Str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say “not-being” does not speak at all?
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν [τι], λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γʼ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι;
Theaet. The argument could go no further in perplexity.
ΘΕΑΙ. τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.
238. Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.
238. ΞΕ. μήπω μέγʼ εἴπῃς· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὖσα τυγχάνει.
Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσῃς.
Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?
ΞΕ. τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένοιτʼ ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἆρά ποτε προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;
Theaet. Certainly not.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.
ΞΕ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν σύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.
Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.
Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε πλῆθος μήτε ἓν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν προσφέρειν.
Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχειροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.
Str. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?
ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἢ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτο ἄν τις ἢ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;
Theaet. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε πῇ;
Str. When we say “things which are not,” do we not attribute plurality to them?
ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἆρα οὐ πλῆθος ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. And in saying “a thing which is not,” do we not equally attribute the singular number?
ΞΕ. μὴ ὂν δέ, ἆρα οὐ τὸ ἓν αὖ;
Theaet. Obviously.
ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.
Str. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτε ὀρθόν φαμεν ὂν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.
Str. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?
ΞΕ. συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;
Theaet. Absolutely.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Str. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι, τὸ δὲ ἔτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν;
Theaet. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα δή;
Str. Why, my dear fellow, don’t you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?
ΞΕ. ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστησι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὕτως, ὥστε, ὁπόταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;
Theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον.
Str. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say “that which is not.” You understand surely?
ΞΕ. οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἓν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα· τὸ μὴ ὂν γὰρ φημί. συνίης τοι.
Str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἄφθεγκτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἶναι. συνέπῃ;
Theaet. Yes, of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. συνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Then when I undertook to attach the verb “to be” to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον;
239. Theaet. Evidently.
239. ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνῃ.
Str. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ διελεγόμην;
Str. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν γε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον ὥς γε πρὸς ἓν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.
Theaet. Of course you did.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it “it” at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.
ΞΕ. φαμὲν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὡς ἓν μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἑνὸς γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.
Str. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.
ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε τί τις ἂν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὕροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ εἶα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς;
Str. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.
ΞΕ. ἴθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὤν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεὶς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγξασθαί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.
Theaet. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.
ΘΕΑΙ. πολλὴ μεντἄν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθʼ ὁρῶν πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροίην.
Str. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐῶμεν· ἕως δʼ ἄν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν.
Theaet. That seems to be decidedly the case.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.
Str. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by “image,” exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man’s question.
ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν τέχνην, ῥᾳδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀποστρέψει τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἴδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.
Theaet. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα που τοιαῦτʼ ἔσθʼ ἕτερα.
Str. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.
ΞΕ. φανερός, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἶ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς.
Str. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.
ΞΕ. δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see.
ΞΕ. τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῷς ἐὰν ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεταί σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δʼ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.
240. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.Theaet. What is that?
240. ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον;
Str. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said “image” of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.
ΞΕ. τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν. λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἄνδρα.
Theaet. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον;
Str. Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say “such”?
ΞΕ. ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες;
Theaet. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλʼ ἐοικὸς μέν.
Str. And by the true you mean that which really is?
ΞΕ. ἆρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὂν λέγων;
Theaet. Exactly.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. And the not true is the opposite of the true?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἆρʼ ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὂν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς.
Theaet. But it does exist, in a way.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι γε μήν πως.
Str. But not truly, you mean.
ΞΕ. οὔκουν ἀληθῶς γε, φῄς.
Theaet. No, except that it is really a likeness.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γʼ εἰκὼν ὄντως.
Str. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?
ΞΕ. οὐκ ὂν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;
Theaet. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.
Str. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.
ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐχ ἑκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἶναί πως.
Theaet. Yes, I see that very well.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ καὶ μάλα.
Str. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα;
Theaet. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις;
Str. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?
ΞΕ. ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναί τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτʼ ἐροῦμεν;
Theaet. We shall say that. What else could we say?
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν;
Str. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?
ΞΕ. ψευδὴς δʼ αὖ δόξα ἔσται τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;
Theaet. Yes.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως· τἀναντία.
Str. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?
ΞΕ. λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν;
Theaet. Necessarily.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
Str. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?
