281. Soc. Hippias, beautiful and wise, what a long time it is since you have put in at the port of Athens!
281. ΣΩ. Ἱππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός· ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.
Hipp. I am too busy, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs to have any business transacted with any of the states, she always comes to me first of her citizens and chooses me as envoy, thinking that I am the ablest judge and messenger of the words that are spoken by the several states. So I have often gone as envoy to other states, but most often and concerning the most numerous and important matters to Lacedaemon. For that reason, then, since you ask me, I do not often come to this neighborhood.
ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἡ γὰρ Ἦλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρός τινα τῶν πόλεων, ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱρουμένη πρεσβευτήν, ἡγουμένη δικαστὴν καὶ ἄγγελον ἱκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἑκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα, πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ περὶ πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα· διὸ δή, ὃ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, οὐ θαμίζω εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους.
Soc. That’s what it is, Hippias, to be a truly wise and perfect man! For you are both in your private capacity able to earn much money from the young and to confer upon them still greater benefits than you receive, and in public affairs you are able to benefit your own state, as a man must who is to be not despised but held in high repute among the many. And yet, Hippias, what in the world is the reason why those men of old whose names are called great in respect to wisdom—Pittacus, and Bias, and the Milesian Thales with his followers and also the later ones, down to Anaxagoras, are all, or most of them, found to refrain from affairs of state?
ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον μέντοι, ὦ Ἱππία, ἔστι τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σοφόν τε καὶ τέλειον ἄνδρα εἶναι. σὺ γὰρ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἱκανὸς εἶ παρὰ τῶν νέων πολλὰ χρήματα λαμβάνων ἔτι πλείω ὠφελεῖν ὧν λαμβάνεις, καὶ αὖ δημοσίᾳ τὴν σαυτοῦ πόλιν ἱκανὸς εὐεργετεῖν, ὥσπερ χρὴ τὸν μέλλοντα μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι ἀλλʼ εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἀτάρ, ὦ Ἱππία, τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος καὶ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου, ὡς ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων;
Hipp. What else do you suppose, Socrates, than that they were not able to compass by their wisdom both public and private matters?
ΙΠ. τί δʼ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατοι ἦσαν καὶ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ἐξικνεῖσθαι φρονήσει ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα, τά τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια;
Soc. Then for Heaven’s sake, just as the other arts have progressed, and the ancients are of no account in comparison with the artisans of today, shall we say that your art also has progressed and those of the ancients who were concerned with wisdom are of no account in comparison with you?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἐπιδεδώκασι καὶ εἰσὶ παρὰ τοὺς νῦν δημιουργοὺς οἱ παλαιοὶ φαῦλοι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην ἐπιδεδωκέναι φῶμεν καὶ εἶναι τῶν ἀρχαίων τοὺς περὶ τὴν σοφίαν φαύλους πρὸς ὑμᾶς;
Hipp. Yes, you are quite right.
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Soc. Then, Hippias, if Bias were to come to life again now, he would be a laughing-stock in comparison with you, just as the sculptors say that Daedalus, if he were to be born now and were to create such works as those from which he got his reputation, would be ridiculous.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἱππία, ὁ Βίας ἀναβιοίη, γέλωτʼ ἂν ὄφλοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Δαίδαλόν φασιν οἱ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, νῦν εἰ γενόμενος τοιαῦτʼ ἐργάζοιτο οἷα ἦν ἀφʼ ὧν τοὔνομʼ ἔσχεν, καταγέλαστον ἂν εἶναι.
282. Hipp. That, Socrates, is exactly as you say. I, however, am in the habit of praising the ancients and our predecessors rather than the men of the present day, and more greatly, as a precaution against the envy of the living and through fear of the wrath of those who are dead.
282. ΙΠ. ἔστι μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὡς σὺ λέγεις· εἴωθα μέντοι ἔγωγε τοὺς παλαιούς τε καὶ προτέρους ἡμῶν προτέρους τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγκωμιάζειν ἢ τοὺς νῦν, εὐλαβούμενος μὲν φθόνον τῶν ζώντων, φοβούμενος δὲ μῆνιν τῶν τετελευτηκότων.
