εἴσιμεν ἐς τὸν λαβύρινθον ἕκαστον, ὡς ἔχειν ἀπραγμόνως μηρυόμενοι αὐτὸ ἐξιέναι.
HERMOTIMUS: Then who will be our Ariadne? And where shall we get our thread?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν Ἀριάδνη γένοιτ' ἂν ἢ πόθεν τοῦ λίνου εὐπορήσομεν;
LYCINUS: Never fear, my friend. I think I have discovered what to hold on to, if we are to get out.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Θάρρει, ὦ ἑταῖρε. δοκῶ γάρ μοι εὑρηκέναι οὗτινος ἐχόμενοι ἐξέλθοιμεν ἄν.
HERMOTIMUS: Well, what?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν;
LYCINUS: I will tell you—it is not mine, it comes from one of the sages: “Keep sober, and remember to disbelieve.” For, if we are not prepared to believe everything we hear, but rather to act like judges and let the next man have his say, perhaps we may escape the labyrinths with ease.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐκ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ ἀλλά τινος τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ “νῆφε καὶ μέμνησο ἀπιστεῖν”· ἢν γὰρ μὴ ῥᾳδίως πιστεύωμεν ἀκούοντες ἀλλὰ δικαστικῶς αὐτὸ ποιῶμεν ἀπολιπόντες καὶ τοῖς ἑξῆς λόγον, ἴσως ἂν εὐμαρῶς τοὺς λαβυρίνθους ἐκφύγοιμεν.
HERMOTIMUS: Good, let us do this.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Εὐ λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶμεν.
48. LYCINUS: Well then, which path should we travel first? Or will this make no difference? Let us begin anywhere—with Pythagoras, for instance. If we do this, how long do we suppose we shall spend in learning all the doctrines of Pythagoras? Please do not leave out those five years of silence. Including the five years I suppose thirty years will be enough, or certainly a minimum of twenty.
48. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Εἶεν. ἐπὶ τίνα δὴ αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἔλθοιμεν ἄν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ἀρξάμενοι δὲ ἀφ' ὁτουοῦν οἷον ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου ἢν οὕτω τύχῃ, πόσῳ ἂν χρόνῳ οἰόμεθα ἐκμαθεῖν τὰ Πυθαγόρου ἅπαντα; καὶ μή μοι ἐξαίρει καὶ τὰ πέντε ἔτη ἐκεῖνα τὰ τῆς σιωπῆς· σὺν δ’ οὖν τοῖς πέντε ἱκανὰ τριάκοντα οἶμαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πάντως γε εἴκοσι.
HERMOTIMUS: Let us assume so.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Θῶμεν οὕτως.
LYCINUS: Following that, we must obviously give the same number to Plato, and not less to Aristotle.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Εἶτα ἑξῆς τῷ Πλάτωνι θετέον δηλαδὴ τοσαῦτα ἕτερα, ἔτι μὴν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει οὐκ ἐλάττω.
HERMOTIMUS: No, not less.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐ γάρ.
LYCINUS: For Chrysippus, I shall not ask you how many. I know from what I have heard you say that forty will hardly suffice.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Χρυσίππῳ δέ γε οὐκέτι ἐρήσομαί σε πόσα. οἶδα γὰρ παρὰ σοῦ ἀκούσας ὅτι τετταράκοντα μόγις ἱκανά.
HERMOTIMUS: Just so.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὕτως.
LYCINUS: Then Epicurus in his turn, and the rest. You can realise that I do not put these figures too high, when you consider the number of Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists, who are octogenarians but who admit, each and every one, that they do not know all the teachings of their own sect, so as to have a thorough knowledge of its doctrines. If they did not admit it, then Chrysippus and Aristotle and Plato would, and even more would Socrates, a man not one whit their inferior: he used to shout out to the whole world not only that he did not know everything, but that he knew absolutely nothing, or only this one thing—that he did not know. Let us count them up from the beginning: we gave twenty to Pythagoras, the same to Plato, and to all the others the same. What would the total be if we assume only ten philosophical sects?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Εἶτα ἑξῆς Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὡς δὲ οὐ πολλὰ ταῦτα τίθημι, ἐκεῖθεν μάθοις ἄν, ἢν ἐννοήσῃς ὅσοι ὀγδοηκοντούτεις εἰσὶ Στωϊκοὶ ἢ Ἐπικούρειοι ἢ Πλατωνικοὶ ὁμολογοῦντες μὴ πάντα εἰδέναι τὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ αἱρέσεως ἕκαστος, ὡς μηδὲν ἐνδεῖν σφίσιν ἐς τὰ μαθήματα. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππός γε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων φαῖεν ἄν, καὶ πρὸ τούτων ὁ Σωκράτης οὐδὲν φαυλότερος αὐτῶν, ὃς ἐκεκράγει πρὸς ἅπαντας οὐχ ὅπως μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ὅλως εἰδέναι τι ἢ τοῦτο μόνον ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. λογισώμεθα οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· εἴκοσι τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ ἐτίθεμεν, εἶτα Πλάτωνι τοσαῦθ' ἕτερα, εἶτα ἑξῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις. πόσα δὴ οὖν ταῦτα συντεθέντα ἐν κεφαλαίῳ γένοιτ' ἄν, εἰ δέκα μόνας θεῖμεν τὰς αἱρέσεις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ;
HERMOTIMUS: More than two hundred years, Lycinus.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ὑπὲρ διακόσια, ὦ Λυκῖνε.
LYCINUS: Shall we take off a quarter, and make a hundred and fifty years enough, or a whole half?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Βούλει οὖν ἀφαιρῶμεν τὸ τέταρτον, ὡς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἔτη ἱκανὰ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ ὅλον;
49. HERMOTIMUS: You would know better than I see this: few would get through them all even on this reckoning, if they began right from the day they were born.
49. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Αὐτὸς ἂν εἰδείης ἄμεινον· ἐγὼ δὲ ὁρῶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὀλίγοι ἂν καὶ οὕτω διὰ πασῶν ἐξέλθοιεν ἐκ γενετῆς εὐθὺς ἀρξάμενοι.
