298. For surely beautiful human beings, Hippias, and all decorations and paintings and works of sculpture which are beautiful, delight us when we see them; and beautiful sounds and music in general and speeches and stories do the same thing, so that if we were to reply to that impudent fellow, “My excellent man, the beautiful is that which is pleasing through hearing and sight,” don’t you think that we should put a stop to his impudence?
298. οἵ τέ γέ που καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ τὰ ποικίλματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα καὶ τὰ πλάσματα τέρπει ἡμᾶς ὁρῶντας, ἃ ἂν καλὰ ᾖ· καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ σύμπασα καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ μυθολογίαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζονται, ὥστʼ εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα τῷ θρασεῖ ἐκείνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ καλόν ἐστι τὸ διʼ ἀκοῆς τε καὶ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδύ, οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν τοῦ θράσους ἐπίσχοιμεν;
Hipp. To me, at any rate, Socrates, it seems that the nature of the beautiful is now well stated.
ΙΠ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ νῦν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστιν.
Soc. But what then? Shall we say, Hippias, that beautiful customs and laws are beautiful because they are pleasing through hearing and sight, or that they have some other form of beauty?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἆρα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τὰ καλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὦ Ἱππία, διʼ ἀκοῆς ἢ διʼ ὄψεως φήσομεν ἡδέα ὄντα καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἔχειν;
Hipp. Perhaps, Socrates, these things might slip past the man unnoticed.
ΙΠ. ταῦτα δʼ ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν παραλάθοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
Soc. No, by dog, Hippias—not past the man before whom I should be most ashamed of talking nonsense and pretending that I was talking sense when I was not.
ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐχ ὅν γʼ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα αἰσχυνοίμην ληρῶν καὶ προσποιούμενός τι λέγειν μηδὲν λέγων.
Hipp. What man is that?
ΙΠ. τίνα τοῦτον;
Soc. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who would no more permit me to say these things carelessly without investigation than to say that I know what I do not know.
ΣΩ. τὸν Σωφρονίσκου, ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἐπιτρέποι ἀνερεύνητα ὄντα ῥᾳδίως λέγειν ἢ ὡς εἰδότα ἃ μὴ οἶδα.
Hipp. But certainly I also, now that you have mentioned it, think that this about the laws is something different.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπειδὴ σὺ εἶπες, δοκεῖ τι ἄλλο εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τοὺς νόμους.
Soc. Not too fast, Hippias; for very likely we have fallen into the same perplexity about the beautiful in which we were a while ago, although we think we have found another way out.
ΣΩ. ἔχʼ ἡσυχῇ, ὦ Ἱππία· κινδυνεύομεν γάρ τοι, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐμπεπτωκότες ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐν ᾗπερ νυνδή, οἴεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι.
Hipp. What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΙΠ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. I will tell you what presents itself to me, if perhaps there may be some sense in it. For perhaps these matters of laws and customs might be shown to be not outside of the perception which we have through hearing and sight; but let us stick to the statement that that which is pleasing through the senses is beautiful, without interjecting the matter of the laws. But if this man of whom I speak, or anyone else whosoever, should ask us: “Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of the pleasing that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses —those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful? Or do you say that such things are not even pleasing and that there is no pleasure at all in them, nor in anything else except sight and hearing?” What shall we say, Hippias?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι φράσω ὅ γʼ ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται, εἰ ἄρα τὶ λέγω. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τάχʼ ἂν φανείη οὐκ ἐκτὸς ὄντα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἣ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει· ἀλλʼ ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, τὸ διὰ τούτων ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παράγοντες. ἀλλʼ εἰ ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο εἴτε οὗτος ὃν λέγω, εἴτε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· τί δή, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀφωρίσατε τοῦ ἡδέος τὸ ταύτῃ ἡδὺ ᾗ λέγετε καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τἀφροδίσια καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔ φατε καλὰ εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ἡδέα, οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φατὲ εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι; τί φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. Certainly, by all means, Socrates, we shall say that there are very great pleasures in the other things also.
ΙΠ. πάντως δήπου φήσομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλας πάνυ ἡδονὰς εἶναι.
