298d. Of all, he said. And is your mother a mother in the same way? My mother too. And is your mother a mother of sea-urchins? Yes, and yours is also, he replied. So then you are a brother of the gudgeons and whelps and porkers. Yes, and so are you, he said. Then your father is a boar and a dog. And so is yours, he said. Yes, said Dionysodorus, and it will take you but a moment, if you will answer me, Ctesippus, to acknowledge all this. Just tell me, have you a dog? Yes, a real rogue, said Ctesippus.
298d. πάντων, ἔφη.—ἦ καὶ μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ;—καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε.—καὶ τῶν ἐχίνων ἄρα, ἔφη, ἡ σὴ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τῶν θαλαττίων.—καὶ ἡ σή γʼ, ἔφη.—καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἀδελφὸς εἶ τῶν κωβιῶν καὶ κυναρίων καὶ χοιριδίων.—καὶ γὰρ σύ, ἔφη.—κάπρος ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων.—καὶ γὰρ σοί, ἔφη. αὐτίκα δέ γε, ἦ δʼ ὃς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἄν μοι ἀποκρίνῃ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ἔστι σοι κύων;—καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—ἔστιν οὖν αὐτῷ κυνίδια;—καὶ μάλʼ, ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.—οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων;—ἔγωγέ τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύνα.—τί οὖν;
298e. Has he got puppies? Yes, a set of rogues like him. Then is the dog their father? Yes, indeed; I saw him with my own eyes covering the bitch. Well now, is not the dog yours? Certainly, he said. Thus he is a father, and yours, and accordingly the dog turns out to be your father, and you a brother of whelps. Hereupon Dionysodorus struck in again quickly, lest Ctesippus should get a word in before him: Answer me just one more little point: do you beat this dog? Ctesippus laughed and said: My word, yes; since I cannot beat you! So you beat your own father?
298e. οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ κύων;—πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν πατὴρ ὢν σός ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός; καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριναι· τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον;—καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ.—οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις;
299a. he said.Soc. There would be much more justice, though, he replied, in my beating yours, for being so ill-advised as to beget clever sons like you. Yet I doubt, Ctesippus went on, if your father, Euthydemus—the puppies’ father—has derived much good from this wisdom of yours. Why, he has no need of much good, Ctesippus, neither he nor you. And have you no need either, yourself, Euthydemus? he asked. No, nor has any other man. Just tell me, Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink physic when he wants it, or whether you consider it not good; or for a man to go to the wars with arms rather than without them.
299a. ΣΩ. πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιότερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρʼ ἂ⟨ν⟩ τύπτοιμι, ὅτι μαθὼν σοφοὺς ὑεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλʼ ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε [ὁ Κτήσιππος], πόλλʼ ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ὑμέτερός τε καὶ τῶν κυνιδίων. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνος οὔτε σύ. οὐδὲ σύ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός; οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ὦ Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἀγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενοῦντι φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὅταν δέηται·
299b. With them, I think, he replied: and yet I believe you are about to utter one of your pleasantries. You will gather that well enough, he said: only answer me. Since you admit that physic is good for a man to drink when necessary, surely one ought to drink this good thing as much as possible; and in such a case it will be well to pound and infuse in it a cart-load of hellebore? To this Ctesippus replied: Quite so, to be sure, Euthydemus, at any rate if the drinker is as big as the Delphian statue.
299b. ἢ εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἴῃ, ὅπλα ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἰέναι ἢ ἄνοπλον.—ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. καίτοι οἶμαί τί σε τῶν καλῶν ἐρεῖν.—σὺ ἄριστα εἴσῃ, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέῃ, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πλεῖστον δεῖ πίνειν, καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἕξει, ἐάν τις αὐτῷ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἐλλεβόρου ἅμαξαν;—καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος εἶπεν· πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐὰν ᾖ γε ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς.—οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὡς πλεῖστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατά τε καὶ ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδήπερ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;—μάλα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος·
299c. Then, further, since in war, he proceeded, it is good to have arms, one ought to have as many spears and shields as possible, if we agree that it is a good thing? Yes, I suppose, said Ctesippus; and you, Euthydemus, do you take the other view, that it should be one shield and one spear? Yes, I do. What, he said, and would you arm Geryon also and Briareus in this way? I thought you more of an expert than that, considering you are a man-at-arms, and your comrade here too! At this Euthydemus was silent; then Dionysodorus asked some questions on Ctesippus’ previous answers, saying: Well now, gold is in your opinion a good thing to have?
299c. σὺ δʼ οὐκ οἴει, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ἓν δόρυ;—ἔγωγε.—ἦ καὶ τὸν Γηρυόνην ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸν Βριάρεων οὕτως σὺ ὁπλίσαις; ἐγὼ δὲ ᾤμην σὲ δεινότερον εἶναι, ἅτε ὁπλομάχην ὄντα, καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἑταῖρον. καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσίγησεν· ὁ δὲ Διονυσόδωρος πρὸς τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα τῷ Κτησίππῳ ἤρετο, οὐκοῦν καὶ χρυσίον, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν;—πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολύ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—τί οὖν;
299d. Certainly, and—here I agree—plenty of it too, said Ctesippus. Well then, do you not think it right to have good things always and everywhere? Assuredly, he said. Then do you admit that gold is also a good? Why, I have admitted it, he replied. Then we ought always to have it, and everywhere, and above all, in oneself? And one will be happiest if one has three talents of gold in one’s belly, a talent in one’s skull, and a stater of gold in each eye? Well, Euthydemus, replied Ctesippus, they say that among the Scythians those are the happiest and best men who have a lot of gold in their own skulls—somewhat as you were saying a moment ago that “dog” is “father”; and a still more marvellous thing is told, how they drink out of their skulls when gilded, and gaze inside them, holding their own headpiece in their hands. Soc. Tell me, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and men in general see things possible of sight, or things impossible?
299d. ἀγαθὰ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι ἀεί τʼ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ;—σφόδρα γʼ, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι;—ὡμολόγηκα μὲν οὖν, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος εἰ ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρί, τάλαντον δʼ ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατῆρα δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τὠφθαλμῷ;—φασί γε οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, τούτους εὐδαιμονεστάτους εἶναι Σκυθῶν καὶ ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, οἳ χρυσίον τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσιν πολὺ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες τὸν κύνα τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὃ θαυμασιώτερόν γε ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ πίνουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν κρανίων κεχρυσωμένων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντὸς καθορῶσιν, τὴν ἑαυτῶν κορυφὴν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες.
300a. Possible, I presume. And you do so too? I too. Then you see our cloaks? Yes. And have they power of sight? Quite extraordinarily, said Ctesippus. What do they see? he asked. Nothing. Perhaps you do not think they see—you are such a sweet innocent. I should say, Euthydemus, that you have fallen asleep with your eyes open and, if it be possible to speak and at the same time say nothing, that this is what you are doing.
300a. ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ ὁρῶσιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καὶ Σκύθαι τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα;—τὰ δυνατὰ δήπου.—οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ, ἔφη;—κἀγώ.—ὁρᾷς οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἱμάτια;—ναί.—δυνατὰ οὖν ὁρᾶν ἐστὶν ταῦτα.—ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—τί δέ; ἦ δʼ ὅς.—μηδέν. σὺ δὲ ἴσως οὐκ οἴει αὐτὰ ὁρᾶν· οὕτως ἡδὺς εἶ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκοιμῆσθαι καί, ⟨εἰ⟩ οἷόν τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
300b. Why, asked Dionysodorus, may there not be a speaking of the silent? By no means whatever, replied Ctesippus. Nor a silence of speaking? Still less, he said. Now, when you speak of stones and timbers and irons, are you not speaking of the silent? Not if I walk by a smithy, for there, as they say, the irons speak and cry aloud, when they are touched; so here your wisdom has seduced you into nonsense. But come, you have still to propound me your second point, how on the other hand there may be a silence of speaking.
300b. ἦ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τʼ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγῶντα λέγειν;—οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ἦ δʼ ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος.—ἆρʼ οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν;—ἔτι ἧττον, ἔφη.—ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις;—οὔκουν εἴ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγεται, ἐάν τις ἅψηται· ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἀλλʼ ἔτι μοι τὸ ἕτερον ἐπιδείξατον, ὅπως αὖ ἔστιν λέγοντα σιγᾶν.
300c. (It struck me that Ctesippus was specially excited on account of his young friend’s presence.) When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not making a silence of all things? Yes, he replied. Then it is a silence of speaking things also, if the speaking are among all things. What, said Ctesippus, are not all things silent? I presume not, said Euthydemus. But then, my good sir, do all things speak? Yes, I suppose, at least those that speak. But that is not what I ask, he said: are all things silent or do they speak? Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, snatching the word from him: I am quite sure that is an answer that will baffle you!
300c. καί μοι ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ παιδικά. ὅταν σιγᾷς, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾷς;—ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾷς, εἴπερ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν [τὰ λεγόμενα].—τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, οὐ σιγᾷ πάντα;—οὐ δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—ἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα;—τά γε δήπου λέγοντα.—ἀλλά, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγᾷ ἢ λέγει;
300d. At this Ctesippus, as his manner was, gave a mighty guffaw, and said: Ah, Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument ambiguous with his “both,” and is worsted and done for. Then Cleinias was greatly delighted and laughed, so that Ctesippus felt his strength was as the strength of ten: but I fancy Ctesippus—he is such a rogue—had picked up these very words by overhearing the men themselves, since in nobody else of the present age is such wisdom to be found.
300d. οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· εὖ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις ὅτι χρῇ. καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρικεν τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἥττηται. καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάνυ ἥσθη καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὥστε ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐγένετο πλεῖον ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. ὁ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἅτε πανοῦργος ὤν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, παρʼ αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρηκηκόει· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.
300e. So I remarked: Why are you laughing, Cleinias, at such serious and beautiful things? What, have you, Socrates, ever yet seen a beautiful thing? asked Dionysodorus. Yes, I have, I replied, and many of them, Dionysodorus. Soc. Did you find them different from the beautiful, he said, or the same as the beautiful?
300e. κἀγὼ εἶπον· τί γελᾷς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὕτω πράγμασιν καὶ καλοῖς; σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πώποτʼ εἶδες, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος. ἔγωγε, ἔφην, καὶ πολλά γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.
301a. Here I was desperately perplexed, and felt that I had my deserts for the grunt I had made: however, I replied that they were different from the beautiful itself, though each of them had some beauty present with it. So if an ox is present with you, he said, you are an ox, and since I am now present with you, you are Dionysodorus. Heavens, do not say that! I cried. But in what way can one thing, by having a different thing present with it, be itself different?
301a. ΣΩ. ἆρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἔφη, ἢ ταὐτὰ τῷ καλῷ; κἀγὼ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγούμην δίκαια πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἔγρυξα, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα ἔφην αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; εὐφήμει τοῦτό γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη;
301b. Are you at a loss there? I asked: already I was attempting to imitate the cleverness of these men, I was so eager to get it. Can I help being at a loss, he said, I and likewise everybody else in the world, in face of what cannot be? What is that you say, Dionysodorus? I asked: is not the beautiful beautiful, and the ugly ugly? Yes, if it seems so to me, he replied. Then does it seem so? Certainly, he said. Then the same also is the same, and the different different? For I presume the different cannot be the same; nay, I thought not even a child would doubt that the different is different.
301b. ἆρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; ἤδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι ὃ μὴ ἔστι; τί λέγεις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλόν ἐστιν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρόν;—ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῇ.—οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ;—πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τό γε ἕτερον ταὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε οὐδʼ ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
301c. But, Dionysodorus, you have deliberately passed over this one point; though, on the whole, I feel that, like craftsmen finishing off each his special piece of work, you two are carrying out your disputation in excellent style. Well, he asked, do you know what is each craftsman’s special piece of work? First of all, whose proper task is it to forge brass? Can you tell? I can: a brazier’s. Well, again, whose to make pots? A potter’s. Once more, whose to slaughter and skin, and after cutting up the joints to stew and roast?
301c. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τοῦτο μὲν ἑκὼν παρῆκας, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ οἷς ἕκαστα προσήκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προσήκει ἑκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν; πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα;—ἔγωγε· ὅτι χαλκέα.—τί δέ, κεραμεύειν;—κεραμέα.—τί δέ, σφάττειν τε καὶ ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ μικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαντα ἕψειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν;
301d. A caterer’s, I said. Now, if one does one’s proper work, he said, one will do rightly? Yes, to be sure. And is it, as you say, the caterer’s proper work to cut up and skin? Did you admit this or not? I did so, I replied, but pray forgive me. It is clear then, he proceeded, that if someone slaughters the caterer and cuts him up, and then stews or roasts him, he will be doing his proper work; and if he hammers the brazier himself, and moulds the potter, he will be doing his business likewise.
301d. μάγειρον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις, ἔφη, τὰ προσήκοντα πράττῃ, ὀρθῶς πράξει;—μάλιστα.—προσήκει δέ γε, ὡς φῄς, τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρειν; ὡμολόγησας ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;—ὡμολόγησα, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε.—δῆλον τοίνυν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὅτι ἄν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον καὶ κατακόψας ἑψήσῃ καὶ ὀπτήσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει· καὶ ἐὰν τὸν χαλκέα τις αὐτὸν χαλκεύῃ καὶ τὸν κεραμέα κεραμεύῃ, καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.
301e. Poseidon! I exclaimed, there you give the finishing touch to your wisdom. I wonder if this skill could ever come to me in such manner as to be my very own. Would you recognize it, Socrates, he asked, if it came to be your own? Yes, if only you are agreeable, I replied, without a doubt. Why, he went on, do you imagine you perceive what is yours? Yes, if I take your meaning aright: for all my hopes arise from you, and end in Euthydemus here.
301e. ὦ Πόσειδον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἤδη κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς τῇ σοφίᾳ. ἆρά μοί ποτε αὕτη παραγενήσεται ὥστε μοι οἰκεία γενέσθαι; ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οἰκείαν γενομένην; ἐὰν σύ γε βούλῃ, ἔφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι. τί δέ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τὰ σαυτοῦ οἴει γιγνώσκειν; εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι, τελευτᾶν δʼ εἰς Εὐθύδημον τόνδε.
302. Soc. Then tell me, he asked, do you count those things yours which you control and are free to use as you please?
302. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἡγῇ σὰ εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξῃς καὶ ἐξῇ σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ;
302a. For instance, an ox or a sheep, would you count these as yours, if you were free to sell or bestow them, or sacrifice them to any god you chose? And things which you could not treat thus are not yours? Hereupon, since I knew that some brilliant result was sure to bob up from the mere turn of the questions, and as I also wanted to hear it as quickly as possible, I said: It is precisely as you say; only such things are mine. Well now, he went on: you call those things animals which have life?
302a. οἷον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατον, ἆρʼ ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἅ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν; ἃ δʼ ἂν μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ, οὐ σά; κἀγώ (ᾔδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν καλόν τι ἀνακύψοιτο τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος ὅτι τάχιστʼ ἀκοῦσαι) πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, οὕτως ἔχει· τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν μόνα ἐμά.—τί δέ; ζῷα, ἔφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς ἃ ἂν ψυχὴν ἔχῃ;
302b. Yes, I said. And you admit that only those animals are yours which you are at liberty to deal with in those various ways that I mentioned just now? I admit that. Then—after a very ironical pause, as though he were pondering some great matter—he proceeded: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here I suspected the discussion was approaching the point at which it eventually ended, and so I tried what desperate wriggle I could to escape from the net in which I now felt myself entangled. My answer was: I have not, Dionysodorus. What a miserable fellow you must be, he said, and no Athenian at all, if you have neither ancestral gods, nor shrines, nor anything else that denotes a gentleman!
302b. ναί, ἔφην.—ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν ζῴων ταῦτα μόνα εἶναι σά, περὶ ἃ ἄν σοι ἐξουσία ᾖ πάντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον;—ὁμολογῶ.—καὶ ὅς, εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχὼν ὥς τι μέγα σκοπούμενος, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν σοι Ζεὺς πατρῷος;—καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύσας ἥξειν τὸν λόγον οἷπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημμένος· οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.—ταλαίπωρος ἄρα τις σύ γε ἄνθρωπος εἶ καὶ οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖος, ᾧ μήτε θεοὶ πατρῷοί εἰσιν μήτε ἱερὰ μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.—ἔα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε.
302c. Enough, Dionysodorus; speak fair words, and don’t browbeat your pupil! For I have altars and shrines, domestic and ancestral, and everything else of the sort that other Athenians have. Then have not other Athenians, he asked, their ancestral Zeus? None of the Ionians, I replied, give him this title, neither we nor those who have left this city to settle abroad: they have an ancestral Apollo, because of Ion’s parentage.
302c. ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ πατρῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσαπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις τῶν τοιούτων.—εἶτα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἔφη, Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῷος;—οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία Ἰώνων οὐδενί, οὔθʼ ὅσοι ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως ἀπῳκισμένοι εἰσὶν οὔθʼ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἴωνος γένεσιν·
302d. Among us the name “ancestral” is not given to Zeus, but that of “houseward” and “tribal,” and we have a tribal Athena. That will do, said Dionysodorus; you have, it seems, Apollo and Zeus and Athena. Certainly, I said. Then these must be your gods? he said. My ancestors, I said, and lords. Well, at least, you have them, he said: or have you not admitted they are yours? I have admitted it, I replied: what else could I do? And are not these gods animals? he asked: you know you have admitted that whatever has life is an animal.
302d. Ζεὺς δʼ ἡμῖν πατρῷος μὲν οὐ καλεῖται, ἕρκειος δὲ καὶ φράτριος, καὶ Ἀθηναία φρατρία.—ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ γʼ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ἔστιν γάρ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ.—πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἶεν; ἔφη.—πρόγονοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ δεσπόται.—ἀλλʼ οὖν σοί γε, ἔφη· ἢ οὐ σοὺς ὡμολόγηκας αὐτοὺς εἶναι;—ὡμολόγηκα, ἔφην· τί γὰρ πάθω;—οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ζῷά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ θεοί;
302e. Or have these gods no life? They have, I replied. Then are they not animals? Yes, animals, I said. And those animals, he went on, you have admitted to be yours, which you are free to bestow and sell and sacrifice to any god you please. I have admitted it, I replied; there is no escape for me, Euthydemus.
302e. ὡμολόγηκας γὰρ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει ζῷα εἶναι. ἢ οὗτοι οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ψυχήν;—ἔχουσιν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ ζῷά εἰσιν;—ζῷα, ἔφην.—τῶν δέ γε ζῴων, ἔφη, ὡμολόγηκας ταῦτʼ εἶναι σά, ὅσα ἄν σοι ἐξῇ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ θῦσαι δὴ θεῷ ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ.—ὡμολόγηκα, ἔφην· οὐκ ἔστιν γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε.
303. Soc. Come then, tell me straight off, he said; since you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, are you free to sell or bestow them or treat them just as you please, like the other animals?
303. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή μοι εὐθύς, ἦ δʼ ὅς, εἰπέ· ἐπειδὴ σὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, ἆρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλʼ ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις;
303a. Well, Crito, here I must say I was knocked out, as it were, by the argument, and lay speechless; then Ctesippus rushed to the rescue and—Bravo, Hercules! he cried, a fine argument! Whereat Dionysodorus asked: Now, do you mean that Hercules is a bravo, or that bravo is Hercules? Ctesippus replied: Poseidon, what a frightful use of words! I give up the fight: these two are invincible.
303a. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἐκείμην ἄφωνος· ὁ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι ἰὼν ὡς βοηθήσων, Πυππὰξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου.—καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἐστιν ἢ ὁ πυππὰξ Ἡρακλῆς;—καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Πόσειδον, ἔφη, δεινῶν λόγων. ἀφίσταμαι· ἀμάχω τὼ ἄνδρε.
303b. Hereupon I confess, my dear Crito, that everyone present without exception wildly applauded the argument and the two men, till they all nearly died of laughing and clapping and rejoicing. For their previous successes had been highly acclaimed one by one, but only by the devotees of Euthydemus; whereas now almost the very pillars of the Lyceum took part in the joyful acclamations in honor of the pair. For myself, I was quite disposed to admit that never had I set eyes on such clever people, and I was so utterly enthralled by their skill that I betook myself to praising and congratulating them, and said: Ah, happy pair!
303b. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν παρόντων ὑπερεπῄνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τὼ ἄνδρε, καὶ γελῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφʼ ἑκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου ἐρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τʼ ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθησαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε ὁμολογεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφούς, καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτὼ ἐτραπόμην, καὶ εἶπον·
303c. What amazing genius, to acquire such a great accomplishment so quickly and in so short a time! Among the many fine points in your arguments, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, there is one that stands out in particular magnificence—that you care not a jot for the multitude, or for any would-be important or famous people, but only for those of your own sort. And I am perfectly sure that there are but a few persons like yourselves who would be satisfied with these arguments: the rest of the world regard them only as arguments with which, I assure you, they would feel it a greater disgrace to refute others than to be refuted themselves.
303c. ὦ μακάριοι σφὼ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, οἳ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξείργασθον. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε· ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τὶ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν μόνον.
303d. And further, there is at the same time a popular and kindly feature in your talk: when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, and so on, and no difference of things at all, in truth you simply stitch up men’s mouths, as you expressly say you do; while as to your apparent power of stitching up your own mouths as well, this is a piece of agreeable manners that takes off any offence from your talk.
303d. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάνυ μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι ἀγαπῷεν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι οὕτως ἀγνοοῦσιν αὐτούς, ὥστʼ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐξελέγχοντες τοιούτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ τόδε αὖ ἕτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὁπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα μήτε λευκὸν μηδʼ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἑτέρων ἕτερον, ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε τὰ στόματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ φατέ·
303e. But the greatest thing of all is, that this faculty of yours is such, and is so skilfully contrived, that anyone in the world may learn it of you in a very short time; this fact I perceived myself by watching Ctesippus and observing how quickly he was able to imitate you on the spot. Soc. Now, in so far as your accomplishment can be quickly imparted, it is excellent; but for public discussions it is not suitable: if I may advise you, beware of talking before a number of people, lest they learn the whole thing in a trice and give you no credit for it.
303e. ὅτι δʼ οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δόξαιτε ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξηύρηται, ὥστʼ ἐ⟨ν⟩ πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὁντινοῦν ἂν μαθεῖν ἀνθρώπων· ἔγνων ἔγωγε καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχων ὡς ταχὺ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα μιμεῖσθαι οἷός τε ἦν.
304a. The best thing for you is to talk to each other by yourselves, in private; failing that, if a third person is present, it must be someone who will pay you a good fee. And if you are prudent you will give this same counsel to your pupils also—that they are never to converse with anybody except you and each other.
304a. ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν τὸ σοφὸν πρὸς μὲν τὸ ταχὺ παραδιδόναι καλόν, ἐναντίον δʼ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλʼ ἄν γέ μοι πείθησθε, εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ ἐκμαθόντες ὑμῖν μὴ εἰδῶσιν χάριν. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὼ πρὸς ἀλλήλω μόνω διαλέγεσθον· εἰ δὲ μή, εἴπερ ἄλλου του ἐναντίον, ἐκείνου μόνου ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῷ ἀργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλεύσετε, μηδέποτε μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι ἀλλʼ ἢ ὑμῖν τε καὶ αὑτοῖς·
304b. For it is the rare, Euthydemus, that is precious, while water is cheapest, though best, as Pindar said. But come, I said, see if you can admit both me and Cleinias here to your class. This, Crito, was our conversation, and after exchanging a few more words we went off. Now you must arrange to join us in taking lessons from the pair;
304b. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλʼ ἄγετε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅπως κἀμὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παραδέξεσθον. ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα ἔτι βραχέα διαλεχθέντες ἀπῇμεν. σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις παρὰ τὼ ἄνδρε, ὡς ἐκείνω φατὸν οἵω τε εἶναι διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντʼ ἀργύριον διδόναι, καὶ οὔτε φύσιν οὔθʼ ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν οὐδεμίαν—ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὁντινοῦν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.
304c. for they say they are able to teach anyone who is willing to pay good money, and that no sort of character or age—and it is well that you especially should be told that they promise that their art is no hindrance to money-making—need deter anyone from an easy acquisition of their wisdom.Cri. Indeed, Socrates, I love listening, and would be glad to learn from them; but I am afraid I am one of the sort who are not like Euthydemus, but who, as you described them just now, would prefer being refuted to refuting with such arguments.
304c. ΚΡ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ ἡδέως ἄν τι μανθάνοιμι, κινδυνεύω μέντοι κἀγὼ εἷς εἶναι τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνων ὧν δὴ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἥδιον ἂν ἐξελεγχομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἢ ἐξελεγχόντων.
304d. Now, although I feel it is absurd to admonish you, I wish nevertheless to report to you what was told me just now. Do you know, one of the people who had left your discussion came up to me as I was taking a stroll—a man who thinks himself very wise, one of those who are so clever at turning out speeches for the law-courts —and said: Crito, do you take no lessons from these wise men? No, in truth, I replied: there was such a crowd that, though I stood quite close, I was unable to catch what was said. Well, let me tell you, he said, it was something worth hearing.
304d. ἀτὰρ γελοῖον μέν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ νουθετεῖν σε, ὅμως δέ, ἅ γʼ ἤκουον, ἐθέλω σοι ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τῶν ἀφʼ ὑμῶν ἀπιόντων ἴσθʼ ὅτι προσελθών τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν;—οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ οἷός τʼ ἦ προσστὰς κατακούειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου.—καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γʼ ἦν ἀκοῦσαι.—τί δέ;
304e. What was it? I asked. You would have heard the disputation of men who are the most accomplished of our day in that kind of speaking. To this I replied: Well, what did they show forth to you? Merely the sort of stuff, he said, that you may hear such people babbling about at any time—making an inconsequent ado about matters of no consequence (in some such parlance he expressed himself). Whereupon—Well, all the same, I said, philosophy is a charming thing.
304e. ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων οἳ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.—κἀγὼ εἶπον· τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι;—τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἢ οἷάπερ ἀεὶ ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων; (οὑτωσὶ γάρ πως καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν).—καὶ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.
305. Cri. Charming is it, my dear innocent? he exclaimed:
305. ΚΡ. ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε;
305a. nay, a thing of no consequence. Why, had you been in that company just now, you would have been filled with shame, I fancy, for your particular friend: he was so strangely willing to lend himself to persons who care not a straw what they say, but merely fasten on any phrase that turns up. And these, as I said just now, are the heads of their profession today. But the fact is, Crito, he went on, the business itself and the people who follow it are worthless and ridiculous. Now, in my opinion, Socrates, he was not right in decrying the pursuit:
305a. οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον. ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ νῦν παρεγένου, πάνυ ἄν σε οἶμαι αἰσχυνθῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἑταίρου· οὕτως ἦν ἄτοπος, ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει ὅτι ἂν λέγωσιν, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται. καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κράτιστοί εἰσι τῶν νῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι διατρίβοντες φαῦλοί εἰσιν καὶ καταγέλαστοι. ἐμοὶ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐδόκει οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν οὔθʼ οὗτος οὔτʼ εἴ τις ἄλλος ψέγει·
305b. he is wrong, and so is anyone else who decries it: though I must say I felt he was right in blaming the readiness to engage in discussion with such people before a large company.
305b. τὸ μέντοι ἐθέλειν διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτοις ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι.
Soc. Crito, these people are very odd. But I do not yet know what answer I shall give you. Of which party was he who came up to you and blamed philosophy? Was he one of those who excel in the contests of the courts, an orator; or of those who equip the orators for the fray, a composer of the speeches they deliver in their contests?
ΣΩ. ὦ Κρίτων, θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ οὔπω οἶδα ὅτι μέλλω ἐρεῖν. ποτέρων ἦν ὁ προσελθών σοι καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι δεινῶν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις, ἢ τῶν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητὴς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται;
305c. Cri. Nothing of an orator, I dare swear, nor do I think he has ever appeared in court: only he is reputed to know about the business, so they declare, and to be a clever person, and compose clever speeches.
305c. ΚΡ. ἥκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτʼ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλʼ ἐπαΐειν αὐτόν φασι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.
Soc. Now I understand: it was of these people that I was just now going to speak myself. They are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus described as the border-ground between philosopher and politician, yet they fancy that they are the wisest of all mankind, and that they not merely are but are thought so by a great many people; and accordingly they feel that none but the followers of philosophy stand in the way of their universal renown.
ΣΩ. ἤδη μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νυνδὴ ἔμελλον λέγειν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν μέν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἴονται δʼ εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους.
305d. Hence they believe that, if they can reduce the latter to a status of no esteem, the prize of victory will by common consent be awarded to them, without dispute or delay, and their claim to wisdom will be won. For they consider themselves to be in very truth the wisest, but find that, when caught in private conversation, they are cut off short by Euthydemus and his set. This conceit of their wisdom is very natural, since they regard themselves as moderately versed in philosophy, and moderately too in politics, on quite reasonable grounds:
305d. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνυ—εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου—μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.
305e. for they have dipped into both as far as they needed, and, evading all risk and struggle, are content to gather the fruits of wisdom.Cri. Well, now, do you consider, Socrates, that there is anything in what they say? It is not to be denied that these men have some color for their statements. Soc. Yes, that is so, Crito; color rather than truth.
305e. ΚΡ. τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ ὅ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν.
306a. It is no easy matter to persuade them that either people or things, which are between two other things and have a certain share of both, if compounded of bad and good are found to be better than the one and worse than the other; but if compounded of two good things which have not the same object, they are worse than either of their components in relation to the object to which each of them is adapted; while if they are compounded of two bad things which have not the same object, and stand between them, this is the only case where they are better than either of the two things of which they have a share.
306a. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον αὐτοὺς πεῖσαι ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα μεταξύ τινοιν δυοῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀμφοτέροιν τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἑκάτερον ᾖ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· ὅσα δʼ ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συντεθέντα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοιν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστίν, ταῦτα μόνα βελτίω ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν.
306b. Now if philosophy and the statesman’s business are both good things, and each of them has a different object, and if these persons, partaking of both, are between them, their claims are nought; for they are inferior to both: if one is good and the other bad, they are better than the one and worse than the other: while if both are bad, in this case there would be some truth in their statement, but in any other case there is none. Now I do not think they will admit either that both these things are bad, or that one is bad and the other good: the truth is that these people, partaking of both, are inferior to both in respect of the objects for which statesmanship and philosophy are important; and while they are really in the third place they seek to be accorded the first.
306b. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρα, οὗτοι δʼ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν—ἀμφοτέρων γάρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι—εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφότερα, οὕτως ἄν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δʼ οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογῆσαι οὔτε κακὼ αὐτὼ ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν·
306c. However, we ought to be indulgent towards their ambition and not feel annoyed, while still judging them to be what they actually are. For we should be glad of anyone, whoever he may be, who says anything that verges on good sense, and labours steadily and manfully in its pursuit.
306c. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους εἰσὶν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἥ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἐστόν, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἡγεῖσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοί εἰσιν· πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὁτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονεῖται.
306d. Cri. Now I myself, Socrates, as I so often tell you, am in doubt about my sons, as to what I am to do with them. The younger is as yet quite small; but Critobulus is already grown up, and needs someone who will be of service to him. When I am in your company, the effect on me is such as to make me feel it is mere madness to have taken ever so much pains in various directions for the good of my children— first in so marrying that they should be of very good blood on their mother’s side; then in making money so that they might be as well off as possible; while I have neglected the training of the boys themselves.
306d. ΚΡ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν ὑέων, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρός σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρός ἐστιν, Κριτόβουλος δʼ ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖταί τινος ὅστις αὐτὸν ὀνήσει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι, οὕτω διατίθεμαι ὥστʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἕνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρός, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελῆσαι·
306e. But when I glance at one of the persons who profess to educate people, I am dismayed, and feel that each one of them, when I consider them, is wholly unsuitable— to tell you the truth between ourselves.
306e. ὅταν δὲ εἴς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι καί μοι δοκεῖ εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι·
307a. So that I cannot see how I am to incline the lad towards philosophy.
307a. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.
307. Soc. My dear Crito are you not aware that in every trade the duffers are many and worthless, whereas the good workers are few and worth any price? Why, do you not hold athletics, and money-making, and rhetoric, and generalship, to be fine things?Cri. Certainly I do, of course.
307. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε πάντως δήπου.ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐν ἑκάστῃ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὁρᾷς;
307b. Soc. Well then, in each of these, do you not see most men making a ridiculous show at their respective tasks?Cri. Yes, I know: what you say is perfectly true.Soc. Then will you yourself on this account eschew all these pursuits, and not let your son have anything to do with them?Cri. No, there would be no good reason for that, Socrates.Soc. Then avoid at least what is wrong, Crito: let those who practise philosophy have their way, whether they are helpful or mischievous; and when you have tested the matter itself, well and truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it, not only your sons: but if you find it to be such as I think it is, pursue and ply it without fear, both you, as they say, and yours.
307b. ΚΡ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτός τε φεύξῃ πάντα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις;ΚΡ. οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ὅ γε οὐ χρὴ ποίει, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀλλʼ ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοί εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μέν σοι φαίνηται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντʼ ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐὰν δὲ φαίνηται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.