LYCINUS: If that is the case, Hermotimus, what can we do? Must we go back on what we have already agreed—that no one can choose the best out of so many without trying them all? We agreed that to choose without putting to the test was to seek the truth more by divination than by judgment. Is that not what we said?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Τί ἂν οὖν πάθοι τις, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα; ἢ ἀνατρεπτέον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἤδη ὡμολογημένα—ὡς οὐκ ἄν τις ἕλοιτο ἐκ πολλῶν τὸ βέλτιστον μὴ οὐχὶ πειραθεὶς ἁπάντων; ὡς τόν γε ἄνευ πείρας αἱρούμενον μαντείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ κρίσει τἀληθὲς ἀναζητοῦντα. οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέγομεν;
HERMOTIMUS: Yes.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ναί.
LYCINUS: Then there is every necessity for us to live all that time, if we are going first to make a good choice when we have made trial of them all, then to practise philosophy after we have made our choice, and finally to be happy after we have practised our philosophy. Until we do this we shall be dancing in the dark, as they say, and whatever we happen to stumble on, and whatever comes first into our hands, we shall assume to be what we are after because of our ignorance of the truth. In any case even if by some good fortune we happen to fall over the truth, we shall not be able to know for sure if it is what we are after. There are many things much alike, each claiming to be the real truth.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον βιῶναι ἡμᾶς, εἰ μέλλοιμεν εὖ τε αἱρήσεσθαι ἁπάντων πειραθέντες καὶ ἑλόμενοι φιλοσοφήσειν καὶ φιλοσοφήσαντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. πρὶν δὲ οὕτω ποιῆσαι, ἐν σκότῳ φασὶν ὀρχοίμεθ' ἂν οἷς ἂν τύχωμεν προσπταίοντες καὶ ὅ τι ἂν πρῶτον ἐς τὰς χεῖρας ἔλθῃ, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τἀληθές. εἰ δὲ καὶ εὕροιμεν ἄλλως κατά τινα ἀγαθὴν τύχην περιπεσόντες αὐτῷ, οὐχ ἕξομεν βεβαίως εἰδέναι εἰ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ ζητοῦμεν. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὅμοια αὑτοῖς, λέγοντα ἕκαστον αὐτὸ εἶναι τἀληθέστατον.
50. HERMOTIMUS: I feel, Lycinus, that what you say is reasonable, but—and I shall be honest—you annoy me a great deal by this detailed examination and your unnecessary precision. It may be that it has done me no good in leaving home today and then meeting you. I was already near the fulfilment of my hopes, but you have thrown me into difficulties with your demonstration that the search for truth is impossible since it needs all those years.
50. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ὦ Λυκῖνε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως εὔλογα μὲν δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ἀτάρ—εἰρήσεται γὰρ τἀληθές—οὐ μετρίως ἀνιᾷς με διεξιὼν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀκριβολογούμενος οὐδὲν δέον. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔοικα οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἐξεληλυθέναι τήμερον ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐξελθὼν ἐντετυχηκέναι σοι, ὅς με πλησίον ἤδη τῆς ἐλπίδος ὄντα εἰς ἀπορίας φέρων ἐμβέβληκας ἀδύνατον ἀποφαίνων τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐτῶν γε τοσούτων δεομένην.
LYCINUS: Surely it would be much fairer, my friend, to blame your father, Menecrates, and your mother, whatever her name was (I do not know) or before them our human natures for having made you (unlike Tithonus) of few years and short life, and for decreeing a hundred years as the longest life for man All I did was with your help to consider and discover the conclusions of the argument.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολὺ δικαιότερον μέμφοιο ἂν τῷ πατρί σου Μενεκράτει καὶ τῇ μητρὶ ἥτις ποτὲ ἐκαλεῖτο (οὐ γὰρ οἶδα), ἢ καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν ὅτι σε μὴ κατὰ τὸν Τιθωνὸν πολυετῆ καὶ μακρόβιον ἔθεσαν, ἀλλὰ περιέγραψαν μὴ πλείω βιῶναι τὸ μήκιστον ἐτῶν ἑκατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα. ἐγὼ δὲ μετὰ σοῦ σκεπτόμενος εὗρον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ἀποβάν.
51. HERMOTIMUS: That is not so. You always lord it over us. I don’t know what makes you hate philosophy and mock philosophers.
51. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ὑβριστὴς ἀεὶ σύ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅ τι παθὼν μισεῖς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἐς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἀποσκώπτεις.
LYCINUS: What truth is, Hermotimus, you wise men can say better than I—you and your master I mean. For myself I know thus much: truth is not all pleasant to listen to; in estimation it is far outfamed by falsehood. Falsehood presents a fairer face, and is therefore more pleasant, while truth knows no deceit and speaks with freedom to men, and for this they take offence. Look at us: you now take offence with me for discovering the truth of these matters with your help and showing that what you and I are in love with is not easy at all. Suppose you had happened to be in love with a statue and, thinking it to be human, hoped to win it, and suppose I saw it was stone or bronze and told you out of friendship that your love was impossible, you would in that case too think that I was an enemy, because I had not let you be deceived when you hoped for what was monstrous and beyond your reach.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ἥτις μὲν ἡ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ὑμεῖς ἂν ἄμεινον εἴποιτε οἱ σοφοί, σύ τε καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος. ἐγὼ δὲ τό γε τοσοῦτον οἶδα, ὡς οὐ πάνυ ἡδεῖά ἐστιν αὐτὴ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ παρευδοκιμεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους παρὰ πολύ. εὐπροσωπότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον, ἡ δὲ ἅτε μηδὲν κίβδηλον ἑαυτῇ συνειδυῖα μετὰ παρρησίας διαλέγεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχθονται αὐτῇ. ἰδού γέ τοι, καὶ σὺ νῦν ἄχθῃ μοι τἀληθὲς ἐξευρόντι περὶ τούτων μετὰ σοῦ καὶ δηλώσαντι οἵων ἐρῶμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὡς οὐ πάνυ ῥᾳδίων. ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνδριάντος ἐρῶν ἐτύγχανες καὶ ᾤου τεύξεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνων ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ κατιδὼν ὡς λίθος ἢ χαλκὸς εἴη ἐμήνυσα πρός σε ὑπ' εὐνοίας ὅτι ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷς, καὶ τότε δύσνουν ἐμὲ εἶναι ᾤου ἂν σαυτῷ διότι σε οὐκ εἴων ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ἀλλόκοτα καὶ ἀνέλπιστα ἐλπίζοντα.
