1.1. WHAT IS THE REASON THAT GOD BADE SOCRATES TO ACT THE MIDWIFE’S PART TO OTHERS, BUT CHARGED HIMSELF NOT TO GENERATE; AS HE SAYS IN THEAETETUS? FOR he would never have used the name of God in such a merry, jesting manner, though Plato in that book makes Socrates several times to talk with great boasting and arrogance, as he does now. “There are many, dear friend, so affected towards me, that they are ready even to bite me, when I offer to cure them of the least madness. For they will not be persuaded that I do it out of goodwill, because they are ignorant that no God bears ill-will to man, and that therefore I wish ill to no man; but I cannot allow myself either to stand in a lie or to stifle the truth.” Whether therefore did he style his own nature, which was of a very strong and pregnant wit, by the name of God,—as Menander says, “For our mind is God,” and as Heraclitus, “Man’s genius is a Deity”? Or did some divine cause or some Daemon or other impart this way of philosophizing to Socrates, whereby always interrogating others, he cleared them of pride, error, and ignorance, and of being troublesome both to themselves and to others? For about that time there happened to be in Greece several sophisters; to these some young men paid great sums of money, for which they purchased a strong opinion of learning and wisdom, and of being stout disputants; but this sort of disputation spent much time in trifling squabblings, which were of no credit or profit. Now Socrates, using an argumentative discourse by way of a purgative remedy, procured belief and authority to what he said, because in refuting others he himself affirmed nothing; and he the sooner gained upon people, because he seemed rather to be inquisitive after the truth as well as they, than to maintain his own opinion.
1.1. Τί δήποτε τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ θεὸς μαιοῦσθαι μὲν ἐκέλευσεν ἑτέρους, αὐτὸν δὲ γεννᾶν ἀπεκώλυσεν; ὡς ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ λέγεται. Οὐ γὰρ εἰρωνευόμενὸς γε καὶ παίζων προσεχρήσατο ἂν τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀνόματι. καὶ ἄλλως ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ πολλὰ μεγάλαυχα καὶ σοβαρὰ Σωκράτει περιτέθεικεν, ὧν καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστί· πολλοὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὕτω πρός; με διετέθησαν, ὥστʼ ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι· καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις· οὐδʼ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδὸς τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πότερον οὖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ὡς κριτικωτέραν ἢ γονιμωτέραν οὖσαν θεὸν προσεῖπε, καθάπερ Μένανδρος ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων· ἢ θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον ὡς ἀληθῶς αἴτιον ὑφηγήσατο Σωκράτει τοῦτο τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ γένος, ᾧ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξετάζων ἀεὶ τύφου καὶ πλάνου καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ τοῦ βαρεῖς εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν αὑτοῖς εἶτα καὶ τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἀπήλλαττε; καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ τύχης τότε φορὰν γενέσθαι συνέβη σοφιστῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι· καὶ τούτοις οἱ νέοι πολὺ τελοῦντες ἀργύριον οἰήματος ἐπληροῦντο καὶ δοξοσοφίας, καὶ λόγων ἐζήλουν σχολὴν καὶ διατριβὰς ἀπράκτους ἐν ἔρισι καὶ φιλοτιμίαις καλὸν δὲ καὶ χρήσιμον οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν. τὸν οὖν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον ὁ Σωκράτης ἀξιόπιστος ἦν ἑτέρους ἐλέγχων τῷ μηδὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἥπτετο δοκῶν ζητεῖν κοινῇ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ βοηθεῖν.
1.2. Now, however useful a thing judgment is, it is mightily impeached by the begetting of a man’s own fancies. For the lover is blinded with the thing loved; and nothing of a man’s own is so beloved as is the opinion and discourse which he has begotten. And the distribution of children, said to be the justest, in respect of discourses is the unjustest; for there a man must take his own, but here a man must choose the best, though it be another man’s. Therefore he that has children of his own, is a worse judge of other men’s; it being true, as the sophister said well, “The Eleans would be the most proper judges of the Olympic games, were no Eleans gamesters.” So he that would judge of disputations cannot be just, if he either seeks the bays for himself, or is himself antagonist to either of the antagonists. For as the Grecian captains, when they were to decide by their suffrages who had behaved himself the best, every man of them voted for himself; so there is not a philosopher of them all but would do the like, besides those that acknowledge, like Socrates, that they can say nothing that is their own; and these only are the pure uncorrupt judges of the truth. For as the air in the ears, unless it be still and void of noise in itself, with out any sound or buzzing, does not exactly take sounds; so the philosophical judgment in disputations, if it be disturbed and obstreperous within, is hardly comprehensive of what is said without. For our familiar and inbred opinion will not admit that which is at variance with itself, as the number of sects and parties proves, of which philosophy—if she deals with them in the best manner—must hold one to be right, and all the others to be at war with the truth in their opinions.
1.2. ἔπειτα τοῦ κρίνειν ὄντος ὠφελίμου, τὸ γεννᾶν ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι. τυφλοῦται γὰρ τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον φιλεῖται δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐδὲν οὕτως ὡς δόξα καὶ λόγος ὑπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος. ἡ γὰρ λεγομένη τέκνων δικαιοτάτη διανομὴ πρὸς λόγους ἐστὶν ἀδικωτάτη δεῖ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μὲν λαβεῖν τὸ ἴδιον, ἐνταῦθα δέ, κἂν ἀλλότριον ᾖ, τὸ βέλτιστον. ὅθεν ὁ γεννῶν ἴδια γίγνεται φαυλότερος ἑτέρων κριτής. καὶ καθάπερ Ἠλείους τῶν σοφῶν τις ἔφη βελτίους ἂν εἶναι τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἀγωνοθέτας, εἰ μηδὲ εἷς Ἠλείων ἦν ἀγωνιστής, οὕτως ὁ μέλλων ἐν λόγοις ὀρθῶς ἐπιστατήσειν καὶ βραβεύσειν οὐ δίκαιός; ἐστιν αὐτὸς φιλοστεφανεῖν οὐδʼ ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς κρινομένοις. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων ψῆφον φέροντες αὑτοὺς ἀρίστους; ἔκριναν ἅπαντες· καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ὃς οὐ τοῦτο πέπονθε δίχα τῶν ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁμολογούντων μηδὲν ἴδιον λέγειν· οὗτοι δὲ καθαροὺς μόνοι καὶ ἀδεκάστους τῆς ἀληθείας παρέχουσιν ἑαυτοὺς δικαστάς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀήρ, ἂν μὴ σταθερὸς μηδὲ φωνῆς ἰδίας ἔρημος ἀλλʼ ἤχου καὶ ῥοίζου μεστός, οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν φθεγγομένων· οὕτω τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κρῖνον, ἂν ἔνδοθεν ἀντιπαταγῇ καὶ ἀντηχῇ, δυσξύνετον ἔσται τῶν λεγομένων ἔξωθεν. ἡ γὰρ οἰκεία δόξα καὶ σύνοικος οὐ προσδέξεται τὸ διαφωνοῦν πρὸς αὑτήν, ὡς μαρτυρεῖ τῶν αἱρέσεων τὸ πλῆθος, ὧν, ἂν ἄριστα πράττῃ φιλοσοφία, μίαν ἔχει κατορθοῦσαν, οἰομένας δὲ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας καὶ μαχομένας πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
1.3. Furthermore, if men can comprehend and know nothing, God did justly interdict Socrates the procreation of false and unstable discourses, which are like wind-eggs, and bid him convince others who were of any other opinion. And reasoning, which rids us of the greatest of evils, error and vanity of mind, is none of the least benefit to us; “For God has not granted this to the Esculapians.” Nor did Socrates give physic to the body; indeed he purged the mind of secret corruption. But if there be any knowledge of the truth, and if the truth be one, he has as much that learns it of him that invented it, as the inventor himself. Now he the most easily attains the truth, that is persuaded he has it not; and he chooses best, just as he that has no children of his own adopts the best.
