637. Meg. What you say, Stranger, is excellent, I suppose; nonetheless I am at a loss to know what reply I should make to it. Still, in my opinion, the Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in ordaining the avoidance of pleasures, while as to the laws of Cnosus—our friend Clinias, if he thinks fit, will defend them.
637. ΜΕ. λέγεται μὲν ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, καλῶς πως· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἀφασία γʼ ἡμᾶς λαμβάνει τί ποτε χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅμως δʼ ἔμοιγε ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ τὸ τὰς ἡδονὰς φεύγειν διακελεύεσθαι τόν γε ἐν Λακεδαίμονι νομοθέτην, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν Κνωσῷ νόμων ὅδε, ἂν ἐθέλῃ, βοηθήσει. τὰ δʼ ἐν Σπάρτῃ κάλλιστʼ ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι κεῖσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς·
637a. The rules about pleasures at Sparta seem to me the best in the world. For our law banished entirely from the land that institution which gives the most occasion for men to fall into excessive pleasures and riotous and follies of every description; neither in the country nor in the cities controlled by Spartiates is a drinking-club to be seen nor any of the practices which belong to such and foster to the utmost all kinds of pleasure. Indeed there is not a man who would not punish at once and most severely any drunken reveller he chanced to meet with, nor would even the feast of Dionysus serve as an excuse to save him—a revel such as I once upon a time witnessed “on the wagons” in your country; and at our colony of Tarentum, too, saw the whole city drunk at the Dionysia.
637a. οὗ γὰρ μάλιστʼ ἄνθρωποι καὶ μεγίσταις προσπίπτουσιν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὕβρεσι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ πάσῃ, τοῦτʼ ἐξέβαλεν ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας συμπάσης, καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν ἐπʼ ἀγρῶν ἴδοις, οὔτʼ ἐν ἄστεσιν ὅσων Σπαρτιάταις μέλει, συμπόσια οὐδʼ ὁπόσα τούτοις συνεπόμενα πάσας ἡδονὰς κινεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐδʼ ἔστιν ὅστις ἂν ἀπαντῶν κωμάζοντί τινι μετὰ μέθης οὐκ ἂν τὴν μεγίστην δίκην εὐθὺς ἐπιθείη, καὶ οὐδʼ ἂν Διονύσια πρόφασιν ἔχοντʼ αὐτὸν λύσαιτο, ὥσπερ ἐν ἁμάξαις εἶδόν ποτε παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀποίκοις πᾶσαν ἐθεασάμην τὴν πόλιν περὶ τὰ Διονύσια μεθύουσαν·
637b. But with us no such thing is possible.
637b. παρʼ ἡμῖν δʼ οὐκ ἔστʼ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον.
Ath. O Stranger of Lacedaemon, all such indulgences are praiseworthy where there exists a strain of firm moral fiber, but where this is relaxed they are quite stupid.
ΑΘ. ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιε ξένε, ἐπαινετὰ μὲν πάντʼ ἐστὶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅπου τινὲς ἔνεισιν καρτερήσεις, ὅπου δὲ ἀνεῖνται, βλακικώτερα·
637c. An Athenian in self-defence might at once retaliate by pointing to the looseness of the women in your country. Regarding all such practices, whether in Tarentum, Athens or Sparta, there is one answer that is held to vindicate their propriety. The universal answer to the stranger who is surprised at seeing in a State some unwonted practice is this: “Be not surprised, O Stranger: such is the custom with us: with you, perhaps, the custom in these matters is different.”
637c. ταχὺ γάρ σου λάβοιτʼ ἄν τις τῶν παρʼ ἡμῶν ἀμυνόμενος, δεικνὺς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρʼ ὑμῖν ἄνεσιν. ἅπασιν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ἐν Τάραντι καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρʼ ὑμῖν δέ, μία ἀπόκρισις ἀπολύεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ κακῶς ἔχειν ἀλλʼ ὀρθῶς· πᾶς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἐρεῖ θαυμάζοντι ξένῳ, τὴν παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἀήθειαν ὁρῶντι, μὴ θαύμαζε, ὦ ξένε· νόμος ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν οὗτος, ἴσως δʼ ὑμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἕτερος.
637d. But, my dear Sirs, our argument now is not concerned with the rest of mankind but with the goodness or badness of the lawgivers themselves. So let us deal more fully with the subject of drunkenness in general for it is a practice of no slight importance, and it requires no mean legislator to understand it. I am now referring not to the drinking or non-drinking of wine generally, but to drunkenness pure and simple, and the question is—ought we to deal with it as the Scythians and Persians do and the Carthaginians also, and Celts, Iberians and Thracians, who are all warlike races, or as you Spartans do; for you, as you say, abstain from it altogether, whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, take their wine neat and let it pour down over their clothes, and regard this practice of theirs as a noble and splendid practice; and the Persians indulge greatly in these and other luxurious habits which you reject, albeit in a more orderly fashion than the others.
637d. ἡμῖν δʼ ἐστὶ νῦν, ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἔτι γὰρ οὖν εἴπωμεν πλείω περὶ ἁπάσης μέθης· οὐ γὰρ σμικρόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα οὐδὲ φαύλου διαγνῶναι νομοθέτου. λέγω δʼ οὐκ οἴνου περὶ πόσεως τὸ παράπαν ἢ μή, μέθης δὲ αὐτῆς πέρι, πότερον ὥσπερ Σκύθαι χρῶνται καὶ Πέρσαι χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἴβηρες καὶ Θρᾷκες, πολεμικὰ σύμπαντα ὄντα ταῦτα γένη, ἢ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς· ὑμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ λέγεις, τὸ παράπαν ἀπέχεσθε, Σκύθαι δὲ καὶ Θρᾷκες ἀκράτῳ παντάπασι χρώμενοι, γυναῖκές τε καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἱματίων καταχεόμενοι, καλὸν καὶ εὔδαιμον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύειν νενομίκασι. Πέρσαι δὲ σφόδρα μὲν χρῶνται καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τρυφαῖς ἃς ὑμεῖς ἀποβάλλετε, ἐν τάξει δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων.
638a. Meg. But we, my good Sir, when we take arms in our hands, put all these people to rout.
638a. ΜΕ. ὦ λῷστε, διώκομεν δέ γε ἡμεῖς πάντας τούτους, ὅταν ὅπλα εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λάβωμεν.
Ath. Say not so, my dear Sir; for there have been, in fact, in the past and there will be in the future many a flight and many a pursuit which are past explaining, so that victory or defeat in battle could never be called a decisive, but rather a questionable, test of the goodness or badness of an institution. Larger States, for example, are victorious in battle over smaller States, and we find the Syracusans subjugating the Locrians, who are reputed to have been the best-governed of the peoples in that part of the world: and the Athenians the Ceians,—and we could find countless other instances of the same kind.