52. HERMOTIMUS: Then this is what you say, Lycinus, that we must not study philosophy, but give ourselves up to idleness and live out our lives as laymen?
52. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Λυκῖνε, φής, ὡς οὐ φιλοσοφητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἀργίᾳ παραδιδόντας αὑτοὺς ἰδιώτας καταβιῶναι;
LYCINUS: When have you heard me say that? What I say is not that we must not study philosophy, but that since we must, and as there are many paths to philosophy and each one claims that it leads to virtue, and the true one is not clear, we must be careful in our choice. But with so many before us we saw it was impossible to choose the best unless we were to visit and test every path. Then the trial was seen to be somewhat lengthy. Now what do you think? I will ask you again—will you follow the first guide you light on and join him in his study while he takes you for a lucky gift from heaven?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Καὶ ποῦ τοῦτο ἤκουσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὡς οὐ φιλοσοφητέον φημί, ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ φιλοσοφητέον ὁδοί τε πολλαί εἰσιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἑκάστη καὶ ἀρετὴν ἄγειν φάσκουσαι, ἡ δ’ ἀληθὴς ἐν αὐταῖς ἄδηλος, ἀκριβῆ ποιήσασθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν. ἀδύνατον δέ γε ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο πολλῶν προτεθέντων ἑλέσθαι τὸ ἄριστον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴοι τις πειρώμενος· εἶτά πως μακρὰ ἡ πεῖρα ὤφθη. σὺ δὲ πῶς ἀξιοῖς; αὖθις γὰρ ἐρήσομαι—ὅτῳ ἂν πρώτῳ ἐντύχῃς, τούτῳ ἕψῃ καὶ συμφιλοσοφήσεις κἀκεῖνος ἕρμαιον ποιήσεταί σε;
53. HERMOTIMUS: What answer could I give you now, when you say that no one can judge for himself, unless he lives as long as a phoenix and goes the full round testing all the philosophers, and when you do not see fit to trust those who have made the test before you or the many who give their praise and their testimony?
53. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Καὶ τί σοι ἀποκριναίμην ἄν ἔτι, ὃς οὔτε αὐτόν τινα κρίνειν οἷόν τε εἶναι φής, ἤν μὴ φοίνικος ἔτη βιώσῃ πάντας ἐν κύκλῳ περιιὼν καὶ πειρώμενος οὔτε τοῖς προπεπειραμένοις πιστεύειν ἀξιοῖς οὔτε τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν;
LYCINUS: Who are these many who know and have tested them all? If any such person really exists, one is quite enough for me, and there will be no need of many. But if you mean those who do not know, the number of them will in no way induce me to trust them, as long as they make declarations about all the systems when they know nothing or only one.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Τίνας φὴς τοὺς πολλοὺς εἰδότας καὶ πεπειραμένους ἁπάντων; εἰ γάρ τις τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ἱκανὸς ἔμοιγε καὶ εἷς, καὶ οὐκέτι πολλῶν δεήσει. ἢν δὲ τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας λέγῃς, οὐδέν τι τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν προσάξεταί με πιστεύειν ἄχρι ἂν ἢ μηδὲν ἢ ἓν εἰδότες περὶ ἁπάντων ἀποφαίνωνται.
HERMOTIMUS: You alone have seen the truth, all the others who study philosophy are fools.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Μόνος δὲ σὺ τἀληθὲς κατεῖδες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀνόητοι ἅπαντες ὅσοι φιλοσοφοῦσιν.
LYCINUS: You wrong me, Hermotimus, when you say that I somehow put myself before other people or in general rank myself in some way with those who know. You do not remember what I said. I did not maintain that I knew the truth more than other people. No, I admitted that like all men I was ignorant of it.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Καταψεύδῃ μου, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, λέγων ὡς ἐγὼ προτίθημί πῃ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ τάττω ὅλως ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσι, καὶ οὐ μνημονεύεις ὧν ἔφην, οὐκ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους διατεινόμενος ἀλλὰ μετὰ πάντων αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν ὁμολογῶν.
54. HERMOTIMUS: Well, Lycinus, the obligation to go round them all, making trial of what they say, and the superiority of this method of choosing are perhaps reasonable, but it is quite ridiculous to spend so many years on each test, as if it were not possible to get a thorough knowledge of the whole from a scrutiny of a small part. This sort of thing seems to me to be quite easy, needing little time. At least, they say that some sculptor (Phidias, I think) saw only the claw of a lion and from it estimated the size of the whole animal on the assumption that it was modelled on the same scale as the claw. You too, if you were shown only the hand of a man, the rest of the body being hidden, would, I suppose, know at once that the hidden figure was a human being, even though you did not see the whole body. So in a fraction of a day it is easy to acquire a good knowledge of the essential points of all the systems, and this precise enquiry which calls for lengthy research is quite unnecessary for choosing that which is preferable. No, you can make a judgment from samples.
54. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἀλλ', ὦ Λυκῖνε, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πάντας ἐλθεῖν χρῆναι καὶ πειραθῆναι ὧν φασι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἂν ἄλλως ἑλέσθαι τὸ βέλτιον ἢ οὕτως, εὔλογον ἴσως, τὸ δὲ τῇ πείρᾳ ἑκάστῃ τοσαῦτα ἔτη ἀποδιδόναι, παγγέλοιον, ὥσπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὂν ἀπ' ὀλίγων καταμαθεῖν τὰ πάντα. ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐ πολλῆς διατριβῆς δεόμενον. φασί γέ τοι τῶν πλαστῶν τινα, Φειδίαν οἶμαι, ὄνυχα μόνον λέοντος ἰδόντα ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἀναλελογίσθαι, ἡλίκος ἂν ὁ πᾶς λέων γένοιτο κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ ὄνυχος ἀναπλασθείς. καὶ σὺ δέ, ἤν τίς σοι χεῖρα μόνην ἀνθρώπου δείξῃ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα κατακαλύψας, εἴσῃ, οἶμαι, αὐτίκα ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ κεκαλυμμένον, κἂν μὴ τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ἴδῃς. καὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν κεφαλαιώδη ὧν ἅπαντες λέγουσι, ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν ἐν ὀλίγῳ μορίῳ ἡμέρας, τὸ δὲ ὑπερακριβὲς τοῦτο καὶ μακρᾶς τῆς ἐξετάσεως δεόμενον οὐ πάνυ ἀναγκαῖον ἐς τὴν αἵρεσιν τοῦ βελτίονος, ἀλλ’ ἔστι κρῖναι καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνων.