ΞΕ. πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἤ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;
Theaet. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύσεταί ποτέ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.
Str. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?
ΞΕ. τί δʼ; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται;
Str. And this too is falsehood?
ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;
Theaet. Yes, it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.
Str. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.
ΞΕ. καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομισθήσεται τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.
241. Theaet. In what other way could a statement be made false?
241. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;
Str. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?
ΞΕ. σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, ὅταν [ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα καὶ ἀδιανόητα] προσδιωμολογημένα ᾖ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει;
Theaet. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τἀναντία φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νυνδή, ψευδῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νυνδὴ τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.
Str. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.
ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἀλλʼ ὅρα δὴ [βουλεύεσθαι] τί χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι· τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
Str. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.
ΞΕ. μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων.
Theaet. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν γʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἑλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
Str. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?
ΞΕ. τί οὖν; οὕτως ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;
Theaet. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν ἔγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοί τʼ ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τἀνδρός ἐσμεν.
Str. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?
ΞΕ. ἕξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;
Theaet. Of course I will.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἕξω;
Str. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.
ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.
ΞΕ. μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαί τινα.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
Str. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.
ΞΕ. τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.
Theaet. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
Str. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.
ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τούτων γὰρ μήτʼ ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τά ⟨γʼ⟩ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὑτῷ λέγειν.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
242. Str. And so we must take courage and attack our father’s theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.
242. ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.
Theaet. But nothing in the world must prevent us.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξῃ.
Str. Then I have a third little request to make of you.
ΞΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.
Theaet. You have only to utter it.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε μόνον.
Str. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.
ΞΕ. εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγχον ἀεί τε ἀπειρηκὼς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.
Theaet. Yes, so you did.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἶπες.
Str. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.
ΞΕ. φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.
Theaet. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὡς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴῃς, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἕνεκα.
Str. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.
ΞΕ. φέρε δή, τίνα ἀρχήν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδʼ, ὦ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.
Theaet. What way?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποίαν δή;
Str. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.
ΞΕ. τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δʼ ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.
Theaet. Express your meaning more clearly.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις.
Str. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.
ΞΕ. εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν.
Str. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship.
ΞΕ. μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται.
Str. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife.
ΞΕ. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπʼ ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ διὰ νεῖκός τι.
243. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.Theaet. What is that?Str. That they paid too little attention and consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.
243. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;ΞΕ. ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ὠλιγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτʼ ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;
Str. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven’s sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term “not-being,” which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.
ΞΕ. ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ὡς ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πῃ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἑκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεῶν συνίης ὅτι λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτό τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὁπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς ᾤμην συνιέναι. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἵνʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.
Theaet. Yes, I see.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ.
Str. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.
ΞΕ. τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὂν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.
Theaet. Perhaps.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
Str. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.
ΞΕ. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Str. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.
ΞΕ. τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθʼ, ἂν δόξῃ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρώτου νῦν σκεπτέον.
Theaet. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term “being,” and see what those who use it think it signifies?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὂν φῂς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθʼ οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται;
Str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this “being” (or “are”) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two “being” you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.
ΞΕ. κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους ὧδε· φέρε, ὁπόσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἤ τινε δύο τοιούτω τὰ πάντʼ εἶναί φατε, τί ποτε ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι καθʼ ὑμᾶς τιθῶμεν; οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὂν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἕν, ἀλλʼ οὐ δύο εἴτην.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν;
Theaet. Perhaps.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
244. Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.
244. ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτʼ ἂν σαφέστατα ἕν.
Theaet. You are perfectly right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα εἴρηκας.
Str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say “being.” For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.— If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?
ΞΕ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἠπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς, τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὂν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ᾠόμεθα, νῦν δʼ ἠπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρʼ ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιοῦντες παρά τε τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι πλεῖον ἑνὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὦ παῖ, τὶ πλημμελήσομεν;
Theaet. Not in the least.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστά γε.
Str. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say “being”?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἓν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἆρʼ οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;
Theaet. Of course we must.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?
ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων. ἕν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι; — φαμὲν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ;
Str. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;
Str. Is it what you call “one,” using two names for the same thing, or how is this?