ΑΘ. ὦ ἄριστε, μὴ λέγε ταῦτα· πολλαὶ γὰρ δὴ φυγαὶ καὶ διώξεις ἀτέκμαρτοι γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται, διὸ φανερὸν ὅρον τοῦτον οὐκ ἄν ποτε λέγοιμεν, ἀλλὰ ἀμφισβητήσιμον, περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ μή, νίκην τε καὶ ἧτταν λέγοντες μάχης. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ μείζους τὰς ἐλάττους πόλεις νικῶσιν μαχόμεναι καὶ καταδουλοῦνται, Συρακόσιοι μὲν Λοκρούς, οἳ δὴ δοκοῦσιν εὐνομώτατοι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον γεγονέναι, Κείους δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι·
638b. So let us leave victories and defeats out of account for the present, and discuss each several institution on its own merits in the endeavor to convince ourselves, and explain in what way one kind is good and another had. And to begin with, listen to my account of the right method of inquiring into the merits and demerits of institutions.
638b. μυρία δὲ ἄλλα τοιαῦτʼ ἂν εὕροιμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιτηδεύματος πειρώμεθα λέγοντες πείθειν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, νίκας δὲ καὶ ἥττας ἐκτὸς λόγου τὰ νῦν θῶμεν, λέγωμεν δʼ ὡς τὸ μὲν τοιόνδʼ ἐστὶν καλόν, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε οὐ καλόν. πρῶτον δʼ ἀκούσατέ τί μου, περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ὡς δεῖ τό τε χρηστὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ σκοπεῖν.
638c. Meg. What is your account of it?
638c. ΜΕ. πῶς οὖν δὴ λέγεις;
Ath. In my opinion all those who take up an institution for discussion and propose, at its first mention, to censure it or commend it, are proceeding in quite the wrong way. Their action is like that of a man who, when he hears somebody praising cheese as a good food, at once starts to disparage it, without having learnt either its effects or its mode of administration—in what form it should be administered and by whom and with what accompaniments, and in what condition and to people in what condition.
ΑΘ. δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ προθέμενοι ψέγειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπαινεῖν εὐθὺς ῥηθέν, οὐδαμῶς δρᾶν κατὰ τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖν οἷον εἰ δή τις, ἐπαινέσαντός τινος πυροὺς βρῶμα ὡς ἀγαθόν, εὐθὺς ψέγοι, μὴ διαπυθόμενος αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ἐργασίαν μήτε τὴν προσφοράν, ὅντινα τρόπον καὶ οἷστισι καὶ μεθʼ ὧν καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσιν. νῦν δὴ ταὐτόν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ποιεῖν·
638d. This, as it seems to me, is exactly what we are now doing in our discourse. At the first mention of the mere name of drunkenness, straightway we fall, some of us to blaming it, others to praising it; which is most absurd. Each party relies on the aid of witnesses, and while the one party claims that its statement is convincing on the ground of the large number of witnesses produced, the other does so on the ground that those who abstain from wine are seen to be victorious in battle; and then this point also gives rise to a dispute. Now it would not be at all to my taste to go through all the rest of the legal arrangements in this fashion; and about our present subject, drunkenness, I desire to speak in quite another fashion (in my opinion, the right fashion), and I shall endeavor, if possible, to exhibit the correct method for dealing with all such subjects for indeed the view of them adopted by your two States would be assailed and controverted by thousands upon thousands of nations.
638d. περὶ μέθης γὰρ ἀκούσαντες τοσοῦτον μόνον, εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν ψέγειν αὐτό, οἱ δʼ ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ μάλα ἀτόπως. μάρτυσιν γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινέταις χρώμενοι ἐπαινοῦμεν ἑκάτεροι, καὶ οἱ μέν, ὅτι πολλοὺς παρεχόμεθα, ἀξιοῦμέν τι λέγειν κύριον, οἱ δέ, ὅτι τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους αὐτῷ ὁρῶμεν νικῶντας μαχομένους· ἀμφισβητεῖται δʼ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ ἑκάστων οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νομίμων διέξιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν εἴη, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον, ὃν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖν, ἐθέλω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς μέθης, πειρώμενος ἂν ἄρα δύνωμαι τὴν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀρθὴν μέθοδον ἡμῖν δηλοῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἔθνη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὑμῖν πόλεσι δυοῖν τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοιτʼ ἄν.
639. Meg. Assuredly, if we know of a right method of investigating these matters, we are bound to give it a ready hearing.
639. ΜΕ. καὶ μὴν εἴ τινα ἔχομεν ὀρθὴν σκέψιν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀποκνητέον ἀκούειν.
639a. Ath. Let us adopt some such method as this. Suppose that a man were to praise the rearing of goats, and the goat itself as a fine thing to own, and suppose also that another man, who had seen goats grazing without a herd and doing damage on cultivated land, were to run them down, and find fault equally with every animal he saw that was without a master or under a bad master,—would such a man’s censure, about any object whatsoever, be of the smallest value?Meg. Certainly not.
639a. ΑΘ. σκεψώμεθα δή πῃ τῇδε. φέρε, εἴ τις αἰγῶν τροφήν, καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ κτῆμα ὡς ἔστιν καλόν, ἐπαινοῖ, ἄλλος δέ τις ἑωρακὼς αἶγας χωρὶς νεμομένας αἰπόλου ἐν ἐργασίμοις χωρίοις δρώσας κακὰ διαψέγοι, καὶ πᾶν θρέμμα ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων ἰδὼν οὕτω μέμφοιτο, τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγον ἡγούμεθα ὑγιὲς ἄν ποτε ψέξαι καὶ ὁτιοῦν;ΜΕ. καὶ πῶς;ΑΘ. χρηστὸς δὲ ἄρχων ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ἐν πλοίοις πότερον ἐὰν τὴν ναυτικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην μόνον, ἄντʼ οὖν ναυτιᾷ ἄντε μή, ἢ πῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;
639b. Ath. Do we call the man who possesses only nautical science, whether or not he suffers from sea-sickness, a good commander on a ship—or what?Meg. By no means good, if along with his skill he suffers in the way you say.Ath. And how about the army commander? Is a man fit for command, provided that he has military science, even though he be a coward and sea-sick with a kind of tipsy terror when danger comes?Meg. Certainly not.Ath. And suppose he has no military skill, besides being a coward?Meg. You are describing an utterly worthless fellow, not a commander of men at all, but of the most womanish of women.
639b. ΜΕ. οὐδαμῶς, ἄν γε πρὸς τῇ τέχνῃ ἔχῃ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ὃ λέγεις.ΑΘ. τί δʼ ἄρχων στρατοπέδων; ἆρʼ ἐὰν τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔχῃ ἐπιστήμην, ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, κἂν δειλὸς ὢν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου ναυτιᾷ;ΜΕ. καὶ πῶς;ΑΘ. ἂν δὲ αὖ μήτε ἔχῃ τὴν τέχνην δειλός τε ᾖ;ΜΕ. παντάπασίν τινα πονηρὸν λέγεις, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἄρχοντα ἀλλά τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν.
639c. Ath. Now take the case of any social institution whatsoever which naturally has a commander and which, under its commander, is beneficial; and suppose that someone, who had never seen the conduct of the institution under its commander, but seen it only when with no commander or bad commanders, were to commend the institution or censure it: do we imagine that either the praise or the blame of such an observer of such an institution is of any value?
