714e. Ath. Yes, for this is one of those “agreed claims” concerning government.Clin. What “claims”? Ath. Those which we dealt with before,—claims as to who should govern whom. It was shown that parents should govern children, the older the younger, the high-born the low-born, and (if you remember) there were many other claims, some of which were conflicting. The claim before us is one of these, and we said that —to quote Pindar—the law marches with nature when it justifies the right of might.
714e. ΚΛ. ποίων δή; ΑΘ. τῶν ἃ τότε ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, τίνας τίνων ἄρχειν δεῖ. καὶ ἐφάνη δὴ γονέας μὲν ἐκγόνων, νεωτέρων δὲ πρεσβυτέρους, γενναίους δὲ ἀγεννῶν, καὶ σύχνʼ ἄττα ἦν ἄλλʼ, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, καὶ ἐμπόδια ἕτερα ἑτέροισι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἓν ἦν αὐτῶν τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφαμέν που κατὰ φύσιν τὸν Πίνδαρον ἄγειν δικαιοῦντα τὸ βιαιότατον, ὡς φάναι.
715a. Clin. Yes, that is what was said then.
715a. ΚΛ. ναί, ταῦτʼ ἦν ἃ τότε ἐλέχθη.
Ath. Consider now, to which class of men should we entrust our State. For the condition referred to is one that has already occurred in States thousands of times.
ΑΘ. σκόπει δὴ ποτέροις τισὶν ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἐστιν παραδοτέα. γέγονεν γὰρ δὴ μυριάκις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔν τισι πόλεσιν.
Clin. What condition?
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
Ath. Where offices of rule are open to contest, the victors in the contest monopolize power in the State so completely that they offer not the smallest share in office to the vanquished party or their descendants; and each party keeps a watchful eye on the other, lest anyone should come into office and, in revenge for the former troubles, cause a rising against them.
ΑΘ. ἀρχῶν περιμαχήτων γενομένων, οἱ νικήσαντες τά τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττηθεῖσιν, μήτε αὐτοῖς μήτε ἐκγόνοις, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μή ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν.
715b. Such polities we, of course, deny to be polities, just as we deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the common weal of the whole State. But where the laws are enacted in the interest of a section, we call them feudalities rather than polities; and the “justice” they ascribe to such laws is, we say, an empty name. Our reason for saying this is that in your State we shall assign office to a man, not because he is wealthy, nor because he possesses any other quality of the kind—such as strength or size or birth; but the ministration of the laws must be assigned, as we assert, to that man who is most obedient to the laws and wins the victory for obedience in the State,—the highest office to the first, the next to him that shows the second degree of mastery, and the rest must similarly be assigned, each in succession, to those that come next in order.
715b. ταύτας δήπου φαμὲν ἡμεῖς νῦν οὔτʼ εἶναι πολιτείας, οὔτʼ ὀρθοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐτέθησαν· οἳ δʼ ἕνεκά τινων, στασιώτας ἀλλʼ οὐ πολίτας τούτους φαμέν, καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια ἅ φασιν εἶναι, μάτην εἰρῆσθαι. λέγεται δὲ τοῦδʼ ἕνεκα ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἡμεῖς τῇ σῇ πόλει ἀρχὰς οὔθʼ ὅτι πλούσιός ἐστίν τις δώσομεν, οὔθʼ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο οὐδὲν κεκτημένος, ἰσχὺν ἢ μέγεθος ἤ τι γένος·
715c. And those who are termed “magistrates” I have now called “ministers” of the laws, not for the sake of coining a new phrase, but in the belief that salvation, or ruin, for a State hangs upon nothing so much as this. For wherever in a State the law is subservient and impotent, over that State I see ruin impending; but wherever the law is lord over the magistrates, and the magistrates are servants to the law, there I descry salvation and all the blessings that the gods bestow on States.
715c. ὃς δʼ ἂν τοῖς τεθεῖσι νόμοις εὐπειθέστατός τε ᾖ καὶ νικᾷ ταύτην τὴν νίκην ἐν τῇ πόλει, τούτῳ φαμὲν καὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν δοτέον εἶναι τὴν μεγίστην τῷ πρώτῳ, καὶ δευτέραν τῷ τὰ δεύτερα κρατοῦντι, καὶ κατὰ λόγον οὕτω τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τὰ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἕκαστα ἀποδοτέον εἶναι. τοὺς δʼ ἄρχοντας λεγομένους νῦν ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις ἐκάλεσα οὔτι καινοτομίας ὀνομάτων ἕνεκα, ἀλλʼ ἡγοῦμαι παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο σωτηρίαν τε πόλει καὶ τοὐναντίον. ἐν ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀρχόμενος ᾖ καὶ ἄκυρος νόμος, φθορὰν ὁρῶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἑτοίμην οὖσαν· ἐν ᾗ δὲ ἂν δεσπότης τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου, σωτηρίαν καὶ πάντα ὅσα θεοὶ πόλεσιν ἔδοσαν ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καθορῶ.
Clin. Aye, by Heaven, Stranger; for, as befits your age, you have keen sight.
ΚΛ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ ξένε· καθʼ ἡλικίαν γὰρ ὀξὺ βλέπεις.
Ath. Yes; for a man’s vision of such objects is at its dullest when he is young, but at its keenest when he is old.
ΑΘ. νέος μὲν γὰρ ὢν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύτατα αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ὁρᾷ, γέρων δὲ ὀξύτατα.
715e. Clin. Very true.
715e. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
Ath. What, then, is to be our next step? May we not assume that our immigrants have arrived and are in the country, and should we not proceed with our address to them?
ΑΘ. τί δὴ τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρʼ οὐχ ἥκοντας μὲν καὶ παρόντας θῶμεν τοὺς ἐποίκους, τὸν δʼ ἑξῆς αὐτοῖς διαπεραντέον ἂν εἴη λόγον;
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
716. Ath. Let us, then, speak to them thus:—“O men, that God who, as old tradition tells, holdeth the beginning, the end, and the center of all things that exist, completeth his circuit by nature’s ordinance in straight, unswerving course.
716. ΑΘ. ἄνδρες τοίνυν φῶμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος·
716a. With him followeth Justice, as avenger of them that fall short of the divine law; and she, again, is followed by every man who would fain be happy, cleaving to her with lowly and orderly behavior; but whoso is uplifted by vainglory, or prideth himself on his riches or his honors or his comeliness of body, and through this pride joined to youth and folly, is inflamed in soul with insolence, dreaming that he has no need of ruler or guide, but rather is competent himself to guide others,— such an one is abandoned and left behind by the God, and when left behind he taketh to him others of like nature, and by his mad prancings throweth all into confusion: to many, indeed, he seemeth to be some great one, but after no long time he payeth the penalty, not unmerited, to Justice, when he bringeth to total ruin himself, his house, and his country.
716a. τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός, ἧς ὁ μὲν εὐδαιμονήσειν μέλλων ἐχόμενος συνέπεται ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος, ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθʼ ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ, καταλειφθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλους τοιούτους προσλαβὼν σκιρτᾷ ταράττων πάντα ἅμα, καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις, μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησεν.
716b. Looking at these things, thus ordained, what ought the prudent man to do, or to devise, or to refrain from doing?”
716b. πρὸς ταῦτʼ οὖν οὕτω διατεταγμένα τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τί μὴ τὸν ἔμφρονα;
Clin. The answer is plain: Every man ought so to devise as to be of the number of those who follow in the steps of the God.
ΚΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε· ὡς τῶν συνακολουθησόντων ἐσόμενον τῷ θεῷ δεῖ διανοηθῆναι πάντα ἄνδρα.
716c. Ath. What conduct, then, is dear to God and in his steps? One kind of conduct, expressed in one ancient phrase, namely, that “like is dear to like” when it is moderate, whereas immoderate things are dear neither to one another nor to things moderate. In our eyes God will be “the measure of all things” in the highest degree—a degree much higher than is any “man” they talk of. He, then, that is to become dear to such an one must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like character; and, according to the present argument, he amongst us that is temperate is dear to God, since he is like him, while he that is not temperate is unlike and at enmity,—as is also he who is unjust, and so likewise with the rest, by parity of reasoning.
716c. ΑΘ. τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ; μία, καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δʼ ἄμετρα οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις. ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, ἄνθρωπος· τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον, εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν θεῷ φίλος, ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ διάφορος καὶ ⟨ὁ⟩ ἄδικος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλʼ οὕτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἔχει.
716d. On this there follows, let us observe, this further rule,—and of all rules it is the noblest and truest,—that to engage in sacrifice and communion with the gods continually, by prayers and offerings and devotions of every kind, is a thing most noble and good and helpful towards the happy life, and superlatively fitting also, for the good man; but for the wicked, the very opposite.
716d. νοήσωμεν δὴ τούτοις ἑπόμενον εἶναι τὸν τοιόνδε λόγον, ἁπάντων κάλλιστον καὶ ἀληθέστατον οἶμαι λόγων, ὡς τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θύειν καὶ προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀναθήμασιν καὶ συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατον πρὸς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ δὴ καὶ διαφερόντως πρέπον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τούτων τἀναντία πέφυκεν.
717. Ath. For the wicked man is unclean of soul, whereas the good man is clean; and from him that is defiled no good man, nor god, can ever rightly receive gifts.
717. ΑΘ. ἀκάθαρτος γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ γε κακός, καθαρὸς δὲ ὁ ἐναντίος, παρὰ δὲ μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτε ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε θεὸν ἔστιν ποτὲ τό γε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι·
717a. Therefore all the great labor that impious men spend upon the gods is in vain, but that of the pious is most profitable to them all. Here, then, is the mark at which we must aim; but as to shafts we should shoot, and (so to speak) the flight of them,—what kind of shafts, think you, would fly most straight to the mark? First of all, we say, if—after the honors paid to the Olympians and the gods who keep the State—we should assign the Even and the Left as their honors to the gods of the under-world, we would be aiming most straight at the mark of piety— as also in assigning to the former gods the things superior, the opposites of these.
717a. μάτην οὖν περὶ θεοὺς ὁ πολύς ἐστι πόνος τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, τοῖσιν δὲ ὁσίοις ἐγκαιρότατος ἅπασιν. σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οὗτος οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι· βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις τὰ ποῖʼ ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτʼ ἄν; πρῶτον μέν, φαμέν, τιμὰς τὰς μετʼ Ὀλυμπίους τε καὶ τοὺς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντας θεοὺς τοῖς χθονίοις ἄν τις θεοῖς ἄρτια καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἀριστερὰ νέμων ὀρθότατα τοῦ τῆς εὐσεβείας σκοποῦ τυγχάνοι, τὰ δὲ τούτων ἄνωθεν [τὰ περιττὰ] καὶ ἀντίφωνα, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθεῖσιν νυνδή.
717b. Next after these gods the wise man will offer worship to the daemons, and after the daemons to the heroes. After these will come private shrines legally dedicated to ancestral deities; and next, honors paid to living parents. For to these duty enjoins that the debtor should pay back the first and greatest of debts, the most primary of all dues, and that he should acknowledge that all that he owns and has belongs to those who begot and reared him, so that he ought to give them service to the utmost of his power—with substance, with body, and with soul, all three—thus making returns for the loans of care and pain spent on the children by those who suffered on their behalf in bygone years, and recompensing the old in their old age, when they need help most.
717b. μετὰ θεοὺς δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτʼ ἄν, ἥρωσιν δὲ μετὰ τούτους. ἐπακολουθοῖ δʼ αὐτοῖς ἱδρύματα ἴδια πατρῴων θεῶν κατὰ νόμον ὀργιαζόμενα, γονέων δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τιμαὶ ζώντων· ὡς θέμις ὀφείλοντα ἀποτίνειν τὰ πρῶτά τε καὶ μέγιστα ὀφειλήματα, χρεῶν πάντων πρεσβύτατα, νομίζειν δέ, ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει, πάντα εἶναι τῶν γεννησάντων καὶ θρεψαμένων πρὸς τὸ παρέχειν αὐτὰ εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνοις κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, δεύτερα τὰ τοῦ σώματος, τρίτα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀποτίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ὑπερπονούντων ὠδῖνας παλαιὰς ἐπὶ νέοις δανεισθείσας, ἀποδιδόντα δὲ παλαιοῖς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ σφόδρα κεχρημένοις.
717c. And throughout all his life he must diligently observe reverence of speech towards his parents above all things, seeing that for light and winged words there is a most heavy penalty,—for over all such matters Nemesis, messenger of Justice, is appointed to keep watch; wherefore the son must yield to his parents when they are wroth, and when they give rein to their wrath either by word or deed, he must pardon them, seeing that it is most natural for a father to be especially wroth when he deems that he is wronged by his own son.
717c. παρὰ δὲ πάντα τὸν βίον ἔχειν τε καὶ ἐσχηκέναι χρὴ πρὸς αὑτοῦ γονέας εὐφημίαν διαφερόντως, διότι κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία—πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος—θυμουμένοις τε οὖν ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποπιμπλᾶσι τὸν θυμόν, ἐάντʼ ἐν λόγοις ἐάντʼ ἐν ἔργοις δρῶσιν τὸ τοιοῦτον, συγγιγνώσκοντα, ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα πατὴρ ὑεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτʼ ἂν διαφερόντως.
717d. When parents die, the most modest funeral rites are the best, whereby the son neither exceeds the accustomed pomp, nor falls short of what his forefathers paid to their sires; and in like manner he should duly bestow the yearly attentions, which ensure honor, on the rites already completed.
717d. τελευτησάντων δὲ γονέων ταφὴ μὲν ἡ σωφρονεστάτη καλλίστη, μήτε ὑπεραίροντα τῶν εἰθισμένων ὄγκων μήτʼ ἐλλείποντα ὧν οἱ προπάτορες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν γεννητὰς ἐτίθεσαν, τάς τε αὖ κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν τῶν ἤδη τέλος ἐχόντων ὡσαύτως ἐπιμελείας τὰς κόσμον φερούσας ἀποδιδόναι·
718. Ath. He should always venerate them, by never failing to provide a continual memorial, and assigning to the deceased a due share of the means which fortune Provides for expenditure.
718. ΑΘ. τῷ δὲ μὴ παραλείπειν μνήμην ἐνδελεχῆ παρεχόμενον, τούτῳ μάλιστʼ ἀεὶ πρεσβεύειν, δαπάνης τε τῆς διδομένης ὑπὸ τύχης τὸ μέτριον τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν νέμοντα.
718a. Every one of us, if we acted thus and observed these rules of life, would win always a due reward from the gods and from all that are mightier than ourselves, and would pass the greatest part of our lives in the enjoyment of hopes of happiness. As regards duties to children, relations, friends and citizens, and those of service done to strangers for Heaven’s sake, and of social intercourse with all those classes,—by fulfilling which a man should brighten his own life and order it as the law enjoins,— the sequel of the laws themselves, partly by persuasion and partly (when men’s habits defy persuasion) by forcible and just chastisement, will render our State, with the concurrence of the gods, a blessed State and a prosperous.