ΞΕ. πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;
Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτʼ, ὦ ξένε, ἀπόκρισις;
Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.
ΞΕ. δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.
Theaet. Why not?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.
ΞΕ. τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν καταγέλαστόν που.
Theaet. Of course it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.
Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.
ΞΕ. τιθείς τε τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινε.
Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἂν ταὐτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοὔνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἰ δέ τινος αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ἕν γε, ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ἓν ὄν.
Theaet. Necessarily.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς ἢ ταὐτὸν φήσουσι τούτῳ;
Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;
Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?
ΞΕ. εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζονοὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν τὸ ὂν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
245. Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.
245. ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὂν καὶ ὅλον ἓν εἶναι.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;
Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?
ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι;
Str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.
ΞΕ. ἀμερὲς δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς ἓν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι.
Theaet. Yes, it must.
ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὂν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ [ὅλῳ] λόγῳ.
Theaet. I understand.
ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω.
Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?
ΞΕ. πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς οὕτως ἕν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν;
Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me.
ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν.
Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.
ΞΕ. ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐ ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἑνὸς ἔσται.
Str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐάν γε τὸ ὂν ᾖ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου πάθος, ᾖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τὸ ὂν ἑαυτοῦ συμβαίνει.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.
ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται τὸ ὄν.
Theaet. So it will.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.
ΞΕ. καὶ ἑνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος.
Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence Theaet. What do you mean?
ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτά τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδʼ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν.ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
Str. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.
ΞΕ. τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν [τὸ ἓν ἢ] τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα.
Theaet. That certainly seems to be true.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν.
Str. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὁποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι.
Theaet. Precisely.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.
Str. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.
ΞΕ. καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ἕκαστον εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὂν εἴτε δύο τινὲ εἴτε ἓν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.
Theaet. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.
ΘΕΑΙ. δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην.
Str. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.
ΞΕ. τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μή, πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵνʼ ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν.
246. Theaet. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.
246. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.
Str. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.
ΞΕ. οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς ⟨τι⟩ φήσει μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.
Theaet. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.
Str. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.
ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντʼ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ συνέστηκεν.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
Str. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.
ΞΕ. παρʼ ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.
Theaet. How shall we get it?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;
Str. It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.
ΞΕ. παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων ῥᾷον, ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων βίᾳ χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλʼ ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾶν.
Theaet. What way?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.
ΞΕ. μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν παρὰ βελτιόνων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ χειρόνων· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τἀληθὲς ζητοῦμεν.
Theaet. Quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.
Str. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.
ΞΕ. κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρʼ αὐτῶν ἀφερμήνευε.
Theaet. I will do so.
ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται.
Str. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.
ΞΕ. λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῷον εἴ φασιν εἶναί τι.
Theaet. Of course they do.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?
ΞΕ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Str. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?
ΞΕ. τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχήν;
247. Theaet. Yes.
247. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
Str. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ ἄφρονα;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ τοιαύτην αὐτῶν ἑκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;
Theaet. Yes, they agree to this also.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ ταῦτα σύμφασιν.
Str. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν.
Theaet. Yes, they say that.
ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?
ΞΕ. οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν εἶναί φασί τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;
Theaet. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν.
Str. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν ἴσχειν;
Theaet. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντʼ εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.
Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.
ΞΕ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἇνδρες· ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντʼ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.
Theaet. That is pretty nearly what they believe.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.
Str. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exit. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.
ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς· εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχʼ οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἆρʼ ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδʼ εἶναι τὸ ὄν.
Theaet. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.
Str. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.
ΞΕ. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [τινα] κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον [ὁρίζειν] τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.
Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.
Str. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us asume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.
ΞΕ. καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη.
248. Theaet. It is settled.
248. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω συνομολογηθέν.ΘΕΑΙ. μένει.
Str. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.
ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.
Theaet. I will.
ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται.
Str. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?
ΞΕ. γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἦ γάρ;
Theaet. Yes, we do.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
Str. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.
ΞΕ. καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει διʼ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.
Theaet. Yes, that is what we say.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.
Str. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?
ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ νυνδὴ παρʼ ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;
Theaet. What is that?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.
ΞΕ. πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον. τάχʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν.