289c. For in this case the art that makes and the art that uses are quite distinct, dealing in separation with the same thing; since there is a wide difference between the art of making lyres and that of harp-playing. Is it not so? He agreed. Nor again, obviously, do we require an art of flute-making; for this is another of the same kind. He assented. Now in good earnest, I asked, if we were to learn the art of speech-making, can that be the art we should acquire if we would be happy? I for one think not, said Cleinias, interposing.
289c. εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιοῦσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη διῄρηται τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ λυροποιικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολὺ διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν. οὐχ οὕτως;—συνέφη.—οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποιικῆς γε δῆλον ὅτι δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἑτέρα τοιαύτη.—συνεδόκει.—ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ τὴν λογοποιικὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν, ἆρά ἐστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι;—οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών.
289d. On what proof do you rely? I asked. I see, he said, certain speech-writers who do not know how to use the special arguments composed by themselves, just as lyre-makers in regard to their lyres: in the former case also there are other persons able to use what the makers produced, while being themselves unable to make the written speech. Hence it is clear that in speech likewise there are two distinct arts, one of making and one of using. I think you give sufficient proof, I said, that this art of the speech-writers cannot be that whose acquisition would make one happy. And yet I fancied that somewhere about this point would appear the knowledge which we have been seeking all this while.
289d. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, χρῇ; ὁρῶ, ἔφη, τινὰς λογοποιούς, οἳ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκεῖνοι ἠργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἡ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρῆσθαι. ἱκανόν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἣν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαίμων εἴη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾤμην ἐνταῦθά που φανήσεσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν.
289e. For not only do these speech-writers themselves, when I am in their company, impress me as prodigiously clever, Cleinias, but their art itself seems so exalted as to be almost inspired. However, this is not surprising; for it is a part of the sorcerer’s art, and only slightly inferior to that.
289e. καὶ γάρ μοι οἵ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· ἔστι γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπῳδῶν τέχνης μόριον μικρῷ τε ἐκείνης ὑποδεεστέρα.
290a. Soc. The sorcerer’s art is the charming of snakes and tarantulas and scorpions and other beasts and diseases, while the other is just the charming and soothing of juries, assemblies, crowds, and so forth. Or does it strike you differently? I asked. No, it appears to me, he replied, to be as you say. Which way then, said I, shall we turn now? What kind of art shall we try? For my part, he said, I have no suggestion. Why, I think I have found it myself, I said. What is it? said Cleinias.
290a. ΣΩ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπῳδῶν ἔχεών τε καὶ φαλαγγίων καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἢ σοί, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ; οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. ποῖ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθʼ ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίαν τέχνην; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη. ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι ηὑρηκέναι. τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.
290b. Generalship, I replied, strikes me as the art whose acquisition above all others would make one happy. I do not think so. Why not? I asked. In a sense, this is an art of hunting men. What then? I said. No part of actual hunting, he replied, covers more than the province of chasing and overcoming; and when they have overcome the creature they are chasing, they are unable to use it: the huntsmen or the fishermen hand it over to the caterers, and so it is too with the geometers, astronomers, and calculators— for these also are hunters in their way, since they are not in each case diagram-makers, but discover the realities of things —and so, not knowing how to use their prey, but only how to hunt, I take it they hand over their discoveries to the dialecticians to use properly, those of them, at least, who are not utter blockheads.
290b. ἡ στρατηγική μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἣν ἄν τις κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἴη. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. πῶς; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. θηρευτική τις ἥδε γέ ἐστιν τέχνη ἀνθρώπων. τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ. οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ χειρώσωνται τοῦτο ὃ ἂν θηρεύωνται, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν κυνηγέται καὶ οἱ ἁλιῆς τοῖς ὀψοποιοῖς παραδιδόασιν, οἱ δʼ αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί—θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι·
290c. Very good, I said, most handsome and ingenious Cleinias; and is this really so? To be sure it is; and so, in the same way, with the generals. When they have hunted either a city or an army, they hand it over to the politicians—since they themselves do not know how to use what they have hunted—just as quail-hunters, I suppose, hand over their birds to the quail-keepers.
290c. οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν—ἅτε οὖν χρῆσθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον, παραδιδόασι δήπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὑρήμασιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοί εἰσιν. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία· τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἵ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον·
290d. If, therefore, he went on, we are looking for that art which itself shall know how to use what it has acquired either in making or chasing, and if this is the sort that will make us blest, we must reject generalship, he said, and seek out some other.
290d. ἐπειδὰν ἢ πόλιν τινὰ θηρεύσωνται ἢ στρατόπεδον, παραδιδόασι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσιν—αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ ἐθήρευσαν—ὥσπερ οἶμαι οἱ ὀρτυγοθῆραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόασιν. εἰ οὖν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, δεόμεθα ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἥτις ᾧ ἂν κτήσηται ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην δή τινα, ἔφη, ζητητέον ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.
290e. Cri. What is this, Socrates? Such a pronouncement from that stripling!
290e. ΚΡ. τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μειράκιον τοιαῦτʼ ἐφθέγξατο;
Soc. You do not believe it is his, Crito?
ΣΩ. οὐκ οἴει, ὦ Κρίτων;
Cri. I should rather think not. For I am sure, if he spoke thus, he has no need of education from Euthydemus or anyone else.
ΚΡ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτʼ εἶπεν, οὔτʼ Εὐθυδήμου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτʼ ἀνθρώπου δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.
Soc. But then, Heaven help me! I wonder if it was Ctesippus who said it, and my memory fails me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτʼ εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;
291a. Cri. Very like Ctesippus!
291a. ΚΡ. ποῖος Κτήσιππος;
Soc. Well, of this at any rate I am certain, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said it. Tell me, mysterious Crito, was it some superior power that was there to speak it? For that speech I heard, I am sure.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος οὔτε Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ, ὦ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο; ὅτι γὰρ ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα.
Cri. Yes, I promise you, Socrates: I fancy it was indeed some superior power—very much so. But after that, did you go on looking for a suitable art? Did you find the one which you had as the object of your search, or not?
ΚΡ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολύ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τινὰ ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ηὕρετε ἐκείνην ἢ οὐχ ηὕρετε, ἧς ἕνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;
291b. Soc. Find it, my good fellow! No, we were in a most ridiculous state; like children who run after crested larks, we kept on believing each moment we were just going to catch this or that one of the knowledges, while they as often slipped from our grasp. What need to tell you the story at length? When we reached the kingly art, and were examining it to see if we had here what provides and produces happiness, at this point we were involved in a labyrinth: when we supposed we had arrived at the end, we twisted about again and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want as when we first started on it.
291b. ΣΩ. πόθεν, ὦ μακάριε, ηὕρομεν; ἀλλʼ ἦμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι· ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, ἀεὶ ᾠόμεθα ἑκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι, αἱ δʼ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέφευγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἄν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτὴν εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἡ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσά τε καὶ ἀπεργαζομένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι ὅσουπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.
291c. Cri. How did this happen to you, Socrates?
291c. ΚΡ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. I will tell you. We took the view that the statesman’s and the monarch’s arts were one and the same.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.
Cri. Well, what then?
ΚΡ. τί οὖν δή;
Soc. To this art, we thought, generalship and the other arts handed over the management of the productions of their own trades, as this one alone knew how to use them. So it seemed clear to us that this was the one we were seeking, and was the cause of right conduct in the state, and precisely as Aeschylus’ line expresses it, is seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, and making the whole useful.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ ἥ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοί εἰσιν, ὡς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει ἡμῖν αὕτη εἶναι ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἰαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.
291d. Cri. And surely your notion was a good one, Socrates?
291d. ΚΡ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. You shall judge of that, Crito, if you care to hear what befell us thereafter. For later on we reconsidered it somewhat in this manner: Look now, does the monarch’s art, that rules over all, produce any effect or not?
ΣΩ. σὺ κρινεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν ὧδέ πως· φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τὶ ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν;
291e. Certainly it does, of course, we said to one another. Would you not say so too, Crito?
291e. πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;
Soc. Then what would you say is its effect? For instance, if I were to ask you whether medicine, in ruling over all that comes under its rule, has any effect to show; would you not say: Yes, health?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ σὲ ἐγὼ ἐρωτῴην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν ⟨ἂν⟩ φαίης;
Soc. And what about your art of agriculture? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἡ γεωργία; πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει, τί [ἔργον] ἀπεργάζεται;
292a. Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth?
292a. οὐ τὴν τροφὴν ἂν φαίης τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;
Soc. And what of the monarch’s art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ βασιλικὴ πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει; τί ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάνυ γʼ εὐπορεῖς.