718a. ταῦτʼ ἂν ποιοῦντες καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ζῶντες ἑκάστοτε ἕκαστοι τὴν ἀξίαν ἂν παρὰ θεῶν καὶ ὅσοι κρείττονες ἡμῶν κομιζοίμεθα, ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀγαθαῖς διάγοντες τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου. ἃ δὲ πρὸς ἐκγόνους καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ φίλους καὶ πολίτας, ὅσα τε ξενικὰ πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεύματα καὶ ὁμιλίας συμπάντων τούτων ἀποτελοῦντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον φαιδρυνάμενον κατὰ νόμον κοσμεῖν δεῖ, τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν ἡ διέξοδος, τὰ μὲν πείθουσα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπείκοντα πειθοῖ τῶν ἠθῶν βίᾳ καὶ δίκῃ κολάζουσα, τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν συμβουληθέντων θεῶν μακαρίαν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἀποτελεῖ·
718b. There are also matters which a lawgiver, if he shares my view, must necessarily regulate, though they are ill-suited for statement in the form of a law; in dealing with these he ought, in my opinion, to produce a sample for his own use and that of those for whom he is legislating, and, after expounding all other matters as best he can, pass on next to commencing the task of legislation.
718b. ἃ δὲ χρὴ μὲν αὖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν νομοθέτην ὅστις ἅπερ ἐγὼ διανοεῖται, ἐν δὲ σχήματι νόμου ἀναρμοστεῖ λεγόμενα, τούτων πέρι δοκεῖ μοι δεῖγμα προενεγκόντα αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἐκείνοις οἷς νομοθετήσει, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα εἰς δύναμιν διεξελθόντα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄρχεσθαι τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων.
718c. Clin. What is the special form in which such matters are laid down?Ath. It is by no means easy to embrace them all in a single model of statement (so to speak) but let us conceive of them in some such way as this, in case we may succeed in affirming something definite about them.Clin. Tell us what that “something” is.Ath. I should desire the people to be as docile as possible in the matter of virtue; and this evidently is what the legislator will endeavor to effect in all his legislation.
718c. ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τίνι μάλιστα σχήματι κείμενα; οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινι τύπῳ, ἀλλʼ οὑτωσί τινα τρόπον λάβωμεν, ἄν τι δυνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν βεβαιώσασθαι.ΚΛ. λέγε τὸ ποῖον.ΑΘ. βουλοίμην ἂν αὐτοὺς ὡς εὐπειθεστάτους πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πειράσεται τοῦτο ὁ νομοθέτης ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιεῖν τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ.
718d. Clin. Assuredly.
718d. ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. I thought the address we have made might prove of some help in making them listen to its monitions with souls not utterly savage, but in a more civil and less hostile mood. So that we may be well content if as I say, it renders the hearer even but a little more docile, because a little less hostile. For there is no great plenty or abundance of persons anxious to become with all speed as good as possible; the majority, indeed, serve to show how wise Hesiod was when he said,“smooth is the way that leadeth unto wickedness,” and that “no sweat is needed to traverse it,” since it is “passing short,”but (he says)—In front of goodness the immortal godsHave set the sweat of toil, and thereuntoLong is the road and steep, and rough withal The first ascent; but when the crest is won,’Tis easy travelling, albeit ’twas hard.
ΑΘ. τὰ τοίνυν δὴ λεχθέντα ἔδοξέν τί μοι προὔργου δρᾶν εἰς τὸ περὶ ὧν ἂν παραινῇ, μὴ παντάπασιν ὠμῆς ψυχῆς λαβόμενα, ἡμερώτερόν τε ἂν ἀκούειν καὶ εὐμενέστερον· ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, σμικρὸν δέ, τὸν ἀκούοντα ὅπερ φησὶν εὐμενέστερον γιγνόμενον εὐμαθέστερον ἀπεργάσεται, πᾶν ἀγαπητόν. οὐ γὰρ πολλή τις εὐπέτεια οὐδὲ ἀφθονία τῶν προθυμουμένων ὡς ἀρίστων ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ὡς τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ Ἡσίοδον οἱ πολλοὶ σοφὸν ἀποφαίνουσι λέγοντα ὡςἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κακότητα ὁδὸς λεία καὶ ἀνιδιτὶ παρέχει πορεύεσθαι, μάλα βραχεῖα οὖσα, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς,φησίν,… ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκανἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν, καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δʼ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,ῥηιδίη δὴ ʼπειτα φέρειν, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.
719. Clin. The poet speaks nobly, I should say.
719. ΚΛ. καὶ καλῶς γʼ ἔοικεν λέγοντι.
Ath. He certainly does. Now I wish to put before you what I take to be the result of the foregoing argument.
ΑΘ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ὁ δὲ προάγων λόγος ὅ γέ μοι ἀπείργασται, βούλομαι ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτὸ θεῖναι.
Clin. Do so.
ΚΛ. τίθει δή.
Ath. Let us address the lawgiver and say: “Tell us, O lawgiver: if you knew what we ought to do and say, is it not obvious that you would state it?”
ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ νομοθέτῃ διαλεγόμενοι τόδε· εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ὦ νομοθέτα·
719b. Clin. Inevitably.Ath. “Now did not we hear you saying a little while ago that the lawgiver should not permit the poets to compose just as they please? For they would not be likely to know what saying of theirs might be contrary to the laws and injurious to the State.”Clin. That is quite true.Ath. Would our address be reasonable, if we were to address him on behalf of the poets in these terms?—Clin. What terms?
719b. εἴπερ ὅτι χρὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς καὶ λέγειν εἰδείης, ἆρα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἂν εἴποις;ΚΛ. ἀναγκαῖον.ΑΘ. σμικρῷ μὲν δὴ πρόσθεν ἆρα οὐκ ἠκούσαμέν σου λέγοντος ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην οὐ δεῖ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς ᾖ φίλον; οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδεῖεν τί ποτʼ ἐναντίον τοῖς νόμοις ἂν λέγοντες βλάπτοιεν τὴν πόλιν.ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι λέγεις.ΑΘ. ὑπὲρ δὴ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰ τάδε λέγοιμεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἆρʼ ἂν τὰ λεχθέντα εἴη μέτρια;ΚΛ. ποῖα;
719c. Ath. These:—“There is, O lawgiver, an ancient saying—constantly repeated by ourselves and endorsed by everyone else—that whenever a poet is seated on the Muses’ tripod, he is not in his senses, but resembles a fountain, which gives free course to the upward rush of water and, since his art consists in imitation, he is compelled often to contradict himself, when he creates characters of contradictory moods; and he knows not which of these contradictory utterances is true. But it is not possible for the lawgiver in his law thus to compose two statements about a single matter; but he must always publish one single statement about one matter.
719c. ΑΘ. τάδε· παλαιὸς μῦθος, ὦ νομοθέτα, ὑπό τε αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἀεὶ λεγόμενός ἐστιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν συνδεδογμένος, ὅτι ποιητής, ὁπόταν ἐν τῷ τρίποδι τῆς Μούσης καθίζηται, τότε οὐκ ἔμφρων ἐστίν, οἷον δὲ κρήνη τις τὸ ἐπιὸν ῥεῖν ἑτοίμως ἐᾷ, καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως ἀναγκάζεται, ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν διατιθεμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὑτῷ πολλάκις, οἶδεν δὲ οὔτʼ εἰ ταῦτα οὔτʼ εἰ θάτερα ἀληθῆ τῶν λεγομένων.
719d. Take an example from one of your own recent statements. A funeral may be either excessive or defective or moderate: of these three alternatives you chose one, the moderate, and this you prescribe, after praising it unconditionally. I, on the other hand, if (in my poem) I had a wife of surpassing wealth, and she were to bid me bury her, would extol the tomb of excessive grandeur; while a poor and stingy man would praise the defective tomb, and the person of moderate means, if a moderate man himself, would praise the same one as you.
719d. τῷ δὲ νομοθέτῃ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, δύο περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ ἕνα περὶ ἑνὸς ἀεὶ δεῖ λόγον ἀποφαίνεσθαι. σκέψαι δʼ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ νυνδὴ λεχθέντων. οὔσης γὰρ ταφῆς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβεβλημένης, τῆς δὲ ἐλλειπούσης, τῆς δὲ μετρίας, τὴν μίαν ἑλόμενος σύ, τὴν μέσην, ταύτην προστάττεις καὶ ἐπῄνεσας ἁπλῶς· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν γυνή μοι διαφέρουσα εἴη πλούτῳ καὶ θάπτειν αὑτὴν διακελεύοιτο ἐν τῷ ποιήματι, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα ἂν τάφον ἐπαινοίην, φειδωλὸς δʼ αὖ τις καὶ πένης ἀνὴρ τὸν καταδεᾶ, μέτρον δὲ οὐσίας κεκτημένος καὶ μέτριος αὐτὸς ὢν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν ἐπαινέσαι.
719e. But you should not merely speak of a thing as moderate, in the way you have now done, but you should explain what ‘the moderate’ is, and what is its size; otherwise it is too soon for you to propose that such a statement should be made law.”
719e. σοὶ δὲ οὐχ οὕτω ῥητέον ὡς νῦν εἶπες μέτριον εἰπών, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μέτριον καὶ ὁπόσον ῥητέον, ἢ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον μήπω σοι διανοοῦ γίγνεσθαι νόμον.
Clin. Exceedingly true.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
720. Ath. Should, then, our appointed president of the laws commence his laws with no such prefatory statement, but declare at once what must be done and what not, and state the penalty which threatens disobedience, and so turn off to another law, without adding to his statutes a single word of encouragement and persuasion?
720. ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ φράζῃ τε, καὶ ἐπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημίαν, ἐπʼ ἄλλον τρέπηται νόμον, παραμυθίας δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς τοῖς νομοθετουμένοις μηδὲ ἓν προσδιδῷ;
720a. Just as is the way with doctors, one treats us in this fashion, and another in that: they have two different methods, which we may recall, in order that, like children who beg the doctor to treat them by the mildest method, so we may make a like request of the lawgiver. Shall I give an illustration of what I mean? There are men that are doctors, we say, and others that are doctors’ assistants; but we call the latter also, to be sure, by the name of “doctors.”
720a. καθάπερ ἰατρὸς δέ τις, ὁ μὲν οὕτως, ὁ δʼ ἐκείνως ἡμᾶς εἴωθεν ἑκάστοτε θεραπεύειν— ἀναμιμνῃσκώμεθα δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἑκάτερον, ἵνα τοῦ νομοθέτου δεώμεθα, καθάπερ ἰατροῦ δέοιντο ἂν παῖδες τὸν πρᾳότατον αὐτὸν θεραπεύειν τρόπον ἑαυτούς. οἷον δὴ τί λέγομεν; εἰσὶν πού τινες ἰατροί, φαμέν, καί τινες ὑπηρέται τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἰατροὺς δὲ καλοῦμεν δήπου καὶ τούτους.
720b. Clin. We do.
720b. ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ath. These, whether they be free-born or slaves, acquire their art under the direction of their masters, by observation and practice and not by the study of nature—which is the way in which the free-born doctors have learnt the art themselves and in which they instruct their own disciples. Would you assert that we have here two classes of what are called “doctors”?
ΑΘ. ἐάντε γε ἐλεύθεροι ὦσιν ἐάντε δοῦλοι, κατʼ ἐπίταξιν δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ κατʼ ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τέχνην κτῶνται, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ μή, καθάπερ οἱ ἐλεύθεροι αὐτοί τε μεμαθήκασιν οὕτω τούς τε αὑτῶν διδάσκουσι παῖδας. θείης ἂν ταῦτα δύο γένη τῶν καλουμένων ἰατρῶν;
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. You are also aware that, as the sick folk in the cities comprise both slaves and free men, the slaves are usually doctored by slaves, who either run round the town or wait in their surgeries; and not one of these doctors either gives or receives any account of the several ailments of the various domestics, but prescribes for each what he deems right from experience, just as though he had exact knowledge, and with the assurance of an autocrat; then up he jumps and off he rushes to another sick domestic, and thus he relieves his master in his attendance on the sick.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ συννοεῖς ὅτι, δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δοῦλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσιν περιτρέχοντες καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰατρείοις περιμένοντες, καὶ οὔτε τινὰ λόγον ἑκάστου πέρι νοσήματος ἑκάστου τῶν οἰκετῶν οὐδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων ἰατρῶν δίδωσιν οὐδʼ ἀποδέχεται, προστάξας δʼ αὐτῷ τὰ δόξαντα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς, καθάπερ τύραννος αὐθαδῶς, οἴχεται ἀποπηδήσας πρὸς ἄλλον κάμνοντα οἰκέτην, καὶ ῥᾳστώνην οὕτω τῷ δεσπότῃ παρασκευάζει τῶν καμνόντων
720d. But the free-born doctor is mainly engaged in visiting and treating the ailments of free men, and he does so by investigating them from the commencement and according to the course of nature; he talks with the patient himself and with his friends, and thus both learns himself from the sufferers and imparts instruction to them, so far as possible; and he gives no prescription until he has gained the patient’s consent, and only then, while securing the patient’s continued docility by means of persuasion, does he attempt to complete the task of restoring him to health.
720d. τῆς ἐπιμελείας· ὁ δὲ ἐλεύθερος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων νοσήματα θεραπεύει τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάζων ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ κάμνοντι κοινούμενος αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, ἅμα μὲν αὐτὸς μανθάνει τι παρὰ τῶν νοσούντων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ καθʼ ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν, διδάσκει τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐπέταξεν πρὶν ἄν πῃ συμπείσῃ, τότε δὲ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἡμερούμενον ἀεὶ παρασκευάζων τὸν κάμνοντα, εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν ἄγων, ἀποτελεῖν πειρᾶται;
720e. Which of these two methods of doctoring shows the better doctor, or of training, the better trainer? Should the doctor perform one and the same function in two ways, or do it in one way only and that the worse way of the two and the less humane?
720e. πότερον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἰατρός τε ἰώμενος ἀμείνων καὶ γυμναστὴς γυμνάζων· διχῇ τὴν μίαν ἀποτελῶν δύναμιν, ἢ μοναχῇ καὶ κατὰ τὸ χεῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ ἀγριώτερον ἀπεργαζόμενος;
Clin. The double method, Stranger, is by far the better.
ΚΛ. πολύ που διαφέρον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ διπλῇ.
Ath. Do you wish us to examine the double method and the single as applied also to actual legislation?
ΑΘ. βούλει δὴ καὶ θεασώμεθα τὸ διπλοῦν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν ταῖς νομοθεσίαις αὐταῖς γιγνόμενον;
Clin. Most certainly I wish it.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι;
721. Ath. Come, tell me then, in Heaven’s name,—what would be the first law to be laid down by the lawgiver? Will he not follow the order of nature, and in his ordinances regulate first the starting-point of generation in States?
721. ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, τίνʼ ἄρα πρῶτον νόμον θεῖτʼ ἂν ὁ νομοθέτης; ἆρʼ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρώτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσιν;
721a. Clin. Of course.
721a. ΚΛ. τί μήν;
Ath. Does not the starting-point of generation in all States lie in the union and partnership of marriage?.
ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἆρʼ οὐχ ἡ τῶν γάμων σύμμειξις καὶ κοινωνία;
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. So it seems that, if the marriage laws were the first to be enacted, that would be the right course in every State.
ΑΘ. γαμικοὶ δὴ νόμοι πρῶτοι κινδυνεύουσιν τιθέμενοι καλῶς ἂν τίθεσθαι πρὸς ὀρθότητα πάσῃ πόλει.
Clin. Most assuredly.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. Let us state the law in its simple form first: how will it run? Probably like this:—“A man shall marry when he is thirty years old and under five and thirty; if he fails to do so, he shall be punished both by a fine in money and by degradation, the fine being of such and such an amount, and the degradation of such and such a kind.” Such shall be the simple form of marriage law. The double form shall be this,—“A man shall marry when he is thirty years old and under thirty-five, bearing in mind that this is the way by which the human race, by nature’s ordinance, shares in immortality, a thing for which nature has implanted in everyone a keen desire.
ΑΘ. λέγωμεν δὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἁπλοῦν, ἔχοι δʼ ἄν πως ἴσως ὧδε— γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι ἐτῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, εἰ δὲ μή, ζημιοῦσθαι χρήμασίν τε καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ, χρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀτιμίᾳ.ὁ μὲν ἁπλοῦς ἔστω τις τοιοῦτος περὶ γάμων, ὁ δὲ διπλοῦς ὅδε—γαμεῖν δέ, ἐπειδὰν ἐτῶν ᾖ τις τριάκοντα, μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ᾗ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τινὶ μετείληφεν ἀθανασίας, οὗ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαν
721c. The desire to win glory, instead of lying in a nameless grave, aims at a like object. Thus mankind is by nature coeval with the whole of time, in that it accompanies it continually both now and in the future; and the means by which it is immortal is this:—by leaving behind it children’s children and continuing ever one and the same, it thus by reproduction shares in immortality. That a man should deprive himself thereof voluntarily is never an act of holiness; and he who denies himself wife and children is guilty of such intentional deprivation. He who obeys the law may be dismissed without penalty, but he that disobeys and does not marry when thirty-five years old shall pay a yearly fine of such and such an amount,—lest he imagine that single life brings him gain and ease,—and he shall have no share in the honors which are paid from time to time by the younger men in the State to their seniors.” When one hears and compares this law with the former one, it is possible to judge in each particular case whether the laws ought to be at least double in length, through combining threats with persuasion, or only single in length, through employing threats alone.
721c. ἴσχειν πᾶς πᾶσαν· τὸ γὰρ γενέσθαι κλεινὸν καὶ μὴ ἀνώνυμον κεῖσθαι τετελευτηκότα τοῦ τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία. γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν τι συμφυὲς τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ συνέπεται καὶ συνέψεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ὂν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφέναι· τούτου δὴ ἀποστερεῖν ἑκόντα ἑαυτὸν οὐδέποτε ὅσιον, ἐκ προνοίας δὲ ἀποστερεῖ ὃς ἂν παίδων καὶ γυναικὸς ἀμελῇ. πειθόμενος μὲν οὖν τῷ νόμῳ ἀζήμιος ἀπαλλάττοιτο ἄν, μὴ πειθόμενος δὲ αὖ, μηδὲ γαμῶν ἔτη τριάκοντα γεγονὼς καὶ πέντε, ζημιούσθω μὲν κατʼ ἐνιαυτὸν τόσῳ καὶ τόσῳ, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ τὴν μοναυλίαν οἱ κέρδος καὶ ῥᾳστώνην φέρειν, καὶ μὴ μετεχέτω δὲ τιμῶν ὧν ἂν οἱ νεώτεροι ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὑτῶν τιμῶσιν ἑκάστοτε.τοῦτον δὴ παρʼ ἐκεῖνον τὸν νόμον ἀκούσαντα ἔξεστιν περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου διανοηθῆναι, πότερον αὐτοὺς διπλοῦς οὕτω δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τῷ μήκει τὸ σμικρότατον, διὰ τὸ πείθειν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀπειλεῖν, ἢ τῷ ἀπειλεῖν μόνον χρωμένους ἁπλοῦς γίγνεσθαι τοῖς μήκεσιν.
722. Meg. Our Laconian way, Stranger, is to prefer brevity always. But were I bidden to choose which of these two statutes I should desire to have enacted in writing in my State, I should choose the longer;
722. ΜΕ. πρὸς μὲν τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ τρόπου, ὦ ξένε, τὸ τὰ βραχύτερα ἀεὶ προτιμᾶν· τούτων μὴν τῶν γραμμάτων εἴ τις κριτὴν ἐμὲ κελεύοι γίγνεσθαι πότερα βουλοίμην ἂν ἐν τῇ πόλει μοι γεγραμμένα τεθῆναι, τὰ μακρότερʼ ἂν ἑλοίμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ παντὸς νόμου κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἑκάτερα, ταὐτὸν τοῦτʼ ἂν αἱροίμην.
722a. and what is more, I should make the same choice in the case of every law in which, as in the example before us, these two alternatives were offered. It is necessary, however, that the laws we are now enacting should have the approval of our friend Clinias also; for it is his State which is now proposing to make use of such things.
722a. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά που καὶ Κλεινίᾳ τῷδʼ ἀρέσκειν δεῖ τὰ νῦν νομοθετούμενα· τούτου γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἡ νῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι διανοουμένη.
Clin. I highly approve of all you have said, Megillus.
ΚΛ. καλῶς γʼ, ὦ Μέγιλλε, εἶπες.
Ath. Still, it is extremely foolish to argue about the length or brevity of writings, for what we should value, I suppose, is not their extreme brevity or prolixity, but their excellence; and in the case of the laws mentioned just now, not only does the one form possess double the value of the other in respect of practical excellence, but the example of the two kinds of doctors, recently mentioned, presents a very exact analogy.
ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ πολλῶν ἢ ὀλίγων γραμμάτων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον λίαν εὔηθες—τὰ γὰρ οἶμαι βέλτιστα, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ βραχύτατα οὐδὲ τὰ μήκη τιμητέον—τὰ δʼ ἐν τοῖς νυνδὴ νόμοις ῥηθεῖσιν οὐ διπλῷ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων διάφορα μόνον εἰς ἀρετὴν τῆς χρείας, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, τὸ τῶν διττῶν ἰατρῶν γένος ὀρθότατα παρετέθη.
722b. But as regards this, it appears that no legislator has ever yet observed that, while it is in their power to make use in their law-making of two methods,—namely, persuasion and force,—in so far as that is feasible in dealing with the uncultured populace, they actually employ one method only: in their legislation they do not temper compulsion with persuasion, but use untempered force alone.