Soc. Yours, Hippias, is a most excellent way, at any rate, of speaking about them and of thinking, it seems to me and I can bear you witness that you speak the truth, and that your art really has progressed in the direction of ability to carry on public together with private affairs. For this man Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public capacity of envoy, as being best able of all the citizens of Leontini to attend to the interests of the community, and it was the general opinion that he spoke excellently in the public assembly, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he earned and received a great deal of money from this city; or, if you like, our friend here, Prodicus, often went to other places in a public capacity, and the last time, just lately, when he came here in a public capacity from Ceos, he gained great reputation by his speaking before the Council, and in his private capacity, by giving exhibitions and associating with the young, he received a marvellous sum of money; but none of those ancients ever thought fit to exact the money as payment for his wisdom or to give exhibitions among people of various places; so simple-minded were they, and so unconscious of the fact that money is of the greatest value. But either of these two has earned more money from his wisdom than any artisan from his art. And even before these Protagoras did so.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σύ, ὦ Ἱππία, ὀνομάζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς. συμμαρτυρῆσαι δέ σοι ἔχω ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ὑμῶν ἐπιδέδωκεν ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰ δημόσια πράττειν δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων. Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἔν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ ἠργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέω λέγων τʼ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ πάνυ ηὐδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνὼν χρήματα ἔλαβεν θαυμαστὰ ὅσα. τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἠξίωσεν ἀργύριον μισθὸν πράξασθαι οὐδʼ ἐπιδείξεις ποιήσασθαι ἐν παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας· οὕτως ἦσαν εὐήθεις καὶ ἐλελήθει αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἴη. τούτων δʼ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἀργύριον ἀπὸ σοφίας εἴργασται ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφʼ ἧστινος τέχνης· καὶ ἔτι πρότερος τούτων Πρωταγόρας.
Hipp. Why, Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties of this. For if you were to know how much money I have made, you would be amazed. I won’t mention the rest, but once, when I went to Sicily, although Protagoras was staying there and had a great reputation and was the older, I, who was much younger, made in a very short time more than one hundred and fifty minas, and in one very small place, Inycus, more than twenty minas; and when I came home, I took this and gave it to my father, so that he and the other citizens were overwhelmed with amazement. And I pretty well think I have made more money than any other two sophists together.
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα τῶν καλῶν περὶ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἴργασμαι ἐγώ, θαυμάσαις ἄν· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐῶ, ἀφικόμενος δέ ποτε εἰς Σικελίαν, Πρωταγόρου αὐτόθι ἐπιδημοῦντος καὶ εὐδοκιμοῦντος καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος πολὺ νεώτερος ὢν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάνυ πλέον ἢ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς ἠργασάμην, καὶ ἐξ ἑνός γε χωρίου πάνυ σμικροῦ, Ἰνυκοῦ, πλέον ἢ εἴκοσι μνᾶς· καὶ τοῦτο ἐλθὼν οἴκαδε φέρων τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα, ὥστε ἐκεῖνον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπλῆχθαι. καὶ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ ἄλλους σύνδυο οὕστινας βούλει τῶν σοφιστῶν.
Soc. That’s a fine thing you say, Hippias, and strong testimony to your wisdom and that of the men of today and to their great superiority to the ancients.
ΣΩ. καλόν γε, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγεις καὶ μέγα τεκμήριον σοφίας τῆς τε σεαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους ὅσον διαφέρουσι.
283. For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left him, he neglected it and lost it all so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients. So this seems to me fine testimony that you adduce for the wisdom of the men of today as compared with the earlier men, and many people agree with me that the wise man must be wise for himself especially; and the test of this is, who makes the most money. Well, so much for that. But tell me this: at which of the cities that you go to did you make the most money? Or are we to take it that it was at Lacedaemon, where your visits have been most frequent?
283. τῶν γὰρ προτέρων [περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται] πολλὴ ἀμαθία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. τοὐναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ φασὶ συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα—οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι—λέγουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καλὸν τεκμήριον ἀποφαίνειν περὶ σοφίας τῶν νῦν πρὸς τοὺς προτέρους, καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ ὅτι τὸν σοφὸν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ μάλιστα δεῖ σοφὸν εἶναι· τούτου δʼ ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσηται. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς πόθεν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἠργάσω τῶν πόλεων εἰς ἃς ἀφικνῇ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, οἷπερ καὶ πλειστάκις ἀφῖξαι;
Hipp. No, by Zeus, it was not, Socrates.
ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. What’s that you say? But did you make least there?
ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς; ἀλλʼ ἐλάχιστον;
Hipp. Why, I never made anything at all.
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν τὸ παράπαν πώποτε.
Soc. That is a prodigious marvel that you tell, Hippias; and say now: is not your wisdom such as to make those who are in contact with it and learn it, better men in respect to virtue?
ΣΩ. τέρας λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ Ἱππία. καί μοι εἰπέ· πότερον ἡ σοφία ἡ σὴ οὐχ οἵα τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μανθάνοντας εἰς ἀρετὴν βελτίους ποιεῖν;
Hipp. Yes, much better, Socrates.
ΙΠ. καὶ πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. But you were able to make the sons of the Inycenes better, and had no power to improve the sons of the Spartans?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν Ἰνυκίνων ὑεῖς οἷός τε ἦσθα ἀμείνους ποιῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν ἠδυνάτεις;
Hipp. That is far from true.