Cri. I am not indeed, Socrates.
ΚΡ. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι.
Cri. Certainly.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Then surely it must purvey something good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι;
Cri. Necessarily, Socrates.
ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
292b. Soc. And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge.
292b. ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὡμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.
Cri. Yes, so you told me.
ΚΡ. ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.
Soc. And it was found that all effects in general that you may ascribe to statesmanship—and a great many of them there must be, presumably, if the citizens are to be made wealthy and free and immune from faction—all these things were neither bad nor good, while this art must make us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to be the one which benefited us and made us happy.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίη ἄν τις πολιτικῆς εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους τοὺς πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιάστους—πάντα ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ σοφοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλεν αὕτη εἶναι ἡ ὠφελοῦσά τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦσα.
292c. Cri. True: so at all events you agreed then, by your account of the discussion.
292c. ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὡμολογήθη, ὡς σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.
Soc. Then do you think that kingship makes men wise and good?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀγαθούς;
Cri. Why not, Socrates?
ΚΡ. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. But does it make all men good, and in all things? And is this the art that confers every sort of knowledge—shoe-making and carpentry and so forth?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθούς; καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικήν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας, αὕτη ἡ παραδιδοῦσά ἐστιν;
Cri. No, I think not, Socrates.
ΚΡ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
292d. Soc. Well, what knowledge does it give? What use can we make of it? It is not to be a producer of any of the effects which are neither bad nor good, while it is to confer no other knowledge but itself. Shall we try and say what it is, and what use we shall make of it? Do you mind if we describe it, Crito, as that whereby we shall make other men good?
292d. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ᾗ τί χρησόμεθα; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μήτε κακῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν αὕτη, ᾗ τί χρησόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, ᾗ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;
Cri. I quite agree.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And in what respect are we going to have these men good, and in what useful? Or shall we venture to say they are to make others so, and these again others? In what respect they can possibly be good is nowhere evident to us, since we have discredited all the business commonly called politics, and it is merely a case of the proverbial “Corinthus Divine”; and, as I was saying, we are equally or even worse at fault as to what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy.
ΣΩ. οἳ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; ἢ ἔτι λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλους;
292e. Cri. Upon my word, Socrates, you got yourselves there, it seems, into a pretty fix. Soc. So then I myself, Crito, finding I had fallen into this perplexity, began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers as though I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins to save us, the lad and myself, from the mighty wave of the argument, and to give us the best of their efforts, and this done, to make plain to us what that knowledge can be of which we must get hold if we are to spend the remainder of our lives in a proper wayCri.
292e. ὅτι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοί εἰσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν φαίνονται, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἠτιμάσαμεν, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ ἔλεγον, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλέονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τίς ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη ἣ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσει;ΚΡ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀφίκεσθε. ΣΩ. ἔγωγε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφίειν, δεόμενος τοῖν ξένοιν ὥσπερ Διοσκούρων ἐπικαλούμενος σῶσαι ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσαντας ἐπιδεῖξαι τίς ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἧς τυχόντες ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν.
293a. Well, did Euthydemus consent to propound anything for you?Soc. Why, certainly; and he began his discourse, my good friend, in this very lofty-minded fashion:
293a. ΚΡ. τί οὖν; ἠθέλησέν τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος;ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ ἤρξατό γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πάνυ μεγαλοφρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὧδε— πότερον δή σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα;
293b. Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this while, or propound that you have it? O gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power to do this? Certainly I have, he replied. Then for Heaven’s sake, I cried, propound that I have it! This will be much easier than learning foraman of my age. Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you know anything? Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though trifles. That is enough, he said; now do you think it possible that anything that is should not be just that which it actually is? On my soul, not I.
293b. ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ἐπίδειξον τοίνυν με νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ ῥᾷον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα. φέρε δή μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὅτι ἐπίστασαι;—πάνυ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε.—ἀρκεῖ, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι;—ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.—οὐκοῦν σύ, ἔφη, ἐπίστασαί τι;—ἔγωγε.—οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπίστασαι;—πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.—οὐδὲν διαφέρει·
293c. Now you, he said, know something? I do. Then you are knowing, if you really know? Certainly, in just that something. That makes no difference; you are not under a necessity of knowing everything, if you are knowing? No, to be sure, I replied; for there are many other things which I do not know. Then if you do not know something, you are not knowing? Not in that thing, my dear sir, I replied. Are you therefore any the less unknowing? Just now you said you were knowing;
293c. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα;—μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλʼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ.—ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—ἧττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι· καὶ οὕτως τυγχάνεις ὢν αὐτὸς οὗτος ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὖ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἅμα.