722b. πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔοικε διανοηθῆναι πώποτε τῶν νομοθετῶν, ὡς ἐξὸν δυοῖν χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας, πειθοῖ καὶ βίᾳ, καθʼ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἄπειρον παιδείας ὄχλον, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶνται μόνον·
722c. And I, my dear sirs, perceive still a third requisite which ought to be found in laws, but which is nowhere to be found at present.
722c. οὐ γὰρ πειθοῖ κεραννύντες τὴν μάχην νομοθετοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἀκράτῳ μόνον τῇ βίᾳ. ἐγὼ δʼ, ὦ μακάριοι, καὶ τρίτον ἔτι περὶ τοὺς νόμους ὁρῶ γίγνεσθαι δέον, οὐδαμῇ τὰ νῦν γιγνόμενον.
Clin. What is it you allude to?
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
Ath. A matter which, by a kind of divine direction, has sprung out of the subjects we have now been discussing. It was little more than dawn when we began talking about laws, and now it is high noon, and here we are in this entrancing resting-place; all the time we have been talking of nothing but laws, yet it is only recently that we have begun, as it seems, to utter laws, and what went before was all simply preludes to laws.
ΑΘ. ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν νυν⟨δὴ⟩ διειλέγμεθα ἡμεῖς κατὰ θεόν τινα γεγονός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξ ὅσου περὶ τῶν νόμων ἤργμεθα λέγειν, ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ μεσημβρία τε γέγονε καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ παγκάλῃ ἀναπαύλῃ τινὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων.
722d. What is my object in saying this? It is to explain that all utterances and vocal expressions have preludes and tunings-up (as one might call them), which provide a kind of artistic preparation which assists towards the further development of the subject. Indeed, we have examples before us of preludes, admirably elaborated, in those prefixed to that class of lyric ode called the “nome,” and to musical compositions of every description.
722d. τί δὲ ταῦτʼ εἴρηκα; τόδε εἰπεῖν βουληθείς, ὅτι λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνὴ κεκοινώνηκεν προοίμιά τέ ἐστιν καὶ σχεδὸν οἷόν τινες ἀνακινήσεις, ἔχουσαί τινα ἔντεχνον ἐπιχείρησιν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαίνεσθαι. καὶ δή που κιθαρῳδικῆς ᾠδῆς λεγομένων νόμων καὶ πάσης μούσης προοίμια θαυμαστῶς ἐσπουδασμένα πρόκειται·
722e. But for the “nomes” (i.e. laws) which are real nomes—and which we designate “political”—no one has ever yet uttered a prelude, or composed or published one, just as though there were no such thing. But our present conversation proves, in my opinion, that there is such a thing; and it struck me just now that the laws we were then stating are something more than simply double, and consist of these two things combined—law, and prelude to law.
722e. τῶν δὲ ὄντως νόμων ὄντων, οὓς δὴ πολιτικοὺς εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτʼ εἶπέ τι προοίμιον οὔτε συνθέτης γενόμενος ἐξήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ φῶς, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος φύσει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ νῦν διατριβὴ γεγονυῖα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, σημαίνει ὡς ὄντος, οἵ τέ γε δὴ διπλοῖ ἔδοξαν νυνδή μοι λεχθέντες νόμοι οὐκ εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω πως διπλοῖ, ἀλλὰ δύο μέν τινε, νόμος τε καὶ προοίμιον τοῦ νόμου·
723. Ath. The part which we called the “despotic prescription”— comparing it to the prescriptions of the slave-doctors we mentioned—is unblended law; but the part which precedes this, and which is uttered as persuasive thereof, while it actually is “persuasion,” yet serves also the same purpose as the prelude to an oration.
723. ΑΘ. ὃ δὴ τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγμα ἀπεικασθὲν ἐρρήθη τοῖς ἐπιτάγμασιν τοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν οὓς εἴπομεν ἀνελευθέρους, τοῦτʼ εἶναι νόμος ἄκρατος, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτου ῥηθέν, πειστικὸν λεχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ὄντως μὲν εἶναι πειστικόν, προοιμίου μὴν τοῦ περὶ λόγους δύναμιν ἔχειν.
723a. To ensure that the person to whom the lawgiver addresses the law should accept the prescription quietly—and, because quietly, in a docile spirit,—that, as I supposed, was the evident object with which the speaker uttered all his persuasive discourse. Hence, according to my argument, the right term for it would be, not legal “statement,” but “prelude,” and no other word.
723a. ἵνα γὰρ εὐμενῶς, καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐμένειαν εὐμαθέστερον, τὴν ἐπίταξιν, ὃ δή ἐστιν ὁ νόμος, δέξηται ᾧ τὸν νόμον ὁ νομοθέτης λέγει, τούτου χάριν εἰρῆσθαί μοι κατεφάνη πᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὃν πείθων εἶπεν ὁ λέγων· διὸ δὴ κατά γε τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον τοῦτʼ αὐτό, προοίμιον, ἀλλʼ οὐ λόγος ἂν ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοιτο εἶναι τοῦ νόμου.
723b. Having said this, what is the next statement I would desire to make? It is this: that the lawgiver must never omit to furnish preludes, as prefaces both to the laws as a whole and to each individual statute, whereby they shall surpass their original form by as much as the “double” examples recently given surpassed the “single.”
723b. ταῦτʼ οὖν εἰπών, τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄν μοι βουληθείην εἰρῆσθαι; τόδε, ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸ πάντων τε ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων χρεών ἐστιν μὴ ἀμοίρους αὐτοὺς προοιμίων ποιεῖν καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον, ᾗ διοίσουσιν ἑαυτῶν ὅσον νυνδὴ τὼ λεχθέντε διηνεγκάτην.
Clin. I, for my part, would charge the expert in these matters to legislate thus, and not otherwise.
ΚΛ. τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως νομοθετεῖν διακελεύοιτο ἡμῖν τὸν τούτων ἐπιστήμονα.
723c. Ath. You are right, I believe, Clinias, in asserting at least thus much,—that all laws have preludes, and that, in commencing each piece of legislation, one ought to preface each enactment with the prelude that naturally belongs to it—for the statement that is to follow the prelude is one of no small importance, and it makes a vast difference whether these statements are distinctly or indistinctly remembered; still, we should be wrong if we prescribed that all statutes, great and small, should be equally provided with preludes.
723c. ΑΘ. καλῶς μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκεῖς μοι τό γε τοσοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι πᾶσίν γε νόμοις ἔστιν προοίμια καὶ ὅτι πάσης ἀρχόμενον νομοθεσίας χρὴ προτιθέναι παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ πεφυκὸς προοίμιον ἑκάστοις—οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ῥηθησόμενον, οὐδʼ ὀλίγον διαφέρον ἢ σαφῶς ἢ μὴ σαφῶς αὐτὰ μνημονεύεσθαι—τὸ μέντοι μεγάλων πέρι λεγομένων νόμων καὶ σμικρῶν εἰ ὁμοίως προοιμιάζεσθαι προστάττοιμεν, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾄσματος οὐδὲ λόγου παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρᾶν—καίτοι πέφυκέν γε εἶναι πᾶσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ χρηστέον ἅπασιν—αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ τε ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ μελῳδῷ καὶ νομοθέτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε ἐπιτρεπτέον.
723d. For neither ought that to be done in the case of songs and speeches of every kind; for they all naturally have preludes, but we cannot employ them always; that is a thing which must be left in each case to the judgment of the actual orator or singer or legislator.Clin. What you say is, I believe, very true. But let us not spend more time, Stranger, in delay, but return to our main subject, and start afresh (if you agree) from the statements you made above—and made not by way of prelude.
723d. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μηκέτʼ, ὦ ξένε, διατριβὴν πλείω τῆς μελλήσεως ποιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπανέλθωμεν καὶ ἀπʼ ἐκείνων ἀρχώμεθα, εἴ σοι φίλον, ὧν οὐχ ὡς προοιμιαζόμενος εἶπες τότε. πάλιν οὖν, οἷόν φασιν οἱ παίζοντες, ἀμεινόνων ἐξ ἀρχῆς δευτέρων ἐπαναπολήσωμεν, ὡς προοίμιον ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν τυχόντα λόγον περαίνοντες, καθάπερ ἄρτι·
723e. Let us, then, repeat from the start the second thoughts that are “best” (to quote the players’ proverb), treating them throughout as a prelude, and not, as before, as a chance discourse; and let us handle the opening part as being confessedly a prelude. As to the worship of the gods and the attention to be paid to ancestors, our previous statement is quite sufficient; it is what comes next to these that you must try to state, until the whole of the prelude has been, in our opinion, adequately set forth by you. After that you will proceed with your statement of the actual laws.
723e. λάβωμεν δʼ αὐτῶν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογοῦντες προοιμιάζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν τιμῆς προγόνων τε θεραπείας, καὶ τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἱκανά· τὰ δʼ ἑξῆς πειρώμεθα λέγειν, μέχριπερ ἄν σοι πᾶν τὸ προοίμιον ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκῇ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς διέξει λέγων.
724a. Ath. So then the prelude we previously composed concerning the gods and those next to the gods, and concerning parents, living and dead, was, as we now declare, sufficient; and you are now bidding me, I understand, to bring up, as it were, to the light of day the residue of this same subject.
724a. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν περὶ θεῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν μετὰ θεοὺς καὶ γονέων ζώντων τε πέρι καὶ τελευτησάντων τότε ἱκανῶς προοιμιασάμεθα, ὡς νῦν λέγομεν· τὸ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενον ἔτι τοῦ τοιούτου φαίνῃ μοι σὺ διακελεύεσθαι τὰ νῦν οἷον πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐπανάγειν.
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. Well, surely it is both fitting and of the greatest mutual advantage that, next to the matters mentioned, the speaker and his hearers should deal with the question of the degree of zeal or slackness which men ought to use in respect of their souls, their bodies, and their goods, and should ponder thereon, and thus get a grasp of education as far as possible.
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ μὴν μετά γε τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς χρὴ τὰ περὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας σπουδῆς τε πέρι καὶ ἀνέσεως ἴσχειν, προσῆκόν τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ κοινότατον ἀναπεμπαζομένους τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας παιδείας γίγνεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπηβόλους·
724b. Precisely this, then, is the statement which we must actually make and listen to next.
724b. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ μετʼ ἐκεῖνα ὄντως ἐστὶν ῥητέα τε καὶ ἀκουστέα.
Clin. Perfectly right.
ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
726a. Ath. Let everyone who has just heard the ordinances concerning gods and dear forefathers now give ear. Of all a man’s own belongings, the most divine is his soul, since it is most his own. A man’s own belongings are invariably twofold: the stronger and better are the ruling elements, the weaker and worse those that serve; wherefore of one’s own belongings one must honor those that rule above those that serve.
726a. ΑΘ. ἀκούοι δὴ πᾶς ὅσπερ νυνδὴ τὰ περὶ θεῶν τε ἤκουε καὶ τῶν φίλων προπατόρων· πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν. τὰ δʼ αὑτοῦ διττὰ πάντʼ ἐστὶ πᾶσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κρείττω καὶ ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τὰ δὲ ἥττω καὶ χείρω δοῦλα· τῶν οὖν αὑτοῦ τὰ δεσπόζοντα ἀεὶ προτιμητέον τῶν δουλευόντων. ΑΘ. οὕτω δὴ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν μετὰ θεοὺς ὄντας δεσπότας καὶ τοὺς τούτοις ἑπομένους τιμᾶν δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν, ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι.
727a. Ath. Thus it is that in charging men to honor their own souls next after the gods who rule and the secondary divinities, I am giving a right injunction. But there is hardly a man of us all who pays honor rightly, although he fancies he does so; for honor paid to a thing divine is beneficent, whereas nothing that is maleficent confers honor; and he that thinks to magnify his soul by words or gifts or obeisances, while he is improving it no whit in goodness, fancies indeed that he is paying it honor, but in fact does not do so. Every boy, for example, as soon as he has grown to manhood, deems himself capable of learning all things, and supposes that by lauding his soul he honors it, and by eagerly permitting it to do whatsoever it pleases.
727a. τιμᾷ δʼ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ· θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθόν που τιμή, τῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐδὲν τίμιον, ὁ δʼ ἡγούμενος ἤ τισι λόγοις ἢ δώροις αὐτὴν αὔξειν ἤ τισιν ὑπείξεσιν, μηδὲν βελτίω δὲ ἐκ χείρονος αὐτὴν ἀπεργαζόμενος, τιμᾶν μὲν δοκεῖ, δρᾷ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς. αὐτίκα παῖς εὐθὺς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ἡγεῖται πάντα ἱκανὸς εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, καὶ τιμᾶν οἴεται ἐπαινῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν, καὶ προθυμούμενος ἐπιτρέπει πράττειν ὅτι ἂν ἐθέλῃ, τὸ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενόν ἐστιν ὡς δρῶν ταῦτα βλάπτει καὶ οὐ τιμᾷ·
727b. But by acting thus, as we now declare, he is not honoring his soul, but injuring it; whereas, we affirm, he ought to pay honor to it next after the gods. Again, when a man counts not himself but others responsible always for his own sins and for the most and greatest evils, and exempts himself always from blame, thereby honoring, as he fancies, his own soul,—then he is far indeed from honoring it, since he is doing it injury.
727b. δεῖ δέ, ὥς φαμεν, μετά γε θεοὺς δευτέραν. οὐδέ γε ὅταν ἄνθρωπος τῶν αὑτοῦ ἑκάστοτε ἁμαρτημάτων μὴ ἑαυτὸν αἴτιον ἡγῆται καὶ τῶν πλείστων κακῶν καὶ μεγίστων, ἀλλὰ ἄλλους, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀναίτιον ἐξαιρῇ, τιμῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν, ὡς δὴ δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖ δρᾶν τοῦτο·
727c. Again, when a man gives way to pleasures contrary to the counsel and commendation of the lawgiver, he is by no means conferring honor on his soul, but rather dishonor, by loading it with woes and remorse. Again, in the opposite case, when toils, fears, hardships and pains are commended, and a man flinches from them, instead of stoutly enduring them,—then by his flinching he confers no honor on his soul; for by all such actions he renders it dishonored. Again, when a man deems life at any price to be a good thing, then also he does not honor, but dishonor, to his soul; for he yields to the imagination of his soul that the conditions in Hades are altogether evil, instead of opposing it, by teaching and convincing his soul that, for all it knows, we may find, on the contrary, our greatest blessings in the realm of the gods below.
