Hipp. That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.
ΙΠ. τοῦτο ἔγωγε· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πρός γε θεοὺς ὅτι οὐ καλὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖ.
Soc. “But if I had asked you,” he will say, “in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly, if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?”
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ σε ἠρόμην, φήσει, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ἐστι καλόν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν, εἴ μοι ἅπερ νῦν ἀπεκρίνω, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀπεκέκρισο; ἔτι δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σοι αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, τοῦτʼ εἶναι παρθένος ἢ ἵππος ἢ λύρα;
Hipp. Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful. So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: “This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold,” he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ τοῦτό γε ζητεῖ, πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῷ τί ἐστι τὸ καλὸν ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ προσγενομένου αὐτοῦ καλὰ φαίνεται. εὐηθέστατος οὖν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει περὶ καλῶν κτημάτων. ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐρωτᾷ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χρυσός, ἀπορήσει καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσει σε ἐλέγχειν. ἴσμεν γάρ που πάντες ὅτι ὅπου ἂν τοῦτο προσγένηται, κἂν πρότερον αἰσχρὸν φαίνηται, καλὸν φανεῖται χρυσῷ γε κοσμηθέν.
Soc. You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.
ΣΩ. ἄπειρος εἶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἱππία, ὡς σχέτλιός ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ῥᾳδίως ἀποδεχόμενος.
Hipp. What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct, or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.
ΙΠ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἢ μὴ ἀποδεχομένῳ καταγελάστῳ εἶναι.
290. Soc. This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: “You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman?” And I shall say, “Not in the least.”
290. ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ ταύτην γε τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ πάνυ με καὶ τωθάσεται, καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ τετυφωμένε σύ, Φειδίαν οἴει κακὸν εἶναι δημιουργόν; καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἐρῶ ὅτι οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
Hipp. And you will be right, Socrates.
ΙΠ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γʼ ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman, “Well, then,” he will say, “do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of?” “Why do you ask that?” I shall say. “Because,” he will say, “he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added.” When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι. τοιγάρτοι ἐκεῖνος, ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δημιουργὸν τὸν Φειδίαν, εἶτα, φήσει, οἴει τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὃ σὺ λέγεις ἠγνόει Φειδίας; καὶ ἐγώ· τί μάλιστα; φήσω. ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὂν κάλλιστον ἔμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐλεφάντινον· δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξήμαρτεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι χρυσὸς ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται. ταῦτα οὖν λέγοντι τί ἀποκρινώμεθα, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.
ΙΠ. οὐδὲν χαλεπόν· ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθῶς ἐποίησε. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλεφάντινον οἶμαι καλόν ἐστιν.
Soc. “Why, then,” he will say, “did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful?” Shall we say that it is, Hippias?
ΣΩ. τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα, φήσει, οὐ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλεφάντινα ἠργάσατο, ἀλλὰ λίθινα, ὡς οἷόν τʼ ἦν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λίθου τῷ ἐλέφαντι ἐξευρών; ἢ καὶ ὁ λίθος ὁ καλὸς καλόν ἐστι; φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.
ΙΠ. φήσομεν μέντοι, ὅταν γε πρέπων ᾖ.
Soc. “But ugly when not appropriate?” Shall I agree, or not?
ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πρέπων, αἰσχρόν; ὁμολογῶ ἢ μή;
Hipp. Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.
ΙΠ. ὁμολόγει, ὅταν γε μὴ πρέπῃ.
Soc. “What then? Do not gold and ivory,” he will say, “when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly?” Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; ὁ ἐλέφας καὶ ὁ χρυσός, φήσει, ὦ σοφὲ σύ, οὐχ ὅταν μὲν πρέπῃ, καλὰ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ὅταν δὲ μή, αἰσχρά; ἔξαρνοι ἐσόμεθα ἢ ὁμολογήσομεν αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐτόν;
Hipp. We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.
ΙΠ. ὁμολογήσομεν τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πρέπῃ ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καλὸν ποιεῖ ἕκαστον.
Soc. “Well, then,” he will say, “when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?”
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν πρέπει, φήσει, ὅταν τις τὴν χύτραν ἣν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὴν καλήν, ἕψῃ ἔτνους καλοῦ μεστήν, χρυσῆ τορύνη αὐτῇ ἢ συκίνη;
Hipp. Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of! Won’t you tell me who he is?