55. LYCINUS: Goodness, Hermotimus, how sure you sound when you affirm that you can know the whole from the parts! And yet I remember hearing just the opposite, that if you know the whole you know the part as well, while if you know only the part, it does not follow now that you know the whole. Tell me this: would Phidias when he saw the lion’s claw ever have known that it belonged to a lion, if he had never seen a whole lion? If you saw a human hand, could you have said that it belonged to a man if you had not previously known or seen a man? Why do you not answer? Am I to give the only possible answer for you, that you could not have said it? It looks as though Phidias has retired unsuccessful and has modelled his lion in vain; clearly he is saying what has nothing to do with Dionysus! Or what comparison is there? Both Phidias and you yourself had no other means of recognising the parts than your knowledge of the whole—I mean the whole man and lion; and in a philosophy (the Stoic, for instance) how can you by knowing a part see the rest as well? How can you prove the rest beautiful? You see, you do not know the whole of which they are parts.
55. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Παπαί, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ὡς ἰσχυρὰ ταῦτα εἴρηκας ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν ἀξιῶν τὰ ὅλα εἰδέναι. καίτοι ἐγὼ τὰ ἐναντία ἀκούσας μέμνημαι ὡς ὁ μὲν τὸ ὅλον εἰδὼς εἰδείη ἂν καὶ τὸ μέρος, ὁ δὲ μόνον τὸ μέρος οὐκέτι καὶ τὸ ὅλον. οὕτως καί μοι τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ὁ Φειδίας ἄν ποτε ἰδὼν ὄνυχα λέοντος ἔγνω ἄν ὅτι λέοντός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἑωράκει ποτὲ λέοντα ὅλον; ἢ σὺ ἀνθρώπου χεῖρα ἰδὼν ἔσχες ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ μὴ πρότερον εἰδὼς μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς ἄνθρωπον; τί σιγᾷς; ἢ βούλει ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὑπὲρ σοῦ τά γε ἀναγκαῖα ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶχες; ὥστε κινδυνεύει ὁ Φειδίας ἄπρακτος ἀπεληλυθέναι μάτην ἀναπλάσας τὸν λέοντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον ὦπται λέγων. ἢ πῶς ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὅμοια; τῷ μὲν γὰρ Φειδίᾳ καὶ σοὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ μέρη αἴτιον ἦν ἢ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ὅλον—ἄνθρωπον λέγω καὶ λέοντα· ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ δέ, οἷον τῇ Στωϊκῶν, πῶς ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἴδοις; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἀποφαίνοιο ὡς καλά; οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα τὸ ὅλον οὗ μέρη ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν.
56. As to your contention that it is easy in a small part of a day to hear the essentials of all philosophies (I suppose you mean their principles and ends, their views of the gods and the soul, who say that everything is corporeal, who assert that immaterial things also exist, the fact that some identify “pleasure,” others “the beautiful “with goodness and happiness, and so on), after a hearing of this sort it is easy and no trouble to state the facts; but to know which is the one that is telling the truth will surely require not part of a day but many days. If not, why on earth have they all written books by the hundreds and thousands on these very subjects, to prove the truth, I suppose, of these very parts, those few parts, which you think easy and soon learnt? Here too, I fancy, you will have need of a prophet to help you choose the best, unless you spend time on accurate selection and make a personal and detailed study of all and everything. It would certainly be a short cut with no complications or delays if you sent for a prophet, listened to the essentials of them all, and sacrificed for each one: the god will save you a great deal of trouble if he reveals in the victim’s liver the choice you must make..
56. Ὃ δὲ φής, ὅτι τὰ κεφάλαια ῥᾴδιον ἀκοῦσαι ἁπάσης φιλοσοφίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ μορίῳ ἡμέρας (οἷον ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν καὶ τέλη καὶ τί θεοὺς οἴονται εἶναι, τί ψυχήν, καὶ τίνες μὲν σώματα πάντα φασί, τίνες δὲ καὶ ἀσώματα εἶναι ἀξιοῦσι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὔδαιμον τίθενται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα) οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκούσαντας ἀποφήνασθαι ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἔργον οὐδέν· εἰδέναι δὲ ὅστις ὁ τἀληθῆ λέγων ἐστίν, ὅρα μὴ οὐχὶ μορίου ἐστὶν ἡμέρας ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν δέηται. ἢ τί γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι παθόντες ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων ἑκατοντάδας καὶ χιλιάδας βιβλίων ἕκαστοι συγγεγράφασιν, ὡς πείσαιεν οἶμαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ὀλίγα ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἅ σοι δοκεῖ ῥᾴδια καὶ εὐμαθῆ; νῦν δὲ μάντεως οἶμαι δεήσει σοι κἀνταῦθα πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν κρειττόνων, εἰ μὴ ἀνέχῃ τὴν διατριβήν ὡς ἀκριβῶς ἑλέσθαι, αὐτὸς ἅπαντα καὶ ὅλον ἕκαστον κατανοήσας. ἐπίτομος γὰρ αὕτη γένοιτ' ἄν, οὐκ ἔχουσα περιπλοκὰς οὐδ’ ἀναβολάς, εἰ μεταστειλάμενος τὸν μάντιν ἀκούσας τῶν κεφαλαίων ἁπάντων σφαγιάζοιο ἐφ' ἑκάστοις· ἀπαλλάξει γάρ σε ὁ θεὸς μυρίων πραγμάτων δείξας ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἱερείου ἥπατι ἅτινά σοι αἱρετέον.