Soc. “Why, then,” he will say, “if they are pleasures no less than the others, do you take from them this designation and deprive them of being beautiful?”
ΣΩ. τί οὖν, φήσει, ἡδονὰς οὔσας οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ καὶ ἐκείνας ἀφαιρεῖσθε τοῦτο τοὔνομα καὶ ἀποστερεῖτε τοῦ καλὰς εἶναι;
299. “Because,” we shall say, “everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odor is not pleasant but is beautiful; and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend that it is most pleasant, but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see.” If we say this, Hippias, “I too understand,” he will perhaps say, “that you have all along been ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to people; but that is not what I asked, what seems to most people to be beautiful, but what is so.” We shall, then, I fancy, say, as we suggested, “We say that that part of the pleasant which comes by sight and hearing is beautiful.” Do you think the statement is of any use, Hippias, or shall we say something else?
299. ὅτι, φήσομεν, καταγελῴη ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὔ, εἰ φαῖμεν μὴ ἡδὺ εἶναι φαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλόν, καὶ ὄζειν ἡδὺ μὴ ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καλόν· τὰ δέ που περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια πάντες ἂν ἡμῖν μάχοιντο ὡς ἥδιστον ὄν, δεῖν δὲ αὐτό, ἐάν τις καὶ πράττῃ, οὕτω πράττειν ὥστε μηδένα ὁρᾶν, ὡς αἴσχιστον ὂν ὁρᾶσθαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ὦ Ἱππία, μανθάνω, ἂν ἴσως φαίη, καὶ ἐγὼ ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἠρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἔστιν. ἐροῦμεν δὴ οἶμαι ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα, ὅτι τοῦθʼ ἡμεῖς γέ φαμεν τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον, καλὸν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἔχεις ἔτι τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἤ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία;
Hipp. Inevitably, in view of what has been said, Socrates, we must say just that.
ΙΠ. ἀνάγκη πρός γε τὰ εἰρημένα, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα ἢ ταῦτα λέγειν.
Soc. “Excellent!” he will say. “Then if that which is pleasant through sight and hearing is beautiful, that among pleasant things which does not happen to be of that sort would evidently not be beautiful?” Shall we agree?
ΣΩ. καλῶς δὴ λέγετε, φήσει. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη; ὁμολογήσομεν;
Soc. “Is, then, that which is pleasant through sight,” he will say, “pleasant through sight and hearing, or is that which is pleasant through hearing pleasant through hearing and sight?” “No,” we shall say, “that which is pleasant through each of these would not in the least be pleasant through both—for that is what you appear to us to mean—but we said that either of these pleasant things would be beautiful alone by itself, and both together.” Is not that the reply we shall make?
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν τὸ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδύ, φήσει, διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἐστιν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ διʼ ἀκοῆς καὶ διʼ ὄψεώς ἐστιν ἡδύ; οὐδαμῶς, φήσομεν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ὂν τοῦτο διʼ ἀμφοτέρων εἴη ἄν—τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖς ἡμῖν λέγειν—ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον τούτων αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ τῶν ἡδέων καλὸν εἴη, καὶ ἀμφότερα. οὐχ οὕτως ἀποκρινούμεθα;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. “Does, then,” he will say, “any pleasant thing whatsoever differ from any pleasant thing whatsoever by this, by being pleasant? I ask not whether any pleasure is greater or smaller or more or less, but whether it differs by just this very thing, by the fact that one of the pleasures is a pleasure and the other is not a pleasure.” “We do not think so.” Do we?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, φήσει, ἡδὺ ἡδέος ὁτιοῦν ὁτουοῦν διαφέρει τούτῳ, τῷ ἡδὺ εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις αὐτῷ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἡδονή, τῶν ἡδονῶν; οὐχ ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖ· οὐ γάρ;
Hipp. No, we do not.
ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δοκεῖ.
Soc. “Is it not,” then, he will say, “for some other reason than because they are pleasures that you chose these pleasures out from the other pleasures —it was because you saw some quality in both, since they have something different from the others, in view of which you say that they are beautiful? For the reason why that which is pleasant through sight is beautiful, is not, I imagine, because it is through sight; for if that were the cause of its being beautiful, the other pleasure, that through hearing, would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through sight.” Shall we say “What you say is true?”
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, φήσει, διʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι ἡδοναί εἰσι προείλεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, τοιοῦτόν τι ὁρῶντες ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέποντες καλάς φατε αὐτὰς εἶναι; οὐ γάρ που διὰ τοῦτο καλή ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι διʼ ὄψεώς ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἦν τὸ αἴτιον καλῇ εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς, καλή· οὔκουν ἔστι γε διʼ ὄψεως ἡδονή. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φήσομεν;
Hipp. Yes, we shall.
ΙΠ. φήσομεν γάρ.
300. Soc. “Nor, again, is the pleasure through hearing beautiful for the reason that it is through hearing; for in that case, again, the pleasure through sight would not be beautiful; it certainly is not pleasure through hearing.” Shall we say, Hippias, that the man who says that speaks the truth?
300. ΣΩ. οὐδέ γʼ αὖ ἡ διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι διʼ ἀκοῆς ἐστι, διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλή· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὖ ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καλὴ ἦν· οὔκουν ἔστι γε διʼ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή. ἀληθῆ φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν τὸν ἄνδρα ταῦτα λέγοντα;
Hipp. Yes, he speaks the truth.
ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ.
Soc. “But yet both are beautiful, as you say.” We do say that, do we not?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότεραί γʼ εἰσὶ καλαί, ὡς φατέ. φαμὲν γάρ;
Soc. “They have, then, something identical which makes them to be beautiful, this common quality which pertains to both of them in common and to each individually; for otherwise they would not both collectively and each individually be beautiful.” Answer me, as if you were answering him.
ΣΩ. ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ἄλλως ἀμφότεραί γε καλαὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἑκατέρα. ἀποκρίνου ἐμοὶ ὡς ἐκείνῳ.
Hipp. I answer, and I think it is as you say.
ΙΠ. ἀποκρίνομαι, καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.
Soc. If, then, these pleasures are both affected in any way collectively, but each individually is not so affected, it is not by this affection that they would be beautiful.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τι αὗται αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν τούτῳ γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί.
Hipp. And how could that be, Socrates, when neither of them individually is affected by some affection or other, that then both are affected by that affection by which neither is affected?
ΙΠ. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, μηδετέρας πεπονθυίας τι τῶν ὄντων ὁτιοῦν, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ μηδετέρα πέπονθεν, ἀμφοτέρας πεπονθέναι;
Soc. You think it cannot be?
ΣΩ. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
Hipp. I should have to be very inexperienced both in the nature of these things and in the language of our present discussion.
ΙΠ. πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν μʼ ἔχοι ἀπειρία καὶ τῆς τούτων φύσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν παρόντων λέξεως λόγων.
Soc. Very pretty, Hippias. But there is a chance that I think I see a case of that kind which you say is impossible, but do not really see it.
ΣΩ. ἡδέως γε, ὦ Ἱππία. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἴσως κινδυνεύω δοκεῖν μέν τι ὁρᾶν οὕτως ἔχον ὡς σὺ φῂς ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ὁρῶ δʼ οὐδέν.
Hipp. There’s no chance about it, Socrates, but you quite purposely see wrongly.
ΙΠ. οὐ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἑτοίμως παρορᾷς.
Soc. And certainly many such cases appear before my mind, but I mistrust them because they do not appear to you, a man who has made more money by wisdom than anyone now living, but to me who never made any money at all; and the thought disturbs me that you are playing with me and purposely deceiving me, they appear to me in such numbers and with such force.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πολλά γέ μοι προφαίνεται τοιαῦτα πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστῶ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι σοὶ μὲν οὐ φαντάζεται, ἀνδρὶ πλεῖστον ἀργύριον εἰργασμένῳ τῶν νῦν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἐμοὶ δέ, ὃς οὐδὲν πώποτε ἠργασάμην. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦμαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ παίζῃς πρός με καὶ ἑκὼν ἐξαπατᾷς· οὕτως μοι σφόδρα καὶ πολλὰ φαίνεται.
Hipp. Nobody, Socrates, will know better than you whether I am playing with you or not, if you proceed to tell these things that appear to you; for it will be apparent to you that you are talking nonsense. For you will never find that you and I are both affected by an affection by which neither of us is affected.
ΙΠ. οὐδεὶς σοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κάλλιον εἴσεται εἴτε παίζω εἴτε μή, ἐὰν ἐπιχειρήσῃς λέγειν τὰ προφαινόμενά σοι ταῦτα· φανήσῃ γὰρ οὐδὲν λέγων. οὐ γὰρ μήποτε εὕρῃς, ὃ μήτʼ ἐγὼ πέπονθα μήτε σύ, τοῦτʼ ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς πεπονθότας.
Soc. What are you saying, Hippias? Perhaps you are talking sense, and I fail to understand; but let me tell more clearly what I wish to say. For it appears to me that it is possible for us both to be so affected as to be something which I am not so affected as to be, and which I am not and you are not either; and again for neither of us to be so affected as to be other things which we both are.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία; ἴσως μὲν τὶ λέγεις, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐ μανθάνω· ἀλλά μου σαφέστερον ἄκουσον ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὃ μήτʼ ἐγὼ πέπονθα εἶναι μήτʼ εἰμὶ μηδʼ αὖ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτο ἀμφοτέρους πεπονθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι· ἕτερα δʼ αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν.
Hipp. Your reply, Socrates, seems to involve miracles again even greater than those of your previous reply. For consider: if we are both just, would not each of us be just also, and if each is unjust, would not both again also be unjust, or if both are healthy, each of us also?
ΙΠ. τέρατα αὖ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἔοικας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι μείζω ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἀπεκρίνω. σκόπει γάρ· πότερον εἰ ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοί ἐσμεν, οὐ καὶ ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη ἄν, ἢ εἰ ἄδικος ἑκάτερος, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι, ἢ εἰ ὑγιαίνοντες, οὐ καὶ ἑκάτερος;
301. Or if each of us were to be tired or wounded or struck or affected in any other way whatsoever, should we not both of us be affected in the same way? Then, too, if we were to be golden or of silver or of ivory, or, if you please, noble or wise or honored or old or young or whatever else you like of all that flesh is heir to, is it not quite inevitable that each of us be that also?
301. ἢ εἰ κεκμηκώς τι ἢ τετρωμένος ἢ πεπληγμένος ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν πεπονθὼς ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐ καὶ ἀμφότεροι αὖ ἂν τοῦτο πεπόνθοιμεν; ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ χρυσοῖ ἢ ἀργυροῖ ἢ ἐλεφάντινοι, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γενναῖοι ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ τίμιοι ἢ γέροντές γε ἢ νέοι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι βούλει τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμφότεροι τύχοιμεν ὄντες, ἆρʼ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν τοῦτο εἶναι;
Soc. Absolutely.
ΣΩ. πάντως γε δήπου.
Hipp. But you see, Socrates, you do not consider the entirety of things, nor do they with whom you are in the habit of conversing, but you all test the beautiful and each individual entity by taking them separately and cutting them to pieces. For this reason you fail to observe that embodiments of reality are by nature so great and undivided. And now you have failed to observe to such a degree that you think there is some affection or reality which pertains to both of these together, but not to each individually, or again to each, but not to both; so unreasoning and undiscerning and foolish and unreflecting is your state of mind.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι, κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτόν σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἴει εἶναί τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἣ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἔστιν ἅμα, περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὔ, ἢ αὖ περὶ μὲν ἑκάτερον, περὶ δὲ ἀμφότερα οὔ· οὕτως ἀλογίστως καὶ ἀσκέπτως καὶ εὐήθως καὶ ἀδιανοήτως διάκεισθε.
Soc. Human affairs, Hippias, are not what a man wishes, but what he can, as the proverb goes which people are constantly citing; but you are always aiding us with admonitions. For now too, until we were admonished by you of our foolish state of mind—shall I continue to speak and make you a still further exhibition of our thoughts on the subject, or shall I not speak?
ΣΩ. τοιαῦτα, ὦ Ἱππία, τὰ ἡμέτερά ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷα βούλεταί τις, φασὶν ἄνθρωποι ἑκάστοτε παροιμιαζόμενοι, ἀλλʼ οἷα δύναται· ἀλλὰ σὺ ἡμᾶς ὀνίνης ἀεὶ νουθετῶν. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εὐήθως διεκείμεθα, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω εἰπὼν ἃ διενοούμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ μὴ εἴπω;
Hipp. You will speak to one who knows, Socrates, for I know the state of mind of all who are concerned with discussions; but nevertheless, if you prefer, speak.
ΙΠ. εἰδότι μὲν ἐρεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶδα γὰρ ἑκάστους τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὡς διάκεινται. ὅμως δʼ εἴ τι σοὶ ἥδιον, λέγε.
Soc. Well, I do prefer. For we, my friend, were so stupid, before you spoke, as to have an opinion concerning you and me, that each of us was one, but that we were not both that which each of us was—for we are not one, but two —so foolish were we. But now we have been taught by you that if we are both two, then each of us is inevitably two, and if each is one, then both are inevitably one; for it is impossible, by the continuous doctrine of reality according to Hippias, that it be otherwise, but what we both are, that each is, and what each is, both are. So now I have been convinced by you, and I hold this position. But first, Hippias, refresh my memory: Are you and I one, or are you two and I two?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥδιόν γε. ἡμεῖς γάρ, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὕτως ἀβέλτεροι ἦμεν, πρίν σε ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν, ὥστε δόξαν εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ ὡς ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἷς ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ ὃ ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη οὐκ ἄρα εἶμεν ἀμφότεροι—οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ δύο—οὕτως εὐηθικῶς εἴχομεν· νῦν δὲ παρὰ σοῦ ἤδη ἀνεδιδάχθημεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο ἀμφότεροί ἐσμεν, δύο καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δὲ εἷς ἑκάτερος, ἕνα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν ἀμφότερα ᾖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ὃ ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα εἶναι. πεπεισμένος δὴ νῦν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐνθάδε κάθημαι. πρότερον μέντοι, ὦ Ἱππία, ὑπόμνησόν με· πότερον εἷς ἐσμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἢ σύ τε δύο εἶ κἀγὼ δύο;
Hipp. What do you mean, Socrates?
ΙΠ. τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. Just what I say; for I am afraid to speak plainly to you, because you are vexed with me, when you think you are talking sensibly;
ΣΩ. ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγω· φοβοῦμαι γάρ σε σαφῶς λέγειν, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνεις, ἐπειδὰν τὶ δόξῃς σαυτῷ λέγειν.
302. however, tell me further: Is not each of us one and affected in such a way as to be one?
302. ὅμως δʼ ἔτι μοι εἰπέ· οὐχ εἷς ἡμῶν ἑκάτερός ἐστι καὶ πέπονθε τοῦτο, εἷς εἶναι;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Then each of us, if one, would be an odd number; or do you not consider one an odd number?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ εἷς, καὶ περιττὸς ἂν εἴη ἑκάτερος ἡμῶν· ἢ οὐ τὸ ἓν περιττὸν ἡγῇ;
Soc. Then are we both an odd number, being two?
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀμφότεροι οὖν περιττοί ἐσμεν δύο ὄντες;
Hipp. That could not be, Socrates.
ΙΠ. οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. But we are both an even number, are we not?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρτιοί γε ἀμφότεροι· ἦ γάρ;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Then because we are both even, is each of us on that account even?
ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν, ὅτι ἀμφότεροι ἄρτιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα καὶ ἑκάτερος ἄρτιος ἡμῶν ἐστιν;
Hipp. No, surely not.
ΙΠ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. Then it is not absolutely inevitable, as you said just now, that what both are, each is, and what each is, both are.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὡς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἃ ἂν ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἑκάτερος καὶ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι.
Hipp. Not things of this sort, but such as I mentioned before.
ΙΠ. οὐ τά γε τοιαῦτα, ἀλλʼ οἷα ἐγὼ πρότερον ἔλεγον.
Soc. That suffices, Hippias; for even this is welcome, since it appears that some things are so and some are not so. For I said, if you remember the beginning of this discussion, that pleasure through sight and through hearing were beautiful, not by that by which each of them was so affected as to be beautiful, but not both, nor both but not each, but by that by which both and each were so affected, because you conceded that both and each were beautiful. For this reason I thought that if both are beautiful they must be beautiful by that essence which belongs to both, but not by that which is lacking in each; and I still think so. But tell me, as in the beginning: If pleasure through sight and pleasure through hearing are both and each beautiful, does not that which makes them beautiful belong to both and to each?
ΣΩ. ἐξαρκεῖ, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀγαπητὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν οὕτω φαίνεται, τὰ δʼ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, εἰ μέμνησαι ὅθεν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονὴ οὐ τούτῳ εἶεν καλαί, ὅτι τυγχάνοιεν ἑκατέρα μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι πεπονθυῖα, ἀμφότεραι δὲ μή, ἢ ἀμφότεραι μέν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἀμφότεραί τε καὶ ἑκατέρα, διότι συνεχώρεις ἀμφοτέρας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι καλὰς καὶ ἑκατέραν. τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα ἑπομένῃ ᾤμην, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά ἐστι καλά, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένῃ μή· καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἴομαι. ἀλλά μοι λέγε, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἡ διʼ ὄψεως ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ διʼ ἀκοῆς, εἴπερ ἀμφότεραί τʼ εἰσὶ καλαὶ καὶ ἑκατέρα, ἆρα καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς οὐχὶ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις γε αὐταῖς ἕπεται καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ;
Hipp. Certainly.
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Is it, then, for this reason, because each is a pleasure and both are pleasures, that they would be beautiful? Or would all other pleasures be for this reason no less beautiful than they? For we saw, if you remember, that they were no less pleasures.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἑκατέρα τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμφότεραι, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν καλαί; ἢ διὰ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἂν οὐδὲν τούτων ἧττον εἶεν καλαί; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἡδοναὶ ἐφάνησαν οὖσαι, εἰ μέμνησαι.
Hipp. Yes, I remember.
ΙΠ. μέμνημαι.
Soc. But for this reason, because these pleasures were through sight and hearing, it was said that they are beautiful.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὅτι γε διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς αὗταί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο καλὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι.
Hipp. Yes, that is what was said.
ΙΠ. καὶ ἐρρήθη οὕτως.
Soc. See if what I say is true. For it was said, if my memory serves me, that this “pleasant” was beautiful, not all “pleasant,” but that which is through sight and hearing.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγω. ἐλέγετο γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ μνήμης ἔχω, τοῦτʼ εἶναι καλὸν τὸ ἡδύ, οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ᾖ.
Soc. Now this quality belongs to both, but not to each, does it not? For surely each of them, as was said before, is not through both senses, but both are through both, and each is not. Is that true?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε τὸ πάθος ἀμφοτέραις μὲν ἕπεται, ἑκατέρᾳ δʼ οὔ; οὐ γάρ που ἑκάτερόν γε αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο, διʼ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ἀμφότερα μὲν διʼ ἀμφοῖν, ἑκάτερον δʼ οὔ· ἔστι ταῦτα;
Soc. Then it is not by that which does not belong to each that each of them is beautiful; for “both” does not belong to each; so that it is possible, according to our hypothesis, to say that they both are beautiful, but not to say that each is so;
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τούτῳ γε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐστι καλόν, ὃ μὴ ἕπεται ἑκατέρῳ (τὸ γὰρ ἀμφότερον ἑκατέρῳ οὐχ ἕπεται) ὥστε ἀμφότερα μὲν αὐτὰ φάναι καλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔξεστιν, ἑκάτερον δὲ οὐκ ἔξεστιν·
303. or what shall we say? Is that not inevitable?
303. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; οὐκ ἀνάγκη;
Hipp. It appears so.
ΙΠ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Shall we say, then, that both are beautiful, but that each is not?
ΣΩ. φῶμεν οὖν ἀμφότερα μὲν καλὰ εἶναι, ἑκάτερον δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;
Hipp. What is to prevent?
ΙΠ. τί γὰρ κωλύει;
Soc. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent, that there were some attributes thus belonging to individual things, which belonged, we thought, to each, if they belonged to both, and to both, if they belonged to each—I mean all those attributes which you specified. Am I right?
ΣΩ. τόδε ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ φίλε, κωλύειν, ὅτι ἦν που ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἑκάστοις, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέροις ἐπιγίγνοιτο, καὶ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ εἴπερ ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις, ἅπαντα ὅσα σὺ διῆλθες· ἦ γάρ;
Soc. But those again which I specified did not; and among those were precisely “each” and “both.” Is that so?
ΣΩ. ἃ δέ γε αὖ ἐγὼ διῆλθον, οὔ· ὧν δὴ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφότερον. ἔστιν οὕτως;
Soc. To which group, then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you to belong? To the group of those that you mentioned? If I am strong and you also, are we both collectively strong, and if I am just and you also, are we both collectively just, and if both collectively, then each individually so, too, if I am beautiful and you also, are we both collectively beautiful, and if both collectively, then each individually? Or is there nothing to prevent this, as in the case that when given things are both collectively even, they may perhaps individually be odd, or perhaps even, and again, when things are individually irrational quantities they may perhaps both collectively be rational, or perhaps irrational, and countless other cases which, you know, I said appeared before my mind? To which group do you assign the beautiful? Or have you the same view about it as I? For to me it seems great foolishness that we collectively are beautiful, but each of us is not so, or that each of us is so, but both are not, or anything else of that sort. Do you choose in this way, as I do, or in some other way?
ΣΩ. ποτέρων οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, δοκεῖ σοι τὸ καλὸν εἶναι; πότερον ὧν σὺ ἔλεγες· εἴπερ ἐγὼ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ δίκαιος καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος· οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἐγὼ καλὸς καὶ σύ, καὶ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἑκάτερος; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἀρτίων ὄντων τινῶν ἀμφοτέρων τάχα μὲν ἑκάτερα περιττὰ εἶναι, τάχα δʼ ἄρτια, καὶ αὖ ἀρρήτων ἑκατέρων ὄντων τάχα μὲν ῥητὰ τὰ συναμφότερα εἶναι, τάχα δʼ ἄρρητα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἐμοὶ προφαίνεσθαι; ποτέρων δὴ τιθεῖς τὸ καλόν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καταφαίνεται, καὶ σοί; πολλὴ γὰρ ἀλογία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι καλούς, ἑκάτερον δὲ μή, ἢ ἑκάτερον μέν, ἀμφοτέρους δὲ μή, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων. οὕτως αἱρῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἢ ʼκείνως;
Hipp. In this way, Socrates.
ΙΠ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. You choose well, Hippias, that we may be free from the need of further search; for if the beautiful is in this group, that which is pleasing through sight and hearing would no longer be the beautiful. For the expression through sight and hearing makes both collectively beautiful, but not each individually; and this was impossible, as you and I agree.
ΣΩ. εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, ἵνα καὶ ἀπαλλαγῶμεν πλείονος ζητήσεως· εἰ γὰρ τούτων γʼ ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλόν. ἀμφότερα μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ καλὰ τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς, ἑκάτερον δʼ οὔ· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἀδύνατον, ὡς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὦ Ἱππία.
Hipp. Yes, we agree.
ΙΠ. ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ.
Soc. It is, then, impossible that the pleasant through sight and hearing be the beautiful, since in becoming beautiful it offers an impossibility.
ΣΩ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ διʼ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδὺ καλὸν εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε καλὸν γιγνόμενον τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι παρέχεται.
Hipp. That is true.
ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Soc. “Then tell us again,” he will say, “from the beginning, since you failed this time; what do you say that this ’beautiful,’ belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest?
ΣΩ. λέγετε δὴ πάλιν, φήσει, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐπειδὴ τούτου διημάρτετε· τί φατε εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διʼ ὅτι ταύτας πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τιμήσαντες καλὰς ὠνομάσατε; ἀνάγκη δή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Ἱππία, λέγειν ὅτι ἀσινέσταται αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσι καὶ βέλτισται, καὶ ἀμφότεραι καὶ ἑκατέρα· ἢ σύ τι ἔχεις λέγειν ἄλλο ᾧ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων;
Hipp. Not at all; for really they are the best.
ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ βέλτισταί εἰσιν.
Soc. “This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say; and you?
ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἄρα, φήσει, λέγετε δὴ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον; ἐοίκαμεν, φήσω ἔγωγε· σὺ δέ;
Hipp. I also.
ΙΠ. καὶ ἐγώ.
Soc. “Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, if each of them is different from the other.”
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὠφέλιμον, φήσει, τὸ ποιοῦν τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον ἕτερον νυνδὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἥκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἑκάτερόν ἐστι.
304. “Absolutely true,” we shall say, if we are reasonable; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.
304. παντός γε μᾶλλον, φήσομεν, ὦ Ἱππία, ἂν σωφρονῶμεν· οὐ γάρ που θέμις τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι μὴ συγχωρεῖν.
Hipp. But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago, divided into bits; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered, to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one’s property, and one’s friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ δή γʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί οἴει ταῦτα εἶναι συνάπαντα; κνήσματά τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, κατὰ βραχὺ διῃρημένα· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο καὶ καλὸν καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, οἷόν τʼ εἶναι εὖ καὶ καλῶς λόγον καταστησάμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ ἢ ἐπὶ ἄλλῃ τινὶ ἀρχῇ, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, πείσαντα οἴχεσθαι φέροντα οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων, σωτηρίαν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων καὶ φίλων. τούτων οὖν χρὴ ἀντέχεσθαι, χαίρειν ἐάσαντα τὰς σμικρολογίας ταύτας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ λίαν ἀνόητος εἶναι λήρους καὶ φλυαρίας ὥσπερ νῦν μεταχειριζόμενος.
Soc. My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune, so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one’s end in a court of law or in any other assemblage, I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. “And yet how are you to know,” he will say, “either who produced a discourse, or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead?” So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb “beautiful things are difficult.”
ΣΩ. ὦ Ἱππία φίλε, σὺ μὲν μακάριος εἶ, ὅτι τε οἶσθα ἃ χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἐπιτετήδευκας ἱκανῶς, ὡς φῄς· ἐμὲ δὲ δαιμονία τις τύχη, ὡς ἔοικε, κατέχει, ὅστις πλανῶμαι μὲν καὶ ἀπορῶ ἀεί, ἐπιδεικνὺς δὲ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπορίαν ὑμῖν τοῖς σοφοῖς λόγῳ αὖ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν προπηλακίζομαι, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδείξω. λέγετε γάρ με, ἅπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ὡς ἠλίθιά τε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πραγματεύομαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ αὖ ἀναπεισθεὶς ὑπὸ ὑμῶν λέγω ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, ὡς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι λόγον εὖ καὶ καλῶς καταστησάμενον περαίνειν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὑπό τε ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀεί με ἐλέγχοντος πάντα κακὰ ἀκούω. καὶ γάρ μοι τυγχάνει ἐγγύτατα γένους ὢν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκῶν· ἐπειδὰν οὖν εἰσέλθω οἴκαδε εἰς ἐμαυτοῦ καί μου ἀκούσῃ ταῦτα λέγοντος, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τολμῶν περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω φανερῶς ἐξελεγχόμενος περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅτι οὐδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν οἶδα. καίτοι πῶς σὺ εἴσῃ, φησίν, ἢ λόγον ὅστις καλῶς κατεστήσατο ἢ μή, ἢ ἄλλην πρᾶξιν ἡντινοῦν, τὸ καλὸν ἀγνοῶν; καὶ ὁπότε οὕτω διάκεισαι, οἴει σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι; συμβέβηκε δή μοι, ὅπερ λέγω, κακῶς μὲν ὑπὸ ὑμῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὀνειδίζεσθαι, κακῶς δὲ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν ταῦτα πάντα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ ὠφελοίμην. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Ἱππία, ὠφελῆσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν ὁμιλίας· τὴν γὰρ παροιμίαν ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, τὸ χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, δοκῶ μοι εἰδέναι.