ΙΠ. Ἡράκλεις, οἷον λέγεις ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐ βούλει μοι εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν;
Soc. You would not know him if I should tell you his name.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἴ σοι εἴποιμι τοὔνομα.
Hipp. But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε γιγνώσκω, ὅτι ἀμαθής τίς ἐστιν.
Soc. He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things, so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.
ΣΩ. μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τί φήσομεν; ποτέραν πρέπειν τοῖν τορύναιν τῷ ἔτνει καὶ τῇ χύτρᾳ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὴν συκίνην; εὐωδέστερον γάρ που τὸ ἔτνος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἅμα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα ἡμῖν τὴν χύτραν ἐκχέαι τὸ ἔτνος καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀποσβέσειεν καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἑστιᾶσθαι ἄνευ ὄψου ἂν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειεν· ἡ δὲ χρυσῆ ἐκείνη πάντα ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ὥστʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν τὴν συκίνην ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον φάναι πρέπειν ἢ τὴν χρυσῆν, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
291. Hipp. No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.
291. ΙΠ. πρέπει μὲν γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον· οὐ μεντἂν ἔγωγε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτῶντι διαλεγοίμην.
Soc. Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow; so instruct me and for my sake answer him. “For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one,” the fellow will say, “would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate?” Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ φίλε· σοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν πρέποι τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ἀναπίμπλασθαι, καλῶς μὲν οὑτωσὶ ἀμπεχομένῳ, καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένῳ, εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα φύρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἐμὲ οὖν προδίδασκε καὶ ἐμὴν χάριν ἀποκρίνου. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρέπει γε μᾶλλον ἡ συκίνη τῆς χρυσῆς, φήσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἄλλο τι καὶ καλλίων ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδήπερ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον ὡμολόγησας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ πρέποντος; ἄλλο τι ὁμολογῶμεν, ὦ Ἱππία, τὴν συκίνην καλλίω τῆς χρυσῆς εἶναι;
Hipp. Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion?
ΙΠ. βούλει σοι εἴπω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ εἰπὼν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἀπαλλάξεις σαυτὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων;
Soc. Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· μὴ μέντοι πρότερόν γε πρὶν ἄν μοι εἴπῃς ποτέραν ἀποκρίνωμαι οἷν ἄρτι ἔλεγον τοῖν τορύναιν πρέπουσάν τε καὶ καλλίω εἶναι.
Hipp. Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ, εἰ βούλει, αὐτῷ ἀπόκριναι ὅτι ἡ ἐκ τῆς συκῆς εἰργασμένη.
Soc. Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?
ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ νυνὶ ὃ ἄρτι ἔμελλες λέγειν. ταύτῃ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, [ᾗ] ἂν φῶ τὸ καλὸν χρυσὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ὡς ἔοικέ μοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον ὂν χρυσὸς ἢ ξύλον σύκινον· τὸ δὲ νῦν τί αὖ λέγεις τὸ καλὸν εἶναι;
Hipp. I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.
ΙΠ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ζητεῖν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ φανεῖται.
Soc. Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
Hipp. Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.
ΙΠ. ἄκουε δή· πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτο ἴσθι, ἐάν τις ἔχῃ ὅτι ἀντείπῃ, φάναι ἐμὲ μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἐπαΐειν.
Soc. Then for Heaven’s sake, speak as quickly as you can.
ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ ὡς τάχιστα πρὸς θεῶν.
Hipp. I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents, to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.
ΙΠ. λέγω τοίνυν ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ κάλλιστον εἶναι ἀνδρί, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀφικομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι.
Soc. Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.
ΣΩ. ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Ἱππία, ἦ θαυμασίως τε καὶ μεγαλείως καὶ ἀξίως σαυτοῦ εἴρηκας· καὶ νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί σου ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὐνοϊκῶς, καθʼ ὅσον οἷός τʼ εἶ, βοηθεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν, ἀλλʼ ἡμῶν δὴ νῦν καὶ πλεῖστον καταγελάσεται, εὖ ἴσθι.
Hipp. A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself and will himself be laughed at by those present.
ΙΠ. πονηρόν γʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέλωτα· ὅταν γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχῃ μὲν μηδὲν ὅτι λέγῃ, γελᾷ δέ, αὑτοῦ καταγελάσεται καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων αὐτὸς ἔσται καταγέλαστος.