57. I will, if you like, suggest another, less troublesome way, without this slaughter of victims or sacrifice to anybody or calling in one of these expensive priests: put some tablets into a pitcher with the name of each of the philosophers on them, and tell a boy—a young lad with both parents living—to go to the pitcher and pick out whichever tablet he first touches with his hand; then all you have to do is to study the philosophy of the one whose lot he has picked.
57. Εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀπραγμονέστερον ὑποθήσομαί σοι, ὡς μὴ ἱερεῖα καταθύῃς ταυτὶ καὶ θυσιάζῃς τῳ μηδὲ ἱερέα τινὰ τῶν μεγαλομίσθων παρακαλῇς, ἀλλὰ ἐς κάλπιν ἐμβαλὼν γραμμάτια ἔχοντα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἑκάστου τοὔνομα κέλευε παῖδα—τῶν ἀνήβων ἀμφιθαλῆ τινα—προσελθόντα πρὸς τὴν κάλπιν ἀνελέσθαι ὅ τι ἂν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τὴν χεῖρα ἔλθῃ τῶν γραμματίων, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν κατὰ τὸν λαχόντα ἐκεῖνον ὅστις ἂν ᾖ φιλοσόφει.
58. HERMOTIMUS: This is mere burlesque and not like you. Now you tell me: have you ever bought wine yourself?
58. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ταυτὶ μέν, ὦ Λυκῖνε, βωμολοχικὰ καὶ οὐ κατά σε. σὺ δὲ εἰπέ μοι· ἤδη ποτὲ οἶνον ἐπρίω αὐτός;
LYCINUS: Of course, many a time.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Καὶ μάλα πολλάκις.
HERMOTIMUS: Then did you go round all the wine-merchants of the city in turn, tasting and comparing and judging the wines?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἆρ' οὖν περιῄεις ἅπαντας ἐν κύκλῳ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καπήλους ἀπογευόμενος καὶ παραβάλλων καὶ ἀντεξετάζων τοὺς οἴνους;
LYCINUS: Not at all.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐδαμῶς.
HERMOTIMUS: I think that you must take away the first wine you come to that is good and satisfactory.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Χρὴ γὰρ οἶμαί σοι τῷ πρώτῳ χρηστῷ καὶ ἀξίῳ ἐντυχόντι ἀποφέρεσθαι.
LYCINUS: Certainly.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Νὴ Δία.
HERMOTIMUS: Could you have said from that brief tasting what was the quality of the whole?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Καὶ ἀπό γε τοῦ ὀλίγου ἐκείνου γεύματος εἶχες ἂν εἰπεῖν ὁποῖος ἅπας ὁ οἶνός ἐστιν;
LYCINUS: Yes.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Εἶχον γάρ.
HERMOTIMUS: If you had approached the wine-merchants and said: “I wish to buy half a pint of wine; each of you give me, please, the whole jar to drink, so that when I have drained it all I may learn who has the better wine and who is to receive my custom”—if you had said this, do you not think that they would have laughed at you, and if you troubled them further, you might have had a jug of water poured on you?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Εἰ δὲ δὴ ἔλεγες προσελθὼν τοῖς καπήλοις, Ἐπειδὴ κοτύλην πρίασθαι βούλομαι, δότε μοι, ὦ οὗτοι, ἐκπιεῖν ὅλον ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τὸν πίθον, ὡς διὰ παντὸς ἐπεξελθὼν μάθοιμι ὅστις ἀμείνω τὸν οἶνον ἔχει καὶ ὅθεν μοι ὠνητέον. εἰ ταῦτα ἔλεγες, οὐκ ἂν οἴει καταγελάσαι σου αὐτούς, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐνοχλοίης τάχα ἂν καὶ προσχέαι τοῦ ὕδατος;
LYCINUS: I do think so, and I should deserve it.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ δίκαιά γ' ἂν πάθοιμι.
HERMOTIMUS: Apply the same consideration to philosophy. Why drain a butt when the tasting of a little can indicate the quality of the whole?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. τί δεῖ ἐκπιεῖν τὸν πίθον δυναμένους γε ἀπ' ὀλίγου τοῦ γεύματος εἰδέναι ὁποῖον τὸ πᾶν ἔστιν;
59. LYCINUS: How slippery you are, Hermotimus! And how you glide through my fingers! But you have helped us: you thought you had got away, but you have fallen into the same net.
59. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ὡς ὀλισθηρὸς εἶ, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, καὶ διαδιδράσκεις ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν. πλὴν ἀλλὰ ὤνησάς γε· οἰόμενος γὰρ ἐκπεφευγέναι ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν κύρτον ἐμπέπτωκας.
HERMOTIMUS: What do you mean?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Πῶς τοῦτο ἔφης;
LYCINUS: You take an object which is quite self-evident and which is known to everyone, wine, and you compare to it things that are unlike and the object of universal dispute, they are so uncertain. I certainly cannot say how in your view philosophy and wine are comparable, except perhaps at this one point that philosophers sell their lessons as wine-merchants their wines—most of them adulterating and cheating and giving false measure. Now let us examine your logic. You say that all the wine in a butt is the same, the whole measure; that is certainly not unreasonable. Now if you care to draw ever so little of it and take a taste, you say you would know at once the quality of the whole butt; this too follows and I would not deny it. Look at what comes next: do philosophy and these who, like your teacher, study philosophy say the same things to you on the same topics every day, or different things on different days? It is quite clear, my friend, that there are many different topics; you would not have stayed with him twenty years like an Odysseus in your wanderings and journeying, if he had said the same things all the time, but you would have been satisfied with one hearing.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ὅτι αὐθομολογούμενον πρᾶγμα λαβὼν καὶ γνώριμον ἅπασι τὸν οἶνον εἰκάζεις αὐτῷ τὰ ἀνομοιότατα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἀφανῶν ὄντων. ὥστε ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν καθ' ὅ τι σοι ὅμοιος φιλοσοφία καὶ οἶνος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀποδίδονται τὰ μαθήματα ὥσπερ οἱ κάπηλοι—κερασάμενοί γε οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δολώσαντες καὶ κακομετροῦντες. οὑτωσὶ δὲ ἐπισκοπήσωμεν ὅ τι καὶ λέγεις· τὸν οἶνον φὴς τὸν ἐν τῷ πίθῳ ὅλον αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὅμοιον εἶναι, καὶ μὰ Δί' οὐδὲν ἄτοπον. ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις γεύσαιτο ἀρυσάμενος ὀλίγον ὅσον αὐτοῦ, εἴσεσθαι αὐτίκα ὁποῖος ἅπας ὁ πίθος ἐστίν, ἀκόλουθον καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔγωγέ τι ἀντεῖπον. ὅρα δὴ καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· φιλοσοφία καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες οἷον ὁ διδάσκαλος ὁ σός, ἆρα ταὐτὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς λέγει ὁσημέραι καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ ἄλλα ἄλλοτε; πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι, πρόδηλον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἢ οὐκ ἂν εἴκοσιν ἔτη παρέμενες αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα περινοστῶν καὶ περιπλανώμενος, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ ἀπέχρη ἄν σοι καὶ ἅπαξ ἀκούσαντι.
60. HERMOTIMUS: Of course.
60. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
LYCINUS: Then how could you have known the whole from just the first taste? There were not the same, but always new things being said on new subjects, unlike wine, which is always the same. So, my friend, unless you drink the whole butt, your tipsiness has been to no purpose; god seems to me to have hidden the good of philosophy right down at the bottom beneath the very lees. You will have to drain it all to the end or you will never find that divine drink for which I think you have long thirsted. But you imagine it to be such that, if you were but to taste and draw just a drop, you would at once become all-wise, as, they say, the prophetess at Delphi becomes inspired as soon as she drinks of the sacred spring and gives her answers to those who consult the oracle. But it seems it is not so: you had drunk over half the butt, and you said that you were still at the beginning.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Πῶς οὖν οἷόν τέ σοι ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου γεύματος εἰδέναι τὰ πάντα; οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτά γε, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἕτερα καινὰ ἐπὶ καινοῖς ἐλέγετο, οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν. ὥστε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἢν μὴ ὅλον ἐκπίῃς τὸν πίθον, ἄλλως μεθύων περίει· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἐν τῷ πυθμένι δοκεῖ μοι ὁ θεὸς κατακρύψαι τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ τὴν τρύγα αὐτήν. δεήσει οὖν ὅλον ἐξαντλῆσαι ἐς τέλος, ἢ οὔποτ' ἂν εὕροις τὸ νεκτάρεον ἐκεῖνο πόμα, οὗ πάλαι διψῆν μοι δοκεῖς. σὺ δὲ οἴει τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς εἰ μόνον γεύσαιο αὐτοῦ καὶ σπάσαις μικρὸν ὅσον, αὐτίκα σε πάνσοφον γενησόμενον ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὴν πρόμαντιν, ἐπειδὰν πίῃ τοῦ ἱεροῦ νάματος, ἔνθεον εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ χρᾶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν. ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ἔοικε· σύ γ' οὖν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ πίθου ἐκπεπωκὼς ἐνάρχεσθαι ἔτι ἔλεγες.
61. Perhaps philosophy is more like this: still keep your butt and your dealer, but no wine; rather take an assortment of cereals—wheat on top, then beans, then barley, and, beneath the barley, lentils, then chickpeas, and other kinds of seeds as well. You come in wishing to buy some of the cereals. He has taken out a pinch of the wheat from where the wheat was and has given you a sample in your hand to examine. Now could you say by looking at that sample whether the peas were pure, the lentils tender, and the beans not completely empty?HERMOTIMUS: Not at all.
61. ὅρα τοίνυν μὴ τῷδε μᾶλλον φιλοσοφία ἔοικεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πίθος ἔτι μενέτω σοι καὶ ὁ κάπηλος, ἐνέστω δὲ μὴ οἶνος, ἀλλὰ πανσπερμία τις, πυρὸς ὑπεράνω καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον κύαμοι, εἶτα κριθαὶ καὶ ὑπὸ ταύταις φακοί, εἶτα ἐρέβινθοι καὶ ἄλλα ποικίλα. πρόσει δὴ σὺ ὠνήσασθαι ἐθέλων τῶν σπερμάτων, καὶ ὃς ἀφελὼν τοῦ πυροῦ, οὗπερ ἦν, ἀνέδωκέ σοι δεῖγμα ἐς τὴν χεῖρα, ὡς ἴδοις, ἆρα οὖν ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀποβλέπων εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐρέβινθοι καθαροὶ καὶ οἱ φακοὶ εὐτακεῖς καὶ οἱ κύαμοι οὐ διάκενοι;ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐδαμῶς.
LYCINUS: Then neither could you learn the nature of all philosophy from the first thing someone says. For it is not really one substance like the wine to which you compare it, claiming that it is like the sample. No, we have seen that there is variation in it, for which a cursory examination will not do. If you buy bad wine you risk a couple of pence, but to rot in the common herd oneself, as you said in the beginning, is very serious. Besides, to insist on drinking the whole butt in order to buy half a pint is to cause loss to the wine-merchant with your unbelieving tasting. But in philosophy there would be no such loss. No, however much you drink, the butt is just as full and the wine-merchant will not suffer loss. For, in the words of the proverb, the more you draw the fuller it becomes. The case is the reverse of the butt of the Danaïdes that would not hold what was put into it but let it run away at once. Take some away from philosophy, however, and what is left increases.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἀφ' ἑνὸς ὧν φήσει τις τοῦ πρώτου, μάθοι ἂν ἅπασαν ὁποία ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἕν τι ἦν ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος, ᾧπερ σὺ αὐτὴν ἀπεικάζεις ἀξιῶν ὁμοίαν εἶναι τῷ γεύματι, τὸ δὲ ἑτεροῖόν τι ὤφθη οὐ παρέργου τῆς ἐξετάσεως δεόμενον. οἶνον μὲν γὰρ φαῦλον πρίασθαι ἐν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ὁ κίνδυνος, αὐτὸν δέ τινα ἐν τῷ συρφετῷ παραπολεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔφησθα, οὐ μικρὸν εἶναι κακόν. ἄλλως τε ὁ μὲν ὅλον ἀξιῶν ἐκπιεῖν τὸν πίθον, ὡς κοτύλην πρίαιτο, ζημιώσαι ἂν τὸν κάπηλον οὕτως ἀπίθανα γευόμενος, φιλοσοφία δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν τοιοῦτο πάθοι, ἀλλὰ κἂν ὅτι πάμπολλα πίῃς, οὐδέν τι ἐλάττων ὁ πίθος γίγνεται οὐδὲ ζημιώσεται ὁ κάπηλος. ἐπιρρεῖ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐξαντλούμενον ἐς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἢ ὁ τῶν Δαναΐδων πίθος. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐμβαλλόμενον οὐ συνεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ διέρρει εὐθύς. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἢν ἀφέλῃς τι, πλεῖον τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται.
