Theaet. None whatever.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.
Str. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?
ΞΕ. οἶσθʼ οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν;
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
Str. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.
ΞΕ. πλεῖον ἢ ʼκεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. Because he says somewhere:Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation, Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.
ΞΕ. ὅτι ὁ μέν πού φησιν—οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδʼ ἀφʼ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.
Str. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.
ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὖσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Theaet. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.
Str. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπῃ τις ὅτι τοὐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἴτʼ ἔστιν εἴτε μή, λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον·
259. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.Theaet. True.
259. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἢ μέχριπερ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκείνῳ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμείγνυταί τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε ὂν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ διʼ ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὗ μετέσχεν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὂν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν· τὸ δὲ ὂν αὖ θατέρου μετειληφὸς ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, ἕτερον δʼ ἐκείνων ἁπάντων ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ σύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὂν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὖ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ σύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
Str. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.
ΞΕ. καὶ ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δʼ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.
ΞΕ. ὃ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πῃ ταὐτὸν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὂν ἕτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατʼ ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.
Theaet. Exactly so.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.
ΞΕ. καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.
Theaet. Why so?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
Str. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.
ΞΕ. τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
260. Str. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.
260. ΞΕ. σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἐᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ μείγνυσθαι.
Theaet. What was our object?
ΘΕΑΙ. πρὸς δὴ τί;
Str. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.
ΞΕ. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν· ἔτι δʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτʼ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφῃρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοί τʼ ἦμεν. ἀφῃρέθημεν δʼ ἄν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.
Theaet. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε· λόγον δὲ διʼ ὅτι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.
Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τῇδʼ ἑπόμενος ῥᾷστʼ ἂν μάθοις.
Theaet. What line?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;
Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὂν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὂν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.
Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξῃ τε καὶ λόγῳ μείγνυται.
Str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.
ΞΕ. μὴ μειγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθῆ πάντʼ εἶναι, μειγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.
Theaet. So it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.
ΞΕ. ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη.
Str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Str. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.
ΞΕ. τὸν δέ γε σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ τόπῳ καταπεφευγέναι μέν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μηδʼ εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαί τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχειν.
Theaet. Yes, so it was.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.
Str. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place.
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι· τάχα δʼ ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτʼ ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας.
Str. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.
ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὂν ἀποδείξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.
261. Theaet. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences, and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.
261. ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξένε, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατʼ ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθήρευτον εἴη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτʼ ἄλλο μετʼ ἐκεῖνο· καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεταί ποτε.
Str. No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.
ΞΕ. θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὅ γʼ ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀπωσθείς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος ἄν ποτε ἕλοι πόλιν. νῦν δʼ ἐπεί, ὠγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ᾑρημένον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ἤδη ῥᾴω καὶ σμικρότερα.
Theaet. Good.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.
Str. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.
ΞΕ. λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισώμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.
Theaet. Very well.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. Then let us now investigate names, just a we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.
ΞΕ. φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ πῃ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.
Theaet. What do we need to understand about names?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον;
Str. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.
ΞΕ. εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρμόττει εἴτε μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.
Theaet. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δʼ οὔ.
Str. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.
ΞΕ. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι συναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.
Theaet. How so, and what do you mean by that?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτʼ εἶπας;
Str. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.
ΞΕ. ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.
Theaet. How so?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
262. Str. One called nouns, the other verbs.
262. ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.
Theaet. Define each of them.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον.
Str. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν.
Str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.
Theaet. Exactly.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδʼ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.
Theaet. I do not understand that.
ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἔμαθον.
Str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.
ΞΕ. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι συνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.
Theaet. In what way?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. For instance, “walks,” “runs,” “sleeps” and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.
ΞΕ. οἷον βαδίζει τρέχει καθεύδει, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὔτʼ εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.
Theaet. No, of course not.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;
Str. And again, when “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται λέων ἔλαφος ἵππος, ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὖ πραττόντων ὠνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδείς πω συνέστη λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτʼ ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδʼ ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δʼ ἥρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος.
Theaet. What do you mean by that?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς ἄρʼ ὧδε λέγεις;
Str. When one says “a man learns,” you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?
ΞΕ. ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῂς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;
Str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.
ΞΕ. δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον ἀλλά τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.
Theaet. That was right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.
ΞΕ. οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἥρμοττεν, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἁρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπηργάσατο.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Str. Now there is another little point.
ΞΕ. ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε.
Theaet. What is it?
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.
ΞΕ. λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ᾖ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἀδύνατον.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
Str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. Now let us pay attention to each other.
ΞΕ. προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.
Theaet. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.
ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γοῦν.
Str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which a action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.
ΞΕ. λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον συνθεὶς πρᾶγμα πράξει διʼ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δʼ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, σύ μοι φράζειν.
263. Theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.
263. ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.
Str. “Theaetetus sits.” It isn’t a long sentence, is it?
ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;
Theaet. No, it is fairly short.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.
Str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.
ΞΕ. σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.
Theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.
Str. And how about this sentence?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ ὅδʼ αὖ;
Theaet. What one?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖος;
Str. “Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.”
ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος, ᾧ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.
Theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτον οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
Str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.
ΞΕ. ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων.
Str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?
ΞΕ. τούτων δὴ ποῖόν τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;
Theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.
Str. The true one states facts as they are about you.
ΞΕ. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
Str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.
ΞΕ. ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.
Str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.
ΞΕ. τὰ μὴ ὄντʼ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.
Theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.
ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.
Str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.
ΞΕ. ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.
Theaet. To be sure.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
Str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.
ΞΕ. ὃν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μέν, ἐξ ὧν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτʼ ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.
Theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.
ΘΕΑΙ. νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ συνωμολογήσαμεν.
Str. And secondly it has a subject.
ΞΕ. ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός.
Str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.
ΞΕ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.
Theaet. Certainly not.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;
Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.
ΞΕ. μηδενὸς ⟨δέ⟩ γε ὢν οὐδʼ ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν· ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.
Theaet. Quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.
Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.
ΞΕ. περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, ⟨λεγόμενα⟩ μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν [ὡς] ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.
Theaet. Yes, very truly.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.
Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθʼ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται;
Theaet. How is it plain?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
Str. You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures and the several differences between them.
ΞΕ. ὧδʼ εἴσῃ ῥᾷον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτὰ τί ποτʼ ἔστιν καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.
Theaet. Give me an opportunity.
ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον.
Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?
ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
Str. And in speech we know there is just— Theaet. What?
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
Str. Affirmation and negation Theaet. Yes, we know that.
ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν.
264. Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?
264. ΞΕ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό;
Theaet. Certainly not.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;
Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?
ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅταν μὴ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ διʼ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἆρʼ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;
Str. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say “it seems” is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δʼ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ [τε] αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?
ΞΕ. κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὑρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό;
Theaet. Yes, I see.
ΘΕΑΙ. κατανοῶ.
Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.
ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατʼ εἴδη διαιρέσεων.
Theaet. What divisions?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποίων δή;
Str. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.
ΞΕ. διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικήν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικήν.
Str. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.
Theaet. You are right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.
Str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.
ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἴδωλον οὔτε φάντασμʼ εἴη τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι.
Theaet. True.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.
Str. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δʼ οὖσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν.
Theaet. Yes, it is possible.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγχωρεῖ.
Str. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γʼ ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.
Str. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.
ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.
265. Theaet. Right.
265. ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἠρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι;
Str. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?
ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καί τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν ἐφαντάζεθʼ ἡμῖν;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα διαιρετέον πρώτην. ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησίς τίς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων· ἦ γάρ;
Theaet. By all means.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.
ΞΕ. ποιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον δύʼ ἔστω μέρη.
Theaet. What are they?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποίω;
Str. The divine and the human.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δʼ ἀνθρώπινον.
Theaet. I don’t yet understand.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔπω μεμάθηκα.
Str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.
ΞΕ. ποιητικήν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατʼ ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι.
Theaet. Yes, we remember.
ΘΕΑΙ. μεμνήμεθα.
Str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief— Theaet. What belief?
ΞΕ. ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τʼ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι— ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ τῳ;
Str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?
ΞΕ. τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης;
Theaet. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαί σε κατά γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.
Str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.
ΞΕ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μέν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρʼ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφʼ ἅπερ νῦν ἕλκεσθαι φῄς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτʼ ἄν. ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τούτων ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων συνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον.
Theaet. Quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
Str. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.
ΞΕ. τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἑκατέραν αὖθις.
266. Str. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.
266. ΞΕ. οἷον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος.
Theaet. Assume that it is done.
ΘΕΑΙ. τετμήσθω.
Str. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.
ΞΕ. τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δʼ αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα.
Str. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.
ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γʼ ὡς ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἓν ἀφʼ ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὼ δʼ ὑπολοίπω σχεδὸν μάλιστʼ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικώ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται.
Theaet. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε ὅπῃ ἑκατέρα αὖθις.
Str. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?
ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς μέν που καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πεφυκότʼ ἐστίν, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα ἕκαστα· ἢ πῶς;
Str. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.
ΞΕ. τούτων δέ γε ἑκάστων εἴδωλα ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονίᾳ καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα.
Theaet. What are they?
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;
Str. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.
ΞΕ. τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθʼ ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκʼ ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθὸν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται.
Theaet. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.
ΘΕΑΙ. δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἴδωλον ἑκάστῳ.
Str. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆρʼ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τινʼ ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην;
Theaet. Certainly.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο διττὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ ποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, [αὐτουργική], τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον [εἰδωλοποιική].
Theaet. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.
ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἴδει· θείαν μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην κατὰ θάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.
Str. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.
ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἔμελλεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄντως ὂν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι φανείη πεφυκός.
Theaet. Yes, there were.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.
Str. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καταριθμήσομεν αὐτὼ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἴδη δύο;
267. Str. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.
267. ΞΕ. τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν δίχα.
Str. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν διʼ ὀργάνων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα.
Theaet. What do you mean?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς;
Str. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.
ΞΕ. ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληταί που.
Str. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.
ΞΕ. μιμητικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες ἀπονειμώμεθα· τὸ δʼ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες καὶ παρέντες ἑτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοῦναί τινʼ αὐτῷ.
Theaet. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.
ΘΕΑΙ. νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.
Str. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι· διʼ ἃ δέ, σκόπει.
Theaet. Please do.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε.
Str. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?
ΞΕ. τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δʼ οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν;
Theaet. None.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.
Str. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδότων ἦν μίμημα; τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἄν τις μιμήσαιτο.
Theaet. Of course.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Str. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης συλλήβδην ἀρετῆς; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μέν, δοξάζοντες δέ πῃ, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσιν τοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι;
Theaet. Yes, there are very many such people.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί.
Str. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?
ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον;
Theaet. Quite the opposite.
ΘΕΑΙ. πᾶν.
Str. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.
ΞΕ. μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν γε ἕτερον ἐκείνου λεκτέον οἶμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γιγνώσκοντος.
Str. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.
ΞΕ. πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατʼ εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν.
Theaet. Agreed.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.
Str. We mat therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.
ΞΕ. θατέρῳ τοίνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς μιμουμένοις δή.
Theaet. Very true.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.
Str. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.
ΞΕ. τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτʼ ἔχων τινά ἐστιν ἐν αὑτῷ.
Theaet. Let us do so.
ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶμεν.ΞΕ. ἔχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐήθης αὐτῶν ἐστιν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει·
268. Str. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.Theaet. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.
268. τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένος ὧν εἴρηκας.
Str. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἁπλοῦν μιμητήν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;
Theaet. That is reaonable, at any rate.
ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.
Str. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?
ΞΕ. τούτου δʼ αὖ τὸ γένος ἓν ἢ δύο φῶμεν;
Theaet. That is your affair.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅρα σύ.
Str. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.
ΞΕ. σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττὼ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ.
Theaet. You are quite right.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.
Str. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?
ΞΕ. τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν;
Theaet. Popular orator.
ΘΕΑΙ. δημολογικόν.
Str. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?
ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;
Theaet. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is all imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μέν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δʼ ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.
Str. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, τοὔνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπʼ ἀρχήν;
Theaet. By all means.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Str. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.
ΞΕ. τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλʼ ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τἀληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ.
Theaet. Yes, he certainly will.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.