ΙΠ. πολλοῦ γε δέω.
Soc. Well, then, the Siceliotes desire to become better, and the Lacedaemonians do not?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα Σικελιῶται μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δʼ οὔ;
Hipp. No certainly, Socrates, the Lacedaemonians also desire it.
ΙΠ. πάντως γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι.
Soc. Then it was for lack of money that they avoided intercourse with you?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν χρημάτων ἐνδείᾳ ἔφευγον τὴν σὴν ὁμιλίαν;
Hipp. Not at all, since they have plenty of money.
ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα, ἐπεὶ ἱκανὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστιν.
Soc. What, then, could be the reason, that when they desired it and had money, and you had power to confer upon them the greatest benefits, they did not send you away loaded with money? But I see; perhaps the Lacedaemonians might educate their own children better than you? Shall we state it so, and do you agree?
ΣΩ. τί δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ἔχοντες χρήματα, καὶ σοῦ δυναμένου τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, οὐ πλήρη σε ἀργυρίου ἀπέπεμψαν; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο, μῶν μὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σοῦ βέλτιον ἂν παιδεύσειαν τοὺς αὑτῶν παῖδας; ἢ τοῦτο φῶμεν οὕτω, καὶ σὺ συγχωρεῖς;
Hipp. Not in the least.
ΙΠ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
Soc. Then were you not able to persuade the young men at Lacedaemon that they would make more progress towards virtue by associating with you than with their own people, or were you powerless to persuade their fathers that they ought rather to hand them over to you than to care for them themselves, if they are at all concerned for their sons? For surely they did not begrudge it to their children to become as good as possible.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τοὺς νέους οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἦσθα πείθειν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὡς σοὶ συνόντες πλέον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδοῖεν ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων πατέρας ἠδυνάτεις πείθειν ὅτι σοὶ χρὴ παραδιδόναι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, εἴπερ τι τῶν ὑέων κήδονται; οὐ γάρ που ἐφθόνουν γε τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶν ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι.
Hipp. I do not think they begrudged it.
ΙΠ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε φθονεῖν.
Soc. But certainly Lacedaemon is well governed.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὔνομός γʼ ἡ Λακεδαίμων.
Hipp. Of course it is.
ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
284. Soc. And in well-governed states virtue is most highly honored.
284. ΣΩ. ἐν δέ γε ταῖς εὐνόμοις πόλεσιν τιμιώτατον ἡ ἀρετή.
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And you know best of all men how to transmit that to another.
ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ ταύτην παραδιδόναι ἄλλῳ κάλλιστʼ ἀνθρώπων ἐπίστασαι.
Hipp. Much best, Socrates.
ΙΠ. καὶ πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Well, he who knows best how to transmit horsemanship would be most honored in Thessaly of all parts of Greece and would receive most money—and anywhere else where horsemanship is a serious interest, would he not?
ΣΩ. ὁ οὖν κάλλιστʼ ἐπιστάμενος ἱππικὴν παραδιδόναι ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μάλιστα τιμῷτο καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἄλλοθι ὅπου τοῦτο σπουδάζοιτο;
Hipp. Very likely.
ΙΠ. εἰκός γε.
Soc. Then will not he who is able to transmit the doctrines that are of most value for the acquisition of virtue be most highly honored in Lacedaemon and make most money, if he so wishes, and in any other of the Greek states that is well governed? But do you, my friend, think he will fare better in Sicily and at Inycus? Are we to believe that, Hippias? For if you tell us to do so, we must believe it.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὴ δυνάμενος παραδιδόναι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια μαθήματα εἰς ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι μάλιστα τιμήσεται καὶ πλεῖστα ἐργάσεται χρήματα, ἂν βούληται, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἥτις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων εὐνομεῖται; ἀλλʼ ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἴει μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν Ἰνυκῷ; ταῦτα πειθώμεθα, ὦ Ἱππία; ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ κελεύῃς, πειστέον.
Hipp. Yes, for it is not the inherited usage of the Lacedaemonians to change their laws or to educate their children differently from what is customary.
ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους, οὐδὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα παιδεύειν τοὺς ὑεῖς.
Soc. What? For the Lacedaemonians is it the hereditary usage not to act rightly, but to commit errors?
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐ πάτριον ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἀλλʼ ἐξαμαρτάνειν;
Hipp. I wouldn’t say so, Socrates.
ΙΠ. οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Would they, then, not act rightly in educating the young men better, but not in educating them worse?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἂν πράττοιεν βέλτιον ἀλλὰ μὴ χεῖρον παιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους;
Hipp. Yes, they would; but it is not lawful for them to give them a foreign education; for you may be sure that if anybody had ever received money there in payment for education, I should have received by far the most; they certainly enjoy hearing me and they applaud me; but, as I say, it is not the law.
ΙΠ. ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ ξενικὴν παίδευσιν οὐ νόμιμον αὐτοῖς παιδεύειν, ἐπεὶ εὖ ἴσθι, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἐκεῖθεν χρήματα ἔλαβεν πώποτε ἐπὶ παιδεύσει, καὶ ἐμὲ ἂν λαβεῖν πολὺ μάλιστα—χαίρουσι γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν— ἀλλʼ, ὃ λέγω, οὐ νόμος.
Soc. But, Hippias, do you say that law is an injury to the state, or a benefit?
ΣΩ. νόμον δὲ λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, βλάβην πόλεως εἶναι ἢ ὠφελίαν;
Hipp. It is made, I think, with benefit in view, but sometimes, if the law is badly made, it is injurious.
ΙΠ. τίθεται μὲν οἶμαι ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ βλάπτει, ἐὰν κακῶς τεθῇ ὁ νόμος.
Soc. Well, then, is it not true that those who make the law make it as the greatest good to the state, and that without this it is impossible to enjoy good government?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον πόλει τίθενται τὸν νόμον οἱ τιθέμενοι; καὶ ἄνευ τούτου μετὰ εὐνομίας ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖν;
Hipp. What you say is true.
ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Then, when those who make the laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the law; or what do you say?
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ ἁμάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι, νομίμου τε καὶ νόμου ἡμαρτήκασιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
Hipp. Speaking accurately, Socrates, that is true; however, men are not accustomed to think so.
ΙΠ. τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ μέντοι εἰώθασιν ἅνθρωποι ὀνομάζειν οὕτω.
Soc. The men who know, Hippias, or those who do not know?
ΣΩ. πότερον, ὦ Ἱππία, οἱ εἰδότες ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες;
Hipp. The many.
ΙΠ. οἱ πολλοί.
Soc. Are these, the many, those who know the truth?
ΣΩ. εἰσὶν δʼ οὗτοι οἱ εἰδότες τἀληθές, οἱ πολλοί;
Hipp. Certainly not.
ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. But surely those who know, think that in truth for all men that which is more beneficial is more lawful than that which is less beneficial; or do you not agree?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που οἵ γʼ εἰδότες τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον τοῦ ἀνωφελεστέρου νομιμώτερον ἡγοῦνται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ἢ οὐ συγχωρεῖς;
Hipp. Yes, I agree that they think it is so in truth.
ΙΠ. ναί, συγχωρῶ, ὅτι γε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.
Soc. Well, it actually is as those who know think it is, is it not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστιν τε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως ὡς οἱ εἰδότες ἡγοῦνται;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. But or the Lacedaemonians, as you say, it is more beneficial to be educated in your education, which is foreign, than in the local education.
ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ γε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὠφελιμώτερον τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ παίδευσιν, ξενικὴν οὖσαν, παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἐπιχωρίαν.
285. Hipp. Yes, and what I say is true.
285. ΙΠ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω.
Soc. And do you say this also, Hippias, that beneficial things are more lawful?
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ὠφελιμώτερα νομιμώτερά ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. Yes, I said so.
ΙΠ. εἶπον γάρ.
Soc. Then, according to what you say, it is more lawful for the sons of the Lacedaemonians to be educated by Hippias and less lawful for them to be educated by their fathers, if in reality they will be more benefited by you.
ΣΩ. κατὰ τὸν σὸν ἄρα λόγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ὑέσιν ὑπὸ Ἱππίου παιδεύεσθαι νομιμώτερόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πατέρων ἀνομώτερον, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι ὑπὸ σοῦ πλείω ὠφεληθήσονται.
Hipp. But certainly they will be benefited, Socrates.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφεληθήσονται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then the Lacedaemonians in not giving you money and entrusting their sons to you, act contrary to law.
ΣΩ. παρανομοῦσιν ἄρα Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ διδόντες σοι χρυσίον καὶ ἐπιτρέποντες τοὺς αὑτῶν ὑεῖς.
Hipp. I agree to that; for you seem to be making your argument in my favour, and there is no need of my opposing it.
ΙΠ. συγχωρῶ ταῦτα· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸν λόγον πρὸς ἐμοῦ λέγειν, καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ αὐτῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι.
Soc. Then my friends, we find that the Lacedaemonians are law-breakers, and that too in the most important affairs—they who are regarded as the most law-abiding of men. But then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, what sort of discourses are those for which they applaud you and which they enjoy hearing? Or are they evidently those which you understand most admirably, those about the stars and the phenomena of the heavens?
ΣΩ. παρανόμους μὲν δή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τοὺς Λάκωνας εὑρίσκομεν, καὶ ταῦτʼ εἰς τὰ μέγιστα, τοὺς νομιμωτάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι. ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ δή σε πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ποῖα; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ κάλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη;
Hipp. Not in the least; they won’t even endure those.
ΙΠ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν· ταῦτά γε οὐδʼ ἀνέχονται.
Soc. But they enjoy hearing about geometry?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ περὶ γεωμετρίας τι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες;
Hipp. Not at all, since one might say that many of them do not even know how to count.
ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ἐπεὶ οὐδʼ ἀριθμεῖν ἐκείνων γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πολλοὶ ἐπίστανται.
Soc. Then they are far from enduring a lecture by you on the processes of thought.
ΣΩ. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν περί γε λογισμῶν ἀνέχεσθαί σου ἐπιδεικνυμένου.
Hipp. Far from it indeed, by Zeus.
ΙΠ. πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία.
Soc. Well, then, those matters which you of all men know best how to discuss, concerning the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα ἐκεῖνα ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν, περί τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν;
Hipp. Harmonies indeed, my good fellow, and letters!
ΙΠ. ποίων, ὠγαθέ, ἁρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων;
Soc. But then what are the things about which they like to listen to you and which they applaud? Tell me yourself, for I cannot discover them.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν ἐστιν ἃ ἡδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτός μοι εἰπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ οὐχ εὑρίσκω.
Hipp. They are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men, Socrates, and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, about antiquity in general, so that for their sake I have been obliged to learn all that sort of thing by heart and practise it thoroughly.
ΙΠ. περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται, ὥστʼ ἔγωγε διʼ αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι τε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, it is lucky for you that the Lacedaemonians do not enjoy hearing one recite the list of our archons from Solon’s time; if they did, you would have trouble in learning it by heart.
ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Ἱππία, ηὐτύχηκάς γε ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ χαίρουσιν ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς ἡμετέρους καταλέγῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, πράγματʼ ἂν εἶχες ἐκμανθάνων.
Hipp. How so, Socrates? After hearing them once, I can remember fifty names.
ΙΠ. πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἅπαξ ἀκούσας πεντήκοντα ὀνόματα ἀπομνημονεύσω.
Soc. True, but I did not understand that you possess the science of memory; and so I understand that the Lacedaemonians naturally enjoy you as one who knows many things, and they make use of you as children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐνενόησα ὅτι τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔχεις· ὥστʼ ἐννοῶ ὅτι εἰκότως σοι χαίρουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἅτε πολλὰ εἰδότι, καὶ χρῶνται ὥσπερ ταῖς πρεσβύτισιν οἱ παῖδες πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως μυθολογῆσαι.
286. Hipp. And by Zeus, Socrates, I have just lately gained reputation there by telling about noble or beautiful pursuits, recounting what those of a young man should be. For I have a very beautiful discourse composed about them, well arranged in its words and also in other respects. And the plan of the discourse, and its beginning, is something like this: After the fall of Troy, the story goes that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what the noble and beautiful pursuits were, by following which a young man would become most famous; so after that we have Nestor speaking and suggesting to him very many lawful and most beautiful pursuits. That discourse, then, I delivered there and intend to deliver here the day after tomorrow in Pheidostratus’s schoolroom, with many other things worth hearing; for Eudicus, the son of Apemantus, asked me to do so. Now be sure to be there yourself and to bring others who are able to judge of discourses that they hear.
286. ΙΠ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ ἔναγχος αὐτόθι ηὐδοκίμησα διεξιὼν ἃ χρὴ τὸν νέον ἐπιτηδεύειν. ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν παγκάλως λόγος συγκείμενος, καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι· πρόσχημα δέ μοί ἐστι καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις τοῦ λόγου. ἐπειδὴ ἡ Τροία ἥλω, λέγει ὁ λόγος ὅτι Νεοπτόλεμος Νέστορα ἔροιτο ποῖά ἐστι καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτηδεύσας νέος ὢν εὐδοκιμώτατος γένοιτο· μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Νέστωρ καὶ ὑποτιθέμενος αὐτῷ πάμπολλα νόμιμα καὶ πάγκαλα. τοῦτον δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐπεδειξάμην καὶ ἐνθάδε μέλλω ἐπιδεικνύναι εἰς τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἐν τῷ Φειδοστράτου διδασκαλείῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια ἀκοῆς· ἐδεήθη γάρ μου Εὔδικος ὁ Ἀπημάντου. ἀλλʼ ὅπως παρέσῃ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλους ἄξεις, οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα.
Soc. Well, that shall be done, God willing, Hippias. Now, however, give me a brief answer to a question about your discourse, for you reminded me of the beautiful just at the right moment. For recently, my most excellent friend, as I was finding fault with some things in certain speeches as ugly and praising other things as beautiful, a man threw me into confusion by questioning me very insolently somewhat after this fashion: “How, if you please, do you know, Socrates,” said he, “what sort of things are beautiful and ugly? For, come now, could you tell me what the beautiful is?” And I, being of no account, was at a loss and could not answer him properly; and so, as I was going away from the company, I was angry with myself and reproached myself, and threatened that the first time I met one of you wise men, I would hear and learn and practise and then go back to the man who questioned me to renew the wordy strife. So now, as I say, you have come at the right moment; just teach me satisfactorily what the absolute beautiful is, and try in replying to speak as accurately as possible, that I may not be confuted a second time and be made ridiculous again. For you doubtless know clearly, and this would doubtless be but a small example of your wide learning.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, ὦ Ἱππία. νυνὶ μέντοι βραχύ τί μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπόκριναι· καὶ γάρ με εἰς καλὸν ὑπέμνησας. ἔναγχος γάρ τις, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰς ἀπορίαν με κατέβαλεν ἐν λόγοις τισὶ τὰ μὲν ψέγοντα ὡς αἰσχρά, τὰ δʼ ἐπαινοῦντα ὡς καλά, οὕτω πως ἐρόμενος καὶ μάλα ὑβριστικῶς· πόθεν δέ μοι σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶσθα ὁποῖα καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά; ἐπεὶ φέρε, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν; καὶ ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν φαυλότητα ἠπορούμην τε καὶ οὐκ εἶχον αὐτῷ κατὰ τρόπον ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀπιὼν οὖν ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας ἐμαυτῷ τε ὠργιζόμην καὶ ὠνείδιζον, καὶ ἠπείλουν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ὑμῶν τῳ τῶν σοφῶν ἐντύχοιμι, ἀκούσας καὶ μαθὼν καὶ ἐκμελετήσας ἰέναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα, ἀναμαχούμενος τὸν λόγον. νῦν οὖν, ὃ λέγω, εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις, καί με δίδαξον ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ἐστί, καὶ πειρῶ μοι ὅτι μάλιστα ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον αὖθις γέλωτα ὄφλω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου σαφῶς, καὶ σμικρόν που τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη μάθημα ὧν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπίστασαι.
Hipp. Yes, surely, by Zeus, a small one, Socrates, and, I may say, of no value.
ΙΠ. σμικρὸν μέντοι νὴ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.
Soc. Then I shall learn it easily, and nobody will confute me any more.
ΣΩ. ῥᾳδίως ἄρα μαθήσομαι καὶ οὐδείς με ἐξελέγξει ἔτι.
Hipp. Nobody, surely; for in that case my profession would be worthless and ordinary.
ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς μέντοι· φαῦλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν.
287. Soc. That is good, by Hera, Hippias, if we are to worst the fellow. But may I without hindering you imitate him, and when you answer, take exception to what you say, in order that you may give me as much practice as possible? For I am more or less experienced in taking exceptions. So, if it is all the same to you, I wish to take exceptions, that I may learn more vigorously.
287. ΣΩ. εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰ χειρωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα. ἀτὰρ μή τι κωλύω μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον, ἐὰν σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι τῶν λόγων, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστά με ἐκμελετήσῃς; σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔμπειρός εἰμι τῶν ἀντιλήψεων. εἰ οὖν μή τί σοι διαφέρει, βούλομαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἵνʼ ἐρρωμενέστερον μάθω.
Hipp. Oh yes, take exceptions. For, as I said just now, the question is no great matter, but I could teach you to answer much harder ones than this, so that nobody in the world could confute you.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ ἀντιλαμβάνου. καὶ γάρ, ὃ νυνδὴ εἶπον, οὐ μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγώ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδένα ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαί σε ἐξελέγχειν.
Soc. Oh how good that is! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man’s part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful; for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, “Stranger from Elis, is it not by justice that the just are just?” So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question.
ΣΩ. φεῦ ὡς εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἄγʼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ κελεύεις, φέρε ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκεῖνος γενόμενος πειρῶμαί σε ἐρωτᾶν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐπιδείξαις ὃν φῄς, τὸν περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀκούσας, ἐπειδὴ παύσαιο λέγων, ἔροιτʼ ἂν οὐ περὶ ἄλλου πρότερον ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ—ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτʼ ἔχει—καὶ εἴποι ἄν· ὦ ξένε Ἠλεῖε, ἆρʼ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι; ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἐκείνου ἐρωτῶντος.
Hipp. I shall answer that it is by justice.
ΙΠ. ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι δικαιοσύνῃ.
Soc. “Then this—I mean justice—is something?”
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι τοῦτο, ἡ δικαιοσύνη;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. “Then, too, by wisdom the wise are wise and by the good all things are good, are they not?”
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σοφίᾳ οἱ σοφοί εἰσι σοφοὶ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἀγαθά;
Hipp. Of course.
ΙΠ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Soc. “And justice, wisdom, and so forth are something; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.”
ΣΩ. οὖσί γέ τισι τούτοις· οὐ γὰρ δήπου μὴ οὖσί γε.
Hipp. To be sure, they are something.
ΙΠ. οὖσι μέντοι.
Soc. “Then are not all beautiful things beautiful by the beautiful?”
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἐστι καλά;
Hipp. Yes, by the beautiful.
ΙΠ. ναί, τῷ καλῷ.
Soc. “By the beautiful, which is something?”
ΣΩ. ὄντι γέ τινι τούτῳ;
Hipp. Yes, for what alternative is there?
ΙΠ. ὄντι· ἀλλὰ τί γὰρ μέλλει;
Soc. “Tell me, then, stranger,” he will say, “what is this, the beautiful?”
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ξένε, φήσει, τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν;
Hipp. Well, Socrates, does he who asks this question want to find out anything else than what is beautiful?
ΙΠ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν δεῖται πυθέσθαι τί ἐστι καλόν;
Soc. I do not think that is what he wants to find out, but what the beautiful is.
ΣΩ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.
Hipp. And what difference is there between the two?
ΙΠ. καὶ τί διαφέρει τοῦτʼ ἐκείνου;
Soc. Do you think there is none?
ΣΩ. οὐδέν σοι δοκεῖ;
Hipp. Yes, for there is no difference.
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.
Soc. Well, surely it is plain that you know best; but still, my good friend, consider; for he asked you, not what is beautiful, but what the beautiful is.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι σὺ κάλλιον οἶσθα. ὅμως δέ, ὠγαθέ, ἄθρει· ἐρωτᾷ γάρ σε οὐ τί ἐστι καλόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.
Hipp. I understand, my good friend, and I will answer and tell him what the beautiful is, and I shall never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if I must speak the truth, a beautiful maiden is beautiful.
ΙΠ. μανθάνω, ὠγαθέ, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γε αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.
Soc. Beautifully answered, Hippias, by the dog, and notably! Then if I give this answer, I shall have answered the question that was asked, and shall have answered it correctly, and shall never be confuted?
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Ἱππία, νὴ τὸν κύνα καὶ εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, τὸ ἐρωτώμενόν τε ἀποκεκριμένος ἔσομαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ;
288. Hipp. Yes, for how could you, Socrates, be confuted, when you say what everybody thinks, and when all who hear it will bear witness that what you say is correct?
288. ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐλεγχθείης, ὅ γε πᾶσιν δοκεῖ καὶ πάντες σοι μαρτυρήσουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεις;
Soc. Very well; certainly. Come, then, Hippias, let me rehearse to myself what you say. The man will question me in some such fashion as this: “Come Socrates, answer me. All these things which you say are beautiful, if the absolute beautiful is anything, would be beautiful?” And I shall say that if a beautiful maiden is beautiful, there is something by reason of which these things would be beautiful.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· πάνυ μὲν οὖν. φέρε δή, ὦ Ἱππία, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀναλάβω ὃ λέγεις. ὁ μὲν ἐρήσεταί με οὑτωσί πως· ἴθι μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῂς καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καλά; ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλόν, ἔστι διʼ ὃ ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καλά;
Hipp. Do you think, then, that he will still attempt to refute you and to show that what you say is not beautiful, or, if he does attempt it, that he will not be ridiculous?
ΙΠ. οἴει οὖν ἔτι αὐτὸν ἐπιχειρήσειν σε ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ καλόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις, ἢ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃ, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἔσεσθαι;
Soc. That he will attempt it, my admirable friend, I am sure but whether the attempt will make him ridiculous, the event will show. However, I should like to tell you what he will ask.
ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν ἐπιχειρήσει, ὦ θαυμάσιε, εὖ οἶδα· εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. ἃ μέντοι ἐρεῖ, ἐθέλω σοι λέγειν.
Soc. “How charming you are, Socrates!” he will say. “But is not a beautiful mare beautiful, which even the god praised in his oracle?” What shall we say, Hippias? Shall we not say that the mare is beautiful, I mean the beautiful mare? For how could we dare to deny that the beautiful thing is beautiful?
ΣΩ. ὡς γλυκὺς εἶ, φήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες. θήλεια δὲ ἵππος καλὴ οὐ καλόν, ἣν καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ ἐπῄνεσεν; τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία; ἄλλο τι ἢ φῶμεν καὶ τὴν ἵππον καλὸν εἶναι, τήν γε καλήν; πῶς γὰρ ἂν τολμῷμεν ἔξαρνοι εἶναι τὸ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;
Hipp. Quite true, Socrates for what the god said is quite correct, too; for very beautiful mares are bred in our country.
ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεί τοι καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν· πάγκαλαι γὰρ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἵπποι γίγνονται.
Soc. “Very well,” he will say, “and how about a beautiful lyre? Is it not beautiful?” Shall we agree, Hippias?
ΣΩ. εἶεν, φήσει δή· τί δὲ λύρα καλή; οὐ καλόν; φῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Soc. After this, then, the man will ask, I am sure, judging by his character: “You most excellent man, how about a beautiful pot? Is it, then, not beautiful?”
ΣΩ. ἐρεῖ τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐκεῖνος, σχεδόν τι εὖ οἶδα ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τεκμαιρόμενος· ὦ βέλτιστε σύ, τί δὲ χύτρα καλή; οὐ καλὸν ἄρα;
Hipp. Socrates, who is the fellow? What an uncultivated person, who has the face to mention such worthless things in a dignified discussion!
ΙΠ. ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ὡς ἀπαίδευτός τις ὃς οὕτω φαῦλα ὀνόματα ὀνομάζειν τολμᾷ ἐν σεμνῷ πράγματι.
Soc. That’s the kind of person he is, Hippias, not elegant, but vulgar, thinking of nothing but the truth. But nevertheless the man must be answered, and I will declare my opinion beforehand: if the pot were made by a good potter, were smooth and round and well fired, as are some of the two-handled pots, those that hold six choes, very beautiful ones— if that were the kind of pot he asked about, we must agree that it is beautiful; for how could we say that being beautiful it is not beautiful?
ΣΩ. τοιοῦτός τις, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός, οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἀποκριτέον τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι· εἴπερ ἡ χύτρα κεκεραμευμένη εἴη ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ κεραμέως λεία καὶ στρογγύλη καὶ καλῶς ὠπτημένη, οἷαι τῶν καλῶν χυτρῶν εἰσί τινες δίωτοι, τῶν ἓξ χοᾶς χωρουσῶν, πάγκαλαι, εἰ τοιαύτην ἐρωτῴη χύτραν, καλὴν ὁμολογητέον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν καλὸν ὂν μὴ καλὸν εἶναι;
Hipp. We could not at all, Socrates.
ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. “Then,” he will say, “a beautiful pot also is beautiful, is it not?” Answer.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ χύτρα, φήσει, καλὴ καλόν; ἀποκρίνου.
Hipp. Well, Socrates, it is like this, I think. This utensil, when well wrought, is beautiful, but absolutely considered it does not deserve to be regarded as beautiful in comparison with a mare and a maiden and all the beautiful things.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχει, οἶμαι· καλὸν μὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σκεῦός ἐστι καλῶς εἰργασμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄξιον κρίνειν ὡς ὂν καλὸν πρὸς ἵππον τε καὶ παρθένον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά.
289. Soc. Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: “Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that Ôthe most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,Õ and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says.” Is it not so, Hippias?
289. ΣΩ. εἶεν· μανθάνω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς ἄρα χρὴ ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὸν ταῦτα ἐρωτῶντα τάδε· ὦ ἄνθρωπε, ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἄρα πιθήκων ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένει συμβάλλειν, καὶ χυτρῶν ἡ καλλίστη αἰσχρὰ παρθένων γένει συμβάλλειν, ὥς φησιν Ἱππίας ὁ σοφός. οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω.
Soc. Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: “Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods, will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else?” Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή. μετὰ τοῦτο γὰρ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι φήσει· τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ τῶν παρθένων γένος θεῶν γένει ἄν τις συμβάλλῃ, οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσεται ὅπερ τὸ τῶν χυτρῶν τῷ τῶν παρθένων συμβαλλόμενον; οὐχ ἡ καλλίστη παρθένος αἰσχρὰ φανεῖται; ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγει, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγῃ, ὅτι ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν; ὁμολογήσωμεν, Ἱππία, τὴν καλλίστην παρθένον πρὸς θεῶν γένος αἰσχρὰν εἶναι;
Hipp. Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?
ΙΠ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀντείποι τούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: “Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked?” “I do,” I shall say, “the question was what the absolute beautiful is.” “Then,” he will say, “when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly?” “So it seems,” I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?
ΣΩ. ἂν τοίνυν ταῦτα ὁμολογήσωμεν, γελάσεταί τε καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ Σώκρατες, μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἠρωτήθης; ἔγωγε, φήσω, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν. ἔπειτα, φήσει, ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνῃ ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, ὡς αὐτὸς φῄς, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν; ἔοικε, φήσω· ἢ τί μοι συμβουλεύεις, ὦ φίλε, φάναι;