62. But I want to tell you another, similar thing, about sampling philosophy, and do not think that I am being blasphemous about it if I say that it is like a deadly poison—hemlock, for example, or aconite, or some other such. Not even they, deadly though they are, will kill, if you scrape off a tiny piece with the tip of your nail and taste that. No, if the quantity, method of consumption, and mixture are wrong, you can take it and not die. You claimed, however, that the tiniest piece was quite enough to give you a complete knowledge of what the whole was like.
62. Ἐθέλω δέ σοι καὶ ἄλλο ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν φιλοσοφίας περὶ γεύματος, καὶ μή με νομίσῃς βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς ἢν εἴπω ὅτι φαρμάκῳ ὀλεθρίῳ ἔοικεν, οἷον κωνείῳ ἢ ἀκονίτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ θανατηφόρα ἐστίν, ἀποκτείνειεν ἄν, εἴ τις ὀλίγον ὅσον ἀκαριαῖον ἀποξύσας αὐτῶν ἄκρῳ τῷ ὄνυχι ἀπογεύσαιτο· ἀλλὰ ἢν μὴ τοσοῦτον ὅσον χρή, καὶ ὅπως καὶ ξὺν οἷς, οὐκ ἂν ἀποθάνοι ὁ προσενεγκάμενος· σὺ δὲ ἠξίους τοὐλάχιστον ἐξαρεκεῖν, ὡς ἀποτελέσαι τὴν τοῦ ὅλου γνῶσιν.
63. HERMOTIMUS: Granted, Lycinus. What next? Must we live a hundred years and have all that trouble? Is there no other way of studying philosophy?
63. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἔστω ταῦτα ὡς βούλει, Λυκῖνε. τί οὖν; ἑκατὸν χρὴ ἔτη βιῶναι καὶ τοσαῦτα ὑπομεῖναι πράγματα; ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως φιλοσοφήσαιμεν;
LYCINUS: No, Hermotimus. Nor need we complain if what you said at first is true: that life is short and art is long. And now I don’t understand why you are distressed if you cannot become a Chrysippus or a Plato or a Pythagoras today before sunset.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε· καὶ δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἴ γε ἀληθῆ ἔλεγες ἐν ἀρχῇ, ὡς ὁ μὲν βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή. νῦν δὲ οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅ τι παθὼν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ μὴ αὐθημερὸν ἡμῖν πρὶν δῦναι ἥλιον Χρύσιππος ἢ Πλάτων ἢ Πυθαγόρας γένοιο.
HERMOTIMUS: You hedge me round, Lycinus, and drive me into a corner, although I have done you no harm. Clearly you are doing this from spite, because I have made progress in my studies while you have neglected yourself—at your age too.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Περιέρχῃ με, ὦ Λυκῖνε, καὶ συνελαύνεις ἐς στενὸν οὐδὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ δεινὸν παθών, ὑπὸ φθόνου δηλαδή, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν προὔκοπτον ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι, σὺ δὲ ὠλιγώρησας ἑαυτοῦ τηλικοῦτος ὤν.
LYCINUS: Do you know what? Take no notice of my ravings, but leave me to my silly chatter, and you go on your way as you are and finish what you decided to do in the first place.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οἶσθ' οὖν ὃ δράσεις; ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥσπερ κορυβαντιῶντι μὴ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἔα ληρεῖν, σὺ δὲ ὡς ἔχεις προχώρει ἐς τὸ πρόσθε τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ πέραινε κατὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σοι δεδογμένα περὶ τούτων.
HERMOTIMUS: You are so compulsive that you do not let me make any choice unless I try them all.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐᾷς σὺ βίαιος ὢν αἱρεῖσθαί τι, ἢν μὴ πειραθῶ ἁπάντων.
LYCINUS: Well, you may be sure that I shall never say anything else. When you call me compulsive you seem to me to be blaming the innocent, as the poet says; for I myself, as long as no other argument comes to your aid to release you from the compulsion, am at present a helpless captive. But look, the argument is going to bring much greater pressure to bear on you, but perhaps you will ignore that and blame me.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Καὶ μὴν εὖ εἰδέναι χρὴ ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλο εἴποιμι. βίαιον δὲ λέγων ἐμὲ ἀναίτιον δοκεῖς μοι κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αἰτιάασθαι, αὐτόν, ἔστ' ἂν μὴ ἕτερός σοι λόγος συμμαχήσας ἀφέληται τῆς βίας, ἤδη ἀγόμενον· ἰδού γέ τοι καὶ τάδε πολλῷ βιαιότερα φαίη ἄν σοι ὁ λόγος· σὺ δὲ ἐκεῖνον παρεὶς ἐμὲ ἴσως αἰτιάσῃ.
HERMOTIMUS: How? I should be surprised if it had anything left to say.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Τὰ ποῖα; θαυμάζω γάρ, εἴ τι ἄρρητον καταλέλειπται αὐτῷ.
64. LYCINUS: It says that to inspect and to investigate everything is not sufficient to give you the power to choose the best. No, the most important thing is still lacking.
64. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐχ ἱκανὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ πάντα ἰδεῖν καὶ διεξελθεῖν δι’ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔχειν ἤδη ἑλέσθαι τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλ’ ἔτι τοῦ μεγίστου ἐνδεῖν.
HERMOTIMUS: What is that?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Τίνος τούτου;
LYCINUS: My dear sir, a critical, examining faculty, a quick wit, and a keen and impartial intellect. You must have this to make a judgment on matters of this kind, or you will have looked at everything in vain. The argument says that not a little time is to be allowed in a matter like this and everything put before you; you are not to rush ahead, but go slowly and make frequent inspections before you choose, having no regard for the age of each speaker, nor for his dress, nor for his reputation for wisdom. No, you must imitate the court of the Areopagus, which sits in judgment at night in the dark, so that it has no regard for who is speaking, but only for what is said. Then it is that you will be able to make a sound choice and practise philosophy.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Κριτικῆς τινος, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καὶ ἐξεταστικῆς παρασκευῆς καὶ νοῦ ὀξέος καὶ διανοίας ἀκριβοῦς καὶ ἀδεκάστου, οἵαν χρὴ εἶναι τὴν περὶ τῶν τηλικούτων δικάσουσαν, ἢ μάτην ἂν ἅπαντα ἑωραμένα εἴη. ἀποδοτέον οὖν φησι καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ προθέμενον ἅπαντα εἰς μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι διαμέλλοντα καὶ βραδύνοντα καὶ πολλάκις ἐπισκοποῦντα, μήτε ἡλικίαν τοῦ λέγοντος ἑκάστου μήτε σχῆμα ἢ δόξαν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ αἰδούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα, οἳ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ ἐς τοὺς λέγοντας, ἀλλ’ ἐς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. καὶ τότ' ἤδη ἐξέσται σοι βεβαίως ἑλομένῳ φιλοσοφεῖν.
HERMOTIMUS: You mean after death. From what you have said no man would live long enough to study everything and observe accurately every detail, and then, after observation, judge, and, after judging, choose, and after choosing practise philosophy; for this is the only way, you say, in which the truth could be discovered.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Μετὰ τὸν βίον φής· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων βίος ἐξαρκέσειεν ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιδεῖν καὶ ἐπιδόντα κρῖναι καὶ κρίναντα ἑλέσθαι καὶ ἑλόμενον φιλοσοφῆσαι, μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εὑρεθῆναι φὴς τἀληθές, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ.
65. LYCINUS: I hesitate to tell you, Hermotimus, that even this is not enough. No, I think we deceived ourselves when we thought we had found safety: we have found no safety at all. We are like fishermen who often when they have let down their nets feel something heavy, and so haul in expecting a huge catch of fish; then when they are tired with their pulling they see a stone or a jar packed with sand. I am afraid we have hauled up something like that.
65. ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ὀκνῶ γάρ σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Ἑρμότιμε, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦτό πω ἱκανόν, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λεληθέναι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι μέν τι εὑρηκέναι βέβαιον, εὑρόντες δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἁλιεύοντες πολλάκις καθέντες τὰ δίκτυα καὶ βάρους τινὸς αἰσθόμενοι ἀνέλκουσιν ἰχθῦς παμπόλλους γε περιβεβληκέναι ἐλπίζοντες, εἶτα ἐπειδὰν κάμωσιν ἀνασπῶντες, ἢ λίθος τις ἀναφαίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ κεράμιον ψάμμῳ σεσαγμένον. σκόπει μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τι τοιοῦτον ἀνεσπάκαμεν.
HERMOTIMUS: I don’t know what these nets of yours mean: you have certainly caught me in them.
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Οὐ μανθάνω τί σοι τὰ δίκτυα ταῦτα βούλεται· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ με περιβάλλεις αὐτοῖς.
LYCINUS: Then try to get out. If anybody knows how to swim, you do—thanks to god’s help. Now, even if we go round all the sects making our tests, and eventually complete our enquiry, I don’t think it will even yet be certain whether any one of them has what we are looking for, or whether all alike are ignorant of it.
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὐκοῦν πειρῶ διεκδῦναι· σὺν θεῷ γὰρ οἶσθα νεῖν, εἰ καί τις ἄλλος· ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν ἐφ' ἅπαντας ἔλθωμεν πειρώμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ἐργασώμεθά ποτε, οὐδέπω οὐδὲ τοῦτο δῆλον ἔσεσθαι νομίζω, εἴ τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ πάντες ὁμοίως ἀγνοοῦσιν.
HERMOTIMUS: What do you mean? Not one of them?
ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Τί φής; οὐδὲ τούτων τις πάντως ἔχει;
LYCINUS: It is debatable. Do you think it impossible that all are wrong, and that the truth may be something different, something which none of them has yet found?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Ἄδηλον. ἤ σοι ἀδύνατον δοκεῖ ἅπαντας ψεύδεσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἄλλο τι εἶναι πρὸς μηδενὸς αὐτῶν πω εὑρημένον;
66. HERMOTIMUS: How could that be possible?
66. ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ: Πῶς οἷόν τε;
LYCINUS: In this way. Suppose our true number to be twenty. Now let someone take twenty beans in his hand, and then close it and ask any ten people how many beans he has in his hand. Suppose one man guesses seven, another five, another thirty, some other ten or fifteen, in short every one differently; nevertheless it is possible for someone by some chance to guess the truth, isn’t it?
ΛΥΚΙΝΟΣ: Οὕτως· ἔστω γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς ἀριθμὸς ἡμῖν εἴκοσιν, οἷον, κυάμους τις εἴκοσιν ἐς τὴν χεῖρα λαβών, ἐπικλεισάμενος ἐρωτάτω δέκα τινάς, ὁπόσοι εἰσὶν οἱ κύαμοι ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ, οἱ δὲ εἰκάζοντες ὁ μὲν ἑπτά, ὁ δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τριάκοντα λεγέτωσαν, ὁ δὲ τις δέκα ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα, καὶ ὅλως ἄλλος ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν· ἐνδέχεται μέντοι καὶ κατὰ τύχην τινὰ ἀληθεῦσαι, ἦ γάρ;