639c. ΑΘ. τί δʼ ἐπαινέτην ἢ ψέκτην κοινωνίας ἡστινοσοῦν ᾗ πέφυκέν τε ἄρχων εἶναι μετʼ ἐκείνου τε ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη ποτʼ ὀρθῶς αὐτὴν αὑτῇ κοινωνοῦσαν μετʼ ἄρχοντος, ἀεὶ δὲ ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων συνοῦσαν; οἰόμεθα δή ποτε τοὺς τοιούτους θεωροὺς τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνιῶν χρηστόν τι ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι;
Meg. Certainly not, when the man has never seen nor shared in an institution of the kind that was properly conducted.
ΜΕ. πῶς δʼ ἄν, μηδέποτέ γε ἰδόντας μηδὲ συγγενομένους ὀρθῶς γενομένῳ μηδενὶ τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνημάτων;
639d. Ath. Now stay a moment! Shall we lay it down that, of the numerous kinds of social institutions, that of banqueters and banquetings forms one?
639d. ΑΘ. ἔχε δή· τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνιῶν συμπότας καὶ συμπόσια θεῖμεν ἂν μίαν τινὰ συνουσίαν εἶναι;
Meg. Most certainly.
ΜΕ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Ath. Now has anyone ever yet beheld this institution rightly conducted? Both of you can easily make answer—“Never yet at all,” for with you this institution is neither customary nor legal; but I have come across many modes of banqueting in many places, and I have also inquired into nearly all of them, and I have scarcely seen or heard of a single one that was in all points rightly conducted; for if any were right at all, it was only in a few details, and most of them were almost entirely on the wrong lines.
ΑΘ. ταύτην οὖν μῶν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἤδη τις πώποτε ἐθεάσατο; καὶ σφῷν μὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ῥᾴδιον ὡς οὐδεπώποτε τὸ παράπαν—οὐ γὰρ ἐπιχώριον ὑμῖν τοῦτο οὐδὲ νόμιμον—ἐγὼ δὲ ἐντετύχηκά τε πολλαῖς καὶ πολλαχοῦ, καὶ προσέτι πάσας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διηρώτηκα, καὶ σχεδὸν ὅλην μὲν οὐδεμίαν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην ἑώρακα οὐδὲ ἀκήκοα, μόρια δʼ εἴ που σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ σύμπανθʼ ὡς εἰπεῖν διημαρτημένα.
640. Clin. What do you mean by that, Stranger? Explain yourself more clearly; for since we are (as you observed) without any experience of such institutions, even if we did come across them, we would probably fail to see at once what was right in them and what wrong.
640. ΚΛ. πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον· ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ εἶπες, ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲ ἐντυγχάνοντες ἂν ἴσως εὐθύς γε γνοῖμεν τό τε ὀρθὸν καὶ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς.
640a. Ath. That is very probable. Try, however, to learn from my description. This you understand—that in all gatherings and associations for any purpose whatsoever it is right that each group should always have a commander.
640a. ΑΘ. εἰκὸς λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἐμοῦ φράζοντος πειρῶ μανθάνειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πάσαις τε συνόδοις, καὶ κοινωνίαις πράξεων ὡντινωνοῦν, ὡς ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντα εἶναι, μανθάνεις;
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. Moreover, we have recently said that the commander of fighting men must be courageous.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἐλέγομεν νυνδὴ μαχομένων ὡς ἀνδρεῖον δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντʼ εἶναι.
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Ath. The courageous man is less perturbed by alarms than the coward.
ΑΘ. ὁ μὴν ἀνδρεῖος τῶν δειλῶν ὑπὸ φόβων ἧττον τεθορύβηται.
640b. Clin. That is true, too.
640b. ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως.
Ath. Now if there had existed any device for putting an army in charge of a general who was absolutely impervious to fear or perturbation, should we not have made every effort to do so?
ΑΘ. εἰ δʼ ἦν τις μηχανὴ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν δεδιότα μηδὲ θορυβούμενον ἐπιστῆσαι στρατοπέδῳ στρατηγόν, ἆρʼ οὐ τοῦτʼ ἂν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπράττομεν;
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.
Ath. But what we are discussing now is not the man who is to command an army in time of war, in meetings of foe with foe, but the man who is to command friends in friendly association with friends in time of peace.
ΑΘ. νῦν δέ γε οὐ στρατοπέδου περὶ λέγομεν ἄρξοντος ἐν ἀνδρῶν ὁμιλίαις ἐχθρῶν ἐχθροῖς μετὰ πολέμου, φίλων δʼ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης.
Clin. Quite so.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.
640c. Ath. Such a gathering, if accompanied by drunkenness, is not free from disturbance, is it?
640c. ΑΘ. ἔστιν δέ γε ἡ τοιαύτη συνουσία, εἴπερ ἔσται μετὰ μέθης, οὐκ ἀθόρυβος. ἦ γάρ;
Clin. Certainly not; quite the reverse, I imagine.
ΚΛ. πῶς γάρ; ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον.
Ath. So those people also need, in the first place, a commander?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντος δεῖ;
Clin. Undoubtedly—they above all.
ΚΛ. τί μήν; ὡς οὐδενί γε πράγματι.
Ath. Should we, if possible, provide them with a commander who is imperturbable?
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν ἀθόρυβον, εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐκπορίζεσθαι δεῖ;
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. Naturally, also, he should be wise about social gatherings. For he has both to preserve the friendliness which already exists among the company and to see that the present gathering promotes it still further.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν περί γε συνουσίας, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι δεῖ· γίγνεται γὰρ φύλαξ τῆς τε ὑπαρχούσης φιλίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος ἐπιμελητὴς ὅπως ἔσται διὰ τὴν τότε συνουσίαν.
640d. Clin. Very true.
640d. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
Ath. Then the commander we set over drunken men should be sober and wise, rather than the opposite? For a commander of drunkards who was himself drunken, young, and foolish would be very lucky if he escaped doing some serious mischief.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν νήφοντά τε καὶ σοφὸν ἄρχοντα μεθυόντων δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ μὴ τοὐναντίον; μεθυόντων γὰρ μεθύων καὶ νέος ἄρχων μὴ σοφός, εἰ μὴ κακὸν ἀπεργάσαιτό τι μέγα, πολλῇ χρῷτʼ ἂν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ.
Clin. Uncommonly lucky.
ΚΛ. παμπόλλῃ μὲν οὖν.
Ath. Suppose, then, that a man were to find fault with such institutions in States where they are managed in the best possible way, having an objection to the institution in itself, he might perhaps be right in doing so but if a man abuses an institution when he sees it managed in the worst way possible, it is plain that he is ignorant, first, of the fact that it is badly conducted, and secondly, that every institution will appear similarly bad when it is carried on without a sober ruler and commander.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν γιγνομένων ὡς δυνατὸν ὀρθότατα τούτων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν συνουσιῶν μέμφοιτό τις, ἐπικαλῶν αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι, τάχʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἴσως μέμφοιτο· εἰ δὲ ἁμαρτανόμενον ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα ἐπιτήδευμά τις ὁρῶν λοιδορεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ὀρθῶς, εἶθʼ ὅτι πᾶν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ φανεῖται πονηρόν, δεσπότου τε καὶ ἄρχοντος νήφοντος χωρὶς πραττόμενον.
641. Ath. For surely you perceive that a sea-captain, and every commander of anything, if drunk, upsets everything, whether it be a ship or a chariot or an army or anything else that under his captaincy.
641. ΑΘ. ἢ οὐ συννοεῖς τοῦθʼ, ὅτι μεθύων κυβερνήτης καὶ πᾶς παντὸς ἄρχων ἀνατρέπει πάντα εἴτε πλοῖα εἴτε ἅρματα εἴτε στρατόπεδον, εἴθʼ ὅτι ποτʼ εἴη τὸ κυβερνώμενον ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ;
641a. Clin. What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true. In the next place, then, tell us this:—suppose this institution of drinking were rightly conducted, of what possible benefit would it be to us? Take the case of an army, which we mentioned just now: there, given a right leader, his men will win victory in war, which is no small benefit; and so too with the other cases: but what solid advantage would accrue either to individuals or to a State from the right regulation of a wine-party?
641a. ΚΛ. παντάπασιν τοῦτό γε ἀληθὲς εἴρηκας, ὦ ξένε· τοὐπὶ τῷδε δʼ ἡμῖν λέγε, τί ποτε, ἂν γίγνηται τοῦτο ὀρθὸν τὸ περὶ τὰς πόσεις νόμιμον, ἀγαθὸν ἂν δράσειεν ἡμᾶς; οἷον, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, εἰ στράτευμα ὀρθῆς ἡγεμονίας τυγχάνοι, νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἂν γίγνοιτο, οὐ σμικρὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τἆλλʼ οὕτω·
641b. Ath. Well, what great gain should we say would accrue to the State from the right control of one single child or even of one band of children? To the question thus put to us we should reply that the State would benefit but little from one; if, however, you are putting a general question as to what solid advantage the State gains from the education of the educated, then it is quite simple to reply that well-educated men will prove good men, and being good they will conquer their foes in battle, besides acting nobly in other ways.
641b. συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος τί μέγα ἰδιώταις ἢ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτʼ ἄν;ΑΘ. τί δέ; παιδὸς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ χοροῦ παιδαγωγηθέντος κατὰ τρόπον ἑνός, τί μέγα τῇ πόλει φαῖμεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι; ἢ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐρωτηθέντες εἴποιμεν ἂν ὡς ἑνὸς μὲν βραχύ τι τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ὄφελος, εἰ δʼ ὅλως ἐρωτᾷς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευθέντων τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνίνησιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ γίγνοιντʼ ἂν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι τά τε ἄλλα πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ κἂν νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι.
641c. Thus, while education brings also victory, victory sometimes brings lack of education for men have often grown more insolent because of victory in war, and through their insolence they have become filled with countless other vices; and whereas education has never yet proved to be “Cadmeian,” the victories which men win in war often have been, and will be, “Cadmeian.”
641c. παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δʼ ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑβριστότεροι διὰ πολέμων νίκας γενόμενοι μυρίων ἄλλων κακῶν διʼ ὕβριν ἐνεπλήσθησαν, καὶ παιδεία μὲν οὐδεπώποτε γέγονεν Καδμεία, νῖκαι δὲ ἀνθρώποις πολλαὶ δὴ τοιαῦται γεγόνασίν τε καὶ ἔσονται.
Clin. You are implying, my friend, as it seems to us, that the convivial gathering, when rightly conducted, is an important element in education.
ΚΛ. δοκεῖς ἡμῖν, ὦ φίλε, τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν διατριβὴν ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν λέγειν, ἂν ὀρθῶς γίγνηται.
641d. Ath. Assuredly.
641d. ΑΘ. τί μήν;
Clin. Could you then show us, in the next place, how this statement is true?
ΚΛ. ἔχοις ἂν οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ἀληθές;
Ath. The truth of my statement, which is disputed by many, it is for God to assert; but I am quite ready to give, if required, my own opinion, now that we have, in fact, embarked on a discussion of laws and constitutions.
ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὦ ξένε, διισχυρίζεσθαι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, θεοῦ· εἰ δʼ ὅπῃ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖ λέγειν, οὐδεὶς φθόνος, ἐπείπερ ὡρμήκαμέν γε τοὺς λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ποιεῖσθαι τὰ νῦν.
Clin. Well, it is precisely your opinion about the questions now in dispute that we are trying to learn.
ΚΛ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ δὴ πειρώμεθα, τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν περὶ τῶν νῦν ἀμφισβητουμένων καταμαθεῖν.
641e. Ath. Thus, then, we must do,—you must brace yourself in the effort to learn the argument, and I to expound it as best I can. But, first of all, I have a preliminary observation to make: our city, Athens, is, in the general opinion of the Greeks, both fond of talk and full of talk, but Lacedaemon is scant of talk, while Crete is more witty than wordy;
641e. ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν οὕτως, ὑμᾶς τε ἐπὶ τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῶσαι πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως, συντεῖναι, τὸν λόγον. πρῶτον δέ μου ἀκούσατε τὸ τοιόνδε. τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογός τέ ἐστι καὶ πολύλογος, Λακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν·
642a. Ath. so I am afraid of making you think that I am a great talker about a small matter, if I spin out a discourse of prodigious length about the small matter of drunkenness. But the fact is that the right ordering of this could never be treated adequately and clearly in our discourse apart from rightness in music, nor could music, apart from education as a whole; and these require lengthy discussions. Consider, then, what we are to do: suppose we leave these matters over for the present, and take up some other legal topic instead.
642a. ΑΘ. σκοπῶ δὴ μὴ δόξαν ὑμῖν παράσχωμαι περὶ σμικροῦ πολλὰ λέγειν, μέθης πέρι, σμικροῦ πράγματος, παμμήκη λόγον ἀνακαθαιρόμενος. τὸ δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ διόρθωσις οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητός ποτε σαφὲς οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπολαβεῖν, μουσικὴ δὲ ἄνευ παιδείας τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἂν αὖ ποτε δύναιτο· ταῦτα δὲ παμπόλλων ἐστὶν λόγων. ὁρᾶτε οὖν τί ποιῶμεν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐάσαιμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, μετεκβαῖμεν δʼ εἰς ἕτερόν τινα νόμων πέρι λόγον.