293d. so here you are, actually the very man that you are, and again, not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time! Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, “well said whate’er you say.” How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom?
293d. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς· πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἐκείνην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν; ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μή, εἴπερ ἓν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι—οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴην ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἅμα—ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, κἀκείνην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχω· ἆρα οὕτως λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σοφόν;
293e. Yes, you see, Socrates, he said, your own words refute you. Well, but, Euthydemus, I continued, are you not in the same plight? I assure you, so long as I had you and this dear fellow Dionysodorus to share my lot, however hard, I should have nothing to complain of. Tell me, you both know some existent things, of course, and others you do not? By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. How do you mean? I asked: do you then not know anything? Oh yes, we do, he said.
293e. αὐτὸς σαυτόν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. τί δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ πέπονθας τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πάσχων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσοδώρου τοῦδε, φίλης κεφαλῆς, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ἀγανακτοίην. εἰπέ μοι, σφὼ οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθον τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθον; ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
294a. Soc. So you know everything, I asked, since you know anything? Everything, he replied; yes, and you too, if you know one thing, know all. Good Heavens, I cried, what a wonderful statement! What a great blessing to boast of! And the rest of mankind, do they know everything or nothing? Surely, he said, they cannot know some things and not others, and so be at once knowing and unknowing. But what then? I asked. All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one. In the name of goodness, Dionysodorus, I said—for now I can see both of you are serious; before, I could hardly prevail on you to be so—do you yourselves really know everything?
294a. ΣΩ. πάντʼ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπίστασθον, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ ὁτιοῦν; πάντʼ, ἔφη· καὶ σύ γε πρός, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἐπίστασαι, πάντα ἐπίστασαι. ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. μῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντʼ ἐπίστανται, ἢ οὐδέν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἐπίστανται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἅμα ἐπιστήμονές τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες. ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πάντες, ἦ δʼ ὅς, πάντα ἐπίστανται, εἴπερ καὶ ἕν.
294b. Carpentry, for instance, and shoe-making? Certainly, he said. And you are good hands at leather-stitching? Why yes, in faith, and cobbling, he said. And are you good also at such things as counting the stars, and the sand? Certainly, he said: can you think we would not admit that also? Here Ctesippus broke in: Be so good, Dionysodorus, he said, as to place some such evidence before me as will convince me that what you say is true.
294b. ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε—δῆλοι γάρ μοί ἐστον ἤδη ὅτι σπουδάζετον, καὶ μόλις ὑμᾶς προυκαλεσάμην σπουδάζειν—αὐτὼ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθον; οἷον τεκτονικὴν καὶ σκυτικήν; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη. ἦ καὶ νευρορραφεῖν δυνατώ ἐστον; καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία καττύειν, ἔφη. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας ὁπόσοι εἰσί, καὶ τὴν ἄμμον; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς· εἶτʼ οὐκ ἂν οἴει ὁμολογῆσαι ἡμᾶς; καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ὑπολαβών· πρὸς Διός, ἔφη, Διονυσόδωρε, τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ᾧ εἴσομαι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον.
294c. What shall I put forward? he asked. Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have? Are you not content, he rejoined, to be told that we know everything? No, do not say that, he replied: only tell us this one thing more, and propound to us that you speak the truth. Then, if you tell us how many teeth each of you has, and you are found by our counting to have known it, we shall believe you thenceforth in everything else likewise.
294c. τί ἐπιδείξω; ἔφη. οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον ὁπόσους ὀδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ὁπόσους σύ; οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα; μηδαμῶς, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῖν μόνον εἴπατον καὶ ἐπιδείξατον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον· καὶ ἐὰν εἴπητον ὁπόσους ἑκάτερος ἔχει ὑμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνόντες ἡμῶν ἀριθμησάντων, ἤδη πεισόμεθα ὑμῖν καὶ τἆλλα.
