7.8. But the manner of the waters running over the earth is not so evident. But it is observable that the waters of lakes and ponds stand immovable, because the air about them stagnates immovable and admits of no vacuity. For the water on the surface of lakes and seas is troubled and fluctuates as the air is moved, it following the motion of the air, and moving as it is moved. For the force from below causes the hollowness of the wave, and from above the swelling thereof; until the air ambient and containing the water is still. Therefore the flux of such waters as follow the motion of the retreating air, and are impelled by that which presses behind, is continued without end. And this is the reason that the stream increases with the waters, and is slow where the water is weak, the air not giving way, and therefore suffering less reaction. So the water of fountains must needs flow upwards, the extrinsic air succeeding into the vacuity and throwing the water out. In a close house, that keeps in the air and wind, the floor sprinkled with water causes an air or wind, because, as the sprinkled water falls, the air gives way. For it is so provided by Nature that air and water force one another and give way to one another; because there is no vacuity in which one can be settled without feeling the change and alteration in the other.
7.8. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ὑδάτων ῥύσις οὐχ ὁμοίως εὐσύνοπτον ἔχει τὸν τῆς ἀντιπεριώσεως τρόπον. ἀλλὰ χρὴ καταμανθάνειν τὰ λιμναῖα τῶν ὑδάτων ἀτρεμοῦντα καὶ μένοντα, τῷ περικεχύσθαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν πανταχόθεν αὑτοῖς ἀκίνητον ἀέρα, μηδαμοῦ κενὴν ποιοῦντα χώραν. τὸ γοῦν ἐπιπολῆς ὕδωρ ἔν τε ταῖς λίμναις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πελάγεσι δονεῖται καὶ κυμαίνεται, τοῦ ἀέρος σάλον λαμβάνοντος· ἕπεται γὰρ εὐθὺς μεθισταμένῳ καὶ συναπορρεῖ διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν· ἡ γὰρ κάτω πληγὴ τὴν κοιλότητα ποιεῖ τοῦ κύματος ἡ δʼ ἄνω τὸν ὄγκον, ἄχρι οὗ καταστῇ καὶ παύσηται, τῆς περιεχούσης τὰ ὑγρὰ χώρας ἱσταμένης. αἱ ῥύσεις οὖν τῶν φερομένων ἀεὶ τὰ ὑποχωροῦντα τοῦ ἀέρος διώκουσαι τοῖς δʼ ἀντιπεριωθουμένοις ἐλαυνόμεναι τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς καὶ ἀλώφητον ἔχουσι, διὸ καὶ φέρονται θᾶττον οἱ ποταμοὶ πληθύοντες· ὅταν δʼ ὀλίγον καὶ κοῖλον, ἵεται τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας, οὐχ ὑπείκοντος τοῦ ἀέρος οὐδὲ πολλὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν λαμβάνοντος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ πηγαῖα τῶν ὑδάτων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀναφέρεσθαι, τοῦ θύραθεν ἀέρος εἰς τὰς κενουμένας ἐν βάθει χώρας ὑποφερομένου καὶ πάλιν θύραζε τὸ ὕδωρ ἐκπέμποντος. οἴκου δὲ βαθυσκίου καὶ περιέχοντος ἀέρα νήνεμον ὕδατι ῥανθὲν ἔδαφος πνεῦμα ποιεῖ καὶ ἄνεμον, μεθισταμένου τοῦ ἀέρος ἐξ ἕδρας παρεμπίπτοντι τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ πληγὰς λαμβάνοντος οὕτως ἐξωθεῖσθαί θʼ ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἀνθυπείκειν ἀλλήλοις πέφυκεν, οὐκ οὔσης κενότητος ἐν ᾗ θάτερον ἱδρυθὲν οὐ μεθέξει τῆς θατέρου μεταβολῆς.
7.9. Concerning symphony, he shows how sounds harmonize. A quick sound is acute, a slow is grave. Therefore acute sounds move the senses the quicker; and these dying and grave sounds supervening, what arises from the contemperation of one with the other causes pleasure to the ear, which we call harmony. And by what has been said, it may easily be understood that air is the instrument of these things. For sound is the stroke upon the sense of the hearer, caused by the air; and the air strikes as it is struck by the thing moving,—if violent, acutely,—if languid, softly. The violent stroke comes quick to the ear; then the circumambient air receiving a slower, it affects and carries the sense along with it.
7.9. καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τῆς συμφωνίας αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν, ὃν τρόπον ὁμοιοῦσι τοὺς φθόγγους. ὀξὺς μὲν γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς γίγνεται βαρὺς δʼ ὁ βραδύς· διὸ καὶ πρότερον κινοῦσι τὴν αἴσθησιν οἱ ὀξεῖς· ὅταν δὲ τούτοις ἤδη μαραινομένοις καὶ ἀπολήγουσιν οἱ βραδεῖς ἐπιβάλωσιν ἀρχόμενοι, τὸ κραθὲν αὐτῶν διʼ ὁμοιοπάθειαν ἡδονὴν τῇ ἀκοῇ παρέσχεν, ἣν συμφωνίαν καλοῦσιν. ὅτι δὲ τούτων ὄργανον ὁ ἀήρ ἐστι, ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ πληγὴ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου διʼ ὤτων ὑπʼ ἀέρος· πλήττει γὰρ πληγεὶς; ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τοῦ κινήσαντος, ἂν μὲν σφοδρόν, ὀξέως, ἂν δʼ ἀμβλύ, μαλακώτερον· ὁ δὴ σφόδρα καὶ συντόνως πληγεὶς προσμίγνυσι τῇ ἀκοῇ πρότερος, εἶτα περιιὼν πάλιν καὶ καταλαμβάνων τὸν βραδύτερον συνέπεται καὶ συμπαραπέμπει τὴν αἴσθησιν.
8.1. WHAT MEANS TIMAEUS, WHEN HE SAYS THAT SOULS ARE DISPERSED IN TO THE EARTH, THE MOON, AND INTO OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF TIME? Does the earth move like the sun, moon, and five planets, which for their motions he calls organs or instruments of time? Or is the earth fixed to the axis of the universe; yet not so built as to remain immovable, but to turn and wheel about, as Aristarchus and Seleucus have shown since; Aristarchus only supposing it, Seleucus positively asserting it? Theophrastus writes how that Plato, when he grew old, repented him that he had placed the earth in the middle of the universe, which was not its place.
8.1. Πῶς λέγει τὰς ψυχὰς ὁ Τίμαιος εἴς τε γῆν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου σπαρῆναι; πότερον οὕτως ἐκίνει τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ ἣλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλάνητας, οὓς ὄργανα χρόνου διὰ τὰς τροπὰς προσηγόρευε, καὶ ἔδει τὴν γῆν ἰλλομένην περὶ τὸν διὰ πάντων πόλον τεταμένον μὴ μεμηχανῆσθαι συνεχομένην καὶ μένουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρεφομένην καὶ ἀνειλουμένην νοεῖν, ὡς ὕστερον Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ Σέλευκος ἀπεδείκνυσαν, ὁ μὲν ὑποτιθέμενος μόνον ὁ δὲ Σέλευκος καὶ ἀποφαινόμενος; Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ μεταμέλειν, ὡς οὐ προσήκουσαν ἀποδόντι τῇ γῇ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός.
8.2. Or is this contradictory to Plato’s opinion elsewhere, and in the Greek instead of χρόνου should it be written χρόνῳ, taking the dative case instead of the genitive, so that the stars will not be said to be instruments, but the bodies of animals So Aristotle has defined the soul to be “the actual being of a natural organic body, having the power of life.” The sense then must be this, that souls are dispersed into meet organical bodies in time. But this is far besides his opinion. For it is not once, but several times, that he calls the stars instruments of time; as when he says, the sun was made, as well as other planets, for the distinction and conservation of the numbers of time.
8.2. ἢ τούτοις μὲν ἀντίκειται πολλὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως ἀρεσκόντων τἀνδρί· μεταγραπτέον δὲ τὸ χρόνου χρόνῳ λαμβάνοντα ἀντὶ τῆς γενικῆς τὴν δοτικήν, καὶ δεκτέον ὄργανα μὴ τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀλλὰ τὰ σώματα τῶν ζῴων λέγεσθαι; καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡρίσατο τὴν ψυχὴν πρώτην ἐντελέχειαν σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ὥστε τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν λόγον· αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ὀργανικὰ σώματα ἐν χρόνῳ κατεσπάρησαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν δόξαν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὄργανα χρόνου τοὺς ἀστέρας εἴρηκεν, ὅπου καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γεγονέναι φησὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλανήτων.
8.3. It is therefore most proper to understand the earth to be here an instrument of time; not that the earth is moved, as the stars are; but that, they being carried about it, it standing still makes sunset and sunrising, by which the first measures of time, nights and days, are circumscribed. Wherefore he called it the infallible guard and artificer of night and day. For the gnomons of dials are instruments and measures of time, not in being moved with the shadows, but in standing still; they being like the earth in intercepting the light of the sun when it is down,—as Empedocles says that the earth makes night by intercepting light. This therefore may be Plato’s meaning.
8.3. ἄριστον οὖν τὴν γῆν ὄργανον ἀκούειν χρόνου, μὴ κινουμένην ὥσπερ τοὺς ἀστέρας, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ αὑτὴν μένουσαν ἀεὶ παρέχειν ἐκείνοις φερομένοις ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις, αἷς τὰ πρῶτα μέτρα τῶν χρόνων, ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες, ὁρίζονται· διὸ καί φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν αὐτὴν ἀτρεκῆ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας προσεῖπε· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν ὡρολογίων γνώμονες οὐ συμμεθιστάμενοι ταῖς σκιαῖς ἀλλʼ ἑστῶτες ὄργανα καὶ χρόνου μέτρα γεγόνασι, μιμούμενοι τῆς γῆς τὸ ἐπιπροσθοῦν τῷ ἡλίῳ περὶ αὐτὴν ὑποφερομένῳ, καθάπερ εἶπεν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς νύκτα δὲ γαῖα τίθησιν, ὑφισταμένη φαέεσσι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ὑπίδοιτο, μὴ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἀτόπως λέγηται μετὰ τῆς σελήνης καὶ τῶν πλανήτων εἰς διορισμὸν χρόνου γεγονέναι.
8.4. And so much the rather might we consider whether the sun is not absurdly and without probability said to be made for the distinction of time, with the moon and the rest of the planets. For as in other respects the dignity of the sun is great; so by Plato in his Republic the sun is called the king and lord of the whole sensible nature, as the Chief Good is of the intelligible. For it is said to be the offspring of Good, it giving both generation and appearance to things visible; as it is from Good that things intelligible both are and are understood. But that this God, having such a nature and so great power, should be only an instrument of time, and a sure measure of the difference that happens among the eight orbs, as they are slow or swift in motion, seems neither decent nor highly rational. It must therefore be said to such as are startled at these things, that it is their ignorance to think that time is the measure of motion in respect of sooner or later, as Aristotle calls it; or quantity in motion, as Speusippus; or an interval of motion and nothing more, as some of the Stoics define it, by an accident, not comprehending its essence and power, which Pindar has not ineptly expressed in these words: Time, who surpasses all in the seats of the blest. Pythagoras also, when he was asked what time was, answered, it was the soul of this world. For time is no affection or accident of motion, but the cause, power, and principle of that symmetry and order that confines all created beings, by which the animated nature of the universe is moved. Or rather, this order and symmetry itself—so far as it is motion—is called time. For this,Walking by still and silent ways,Mortal affairs with justice guides. According to the ancients, the essence of the soul is a number moving itself. Therefore Plato says that time and heaven were coexistent, but that motion was before heaven had being. But time was not. For then there neither was order, nor measure, nor determination; but indefinite motion, as it were, the formless and rude matter of time. … But when matter was informed with figures, and motion with circuitions, from that came the world, from this time. Both are representations of God; the world, of his essence; time, of his eternity in the form of motion, as the world is God in creation. Therefore they say heaven and motion, being bred together, will perish together, if ever they do perish. For nothing is generated without time, nor is any thing intelligible without eternity; if this is to endure for ever, and that never to die when once bred. Time therefore, having a necessary connection and affinity with heaven, cannot be called simple motion, but (as it were) motion in order having terms and periods; whereof since the sun is prefect and overseer, to determine, moderate, produce, and observe changes and seasons, which (according to Heraclitus) produce all things, he is coadjutor to the governing and chief God, not in trivial things, but in the greatest and most momentous affairs.
8.4. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως μέγα τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν Πολιτείᾳ βασιλεὺς ἀνηγόρευται παντὸς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κύριος, ὥσπερ τοῦ νοητοῦ τἀγαθόν· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἔκγονος λέγεται, παρέχων τοῖς ὁρατοῖς μετὰ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὸ γίγνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἀπʼ ἐκείνου τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι τοῖς νοητοῖς ὑπάρχει. τὸν δὴ τοιαύτην φύσιν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν τηλικαύτην θεὸν ὄργανον χρόνου γεγονέναι καὶ μέτρον ἐναργὲς τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλας βραδυτῆτι καὶ τάχει τῶν ὀκτὼ σφαιρῶν διαφορᾶς οὐ πάνυ δοκεῖ πρεπῶδες οὐδʼ ἄλλως εὔλογον εἶναι. ῥητέον οὖν τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ταραττομένους δἰ ἄγνοιαν οἴεσθαι τὸν χρόνον μέτρον εἶναι κινήσεως καὶ ἀριθμὸν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης εἶπεν, ἤ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ποσόν ὡς Σπεύσιππος, ἢ διάστημα κινήσεως ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν Στωικῶν ἀπὸ συμβεβηκότος ὁριζόμενοι τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐ συνορῶντες, ἣν ὅ τε Πίνδαρος ἔοικεν οὐ φαύλως ὑπονοῶν εἰπεῖν ἄνακτα τὸν πάντων ὑπερβάλλοντα χρόνον μακάρων ὅ τε Πυθαγόρας, ἐρωτηθεὶς τί χρόνος ἐστί, τὴν τούτου ψυχὴν εἰπεῖν. οὐ γὰρ πάθος οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἧς ἔτυχε κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστίν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς πάντα συνεχούσης τὰ γιγνόμενα συμμετρίας καὶ τάξεως, ἣν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις ἔμψυχος οὖσα κινεῖται· μᾶλλον δὲ κίνησις οὖσα καὶ τάξις αὐτὴ καὶ συμμετρία χρόνος καλεῖται·πάντα γὰρ διʼ ἀψόφουβαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτʼ ἄγεικαὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἀριθμὸς ἦν αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν κινῶν διὸ δὴ καὶ Πλάτων ἔφη χρόνον ἅμα μετʼ οὐρανοῦ γεγονέναι κίνησιν δὲ καὶ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως. χρόνος δʼ οὐκ ἦν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τάξις οὐδὲ μέτρον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ κίνησις ἀόριστος ὥσπερ ἄμορφος ὕλη χρόνου καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος· ἐπικλύσασα δʼ ἐν χρόᾳ καὶ καταβαλοῦσα τὴν μὲν ὕλην σχήμασι τὴν δὲ κίνησιν περιόδοις, τὴν μὲν κόσμον ἅμα τὴν δὲ χρόνον ἐποίησεν. εἰκόνες δʼ εἰσὶν ἄμφω τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὁ κόσμος τῆς δʼ ἀιδιότητος ὁ χρόνος ἐν κινήσει, καθάπερ ἐν γενέσει θεὸς ὁ κόσμος. ὅθεν ὁμοῦ γεγονότας φησὶν ὁμοῦ καὶ λυθήσεσθαι πάλιν, ἄν τις αὐτοὺς καταλαμβάνῃ λύσις· οὐ γὰρ οἷὸν τʼ εἶναι χωρὶς χρόνου τὸ γενητὸν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ νοητὸν αἰῶνος, εἰ μέλλει τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μένειν τὸ δὲ μηδέποτε διαλύεσθαι γιγνόμενον. οὕτως οὖν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχων συμπλοκὴν καὶ συναρμογὴν ὁ χρόνος οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐστι κίνησις, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται κίνησις ἐν τάξει μέτρον ἐχούσῃ καὶ πέρατα καὶ περιόδους· ὧν ὁ ἥλιος ἐπιστάτης ὢν καὶ σκοπὸς ὁρίζειν καὶ βραβεύειν καὶ ἀναδεικνύναι καὶ ἀναφαίνειν μεταβολὰς καὶ ὥρας, αἳ πάντα φέρουσι καθʼ Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ φαύλων οὐδὲ μικρῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ κυριωτάτων τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ πρώτῳ θεῷ γίγνεται συνεργός.
9.1. Since Plato in his Commonwealth, discoursing of the faculties of the soul, has very well compared the symphony of reason and of the irascible and the concupiscent faculties to the harmony of the middle, lowest, and highest chord, some men may properly ask this question:— DID PLATO PLACE THE RATIONAL OR THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY IN THE MIDDLE? FOR HE IS NOT CLEAR IN THE POINT. Indeed, according to the natural order of the parts, the place of the irascible faculty must be in the middle, and of the rational in the highest, which the Greeks call hypate. For they of old called the chief and supreme ὕπατος. So Xenocrates calls Jove, in respect of immutable things, ὕπατος (or highest), in respect of sublunary things νέατος (or lowest.) And long before him, Homer calls the chief God ὕπατος κρειότων, Highest of Rulers. And Nature has of due given the highest place to what is most excellent, having placed reason as a steersman in the head, and the concupiscent faculty at a distance, last of all and lowest. And the lowest place they call νεάτη, as the names of the dead, νέρτεροι and ἔνεροι, do show. And some say, that the south wind, inasmuch as it blows from a low and obscure place, is called νότος. Now since the concupiscent faculty stands in the same opposition to reason in which the lowest stands to the highest and the last to the first, it is not possible for the reason to be uppermost and first, and yet for any other part to be the one called ὕπατος (or highest). For they that ascribe the power of the middle to it, as the ruling power, are ignorant how they deprive it of a higher power, namely, of the highest, which is competible neither to the irascible nor to the concupiscent faculty; since it is the nature of them both to be governed by and obsequious to reason, and the nature of neither of them to govern and lead it. And the most natural place of the irascible faculty seems to be in the middle of the other two. For it is the nature of reason to govern, and of the irascible faculty both to govern and be governed, since it is obsequious to reason, and commands the concupiscent faculty when this is disobedient to reason. And as in letters the semi-vowels are middling between mutes and vowels, having something more than those and less than these; so in the soul of man, the irascible faculty is not purely passive, but hath often an imagination of good mixed with the irrational appetite of revenge. Plato himself, after he had compared the soul to a pair of horses and a charioteer, likened (as every one knows) the rational faculty to the charioteer, and the concupiscent to one of the horses, which was resty and unmanageable altogether, bristly about the ears, deaf and disobedient both to whip and spur; and the irascible he makes for the most part very obsequious to the bridle of reason, and assistant to it. As therefore in a chariot, the middling one in virtue and power is not the charioteer, but that one of the horses which is worse than his guider and yet better than his fellow; so in the soul, Plato gives the middle place not to the principal part, but to that faculty which has less of reason than the principal part and more than the third. This order also observes the analogy of the symphonies, i.e. the relation of the irascible to the rational (which is placed as hypate) forming the diatessaron (or fourth), that of the irascible to the concupiscent (or nete) forming the diapente (or fifth), and that of the rational to the concupiscent (as hypate to nete) forming an octave or diapason. But should you place the rational in the middle, you would make the irascible farther from the concupiscent; though some of the philosophers have taken the irascible and the concupiscent faculty for the selfsame, by reason of their likeness.
9.1. Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Πλάτωνος τὴν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ θυμοειδοῦς καὶ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ συμφωνίαν ἁρμονίᾳ μέσης καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ νήτης εἰκάσαντος; ἄριστα, διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις πότερον κατὰ τῆς μέσης τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἢ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἔταξεν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἔν γε τούτοις οὐ δεδήλωκεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον τῶν μερῶν τάξις εἰς τὴν τῆς μέσης χώραν τίθεται τὸ θυμοειδές, τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν εἰς τὴν τῆς ὑπάτης. τὸ γὰρ ἄνω καὶ πρῶτον ὕπατον οἱ παλαιοὶ προσηγόρευον ᾗ καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὕπατον καλεῖ, νέατον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην πρότερος δʼ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα θεὸν ὕπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε. καὶ δικαίως τῷ κρατίστῳ ἀποδέδωκε τὴν ἄνω χώραν ἡ φύσις, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτην ἐνιδρύσασα τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸν λογισμόν, ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ νέατον ἀποικίσασα πόρρω τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. ἡ γὰρ κάτω νεάτη προσαγορεύεται τάξις, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ τῶν νεκρῶν κλήσεις νερτέρων καὶ ἐνέρων προσαγορευομένων· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνέμων φασὶ τὸν κάτωθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς πνέοντα νότον ὠνομάσθαι. ἣν οὖν τὸ ἔσχατον ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀντίθεσιν καὶ τὸ νέατον πρὸς τὸ ὕπατον, ταύτην τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς τὸ λογιστικὸν ἔχοντος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνωτάτω μὲν εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον ὕπατον δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον. οἱ γὰρ ὡς κυρίαν δύναμιν αὐτῷ τὴν τῆς μέσης ἀποδιδόντες ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι τὴν κυριωτέραν ἀφαιροῦνται τὴν τῆς ὑπάτης, μήτε τῷ θυμῷ μήτε τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ προσήκουσαν ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν οὐδέτερον δʼ ἄρχειν ἢ ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ φύσει φανεῖται τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῷ τόπῳ τὴν μέσην ἔχον ἐκείνων τάξιν· εἴ γε δὴ τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ τὸ ἄρχειν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, ὑπηκόῳ μὲν ὄντι τοῦ λογισμοῦ κρατοῦντι δὲ καὶ κολάζοντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅταν ἀπειθῇ τῷ λογισμῷ. καὶ καθάπερ ἐν γράμμασι τὰ ἡμίφωνα μέσα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν φωνηέντων τῷ πλέον ἐκείνων ἠχεῖν ἔλαττον δὲ τούτων, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τἀνθρώπου τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐκ ἀκράτως παθητικόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ φαντασίαν καλοῦ πολλάκις ἔχει μεμιγμένην ἀλόγῳ τῇ τῆς τιμωρίας ὀρέξει. καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς εἰκάσας συμφύτῳ ζεύγει καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἡνίοχον μέν, ὡς παντὶ δῆλον, ἀπέφηνε τὸ λογιστικόν· τῶν δʼ ἵππων τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀπειθὲς καὶ ἀνάγωγον παντάπασι περὶ ὦτα λάσιον, κωφόν, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόλις ὑπεῖκον, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς; εὐήνιον τὰ πολλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ σύμμαχον. ὥσπερ οὖν συνωρίδος οὐχ ὁ ἡνίοχός ἐστιν ἀρετῇ καὶ δυνάμει μέσος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἵππων ὁ φαυλότερος μὲν τοῦ ἡνιόχου βελτίων δὲ τοῦ ὁμοζύγου, οὕτω τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ τῷ κρατοῦντι τὴν μέσην ἀπένειμε τάξιν, ἀλλʼ ᾧ πάθους μὲν ἧττον ἢ τῷ τρίτῳ μᾶλλον δʼ ἢ τῷ πρώτῳ, λόγου δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τρίτῳ ἧττον δʼ ἢ τῷ πρώτῳ μέτεστιν. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τάξις καὶ τὴν τῶν συμφωνιῶν ἀναλογίαν φυλάσσει, τοῦ μὲν θυμοειδοῦς πρὸς τὸ λογιστικὸν ὡς ὑπάτην τὸ διὰ τεσσάρων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὡς νήτην τὸ διὰ πέντε, τοῦ δὲ λογιστικοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὡς ὑπάτη πρὸς νήτην τὸ διὰ πασῶν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἕλκωμεν, ἔσται πλέον ὁ θυμὸς ἀπέχων τῆς ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὃν ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπιθυμίᾳ ταὐτὸν εἶναι διʼ ὁμοιότητα νομίζουσιν.
9.2. But it may be ridiculous to describe the first, middle, and last by their place; since we see hypate highest in the harp, lowest in the pipe; and wheresoever you place the mese in the harp, provided it is tunable, it sounds more acute than hypate, and more grave than nete. Nor does the eye possess the same place in all animals; but whereever it is placed, it is natural for it to see. So a pedagogue, though he goes not foremost but follows behind, is said to lead (ἄγειν), as the general of the Trojan army,Now in the front, now in the rear was seen,And kept command;but wherever he was, he was first and chief in power. So the faculties of the soul are not to be ranged by mere force in order of place or name, but according to their power and analogy. For that in the body of man reason is in the highest place, is accidental. But it holds the chief and highest power, as mese to hypate, in respect of the concupiscent; as mese to nete, in respect of the irascible; insomuch as it depresses and heightens,—and in fine makes a harmony,—by abating what is too much and by not suffering them to flatten and grow dull. For what is moderate and symmetrous is defined by mediocrity. Still more is it the object of the rational faculty to reduce the passions to moderation, which is called sacred, as effecting a harmony of the extremes with reason, and through reason with each other. For in chariots the best of the beasts is not in the middle; nor is the skill of driving to be placed as an extreme, but it is a mediocrity between the inequality of the swiftness and the slowness of the horses. So the force of reason takes up the passions irrationally moved, and reducing them to measure, constitutes a mediocrity betwixt too much and too little.
9.2. ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῖς τόποις ἀπονέμειν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα γελοῖόν ἐστιν, αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπάτην ὁρῶντας ἐν μὲν λύρᾳ τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρῶτον, ἐν δʼ αὐλοῖς τὸν κάτω καὶ τὸν τελευταῖον ἐπέχουσαν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν μέσην ἐν ᾧ τις ἂν χωρίῳ τῆς λύρας θέμενος ὡσαύτως ἁρμόσηται, φθεγγομένην ὀξύτερον μὲν ὑπάτης βαρύτερον δὲ νήτης. καὶ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ ἐν παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ καὶ πανταχοῦ κείμενος κατὰ φύσιν ὁρᾶν ὁμοίως πέφυκεν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ παιδαγωγὸς οὐ πρόσθεν ἀλλʼ ὄπισθεν βαδίζων ἄγειν λέγεται, καὶ ὁ τῶν Τρώων στρατηγὸςὁτὲ μέν τε μετὰ πρώτοισι φάνεσκεν,ἄλλοτε δʼ ἐν πυμάτοισι κελεύωνἑκατέρωθι δʼ ἦν πρῶτος καὶ τὴν πρώτην δύναμιν εἶχεν· οὕτω τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόρια δεῖ μὴ τοῖς τόποις καταβιάζεσθαι μηδὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐξετάζειν. τὸ γὰρ τῇ θέσει πρῶτον ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι τἀνθρώπου κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι· τὴν δὲ πρώτην ἔχει καὶ κυριωτάτην δύναμιν ὡς μέση πρὸς ὑπάτην μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, νήτην δὲ τὸ θυμοειδές, τῷ χαλᾶν καὶ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ὅλως συνῳδὰ καὶ σύμφωνα ποιεῖν ἑκατέρου τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀφαιρῶν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐῶν ἀνίεσθαι παντάπασιν οὐδὲ καταδαρθάνειν· τὸ γὰρ μέτριον καὶ σύμμετρον ὁρίζεται μεσότητι. μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεως, μεσότητας ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι ποιεῖν, ἃς ἱερὰς καλοῦσιν οὐσίας, ἐχούσας τὴν τῶν ἄκρων πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα διὰ τοῦ λόγου σύγκρασιν. οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνωρὶς μέσον ἔχει τῶν ὑποζυγίων τὸ κρεῖττον· οὐδὲ τὴν ἡνιοχείαν ἀκρότητα θετέον ἀλλὰ μεσότητα τῆς ἐν ὀξύτητι καὶ βραδύτητι τῶν ἵππων ἀμετρίας, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ λόγου δύναμις ἀντιλαμβανομένη κινουμένων ἀλόγως τῶν παθῶν καὶ συναρμόττουσα περὶ αὑτὴν εἰς τὸ μέτριον ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητα καθίστησι.
10.1. WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? For he seems to make no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a sportive humor has comprehended them all in one verse:Αὐτός ἰὼν κλισίηνδε τὸ σὸν γέρας, ὄφρ᾽ εὖ εἰδῇς.For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particle -δε being put instead of the preposition εἰς; for κλισίηνδε, to the tent, is said in the same sense as Ἀθηνάζε to Athens. What then shall we say for Plato? Is it that at first the ancients called that λόγος, or speech, which once was called protasis and now is called axiom or proposition,—which as soon as a man speaks, he speaks either true or false? This consists of a noun and verb, which logicians call the subject and predicate. For when we hear this said, “Socrates philosophizeth” or “Socrates is changed,” requiring nothing more, we say the one is true, the other false. For very likely in the beginning men wanted speech and articulate voice, to enable them to express clearly at once the passions and the patients, the actions and the agents. Now, since actions and affections are sufficiently expressed by verbs, and they that act and are affected by nouns, as he says, these seem to signify. And one may say, the rest signify not. For instance, the groans and shrieks of stage-players, and even their smiles and reticence, make their discourse more emphatic. But they have no necessary power to signify any thing, as a noun and verb have, but only an ascititious power to vary speech; just as they vary letters who mark spirits and quantities upon letters, these being the accidents and differences of letters. This the ancients have made manifest, whom sixteen letters sufficed to speak and write any thing.
10.1. Διὰ τί Πλάτων εἶπε τὸν λόγον ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων κεράννυσθαι; δοκεῖ γὰρ πάντα πλὴν δυεῖν τούτων τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου μηθέν, Ὅμηρον δὲ καὶ νεανιευσάμενον εἰς ἕνα στίχον ἐμβαλεῖν ἅπαντα τοῦτον αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίηνδε, τὸ σὸν γέρας· ὄφρʼ εὖ εἰδῇς. καὶ γὰρ ἀντωνυμία καὶ μετοχὴ καὶ ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ πρόθεσις καὶ ἄρθρον καὶ σύνδεσμος καὶ ἐπίρρημα ἔνεστι· τὸ γάρ δε μόριον νῦν ἀντὶ τῆς εἰς προθέσεως τέτακται· τὸ γάρ κλισίηνδε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ Ἀθήναζε. τί δὴ ῥητέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἦ ὅτι πρῶτον λόγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν τότε καλουμένην πρότασιν νῦν δʼ ἀξίωμα προσηγόρευον, ὃ πρῶτον λέγοντες ἀληθεύουσιν ἢ ψεύδονται; τοῦτο δʼ ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ τὸ δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν. ἀκούσαντες γὰρ ὅτι Σωκράτης φιλοσοφεῖ καὶ πάλιν ὅτι Σωκράτης τρέπεται, τὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ψευδῆ φήσομεν, οὐδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεηθέντες. καὶ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐν χρείᾳ λόγου τὸ πρῶτον καὶ φωνῆς ἐνάρθρου γενέσθαι, τάς τε πράξεις καὶ τοὺς πράττοντας αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τοὺς πάσχοντας ἀλλήλοις διασαφεῖν καὶ ἀποσημαίνειν βουλομένους. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τῷ μὲν ῥήματι τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ πάθη; τῷ δʼ ὀνόματι τοὺς πράττοντας αὐτὰ καὶ πάσχοντας ἀποχρώντως δηλοῦμεν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴρηκε, ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἔδοξε τὰ δʼ ἄλλα φαίη τις ἂν οὐ σημαίνειν, οἷον οἱ στεναγμοὶ καὶ ὀλολυγμοὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία πολλάκις ἐπιμειδίασις καὶ ἀποσιώπησις ἐμφαντικώτερον ποιεῖ τὸν λόγον, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν ὡς τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τοὔνομα δύναμιν ἀλλʼ ἐπίθετόν τινα ποικίλλουσαν τὸν λόγον ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα ποικίλλουσιν οἱ τὰ πνεύματα καὶ τὰς δασύτητας αὐτῶν ἐκτάσεις τε καὶ συστολὰς ἐνίων αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑπὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι, πάθη μᾶλλον ὄντα καὶ συμβεβηκότα καὶ διαφορὰς στοιχείων, ὡς ἐδήλωσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ διὰ τῶν ἑκκαίδεκα φράζοντες ἀποχρώντως καὶ γράφοντες ἔπειτα σκόπει μὴ παρακούωμεν τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ἐκ τούτων κεράννυσθαι τὸν λόγον οὐ διὰ τούτων εἰρηκότος·
10.2. Besides, we must not neglect to observe, that Plato says that speech is composed of these, not by these; nor must we blame Plato for leaving out conjunctions, prepositions, and the like, any more than we should cavil at a man who should say such a medicine is composed of wax and galbanum, because fire and utensils are omitted, without which it cannot be made. For speech is not composed of these; yet by their means, and not without them, speech must be composed. As, if a man pronounce beats or is beaten, and put Socrates and Pythagoras to the same, he offers us something to conceive and understand. But if a man pronounce indeed or for or about, and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering. For neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify any thing. And join and confound together conjunctions, articles, and prepositions, supposing you would make something of them; yet you will be taken to babble, and not to speak sense. But when there is a verb in construction with a noun, the result is speech and sense. Therefore some do with good reason make only these two parts of speech; and perhaps Homer is willing to declare himself of this mind, when he says so often,Ἐπος τ᾽ ἔφατ᾽ ἔκ τ᾽ ὀνόμαζεν.For by ἔπος he usually means a verb, as in these verses. “Ὦ γύναι, ἤ μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος θυμαλγές ἔειπες,” and,Χαῖρε, πάτερ, ὦ ξεῖνε, ἔπος δ᾽ εἴπερ τι λέλεκταιΔεινὸν, ἄφαρ τὸ φέροιεν ἀναρπάξασαι ἄελλαι.For neither conjunction, article, nor preposition could be called δεινόν (terrible) or θυμαλγές (soul-grieving), but only a verb expressing a base action or a foolish passion of the mind. Therefore, when we would praise or dispraise poets or writers, we are wont to say, such a man uses Attic nouns and good verbs, or else common nouns and verbs; but none can say that Thucydides or Euripides used Attic or good or common articles.
10.2. εἶθʼ ὥσπερ ὁ τὸν λέγοντα τὸ φάρμακον ἐκ κηροῦ μεμῖχθαι καὶ χαλβάνης; συκοφαντῶν, ἐπεὶ τὸ πῦρ παρέλιπε καὶ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ὧν χωρὶς; οὐκ ἐνῆν μεμῖχθαι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμοίως ἐγκαλῶμεν ὅτι συνδέσμους καὶ προθέσεις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παρῆκεν οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὁ λόγος ἀλλʼ, εἴπερ ἄρα, διὰ τούτων καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων κεράννυσθαι πέφυκεν. οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ τὸ τύπτει φθεγξάμενος ἢ τὸ τύπτεται καὶ πάλιν τὸ Σωκράτης ἢ τὸ Πυθαγόρας ἁμωσγέπως νοῆσαί τι καὶ διανοηθῆναι παρέσχηκεν, οὕτω, τοῦ μέν ἢ γάρ ἢ περί καθʼ αὑτὸ ἐκφωνηθέντος, ἔστιν ἔννοιάν τινα λαβεῖν ἢ πράγματος ἢ σώματος· ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὴ περὶ ἐκεῖνα καὶ μετʼ ἐκείνων ἐκφέρηται, ψόφοις κενοῖς καὶ ἤχοις ἔοικεν· ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν οὔτε καθʼ αὑτὰ σημαίνειν οὔτε μετʼ ἀλλήλων οὐδὲν πέφυκεν, ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἂν συμπλέκωμεν ἢ μιγνύωμεν εἰς ταὐτὸ συνδέσμους καὶ ἄρθρα καὶ προθέσεις, ἕν τι πειρώμενοι κοινὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιεῖν, τερετίζειν μᾶλλον ἢ διαλέγεσθαι δόξομεν· ῥήματος δʼ ὀνόματι συμπλεκομένου, τὸ γενόμενον εὐθὺς διάλεκτός ἐστι καὶ λόγος. ὅθεν εἰκότως ἔνιοι μόνα ταῦτα μέρη τοῦ λόγου τίθενται· καὶ Ὅμηρος ἴσως τοῦτο βούλεται δηλοῦν ἑκάστοτε λέγων ἔπος τʼ ἔφατʼ ἔκ τʼ ὀνόμαζεν ἔπος γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα καλεῖν εἴωθεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις ὦ γύναι, ἦ μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος θυμαλγὲς ἔειπες καὶχαῖρε πάτερ ὦ ξεῖνε, ἔπος δʼ εἴπερ τι λέλεκταιδεινόν, ἄφαρ τὸ φέροιεν ἀναρπάξασαι ἄελλαι.οὔτε γὰρ σύνδεσμον οὔτʼ ἄρθρον οὔτε πρόθεσιν δεινὸν ἔστι καὶ θυμαλγὲς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ ῥῆμα πράξεως ἐμφαντικὸν αἰσχρᾶς ἢ πάθους τινὸς ἀνεπιτηδείου. διὸ καὶ ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφεῖς εἰώθαμεν ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν οὕτω πως λέγοντες Ἀττικοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὁ δεῖνα κέχρηται καλοῖς ῥήμασινʼ ἢ πάλιν πεζοῖς τὸ δέ γε πεζοῖς ἢ καλοῖς πάλιν καὶ Ἀττικοῖς ἄρθροις οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις Εὐριπίδην ἢ Θουκυδίδην διειλέχθαι.
10.3. What then? may some say, do the rest of the parts conduce nothing to speech? I answer, They conduce, as salt does to victuals, or water to barley cakes. And Euenus calls fire the best sauce. Though sometimes there is neither occasion for fire to boil, nor for salt to season our food, which we have always occasion for. Nor has speech always occasion for articles. I think I may say this of the Latin tongue, which is now the universal language; for it has taken away all prepositions, saving a few, nor does it use any articles, but leaves its nouns (as it were) without skirts and borders. Nor is it any wonder, since Homer, who in fineness of epic surpasses all men, has put articles only to a few nouns, like handles to cans, or crests to helmets. Therefore these verses are remarkable wherein the articles are expressed:Αἴαντι δὲ μάλιστα δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινεΤῷ Τελαμωνιάδῃ·and,Ποίεον ὄφρα τὸ κῆτος ὑπεκπροφυγὼν ἀλέαιτοand some few besides. But in a thousand others, the omission of the articles hinders neither perspicuity nor elegance of phrase.
10.3. τί οὖν; φήσαι τις ἄν, οὐδὲν ταῦτα συμβάλλεται πρὸς λόγον; ἔγωγε φήσαιμʼ ἂν ὥσπερ ἅλας συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ὄψον ὕδωρ δὲ πρὸς μᾶζαν. Εὔηνος δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἔφασκεν ἡδυσμάτων εἶναι κράτιστον· ἀλλʼ οὔθʼ ὕδωρ μάζης ἢ ἄρτου μέρος εἶναι λέγομεν οὔτε πῦρ οὔθʼ ἅλας ἑψήματος ἢ βρώματος, ὧν ἀεὶ τυγχάνομεν δεόμενοι· οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος πολλάκις ἐκείνων ἀπροσδεής ἐστιν· ὡς δοκεῖ μοι ὁ Ῥωμαίων, ᾧ νῦν ὁμοῦ τι πάντες ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται· προθέσεις τε γὰρ ἀφῄρηκε πλὴν ὀλίγων ἁπάσας, τῶν τε καλουμένων ἄρθρων οὐδὲν προσδέχεται τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἀκρασπέδοις χρῆται τοῖς ὀνόμασι. καὶ οὐ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὅπου καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπέων κόσμῳ περιγενόμενος ὀλίγοις τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄρθρα ὥσπερ λαβὰς ἐκπώμασι δεομένοις ἢ λόφους κράνεσιν ἐπιτίθησι· διὸ καὶ παράσημα τῶν ἐπῶν, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα ποιεῖ, γέγονεν, ὡς τὸΑἴαντι δὲ μάλιστα δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινετῷ Τελαμωνιάδῃκαὶ τὸ ποίεον, ὄφρα τὸ κῆτος ὑπεκπροφυγὼν ἀλέοιτο καὶ βραχέα πρὸς τούτοις ἕτερα. τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις μυρίοις οὖσιν ἄρθρου μὴ προσόντος, οὐδὲν εἰς σαφήνειαν οὐδὲ κάλλος ἡ φράσις βλάπτεται.
10.4. Now neither an animal nor an instrument nor arms nor any thing else is more fine, efficacious, or graceful, for the loss of a part. Yet speech, by taking away conjunctions, often becomes more persuasive, as here:One rear’d a dagger at a captive’s breast;One held a living foe, that freshly bledWith new-made wounds; another dragg’d a dead.And this of Demosthenes: “A bully in an assault may do much which his victim cannot even describe to another person,—by his mien, his look, his voice,—when he stings by insult, when he attacks as an avowed enemy, when he smites with his fist, when he gives a blow on the face. These rouse a man; these make a man beside himself who is unused to such foul abuse.” And again: “Not so with Midias; but from the very day, he talks, he abuses, he shouts. Is there an election of magistrates? Midias the Anagyrrasian is nominated. He is the advocate of Plutarchus; he knows state secrets; the city cannot contain him.” Therefore the figure asyndeton, whereby conjunctions are omitted, is highly commended by writers of rhetoric. But such as keep overstrict to the law, and (according to custom) omit not a conjunction, rhetoricians blame for using a dull, flat, tedious style, without any variety in it. And inasmuch as logicians mightily want conjunctions for the joining together their axioms, as much as charioteers want yokes, and Ulysses wanted withs to tie Cyclop’s sheep; this shows they are not parts of speech, but a conjunctive instrument thereof, as the word conjunction imports. Nor do conjunctions join all, but only such as are not spoken simply; unless you will make a cord part of the burthen, glue a part of a book, or distribution of money part of the government. For Demades says, that money which is given to the people out of the exchequer for public shows is the glue of a democracy. Now what conjunction does so of several propositions make one, by knitting and joining them together, as marble joins iron that is melted with it in the fire Yet the marble neither is nor is said to be part of the iron; although in this case the substances enter into the mixture and are melted together, so as to form a common substance from many and to be mutually affected. But there be some who think that conjunctions do not make any thing one, but that this kind of discourse is merely an enumeration, as when magistrates or days are reckoned in order.
10.4. καὶ μὴν οὔτε ζῷον οὔτʼ ὄργανον οὔθʼ ὅπλον οὔτʼ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οἰκείου μέρους ἀφαιρέσει καὶ στερήσει πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κάλλιον οὐδʼ ἐνεργέστερον οὐδʼ ἣδιον· λόγος δέ, συνδέσμων ἐξαιρεθέντων, πολλάκις ἐμπαθεστέραν καὶ κινητικωτέραν ἔχει δύναμιν ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτοςἄλλον ζωὸν ἔχουσα νεούτατον, ἄλλον ἄουτον,ἄλλον τεθνειῶτα κατὰ μόθον ἕλκε ποδοῖιν·καὶ τὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ταυτὶ πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνιʼ οὐδʼ ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιθʼ ἑτέρῳ· τῷ σχήματι τῷ βλέμματι τῇ φωνῇ· ὅταν ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης· ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτʼ ἐξίστησιν αὑτῶν ἀνθρώπους ἀήθεις τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἀλλʼ οὐ Μειδίας· ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας λέγει, λοιδορεῖται, βοᾷ· χειροτονεῖται τίς; Μειδίας· Ἀναγυράσιος προβέβληται· Πλουτάρχου προξενεῖ, τἀπόρρητʼ οἶδεν, ἡ πόλις αὐτὸν οὐ χωρεῖ. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τὸ ἀσύνδετον σχῆμα παρὰ τοῖς τέχνας γράφουσιν εὐδοκιμεῖ τοὺς δʼ ἄγαν νομίμους ἐκείνους καὶ μηδένα σύνδεσμον ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας ἀφιέντας ὡς ἀργὴν καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ κοπώδη τῷ ἀμεταβλήτῳ τὴν φράσιν ποιοῦντας αἰτιῶνται. τὸ δὲ τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς μάλιστα συνδέσμων δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀξιωμάτων συναφὰς καὶ συμπλοκὰς καὶ διαζεύξεις, ὥσπερ ἡνιόχους ζυγῶν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Κύκλωπος Ὀδυσσέα λύγων πρὸς τῶν προβάτων … οὐ μέρος λόγου τὸν σύνδεσμον ἀλλʼ ὄργανόν τι συνδετικὸν ἀποφαίνει, καθάπερ ὠνόμασται, καὶ συνεκτικὸν οὐ πάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν οὐχ ἁπλῶς λεγομένων· εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦ φορτίου τὸν ἱμάντα καὶ τοῦ βιβλίου τὴν κόλλαν ἀξιοῦσι μέρος εἶναι, καὶ τὰς διανομὰς τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας ποῖος δὲ σύνδεσμος οὕτως ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀξίωμα ποιεῖ συμπλέκων καὶ συνάπτων, ὡς ἡ μάρμαρος τὸν συλλιπαινόμενον διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς σίδηρον; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ λέγεται τοῦ σιδήρου μέρος· καίτοι ταῦτά γε τοῖς κεραννυμένοις ἐνδυόμενα καὶ συντηκόμενα ποιεῖ τι καὶ πάσχει κοινὸν ἐκ πλειόνων. τοὺς δὲ συνδέσμους εἰσὶν οἱ μὴ νομίζοντες ἕν τι ποιεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἐξαρίθμησιν εἶναι τὴν διάλεκτον, ὥσπερ ἀρχόντων ἐφεξῆς ἢ ἡμερῶν καταλεγομένων.
10.5. Moreover, as to the other parts of speech, a pronoun is manifestly a sort of noun; not only because it has cases like the noun, but because some pronouns, when they are applied to objects heretofore defined, by their mere utterance give the most distinct and proper designation of them. Nor do I know whether he that says Socrates or he that says this one does more by name declare the person.
10.5. καὶ μὴν τῶν γε λοιπῶν ἡ μὲν ἀντωνυμία περιφανῶς γένος ὀνόματός ἐστιν, οὐχ πτώσεων μετέχει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ κυριωτάτην ἅμα τῇ φάσει ποιεῖν δεῖξιν ἐνίας ἐπὶ τῶν ὡρισμένων ἐκφερομένας· καὶ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον ὁ Σωκράτην φθεγξάμενος ἢ ὁ τοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀνομαστὶ πρόσωπον δεδήλωκεν.
10.6. The thing we call a participle, being a mixture of a verb and noun, is nothing of itself, as are not the common names of male and female qualities (i.e. adjectives), but in construction it is put with others, in regard of tenses belonging to verbs, in regard of cases to nouns. Logicians call them ἀνάκλαστοι,(i.e. reflected),—as φρονῶν comes from φρόνιμος and σωφονῶν from σώφρονος,—having the force both of nouns and appellatives.
10.6. ἡ δὲ καλουμένη μετοχή, μῖγμα ῥήματος οὖσα καὶ ὀνόματος, καθʼ ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ κοινὰ θηλυκῶν καὶ ἀρρενικῶν ὀνόματα, συντάττεται δʼ ἐκείνοις, ἐφαπτομένη τοῖς μὲν χρόνοις τῶν ῥημάτων ταῖς δὲ πτώσεσι τῶν ὀνομάτων. οἱ δὲ διαλεκτικοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦσιν ἀνακλάστους, οἷον ὁ φρονῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ὁ σωφρονῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἐστιν, ὡς ὀνομάτων καὶ προσηγοριῶν δύναμιν ἔχοντα.
10.7. And prepositions are like to the crests of a helmet, or footstools and pedestals, which (one may rather say) do belong to words than are words themselves. See whether they rather be not pieces and scraps of words, as they that are in haste write but dashes and pricks for letters. For it is plain that ἐμβῆναι and ἐκβῆναι are abbreviations of the whole words ἐντὸς βῆναι and ἐκτὸς βῆναι, προγενέσθαι for πρότερον γενέσθαι, and καθίζειν for κάτω ἵζειν. As undoubtedly for haste and brevity’s sake, instead of λίθους βάλλειν and τοίχους ὀρύττειν men first said λιθοβολεῖν and τοιχωρυζεῖν.
10.7. τάς γε μὴν προθέσεις ἔστιν ἐπικράνοις καὶ βάσεσι καὶ ὑποθέμασιν, ὡς οὐ λόγους ἀλλὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον οὔσας, ὁμοιοῦν. ὅρα δὲ μὴ κόμμασι καὶ θραύσμασιν ὀνομάτων ἐοίκασιν, ὥσπερ γραμμάτων σπαράγμασι καὶ κεραίαις οἱ σπεύδοντες γράφουσι· τὸ γάρ ἐμβῆναι καὶ ἐκβῆναι συγκοπὴ προφανής ἐστι τοῦ ἐντὸς βῆναι καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς βῆναι, καὶ τὸ προγενέσθαι τοῦ πρότερον γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καθίζειν τοῦ κάτω ἵζειν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὸ λίθους βάλλειν καὶ τοίχους ὀρύσσειν λιθοβολεῖν καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν ἐπιταχύνοντες καὶ σφίγγοντες τὴν φράσιν λέγουσι.
10.8. Therefore every one of these is of some use in speech; but nothing is a part or element of speech (as has been said) except a noun and a verb, which make the first juncture admitting of truth or falsehood, which some call a proposition or protasis, others an axiom, and which Plato called speech.
10.8. διὸ χρείαν μέν τινα τῷ λόγῳ παρέχεται τούτων ἕκαστον, μέρος δὲ λόγου καὶ στοιχεῖον οὐδέν ἐστι, πλὴν ὥσπερ εἴρηται τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τοὔνομα, ποιοῦντα τὴν πρώτην τὸ τʼ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος δεχομένην σύνθεσιν, ἣν οἱ μὲν πρότασιν οἱ δʼ ἀξίωμα, Πλάτων δὲ λόγον προσηγόρευκεν.