727c. βλάπτει γάρ. οὐδʼ ὁπόταν ἡδοναῖς παρὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ ἔπαινον χαρίζηται, τότε οὐδαμῶς τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δὲ κακῶν καὶ μεταμελείας ἐμπιμπλὰς αὐτήν. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν αὖ τἀναντία τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους πόνους καὶ φόβους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ λύπας μὴ διαπονῇ καρτερῶν ἀλλὰ ὑπείκῃ, τότε οὐ τιμᾷ ὑπείκων· ἄτιμον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀπεργάζεται δρῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμπαντα. οὐδʼ ὁπόταν ἡγῆται τὸ ζῆν πάντως ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τιμᾷ, ἀτιμάζει δʼ αὐτὴν καὶ τότε·
727d. Again, when a man honors beauty above goodness, this is nothing else than a literal and total dishonoring of the soul; for such a statement asserts that the body is more honorable than the soul,— but falsely, since nothing earth-born is more honorable than the things of heaven, and he that surmises otherwise concerning the soul knows not that in it he possesses, and neglects, a thing most admirable.
727d. τὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου πράγματα πάντα κακὰ ἡγουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὑπείκει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει διδάσκων τε καὶ ἐλέγχων ὡς οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδʼ εἰ τἀναντία πέφυκεν μέγιστα εἶναι πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς ἐκεῖ. οὐδὲ μὴν πρὸ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν αὖ προτιμᾷ τις κάλλος, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντως καὶ πάντως ἀτιμία. ψυχῆς γὰρ σῶμα ἐντιμότερον οὗτος ὁ λόγος φησὶν εἶναι, ψευδόμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γηγενὲς Ὀλυμπίων ἐντιμότερον, ἀλλʼ ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλως δοξάζων ἀγνοεῖ ὡς θαυμαστοῦ τούτου κτήματος ἀμελεῖ.
728. Ath. Again, when a man craves to acquire wealth ignobly, or feels no qualm in so acquiring it, he does not then by his gifts pay honor to his soul,—far from it, in sooth!—for what is honorable therein and noble he is bartering away for a handful of gold; yet all the gold on earth, or under it, does not equal the price of goodness.
728. ΑΘ. οὐδέ γε ὁπόταν χρήματά τις ἐρᾷ κτᾶσθαι μὴ καλῶς, ἢ μὴ δυσχερῶς φέρῃ κτώμενος, δώροις ἄρα τιμᾷ τότε τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχήν—παντὸς μὲν οὖν λείπει—τὸ γὰρ αὐτῆς τίμιον ἅμα καὶ καλὸν ἀποδίδοται σμικροῦ χρυσίου·
728a. To speak shortly:—in respect of the things which the lawgiver enumerates and describes as either, on the one hand, base and evil, or, on the other hand, noble and good, if any man refuses to avoid by every means the one kind, and with all his power to practise the other kind,—such a man knows not that everyone who acts thus is treating most dishonorably and most disgracefully that most divine of things, his soul.
728a. πᾶς γὰρ ὅ τʼ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς χρυσὸς ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἀντάξιος. ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην, ὃς ἅπερ ἂν νομοθέτης αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ διαριθμούμενος τάττῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλά, τῶν μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ ἐθέλῃ πάσῃ μηχανῇ, τὰ δὲ ἐπιτηδεύειν σύμπασαν κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐκ οἶδεν ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴν θειότατον ὂν ἀτιμότατα καὶ κακοσχημονέστατα διατιθείς.
728b. Hardly anyone takes account of the greatest “judgment” (as men call it) upon evil-doing; that greatest judgment is this,—to grow like unto men that are wicked, and, in so growing, to shun good men and good counsels and cut oneself off from them, but to cleave to the company of the wicked and follow after them; and he that is joined to such men inevitably acts and is acted upon in the way that such men bid one another to act.
728b. τὴν γὰρ λεγομένην δίκην τῆς κακουργίας τὴν μεγίστην οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογίζεται, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ μεγίστη τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὁμοιούμενον δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς φεύγειν ἄνδρας καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποσχίζεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ προσκολλᾶσθαι διώκοντα κατὰ τὰς συνουσίας· προσπεφυκότα δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πεφύκασιν ἀλλήλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.
728c. Now such a resultant condition is not a “judgment” (for justice and judgment are things honorable), but a punishment, an infliction that follows on injustice; both he that undergoes this and he that undergoes it not are alike wretched,—the one in that he remains uncured, the other in that he is destroyed in order to secure the salvation of many others. Thus we declare that honor, speaking generally, consists in following the better, and in doing our utmost to effect the betterment of the worse, when it admits of being bettered. Man has no possession better fitted by nature than the soul for the avoidance of evil and the tracking and taking of what is best of all, and living in fellowship therewith, when he has taken it, for all his life thereafter.
728c. τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν—καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ἧς ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἄθλιος, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σῴζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. τιμὴ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ χείρονα, γενέσθαι δὲ βελτίω δυνατά, τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ὡς ἄριστα ἀποτελεῖν. ψυχῆς οὖν ἀνθρώπῳ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν εὐφυέστερον εἰς τὸ φυγεῖν μὲν τὸ κακόν, ἰχνεῦσαι δὲ καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ πάντων ἄριστον, καὶ ἑλόντα αὖ κοινῇ συνοικεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον·
728d. Wherefore the soul is put second in order of honor; as for the third, everyone would conceive that this place naturally belongs to the honor due to the body. But here again one has to investigate the various forms of honor,—which of them are genuine, which spurious; and this is the lawgiver’s task. Now he, as I suppose, declares that the honors are these and of these kinds:—the honorable body is not the fair body nor the strong nor the swift nor the large, nor yet the body that is sound in health, although this is what many believe; neither is it a body of the opposite kind to any of these; rather those bodies which hold the mean position between all these opposite extremes are by far the most temperate and stable; for while the one extreme makes the souls puffed up and proud, the other makes them lowly and spiritless.
728d. διὸ δεύτερον ἐτάχθη τιμῇ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον—πᾶς ἂν τοῦτό γε νοήσειεν—τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμήν· τὰς δʼ αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι, τοῦτο δὲ νομοθέτου. μηνύειν δή μοι φαίνεται τάσδε καὶ τοιάσδε τινὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τίμιον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τάχος ἔχον οὐδὲ μέγα, οὐδέ γε τὸ ὑγιεινόν—καίτοι πολλοῖς ἂν τοῦτό γε δοκοῖ—καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων γʼ ἐναντία, τὰ δʼ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἁπάσης ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως ἐφαπτόμενα σωφρονέστατα ἅμα τε ἀσφαλέστατα εἶναι μακρῷ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ χαύνους τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ θρασείας ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ ταπεινάς τε καὶ ἀνελευθέρους.
729. Ath. The same holds good of the possession of goods and chattels, and they are to be valued on a similar scale. In each case, when they are in excess, they produce enmities and feuds both in States and privately, while if they are deficient they produce, as a rule, serfdom.
729. ΑΘ. ὡς δʼ αὕτως ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις, καὶ τιμήσεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἑκάστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δʼ ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὡς τὸ πολύ.
729a. And let no man love riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as wealthy as possible; for that is good neither for them nor for the State. For the young the means that attracts no flatterers, yet is not lacking in things necessary, is the most harmonious of all and the best; for it is in tune with us and in accord, and thus it renders our life in all respects painless.
729a. μὴ δή τις φιλοχρημονείτω παίδων γʼ ἕνεκα, ἵνα ὅτι πλουσιωτάτους καταλίπῃ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὖ τῇ πόλει ἄμεινον. ἡ γὰρ τῶν νέων ἀκολάκευτος οὐσία, τῶν δʼ ἀναγκαίων μὴ ἐνδεής, αὕτη πασῶν μουσικωτάτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη· συμφωνοῦσα γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ συναρμόττουσα εἰς ἅπαντα ἄλυπον τὸν βίον ἀπεργάζεται.