642b. Meg. O Stranger of Athens, you are not, perhaps, aware that our family is, in fact, a “proxenus” of your State. It is probably true of all children that, when once they have been told that they are “proxeni” of a certain State, they conceive an affection for that State even from infancy, and each of them regards it as a second mother-land, next after his own country. That is precisely the feeling I now experience. For through hearing mere children crying out— whenever they, being the Lacedaemonians, were blaming the Athenians for anything or praising them—“Your State, Megillus, has done us a bad turn or a good one,”—through hearing such remarks, I say, and constantly fighting your battles against those who were thus decrying your State, I acquired a deep affection for it; so that now not only do I delight in your accent, but I regard as absolutely true the common saying that “good Athenians are always incomparably good,” for they alone are good
642b. ΜΕ. ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, οὐκ οἶσθʼ ἴσως ὅτι τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἡ ἑστία τῆς πόλεως οὖσα ὑμῶν πρόξενος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς παισίν, ἐπειδὰν ἀκούσωσιν ὅτι τινός εἰσιν πόλεως πρόξενοι, ταύτῃ τις εὔνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων τῇ πόλει, ὡς δευτέρᾳ οὔσῃ πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πόλιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐγγέγονεν. ἀκούων γὰρ τῶν παίδων εὐθύς, εἴ τι μέμφοιντο ἢ καὶ ἐπαινοῖεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίους, ὡς ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔφασαν, ἡμᾶς οὐ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἔρρεξε —ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούων, καὶ μαχόμενος πρὸς αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἄγοντας, πᾶσαν εὔνοιαν ἔσχον, καί μοι νῦν ἥ τε φωνὴ προσφιλὴς ὑμῶν, τό τε ὑπὸ πολλῶν λεγόμενον, ὡς ὅσοι Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ διαφερόντως εἰσὶν τοιοῦτοι, δοκεῖ ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι· μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔτι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί.
642d. not by outward compulsion but by inner disposition. Thus, so far as I am concerned, you may speak without fear and say all you please.
642d. θαρρῶν δὴ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα λέγοις ἂν τοσαῦτα ὁπόσα σοι φίλον.
Clin. My story, too, Stranger, when you hear it, will show you that you may boldly say all you wish. You have probably heard how that inspired man Epimenides, who was a family connection of ours, was born in Crete; and how ten years before the Persian War, in obedience to the oracle of the god, he went to Athens and offered certain sacrifices which the god had ordained; and how, moreover, when the Athenians were alarmed at the Persians’ expeditionary force, he made this prophecy—“They will not come for ten years, and when they do come, they will return back again with all their hopes frustrated, and after suffering more woes than they inflict.”
ΚΛ. καὶ μήν, ὦ ξένε, καὶ τὸν παρʼ ἐμοῦ λόγον ἀκούσας τε καὶ ἀποδεξάμενος, θαρρῶν ὁπόσα βούλει λέγε. τῇδε γὰρ ἴσως ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θεῖος, ὃς ἦν ἡμῖν οἰκεῖος, ἐλθὼν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν δέκα ἔτεσιν πρότερον παρʼ ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείαν, θυσίας τε ἐθύσατό τινας ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον, εἶπεν ὅτι δέκα μὲν ἐτῶν οὐχ ἥξουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ἔλθωσιν, ἀπαλλαγήσονται πράξαντες οὐδὲν ὧν ἤλπιζον, παθόντες τε ἢ δράσαντες πλείω κακά.
643. Clin. Then our forefathers became guest-friends of yours, and ever since both my fathers and I myself have cherished an affection for Athens.
643. ΚΛ. τότʼ οὖν ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν, καὶ εὔνοιαν ἐκ τόσου ἔγωγε ὑμῖν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἔχουσιν γονῆς.
643a. Ath. Evidently, then, you are both ready to play your part as listeners. But as for my part, though the will is there, to compass the task is hard: still, I must try. In the first place, then, our argument requires that we should define education and describe its effects: that is the path on which our present discourse must proceed until it finally arrives at the god of Wine.
643a. ΑΘ. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑμέτερα ἀκούειν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτοιμʼ ἂν εἴη· τὰ δʼ ἐμὰ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἕτοιμα, δύνασθαι δὲ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδια, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον. πρῶτον δὴ οὖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρισώμεθα παιδείαν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης φαμὲν ἰτέον εἶναι τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν, μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀφίκηται.
Clin. By all means let us do so, since it is your wish.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δρῶμεν ταῦτα, εἴπερ σοί γε ἡδύ.
643b. Ath. Then while I am stating how education ought to be defined, you must be considering whether you are satisfied with my statement.
643b. ΑΘ. λέγοντος τοίνυν ἐμοῦ τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι παιδείαν εἶναι, σκέψασθε ἂν ἀρέσκῃ τὸ λεχθέν.
Clin. Proceed with your statement.
ΚΛ. λέγοις ἄν.
Ath. I will. What I assert is that every man who is going to be good at any pursuit must practice that special pursuit from infancy, by using all the implements of his pursuit both in his play and in his work. For example, the man who is to make a good builder must play at building toy houses, and to make a good farmer he must play at tilling land; and those who are rearing them must provide each child with toy tools modelled on real ones.
ΑΘ. λέγω δή, καί φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν δεῖν, παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν. οἷον τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι γεωργὸν ἤ τινα οἰκοδόμον, τὸν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντά τι τῶν παιδείων οἰκοδομημάτων παίζειν χρή, τὸν δʼ αὖ γεωργοῦντα, καὶ ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα, παρασκευάζειν τὸν τρέφοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν, οἷον τέκτονα μετρεῖν ἢ σταθμᾶσθαι καὶ πολεμικὸν ἱππεύειν παίζοντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο ποιοῦντα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἷ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν.
643c. Besides this, they ought to have elementary instruction in all the necessary subjects,—the carpenter, for instance, being taught in play the use of rule and measure, the soldier taught riding or some similar accomplishment. So, by means of their games, we should endeavor to turn the tastes and desires of the children in the direction of that object which forms their ultimate goal. First and foremost, education, we say, consists in that right nurture which most strongly draws the soul of the child when at play to a love for that pursuit of which, when he becomes a man, he must possess a perfect mastery. Now consider, as I said before, whether, up to this point, you are satisfied with this statement of mine.
643c. κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρʼ αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς· ὁρᾶτε οὖν εἰ μέχρι τούτου γε, ὅπερ εἶπον, ὑμῖν ἀρέσκει τὸ λεχθέν.
Clin. Certainly we are.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. But we must not allow our description of education to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man’s upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation.
ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές θʼ ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων·
643e. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up education: the education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously.
643e. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικʼ, εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης.
644. Ath. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term “education” whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name “education.”
644. ΑΘ. ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτʼ ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάναυσόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι.
644a. Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might.
644a. ἡμεῖς δὴ μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθʼ αὑτοῖς, ἀλλʼ ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν παιδείαν μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον·
644b. Clin. You are right, and we agree with what you say.Ath. Further, we agreed long ago that if men are capable of ruling themselves, they are good, but if incapable, bad.Clin. Quite true.Ath. Let us, then, re-state more clearly what we meant by this.
644b. καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δʼ ἐστὶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν πάλαι γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ὡς ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὑτῶν, κακῶν δὲ τῶν μή.ΚΛ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.ΑΘ. σαφέστερον ἔτι τοίνυν ἀναλάβωμεν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτὲ λέγομεν.
644c. With your permission, I will make use of an illustration in the hope of explaining the matter.
644c. καί μοι διʼ εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε ἐάν πως δυνατὸς ὑμῖν γένωμαι δηλῶσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον.
Clin. Go ahead.
ΚΛ. λέγε μόνον.
Ath. May we assume that each of us by himself is a single unit?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;
Ath. And that each possesses within himself two antagonistic and foolish counsellors, whom we call by the names of pleasure and pain?
ΑΘ. δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὣ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην;
Clin. That is so.
ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Ath. And that, besides these two, each man possesses opinions about the future, which go by the general name of “expectations”; and of these, that which precedes pain bears the special name of “fear,” and that which precedes pleasure the special name of “confidence”;
ΑΘ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου·
644d. and in addition to all these there is “calculation,” pronouncing which of them is good, which bad; and “calculation,” when it has become the public decree of the State, is named “law.”
644d. ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅτι ποτʼ αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.
Clin. I have some difficulty in keeping pace with you: assume, however, that I do so, and proceed.
ΚΛ. μόγις μέν πως ἐφέπομαι, λέγε μὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἑπομένου.
Meg. I am in exactly the same predicament.
ΜΕ. καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὴν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος ἔνι.
Ath. Let us conceive of the matter in this way. Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing; but this we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.
ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ τούτων διανοηθῶμεν οὑτωσί. θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι συνεστηκός· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δὲ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσίν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπʼ ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται.
645. Ath. For, as our argument declares, there is one of these pulling forces which every man should always follow and nohow leave hold of, counteracting thereby the pull of the other sinews: it is the leading-string, golden and holy, of “calculation,” entitled the public law of the State; and whereas the other cords are hard and steely and of every possible shape and semblance, this one is flexible and uniform, since it is of gold. With that most excellent leading-string of the law we must needs co-operate always; for since calculation is excellent, but gentle rather than forceful, its leading-string needs helpers to ensure that the golden kind within us may vanquish the other kinds.
645. ΑΘ. μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δʼ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρᾴου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα γένη.
645b. In this way our story comparing ourselves to puppets will not fall flat, and the meaning of the terms “self-superior” and “self-inferior” will become somewhat more clear, and also how necessary it is for the individual man to grasp the true account of these inward pulling forces and to live in accordance therewith, and how necessary for the State (when it has received such an account either from a god or from a man who knows) to make this into a law for itself and be guided thereby in its intercourse both with itself and with all other States.
645b. καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτων, τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν, πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινος ἢ παρὰ τούτου τοῦ γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην, αὑτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. οὕτω καὶ κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη·
645c. Thus both badness and goodness would be differentiated for us more clearly; and these having become more evident, probably education also and the other institutions will appear less obscure; and about the institution of the wine-party in particular it may very likely be shown that it is by no means, as might be thought, a paltry matter which it is absurd to discuss at great length but rather a matter which folly merits prolonged discussion.
645c. ἐναργεστέρου δʼ αὐτοῦ γενομένου καὶ παιδεία καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα ἴσως ἔσται μᾶλλον καταφανῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις διατριβῆς, ὃ δοξασθείη μὲν ἂν εἶναι φαύλου πέρι μῆκος πολὺ λόγων περιττὸν εἰρημένον, φανείη δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως τοῦ μήκους γʼ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπάξιον.
Clin. Quite right: let us go through with every topic that seems important for the present discussion.
ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ περαίνωμεν ὅτιπερ ἂν τῆς γε νῦν διατριβῆς ἄξιον γίγνηται.
645d. Ath. Tell me now: if we give strong drink to this puppet of ours, what effect will it have on its character?
645d. ΑΘ. λέγε δή· προσφέροντες τῷ θαύματι τούτῳ τὴν μέθην, ποῖόν τί ποτε αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζόμεθα;
Clin. In reference to what particular do you ask this question?
ΚΛ. πρὸς τί δὲ σκοπούμενος αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτᾷς;
Ath. To no particular, for the moment: I am putting the question in general terms—“when this shares in that, what sort of thing does it become in consequence?” I will try to convey my meaning still more clearly: what I ask is this—does the drinking of wine intensify pleasures and pains and passions and lusts?
ΑΘ. οὐδέν πω πρὸς ὅτι, τοῦτο δὲ ὅλως κοινωνῆσαν τούτῳ ποῖόν τι συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ὃ βούλομαι πειράσομαι φράζειν. ἐρωτῶ γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα σφοδροτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας ἡ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει;
Clin. Yes, greatly.
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
645e. Ath. And how about sensations and recollections and opinions and thoughts? Does it make them likewise more intense? Or rather, do not these quit a man entirely if he becomes surfeited with drink?
645e. ΑΘ. τί δʼ αὖ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ φρονήσεις; πότερον ὡσαύτως σφοδροτέρας; ἢ πάμπαν ἀπολείπει ταῦτα αὐτόν, ἂν κατακορής τις τῇ μέθῃ γίγνηται;
Clin. Yes, they quit him entirely.
ΚΛ. ναί, πάμπαν ἀπολείπει.
Ath. He then arrives at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφικνεῖται τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν τῇ τότε ὅτε νέος ἦν παῖς;
Clin. He does.
ΚΛ. τί μήν;
Ath. So at that moment he will have very little control of himself?
ΑΘ. ἥκιστα δὴ τότʼ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γίγνοιτο ἐγκρατής.
646a. Clin. Very little.
646a. ΚΛ. ἥκιστα.
Ath. And such a man is, we say, very bad?
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν πονηρότατος, φαμέν, ὁ τοιοῦτος;
Clin. Very, indeed.
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
Ath. It appears, then, that not the grey-beard only may be in his “second childhood,” but the drunkard as well.
ΑΘ. οὐ μόνον ἄρʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ γέρων δὶς παῖς γίγνοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μεθυσθείς.
Clin. An admirable observation, Stranger.
ΚΛ. ἄριστα εἶπες, ὦ ξένε.
Ath. Is there any argument which will undertake to persuade us that this is a practice we ought to indulge in, instead of shunning it with all our might so far as we possibly can?
ΑΘ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἔσθʼ ὅστις λόγος ἐπιχειρήσει πείθειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ γεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ φεύγειν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν;
Clin. It appears that there is: at any rate you assert this, and you were ready just now to argue it.
ΚΛ. ἔοικʼ εἶναι· σὺ γοῦν φῂς καὶ ἕτοιμος ἦσθα νυνδὴ λέγειν.
646b. Ath. You are right in your reminder, and I am still ready to do so, now that you and Megillus have both expressed your willingness to listen to me.
646b. ΑΘ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι μνημονεύεις· καὶ νῦν γʼ εἴμʼ ἕτοιμος, ἐπειδήπερ σφώ γε ἐθελήσειν προθύμως ἔφατον ἀκούειν.
Clin. Of course we shall listen, if only on account of the surprising paradox that, of his own free will, a man ought to plunge into the depths of depravity.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὐκ ἀκουσόμεθα; κἂν εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ τε καὶ ἀτόπου, εἰ δεῖ ἑκόντα ποτὲ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἅπασαν φαυλότητα ἑαυτὸν ἐμβάλλειν.
Ath. Depravity of soul, you mean, do you not?
ΑΘ. ψυχῆς λέγεις· ἦ γάρ;
Ath. And how about plunging into a bad state of body, such as leanness or ugliness or impotence? Should we be surprised if a man of his own free will ever got into such a state?
ΑΘ. τί δέ; σώματος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, εἰς πονηρίαν, λεπτότητά τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, θαυμάζοιμεν ἂν εἴ ποτέ τις ἑκὼν ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖται;
646c. Clin. Of course we should.
646c. ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. Well then, do we suppose that persons who go of themselves to dispensaries to drink medicines are not aware that soon afterwards, and for many days to come, they will find themselves in a bodily condition such as would make life intolerable if it were to last for ever? And we know, do we not, that men who go to the gymnasia for hard training commence by becoming weaker?
ΑΘ. τί οὖν; τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἰατρεῖα αὐτοὺς βαδίζοντας ἐπὶ φαρμακοποσίᾳ ἀγνοεῖν οἰόμεθα ὅτι μετʼ ὀλίγον ὕστερον καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἕξουσιν τοιοῦτον τὸ σῶμα, οἷον εἰ διὰ τέλους ἔχειν μέλλοιεν, ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιντο; ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ πόνους ἰόντας οὐκ ἴσμεν ὡς ἀσθενεῖς εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα γίγνονται;
Clin. All this we know.
ΚΛ. πάντα ταῦτα ἴσμεν.
Ath. We know also that they go there voluntarily for the sake of the subsequent benefit?
ΑΘ. καὶ ὅτι τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα ὠφελίας ἕνεκα ἑκόντες πορεύονται;
646d. Clin. Quite true.
646d. ΚΛ. κάλλιστα.
Ath. Should one not take the same view of the other institutions also?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι διανοεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πάνυ γε.
Ath. Then one must also take the same view of the practice of wine-drinking, if one can rightly class it amongst the others.
ΑΘ. καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον, εἴπερ ἔνι τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις ὀρθῶς διανοηθῆναι.
Clin. Of course one must.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Ath. If then this practice should be shown to be quite as beneficial for us as bodily training, certainly at the outset it is superior to it, in so far as it is not, like bodily training, accompanied by pain.
ΑΘ. ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἔχουσα φαίνηται μηδὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐλάττω, τῇ γε ἀρχῇ τὴν σωμασκίαν νικᾷ τῷ τὴν μὲν μετʼ ἀλγηδόνων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μή.
646e. Clin. That is true; but I should be surprised if we succeeded in discovering in it any benefit.
646e. ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις, θαυμάζοιμι δʼ ἂν εἴ τι δυναίμεθα τοιοῦτον ἐν αὐτῷ καταμαθεῖν.
Ath. That is precisely the point which we must at once try to make plain. Tell me now: can we discern two kinds of fear, of which the one is nearly the opposite of the other?
ΑΘ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ δὴ νῦν, ὡς ἔοιχʼ, ἡμῖν ἤδη πειρατέον φράζειν. καί μοι λέγε· δύο φόβων εἴδη σχεδὸν ἐναντία δυνάμεθα κατανοῆσαι;
Clin. What kinds do you mean?
ΚΛ. ποῖα δή;
Ath. These: when we expect evils to occur, we fear them.
ΑΘ. τὰ τοιάδε· φοβούμεθα μέν που τὰ κακά, προσδοκῶντες γενήσεσθαι.
647. Ath. And often we fear reputation, when we think we shall gain a bad repute for doing or saying something base;
647. ΑΘ. φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοί, πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην.
647a. and this fear we (like everybody else, I imagine) call shame.Clin. Of course.Ath. These are the two fears I was meaning; and of these the second is opposed to pains and to all other objects of fear, and opposed also to the greatest and most numerous pleasures.Clin. Very true.Ath. Does not, then, the lawgiver, and every man who is worth anything, hold this kind of fear in the highest honor, and name it “modesty”; and to the confidence which is opposed to it does he not give the name “immodesty,” and pronounce it to be for all, both publicly and privately, a very great evil?
647a. ΚΛ. τί δʼ οὔ;ΑΘ. τούτους δὴ δύο ἔλεγον φόβους· ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐναντίος μὲν ταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβοις, ἐναντίος δʼ ἐστὶ ταῖς πλείσταις καὶ μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς.ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ νομοθέτης, καὶ πᾶς οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, τοῦτον τὸν φόβον ἐν τιμῇ μεγίστῃ σέβει, καὶ καλῶν αἰδῶ, τὸ τούτῳ θάρρος ἐναντίον ἀναίδειάν τε προσαγορεύει καὶ μέγιστον κακὸν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶσι νενόμικεν;
647b. Clin. Quite right.
647b. ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Ath. And does not this fear, besides saving us in many other important respects, prove more effective than anything else in ensuring for us victory in war and security? For victory is, in fact, ensured by two things, of which the one is confidence towards enemies, the other, fear of the shame of cowardice in the eyes of friends.
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τά τʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁ φόβος ἡμᾶς οὗτος σῴζει, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νίκην καὶ σωτηρίαν ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτως σφόδρα ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται; δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὸν τὰ τὴν νίκην ἀπεργαζόμενα, θάρρος μὲν πολεμίων, φίλων δὲ φόβος αἰσχύνης πέρι κακῆς.
Clin. That is so.
ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Ath. Thus each one of us ought to become both fearless and fearful;
ΑΘ. ἄφοβον ἡμῶν ἄρα δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβερὸν ἕκαστον·
647c. and that for the several reasons we have now explained.
647c. ὧν δʼ ἑκάτερον ἕνεκα, διῃρήμεθα.
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ath. Moreover, when we desire to make a person fearless in respect of a number of fears, it is by drawing him, with the help of the law, into fear that we make him such.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἄφοβόν γε ἕκαστον βουληθέντες ποιεῖν φόβων πολλῶν τινων, εἰς φόβον ἄγοντες αὐτὸν μετὰ νόμου, τοιοῦτον ἀπεργαζόμεθα.
Clin. Apparently.
ΚΛ. φαινόμεθα.
Ath. And how about the opposite case, when we attempt with the aid of justice to make a man fearful? Is it not by pitting him against shamelessness and exercising him against it that we must make him victorious in the fight against his own pleasures? Or shall we say that, whereas in the case of courage it is only by fighting and conquering his innate cowardice that a man can become perfect, and no one unversed and unpracticed in contests of this sort can attain even half the excellence of which he is capable,—in the case of temperance, on the other hand, a man may attain perfection without a stubborn fight against hordes of pleasures and lusts which entice towards shamelessness and wrong-doing, and without conquering them by the aid of speech and act and skill, alike in play and at work,—and, in fact, without undergoing any of these experiences?
ΑΘ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἐπιχειρῶμέν τινα φοβερὸν ποιεῖν μετὰ δίκης; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναισχυντίᾳ συμβάλλοντας αὐτὸν καὶ προσγυμνάζοντας νικᾶν δεῖ ποιεῖν διαμαχόμενον αὑτοῦ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς; ἢ τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὑτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἄπειρος δὲ δήπου καὶ ἀγύμναστος ὢν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ὁστισοῦν οὐδʼ ἂν ἥμισυς ἑαυτοῦ γένοιτο πρὸς ἀρετήν, σώφρων δὲ ἄρα τελέως ἔσται μὴ πολλαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν διαμεμαχημένος καὶ νενικηκὼς μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καὶ τέχνης ἔν τε παιδιαῖς καὶ ἐν σπουδαῖς, ἀλλʼ ἀπαθὴς ὢν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων;
647d. Clin. It would not be reasonable to suppose so.
647d. ΚΛ. οὔκουν τόν γʼ εἰκότα λόγον ἂν ἔχοι.
647e. Ath. Well then:
647e. ΑΘ. τί οὖν;
648. Ath.in the case of fear does there exist any specific, given by God to men, such that, the more a man likes to drink of it, the more, at every draught, he fancies himself plunged in misfortune and finally, though he be the bravest of men, he arrives at a state of abject terror; whereas, when he has once got relieved of the potion and slept it off, he always becomes his normal self again?
648. ΑΘ. φόβου φάρμακον ἔσθʼ ὅστις θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε ὁπόσῳ πλέον ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις πίνειν αὐτοῦ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτὸν νομίζειν καθʼ ἑκάστην πόσιν δυστυχῆ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ παρόντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα αὑτῷ πάντα, καὶ τελευτῶντα εἰς πᾶν δέος ἰέναι τὸν ἀνδρειότατον ἀνθρώπων, ἐκκοιμηθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῦ πώματος ἀπαλλαγέντα πάλιν ἑκάστοτε τὸν αὐτὸν γίγνεσθαι.
648a. Clin. What potion of the kind can we mention, Stranger, as existing anywhere?
648a. ΚΛ. καὶ τί τοιοῦτον φαῖμεν ἄν, ὦ ξένε, ἐν ἀνθρώποις γεγονέναι πῶμα;
Ath. There is none. Supposing, however, that there had been one, would it have been of any service to the lawgiver for promoting courage? For instance, we might quite well have addressed him concerning it in this wise: “Come now, O lawgiver,—whether it be Cretans you are legislating for or anyone else, would not your first desire be to have a test of courage and of cowardice which you might apply to your citizens?”
ΑΘ. οὐδέν· εἰ δʼ οὖν ἐγένετό ποθεν, ἔσθʼ ὅτι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἦν ἂν νομοθέτῃ χρήσιμον; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι· φέρε, ὦ νομοθέτα, εἴτε Κρησὶν εἴθʼ οἱστισινοῦν νομοθετεῖς, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν ἆρʼ ἂν δέξαιο βάσανον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας;
648b. Clin. Obviously everyone of them would say “Yes.”
648b. ΚΛ. φαίη που πᾶς ἂν δῆλον ὅτι.
Ath. “And would you desire a test that was safe and free from serious risks, or the reverse?”
ΑΘ. τί δέ; μετʼ ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων μεγάλων ἢ μετὰ τῶν ἐναντίων;
Clin. All will agree, also, that the test must be safe.
ΚΛ. καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῆς ἀσφαλείας συνομολογήσει πᾶς.
Ath. “And would you utilize the test by bringing men into these fears and proving them while thus affected, so as to compel them to become fearless; employing exhortations admonitions and rewards,— but degradation for all those that refused to conform wholly to the character you prescribed?
ΑΘ. χρῷο δʼ ἂν εἰς τοὺς φόβους τούτους ἄγων καὶ ἐλέγχων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκάζειν ἄφοβον γίγνεσθαι, παρακελευόμενος καὶ νουθετῶν καὶ τιμῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμάζων, ὅστις σοι μὴ πείθοιτο εἶναι τοιοῦτος οἷον σὺ τάττοις ἐν πᾶσιν;
648c. And would you acquit without penalty everyone who had trained himself manfully and well, but impose a penalty on everyone who had done so badly? Or would you totally refuse to employ the potion as a test, although you have no objection to it on other grounds?”
648c. καὶ γυμνασάμενον μὲν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀζήμιον ἀπαλλάττοις ἄν, κακῶς δέ, ζημίαν ἐπιτιθείς; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν χρῷο, μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐγκαλῶν τῷ πώματι;
Clin. Of course he would employ it, Stranger.
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἂν χρῷτο, ὦ ξένε;
Ath. At any rate, my friend, the training involved would be wonderfully simple, as compared with our present methods, whether it were applied to individuals singly, or to small groups, or to groups ever so large.
ΑΘ. γυμνασία γοῦν, ὦ φίλε, παρὰ τὰ νῦν θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνης ἂν εἴη καθʼ ἕνα καὶ κατʼ ὀλίγους καὶ καθʼ ὁπόσους τις ἀεὶ βούλοιτο·
648d. Suppose, then, that a man, actuated by a feeling of shame and loth to show himself in public before he was in the best of condition, should remain alone by himself while undergoing this training against fears and relying on the potion alone for his solitary equipment, instead of endless exercises,—he would be acting quite rightly: so too would he who, trusting in himself that by nature and practice he is already well equipped, should have no hesitation in training in company with a number of drinking companions and showing off how for speed and strength he is superior to the potency of the draughts he is obliged to drink, with the result that because of his excellence he neither commits any grave impropriety nor loses his head, and who, before they came to the last round, should quit the company, through fear of the defeat inflicted on all men by the wine-cup.
648d. καὶ εἴτε τις ἄρα μόνος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενος, πρὶν εὖ σχεῖν ἡγούμενος ὁρᾶσθαι μὴ δεῖν, οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς φόβους γυμνάζοιτο, πῶμα μόνον ἀντὶ μυρίων πραγμάτων παρασκευαζόμενος, ὀρθῶς ἄν τι πράττοι, εἴτε τις ἑαυτῷ πιστεύων φύσει καὶ μελέτῃ καλῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, μηδὲν ὀκνοῖ μετὰ συμποτῶν πλειόνων γυμναζόμενος ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν ἐν τῇ τοῦ πώματος ἀναγκαίᾳ διαφορᾷ δύναμιν ὑπερθέων καὶ κρατῶν, ὥστε ὑπʼ ἀσχημοσύνης μηδὲ ἓν σφάλλεσθαι μέγα μηδʼ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι διʼ ἀρετήν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοιτο πρὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι, τὴν πάντων ἧτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος.
649. Clin. Yes, Stranger, this man too would be acting temperately.
649. ΚΛ. ναί· σωφρονοῖ γὰρ ⟨ἄν⟩, ὦ ξένε, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος οὕτω πράττων.
649a. Ath. Once more let us address the lawgiver and say: “Be it so, O lawgiver, that for producing fear no such drug apparently has been given to men by God, nor have we devised such ourselves (for quacks I count not of our company); but does there exist a potion for inducing fearlessness and excessive and untimely confidence,—of what shall we say about this?”
649a. ΑΘ. πάλιν δὴ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην λέγωμεν τάδε· εἶεν, ὦ νομοθέτα, τοῦ μὲν δὴ φόβου σχεδὸν οὔτε θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις τοιοῦτον φάρμακον οὔτε αὐτοὶ μεμηχανήμεθα— τοὺς γὰρ γόητας οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω—τῆς δὲ ἀφοβίας καὶ τοῦ λίαν θαρρεῖν καὶ ἀκαίρως ἃ μὴ χρή, πότερον ἔστιν πῶμα, ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;