Theaet. What is it, then, that they say?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνʼ οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;
Str. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.
ΞΕ. οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.
Theaet. What was it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.
ΞΕ. ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;
Str. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.
ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν φασίν.
Theaet. And is there not something in that?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;
Str. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.
ΞΕ. πρὸς ὅ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρʼ αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.
Theaet. They certainly assent to that.
ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.
Str. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαί φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;
Theaet. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τἀναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.
Str. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.
ΞΕ. μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθʼ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
Theaet. Right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. But for heaven’s sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;
249. Theaet. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.
249. ΘΕΑΙ. δεινὸν μεντἄν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.
Str. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;
Theaet. How can we?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
Str. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντʼ αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;
Theaet. But how else can it possess them?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τίνʼ ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;
Str. Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν ⟨ἔχειν⟩, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὂν ἑστάναι;
Theaet. All those things seem to me absurd.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτʼ εἶναι φαίνεται.
Str. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.
ΞΕ. συμβαίνει δʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.
Theaet. Exactly.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντʼ εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?
ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτʼ ἄν;
Theaet. Not at all.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
Str. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?
ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν;
Theaet. By no means.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα.
Str. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν πρός γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὁπῃοῦν.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.
Str. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children’s prayer, “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.
ΞΕ. τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὂν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναμφότερα λέγειν.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.
Str. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?
ΞΕ. τί οὖν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.
ΞΕ. βαβαὶ μέντʼ ἂν ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως.
Theaet. What is this again? What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτʼ εἴρηκας;
Str. My dear fellow, don’t you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?
ΞΕ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;
Theaet. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπῃ δʼ αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἔχοντες, οὐ πάνυ συνίημι.
Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.
ΞΕ. σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον εἰ τὰ νῦν συνομολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν.
250. Theaet. What questions? Remind me.
250. ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα; ὑπόμνησόν με.
Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.
ΞΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προΐωμεν.
Theaet. That is right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?
ΞΕ. εἶεν δή, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν εἶναί γε ὁμοίως φῂς ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἑκάτερον;
Theaet. Yes, I do.
ΘΕΑΙ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?
ΞΕ. ἆρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῇς;
Theaet. By no means.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἑστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι;
Theaet. Of course not.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?
ΞΕ. τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὡς ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφότερα;
Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαί τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.
Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφότερον τὸ ὂν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον δή τι τούτων.
Theaet. Apparently.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.
ΞΕ. κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὂν οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.
Theaet. You are about right.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?
ΞΕ. ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρʼ ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;
Theaet. What indeed?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖ γάρ;
Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
ΞΕ. οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι ῥᾴδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἕστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἑστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὂν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο;
Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.
Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.
ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?
ΞΕ. ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοὔνομα ἐφʼ ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ. μέμνησαι;
Theaet. Of course I do.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?
ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τὸ ὄν;
Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ ξένε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα.
Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge.
ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπορίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἤδη καθάπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι·
251. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.Theaet. Good.
251. καὶ ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπῃπερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.
Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.
ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ καθʼ ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.
Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.
ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.
Str. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
ΞΕ. λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλʼ ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἓν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Str. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.
ΞΕ. ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.
ΞΕ. ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.
Theaet. What are the arguments?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δή;
Str. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?
ΞΕ. πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἄμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;
Theaet. I cannot answer these questions for them.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.
Str. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?
ΞΕ. τί οὖν οὐ καθʼ ἓν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;
Theaet. A good suggestion.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.
Str. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?
ΞΕ. καὶ τιθῶμέν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κίνησίς τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξετον οὐσίας;
252. Theaet. No.
252. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Str. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν;
Theaet. It will not.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔσται.
Str. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe “is” in motion, another that it “is” at rest.
ΞΕ. ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατʼ εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἑστηκότʼ εἶναι.
Theaet. Exactly.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interruption, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν συντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἔστι σύμμειξις.
Theaet. Quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.
ΞΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions “to be,” “apart,” “from the rest,” “by itself,” and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.
ΞΕ. τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.
Theaet. That is a remarkably accurate illustration Str. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ λέγεις ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.ΞΕ. τί δʼ, ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;
Theaet. Even I can dispose of that assumption.
ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.
Theaet. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἵσταιτʼ ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινοῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοίσθην ἐπʼ ἀλλήλοιν.
Str. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἵστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Then only the third possibility is left.
ΞΕ. τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.
Str. And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ηὑρέθη.
Str. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.
ΞΕ. πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.
Theaet. Precisely.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.
ΞΕ. ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δʼ οὔ, σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότʼ ἂν εἴη.
253. Theaet. Of course.
253. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ συναρμόττει.ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.
ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἁρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε.
Str. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?
ΞΕ. πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὁποῖα ὁποίοις δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτό;
Theaet. He has need of art.
ΘΕΑΙ. τέχνης.
Theaet. The art of grammar.
ΘΕΑΙ. τῆς γραμματικῆς.
Str. And is not the same true in connection with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιεὶς ἄμουσος;
Str. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?
ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν τοιαῦτα εὑρήσομεν ἕτερα.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?
ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ μείξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἆρʼ οὐ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντʼ ἄττʼ αὔτʼ ἐστιν, ὥστε συμμείγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ διʼ ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἴτια;
Theaet. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;
Str. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?
ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν αὖ [νῦν] προσεροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;
Str. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?
ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;
Theaet. Yes, we shall.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, φήσομεν.
Str. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ διʼ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.
Theaet. Certainly it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Str. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.
Theaet. How could it be granted to anyone else?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοίη τις;
Str. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him;
ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον ἥ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἥ τε τούτου.
254. he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.Theaet. How do they differ?
254. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice, and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don’t you think so?
ΞΕ. ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἦ γάρ;
Theaet. It seems likely.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
Str. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.
ΞΕ. ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.
Theaet. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἧττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.
Str. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ᾖ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.
Theaet. You are right.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.
Str. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.
ΞΕ. ὅτʼ οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὡμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπʼ ὀλίγον, τὰ δʼ ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο συνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ σαφηνείᾳ δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθʼ ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ παρεικάθῃ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὂν ἀθῴοις ἀπαλλάττειν.
Theaet. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή.
Str. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.
ΞΕ. μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν ἃ νυνδὴ διῇμεν τό τε ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.
Theaet. Yes, by far.
ΘΕΑΙ. πολύ γε.
Str. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τώ γε δύο φαμὲν αὐτοῖν ἀμείκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλω.
Theaet. Decidedly not.
ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.
Str. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ὂν μεικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω που.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. Then these prove to be three.
ΞΕ. τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.
Theaet. To be sure.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δʼ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν.
Str. But what do we mean by these words, “the same” and “other,” which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say “the same” or “other”?
ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτώ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;
255. Theaet. Perhaps.
255. ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
Str. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὔθʼ ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.
ΞΕ. ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.
Theaet. Why not?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
Str. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became “other” would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.
ΞΕ. κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Theaet. Exactly so.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.
Str. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.
ΞΕ. μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.
Str. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γʼ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδʼ αὖ στάσιν.
Str. But should we conceive of “being” and “the same” as one?
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;
Theaet. Perhaps.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
Str. But if “being” and “the same” have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ εἰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν.
Theaet. But surely that is impossible.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.
Str. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.
ΞΕ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι.
Theaet. Pretty nearly.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
Str. So we shall consider “the same” a fourth class in addition to the other three?
ΞΕ. τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἴδεσιν τὸ ταὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Then shall we call “the other” a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and “being” as two names for one class?
ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἆρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡς δύʼ ἄττα ὀνόματα ἐφʼ ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;
Theaet. May be.
ΘΕΑΙ. τάχʼ ἄν.
Str. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;
Str. And other is always relative to other, is it not?
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἦ γάρ;
Str. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.
Theaet. The facts are as you say.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.
Str. Then we must place the nature of “the other” as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.
ΞΕ. πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.
Str. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.
ΞΕ. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.
Theaet. Exactly.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.
ΞΕ. ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθʼ ἓν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.
Str. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?
ΞΕ. πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;
Theaet. We do.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. Then it is not rest.
ΞΕ. οὐ στάσις ἄρʼ ἐστίν.
Theaet. Not at all.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
256. Str. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.
256. ΞΕ. ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.
Theaet. Yes, it exists.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.
Str. Now motion again is other than the same.
ΞΕ. αὖθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταὐτοῦ ἐστιν.
Theaet. You’re about right.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
Str. Therefore it is not the same.
ΞΕ. οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν.
Theaet. No, it is not.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Str. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.
ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γʼ ἦν ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντʼ αὐτοῦ.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
Str. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.
ΞΕ. τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλʼ ὁπόταν μὲν ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, διʼ ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ὥστε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταὐτόν.
Theaet. Yes, certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ κίνησις στάσεως, οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν στάσιμον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύειν;
Theaet. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατά γε, εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μείγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή.
Str. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐπί γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτῃ.
Theaet. Yes, of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?
ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν· ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, καθάπερ ταὐτοῦ τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;
Theaet. Inevitably.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαῖον.
Str. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.
ΞΕ. οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρʼ ἐστί πῃ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν νυνδὴ λόγον.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
Str. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?
ΞΕ. τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἆρʼ αὖ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προυθέμεθα σκοπεῖν;
Theaet. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νυνδὴ φανέντος.
Str. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?
ΞΕ. ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;
Theaet. Yes, most fearlessly.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.
Str. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;
Theaet. That is perfectly clear.
ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.
Str. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.
ΞΕ. ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα.
Theaet. Yes, I suppose so.
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.
Str. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.
ΞΕ. περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Theaet. So it seems.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
257. Str. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.
257. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.
Theaet. Yes, it must.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
Str. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρʼ ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.
Theaet. That is not far from the truth.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτως.
Str. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.
Theaet. That is very fair.
ΘΕΑΙ. δικαιότατα εἴρηκας.
Str. Then here is a point to consider.
ΞΕ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.
ΞΕ. ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλʼ ἕτερον μόνον.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?
ΞΕ. οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;
Theaet. No, of course not.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
Str. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle “not” indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρʼ, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τὶ μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὒ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττʼ ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Str. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.
ΞΕ. τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.
ΞΕ. ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.
ΞΕ. μία μέν ἐστί που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δʼ ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τʼ εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.
Theaet. Yes, certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὔσης ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο.
Theaet. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.
ΘΕΑΙ. τάχʼ ἄν· ἀλλʼ ὅπῃ δὴ λέγωμεν;
Str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?
ΞΕ. ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον;
Theaet. There is.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.
Str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?
ΞΕ. τοῦτʼ οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἤ τινʼ ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;
Theaet. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχον· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἑκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.
Str. Now, then, tell me something more.
ΞΕ. ἴθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε.
Theaet. What?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?
ΞΕ. ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν;
Str. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.
ΞΕ. ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὂν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικʼ, εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.
Theaet. Quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.
Str. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?
ΞΕ. τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἆρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ἧττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν;
Theaet. Not at all.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.
258. Str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?
258. ΞΕ. ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;
Theaet. No less truly.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὁμοίως.
Str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.
ΞΕ. καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὖσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὔσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἧττον ὄντα τιθέναι.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.
Theaet. That is perfectly clear.
ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.
Str. Then what shall we call this?
ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;
Theaet. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτό ἐστι τοῦτο.
Str. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?
ΞΕ. πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα ⟨μὴ μέγα⟩ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ⟨μὴ καλόν⟩, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν; ἤ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;