1.3. ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι καταληπτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ γνωστόν, εἰκότως ὁ θεὸς ἀπεκώλυσεν αὐτὸν ὑπηνέμια καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀβέβαια γεννᾶν. ἐλέγχειν δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἠνάγκαζε τοιαῦτα δοξάζοντας. οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν ἦν ὄφελος ἀλλὰ μέγιστον ὁ τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν κακῶν, ἀπάτης καὶ κενοφροσύνης, ἀπαλλάττων λόγος οὐδʼ Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτὸ γʼ ἔδωκε θεός. οὐ γὰρ σώματος ἡ Σωκράτους ἰατρεία, ψυχῆς δʼ ἦν ὑπούλου καὶ διεφθαρμένης καθαρμός. εἰ δʼ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τἀληθοῦς ἓν δὲ τἀληθές, οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔχει τοῦ εὑρόντος ὁ μαθὼν παρὰ τοῦ εὑρόντος· λαμβάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ μὴ πεπεισμένος ἔχειν, καὶ λαμβάνει τὸ βέλτιστον ἐξ ἁπάντων, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ τεκὼν παιδοποιεῖται τὸν ἄριστον.
1.4. Mark this well, that poetry, mathematics, oratory, and sophistry, which are the things the Deity forbade Socrates to generate, are of no value; and that of the sole wisdom about what is divine and intelligible (which Socrates called amiable and eligible for itself), there is neither generation nor invention by man, but reminiscence. Wherefore Socrates taught nothing, but suggesting principles of doubt, as birth-pains, to young men, he excited and at the same time confirmed the innate notions. This he called his Art of Midwifery, which did not (as others professed) extrinsically confer intelligence upon his auditors; but demonstrated it to be innate, yet imperfect and confused, and in want of a nurse to feed and strengthen it.
1.4. ὅρα δὲ μὴ τἄλλα μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἦν ἄξια σπουδῆς ποιήματα καὶ μαθήματα καὶ λόγοι ῥητόρων καὶ δόγματα σοφιστῶν, ἃ Σωκράτην γεννᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀπεκώλυσεν· ἣν δὲ μόνην ἡγεῖτο Σωκράτης σοφίαν περὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ νοητόν, ἐρωτικὴν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ προσαγορευομένην, ταύτης οὐ γένεσις ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις οὐδʼ εὕρεσις ἀλλʼ ἀνάμνησις. ὅθεν οὐδὲν ἐδίδασκε Σωκράτης, ἀλλʼ ἐνδιδοὺς ἀρχὰς ἀποριῶν ὥσπερ ὠδίνων τοῖς νέοις ἐπήγειρε καὶ ἀνεκίνει καὶ συνεξῆγε τὰς ἐμφύτους νοήσεις· καὶ τοῦτο μαιωτικὴν τέχνην ὠνόμαζεν, οὐκ ἐντιθεῖσαν ἔξωθεν, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι προσεποιοῦντο, νοῦν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἔχοντας οἰκεῖον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀτελῆ δὲ καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ δεόμενον τοῦ τρέφοντος καὶ βεβαιοῦντος ἐπιδεικνύουσαν.
2.1. WHY DOES HE CALL THE SUPREME GOD FATHER AND MAKER OF, ALL THINGS? Is it because he is (as Homer calls him) of created Gods and men the Father, and of brutes and things that have no soul the maker? If Chrysippus may be credited, he is not properly styled the father of the afterbirth who supplied the seed, although it springs from the seed. Or has he figuratively called the maker of the world the father of it? In his Convivium he calls Phaedrus the father of the amatorious discourse which he had introduced; and so in his Phaedrus he calls him “father of noble children,” when he had been the occasion of many excellent discourses about philosophical matters. Or is there any difference between a father and a maker? Or between procreation and making? For as what is procreated is also made, but not the contrary; so he that procreated did also make, for the procreation of an animal is the making of it. Now the work of a maker—as of a builder, a weaver, a musical-instrument maker, or a statuary—is altogether distinct and separate from its author; but the principle and power of the procreator is implanted in the progeny, and contains his nature, the progeny being a piece pulled off the procreator. Since therefore the world is neither like a piece of potter’s work nor joiner’s work, but there is a great share of life and divinity in it, which God from himself communicated to and mixed with matter, God may properly be called Father of the world—since it has life in it—and also the maker of it.
2.1. Τί δήποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα τῶν πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν; πότερον ὅτι τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν, ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων; οὐδὲ γὰρ χορίου φησὶ Χρύσιππος πατέρα καλεῖσθαι τὸν παρασχόντα τὸ σπέρμα, καίπερ ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος γεγονότος. ἢ τῇ μεταφορᾷ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ εἴωθε, τὸν αἴτιον πατέρα τοῦ κόσμου κέκληκεν; ὡς τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων πατέρα Φαῖδρον ἐν Συμποσίῳ προσεῖπεν, εἰσηγητὴν αὐτῶν γενόμενον· ἐν δὲ τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ καλλίπαιδα πολλοὺς γὰρ καὶ καλοὺς λόγους ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γενέσθαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνου παρασχόντος. ἢ διαφέρει πατήρ τε ποιητοῦ καὶ γεννήσεως ποίησις; ὡς γὰρ τὸ γεγεννημένον καὶ πεποίηται, οὐ μὴν ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ὁ γεννήσας καὶ πεποίηκεν· ἐμψύχου γὰρ ποίησις ἡ γέννησίς ἐστι· καὶ ποιητοῦ μέν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδριάντος, ἀπήλλακται γενόμενον τοὔργον· ἡ δʼ ἀπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλʼ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θειότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς; ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρ τε τοῦ κόσμου, ζῴου γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται.
2.2. And since these things come very near to Plato’s opinion, consider, I pray, whether there may not be some probability in them. Whereas the world consists of two parts, body and soul, God indeed made not the body; but matter being provided, he formed and fitted it, binding up and confining what was infinite within proper limits and figures. But the soul, partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, was not only the work of God, but part of him; not only made by him, but begot by him.
2.2. τούτων δὲ μάλιστα τῆς Πλάτωνος ἁπτομένων δόξης, ἐπίστησον εἰ κἀκεῖνο λεχθήσεται πιθανῶς· ὅτι, δυεῖν ὄντοιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκε, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐγέννησε θεὸς ἀλλά, τῆς ὕλης παρασχομένης, ἐμόρφωσε καὶ συνήρμοσε, πέρασιν οἰκείοις καὶ σχήμασι δήσας καὶ ὁρίσας τὸ ἄπειρον ἡ δὲ ψυχή, νοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδʼ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν.
3.1. In the Republic, he supposes the universe, as one line, to be cut into two unequal sections; again he cuts each of these sections in two after the same proportion, and supposes the two sections first made to constitute the two genera of things sensible and things intelligible in the universe. The first represents the genus of intelligibles, comprehending in the first subdivision the primitive forms or ideas, in the second the mathematics. Of sensibles, the first subdivision comprehends solid bodies, the second comprehends the images and representations of them. Moreover, to every one of these four he has assigned its proper judicatory faculty;—to the first, reason; to the mathematics, the understanding; to sensibles, belief; to images and likenesses, conjecture. BUT WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY DIVIDING THE UNIVERSE INTO UN EQUAL PARTS? AND WHICH OF THE SECTIONS, THE INTELLIGIBLE OR THE SENSIBLE, IS THE GREATER? FOR IN THIS HE HAS NOT EXPLAINED HIMSELF. At first sight it will appear that the sensible is the greater portion. For the essence of intelligibles being indivisible, and in the same respect ever the same, is contracted into a little, and pure; but an essence divisible and pervading bodies constitutes the sensible part. Now what is immaterial is limited; but body in respect of matter is infinite and unlimited, and it becomes sensible only when it is defined by partaking of the intelligible. Besides, as every sensible has many images, shadows, and representations, and from one and the same original several copies may be taken both by nature and art; so the latter must needs exceed the former in number, according to Plato, who makes things intelligible to be patterns or ideas of things sensible, like the originals of images and reflections. Further, Plato derives the knowledge of ideas from body by abstraction and cutting away, leading us by various steps in mathematical discipline from arithmetic to geometry, thence to astronomy, and setting harmony above them all. For things become geometrical by the accession of magnitude to quantity; solid, by the accession of profundity to magnitude; astronomical, by the accession of motion to solidity; harmonical, by the accession of sound to motion. Abstract then sound from moving bodies, motion from solids, profundity from superficies, magnitude from quantity, we are then come to pure intelligible ideas, which have no distinction among themselves in respect of the one single intelligible essence. For unity makes no number, unless joined by the infinite binary; then it makes a number. And thence we proceed to points, thence to lines, from them to superficies, and profundities, and bodies, and to the qualities of the bodies so and so qualified. Now the reason is the only judicatory faculty of intelligibles; and the understanding is the reason in the mathematics, where intelligibles appear as by reflection in mirrors. But as to the knowledge of bodies, because of their multitude, Nature has given us five powers or distinctions of senses; nor are all bodies discerned by them, many escaping sense by reason of their smallness. And though every one of us consists of a body and soul, yet the hegemonic and intellectual faculty is small, being hid in the huge mass of flesh. And the case is the same in the universe, as to sensible and intelligible. For intelligibles are the principles of bodily things, but every thing is greater than the principle whence it came.
3.1. Ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, τοῦ παντὸς ὥσπερ μιᾶς γραμμῆς τετμημένης ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνων ἑκάτερον τμῆμα εἰς δύο ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὸ τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένος καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου περὶ τὰ πάντα ποιήσας τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ πρῶτον ἀποφαίνει τὸ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἴδη, δεύτερον τὸ μαθηματικὸν τοῦ δʼ αἰσθητοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ στερέμνια σώματα, δεύτερον δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα τούτων καὶ κριτήριον ἑκάστῳ τῶν τεττάρων ἀποδίδωσιν ἴδιον, νοῦν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ διάνοιαν δὲ τῷ μαθηματικῷ, τοῖς δʼ αἰσθητοῖς πίστιν, εἰκασίαν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας. τί οὖν διανοηθεὶς εἰς ἄνισα τμήματα τὸ πᾶν ἔτεμε; καὶ πότερον τῶν τμημάτων, τὸ νοητὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητόν, μεῖζόν ἐστιν; αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε. δόξει δʼ αὐτόθεν μὲν εἶναι μεῖζον τὸ αἰσθητόν· ἡ γὰρ ἀμέριστος οὐσία καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα τῶν νοητῶν ἐστιν εἰς βραχὺ συνηγμένη καὶ καθαρόν, ἡ δὲ σκεδαστὴ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ περιπλανὴς τὸ αἰσθητὸν παρέσχεν. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον πέρατος οἰκεῖον, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῇ ὕλῃ μὲν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον, αἰσθητὸν δὲ γιγνόμενον, ὅταν ὁρισθῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ νοητοῦ. ἔτι, καθάπερ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον εἰκόνας ἔχει πλείους καὶ σκιὰς καὶ εἴδωλα καὶ ὅλως; ἀφʼ ἑνὸς παραδείγματος πάμπολλα μιμήματα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φύσει καὶ τέχνῃ δυνατόν ἐστιν, οὕτως ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἐκεῖ πλήθει διαφέρειν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα παραδείγματα καὶ ἰδέας τὰ νοητὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὥσπερ εἰκόνων ἢ ἐμφάσεων ὑποτιθέμενον. ἔτι τῶν εἰδῶν νόησιν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ περικοπῆς σώματος ἐπάγει, τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων τάξει καταβιβάζων ἀπὸ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπὶ γεωμετρίαν, εἶτα μετὰ ταύτην ἐπʼ ἀστρολογίαν, ἐπὶ πάσαις δὲ τὴν ἁρμονικὴν τιθείς· γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν γεωμετρούμενα, τοῦ ποσοῦ μέγεθος προσλαβόντος τὰ δὲ στερεά, τοῦ μεγέθους βάθος· τὰ δʼ ἀστρολογούμενα, τοῦ στερεοῦ κίνησιν· τὰ δʼ ἁρμονικά, τῷ κινουμένῳ σώματι φωνῆς προσγενομένης. ὅθεν ἀφαιροῦντες φωνὴν μὲν τῶν κινουμένων κίνησιν δὲ τῶν στερεῶν βάθος δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέδων, μέγεθος δὲ τῶν ποσῶν, ἐν αὐταῖς γενησόμεθα ταῖς νοηταῖς ἰδέαις, οὐδεμίαν διαφορὰν ἐχούσαις πρὸς ἀλλήλας κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ μόνον νοούμενον. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ μονὰς ἀριθμόν, ἂν· μὴ τῆς ἀπείρου δυάδος ἅψηται· ποιήσασα δʼ οὕτως ἀριθμόν, εἰς στιγμὰς εἶτα γραμμὰς ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ βάθη καὶ σώματα πρόεισι καὶ σωμάτων ποιότητας ἐν πάθεσι γιγνομένων. ἔτι τῶν μὲν νοητῶν ἓν κριτήριον ὁ νοῦς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ διάνοια νοῦς· ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαινομένων τῶν νοητῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων γνῶσιν ὑπὸ πλήθους πέντε δυνάμεις καὶ διαφορὰς αἰσθητηρίων ἡ φύσις ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν· καὶ οὐ πάντα φωρᾶται ταύταις ἀλλʼ ἐκφεύγει πολλὰ διὰ μικρότητα τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἔτι, ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἑκάστου συνεστῶτος ἔκ τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος μικρόν ἐστι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ νοερὸν ἐν πολλῷ τῷ τῆς σαρκὸς ὄγκῳ κεκρυμμένον, οὕτως εἰκὸς ἔχειν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὸ νοητὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν. καὶ γὰρ ἄρχει τὰ νοητὰ τῶν σωματικῶν, ἀρχῆς δὲ πάσης πλέον τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ μεῖζον.
3.2. Yet, on the contrary, some will say that, by comparing sensibles with intelligibles, we match things mortal with divine, in some measure; for God is in intelligibles. Besides, the thing contained is ever less than the containing, and the nature of the universe contains the sensible in the intelligible. For God, having placed the soul in the middle, hath extended it through all, and hath covered it all round with bodies. The soul is invisible, and cannot be perceived by any of the senses, as Plato says in his Book of Laws; therefore every man must die, but the world shall never die. For mortality and dissolution surround every one of our vital faculties. The case is quite otherwise in the world; for the corporeal part, contained in the middle by the more noble and unalterable principle, is ever preserved. And a body is said to be without parts and indivisible for its minuteness; but what is incorporeal and intelligible is so, as being simple and sincere, and void of all firmness and difference. Besides, it were folly to think to judge of incorporeal things by corporeal. The present, or now, is said to be without parts and indivisible, since it is everywhere and no part of the world is void of it. But all affections and actions, and all corruptions and generations in the world, are contained by this now. But the mind is judge only of what is intelligible, as the sight is of light, by reason of its simplicity and similitude. But bodies, having several differences and diversities, are comprehended, some by one judicatory faculty, others by another, as by several organs. Yet they do not well who despise the intelligible and intelligent faculty in us; for being great, it comprehends all sensibles, and attains to things divine. The most important thing he himself teaches in his Banquet, where he shows us how we should use amatorious matters, turning our minds from sensible goods to things discernible only by the reason, that we ought not to be enslaved by the beauty of any body, study, or learning, but laying aside such pusillanimity, should turn to the vast ocean of beauty.
3.2. πρὸς δὲ τοὐναντίον εἴποι τις ἂν πρῶτον, ὅτι συγκρίνοντες τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς τρόπον τινὰ τὰ θνητὰ τοῖς θείοις ἐξισοῦμεν ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς. ἔπειτα πανταχοῦ δήπου τὸ περιεχόμενον ἔλαττόν ἐστι τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τῷ νοητῷ περιέχει τὸ αἰσθητόν· ὁ γὰρ θεός τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ μέσον θεὶς διὰ παντὸς τʼ ἔτεινε καὶ ἔξωθεν τὰ σώματα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν. ἔστι δʼ ἀόρατος ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀναίσθητος ὡς ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις εἴρηται· διὸ καὶ φθαρτὸς ἡμῶν εἷς ἕκαστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐ φθαρησόμενος· ἡμῶν μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστου τὴν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν ἐντὸς περιέχει τὸ θνητοειδὲς καὶ διαλυτόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ τοὐναντίον, ὑπὸ τῆς κυριωτέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης ἀεὶ σῴζεται τὸ σωματικὸν ἐν μέσῳ περιεχόμενον. καὶ μὴν ἀμερές γε λέγεται καὶ ἀμέριστον τὸ μὲν σῶμα μικρότητι, τὸ δʼ ἀσώματον καὶ νοητὸν ὡς ἁπλοῦν καὶ εἰλικρινὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἁπάσης στερεότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς. καὶ ἄλλως εὔηθές ἐστι τοῖς σωματικοῖς τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων. τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμερὲς μὲν καλεῖται καὶ ἀμέριστον, ἅμα δὲ πανταχοῦ ἐνέστηκε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης μέρος ἔρημόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάθη πάντα καὶ πράξεις φθοραί τε πᾶσαι καὶ γενέσεις αἱ ὑπὸ τὸν κόσμον ἐν τῷ νῦν περιέχονται. κριτήριον δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ μόνον ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς, ὡς φωτὸς ὄψις, διʼ ἁπλότητα καὶ ὁμοιότητα· τὰ δὲ σώματα, πολλὰς διαφορὰς ἔχοντα καὶ ἀνομοιότητας, ἄλλα ἄλλοις κριτηρίοις ὥσπερ ὀργάνοις ἁλίσκεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν νοητῆς καὶ νοερᾶς δυνάμεως καταφρονοῦσιν ὀρθῶς· πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα καὶ μεγάλη περίεστι παντὸς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ μέχρι τῶν θείων ἐξικνεῖται. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον αὐτὸς ἐν Συμποσίῳ διδάσκων, πῶς δεῖ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς χρῆσθαι, μετάγοντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καλῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητά, παρεγγυᾷ μήτε σώματός τινος μήτε ἐπιτηδεύματος μήτʼ ἐπιστήμης κάλλει μιᾶς ὑποτετάχθαι καὶ δουλεύειν, ἀλλʼ ἀποστάντα τῆς περὶ ταῦτα μικρολογίας ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ καλοῦ πέλαγος τρέπεσθαι Τί δήποτε, τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ πρεσβυτέραν ἀποφαίνων τοῦ σώματος αἰτίαν τε τῆς ἐκείνου γενέσεως καὶ ἀρχήν, πάλιν φησὶν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι ψυχὴν ἄνευ σώματος οὐδὲ νοῦν ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ἐν σώματι νοῦν δʼ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ;
4.1. WHAT IS THE REASON THAT, THOUGH PLATO ALWAYS SAYS THAT THE SOUL IS ANCIENTER THAN THE BODY, AND THAT IT IS THE CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE OF ITS RISE, YET HE LIKEWISE SAYS, THAT NEITHER COULD THE SOUL EXIST WITHOUT THE BODY, NOR THE REASON WITHOUT THE SOUL, BUT THE SOUL IN THE BODY AND THE REASON IN THE SOUL? FOR SO THE BODY WILL SEEM TO BE AND NOT TO BE, BECAUSE IT BOTH EXISTS WITH THE SOUL, AND IS BEGOT BY THE SOUL. Perhaps what we have often said is true; viz., that the soul without reason and the body without form did mutually ever coexist, and neither of them had generation or beginning. But after the soul did partake of reason and harmony, and being through consent made wise, it wrought a change in matter, and being stronger than the other’s motions, it drew and converted these motions to itself. So the body of the world drew its original from the soul, and became conformable and like to it. For the soul did not make the Nature of the body out of itself, or out of nothing; but it wrought an orderly and pliable body out of one disorderly and formless. Just as if a man should say that the virtue of the seed is with the body, and yet that the body of the fig-tree or olive-tree was made of the seed, he would not be much out; for the body, its innate motion and mutation proceeding from the seed, grew up and became what it is. So, when formless and indefinite matter was once formed by the inbeing soul, it received such a form and disposition.
4.1. δόξει γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, συνυπάρχον ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ γεννώμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἦ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφʼ ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς ἐστιν; ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ καὶ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεσιν ἔσχεν οὐδʼ ἀρχήν· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ ψυχὴ νοῦ μετέλαβε καὶ ἁρμονίας, καὶ γενομένη διὰ συμφωνίας ἔμφρων μεταβολῆς αἰτία γέγονε τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κρατήσασα ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσι τὰς ἐκείνης ἐπεσπάσατο καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν, οὕτω τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ἔσχεν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ κατασχηματιζόμενον καὶ συνομοιούμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐδημιούργει φύσιν οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλʼ ἐκ σώματος ἀτάκτου καὶ ἀσχηματίστου σῶμα τεταγμένον ἀπειργάσατο καὶ πειθήνιον. ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ φαίη τις ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος δύναμιν εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, γεγονέναι μέντοι τὸ σῶμα τῆς συκῆς ἢ τῆς ἐλαίας ὑπὸ σπέρματος, οὐδὲν ἐρεῖ διάφωνον αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα, κινήσεως αὐτῷ καὶ μεταβολῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ σπέρματος ἐγγενομένης, ἔφυ τοιοῦτο καὶ διεβλάστησεν οὕτως ἡ ἄμορφος ὕλη καὶ ἀόριστος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνούσης σχηματισθεῖσα μορφὴν ἔσχε τοιαύτην καὶ διάθεσιν.
5.1. WHY, SINCE BODIES AND FIGURES ARE CONTAINED PARTLY BY RECTTLINEARS AND PARTLY BY CIRCLES, DOES HE MAKE ISOSCELES TRIANGLES AND TRIANGLES OF UNEQUAL SIDES THE PRINCIPLES OF RECTILINEARS; OF WHICH THE ISOSCELES TRIANGLE FORMS THE CUBE, THE ELEMENT OF THE EARTH; AND A SCALENE TRIANGLE FORMS THE PYRAMID WHICH IS THE SEED OF FIRE, THE OCTAHEDRON WHICH IS THE SEED OF AIR, AND THE ICOSAHEDRON WHICH IS THE SEED OF WATER;—WHILE HE DOES NOT MEDDLE WITH CIRCULARS, THOUGH HE DOES MENTION THE GLOBE, WHERE HE SAYS THAT EACH OF THE AFORE-RECKONED FIGURES DIVIDES A ROUND BODY THAT ENCLOSES IT INTO EQUAL PARTS. Is their opinion true who think that he ascribed a dodecahedron to the globe, when he says that God made use of it in delineating the universe? For upon account of the multitude of its bases and the obtuseness of its angles, avoiding all rectitude, it is flexible, and by circumtension, like globes made of twelve skins, it becomes circular and comprehensive. For it has twenty solid angles, each of which is contained by three obtuse planes, and each of these contains one and the fifth part of a right angle. Now it is made up of twelve equilateral and equangular quinquangles (or pentagons), each of which consists of thirty of the first scalene triangles. Therefore it seems to resemble both the Zodiac and the year, it being divided into the same number of parts as these.
5.1. Διὰ τί, τῶν μὲν εὐθυγράμμων τῶν δὲ κυκλικῶν σωμάτων καὶ σχημάτων ὄντων, τὰς τῶν εὐθυγράμμων ἀρχὰς ἔλαβε τὸ ἰσοσκελὲς τρίγωνον καὶ τὸ σκαληνόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν τὸν κύβον συνέστησε γῆς στοιχεῖον ὄντα, τὸ δὲ σκαληνὸν τήν τε πυραμίδα καὶ τὸ ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον, τὸ μὲν πυρὸς σπέρμα τὸ δʼ ἀέρος τὸ δʼ ὕδατος γενόμενον· τὸ δὲ τῶν κυκλικῶν ὅλως παρῆκε, καίτοι μνησθεὶς τοῦ σφαιροειδοῦς, ἐν οἷς φησι τῶν κατηριθμημένων σχημάτων ἕκαστον σώματος περιφεροῦς εἰς ἴσα διανεμητικὸν εἶναι; πότερον, ὡς ὑπονοοῦσιν ἔνιοι, τὸ δωδεκάεδρον τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ προσένειμεν, εἰπὼν ὅτι τούτῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὁ θεὸς κατεχρήσατο φύσιν ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν. καὶ γὰρ μάλιστα τῷ πλήθει τῶν στοιχείων ἀμβλύτητι δὲ τῶν γωνιῶν τὴν εὐθύτητα διαφυγὸν εὐκαμπές ἐστι, καὶ τῇ περιτάσει καθάπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι κυκλοτερὲς γίγνεται καὶ περιληπτικόν· ἔχει γὰρ εἴκοσι γωνίας στερεάς, ὧν ἑκάστην ἐπίπεδοι περιέχουσιν ἀμβλεῖαι τρεῖς ἑκάστη γὰρ ὀρθῆς ἐστι καὶ πέμπτου μορίου· συνήρμοσται δὲ καὶ συμπέπηγεν ἐκ δώδεκα πενταγώνων ἰσογωνίων καὶ ἰσοπλεύρων, ὧν ἕκαστον ἐκ τριάκοντα τῶν πρώτων σκαληνῶν τριγώνων συνέστηκε· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ τὸν ζῳδιακὸν ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπομιμεῖσθαι ταῖς διανομαῖς τῶν μοιρῶν ἰσαρίθμοις οὔσαις.
5.2. Or is a right line in Nature prior to circumference; or is circumference but an accident of rectilinear? For a right line is said to bend; and a circle is described by a centre and distance, which is the place of a right line by which a circumference is measured, this being everywhere equally distant from the middle. And a cone and a cylinder are made by rectilinears; a cone by keeping one side of a triangle fixed and carrying another round with the base,—a cylinder, by doing the like with a parallelogram. Further, that is nearest to principle which is less; but a right is the least of all lines, as it is simple; whereas in a circumference one part is convex without, another concave within. Besides, numbers are before figures, as unity is before a point, which is unity in position. But indeed unity is triangular; for every triangular number taken eight times, by adding unity, becomes quadrate; and this happens to unity. Therefore a triangle is before a circle, whence a right line is before a circumference. Besides, no element is divided into things compounded of itself; indeed there is a dissolution of all other things into the elements. Now a triangle is divided into no circumference, but two diameters cut a circle into four triangles; therefore a rectilinear figure is before a circular, and has more of the nature of an element. And Plato himself shows that a rectilinear is in the first place, and a circular is only consequential and accidental. For when he says the earth consists of cubes, each of which is contained with rectilinear superficies, he says the earth is spherical and round. Therefore there was no need of making a peculiar element for round things, since rectilinears, fitted after a certain manner among themselves, do make up this figure.
5.2. ἢ πρότερόν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν τὸ εὐθὺ τοῦ περιφεροῦς, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως; πάθος τι τῆς εὐθείας ἡ περιφερής; κάμπτεσθαι γὰρ λέγεται τὸ ὀρθόν καὶ ὁ κύκλος γράφεται κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν εὐθείας τόπος, ὑφʼ ἧς καὶ μετρεῖται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πανταχόθεν ἴσον ἀφέστηκε. γεννᾶται δὲ καὶ κῶνος καὶ κύλινδρος ἀπʼ εὐθυγράμμων, ὁ μὲν τριγώνου περὶ μίαν πλευρὰν μένουσαν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ πλευρᾷ καὶ τῇ βάσει περιενεχθέντος· ὁ δὲ κύλινδρος παραλληλογράμμου ταὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντος. ἔτι τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς ἐγγυτέρω τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐλαχίστη δὲ πασῶν ἡ εὐθεῖα· τῆς γὰρ περιφεροῦς τὸ μὲν ἐντός ἐστι κοῖλον κυρτὸν δὲ τὸ ἐκτός. ἔτι τῶν σχημάτων οἱ ἀριθμοὶ πρότεροι, καὶ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς τῆς στιγμῆς· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ στιγμὴ μονὰς ἐν θέσει. καὶ μὴν ἡ μονὰς τρίγωνός ἐστι· πᾶς γὰρ τρίγωνος ἀριθμὸς ὀκτάκις γενόμενος καὶ μονάδα προσλαβὼν γίγνεται τετράγωνος· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῇ μονάδι συμβέβηκε· πρότερον οὖν τοῦ κύκλου τὸ τρίγωνον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ εὐθεῖα τῆς περιφεροῦς. ἔτι τὸ στοιχεῖον εἰς οὐδὲν διαιρεῖται τῶν συνισταμένων ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις εἰς τὸ στοιχεῖον ἡ διάλυσις. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τρίγωνον εἰς οὐδὲν περιφερὲς διαλύεται, τὸν δὲ κύκλον εἰς τέτταρα τρίγωνα τέμνουσιν αἱ δύο διάμετροι, πρότερον ἂν τῇ φύσει καὶ στοιχειωδέστερον εἴη τοῦ κυκλικοῦ τὸ εὐθύγραμμον. ὅτι τοίνυν προηγούμενον μέν ἐστι τὸ εὐθύγραμμον, τὸ δὲ κυκλικὸν ἐπιγιγνόμενον καὶ συμβεβηκός, αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐνεδείξατο· τὴν γὰρ γῆν ἐκ κύβων συστησάμενος, ὧν ἕκαστον εὐθύγραμμοι περιέχουσιν ἐπιφάνειαι, σφαιροειδὲς αὐτῆς γεγονέναι τὸ σχῆμά φησι καὶ στρογγύλον. ὥστʼ οὐδὲν ἔδει ποιεῖν τῶν περιφερῶν ἴδιον στοιχεῖον, εἰ καὶ τοῖς εὐθυγράμμοις πρὸς ἄλληλά πως συναρμοττομένοις ὁ σχηματισμὸς οὗτος ἐπιγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.
5.3. Besides, a right line, whether great or little, preserves the same rectitude; but as to the circumference of a circle, the less it is, the crookeder it is; the larger, the straighter. Therefore if a convex superficies stands on a plane, it sometimes touches the subject plane in a point, sometimes in a line. So that a man may imagine that a circumference is made up of little right lines.
5.3. ἔτι, εὐθεῖα μὲν ἥ τε μείζων ἥ τε μικροτέρα τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθύτητα διατηρεῖ, τὰς δὲ τῶν κύκλων περιφερείας, ἂν ὦσι σμικρότεραι, καμπυλωτέρας καὶ σφιγγομένας τῇ κυρτότητι μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν· ἂν δὲ μείζους, ἀνειμένας· ἱστάμενοι γοῦν κατὰ τὴν κυρτὴν περιφέρειαν οἱ μὲν κατὰ σημεῖον οἱ δὲ κατὰ γραμμὴν ἅπτονται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐπιπέδων· ὥστʼ ὑπονοήσειεν ἄν τις εὐθείας κατὰ μικρὰ πολλὰς συντιθεμένας τὴν περιφερῆ γραμμὴν ἀποτελεῖν.
5.4. But observe whether this be not true, that no circle or sphere in this world is exact; but since by the tension and circumtension of the right lines, or by the minuteness of the parts, the difference disappears, the figure seems circular and round. Therefore no corruptible body moves circularly, but altogether in a right line. To be truly spherical is not in a sensible body, but is the element of the soul and mind, to which he has given circular motion, as being agreeable to their nature.
5.4. ὅρα δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐνταῦθα κυκλικῶν καὶ σφαιροειδῶν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπηκριβωμένον, ἀλλʼ ἐντάσει καὶ περιτάσει τῶν εὐθυγράμμων ἢ μικρότητι τῶν μορίων τῆς διαφορᾶς λανθανούσης ἐπιφαίνεται τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ κυκλοειδές ὅθεν οὐδὲ κινεῖται φύσει τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων ἐγκυκλίως οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ εὐθείας ἅπαντα· τὸ δʼ ὄντως σφαιροειδὲς; οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ νοῦ στοιχεῖον, οἷς καὶ τὴν κυκλοφορικὴν κίνησιν ὡς προσήκουσαν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσιν.
6.1. HOW COMES IT TO PASS THAT IN PHAEDRUS IT IS SAID, THAT THE NATURE OF A WING, BY WHICH ANY THING THAT IS HEAVY IS CARRIED UPWARDS, PARTICIPATES MOST OF THE BODY OF GOD? Is it because the discourse is of love, and love is of beauty inherent in a body? Now beauty, by similitude to things divine, moves and reminds the soul. Or it may be (without too much curiosity) he may be understood in plain meaning, to wit, that the several faculties of the soul being employed about bodies, the power of reasoning and understanding partakes most about divine and heavenly things; which he did not impertinently call a wing, it raising the soul from mean and mortal things to things above.
6.1. Πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ λέγεται τὸ τὴν τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσιν, ὑφʼ ἧς ἄνω τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἀνάγεται, κεκοινωνηκέναι μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου; πότερον ὅτι περὶ ἔρωτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κάλλους δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἔρως, τὸ δὲ κάλλος ὁμοιότητι τῇ πρὸς τὰ θεῖα κινεῖ καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκει τὴν ψυχήν· ἢ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν περιεργαστέον ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς ἀκουστέον ὅτι, τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων πλειόνων οὐσῶν, ἡ διαλογιστικὴ καὶ διανοητικὴ μάλιστα τοῦ θείου κεκοινώνηκεν, ἣν τῶν θείων καὶ οὐρανίων ἔφησεν; ἣν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου πτερὸν προσηγόρευσεν, ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ταπεινῶν καὶ θνητῶν ἀναφέρουσαν.
7.1. IN WHAT SENSE DOES PLATO SAY, THAT THE ANTIPERISTASIS (OR REACTION) OF MOTION—BY REASON THERE IS NO VACUUM—IS THE CAUSE OF THE EFFECTS IN PHYSICIANS’ CUPPING-GLASSES, IN SWALLOWING, IN THROWING OF WEIGHTS, IN THE RUNNING OF WATER, IN THUNDER, IN THE ATTRACTION OF THE LOADSTONE, AND IN THE HARMONY OF SOUNDS? For it seems unreasonable to ascribe the reason of such different effects to the selfsame cause.
7.1. Πῶς ποτέ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τῆς κινήσεως διὰ τὸ μηδαμοῦ κενὸν ὑπάρχειν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἰατρικὰς σικύας παθημάτων, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάποσιν καὶ τὰ ῥιπτούμενα βάρη καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑδάτων ῥεύματα καὶ κεραυνούς, τήν τε φαινομένην πρὸς ἢλεκτρα καὶ τὸν λίθον τὸν Ἡράκλειον ὁλκὴν τάς τε τῶν φθόγγων συμφωνίας; δόξει γὰρ ἀτόπως αἰτίαν μίαν παμπόλλων καὶ ἀνομοίων γένεσιν ἐπάγειν παθῶν.
7.2. How respiration is made by the reaction of the air, he has sufficiently shown. But the rest, he says, seem to be done miraculously, but really the bodies thrust each other aside and change places with one another; while he has left for us to determine how each is particularly done.
7.2. τὸ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν ὡς γίγνεται τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει τοῦ ἀέρος, αὐτὸς ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδειχε· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα φήσας θαυματουργεῖσθαι καὶ τῷ κενὸν εἶναι μηδὲν περιωθεῖν θʼ αὑτὰ ταῦτʼ εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ διαμείβεσθαι πρὸς τὰς αὑτῶν ἕδρας ἰόντα, τὴν καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐξεργασίαν ἡμῖν ἀφῆκε.
7.3. As to cupping-glasses, the case is thus: the air next to the flesh being comprehended and inflamed by the heat, and being made more rare than the pores of the brass, does not go into a vacuum (for there is no such thing), but into the air that is without the cupping-glass, and has an impulse upon it. This air drives that before it; and each, as it gives way, strives to succeed into the place which was vacuated by the cession of the first. And so the air approaching the flesh comprehended by the cupping-glass, and exciting it, draws the humors into the cupping-glass.
7.3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὸ περὶ τὴν σικύαν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ὁ περιληφθεὶς ὑπʼ αὐτῆς πρὸς τῇ σαρκὶ μετὰ θερμότητος ἀὴρ ἐκπυρωθεὶς καὶ γενόμενος τῶν τοῦ χαλκοῦ πόρων ἀραιότερος ἐξέπεσεν οὐκ εἰς κενὴν χώραν, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν περιεστῶτα τὴν σικύαν ἔξωθεν ἀέρα, κἀκεῖνον ἀπέωσεν ὁ δὲ τὸν πρὸ αὑτοῦ· καὶ τοῦτο πάσχων ἀεὶ καὶ δρῶν ὁ ἔμπροσθεν ὑποχωρεῖ, τῆς κενουμένης γλιχόμενος χώρας, ἣν ὁ πρῶτος ἐξέλιπεν οὕτω δὲ τῇ σαρκὶ περιπίπτων, ἧς ἡ σικύα δέδρακται, καὶ ἀναζέων ἅμα συνεκθλίβει τὸ ὑγρὸν εἰς τὴν σικύαν.
7.4. Swallowing takes place in the same way. For the cavities about the mouth and stomach are full of air; when therefore the meat is squeezed down by the tongue and tonsils, the elided air follows what gives way, and also forces down the meat.
7.4. ἡ δὲ κατάποσις γίγνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· αἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸν στόμαχον κοιλότητες ἀέρος ἀεὶ πλήρεις εἰσίν· ὅταν οὖν ἐμπιεσθῇ τὸ σιτίον ὑπὸ τῆς γλώττης, ἅμα καὶ τῶν παρισθμίων ἐνταθέντων, ἐκθλιβόμενος ὁ ἀὴρ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχεται τοῦ ὑποχωροῦντος καὶ συνεπωθεῖ τὸ σιτίον.
7.5. Weights also thrown cleave the air and dissipate it, as they fall with force; the air recoiling back, according to its natural tendency to rush in and fill the vacuity, follows the impulse, and accelerates the motion.
7.5. τὰ δὲ ῥιπτούμενα βάρη τὸν ἀέρα σχίζει μετὰ πληγῆς ἐμπεσόντα καὶ διίστησιν ὁ δὲ περιρρέων ὀπίσω, τῷ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὴν ἐρημουμένην χώραν διώκειν καὶ ἀναπληροῦν, συνέπεται τῷ ἀφιεμένῳ τὴν κίνησιν συνεπιταχύνων.
7.6. The fall also of thunderbolts is like to darting any thing. For by the blow in the cloud, the fiery matter exploded breaks into the air; and it being broken gives way, and again being contracted above, by main force it presses the thunderbolt downwards contrary to Nature.
7.6. αἱ δὲ τῶν κεραυνῶν πτώσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ῥίψεσιν ἐοίκασιν· ἐκπηδᾷ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῆς ἐν τῷ νέφει γενομένης τὸ πυρῶδες εἰς τὸν ἀέρα· κἀκεῖνος ἀντιρραγεὶς ὑποχωρεῖ, καὶ πάλιν ἐς ταὐτὸ συμπίπτων ἄνωθεν ἐξωθεῖ κάτω παρὰ φύσιν ἀποβιαζόμενος τὸν κεραυνόν.
7.7. And neither amber nor the loadstone draws any thing to it which is near, nor does any thing spontaneously approach them. But this stone emits strong exhalations, by which the adjoining air being impelled forceth that which is before it; and this being carried round in the circle, and returning into the vacuated place, forcibly draws the iron in the same direction. In amber there is a flammeous and spirituous nature, and this by rubbing on the surface is emitted by recluse passages, and does the same that the loadstone does. It also draws the lightest and driest of adjacent bodies, by reason of their tenuity and weakness; for it is not so strong nor so endued with weight and strength as to force much air and to act with violence and to have power over great bodies, as the magnet has. But what is the reason the air never draws a stone, nor wood, but iron only, to the loadstone? This is a common question both by them who think the coition of these bodies is made by the attraction of the loadstone, and by such as think it done by the incitement of the iron. Iron is neither so rare as wood, nor altogether so solid as gold or a stone; but has certain pores and asperities, which in regard of the inequality are proportionable to the air; and the air being received in certain seats, and having (as it were) certain stays to cling to, does not slip away; but when it is carried up to the stone and strikes against it, it draws the iron by force along with it to the stone. Such then may be the reason of this.
7.7. τὸ δʼ ἤλεκτρον οὐδὲν ἕλκει τῶν παρακειμένων ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ σιδηρῖτις λίθος, οὐδὲ προσπηδᾷ τι τούτοις ἀφʼ αὑτοῦ τῶν πλησίον· ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν λίθος τινὰς ἀπορροὰς ἐξίησιν ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ πνευματώδεις, αἷς ὁ συνεχὴς ἀναστελλόμενος ἀὴρ ὠθεῖ τὸν πρὸ αὑτοῦ· κἀκεῖνος ἐν κύκλῳ περιιὼν καὶ ὑπονοστῶν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν κενουμένην χώραν ἀποβιάζεται καὶ συνεφέλκεται τὸν σίδηρον. τὸ δʼ ἤλεκτρον ἔχει μέν τι φλογοειδὲς ἢ πνευματικόν, ἐκβάλλει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ τρίψει τῆς ἐπιφανείας, τῶν πόρων ἀναστομωθέντων· τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸ μὲν ἐκπεσὸν ποιεῖ τῷ τῆς σιδηρίτιδος, ἐφέλκεται δὲ τῶν πλησίον τὰ κουφότατα καὶ ξηρότατα διὰ λεπτότητα καὶ ἀσθένειαν οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἰσχυρὸν οὐδʼ ἔχει βάρος οὐδὲ ῥύμην πλῆθος ἀέρος ἐξῶσαι δυναμένην, ᾧ τῶν μειζόνων, ὥσπερ ἡ σιδηρῖτις, ἐπικρατήσει. πῶς οὖν οὔτε λίθον οὔτε ξύλον ὁ ἀὴρ ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸν σίδηρον ὠθεῖ καὶ προστέλλει πρὸς τὴν λίθον; αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπορία κοινὴ πρός τε τοὺς ὁλκῇ τῆς λίθου καὶ τοὺς φορᾷ τοῦ σιδήρου τὴν σύμπηξιν οἰομένους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων εἰλυσπᾶν δʼ οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος. ὁ σίδηρος οὔτʼ ἄγαν ἀραιὸς ἐστιν ὡς ξύλον οὔτʼ ἄγαν πυκνὸς ὡς χρυσὸς ἢ λίθος, ἀλλʼ ἔχει πόρους καὶ οἴμους καὶ τραχύτητας διὰ τὰς ἀνωμαλίας τῷ ἀέρι συμμέτρους, ὥστε μὴ ἀπολισθάνειν ἀλλʼ ἕδραις τισὶν ἐνισχόμενον καὶ ἀντερείσεσι περιπλοκὴν σύμμετρον ἐχούσαις, ὡς ἂν ἐμπέσῃ πρὸς τὴν λίθον φερόμενος, ἀποβιάζεσθαι καὶ προωθεῖν τὸν σίδηρον. τούτων μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτός τις ἂν εἴη λόγος.