294d. Well, as they supposed we were making fun of them, they would not do it: only they agreed that they knew all subjects, when questioned on them, one after the other, by Ctesippus; who, before he had done with them, asked them if they knew every kind of thing, even the most unseemly, without the least reserve; while they most valiantly encountered his questions, agreeing that they had the knowledge in each case, like boars when driven up to face the spears: so that I for my part, Crito, became quite incredulous, and had to ask in the end if Dionysodorus knew also how to dance.
294d. ἡγουμένω οὖν σκώπτεσθαι οὐκ ἠθελέτην, ἀλλʼ ὡμολογησάτην πάντα χρήματα ἐπίστασθαι, καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ Κτησίππου. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος πάνυ ἀπαρακαλύπτως οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ τὰ αἴσχιστα, εἰ ἐπισταίσθην· τὼ δὲ ἀνδρειότατα ὁμόσε ᾔτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, ὁμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν ὁμόσε ὠθούμενοι, ὥστʼ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ὑπʼ ἀπιστίας ἠναγκάσθην τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι [τὸν Εὐθύδημον] εἰ καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐπίσταιτο ὁ Διονυσόδωρος·
294e. To which he replied: Certainly. I do not suppose, I said, that you have attained such a degree of skill as to do sword-dancing, or be whirled about on a wheel, at your time of life? There is nothing, he said, that I cannot do. Then tell me, I went on, do you know everything at present only, or for ever? For ever too, he said. And when you were children, and were just born, you knew? Everything, they both replied together.
294e. ὁ δέ, πάνυ, ἔφη. οὐ δήπου, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστᾶν καὶ ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι τηλικοῦτος ὤν, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἥκεις; οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὅτι οὔ. πότερον δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ καὶ ἀεί; καὶ ἀεί, ἔφη. καὶ ὅτε παιδία ἤστην καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ἠπίστασθε πάντα; ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω.
295a. Soc. Now, to us the thing seemed incredible: then Euthydemus said: You do not believe it, Socrates? I will only say, I replied, that you must indeed be clever. Why, he said, if you will consent to answer me, I will propound that you too admit these surprising facts. Oh, I am only too glad, I replied, to be refuted in the matter. For if I am not aware of my own cleverness, and you are going to show me that I know everything always, what greater stroke of luck than this could befall me in all my living days? Then answer me, he said. Ask: I am ready to answer.
295a. ΣΩ. καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄπιστον ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι· ὁ δʼ Εὐθύδημος, ἀπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; πλήν γʼ ὅτι, ⟨ἦν δʼ⟩ ἐγώ, εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστι σοφοὺς εἶναι. ἀλλʼ ἤν, ἔφη, ἐθελήσῃς μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ὁμολογοῦντα. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ γάρ τοι λέληθα ἐμαυτὸν σοφὸς ὤν, σὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὡς πάντα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ ἀεί, τί μεῖζον ἕρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὕροιμι ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ; ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη.
295b. Well then, Socrates, he asked, have you knowledge of something, or not? I have. And tell me, do you know with that whereby you have knowledge, or with something else? With that whereby I have knowledge: I think you mean the soul, or is not that your meaning? Are you not ashamed, Socrates, he said, to ask a question on your side when you are being questioned? Very well, I said: but how am I to proceed? I will do just as you bid me. When I cannot tell what you are asking, is it your order that I answer all the same, without asking a question upon it? Why, he replied, you surely conceive some meaning in what I say?
295b. ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου ἐρώτα. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστήμων του εἶ ἢ οὔ;—ἔγωγε.—πότερον οὖν ᾧ ἐπιστήμων εἶ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ;—ὧι ἐπιστήμων. οἶμαι γάρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγειν· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις; οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾷς; εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γὰρ ποιήσω ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς, κελεύεις με ὅμως ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπανερέσθαι;
295c. I do, I replied. Answer then to the meaning you conceive to be in my words. Well, I said, if you ask a question with a different meaning in your mind from that which I conceive, and I answer to the latter, are you content I should answer nothing to the point? For my part, he replied, I shall be content: you, however, will not, so far as I can see. Then I declare I shall not answer, I said, before I get it right. You refuse to answer, he said, to the meaning you conceive in each case, because you will go on driveling, you hopeless old dotard!
295c. ὑπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι, ἔφη, ὃ λέγω; ἔγωγε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πρὸς τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀποκρίνου ὃ ὑπολαμβάνεις. τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλῃ ἐρωτᾷς διανοούμενος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλλῃ ὑπολάβω, ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι; ἔμοιγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοί γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. οὐ τοίνυν μὰ Δία ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πρότερον πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι. οὐκ ἀποκρινῇ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος.
295d. Here I perceived he was annoyed with me for distinguishing between the phrases used, when he wanted to entrap me in his verbal snares. So I remembered Connus, how he too is annoyed with me whenever I do not give in to him, with the result that he now takes less trouble over me as being a stupid person. So being minded to take lessons from this new teacher, I decided that I had better give in, lest he should take me for a blockhead and not admit me to his classes. So I said: Well, if you think fit, Euthydemus, to proceed thus, we must do so; in any case I suppose you understand debating better than I do—you are versed in the method, and I am but a layman.
295d. κἀγὼ ἔγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνοι διαστέλλοντι τὰ λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας. ἀνεμνήσθην οὖν τοῦ Κόννου, ὅτι μοι κἀκεῖνος χαλεπαίνει ἑκάστοτε ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπείκω, ἔπειτά μου ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖται ὡς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν διενενοήμην καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον φοιτᾶν, ᾠήθην δεῖν ὑπείκειν, μή με σκαιὸν ἡγησάμενος φοιτητὴν μὴ προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, Εὐθύδημε, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον·
295e. Begin your questions, then, over again. Now, answer me once more, he said: do you know what you know by means of something, or not? I do, I replied; by means of my soul.
295e. σὺ γὰρ πάντως που κάλλιον ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαί τῳ ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὔ;—ἔγωγε, ἔφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.
296a. Soc. There he is again, he said, answering more than he is asked. For I am not asking what the means is, but only whether you know by some means. Yes, I did again answer more than I ought, I said, through lack of education. But forgive me, and I will now simply reply that I know what I know by some means. By one and the same means always, he asked, or sometimes by one and sometimes by another? Always, whenever I know, I replied, it is by this means. There again, he cried, you really must stop adding these qualifications.
296a. ΣΩ. οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλʼ εἰ ἐπίστασαί τῳ. πλέον αὖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμην ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκέ μοι· ἀποκρινοῦμαι γὰρ ἤδη ἁπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαί τῳ ἃ ἐπίσταμαι.—πότερον, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γʼ ἀεί, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε ἑτέρῳ;—ἀεί, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τούτῳ. οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσῃ παραφθεγγόμενος; ἀλλʼ ὅπως μή τι ἡμᾶς σφήλῃ τὸ ἀεὶ τοῦτο.
296b. But I am so afraid this word “always” may bring us to grief. Not us, he rejoined, but, if anyone, you. Now answer: do you know by this means always? Always, I, replied, since I must withdraw the “whenever.” Then you always know by this means: that being the case, do you know some things by this means of knowing, and some things by another means, or everything by this? Everything by this, I replied; everything, that is, that I know. There it comes again, he cried; the same qualification! Well, I withdraw my “that is, that I know.” No, do not withdraw a single word, he said: I ask you for no concession.
296b. οὔκουν ἡμᾶς γʼ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, σέ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου· ἦ ἀεὶ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι;—ἀεί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ ἀφελεῖν τὸ ὅταν.—οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· ἀεὶ δʼ ἐπιστάμενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δʼ ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ πάντα;—τούτῳ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, ἅ γʼ ἐπίσταμαι. τοῦτʼ ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη· ἥκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα. ἀλλʼ ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἅ γʼ ἐπίσταμαι. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἕν, ἔφη, ἀφέλῃς· οὐδὲν γάρ σου δέομαι.
296c. Only answer me: could you know all things if you did not know everything? It would be most surprising, I said. Then he went on: You may therefore add on now whatever you please: for you admit that you know all things. It seems I do, I replied, seeing that my “that I know” has no force, and I know everything. Now you have also admitted that you know always by the means whereby you know, whenever you know—or however you like to put it. For you have admitted that you always know and, at the same time, everything. Hence it is clear that even as a child you knew, both when you were being born and when you were being conceived: and before you yourself came into being or heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, since you always know.
296c. ἀλλά μοι ἀπόκριναι· δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταιο; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. καὶ ὃς εἶπε· Προστίθει τοίνυν ἤδη ὅτι βούλει· ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. ἔοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ ἃ ἐπίσταμαι, πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστῃ εἴτε ὅπως βούλει· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὢν ἠπίστω, καὶ ὅτʼ ἐγίγνου, καὶ ὅτʼ ἐφύου·
296d. Yes, and I declare, he said, you yourself will always know all things, if it be my pleasure. Oh, pray let it be your pleasure, I replied, most worshipful Euthydemus, if what you say is really true. Only I do not quite trust in your efficacy, if your pleasure is not to he also that of your brother here, Dionysodorus: if it is, you will probably prevail. And tell me, I went on, since I cannot hope in a general way to dispute the statement that I know everything with persons so prodigiously clever—since it is your statement—how am I to say I know certain things, Euthydemus; for instance, that good men are unjust?
296d. καὶ πρὶν αὐτὸς γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω ἅπαντα, εἴπερ ἀεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστήσῃ καὶ ἅπαντα, ἂν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι. ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλʼ οὔ σοι πάνυ πιστεύω ἱκανῷ εἶναι, εἰ μή σοι συμβουληθείη ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὑτοσὶ Διονυσόδωρος· οὕτω δὲ τάχα ἄν. εἴπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ— τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοίην, οὕτως εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδή γε ὑμεῖς φατε—τὰ δὲ τοιάδε πῶς φῶ ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοί εἰσιν;
296e. Come, tell me, do I know this or not? You know it certainly, he said. What? I said. That the good are not unjust. Soc. Quite so, I said: I knew that all the time; but that is not what I ask:
296e. φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη. τί; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί.
297a. tell me, where did I learn that the good are unjust? Nowhere, said Dionysodorus. Then I do not know this, I said. You are spoiling the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus, and we shall find that this fellow does not know, and is at once both knowing and unknowing. At this Dionysodorus reddened. But you, I said, what do you mean, Euthydemus.
297a. ΣΩ. πάνυ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πάλαι. ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλʼ ὡς ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἔμαθον; οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφην, τοῦτο ἐγώ. διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὑτοσὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ἠρυθρίασεν. ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὀρθῶς ἁδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντʼ εἰδώς;
297b. Do you find that your brother, who knows everything, has not spoken aright? I a brother of Euthydemus? quickly interposed Dionysodorus. Whereupon I said: Let me alone, good sir, till Euthydemus has taught me that I know that good men are unjust, and do not grudge me this lesson. You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; you refuse to answer. Yes, and with good reason, I said: for I am weaker than either one of you, so I have no scruple about running away from the two together.
297b. ἀδελφὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγώ εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος; κἀγὼ εἶπον· ἔασον, ὠγαθέ, ἕως ἂν Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ ὡς ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὅτι ἄδικοί εἰσι, καὶ μή μοι φθονήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος. φεύγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἰκότως γʼ, εἶπον ἐγώ· ἥττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν. πολὺ γάρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνιείσῃ, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ σοφιστῇ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένῳ, νεωστί, μοι δοκεῖν, καταπεπλευκότι·
297c. You see, I am sadly inferior to Hercules, who was no match for the hydra—that she-professor who was so clever that she sent forth many heads of debate in place of each one that was cut off; nor for another sort of, crab-professor from the sea— freshly, I fancy, arrived on shore; and, when the hero was so bothered with its leftward barks and bites, he summoned his nephew Iolaus to the rescue, and he brought him effective relief. But if my Iolaus were to come, he would do more harm than good. Well, answer this, said Dionysodorus, now you have done your descanting: Was Iolaus more Hercules’ nephew than yours? I see I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said. For you will never cease putting questions—I think I may say I am sure of this—in a grudging, obstructing spirit, so that Euthydemus may not teach me that bit of cleverness. Then answer, he said. Well, I answer, I said, that Iolaus was Hercules’ nephew, but not mine, so far as I can see, in any way whatever.
297c. ὃς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπʼ ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ δʼ ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως [Πατροκλῆς] εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν. ἀπόκριναι δή, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὁπότε σοι ταῦτα ὕμνηται· πότερον ὁ Ἰόλεως τοῦ Ἡρακλέους μᾶλλον ἦν ἀδελφιδοῦς ἢ σός; κράτιστον τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῇς ἐρωτῶν, σχεδόν τι ἐγὼ τοῦτʼ εὖ οἶδα, φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα μὴ διδάξῃ με Εὐθύδημος ἐκεῖνο τὸ σοφόν.—ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη.—ἀποκρίνομαι δή, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἦν ὁ Ἰόλεως ἀδελφιδοῦς, ἐμὸς δʼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
297e. For Patrocles, my brother, was not his father; only Hercules’ brother Iphicles had a name somewhat similar to his. And Patrocles, he said, is your brother? Certainly, I said: that is, by the same mother, but not by the same father. Then he is your brother and not your brother. Not by the same father, worthy sir, I replied. His father was Chaeredemus, mine Sophroniscus. So Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus, he said, were “father”?