292. Soc. Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.
292. ΣΩ. ἴσως οὕτως ἔχει· ἴσως μέντοι ἐπί γε ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ὡς ἐγὼ μαντεύομαι, κινδυνεύσει οὐ μόνον μου καταγελᾶν.
Hipp. Why do you say that, pray?
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν;
Soc. Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.
ΣΩ. ὅτι, ἂν τύχῃ βακτηρίαν ἔχων, ἂν μὴ ἐκφύγω φεύγων αὐτόν, εὖ μάλα μου ἐφικέσθαι πειράσεται.
Hipp. What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?
ΙΠ. πῶς λέγεις; δεσπότης τίς σου ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχθήσεται καὶ δίκας ὀφλήσει; ἢ οὐκ ἔνδικος ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἐᾷ ἀδίκως τύπτειν ἀλλήλους τοὺς πολίτας;
Soc. Oh no that is not allowed at all.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν ἐᾷ.
Hipp. Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.
ΙΠ. οὐκοῦν δώσει δίκην ἀδίκως γέ σε τύπτων.
Soc. I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.
ΣΩ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία, οὔκ, εἰ ταῦτά γε ἀποκριναίμην, ἀλλὰ δικαίως, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Hipp. Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.
ΙΠ. καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ γε αὐτὸς ταῦτα οἴει.
Soc. Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπω σοι καὶ ᾗ αὐτὸς οἴομαι δικαίως ἂν τύπτεσθαι ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; ἢ καὶ σύ με ἄκριτον τυπτήσεις; ἢ δέξῃ λόγον;
Hipp. It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?
ΙΠ. δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ δεχοίμην· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;
Soc. I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, “Tell me, Socrates,” he will say, “do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question?” “How so?” I shall say. “How so?” he will say; “are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful, by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain.” Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias, if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? “Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful; and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always.” What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ νυνδή, μιμούμενος ἐκεῖνον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς σὲ λέγω ῥήματα, οἷα ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἐμὲ ἐρεῖ, χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, εἰπέ μοι, φήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴει ἂν ἀδίκως πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ὅστις διθύραμβον τοσουτονὶ ᾁσας οὕτως ἀμούσως πολὺ ἀπῇσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος; πῶς δή; φήσω ἐγώ. ὅπως; φήσει· οὐχ οἷός τʼ εἶ μεμνῆσθαι ὅτι τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ ἠρώτων, ὃ παντὶ ᾧ ἂν προσγένηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι, καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ καὶ πάσῃ πράξει καὶ παντὶ μαθήματι; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὤνθρωπε, κάλλος ἐρωτῶ ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ οὐδέν σοι μᾶλλον γεγωνεῖν δύναμαι ἢ εἴ μοι παρεκάθησο λίθος, καὶ οὗτος μυλίας, μήτε ὦτα μήτε ἐγκέφαλον ἔχων. εἰ οὖν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμι ἐγὼ ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν ἄχθοιο, ὦ Ἱππία; ἀλλὰ μέντοι τόδε τὸ καλὸν εἶναι Ἱππίας ἔφη· καίτοι ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἠρώτων οὕτως ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμέ, ὃ πᾶσι καλὸν καὶ ἀεί ἐστι. πῶς οὖν φῄς; οὐκ ἀχθέσῃ, ἂν εἴπω ταῦτα;
Hipp. I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.
ΙΠ. εὖ γʼ οὖν οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πᾶσι καλὸν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ εἶπον, καὶ δόξει.
Soc. And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἔσται; φήσει· ἀεὶ γάρ που τό γε καλὸν καλόν.
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. “Then was it so, too?” he will say.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἦν; φήσει.
Hipp. It was so, too.
ΙΠ. καὶ ἦν.
Soc. “And,” he will say, “did the stranger from Elis say also that for Achilles it was beautiful to be buried later than his parents, and for his grandfather Aeacus, and all the others who were born of gods, and for the gods themselves?”
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, φήσει, ὁ ξένος ὁ Ἠλεῖος ἔφη καλὸν εἶναι ὑστέρῳ τῶν προγόνων ταφῆναι, καὶ τῷ πάππῳ αὐτοῦ Αἰακῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι ἐκ θεῶν γεγόνασι, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς;
293. Hipp. What’s that? Confound it! These questions of the fellow’s are not even respectful to religion.
293. ΙΠ. τί τοῦτο; βάλλʼ ἐς μακαρίαν. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐδʼ εὔφημα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτά γε τὰ ἐρωτήματα.
Soc. Well, then, when another asks the question, perhaps it is not quite disrespectful to religion to say that these things are so?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ ἐρομένου ἑτέρου φάναι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν οὐ πάνυ δύσφημον;
Soc. “Perhaps, then, you are the man,” he will say, “who says that it is beautiful for every one and always to be buried by one’s offspring, and to bury one’s parents; or was not Heracles included in ’every one,’ he and all those whom we just now mentioned?”
ΣΩ. ἴσως τοίνυν σὺ εἶ οὗτος, φήσει, ὃς παντὶ φῂς καὶ ἀεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐκγόνων ταφῆναι, τοὺς δὲ γονέας θάψαι· ἢ οὐχ εἷς τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ἦν καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντες;
Hipp. But I did not say it was so for the gods.
ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔγωγε ἔλεγον.
Soc. “Nor for the heroes either, apparently.”
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὡς ἔοικας.
Hipp. Not those who were children of gods.
ΙΠ. οὐχ ὅσοι γε θεῶν παῖδες ἦσαν.
Soc. “But those who were not?”
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὅσοι μή;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. “Then again, according to your statement, among the heroes it is terrible and impious and disgraceful for Tantalus and Dardanus and Zethus, but beautiful for Pelops and the others who were born as he was?”
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν αὖ λόγον, ὡς φαίνεται, τῶν ἡρώων τῷ μὲν Ταντάλῳ καὶ τῷ Δαρδάνῳ καὶ τῷ Ζήθῳ δεινόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστι, Πέλοπι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς οὕτω γεγονόσι καλόν.
Hipp. I think so.
ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. “You think, then, what you did not say just now, that to bury one’s parents and be buried by one’s offspring is sometimes and for some persons disgraceful; and it is still more impossible, as it seems, for this to become and to be beautiful for all, so that the same thing has happened to this as to the things we mentioned before, the maiden and the pot, in a still more ridiculous way than to them; it is beautiful for some and not beautiful for others. And you are not able yet, even today, Socrates,” he will say, “to answer what is asked about the beautiful, namely what it is.” With these words and the like he will rebuke me, if I reply to him in this way. For the most part, Hippias, he talks with me in some such way as that but sometimes, as if in pity for my inexperience and lack of training, he himself volunteers a question, and asks whether I think the beautiful is so and so or whatever else it is which happens to be the subject of our questions and our discussion.
ΣΩ. σοὶ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, φήσει, ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα, τὸ θάψαντι τοὺς προγόνους ταφῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκγόνων ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐνίοις αἰσχρὸν εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀδύνατον πᾶσι τοῦτο γενέσθαι καὶ εἶναι καλόν, ὥστε τοῦτό γε ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ἥ τε παρθένος καὶ ἡ χύτρα, ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, καὶ ἔτι γελοιοτέρως τοῖς μέν ἐστι καλόν, τοῖς δʼ οὐ καλόν. καὶ οὐδέπω καὶ τήμερον, φήσει, οἷός τʼ εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι. ταῦτά μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα ὀνειδιεῖ δικαίως, ἐὰν αὐτῷ οὕτως ἀποκρίνωμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Ἱππία, σχεδόν τί μοι οὕτω διαλέγεται· ἐνίοτε δὲ ὥσπερ ἐλεήσας μου τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν αὐτός μοι προβάλλει ἐρωτῶν εἰ τοιόνδε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὅτου ἂν τύχῃ πυνθανόμενος καὶ περὶ οὗ ἂν λόγος ᾖ.
Hipp. What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. I will tell you. “Oh, my dear Socrates,” he says, “stop making replies of this sort and in this way—for they are too silly and easy to refute; but see if something like this does not seem to you to be beautiful, which we got hold of just now in our reply, when we said that gold was beautiful for those things for which it was appropriate, but not for those for which it was not, and that all the other things were beautiful to which this quality pertains; so examine this very thing, the appropriate, and see if it is perchance the beautiful.” Now I am accustomed to agree to such things every time for I don’t know what to say; but now does it seem to you that the appropriate is the beautiful?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι φράσω. ὦ δαιμόνιε, φησί, Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ οὕτω παῦσαι— λίαν γὰρ εὐήθη τε καὶ εὐεξέλεγκτά ἐστιν—ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, οὗ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐπελαβόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἡνίκʼ ἔφαμεν τὸν χρυσὸν οἷς μὲν πρέπει καλὸν εἶναι, οἷς δὲ μή, οὔ, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οἷς ἂν τοῦτο προσῇ· αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος σκόπει εἰ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ καλόν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εἴωθα συμφάναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἑκάστοτε—οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ὅτι λέγω—σοὶ δʼ οὖν δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν εἶναι;
Hipp. Yes, certainly, Socrates.
ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Let us consider, lest we make a mistake somehow.
ΣΩ. σκοπώμεθα, μή πῃ ἄρʼ ἐξαπατώμεθα.
Hipp. Yes, we must consider.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.
Soc. See, then; do we say that the appropriate is that which, when it is added, makes each of those things to which it is added appear beautiful, or which makes them be beautiful, or neither of these?
ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν· τὸ πρέπον ἆρα τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὃ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ τούτων οἷς ἂν παρῇ, ἢ ὃ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἢ οὐδέτερα τούτων;
294. Hipp. I think so.Soc. Which?Hipp. That which makes them appear beautiful; as when a man takes clothes or shoes that fit, even if he be ridiculous, he appears more beautiful.Soc. Then if the appropriate makes him appear more beautiful than he is, the appropriate would be a sort of deceit in respect to the beautiful, and would not be that which we are looking for, would it, Hippias? For we were rather looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—like that by which all great things are great, that is, excess; for it is by this that all great things are great; for even if they do not appear great, but exceed, they are of necessity great; so, then, we say, what would the beautiful be, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear so or not? For it could not be the appropriate, since that, by your statement, makes things appear more beautiful than they are, but does not let them appear such as they are. But we must try to say what that is which makes things be beautiful, as I said just now, whether they appear so or not; for that is what we are looking for, since we are looking for the beautiful.Hipp. But the appropriate, Socrates, makes things both be and appear beautiful by its presence.Soc. Is it impossible, then, for things which are really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful, at any rate when that is present which makes them appear so?Hipp. It is impossible.Soc. Shall we, then, agree to this, Hippias, that all things which are really beautiful, both uses and pursuits, are always believed to be beautiful by all, and appear so to them, or, quite the contrary, that people are ignorant about them, and that there is more strife and contention about them than about anything else, both in private between individuals and in public between states?Hipp. The latter rather, Socrates; that people are ignorant about them.Soc. They would not be so, if the appearance of beauty were added to them; and it would be added, if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only to be beautiful, but also to appear so. So that the appropriate, if it is that which makes things be beautiful, would be the beautiful which we are looking for, but would not be that which makes things appear beautiful; but if, on the other hand, the appropriate is that which makes things appear beautiful, it would not be the beautiful for which we are looking. For that makes things be beautiful, but the same element could not make things both appear and be beautiful, nor could it make them both appear and be anything else whatsoever. Let us choose, then, whether we think that the appropriate is that which makes things appear or be beautiful.Hipp. That which makes them appear so, in my opinion, Socrates.Soc. Whew! Our perception of what the beautiful is has fled away and gone, Hippias, since the appropriate has been found to be something other than the beautiful.Hipp. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and to me that is very queer.
294. ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ [πότερα] ὃ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι καλά· ὥσπερ γε ἐπειδὰν ἱμάτιά τις λάβῃ ἢ ὑποδήματα ἁρμόττοντα, κἂν ᾖ γελοῖος, καλλίων φαίνεται.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλλίω ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστι τὸ πρέπον, ἀπάτη τις ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ πρέπον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία; ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ που ἐκεῖνο ἐζητοῦμεν, ᾧ πάντα τὰ καλὰ πράγματα καλά ἐστιν— ὥσπερ ᾧ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι· τούτῳ γὰρ πάντα μεγάλα ἐστί, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φαίνηται, ὑπερέχῃ δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι—οὕτω δή, φαμέν, καὶ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καλὰ πάντα ἐστίν, ἄντʼ οὖν φαίνηται ἄντε μή, τί ἂν εἴη; τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καλλίω γὰρ ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, οἷα δʼ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐᾷ φαίνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι καλά, ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐάντε φαίνηται ἐάντε μή, πειρατέον λέγειν τί ἐστι· τοῦτο γὰρ ζητοῦμεν, εἴπερ τὸ καλὸν ζητοῦμεν.ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ καλὰ παρόν.ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καλὰ ὄντα μὴ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ εἶναι, παρόντος γε τοῦ ποιοῦντος φαίνεσθαι;ΙΠ. ἀδύνατον.ΣΩ. ὁμολογήσομεν οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Ἱππία, πάντα τὰ τῷ ὄντι καλὰ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ δοξάζεσθαι καλὰ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ πᾶσιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἔριν καὶ μάχην περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ ταῖς πόλεσιν;ΙΠ. οὕτω μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀγνοεῖσθαι.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν· προσῆν δʼ ἄν, εἴπερ τὸ πρέπον καλὸν ἦν καὶ μὴ μόνον καλὰ ἐποίει εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ πρέπον, εἰ μὲν τὸ καλὰ ποιοῦν ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ποιοῦν φαίνεσθαι· εἰ δʼ αὖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦν ἐστιν τὸ πρέπον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ καλόν, ὃ ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν. εἶναι γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε ποιεῖ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ [ποιεῖν] εἶναι οὐ μόνον καλὰ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν. ἑλώμεθα δὴ πότερα δοκεῖ τὸ πρέπον εἶναι τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλὰ ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ εἶναι.ΙΠ. τὸ φαίνεσθαι, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, οἴχεται ἄρʼ ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγός, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ καλὸν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἐπειδή γε τὸ πρέπον ἄλλο τι ἐφάνη ὂν ἢ καλόν.ΙΠ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε ἀτόπως.
295. Soc. However, my friend, let us not yet give it up, for I still have hopes that what the beautiful is will be made clear.Hipp. Certainly, to be sure, Socrates, for it is not hard to find. Now I know that if I should go away into solitude and meditate alone by myself, I could tell it to you with the most perfect accuracy.Soc. Ah, don’t boast, Hippias. You see how much trouble it has caused us already; I’m afraid it may get angry and run away more than ever. And yet that is nonsense; for you, I think, will easily find it when you go away by yourself. But for Heaven’s sake, find it in my presence, or, if you please, join me, as you are now doing, in looking for it. And if we find it, that will be splendid, but if we do not, I shall, I suppose, accept my lot, and you will go away and find it easily. And if we find it now, I shall certainly not be a nuisance to you by asking what that was which you found by yourself; but now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful: I say, then, that it is—but consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense—for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right?Hipp. Yes.Soc. Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running, part for wrestling; and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also—pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them—how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted—the useful we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?Hipp. It is. Soc, Then are we right in saying that the useful rather than everything else is beautiful?Hipp. We are right, surely, Socrates.Soc. Now that which has power to accomplish anything is useful for that for which it has power, but that which is powerless is useless, is it not?Hipp. Certainly.Soc. Power, then, is beautiful, and want of power is disgraceful or ugly.Hipp. Decidedly. Now other things, Socrates, testify for us that this is so, but especially political affairs; for in political affairs and in one’s own state to be powerful is the most beautiful of all things, but to be powerless is the most disgraceful of all.
295. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μήπω γε ἀνῶμεν αὐτό· ἔτι γάρ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχω ἐκφανήσεσθαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν.ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι, εἰ ὀλίγον χρόνον εἰς ἐρημίαν ἐλθὼν σκεψαίμην πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ἀκριβέστερον ἂν αὐτό σοι εἴποιμι τῆς ἁπάσης ἀκριβείας.ΣΩ. ἆ μὴ μέγα, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγε. ὁρᾷς ὅσα πράγματα ἡμῖν ἤδη παρέσχηκε· μὴ καὶ ὀργισθὲν ἡμῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀποδρᾷ. καίτοι οὐδὲν λέγω· σὺ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸ εὑρήσεις, ἐπειδὰν μόνος γένῃ. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν ἐμοῦ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἔξευρε, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐμοὶ συζήτει· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν εὕρωμεν, κάλλιστα ἕξει, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρξω οἶμαι ἐγὼ τῇ ἐμῇ τύχῃ, σὺ δʼ ἀπελθὼν ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν νῦν εὕρωμεν, ἀμέλει οὐκ ὀχληρὸς ἔσομαί σοι πυνθανόμενος ὅτι ἦν ἐκεῖνο ὃ κατὰ σαυτὸν ἐξηῦρες· νῦν δὲ θέασαι αὐτὸ ὅ σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ καλόν. λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ εἶναι—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπισκόπει μοι πάνυ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν μὴ παραληρήσω—τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν καλόν, ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ. εἶπον δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε ἐννοούμενος· καλοί, φαμέν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί εἰσιν, οὐχ οἳ ἂν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἷοι μὴ δυνατοὶ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλʼ οἳ ἂν δυνατοί τε καὶ χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν. ἦ γάρ;ΙΠ. ναί.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον σῶμα οὕτω λέγομεν καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην, καὶ αὖ τὰ ζῷα πάντα, ἵππον καλὸν καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνα καὶ ὄρτυγα, καὶ τὰ σκεύη πάντα καὶ τὰ ὀχήματα τά τε πεζὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ πλοῖά τε καὶ τριήρεις, καὶ τά γε ὄργανα πάντα τά τε ὑπὸ τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους, σχεδόν τι πάντα ταῦτα καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ· ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ᾗ πέφυκεν, ᾗ εἴργασται, ᾗ κεῖται, τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον καὶ ᾗ χρήσιμον καὶ πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον καὶ ὁπότε χρήσιμον καλόν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἄχρηστον αἰσχρόν· ἆρʼ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὦ Ἱππία;ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε.ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα νῦν λέγομεν ὅτι τυγχάνει παντὸς ὂν μᾶλλον καλὸν τὸ χρήσιμον;ΙΠ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς ὅπερ δυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρήσιμον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄχρηστον;ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν;ΙΠ. σφόδρα γε. τά τε γοῦν ἄλλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαρτυρεῖ ἡμῖν ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τὰ πολιτικά·
296. Soc. Good! Then, for Heaven’s sake, Hippias, is wisdom also for this reason the most beautiful of all things and ignorance the most disgraceful of all things?Hipp. Well, what do you suppose, Socrates?Soc. Just keep quiet, my dear friend; I am so afraid and wondering what in the world we are saying again.Hipp. What are you afraid of again, Socrates, since now your discussion has gone ahead most beautifully?Soc. I wish that might be the case; but consider this point with me: could a person do what he did not know how and was utterly powerless to do?Hipp. By no means; for how could he do what he was powerless to do?Soc. Then those who commit errors and accomplish and do bad things involuntarily, if they were powerless to do those things, would not do them?Hipp. Evidently not.Soc. But yet it is by power that those are powerful who are powerful for surely it is not by powerlessness.Hipp. Certainly not.Soc. And all who do, have power to do what they do?Hipp. Yes.Soc. Men do many more bad things than good, from childhood up, and commit many errors involuntarily.Hipp. That is true.Soc. Well, then, this power and these useful things, which are useful for accomplishing something bad—shall we say that they are beautiful, or far from it?Hipp. Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.Soc. Then, Hippias, the powerful and the useful are not, as it seems, our beautiful.Hipp. They are, Socrates, if they are powerful and useful for good.Soc. Then that assertion, that the powerful and useful are beautiful without qualification, is gone; but was this, Hippias, what our soul wished to say, that the useful and the powerful for doing something good is the beautiful?Hipp. Yes, in my opinion.Soc. But surely this is beneficial; or is it not?Hipp. Certainly.Soc. So by this argument the beautiful persons and beautiful customs and all that we mentioned just now are beautiful because they are beneficial.Hipp. Evidently.Soc. Then the beneficial seems to us to be the beautiful, Hippias.Hipp. Yes, certainly, Socrates.Soc. But the beneficial is that which creates good.Hipp. Yes, it is.Soc. But that which creates is nothing else than the cause; am I right?Hipp. It is so.Soc. Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.
296. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τε καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει τὸ μὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι πάντων κάλλιστον, τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντων αἴσχιστον.ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς θεῶν, Ἱππία, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ σοφία πάντων κάλλιστον, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία πάντων αἴσχιστον;ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες;ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ ἠρέμα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε· ὡς φοβοῦμαι τί ποτʼ αὖ λέγομεν.ΙΠ. τί δʼ αὖ φοβῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ νῦν γέ σοι ὁ λόγος παγκάλως προβέβηκε;ΣΩ. βουλοίμην ἄν, ἀλλά μοι τόδε συνεπίσκεψαι· ἆρʼ ἄν τίς τι ποιήσειεν ὃ μήτʼ ἐπίσταιτο μήτε τὸ παράπαν δύναιτο;ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε μὴ δύναιτο;ΣΩ. οἱ οὖν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοί τε καὶ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες, ἄλλο τι οὗτοι, εἰ μὴ ἐδύναντο ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐποίουν;ΙΠ. δῆλον δή.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι δυνάμει γε δύνανται οἱ δυνάμενοι· οὐ γάρ που ἀδυναμίᾳ γε.ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.ΣΩ. δύνανται δέ γε πάντες ποιεῖν οἱ ποιοῦντες ἃ ποιοῦσιν;ΙΠ. ναί.ΣΩ. κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων, καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνουσιν ἄκοντες.ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, ἃ ἂν ᾖ ἐπὶ τὸ κακόν τι ἐργάζεσθαι χρήσιμα, ἆρα φήσομεν ταῦτα εἶναι καλά, ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ;ΙΠ. πολλοῦ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν.ΙΠ. ἐάν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀγαθὰ δύνηται καὶ ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμον ᾖ.ΣΩ. ἐκεῖνο μὲν τοίνυν οἴχεται, τὸ δυνατόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἁπλῶς εἶναι καλόν· ἀλλʼ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἦν ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἱππία, ὃ ἐβούλετο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν;ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὔ;ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ καλὰ νόμιμα καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα καλά ἐστιν, ὅτι ὠφέλιμα.ΙΠ. δῆλον ὅτι.ΣΩ. τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἄρα ἔοικεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ καλόν, ὦ Ἱππία.ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιοῦν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.ΣΩ. τὸ ποιοῦν δέ γʼ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αἴτιον· ἦ γάρ;ΙΠ. οὕτως.ΣΩ. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα αἴτιόν ἐστιν τὸ καλόν.
297. Hipp. Yes, it is.Soc. But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way was not the cause seen to be creating?Hipp. Yes, certainly.Soc. By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates. Is not that true?Hipp. That is true.Soc. The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.Hipp. Certainly.Soc. If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.Hipp. Certainly for what you say is well said, Socrates.Soc. Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father?Hipp. To be sure it is well said.Soc. And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.Hipp. True.Soc. By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said?Hipp. No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.Soc. Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful?Hipp. No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.Soc. Right, by Zeus, Hippias! And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.Hipp. Yes, that is likely.Soc. Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.Hipp. That is likely.Soc. And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn; I am at a loss; but have you anything to say?Hipp. Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.Soc. But it seems to me that I am so eager to know that I cannot wait for you while you delay; for I believe I have just now found a way out. Just see; how would it help us towards our goal if we were to say that that is beautiful which makes us feel joy; I do not mean all pleasures, but that which makes us feel joy through hearing and sight?
297. ΙΠ. ἔστι γάρ.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε αἴτιον, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ οὗ ἂν αἴτιον ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, ἄλλο ἐστίν· οὐ γάρ που τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου αἴτιον ἂν εἴη. ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐ τὸ αἴτιον ποιοῦν ἐφάνη;ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖται οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ ποιοῦν;ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν;ΙΠ. ναί.ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τό γʼ αἴτιον αἴτιον αἰτίου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ.ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τὸ καλόν ἐστιν αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικε, σπουδάζομεν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ καλά, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἔκγονον σπουδαστόν ἐστι, τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐξ ὧν εὑρίσκομεν ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέᾳ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καλῶς λέγω, ὅτι οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ ὑός ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ ὑὸς πατήρ;ΙΠ. καλῶς μέντοι.ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τὸ αἴτιον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὖ αἴτιον.ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων;ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔ μοι φαίνεται.ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν;ΙΠ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ μοι ἀρέσκει.ΣΩ. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Ἱππία· ἐμοὶ δέ γε πάντων ἥκιστα ἀρέσκει ὧν εἰρήκαμεν λόγων.ΙΠ. ἔοικε γὰρ οὕτως.ΣΩ. κινδυνεύει ἄρα ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐφαίνετο κάλλιστος εἶναι τῶν λόγων τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ, εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι γελοιότερος τῶν πρώτων, ἐν οἷς τήν τε παρθένον ᾠόμεθα εἶναι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων.ΙΠ. ἔοικεν.ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέν γε οὐκ ἔτι ἔχω, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅποι τράπωμαι, ἀλλʼ ἀπορῶ· σὺ δὲ ἔχεις τι λέγειν;ΙΠ. οὐκ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, σκεψάμενος εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι εὑρήσω.ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ εἰδέναι οὐχ οἷός τε σὲ εἶναι περιμένειν μέλλοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὖν δή τι καὶ οἶμαι ἄρτι ηὐπορηκέναι. ὅρα γάρ· εἰ ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρʼ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα;