624a. Ath. To whom do you ascribe the authorship of your legal arrangements, Strangers? To a god or to some man?
624a. ΑΘ. θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως;
Clin. To a god, Stranger, most rightfully to a god. We Cretans call Zeus our lawgiver; while in Lacedaemon, where our friend here has his home, I believe they claim Apollo as theirs. Is not that so, Megillus?
ΚΛ. θεός, ὦ ξένε, θεός, ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν· παρὰ μὲν ἡμῖν Ζεύς, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅθεν ὅδε ἐστίν, οἶμαι φάναι τούτους Ἀπόλλωνα. ἦ γάρ;
Ath. Do you then, like Homer, say that Minos used to go every ninth year to hold converse with his father Zeus, and that he was guided by his divine oracles in laying down the laws for your cities?
ΑΘ. μῶν οὖν καθʼ Ὅμηρον λέγεις ὡς τοῦ Μίνω φοιτῶντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑκάστοτε συνουσίαν διʼ ἐνάτου ἔτους καὶ κατὰ τὰς παρʼ ἐκείνου φήμας ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους;
625. Clin. So our people say. And they say also that his brother Rhadamanthys,—no doubt you have heard the name,—was exceedingly just. And certainly we Cretans would maintain that he won this title owing to his righteous administration of justice in those days.
625. ΚΛ. λέγεται γὰρ οὕτω παρʼ ἡμῖν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν γε αὐτοῦ Ῥαδάμανθυν—ἀκούετε γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα—δικαιότατον γεγονέναι.
625a. Ath. Yes, his renown is indeed glorious and well befitting a son of Zeus. And, since you and our friend Megillus were both brought up in legal institutions of so noble a kind, you would, I imagine, have no aversion to our occupying ourselves as we go along in discussion on the subject of government and laws. Certainly, as I am told, the road from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is a long one, and we are sure to find, in this sultry weather, shady resting-places among the high trees along the road: in them we can rest ofttimes, as befits our age, beguiling the time with discourse, and thus complete our journey in comfort.
625a. τοῦτον οὖν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς γε οἱ Κρῆτες, ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν τὰ περὶ τὰς δίκας, ὀρθῶς τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι.ΑΘ. καὶ καλόν γε τὸ κλέος ὑεῖ τε Διὸς μάλα πρέπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τοιούτοις ἤθεσι τέθραφθε νομικοῖς σύ τε καὶ ὅδε, προσδοκῶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς περί τε πολιτείας τὰ νῦν καὶ νόμων τὴν διατριβήν, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἅμα κατὰ τὴν πορείαν, ποιήσασθαι.
625b. Clin. True, Stranger; and as one proceeds further one finds in the groves cypress-trees of wonderful height and beauty, and meadows too, where we may rest ourselves and talk. Ath. You say well.Clin. Yes, indeed: and when we set eyes on them we shall say so still more emphatically. So let us be going, and good luck attend us.Ath. Amen! And tell me now, for what reason did your law ordain the common meals you have, and your gymnastic schools and military equipment?Clin. Our Cretan customs, Stranger, are, as I think, such as anyone may grasp easily. As you may notice, Crete, as a whole, is not a level country, like Thessaly: consequently, whereas the Thessalians mostly go on horseback, we Cretans are runners, since this land of ours is rugged and more suitable for the practice of foot-running.
625b. πάντως δʼ ἥ γε ἐκ Κνωσοῦ ὁδὸς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον καὶ ἱερόν, ὡς ἀκούομεν, ἱκανή, καὶ ἀνάπαυλαι κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ὡς εἰκός, πνίγους ὄντος τὰ νῦν, ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς δένδρεσίν εἰσι σκιαραί, καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις πρέπον ἂν ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι πυκνὰ ἐν αὐταῖς, λόγοις τε ἀλλήλους παραμυθουμένους τὴν ὁδὸν ἅπασαν οὕτω μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης διαπερᾶναι.ΚΛ. καὶ μὴν ἔστιν γε, ὦ ξένε, προϊόντι κυπαρίττων τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλσεσιν ὕψη καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐν οἷσιν ἀναπαυόμενοι διατρίβοιμεν ἄν. ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἰδόντες δὲ μᾶλλον φήσομεν. ἀλλʼ ἴωμεν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.ΑΘ. ταῦτʼ εἴη. καί μοι λέγε· κατὰ τί τὰ συσσίτιά τε ὑμῖν συντέταχεν ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἕξιν;ΚΛ. οἶμαι μέν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ παντὶ ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι τά γε ἡμέτερα. τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς·
625d. Under these conditions we are obliged to have light armour for running and to avoid heavy equipment; so bows and arrows are adopted as suitable because of their lightness. Thus all these customs of ours are adapted for war, and, in my opinion, this was the object which the lawgiver had in view when he ordained them all.
625d. ἥδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῇ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὅπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βάρος ἔχοντα θεῖν· τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἁρμόττειν δοκεῖ. ταῦτʼ οὖν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῖν ἅπαντα ἐξήρτυται, καὶ πάνθʼ ὁ νομοθέτης, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων συνετάττετο·
625e. Probably this was his reason also for instituting common meals: he saw how soldiers, all the time they are on campaign, are obliged by force of circumstances to mess in common, for the sake of their own security. And herein, as I think, he condemned the stupidity of the mass of men in failing to perceive that all are involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war against all States.
625e. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ συσσίτια κινδυνεύει συναγαγεῖν, ὁρῶν ὡς πάντες ὁπόταν στρατεύωνται, τόθʼ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκάζονται φυλακῆς αὑτῶν ἕνεκα συσσιτεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον. ἄνοιαν δή μοι δοκεῖ καταγνῶναι τῶν πολλῶν ὡς οὐ μανθανόντων ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ πᾶσιν διὰ βίου συνεχής ἐστι πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις·
626. Clin. If, then, these practices are necessary in war,—namely, messing in common for safety’s sake, and the appointment of relays of officers and privates to act as guards,— they must be carried out equally in time of peace.
626. ΚΛ. εἰ δὴ πολέμου γε ὄντος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα δεῖ συσσιτεῖν καί τινας ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους διακεκοσμημένους εἶναι φύλακας αὐτῶν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δραστέον.
626a. For (as he would say) “peace,” as the term is commonly employed, is nothing more than a name, the truth being that every State is, by a law of nature, engaged perpetually in an informal war with every other State. And if you look at the matter from this point of view you will find it practically true that our Cretan lawgiver ordained all our legal usages, both public and private, with an eye to war, and that he therefore charged us with the task of guarding our laws safely, in the conviction that without victory in war nothing else, whether possession or institution, is of the least value, but all the goods of the vanquished fall into the hands of the victors.
626a. ἣν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτʼ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δʼ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις, οὕτω σκοπῶν, τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω φυλάττειν παρέδωκε τοὺς νόμους, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὂν οὔτε κτημάτων οὔτʼ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἂν μὴ τῷ πολέμῳ ἄρα κρατῇ τις, πάντα δὲ τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι.
626b. Ath. Your training, Stranger, has certainly, as it seems to me, given you an excellent understanding of the legal practices of Crete. But tell me this more clearly still: by the definition you have given of the well-constituted State you appear to me to imply that it ought to be organized in such a way as to be victorious in war over all other States.
626b. ΑΘ. καλῶς γε, ὦ ξένε, φαίνῃ μοι γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμιμα. τόδε δέ μοι φράζε ἔτι σαφέστερον· ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν οὕτω κεκοσμημένην οἰκεῖν δεῖν, ὥστε πολέμῳ νικᾶν τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις.
626c. Is that so?
626c. ἦ γάρ;
Clin. Certainly it is; and I think that our friend here shares my opinion.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῷδε οὕτω συνδοκεῖν.
Meg. No Lacedaemonian, my good sir, could possibly say otherwise.
ΜΕ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποκρίναιτο, ὦ θεῖε, Λακεδαιμονίων γε ὁστισοῦν;
Ath. If this, then, is the right attitude for a State to adopt towards a State, is the right attitude for village towards village different?
ΑΘ. πότερʼ οὖν δὴ πόλεσι μὲν πρὸς πόλεις ὀρθὸν τοῦτʼ ἐστί, κώμῃ δὲ πρὸς κώμην ἕτερον;
Clin. By no means.
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Ath. It is the same, you say?
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν;
Ath. Well then, is the same attitude right also for one house in the village towards another, and for each man towards every other?
ΑΘ. τί δέ; πρὸς οἰκίαν οἰκίᾳ τῶν ἐν τῇ κώμῃ, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα ἀνδρὶ ἑνὶ πρὸς ἕνα, ταὐτὸν ἔτι;
626d. Ath. And must each individual man regard himself as his own enemy? Or what do we say when we come to this point?
626d. ΑΘ. αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὑτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον; ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν;
Clin. O Stranger of Athens, for I should be loth to call you a man of Attica, since methinks you deserve rather to be named after the goddess Athena, seeing that you have made the argument more clear by taking it back again to its starting-point; whereby you will the more easily discover the justice of our recent statement that, in the mass, all men are both publicly and privately the enemies of all, and individually also each man is his own enemy.
ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε—οὐ γάρ σε Ἀττικὸν ἐθέλοιμʼ ἂν προσαγορεύειν· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νυνδὴ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς ἐρρήθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσιν δημοσίᾳ τε, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς.
626e. Ath. What is your meaning, my admirable sir?
626e. ΑΘ. πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε;
Clin. It is just in this war, my friend, that the victory over self is of all victories the first and best while self-defeat is of all defeats at once the worst and the most shameful. For these phrases signify that a war against self exists within each of us.
ΚΛ. κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.
627. Ath. Now let us take the argument back in the reverse direction. Seeing that individually each of us is partly superior to himself and partly inferior, are we to affirm that the same condition of things exists in house and village and State, or are we to deny it?
627. ΑΘ. πάλιν τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν κρείττων αὑτοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστί, πότερα φῶμεν οἰκίαν τε καὶ κώμην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐν αὑταῖς ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;
627a. Clin. Do you mean the condition of being partly self-superior and partly self-inferior?
627a. ΚΛ. τὸ κρείττω τε ἑαυτῆς εἶναι λέγεις τινά, τὴν δʼ ἥττω;
Clin. That, too, is a proper question; for such a condition does most certainly exist, and in States above all. Every State in which the better class is victorious over the populace and the lower classes would rightly be termed “self-superior,” and would be praised most justly for a victory of this kind; and conversely, when the reverse is the case.
ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἤρου· πάνυ γὰρ ἔστι καὶ σφόδρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. ἐν ὁπόσαις μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἀμείνονες νικῶσιν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς χείρους, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὕτη κρείττων τε ἑαυτῆς λέγοιθʼ ἡ πόλις, ἐπαινοῖτό τε ἂν δικαιότατα τῇ τοιαύτῃ νίκῃ· τοὐναντίον δέ, ὅπου τἀναντία.
627b. Ath. Well then, leaving aside the question as to whether the worse element is ever superior to the better (a question which would demand a more lengthy discussion), what you assert, as I now perceive, is this,—that sometimes citizens of one stock and of one State who are unjust and numerous may combine together and try to enslave by force those who are just but fewer in number, and wherever they prevail such a State would rightly be termed “self-inferior” and bad, but “self-superior” and good wherever they are worsted.
627b. ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν εἴ ποτέ ἐστίν που τὸ χεῖρον κρεῖττον τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐάσωμεν—μακροτέρου γὰρ λόγου—τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενον μανθάνω νῦν, ὥς ποτε πολῖται, συγγενεῖς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως γεγονότες, ἄδικοι καὶ πολλοὶ συνελθόντες, δικαίους ἐλάττους ὄντας βιάσονται δουλούμενοι, καὶ ὅταν μὲν κρατήσωσιν, ἥττων ἡ πόλις αὑτῆς ὀρθῶς αὕτη λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἅμα καὶ κακή, ὅπου δʼ ἂν ἡττῶνται, κρείττων τε καὶ ἀγαθή.
627c. Clin. This statement is indeed most extraordinary, Stranger; none the less we cannot possibly reject it.
627c. ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον· ὅμως δὲ ὁμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγκαιότατον.
Ath. Stay a moment: here too is a case we must further consider. Suppose there were a number of brothers, all sons of the same parents, it would not be at all surprising if most of them were unjust and but few just.
ΑΘ. ἔχε δή. καὶ τόδε πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα· πολλοὶ ἀδελφοί που γένοιντʼ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρός τε καὶ μιᾶς ὑεῖς, καὶ δὴ καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς πλείους μὲν ἀδίκους αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἐλάττους δικαίους.
Clin. It would not.
ΚΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Ath. And, moreover, it would ill beseem you and me to go a-chasing after this form of expression, that if the bad ones conquered the whole of this family and house should be called “self-inferior,” but “self-superior” if they were defeated; for our present reference to the usage of ordinary speech is not concerned with the propriety or impropriety of verbal phrases but with the essential rightness or wrongness of laws.
ΑΘ. καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γε πρέπον ἐμοί τε καὶ ὑμῖν τοῦτο θηρεύειν, ὅτι νικώντων μὲν τῶν πονηρῶν ἥ τε οἰκία καὶ ἡ συγγένεια αὕτη πᾶσα ἥττων αὑτῆς λέγοιτʼ ἄν, κρείττων δὲ ἡττωμένων·
627d. Clin. Very true, Stranger.Meg. And finely spoken, too, up to this point, as I agree.Ath. Let us also look at this point: the brothers we have just described would have, I suppose, a judge?Clin. Certainly.Ath. Which of the two would be the better—a judge who destroyed all the wicked among them and charged the good to govern themselves, or one who made the good members govern and, while allowing the bad to live, made them submit willingly to be governed?
627d. οὐ γὰρ εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης ῥημάτων ἕνεκα τὰ νῦν σκοπούμεθα πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον, ἀλλʼ ὀρθότητός τε καὶ ἁμαρτίας πέρι νόμων, ἥτις ποτʼ ἐστὶν φύσει.ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις.ΜΕ. καλῶς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε ἐμοὶ συνδοκεῖν, τό γε τοσοῦτον, τὰ νῦν.ΑΘ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε· τούτοις τοῖς ἄρτι λεγομένοις ἀδελφοῖς γένοιτʼ ἄν πού τις δικαστής;ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.ΑΘ. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων, ὅστις τοὺς μὲν ἀπολέσειεν αὐτῶν ὅσοι κακοί, τοὺς δὲ βελτίους ἄρχειν αὐτοὺς αὑτῶν προστάξειεν, ἢ ὅδε ὃς ἂν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἄρχειν, τοὺς χείρους δʼ ἐάσας ζῆν ἄρχεσθαι ἑκόντας ποιήσειεν;
628. Ath. And there is a third judge we must mention (third and best in point of merit),—if indeed such a judge can be found,— who in dealing with a single divided family will destroy none of them but reconcile them and succeed, by enacting laws for them, in securing amongst them thenceforward permanent friendliness.
628. ΑΘ. τρίτον δέ που δικαστὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἴπωμεν, εἴ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ὅστις παραλαβὼν συγγένειαν μίαν διαφερομένην, μήτε ἀπολέσειεν μηδένα, διαλλάξας δὲ εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον, νόμους αὐτοῖς θείς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους παραφυλάττειν δύναιτο ὥστε εἶναι φίλους.
628a. Clin. A judge and lawgiver of that kind would be by far the best.
628a. ΚΛ. μακρῷ ἀμείνων γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής τε καὶ νομοθέτης.
Ath. But mark this: his aim, in the laws he enacted for them, would be the opposite of war.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν τοὐναντίον γε ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον ἂν βλέπων αὐτοῖς τοὺς νόμους διανομοθετοῖ.
Clin. That is true.
ΚΛ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.
Ath. And what of him who brings the State into harmony? In ordering its life would he have regard to external warfare rather than to the internal war, whenever it occurs, which goes by the name of “civil” strife?
ΑΘ. τί δʼ ὁ τὴν πόλιν συναρμόττων; πρὸς πόλεμον αὐτῆς ἂν τὸν ἔξωθεν βλέπων τὸν βίον κοσμοῖ μᾶλλον, ἢ πρὸς πόλεμον τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε, ἣ δὴ καλεῖται στάσις;
628b. For this is a war as to which it would be the desire of every man that, if possible, it should never occur in his own State, and that, if it did occur, it should come to as speedy an end as possible.
628b. ὃν μάλιστα μὲν ἅπας ἂν βούλοιτο μήτε γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ πόλει γενόμενόν τε ὡς τάχιστα ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
Clin. Evidently he would have regard to civil war.
ΚΛ. δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τοῦτον.
Ath. And would anyone prefer that the citizens should be obliged to devote their attention to external enemies after internal concord had been secured by the destruction of one section and the victory of their opponents rather than after the establishment of friendship and peace by terms of conciliation?
ΑΘ. πότερα δὲ ἀπολομένων αὖ τῶν ἑτέρων εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως γενέσθαι, νικησάντων δὲ ποτέρων, δέξαιτʼ ἄν τις, μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίας τε καὶ εἰρήνης ὑπὸ διαλλαγῶν γενομένης, οὕτω τοῖς ἔξωθεν πολεμίοις προσέχειν ἀνάγκην εἶναι τὸν νοῦν;
628c. Clin. Everyone would prefer the latter alternative for his own State rather than the former.
628c. ΚΛ. οὕτω πᾶς ἂν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἢ ʼκείνως περὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλιν.
Ath. And would not the lawgiver do the same?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ νομοθέτης ὡσαύτως;
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
Ath. Would not every lawgiver in all his legislation aim at the highest good?
ΑΘ. ἆρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα ἂν τὰ νόμιμα τιθείη πᾶς;
Clin. Assuredly.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Ath. The highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife—which things we should pray rather to be saved from—but peace one with another and friendly feeling. Moreover, it would seem that the victory we mentioned of a State over itself is not one of the best things but one of those which are necessary.
ΑΘ. τό γε μὴν ἄριστον οὔτε ὁ πόλεμος οὔτε ἡ στάσις, ἀπευκτὸν δὲ τὸ δεηθῆναι τούτων, εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νικᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν αὑτὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἀρίστων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων·
628d. For imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and aged with physic, while never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all! Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will never make genuine statesman who pays attention primarily solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war.
628d. ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ κάμνον σῶμα ἰατρικῆς καθάρσεως τυχὸν ἡγοῖτό τις ἄριστα πράττειν τότε, τῷ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδὲ προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτου διανοούμενος οὕτω τις οὔτʼ ἄν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο ὀρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὔτʼ ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης.
628e. Clin. This statement, Stranger, is apparently true; yet, unless I am much mistaken, our legal usages in Crete, and in Lacedaemon too, are wholly acted towards war. Ath. Very possibly; but we must not now attack them violently, but mildly interrogate them, since both we and your legislators are earnestly interested in these matters.
628e. ΚΛ. φαίνεται μέν πως ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς εἰρῆσθαι, θαυμάζω γε μὴν εἰ τά τε παρʼ ἡμῖν νόμιμα καὶ ἔτι τὰ περὶ Λακεδαίμονα μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν τούτων ἕνεκα πεποίηται.
629a. Pray follow the argument closely. Let us take the opinion of Tyrtaeus (an Athenian by birth and afterwards a citizen of Lacedaemon), above all men, was keenly interested in our subject. This is what he says:Though a man were the richest of men, though a man possessed goods in plenty (and he specifies nearly every good there is), if he failed to prove himself at all times most valiant in war, no mention should I make of nor take account of him at all.
629a. ΑΘ. τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως· δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν σκληρῶς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς διαμάχεσθαι τὰ νῦν ἀλλʼ ἠρέμα ἀνερωτᾶν, ὡς μάλιστα περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων σπουδαζόντων. καί μοι τῷ λόγῳ συνακολουθήσατε. προστησώμεθα γοῦν Τύρταιον, τὸν φύσει μὲν Ἀθηναῖον, τῶνδε δὲ πολίτην γενόμενον, ὃς δὴ μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπούδακεν εἰπὼν ὅτι—οὔτʼ ἂν μνησαίμην οὔτʼ ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην οὔτʼ εἴ τις πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἴη, φησίν, οὔτʼ εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, ὃς μὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄριστος γίγνοιτʼ ἀεί.
629b. No doubt you also have heard these poems; while our friend Megillus is, I imagine, surfeited with them.
629b. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀκήκοάς που καὶ σὺ τὰ ποιήματα· ὅδε μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διακορὴς αὐτῶν ἐστι.
Meg. I certainly am.
ΜΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Clin. And I can assure you they have reached Crete also, shipped over from Lacedaemon.
ΚΛ. καὶ μὴν καὶ παρʼ ἡμᾶς ἐλήλυθε κομισθέντα ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος.
Ath. Come now, let us jointly interrogate this poet somehow on this wise:
ΑΘ. ἴθι νυν ἀνερώμεθα κοινῇ τουτονὶ τὸν ποιητὴν οὑτωσί πως· ὦ Τύρταιε, ποιητὰ θειότατε—δοκεῖς γὰρ δὴ σοφὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθός, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διαφέροντας διαφερόντως ἐγκεκωμίακας—ἤδη οὖν τυγχάνομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε καὶ Κλεινίας ὁ Κνώσιος οὑτοσὶ συμφερόμενοί σοι περὶ τούτου σφόδρα, ὡς δοκοῦμεν·
629c. “O Tyrtaeus, most inspired of poets (for assuredly you seem to us both wise and good in that you have eulogized excellently those who excel in war), concerning this matter we three Megillus, Clinias of Cnosus and myself are already in entire accord with you, as we suppose; but we wish to be assured that both we and you are alluding to the same persons. Tell us then: do you clearly recognize, as we do, two distinct kinds of war?” In reply to this I suppose that even a much less able man than Tyrtaeus would state the truth, that there are two kinds, the one being that which we all call “civil,” which is of all wars the most bitter, as we said just now, while the other kind, as I suppose we shall all agree, is that which we engage in when we quarrel with foreigners and aliens—a kind much milder than the former.
629c. εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀνδρῶν ἢ μή, βουλόμεθα σαφῶς εἰδέναι. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν· ἆρα εἴδη δύο πολέμου καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἡγῇ καὶ σὺ σαφῶς; ἢ πῶς; πρὸς ταῦτʼ οἶμαι κἂν πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴποι Τυρταίου τις τἀληθές, ὅτι δύο, τὸ μὲν ὃ καλοῦμεν ἅπαντες στάσιν, ὃς δὴ πάντων πολέμων χαλεπώτατος, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡμεῖς νυνδή·
629d. Clin. Certainly.Ath. Come, then, which kind of warriors, fighting in which kind of war, did you praise so highly, while blaming others? Warriors, apparently, who fight in war abroad. At any rate, in your poems you have said that you cannot abide men who dare notface the gory frayand smite the foe in close combat.Then we should proceed to say, “It appears, O Tyrtaeus, that you are chiefly praising those who achieve distinction in foreign and external warfare.” To this, I presume, he would agree, and say “Yes”?
629d. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πολέμου θήσομεν οἶμαι γένος ἅπαντες ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός τε καὶ ἀλλοφύλους χρώμεθα διαφερόμενοι, πολὺ πρᾳότερον ἐκείνου.ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΑΘ. φέρε δή, ποτέρους, καὶ πρὸς πότερον ἐπαινῶν τὸν πόλεμον, οὕτως ὑπερεπῄνεσας, τοὺς δὲ ἔψεξας τῶν ἀνδρῶν; ἔοικας μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός· εἴρηκας γοῦν ὧδε ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν, ὡς οὐδαμῶς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνεχόμενος, οἳ μὴ τολμήσωσιν μὲνὁρᾶν φόνον αἱματόεντα,καὶ δηίων ὀρέγοιντʼ ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι. οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα εἴποιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ὡς ἔοικας, ὦ Τύρταιε, μάλιστα τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν πόλεμον γιγνομένους ἐπιφανεῖς. φαίη ταῦτʼ ἄν που καὶ ὁμολογοῖ; ΚΛ. τί μήν;
630a. Clin. Of course.Ath. Yet, brave though these men are, we still maintain that they are far surpassed in bravery by those who are conspicuously brave in the greatest of wars; and we also have a poet for witness,—Theognis (a citizen of Sicilian Megara), who says:In the day of grievous feud, O Cyrnus, the loyal warrior is worth his weight in silver and gold.Such a man, in a war much more grievous, is, we say, ever so much better than the other—nearly as much better, in fact, as the union of justice, prudence and wisdom with courage is better than courage by itself alone.
630a. ΑΘ. ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τούτων ἔτι φαμὲν ἀμείνους εἶναι καὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ πολέμῳ γιγνομένους ἀρίστους διαφανῶς· ποιητὴν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς μάρτυρʼ ἔχομεν, Θέογνιν, πολίτην τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Μεγαρέων, ὅς φησιν—πιστὸς ἀνὴρ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀντερύσασθαιἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ, Κύρνε, διχοστασίῃ.τοῦτον δή φαμεν ἐν πολέμῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ ἀμείνονα ἐκείνου πάμπολυ γίγνεσθαι, σχεδὸν ὅσον ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθοῦσαι μετʼ ἀνδρείας, αὐτῆς μόνης ἀνδρείας.
630b. For a man would never prove himself a loyal and sound in civil war if devoid of goodness in its entirety; whereas in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks there are vast numbers of mercenaries ready to die fightingwith well-planted feet apart,of whom the majority, with but few exceptions, prove themselves reckless, unjust, violent, and pre-eminently foolish. What, then, is the conclusion to which our present discourse is tending, and what point is it trying to make clear by these statements? Plainly it is this: both the Heaven-taught legislator of Crete and every legislator who is worth his salt will most assuredly legislate always with a single eye to the highest goodness and to that alone; and this (to quote Theognis) consists inloyalty in danger,and one might term it “complete righteousness.”
630b. πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσεσιν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄνευ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς· διαβάντες δʼ εὖ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐθέλοντες ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐν ᾧ πολέμῳ φράζει Τύρταιος τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰσὶν πάμπολλοι, ὧν οἱ πλεῖστοι γίγνονται θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων, ἐκτὸς δή τινων εὖ μάλα ὀλίγων. ποῖ δὴ τελευτᾷ νῦν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί φανερόν ποτε ποιῆσαι βουληθεὶς λέγει ταῦτα;
630c. But that goodness which Tyrtaeus specially praised, fair though it be and fitly glorified by the poet, deserves nevertheless to be placed no higher than fourth in order and estimation.
630c. δῆλον ὅτι τόδε, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ὁ τῇδε παρὰ Διὸς νομοθέτης, πᾶς τε οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους· ἔστι δέ, ὥς φησιν Θέογνις, αὕτη πιστότης ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἥν τις δικαιοσύνην ἂν τελέαν ὀνομάσειεν. ἣν δʼ αὖ Τύρταιος ἐπῄνεσεν μάλιστα, καλὴ μὲν καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν κεκοσμημένη τῷ ποιητῇ, τετάρτη μέντοι ὅμως ἀριθμῷ τε καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ τιμία εἶναι λέγοιτʼ ἂν ὀρθότατα.
Clin. We are degrading our own lawgiver, Stranger, to a very low level!
ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, τὸν νομοθέτην ἡμῶν ἀποβάλλομεν εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας.
Ath. Nay, my good Sir, it is ourselves we are degrading, in so far as we imagine that it was with a special view to war that Lycurgus and Minos laid down all the legal usages here and in Lacedaemon.
ΑΘ. οὐχ ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ ἄριστε, ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, ὅταν οἰώμεθα πάντα τά τʼ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ τὰ τῇδε πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα βλέποντας Λυκοῦργόν τε καὶ Μίνω τίθεσθαι τὰ νόμιμα.
Clin. How, then, ought we to have stated the matter?
ΚΛ. τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;
Ath. In the way that is, as I think, true and proper when talking of a divine hero. That is to say, we should state that he enacted laws with an eye not to some one fraction, and that the most paltry, of goodness, but to goodness as a whole, and that he devised the laws themselves according to classes, though not the classes which the present devisers propound.
ΑΘ. ὥσπερ τό τε ἀληθὲς οἶμαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπέρ γε θείας διαλεγομένους λέγειν, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον, ἐτίθει βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, καὶ κατʼ εἴδη ζητεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς νόμους οὐδʼ ἅπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἴδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν.
631. Ath. For everyone now brings forward and devises just the class which he needs: one man deals with inheritances and heiresses, another with cases of battery, and so on in endless variety.
631. ΑΘ. οὗ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος, ὁ μὲν τὰ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ὁ δὲ τῆς αἰκίας πέρι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλʼ ἄττα μυρία τοιαῦτα· ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ περὶ νόμους ζήτημα τῶν εὖ ζητούντων ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἠρξάμεθα.
631a. But what we assert is that the devising of laws, when rightly conducted, follows the procedure which we have now commenced. Indeed, I greatly admire the way you opened your exposition of the laws; for to make a start with goodness and say that that was the aim of the lawgiver is the right way. But in your further statement that he legislated wholly with reference to a fraction of goodness, and that the smallest fraction, you seemed to me to be in error, and all this latter part of my discourse was because of that. What then is the manner of exposition I should have liked to have heard from you?
631a. καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν τῆς ἐξηγήσεως περὶ τοὺς νόμους παντάπασιν ἄγαμαι· τὸ γὰρ ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς ἄρχεσθαι, λέγοντα ὡς ἐτίθει ταύτης ἕνεκα τοὺς νόμους, ὀρθόν· ὅτι δὲ πάντα εἰς μόριον ἀρετῆς, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ σμικρότατον, ἐπαναφέροντα ἔφησθʼ αὐτὸν νομοθετεῖν, οὔτε ὀρθῶς ἔτι μοι κατεφάνης λέγων τόν τε ὕστερον νῦν λόγον τοῦτον πάντα εἴρηκα διὰ ταῦτα. πῇ δὴ οὖν σε ἔτʼ ἂν ἐβουλόμην διελόμενον λέγειν αὐτός τε ἀκούειν;
631b. Shall I tell you?
631b. βούλει σοι φράζω;
Clin. Yes, by all means.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ath. “O Stranger” (thus you ought to have said), “it is not for nothing that the laws of the Cretans are held in superlatively high repute among all the Hellenes. For they are true laws inasmuch as they effect the well-being of those who use them by supplying all that are good. Now goods are of two kinds, human and divine; and the human goods are dependent on the divine, and he who receives the greater acquires also the less, or else he is bereft of both.
ΑΘ. ὦ ξένε, ἐχρῆν εἰπεῖν, οἱ Κρητῶν νόμοι οὐκ εἰσὶν μάτην διαφερόντως ἐν πᾶσιν εὐδόκιμοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἔχουσιν γὰρ ὀρθῶς, τοὺς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους εὐδαίμονας ἀποτελοῦντες. πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ πορίζουσιν. διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα· ἤρτηται δʼ ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηταί τις τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα, εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν.
631c. The lesser goods are those of which health ranks first, beauty second; the third is strength, in running and all other bodily exercises; and the fourth is wealth—no blind god Plutus, but keen of sight, provided that he has wisdom for companion. And wisdom, in turn, has first place among the goods that are divine, and rational temperance of soul comes second; from these two, when united with courage, there issues justice, as the third;
631c. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται μὲν ὑγίεια, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ δὴ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλὸς ἀλλʼ ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἄνπερ ἅμʼ ἕπηται φρονήσει· ὃ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦ σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετʼ ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία.
631d. and the fourth is courage. Now all these are by nature ranked before the human goods, and verily the law-giver also must so rank them. Next, it must be proclaimed to the citizens that all the other instructions they receive have these in view; and that, of these goods themselves, the human look up to the divine, and the divine to reason as their chief. And in regard to their marriage connections, and to their subsequent breeding and rearing of children, male and female, both during youth and in later life up to old age, the lawgiver must supervise the citizens, duly apportioning honor and dishonor;”
631d. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκείνων ἔμπροσθεν τέτακται φύσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τακτέον οὕτως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλεπούσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστέον, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα εἰς τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν σύμπαντα βλέπειν· περί τε γάμους ἀλλήλοις ἐπικοινουμένους, μετά τε ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς τῶν παίδων γεννήσεσιν καὶ τροφαῖς ὅσοι τε ἄρρενες καὶ ὅσαι θήλειαι, νέων τε ὄντων καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἰόντων μέχρι γήρως, τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα,
632. Ath. “and in regard to all their forms of intercourse he must observe and watch their pains and pleasures and desires and all intense passions, and distribute praise and blame correctly by the means of the laws themselves.
632. ΑΘ. ἐν πάσαις ταῖς τούτων ὁμιλίαις τάς τε λύπας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας συμπάντων τε ἐρώτων τὰς σπουδὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον καὶ παραπεφυλαχότα, ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων·
632a. Moreover, in the matter of anger and of fear, and of all the disturbances which befall souls owing to misfortune, and of all the avoidances thereof which occur in good-fortune, and of all the experiences which confront men through disease or war or penury or their opposites,— in regard to all these definite instruction must be given as to what is the right and what the wrong disposition in each case.
632a. ἐν ὀργαῖς τε αὖ καὶ ἐν φόβοις, ὅσαι τε διὰ δυστυχίαν ταραχαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐν εὐτυχίαις τῶν τοιούτων ἀποφυγαί, ὅσα τε κατὰ νόσους ἢ κατὰ πολέμους ἢ πενίας ἢ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία γιγνόμενα προσπίπτει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παθήματα, ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῆς ἑκάστων διαθέσεως διδακτέον καὶ ὁριστέον τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή.
632b. It is necessary, in the next place, for the law-giver to keep a watch on the methods employed by the citizens in gaining and spending money, and to supervise the associations they form with one another, and the dissolutions thereof, whether they be voluntary or under compulsion; he must observe the manner in which they conduct each of these mutual transactions, and note where justice obtains and where it is lacking. To those that are obedient he must assign honors by law, but on the disobedient he must impose duly appointed penalties.
632b. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη τὸν νομοθέτην τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα φυλάττειν ὅντινʼ ἂν γίγνηται τρόπον, καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πᾶσιν τούτοις κοινωνίας καὶ διαλύσεις ἑκοῦσίν τε καὶ ἄκουσιν καθʼ ὁποῖον ἂν ἕκαστον πράττωσιν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπισκοπεῖν, τό τε δίκαιον καὶ μὴ ἐν οἷς ἔστιν τε καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐλλείπει, καὶ τοῖς μὲν εὐπειθέσιν τῶν νόμων τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν, τοῖς δὲ δυσπειθέσι δίκας τακτὰς ἐπιτιθέναι, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τέλος ἁπάσης πολιτείας ἐπεξελθών, ἴδῃ τῶν τελευτησάντων τίνα δεῖ τρόπον ἑκάστοις γίγνεσθαι τὰς ταφὰς καὶ τιμὰς ἅστινας αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμειν δεῖ·
632c. Then finally, when he arrives at the completion of the whole constitution, he has to consider in what manner in each case the burial of the dead should be carried out, and what honors should be assigned to them. This being settled, the framer of the laws will hand over all his statutes to the charge of Wardens—guided some by wisdom, others by true opinion—to the end that Reason, having bound all into one single system, may declare them to be ancillary neither to wealth nor ambition, but to temperance and justice.”
632c. κατιδὼν δὲ ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ διʼ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσας ὁ νοῦς ἑπόμενα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀποφήνῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλούτῳ μηδὲ φιλοτιμίᾳ.
632d. In this manner, Strangers, I could have wished (and I wish it still) that you had fully explained how all these regulations are inherent in the reputed laws of Zeus and in those of the Pythian Apollo which were ordained by Minos and Lycurgus, and how their systematic arrangement is quite evident to him who, whether by art or practice, is an expert in law, although it is by no means obvious to the rest of us.
632d. οὕτως, ὦ ξένοι, ἔγωγε ἤθελον ἂν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἔτι νῦν βούλομαι διεξελθεῖν πῶς ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Διὸς λεγομένοις νόμοις τοῖς τε τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος, οὓς Μίνως τε καὶ Λυκοῦργος ἐθέτην, ἔνεστίν τε πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ ὅπῃ τάξιν τινὰ εἰληφότα διάδηλά ἐστιν τῷ περὶ νόμων ἐμπείρῳ τέχνῃ εἴτε καί τισιν ἔθεσιν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐδαμῶς ἐστι καταφανῆ.
Clin. What then, Stranger, should be the next step in our argument?
ΚΛ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ ξένε, λέγειν χρὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα;
Ath. We ought, as I think, to do as we did at first— start from the beginning to explain first the institutions which have to do with courage; and after that we shall, if you wish, deal with a second and a third form of goodness.
ΑΘ. ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ χρῆναι διεξελθεῖν, καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας πρῶτον ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἔπειτα ἕτερον καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς διέξιμεν, ἐὰν βούλησθε·
632e. And as soon as we have completed our treatment of the first theme, we shall take that as our model and by a discussion of the rest on similar lines beguile the way; and at the end of our treatment of goodness in all its forms we shall make it clear, if God will, that the rules we discussed just now had goodness for their aim.
632e. ὅπως δʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διεξέλθωμεν, πειρασώμεθα αὐτὸ παράδειγμα θέμενοι καὶ τἆλλʼ οὕτω διαμυθολογοῦντες παραμύθια ποιήσασθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ, ὕστερον δὲ ἀρετῆς πάσης ἅ γε νυνδὴ διήλθομεν ἐκεῖσε βλέποντα ἀποφανοῦμεν, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
633a. Meg. A good suggestion! And begin with our friend here, the panegyrist of Zeus—try first to put him to the test.
633a. ΜΕ. καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ πειρῶ πρῶτον κρίνειν τὸν τοῦ Διὸς ἐπαινέτην τόνδε ἡμῖν.
Ath. Try I will, and to test you too and myself; for the argument concerns us all alike. Tell me then: do we assert that the common meals and the gymnasia were devised by the lawgiver with a view to war?
ΑΘ. πειράσομαι, καὶ σέ τε καὶ ἐμαυτόν· κοινὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος. λέγετε οὖν· τὰ συσσίτιά φαμεν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐξηυρῆσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ;
Ath. And is there a third institution of the kind, and a fourth? For probably one ought to employ this method of enumeration also in dealing with the subdivisions (or whatever we ought to call them) of the other forms of goodness, if only one makes oneÕs meaning clear.
ΑΘ. καὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὕτω χρείη διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἅττʼ αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι, δηλοῦντα μόνον ἃ λέγει.
633b. Meg. The third thing he devised was hunting: so I and every Lacedaemonian would say.
633b. ΜΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν, ἔγωγʼ εἴποιμʼ ἂν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁστισοῦν, τὴν θήραν ηὗρε.
Ath. Let us attempt also to state what comes fourth,—and fifth too, if possible.
ΑΘ. τέταρτον δέ, ἢ πέμπτον εἰ δυναίμεθα, λέγειν πειρώμεθα.
Meg. The fourth also I may attempt to state: it is the training, widely prevalent amongst us, in hardy endurance of pain, by means both of manual contests and of robberies carried out every time at the risk of a sound drubbing; moreover, the “Crypteia,” as it is called, affords a wonderfully severe training in hardihood, as the men go bare-foot in winter and sleep without coverlets and have no attendants, but wait on themselves and rove through the whole countryside both by night and by day.
ΜΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἔγωγε πειρῴμην ἂν λέγειν, τὸ περὶ τὰς καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδόνων πολὺ παρʼ ἡμῖν γιγνόμενον, ἔν τε ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταῖς χερσὶ μάχαις καὶ ἐν ἁρπαγαῖς τισιν διὰ πολλῶν πληγῶν ἑκάστοτε γιγνομένων· ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρυπτεία τις ὀνομάζεται θαυμαστῶς πολύπονος πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, χειμώνων τε ἀνυποδησίαι καὶ ἀστρωσίαι καὶ ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν διακονήσεις νύκτωρ τε πλανωμένων διὰ πάσης τῆς χώρας καὶ μεθʼ ἡμέραν.
633c. Moreover in our games, we have severe tests of endurance, when men unclad do battle with the violence of the heat,—and there are other instances so numerous that the recital of them would be well-nigh endless.
633c. ἔτι δὲ κἀν ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις δειναὶ καρτερήσεις παρʼ ἡμῖν γίγνονται τῇ τοῦ πνίγους ῥώμῃ διαμαχομένων, καὶ πάμπολλα ἕτερα, σχεδὸν ὅσα οὐκ ἂν παύσαιτό τις ἑκάστοτε διεξιών.
Ath. Splendid, O Stranger of Lacedaemon! But come now, as to courage, how shall we define it? Shall we define it quite simply as battling against fears and pains only, or as against desires also and pleasures, with their dangerous enticements and flatteries, which melt men’s hearts like wax—even men most reverenced in their own conceit.
ΑΘ. εὖ γε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, λέγεις. τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ, φέρε, τί θῶμεν; πότερον ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἶναι πρὸς φόβους καὶ λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἡδονὰς καί τινας δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς, αἳ καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν οἰομένων εἶναι τοὺς θυμοὺς ποιοῦσιν κηρίνους.
633d. Meg. The latter definition is, I think, the right one: courage is battling against them all.
633d. ΜΕ. οἶμαι μὲν οὕτω· πρὸς ταῦτα σύμπαντα.
Ath. Earlier in our discourse (if I am not mistaken) Clinias here used the expression “self-inferior” of a State or an individual: did you not do so, O Stranger of Cnosus?
ΑΘ. εἰ γοῦν μεμνήμεθα τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους, ἥττω τινὰ ὅδε καὶ πόλιν ἔλεγεν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς καὶ ἄνδρα. ἦ γάρ, ὦ ξένε Κνώσιε;
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
633e. Ath. At present do we apply the term “bad” to the man who is inferior to pains, or to him also who is inferior to pleasures?
633e. ΑΘ. νῦν οὖν πότερα λέγομεν τὸν τῶν λυπῶν ἥττω κακὸν ἢ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν;
Clin. To the man who is inferior to pleasures more than to the other, in my opinion. All of us, indeed, when we speak of a man who is shamefully self-inferior, mean one who is mastered by pleasures rather than one who is mastered by pains.
ΚΛ. μᾶλλον, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν· καὶ πάντες που μᾶλλον λέγομεν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρατούμενον τοῦτον τὸν ἐπονειδίστως ἥττονα ἑαυτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λυπῶν.
634a. Ath. Then surely the lawgiver of Zeus and he of Apollo did not enact by law a lame kind of courage, able only to defend itself on the left and unable to resist attractions and allurements on the right, but rather one able to resist on both sides?
634a. ΑΘ. ὁ Διὸς οὖν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πυθικὸς νομοθέτης οὐ δήπου χωλὴν τὴν ἀνδρείαν νενομοθετήκατον, πρὸς τἀριστερὰ μόνον δυναμένην ἀντιβαίνειν, πρὸς τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κομψὰ καὶ θωπευτικὰ ἀδυνατοῦσαν; ἢ πρὸς ἀμφότερα;
Clin. On both sides, as I would maintain.
ΚΛ. πρὸς ἀμφότερα ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ.
Ath. Let us, then, mention once more the State institutions in both your countries which give men a taste of pleasures instead of shunning them,—just as they did not shun pains but plunged their citizens into the midst of them and so compelled them, or induced them by rewards, to master them.
ΑΘ. λέγωμεν τοίνυν πάλιν ἐπιτηδεύματα ποῖα ἔσθʼ ὑμῖν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ γεύοντα τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐ φεύγοντα αὐτάς, καθάπερ τὰς λύπας οὐκ ἔφευγεν, ἀλλʼ ἄγοντα εἰς μέσας, ἠνάγκαζε καὶ ἔπειθεν τιμαῖς ὥστε κρατεῖν αὐτῶν;
634b. Where, pray, in your laws is the same policy adopted in regard to pleasures? Let us declare what regulation of yours there is which causes the same men to be courageous toward pains and pleasures alike, conquering where they ought to conquer and in no wise worsted by their nearest and most dangerous enemies.
634b. ποῦ δὴ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ταὐτὸν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς συντεταγμένον ἐν τοῖς νόμοις; λεγέσθω τί τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὃ καὶ ἀπεργάζεται ὑμῖν ὁμοίως πρός τε ἀλγηδόνας καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνδρείους, νικῶντάς τε ἃ δεῖ νικᾶν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἥττους πολεμίων τῶν ἐγγύτατα ἑαυτῶν καὶ χαλεπωτάτων.
Meg. Although, Stranger, I was able to mention a number of laws that dealt with mastery over pains, in the case of pleasures I may not find it equally easy to produce important and conspicuous examples;
ΜΕ. οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, καθάπερ πρὸς τὰς ἀλγηδόνας εἶχον νόμους ἀντιτεταγμένους πολλοὺς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἴσως εὐποροίην κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη καὶ διαφανῆ λέγων περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν·
634c. but I might perhaps furnish some minor instances.Clin. Neither could I in like manner give myself clear examples from the Cretan laws.Ath. And no wonder, my most excellent friends. If then, in his desire to discover what is true and superlatively good, any one of us should find fault with any domestic law of his neighbors, let us take one another’s remarks in good part and without resentment.
634c. κατὰ δὲ σμικρὰ ἴσως εὐποροίην ἄν.ΚΛ. οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Κρήτην νόμοις ἔχοιμι ἐμφανὲς ὁμοίως ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον.ΑΘ. ὦ ἄριστοι ξένων, καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν. ἀλλʼ ἂν ἄρα τις ἡμῶν περὶ τοὺς ἑκάστων οἴκοι νόμους ψέξῃ τι, βουλόμενος ἰδεῖν τό τε ἀληθὲς ἅμα καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ χαλεπῶς ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἀποδεχώμεθα ἀλλήλων.ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, εἴρηκας, καὶ πειστέον.
634d. Clin. You are right, Stranger: that is what we must do.Ath. Yes, for resentment would ill become men of our years.Clin. Ill indeed.Ath. Whether men are right or wrong in their censures of the Laconian polity and the Cretan—that is another story; anyhow, what is actually said by most men I, probably, am in a better position to state than either of you. For in your case (your laws being wisely framed) one of the best of your laws will be that which enjoins that none of the youth shall inquire which laws are wrong and which right, but all shall declare in unison, with one mouth and one voice, that all are rightly established by divine enactment, and shall turn a deaf ear to anyone who says otherwise; and further, that if any old man has any stricture to pass on any of your laws, he must not utter such views in the presence of any young man, but before a magistrate or one of his own age.
634d. ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, τηλικοῖσδε ἀνδράσιν πρέποι τὸ τοιοῦτον.ΚΛ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.ΑΘ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ἢ μή τις ἐπιτιμᾷ τῇ τε Λακωνικῇ καὶ τῇ Κρητικῇ πολιτείᾳ, λόγος ἂν ἕτερος εἴη· τὰ δʼ οὖν λεγόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἔχοιμʼ ἂν ὑμῶν ἀμφοτέρων λέγειν. ὑμῖν μὲν γάρ, εἴπερ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἷς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἐᾶν ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται θέντων θεῶν, καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλως λέγῃ, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἀκούοντας· γέρων δὲ εἴ τίς τι συννοεῖ τῶν παρʼ ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἄρχοντά τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιώτην μηδενὸς ἐναντίον νέου ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.
635. Clin. A very sound observation, Stranger; and just like a diviner, far away though you are from the original lawgiver, you have fairly spotted, as I think, his intention, and described it with perfect truth.
635. ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις, καὶ καθάπερ μάντις, ἀπὼν τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτά, νῦν ἐπιεικῶς μοι δοκεῖς ἐστοχάσθαι καὶ σφόδρα ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
635a. Ath. Well, there are no young people with us now; so we may be permitted by the lawgiver, old as we are, to discuss these matters among ourselves privately without offence.
635a. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν ἐρημία μὲν νέων, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἕνεκα γήρως ἀφείμεθʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου διαλεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μόνοι πρὸς μόνους μηδὲν ἂν πλημμελεῖν;
Clin. That is so. Do you, then, have no scruple in censuring our laws; for there is nothing discreditable in being told of some flaw; rather it is just this which leads to a remedy, if the criticism be accepted not peevishly but in a friendly spirit.
ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἃ καὶ μηδέν γε ἀνῇς ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν· οὐ γὰρ τό γε γνῶναί τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἄτιμον, ἀλλὰ ἴασιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι τῷ μὴ φθόνῳ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀλλʼ εὐνοίᾳ δεχομένῳ.
635b. Ath. Good! But until I have investigated your laws as carefully as I can I shall not censure them but rather express the doubts I feel. You alone of Greeks and barbarians, so far as I can discover, possess a lawgiver who charged you to abstain from the greatest of pleasures and amusements and taste them not; but concerning pains and fears, as we said before, he held the view that anyone who shuns them continuously from childhood onward, when confronted with unavoidable hardships and fears and pains, will be put to flight by the men who are trained in such things, and will become their slave.
635b. ΑΘ. καλῶς· οὐ μὴν ἐπιτιμῶν γε ἐρῶ τοῖς νόμοις πω, πρὶν βεβαίως εἰς δύναμιν διασκέψασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπορῶν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης μόνοις Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, ὧν ἡμεῖς πυνθανόμεθα, τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν καὶ παιδιῶν ἐπέταξεν ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ γεύεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, ὅπερ ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, ἡγήσατο εἴ τις ἐκ παίδων φευξεῖται διὰ τέλους, ὁπόταν εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἔλθῃ πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ λύπας, φευξεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν ἐκείνοις γεγυμνασμένους καὶ δουλεύσειν αὐτοῖς.
635c. Now I presume that this same lawgiver should have held the same view about pleasures as well, and should have argued with himself that, if our citizens grow up from their youth unpracticed in the greatest pleasures, the consequence must be that, when they find themselves amongst pleasures without being trained in the duty of resisting them and of refusing to commit any disgraceful act, because of the natural attraction of pleasures, they will suffer the same fate as those who are worsted by fears: they will, that is to say, in another and still more shameful fashion be enslaved by those who are able to hold out amidst pleasures and those who are versed in the art of pleasure,—people who are sometimes wholly vicious: thus their condition of soul will be partly enslaved and partly free, and they will not deserve to be called, without qualification, free men and men of courage.
635c. ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦτʼ, οἶμαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔδει διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν νομοθέτην, λέγοντα αὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἡμῖν ἐκ νέων εἰ ἄπειροι τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν οἱ πολῖται γενήσονται, καὶ ἀμελέτητοι γιγνόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καρτερεῖν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποιεῖν, ἕνεκα τῆς γλυκυθυμίας τῆς πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῖς ἡττωμένοις τῶν φόβων·
635d. Consider, then, whether you at all approve these remarks of mine.
635d. δουλεύσουσι τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ ἔτʼ αἰσχίω τοῖς γε δυναμένοις καρτερεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ τοῖς κεκτημένοις τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀνθρώποις ἐνίοτε παντάπασι κακοῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ μὲν δούλην τῇ δὲ ἐλευθέραν ἕξουσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοι ἁπλῶς ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἐλευθέριοι ἔσονται προσαγορεύεσθαι. σκοπεῖτε οὖν εἴ τι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ὑμῖν κατὰ τρόπον δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
Clin. On the face of them, we are inclined to approve; but to yield quick and easy credence in matters of such importance would, I fear, be rash and thoughtless.
ΚΛ. δοκεῖ μὲν ἡμῖν γέ πως λεγομένου τοῦ λόγου· περὶ δὲ τηλικούτων εὐθὺς πεπιστευκέναι ῥᾳδίως μὴ νέων τε ᾖ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνοήτων.
Ath. Well then, O Clinias, and thou, Stranger of Lacedaemon, suppose we discuss the second of the subjects we proposed, and take temperance next after courage: shall we discover any point in which these polities are superior to those framed at random, as we found just now in regard to their military organization?
ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ εἰ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα διεξίοιμεν ὧν προυθέμεθα, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε—μετʼ ἀνδρείαν γὰρ δὴ σωφροσύνης πέρι λέγωμεν—τὶ διαφέρον ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ ταῖς τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων ἀνευρήσομεν, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον νυνδή;
636a. Meg. Hardly an easy matter! Yet probably the common meals and the gymnasia are well devised to foster both these virtues.
636a. ΜΕ. σχεδὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλʼ ἔοικεν γὰρ τά τε συσσίτια καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καλῶς ηὑρῆσθαι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας.
Ath. In truth, Strangers, it seems a difficult thing for State institutions to be equally beyond criticism both in theory and in practice. Their case resembles that of the human body, where it seems impossible to prescribe any given treatment for each case without finding that this same prescription is partly beneficial and partly injurious to the body.
ΑΘ. ἔοικεν δῆτα, ὦ ξένοι, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναμφισβητήτως ὁμοίως ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ γίγνεσθαι· κινδυνεύει γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι προστάξαι τι πρὸς ἓν σῶμα ἓν ἐπιτήδευμα, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἂν φανείη ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τὰ μὲν βλάπτον τὰ ἡμῶν σώματα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὠφελοῦν.
636b. So these common meals, for example, and these gymnasia, while they are at present beneficial to the States in many other respects, yet in the event of civil strife they prove dangerous (as is shown by the case of the youth of Miletus, Bocotia and Thurii); and, moreover, this institution, when of old standing, is thought to have corrupted the pleasures of love which are natural not to men only but also natural to beasts. For this your States are held primarily responsible, and along with them all others that especially encourage the use of gymnasia.
636b. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ συσσίτια πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὠφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπά—δηλοῦσιν δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παῖδες—καὶ δὴ καὶ παλαιὸν νόμον δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων, διεφθαρκέναι. καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις πρώτας ἄν τις αἰτιῷτο καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα ἅπτονται τῶν γυμνασίων·
636c. And whether one makes the observation in earnest or in jest, one certainly should not fail to observe that when male unites with female for procreation the pleasure experienced is held to be due to nature, but contrary to nature when male mates with male or female with female, and that those first guilty of such enormities were impelled by their slavery to pleasure. And we all accuse the Cretans of concocting the story about Ganymede.
636c. καὶ εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοητέον ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει εἰς κοινωνίαν ἰούσῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἡ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδόσθαι δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημʼ εἶναι διʼ ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς. πάντες δὲ δὴ Κρητῶν τὸν περὶ Γανυμήδη μῦθον κατηγοροῦμεν ὡς λογοποιησάντων τούτων·
636d. Because it was the belief that they derived their laws from Zeus, they added on this story about Zeus in order that they might be following his example in enjoying this pleasure as well. Now with the story itself we have no more concern; but when men are investigating the subject of laws their investigation deals almost entirely with pleasures and pains, whether in States or in individuals. These are the two fountains which gush out by nature’s impulse; and whoever draws from them a due supply at the due place and time is blessed—be it a State or an individual or any kind of creature; but whosoever does so without understanding and out of due season will fare contrariwise.
636d. ἐπειδὴ παρὰ Διὸς αὐτοῖς οἱ νόμοι πεπιστευμένοι ἦσαν γεγονέναι, τοῦτον τὸν μῦθον προστεθηκέναι κατὰ τοῦ Διός, ἵνα ἑπόμενοι δὴ τῷ θεῷ καρπῶνται καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μύθου χαιρέτω, νόμων δὲ πέρι διασκοπουμένων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν· δύο γὰρ αὗται πηγαὶ μεθεῖνται φύσει ῥεῖν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυτόμενος ὅθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ πόλις ὁμοίως καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ζῷον ἅπαν, ὁ δʼ ἀνεπιστημόνως ἅμα καὶ ἐκτὸς τῶν καιρῶν τἀναντία ἂν ἐκείνῳ ζῴη.