297e. οὐ γὰρ Πατροκλῆς ἦν αὐτῷ πατήρ, ὁ ἐμὸς ἀδελφός, ἀλλὰ παραπλήσιον μὲν τοὔνομα Ἰφικλῆς, ὁ Ἡρακλέους ἀδελφός.—Πατροκλῆς δέ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, σός;—πάνυ γʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμομήτριός γε, οὐ μέντοι ὁμοπάτριος.—ἀδελφὸς ἄρα ἐστί σοι καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός.—οὐχ ὁμοπάτριός γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην· ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ Χαιρέδημος ἦν πατήρ, ἐμὸς δὲ Σωφρονίσκος.—πατὴρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Χαιρέδημος;
298. Soc. Certainly, I said: the former mine, the latter his. Then surely, he went on, Chaeredemus was other than “father”? Than mine, at any rate, I said. Why then, he was father while being other than father. Or are you the same as “the stone”? I fear you may prove that of me, I said, though I do not feel like it. Then are you other than the stone? Other, I must say. Then of course, he went on, if you are other than stone, you are not stone? And if you are other than gold, you are not gold? Quite so. Hence Chaeredemus, he said, being other than father, cannot be “father.”
298. ΣΩ. πάνυ γʼ, ἔφην· ὁ μέν γε ἐμός, ὁ δὲ ἐκείνου.—οὐκοῦν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἕτερος ἦν Χαιρέδημος τοῦ πατρός;—τοὐμοῦ γʼ, ἔφην ἐγώ.—ἆρʼ οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἕτερος ὢν πατρός; ἢ σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ λίθῳ;—δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην, μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτός· οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκῶ.—οὐκοῦν ἕτερος εἶ, ἔφη, τοῦ λίθου;—ἕτερος μέντοι.—ἄλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὢν λίθου οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ;—ἔστι ταῦτα.—οὔκουν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς [οὐκ ἂν] πατήρ ἐστιν.—ἔοικεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ πατὴρ εἶναι.
298b. It seems, I said, that he is not a father. No, for I presume, interposed Euthydemus, that if Chaeredemus is a father Sophroniscus in his turn, being other than a father, is not a father; so that you, Socrates, are fatherless. Here Ctesippus took it up, observing: And your father too, is he not in just the same plight? Is he other than my father? Not in the slightest, said Euthydemus. What, asked the other, is he the same? The same, to be sure. I should not like to think he was: but tell me, Euthydemus, is he my father only, or everybody else’s too?
298b. εἰ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλιν αὖ ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν, ὥστε σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἶ. καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐκδεξάμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, αὖ πατὴρ οὐ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πέπονθεν; ἕτερός ἐστιν τοὐμοῦ πατρός;—πολλοῦ γʼ, ἔφη, δεῖ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—ἀλλά, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὁ αὐτός;—ὁ αὐτὸς μέντοι.—οὐκ ἂν συμβουλοίμην. ἀλλὰ πότερον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐμὸς μόνον ἐστὶ πατὴρ ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;—καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔφη·
298c. Everybody else’s too, he replied; or do you suppose that the same man, being a father, can be no father? I did suppose so, said Ctesippus. Well, said the other, and that a thing being gold could be not gold? Or being a man, not man? Perhaps, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, you are knotting flax with cotton, as they say: for it is a strange result that you state, if your father is father of all. He is, though, was the reply. Of all men, do you mean? asked Ctesippus, or of horses too, and all other animals?
298c. ἢ οἴει τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι;—ὤιμην δῆτα, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—τί δέ; ἦ δʼ ὅς· χρυσὸν ὄντα μὴ χρυσὸν εἶναι; ἢ ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ ἄνθρωπον;—μὴ γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις· δεινὸν γὰρ λέγεις πρᾶγμα εἰ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ πάντων ἐστὶν πατήρ.—ἀλλʼ ἔστιν, ἔφη.—πότερον ἀνθρώπων; ἦ δʼ ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζῴων;