14. Therefore it seems not unreasonable to me to take next into our consideration, as it were all in a train, what he has also said against him. But first let us contemplate a little the diligence — together with the manifold and profound knowledge — of this our philosopher, who says, that Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and all the Peripatetics have followed these doctrines of Plato. For in what corner of the uninhabitable world have you, O Colotes, written your book, that, composing all these accusations against such personages, you never have lighted upon their works, nor have taken into your hands the books of Aristotle concerning Heaven and the Soul, nor those of Theophrastus against the Naturalists, nor the Zoroaster of Heraclides, nor his books of Hell, nor that of Natural Doubts and Difficulties, nor the book of Dicaearchus concerning the Soul; in all which books they are in the highest degree contradictory and repugnant to Plato about the principal and greatest points of natural philosophy? Nay, Strato himself, the very head and prince of the other Peripatetics, agrees not in many things with Aristotle, and holds opinions altogether contrary to Plato, concerning motion, the understanding, the soul, and generation. In fine, he says that the world is not an animal, and that what is according to Nature follows what is according to Fortune; for that Chance gave the beginning, and so every one of the natural effects was afterwards finished. Now as to the ideas, — for which he quarrels with Plato, — Aristotle, by moving this matter at every turn, and alleging all manner of doubts concerning them, in his Ethics, in his Physics, and in his Exoterical Dialogues seems to some rather obstinately than philosophically to have disputed against these doctrines, as having proposed to himself the debasing and undervaluing of Plato’s philosophy; so far he was from following it. What an impudent rashness then is this, that having neither seen nor understood what these persons have written and what were their opinions, he should go and devise such things as they never imagined; and persuading himself that he reprehends and refutes others, he should produce a proof, written with his own hand, arguing and convincing himself of ignorance, licentiousness, and shameful impudence, in saying that those who contradict Plato agree with him, and that those who oppose him follow him?
14. διὸ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον εἰρημένα δοκεῖ μοι λαβεῖν ἐφεξῆς. καὶ πρῶτόν γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ πολυμάθειαν τοῦ φιλοσόφου σκεψώμεθα, λέγοντος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπηκολουθήκασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί. ποῦ γὰρ ὢν τῆς ἀοικήτου τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραφες, ἵνα ταῦτα συντιθεὶς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχῃς μηδʼ ἀναλάβῃς εἰς χεῖρας Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ περὶ Οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὰ περὶ Ψυχῆς, Θεοφράστου δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς, Ἡρακλείδου δὲ τὸν Ζωροάστρην, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τὸ περὶ τῶν Φυσικῶς ἀπορουμένων, Δικαιάρχου δὲ τὰ περὶ Ψυχῆς, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπεναντιούμενοι τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ μαχόμενοι διατελοῦσι; καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαιότατος Στράτων οὔτʼ Ἀριστοτέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτωνι τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ κινήσεως περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· καὶ τελευτῶν τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῷον εἶναί φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶθʼ οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. τάς γε μὴν ἰδέας, περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι, πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐκ … τῶν δογμάτων τούτων, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπερείπειν φιλοσοφίαν οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν. τίνος οὖν εὐχερείας ἐστὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι μὴ μαθόντα καταψεύδεσθαι τὰ μὴ δοκοῦντα; καὶ πεπεισμένον ἐλέγχειν ἑτέρους αὐτόγραφον ἐξενεγκεῖν ἀμαθίας ἔλεγχον καθʼ αὑτοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος, ὁμολογεῖν Πλάτωνι φάσκοντα τοὺς διαφερομένους καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας;
15. Plato, says he, writes that horses are in vain by us esteemed horses, and men men. And in which of Plato’s commentaries has he found this hidden? For as to us, we read in all his books, that horses are horses, that men are men, and that fire is by him esteemed fire, because he holds that every one of these things is sensible and subject to opinion. But this fine fellow Colotes, as if he were not a hair’s breadth removed from perfect wisdom, apprehends it to be one and the same thing to say, “Man is not” and “Man is a non ens.” Now to Plato there seems to be a wonderful great difference between not being at all and being a non ens; because the first imports an annihilation and abolishment of all substance, and the other shows the diversity there is between that which is participated and that which participates. Which diversity those who came after distinguished only into the difference of genus and species, and certain common and proper qualities or accidents, as they are called, but ascended no higher, falling into more logical doubts and difficulties. Now there is the same proportion between that which is participated and that which participates, as there is between the cause and the matter, the original and the image, the faculty and the effect. Wherein that which is by itself and always the same principally differs from that which is by another and never abides in one and the same manner; because the one never was nor ever shall be non-existent, and is therefore totally and essentially an ens; but to the other that very being, which it has not of itself but happens to take by participation from another, does not remain firm and constant, but it goes out of it by its imbecility, — the matter always gliding and sliding about the form, and receiving several affections and changes in the image of the substance, so that it is continually moving and shaking. As therefore he who says that the image of Plato is not Plato takes not away the sense and substance of the image, but shows the difference of that which exists of itself from that which exists only in regard to some other; so neither do they take away the nature, use, or sense of men, who affirm that every one of us, by participating in a certain common substance, that is, by the idea, is become the image of that which afforded the likeness for our generation. For neither does he who says that a red-hot iron is not fire, or that the moon is not the sun, but, as Parmenides has it,A torch which round the earth by nightDoes bear about a borrowed light,take away therefore the use of iron, or the nature of the moon. But if he should deny it to be a body, or affirm that it is not illuminated, he would then contradict the senses, as one who admitted neither body, animal, generation, nor sense. But he who by his opinion imagines that these things subsist only by participation, and considers how far remote and distant they are from that which always is and which communicates to them their being, does not reject the sensible, but affirms that the intelligible is; nor does he take away and abolish the effects which are wrought and appear in us; but he shows to those who follow him that there are other things, firmer and more stable than these in respect of their essence, because they are neither engendered, nor perish, nor suffer any thing; and he teaches them, more purely touching the difference, to express it by names, calling these ὄντα or entia (things that have being), and those γιγνόμενα or fientia (things engendered). And the same also usually befalls the moderns; for they deprive many — and those great things — of the appellation of ens or being; such as are voidness, time, place, and simply the entire genus of things spoken, in which are comprised all things true. For these things, they say, are not entia but some things; and they perpetually make use of them in their lives and in their philosophy, as of things having subsistence and existence.
15. ἀλλὰ δὴ Πλάτων φησὶ τοὺς ἵππους ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ματαίως ἵππους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ποῦ τοῦτο τῶν Πλάτωνος συγγραμμάτων ἀποκεκρυμμένον εὗρεν ὁ Κωλώτης; ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀναγινώσκομεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ἵππου καὶ πῦρ τὸ πῦρ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ δοξαζόμενον· καὶ δοξαστὸν ὀνομάζει τούτων ἕκαστον. ὁ δʼ οἷα δὴ σοφίας οὐδʼ ἀκαρὲς ἀπέχων ὡς ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἔλαβε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὂν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. τῷ Πλάτωνι δὲ θαυμαστῶς ἐδόκει διαφέρειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίρεσιν οὐσίας πάσης τῷ δʼ ἑτερότητα δηλοῦσθαι τοῦ μεθεκτοῦ καὶ τοῦ μετέχοντος. ἣν οἱ μὲν ὕστερον εἰς γένους καὶ εἴδους καὶ κοινῶς τινων καὶ ἰδίων λεγομένων ποιῶν διαφορὰν ἔθεντο μόνον, ἀνωτέρω δʼ οὐ προῆλθον, εἰς λογικωτέρας ἀπορίας ἐμπεσόντες. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μεθεκτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μετέχον λόγος, ὃν αἰτία τε πρὸς ὕλην ἔχει καὶ παράδειγμα πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ δύναμις πρὸς πάθος. ᾧ γε δὴ μάλιστα τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ ταὐτὸν ὂν ἀεὶ διαφέρει τοῦ διʼ ἕτερον καὶ μηδέποτʼ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος· ὅτι τὸ μὲν οὔτʼ ἔσται ποτὲ μὴ ὂν οὔτε γέγονε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ὄντως ὄν ἐστι· τῷ δʼ οὐδʼ ὅσον ἀπʼ ἄλλου συμβέβηκε μετέχειν τοῦ εἶναι βέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐξίσταται διʼ ἀσθένειαν, ἅτε τῆς ὕλης περὶ τὸ εἶδος ὀλισθανούσης καὶ πάθη πολλὰ καὶ μεταβολὰς εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι καὶ σαλεύεσθαι, δεχομένης. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ λέγων Πλάτωνα μὴ εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πλάτωνος, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ὡς εἰκόνος αἴσθησιν αὐτῆς καὶ ὕπαρξιν, ἀλλʼ ἐνδείκνυται καθʼ αὑτό τινος ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἑτέρου γεγονότος διαφοράν· οὕτως οὔτε φύσιν οὔτε χρῆσιν οὔτʼ αἴσθησιν ἀνθρώπων ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ κοινῆς τινος οὐσίας μετοχῇ καὶ ἰδέᾳ γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον εἰκόνα τοῦ παρασχόντος τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῇ γενέσει προσαγορεύοντες οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πῦρ μὴ λέγων εἶναι τὸν πεπυρωμένον σίδηρον ἢ τὴν σελήνην ἥλιον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ Παρμενίδην νυκτιφαὲς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον, ἀλλότριον φῶς, ἀναιρεῖ σιδήρου χρῆσιν ἢ σελήνης· φύσιν· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ λέγοι σῶμα μηδὲ πεφωτισμένον, ἤδη μάχεται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σῶμα καὶ ζῷον καὶ γένεσιν καὶ αἴσθησιν μὴ ἀπολείπων. ὁ δὲ ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχειν τῷ μετεσχηκέναι καὶ ὅσον ἀπολείπεται τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρέχοντος αὐτοῖς ὑπονοῶν οὐ παρορᾷ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀλλὰ παρορᾷ τὸ νοητόν, οὐδʼ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ φαινόμενα περὶ ἡμᾶς τῶν παθῶν ἀλλʼ ὅτι βεβαιότερα τούτων ἕτερα καὶ μονιμώτερα πρὸς οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τῷ μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτʼ ἀπόλλυσθαι μήτε πάσχειν μηδέν, ἐνδείκνυται τοῖς ἑπομένοις, καὶ διδάσκει καθαρώτερον τῆς διαφορᾶς ἁπτομένους τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ μὲν ὄντα τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα προσαγορεύειν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις συμβέβηκε· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα τῆς τοῦ ὄντος; ἀποστεροῦσι προσηγορίας, τὸ κενὸν τὸν χρόνον τὸν τόπον, ἁπλῶς τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τἀληθῆ πάντʼ ἔνεστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ὄντα μὲν μὴ εἶναι τινὰ δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι, χρώμενοι δʼ αὐτοῖς ὡς ὑφεστῶσι καὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν διατελοῦσιν.
16. But I would willingly ask this our fault-finder, whether themselves do not in their affairs perceive this difference, by which some things are permanent and immutable in their substances, — as they say of their atoms, that they are at all times and continually after one and the same manner, because of their impassibility and hardness, — but that all compounded things are fluxible, changeable, generated, and perishing; forasmuch as infinite images are always departing and going from them, and infinite others, as it is probable, repair to them from the ambient air, filling up what was diminished from the mass, which is much diversified and transvasated, as it were, by this change, since those atoms which are in the very bottom of the said mass can never cease stirring and reciprocally beating upon one another; as they themselves affirm. There is then in things such a diversity of substance But Epicurus is in this wiser and more learned than Plato. that he calls them all equally entia, — to wit, the impalpable voidness, the solid and resisting body, the principles, and the things composed of them, — and thinks that the eternal participates of the common substance with that which is generated, the immortal with the corruptible, and the natures that are impassible, perdurable, unchangeable, and that can never fall from their being, with those which have their essence in suffering and changing, and can never continue in one and the same state. But though Plato had with all the justness imaginable deserved to be condemned for having offended in this, yet should he have been sentenced by these gentlemen, who speak Greek more elegantly and discourse more correctly than he, only as having confounded the terms, and not as having taken away the things and driven life from us, because he named them fientia (or things engendered), and not entia (things that have being), as these men do.
16. ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἡδέως ἂν ἐροίμην τὸν κατήγορον, εἰ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἐνορῶσι ταύτην, καθʼ ἣν τὰ μὲν μόνιμα καὶ ἄτρεπτα ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, ὡς λέγουσι καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ στερρότητι πάντα χρόνον ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ συγκρίματα πάντα ῥευστὰ καὶ μεταβλητὰ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμεν εἶναι, μυρίων μὲν εἰδώλων ἀπερχομένων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων, μυρίων δʼ ὡς εἰκὸς ἑτέρων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιρρεόντων καὶ ἀναπληρούντων τὸ ἄθροισμα, ποικιλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ταύτης καὶ μετακεραννύμενον, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τῶν ἐν βάθει τοῦ συγκρίματος ἀτόμων οὐδέποτε λῆξαι κινήσεως οὐδὲ παλμῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας δυναμένων ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλʼ ἔστι μὲν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἡ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας· σοφώτερος δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, πάνθʼ ὁμοίως ὄντα προσαγορεύει, τὸ ἀναφὲς κενόν, τὸ ἀντερεῖδον σῶμα, τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰ συγκρίματα κοινῆς ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἡγούμενος οὐσίας μετέχειν τὸ ἀίδιον τῷ γιγνομένῳ, τὸ ἀνώλεθρον τῷ φθειρομένῳ, τὰς ἀπαθεῖς καὶ διαρκεῖς καὶ ἀμεταβλήτους καὶ μηδέποτε τοῦ εἶναι δυναμένας ἐκπεσεῖν φύσεις ταύταις ὧν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸ εἶναι, ταῖς μηδένα χρόνον ὡσαύτως; ἐχούσαις. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα διήμαρτε τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων, ὀνομάτων ὤφειλε συγχύσεως εὐθύνας ὑπέχειν τοῖς ἀκριβέστερον ἑλληνίζουσι τούτοις καὶ καθαρώτερον διαλεγομένοις, οὐχ ὡς ἀναιρῶν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξάγων ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὰ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ὄντα, καθάπερ οὗτοι, προσηγόρευσεν.
17. But because we have passed over Socrates, who should have come next after Parmenides, we must now turn back our discourse to him. Him therefore has Colotes begun at the very first to remove, as the common proverb has it, from the sacred line; and having mentioned how Chaerephon brought from Delphi an oracle, well known to us all, concerning Socrates, he says thus: “Now as to this narration of Chaerephon’s, because it is odious and absolutely sophistical, we will overpass it.” Plato then, that we may say nothing of others, is also odious, who has committed it to writing; and the Lacedaemonians are yet more odious, who reserve the oracle of Lycurgus amongst their most ancient and most authentic inscriptions. The oracle also of Themistocles, by which he persuaded the Athenians to quit their town, and in a naval fight defeated the barbarous Xerxes, was a sophistical fiction. Odious also were all the ancient legislators and founders of Greece, who established the most part of their temples, sacrifices, and solemn festivals by the answer of the Pythian Oracle. But if the oracle brought from Delphi concerning Socrates, a man ravished with a divine zeal to virtue, by which he is styled and declared wise, is odious, fictitious, and sophistical, by what name shall we call your cries, noises, and shouts, your applauses, adorations and canonizations, with which you extol and celebrate him who incites and exhorts you to frequent and continual pleasures? For thus has he written in his epistle to Anaxarchus: “I for my part in cite and call you to continual pleasures, and not to vain and empty virtues, which have nothing but turbulent hopes of uncertain fruits.” And yet Metrodorus, writing to Timarchus, says: “Let us do some extraordinarily excellent thing, not suffering ourselves to be plunged in reciprocal affections, but retiring from this low and terrestrial life, and elevating ourselves to the truly holy and divinely revealed ceremonies and mysteries of Epicurus.” And even Colotes himself, hearing one day Epicurus discoursing of natural things, fell suddenly at his feet and embraced his knees, as Epicurus himself, glorying in it, thus writes: “For as if you had adored what we were then saying, you were suddenly taken with a desire, proceeding not from any natural cause, to come to us, prostrate yourself on the ground, embrace our knees, and use all those gestures to us which are ordinarily practised by those who adore and pray to the Gods. So that you made us also,” says he, “reciprocally sanctify and adore you.” Those, by Jupiter, well deserve to be pardoned, who say, they would willingly give any money for a picture in which should be presented to the life this fine story of one lying prostrate at the knees and embracing the legs of another, who mutually again adores him and makes his devout prayers to him. Nevertheless this devout service, how well soever it was ordered and composed by Colotes, received not the condign fruit he expected; for he was not declared wise; but it was only said to him: Go thy ways, and walk immortal; and understand that we also are in like manner immortal.
17. ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ τὸν Σωκράτην μετὰ τὸν Παρμενίδην ὑπερέβημεν, ἀναληπτέος εὐθὺς οὖν τὸν ἀφʼ ἱερᾶς κεκίνηκεν ὁ Κωλώτης· καὶ διηγησάμενος ὅτι χρησμὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν περὶ Σωκράτους ἀνήνεγκε Χαιρεφῶν, ὃν ἴσμεν ἅπαντες, ταῦτʼ ἐπείρηκε τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ Χαιρεφῶντος διὰ τὸ τελέως σοφιστικὸν καὶ φορτικὸν διήγημα εἶναι παρήσομεν φορτικὸς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ὁ τοῦτον ἀναγράψας τὸν χρησμόν, ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσω. φορτικώτεροι δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὸν περὶ Λυκούργου χρησμὸν ἐν ταῖς παλαιοτάταις ἀναγραφαῖς ἔχοντες σοφιστικὸν δʼ ἦν διήγημα τὸ Θεμιστοκλέους, ᾧ πείσας Ἀθηναίους τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν κατεναυμάχησε τὸν βάρβαρον φορτικοὶ δʼ οἱ τῆς Ἑλλάδος νομοθέται, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἱερῶν πυθόχρηστα καθιστάντες. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτου γενομένου, χρησμὸς ἀνενεχθεὶς ὡς σοφοῦ, φορτικὸς ἦν καὶ σοφιστικός, τίνι προσείπωμεν ἀξίως ὀνόματι τοὺς ὑμετέρους βρόμους καὶ ὀλολυγμούς καὶ κροτοθορύβους καὶ σεβάσεις καὶ ἐπιθειάσεις, αἷς προστρέπεσθε καὶ καθυμνεῖτε τὸν ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς παρακαλοῦντα συνεχεῖς καὶ πυκνάς; ὃς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐπιστολῇ ταυτὶ γέγραφεν ἐγὼ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετάς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ὁ μὲν Μητρόδωρος τὸν Τίμαρχον παρακαλῶν φησι ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μονονοὺ καταδύντες ταῖς ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια Κωλώτης δʼ αὐτὸς ἀκροώμενος Ἐπικούρου φυσιολογοῦντος ἄφνω τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτοῦ προσέπεσε, καὶ ταῦτα γράφει σεμνυνόμενος αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος ὡς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τόθʼ ὑφʼ ἡμῶν λεγόμενα προσέπεσεν ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον τοῦ περιπλακῆναι ἡμῖν γονάτων ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίγνεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις τιμῶν καὶ λιτάς· ἐποίεις οὖν φησί, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι συγγνωστὰ νὴ Δία τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς παντὸς ἂν πρίαιντο τῆς ὄψεως; ἐκείνης εἰκόνα γεγραμμένην θεάσασθαι, τοῦ μὲν προσπίπτοντος εἰς γόνατα καὶ περιπλεκομένου τοῦ δʼ ἀντιλιτανεύοντος καὶ ἀντιπροσκυνοῦντος. οὐ μέντοι τὸ θεράπευμα τοῦτο, καίπερ εὖ τῷ Κωλώτῃ συντεθέν, ἔσχε καρπὸν ἄξιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀνηγορεύθη σοφὸς ἀλλὰ μόνον ἄφθαρτός μοι περιπάτει φησὶ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοοῦ.
18. These men, knowing well in their consciences that they have used such foolish speeches, have had such motions, and such passions, dare nevertheless call others odious. And Colotes, having shown us these fine first-fruits and wise positions touching the natural senses, — that we eat meat, and not hay or forage; and that when rivers are deep and great, we pass them in boats, but when shallow and easily fordable, on foot, — cries out, “You use vain and arrogant speeches, O Socrates; you say one thing to those who come to discourse with you, and practise another.” Now I would fain know what these vain and arrogant speeches of Socrates were, since he ordinarily said that he knew nothing, that he was always learning, and that he went enquiring and searching after the truth. But if, O Colotes, you had happened on such expressions of Socrates as are those which Epicurus writ to Idomeneus, “Send me then the first-fruits for the entertainment of our sacred body, for ourself and for our children: for so it comes upon me to speak;” what more arrogant and insolent words could you have used? And yet that Socrates spake otherwise than he lived, you have wonderful proofs in his gests at Delium, at Potidaea, in his behavior during the time of the Thirty Tyrants, towards Archelaus, towards the people of Athens, in his poverty, and in his death. For are not these things beseeming and answerable to the doctrine of Socrates? They would indeed, good sir, have been indubitable testimonies to show that he acted otherwise than he taught, if, having proposed pleasure for the end of life, he had led such a life as this.
18. τοιαῦτα μέντοι ῥήματα καὶ κινήματα καὶ πάθη συνειδότες αὑτοῖς ἑτέρους φορτικοὺς ἀποκαλοῦσι. καὶ δῆτα καὶ προθεὶς ὁ Κωλώτης τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα· καὶ καλὰ περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅτι σιτία προσαγόμεθα καὶ οὐ χόρτον, καὶ τοὺς ποταμούς, ὅταν ὦσι μεγάλοι, πλοίοις διαπερῶμεν, ὅταν δʼ εὐδιάβατοι γένωνται, τοῖς ποσίν, ἐπιπεφώνηκεν ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀλαζόνας ἐπετήδευσας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες καὶ ἕτερα μὲν διελέγου τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἕτερα δʼ ἔπραττες. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλαζόνες οἱ Σωκράτους λόγοι, μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἰδέναι φάσκοντος ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ἀεὶ καὶ ζητεῖν τἀληθές; εἰ δὲ τοιαύταις, ὦ Κωλῶτα, Σωκράτους φωναῖς περιέπεσες, οἵας Ἐπίκουρος γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καί τέκνων· οὕτω γάρ μοι λέγειν ἐπέρχεται τίσιν ἂν ῥήμασιν ἀγροικοτέροις ἐχρήσω; καὶ μὴν ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄλλα μὲν ἔλεγεν ἄλλα δʼ ἔπραττε, θαυμαστῶς μαρτυρεῖ σοι τὰ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ τὰ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα τὰ πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον τὰ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἡ πενία ὁ θάνατος· οὐ γὰρ ἄξια ταῦτα τῶν Σωκρατικῶν λόγων. ἐκεῖνος ἦν, ὦ μακάριε, κατὰ Σωκράτους ἔλεγχος ἕτερα μὲν λέγοντος ἕτερα δὲ πράττοντος, εἰ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν τέλος ἐκθέμενος οὕτως ἐβίωσε.
19. Thus much for the calumnies he has uttered against Socrates. Colotes besides perceives not that he is himself found guilty of the same offences in regard to proofs which he objects against Socrates. For this is one of the sentences and propositions of Epicurus, that none but the wise man ought irrevocably and unchangeably to be persuaded of any thing. Since then Colotes, even after those adorations he performed to Epicurus, became not one of the sages, let him first make these questions and interrogatories his own: How is it that being hungry he eats meat and not hay, and that he puts a robe about his body and not about a pillar, since he is not indubitably persuaded either that a robe is a robe or that meat is meat? But if he not only does these things, but also passes not over rivers, when they are great and high, on foot, and flies from wolves and serpents, not being irrevocably persuaded that any of these things is such as it appears, but yet doing every thing according to what appears to him; so likewise the opinion of Socrates concerning the senses was no obstacle to him, but that he might in like manner make use of things as they appeared to him. For it is not likely that bread appeared bread and hay hay to Colotes, because he had read those holy rules of Epicurus which came down from heaven, while Socrates through his vanity took a fancy that hay was bread and bread hay. For these wise men use better opinions and reasons than we; but to have sense, and to receive an impression from things as they appear, is common as well to the ignorant as to the wise, as proceeding from causes where there needs not the discourse of reason. And the proposition which affirms that the natural senses are not perfect, nor certain enough to cause an entire belief, hinders not that every thing may appear to us; but leaving us to make use of our senses in our actions according to that which appears, it permits us not so to give credit to them as if they were exactly true and without error. For it is sufficient that in what is necessary and commodious for use there is nothing better. But as for the science and knowledge which the soul of a philosopher desires to have concerning every thing, the senses have it not.
19. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰς βλασφημίας. ὅτι δέ, οἷς ἐγκαλεῖ περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν, ἔνοχος αὐτός ἐστιν, οὐ συνεῖδεν. ἓν γάρ ἐστι τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἀμεταπείστως πεπεῖσθαι μηδένα πλὴν τὸν σοφόν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ Κωλώτης οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς οὐδὲ μετὰ τὰς σεβάσεις ἐκείνας, ἐρωτάτω πρῶτον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐρωτήματα, πῶς σιτία προσάγεται καὶ οὐ χόρτον ἐπιτήδειος ὢν, καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ σώματι καὶ οὐ τῷ κίονι περιτίθησι, μήθʼ ἱμάτιον εἶναι τὸ ἱμάτιον μήτε σιτίον τὸ σιτίον ἀμεταπείστως πεπεισμένος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πράττει καὶ τοὺς ποταμούς, ὅταν ὦσι μεγάλοι, ποσὶν οὐ διέρχεται, καὶ τοὺς ὄφεις φεύγει καὶ τοὺς λύκους, μηδὲν εἶναι τούτων οἷον φαίνεται πεπεισμένος ἀμεταπείστως, ἀλλὰ πράττων ἕκαστα κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον· οὐδὲ Σωκράτει δήπουθεν ἐμποδὼν ἦν ἡ περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δόξα τοῦ χρῆσθαι τοῖς φαινομένοις ὁμοίως. οὐ γὰρ Κωλώτῃ μὲν ὁ ἄρτος ἄρτος ἐφαίνετο καὶ χόρτος ὁ χόρτος, ὅτι τοὺς διοπετεῖς ἀνεγνώκει Κανόνας· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ὑπʼ ἀλαζονείας ἄρτου μὲν ὡς χόρτου χόρτου δʼ ὡς ἄρτου φαντασίαν ἐλάμβανε. δόγμασι γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ λόγοις οὗτοι χρῶνται βελτίοσιν οἱ σοφοί· τὸ δʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα κοινόν ἐστι πάθος ἀλόγοις περαινόμενον αἰτίαις. ὁ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις λόγος ἐπαγόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀκριβεῖς οὐδʼ ἀσφαλεῖς πρὸς πίστιν οὔσας, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ χρωμένοις κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ πιστεύειν ὡς ἀληθέσι πάντῃ καὶ ἀδιαπτώτοις οὐ δίδωσιν αὐταῖς τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρκεῖ καὶ χρειῶδες ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ὅτι βέλτιον ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν· ἣν δὲ ποθεῖ φιλόσοφος ψυχὴ λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην περὶ ἑκάστου καὶ γνῶσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσι.
20. But as to this, Colotes will farther give us occasion to speak of it hereafter, for he brings this objection against several others. Furthermore, whereas he profusely derides and despises Socrates for asking what man is, and in a youthful bravery (as he terms it) affirming that he was ignorant of it, it is manifest that he himself, who scoffs at it, never so much as thought of this matter; but Heraclitus on the contrary, as having done some great and worthy thing, said, I have been seeking myself. And of the sentences that were written in Apollo’s temple at Delphi, the most excellent and most divine seems to have been this, Know thyself. And this it was which gave Socrates an occasion and beginning of doubting and enquiring into it, as Aristotle says in his Platonics. And yet this appears to Colotes ridiculous and fit to be scoffed at. And I wonder that he derides not also his master himself, who does as much whenever he writes concerning the substance of the soul and the origin of man. For if that which is compounded of both, as they themselves hold, — of the body, to wit, and the soul, — is man, he who searches into the nature of the soul consequently also searches into the nature of man, beginning from his chiefest principle. Now that the soul is very difficult to be comprehended by reason, and altogether incomprehensible by the exterior senses, let us not learn from Socrates, who is a vain-glorious and sophistical disputer, but let us take it from these wise men, who, having forged and framed the substance of the soul of somewhat hot, spiritual, and aerial, as far as to her faculties about the flesh, by which she gives heat, softness and strength to the body, proceed not to that which is the principal, but give over faint and tired by the way. For that by which she judges, remembers, loves, hates, — in a word, that which is prudent and rational, is, — say they, made afterwards of I know not what nameless quality. Now we well know, that this nameless thing is a confession of their shameful ignorance, whilst they pretend they cannot name what they are not able to understand or comprehend. But let this, as they say, be pardoned them. For it seems not to be a light and easy matter, which every one can at the first attempt find out and attain to, but has retired itself to the bottom of some very remote place, and there lies obscurely concealed. So that there is not, amongst so many words and terms as are in use, any one that can explain or show it. Socrates therefore was not a fool or blockhead for seeking and searching what himself was; but they are rather to be thought shallow coxcombs, who enquire after any other thing before this, the knowledge of which is so necessary and so hard to find. For how could he hope to gain the knowledge of other things, who has not been able to comprehend the principal part even of himself?
20. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων καὶ πάλιν ὁ Κωλώτης εἰπεῖν παρέξει, ταὐτὰ πολλοῖς ἐγκεκληκώς. ἐν οἷς δὲ κομιδῇ διαγελᾷ καὶ φλαυρίζει τὸν Σωκράτην ζητοῦντα τί ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ νεανιευόμενον, ὥς φησιν, ὅτι μηδʼ αὐτὸς εἰδείη, δῆλος μέν ἐστιν αὐτὸς οὐδέποτε πρὸς τούτῳ γενόμενος· ὁ δʼ Ἡράκλειτος ὡς μέγα τι καὶ σεμνὸν διαπεπραγμένος ἐδιζησάμην φησὶν ἐμεωυτόν, καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θειότατον ἐδόκει τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν ὃ δὴ καὶ Σωκράτει ἀπορίας καὶ ζητήσεως ταύτης ἀρχὴν ἐνέδωκεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς εἴρηκε· Κωλώτῃ δὲ γελοῖον δοκεῖ. τί οὖν οὐ καταγελᾷ καὶ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος, τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ πράττοντος, ὁσάκις γράφοι καὶ διαλέγοιτο περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀθρόου τῆς καταρχῆς; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ὡς ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοί, σώματος τοιοῦδε καὶ ψυχῆς, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὁ ζητῶν ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖ φύσιν ἐκ τῆς κυριωτέρας ἀρχῆς. ὅτι δʼ αὕτη λόγῳ δυσθεώρητος αἰσθήσει δʼ ἄληπτός ἐστι, μὴ παρὰ Σωκράτους σοφιστοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος ἀνδρός, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων λάβωμεν, οἳ μέχρι τῶν περὶ σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, αἷς θερμότητα καὶ μαλακότητα καὶ τόνον παρέχει τῷ σώματι, τὴν οὐσίαν συμπηγνύντες αὐτῆς ἔκ τινος θερμοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ ἀερώδους οὐκ ἐξικνοῦνται πρὸς τὸ κυριώτατον ἀλλʼ ἀπαγορεύουσι. τὸ γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει καὶ μνημονεύει καὶ φιλεῖ καὶ μισεῖ, καὶ ὅλως τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ λογιστικὸν ἔκ τινος φησιν ἀκατονομάστου ποιότητος ἐπιγίνεσθαι. καὶ ὅτι μὲν αἰσχυνομένης ἐστὶν ἀγνοίας τουτὶ τὸ ἀκατονόμαστον ἐξομολόγησις, οὐκ ἔχειν ὀνομάσαι φασκόντων ὃ μὴ δύνανται καταλαβεῖν, ἴσμεν· ἐχέτω δὲ συγγνώμην καὶ τοῦτο ὡς λέγουσι. φαίνεται γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲ τοῦ τυχόντος εἶναι καταμαθεῖν ἀλλʼ ἐνδεδυκὸς ἀπόρῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ δεινῶς ἀποκεκρυμμένον, ᾧ γʼ ὄνομα μηδὲν ἐν τοσούτοις πρὸς δήλωσιν οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν. οὐ Σωκράτης οὖν ἀβέλτερος, ὅστις εἴη ζητῶν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες, οἷς ἔπεισί τι τῶν ἄλλων πρὸ τούτου ζητεῖν, ὅτι τὴν γνῶσιν ἀναγκαίαν ἔχον οὕτως εὑρεθῆναι χαλεπόν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλπίσειεν ἑτέρου λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην, ὃν διαπέφευγε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ κυριώτατον καταλαβεῖν.
21. But granting a little to Colotes, that there is nothing so vain, useless, and odious as the seeking into one’s self, let us ask him, what confusion of human life is in this, and how it is that a man cannot continue to live, when he comes once thus to reason and discourse in himself: “Go to now, what am I? Am I a composition, made up of soul and body; or rather a soul, serving itself and making use of the body, as an horseman using his horse is not a subject composed of horse and man? Or is every one of us the principal part of the soul, by which we understand, reason, and act; and are all the other parts, both of soul and body, only organs and utensils of this power? Or, to conclude, is there no proper substance of the soul at all apart, but is only the temperature and complexion of the body so disposed, that it has force and power to understand and live?” But Socrates does not by these questions overthrow human life, since all natural philosophers treat of the same matter. But those perhaps are the monstrous questions and enquiries that turn every thing upside down, which are in Phaedrus, where he says, that every one ought to examine and consider himself, whether he is a savage beast, more cautelous, outrageous, and furious than ever was the monster Typhon; or on the contrary, an animal more mild and gentle, partaking by Nature of a certain divine portion, and such as is free from pride. Now by these discourses and reasonings he overturns not the life of man, but drives from it presumption and arrogance, and those haughty and extravagant opinions and conceits he has of himself. For this is that monster Typhon, which your teacher and master has made to be so great in you by his warring against the Gods and divine men.
21. ἀλλὰ διδόντες αὐτῷ τὸ μηδὲν οὕτως ἄχρηστον εἶναι μηδὲ φορτικὸν ὡς τὸ ζητεῖν αὑτόν, ἐρώμεθα τίς αὕτη τοῦ βίου σύγχυσίς ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὐ δύναται διαμένειν ἀνήρ, ὅτε τύχοι, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλογιζόμενος φέρε, τίς ὢν οὗτος ὁ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω; πότερον ὡς κρᾶμά τι μεμιγμένον ἔκ τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος· ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι χρωμένη, καθάπερ ἱππεὺς ἀνὴρ ἵππῳ χρώμενος, οὐ τὸ ἐξ ἵππου καὶ ἀνδρός; ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κυριώτατον, ᾧ φρονοῦμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ πράττομεν, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ καὶ ψυχῆς μόρια πάντα καὶ σώματος ὄργανα τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ψυχῆς ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα κεκραμένον ἔσχηκε τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν δύναμιν; ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸν βίον ὁ Σωκράτης, ἃ δὴ πάντες οἱ φυσικοὶ ζητοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα δʼ ἦν τὰ ἐν Φαίδρῳ δεινὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, αὑτὸν οἰομένου δεῖν ἀναθεωρεῖν, εἴτε Τυφῶνός ἐστι θηρίον πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον εἴτε θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον ἀλλὰ τούτοις γε τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς οὐ τὸν βίον ἀνῄρει, τὴν δʼ ἐμβροντησίαν ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τὸν τῦφον ἐξήλαυνε καὶ τὰς ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ ὑπερόγκους κατοιήσεις καὶ μεγαλαυχίας· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ Τυφών ἐστιν, ὃν πολὺν ὑμῖν ἐνεποίησεν ὁ καθηγεμὼν καὶ θεοῖς πολεμῶν καὶ θείοις ἀνδράσι.
22. Having done with Socrates and Plato, he next attacks Stilpo. Now as for those his true doctrines and good discourses, by which he managed and governed himself, his country, his friends, and such kings and princes as loved him and esteemed him, he has not written a word; nor yet what prudence and magnanimity was in his heart, accompanied with meekness, moderation, and modesty. But having made mention of one of those little sentences he was wont in mirth and raillery to object against the sophisters, he does, without alleging any reason against it or solving the subtlety of the objection, stir up a terrible tragedy against Stilpo, saying that the life of man is subverted by him, inasmuch as he affirms that one thing cannot be predicated of another. “For how,” says he, “shall we live, if we cannot style a man good, nor a man a captain, but must separately name a man a man, good good, and a captain a captain; nor can say ten thousand horsemen, or a fortified town, but only call horsemen horsemen, and ten thousand ten thousand, and so of the rest?” Now what man ever was there that lived the worse for this? Or who is there that, hearing this discourse, does not immediately perceive and understand it to be the speech of a man who rallies gallantly, and proposes to others this logical question for the exercise of their wits? It is not, O Colotes, a great and dangerous scandal not to call man good, or not to say ten thousand horsemen; but not to call God God, and not to believe him to be God, — as you and the rest do, who will not confess that there is a Jupiter presiding over generation, or a Ceres giving laws, or a Neptune fostering the plants, — it is this separation of names that is pernicious, and fills our life with audaciousness and an atheistical contempt of the Gods. When you pluck from the Gods the names and appellations that are tied to them, you abolish also the sacrifices, mysteries, processions, and feasts. For to whom shall we offer the sacrifices preceding the tilling of the ground? To whom those for the obtaining of preservation? How shall we celebrate the Phosphoria, or torch-festivals, the Bacchanals, and the ceremonies that go before marriage, if we admit neither Bacchantes, Gods of light, Gods who protect the sown field, nor preservers of the state? For this it is that touches the principal and greatest points, being an error in things, — not in words, in the structure of propositions, or use of terms. Now if these are the things that disturb and subvert human life, who are there that more offend and fail in language than you? For you take utterly away the whole class of namable things, which constitute the essence of language; and leave only words and their accidental objects, while you take away in the mean time the things particularly signified by them, by which are wrought disciplines, doctrines, preconceptions, intelligences, inclination, and assent, which you hold to be nothing at all.
22. μετὰ δὲ Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα προσμάχεται Στίλπωνι καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθινὰ δόγματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τάνδρός, οἷς ἑαυτόν τε κατεκόσμει καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ τῶν βασιλέων τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν σπουδάσαντας, οὐ γέγραφε, οὐδʼ ὅσον ἦν φρόνημα τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ πραότητος καὶ μετριοπαθείας· ὧν δὲ παίζων καὶ χρώμενος γέλωτι πρὸς.; τοὺς σοφιστὰς λογαρίων προύβαλεν αὐτοῖς, ἑνὸς μνησθεὶς καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο μηδὲν εἰπὼν μηδὲ λύσας τὴν πιθανότητα, τραγῳδίαν ἐπάγει τῷ Στίλπωνι καί τὸν βίον ἀναιρεῖσθαὶ φησιν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, λέγοντος ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. πῶς γὰρ βιωσόμεθα, μὴ λέγοντες ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν μηδʼ ἄνθρωπον στρατηγὸν ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ στρατηγὸν στρατηγόν, μηδʼ ἱππεῖς μυρίους μηδὲ πόλιν ἐχυράν, ἀλλʼ ἱππεῖς ἱππεῖς, καὶ μυρίους μυρίους, καὶ τἄλλα δμοίως; τίς δὲ διὰ ταῦτα χεῖρον ἐβίωσεν ἀνθρώπων; τίς δὲ τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας οὐ συνῆκεν, ὅτι παίζοντός ἐστιν εὐμούσως ἢ γύμνασμα τοῦτο προβάλλοντος ἑτέροις διαλεκτικόν; οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Κωλῶτα, μὴ λέγειν ἀγαθὸν οὐδʼ ἱππεῖς μυρίους δεινόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν μὴ λέγειν θεὸν μηδὲ νομίζειν, ὃ πράττετε ὑμεῖς μήτε Δία γενέθλιον μήτε Δήμητρα θεσμοφόρον εἶναι μήτε Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλμιον ὁμολογεῖν ἐθέλοντες, οὗτος ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ὀνομάτων πονηρὸς ἐστι καὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπίπλησιν ὀλιγωρίας ἀθέου καὶ θρασύτητος, ὅταν τὰς συνεζευγμένας τοῖς θεοῖς προσηγορίας ἀποσπῶντες συναναιρῆτε θυσίας μυστήρια πομπὰς ἑορτάς. τίνι γὰρ προηρόσια θύσομεν; τίνι σωτήρια; πῶς δὲ φωσφόρεια, βακχεῖα, προτέλεια γάμων ἄξομεν, μὴ ἀπολιπόντες μηδὲ βακχεῖς καὶ φωσφόρους καὶ προηροσίους καὶ σωτῆρας; ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπτεται τῶν κυριωτάτων καὶ μεγίστων, ἐν πράγμασιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀπάτην, οὐ περὶ φωνάς τινας οὐδὲ λεκτῶν σύνταξιν οὐδʼ ὀνομάτων συνήθειαν. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ ταῦτα τὸν βίον ἀνατρέπει, τίνες μᾶλλον ὑμῶν πλημμελοῦσι περὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, οἳ τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχον ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖτε, τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ τυγχάνοντα μόνον ἀπολιπόντες, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ σημαινόμενα πράγματα, διʼ ὧν γίγνονται μαθήσεις διδασκαλίαι προλήψεις νοήσεις ὁρμαὶ συγκαταθέσεις, τὸ παράπαν οὐδʼ εἶναι λέγοντες;
23. But as for Stilpo, thus his argument stands. “If of a man we predicate good, and of an horse running, the predicate or thing predicated is not the same with the subject or that of which it is predicated, but the essential definition of man is one, and of good another. And again, to be a horse differs from to be running. For being asked the definition of the one and of the other, we do not give the same for them both; and therefore those err who predicate the one of the other. For if good is the same with man, and to run the same with a horse, how is good affirmed also of food and medicine, and again (by Jupiter) to run of a lion and a dog? But if the predicate is different, then we do not rightly say that a man is good, and a horse runs.” Now if Stilpo is in this exorbitant and grossly mistaken, not admitting any copulation of such things as are in the subject, or affirmed of the subject, with the subject itself; but holding that every one of them, if it is not absolutely one and the same thing with that to which it happens or of which it is spoken, ought not to be spoken or affirmed of it, — no, not even as an accident; it is nevertheless manifest, that he was only offended with some words, and opposed the usual and accustomed manner of speaking, and not that he overthrew man’s life, and turned his affairs upside down.
23. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Στίλπωνος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὔ φησι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἀλλʼ ἕτερον· οὐδʼ εἰ περὶ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἵππον εἶναι τοῦ τρέχοντα εἶναι διαφέρειν· ἑκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν ὅθεν ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας … εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τάνθρώπῳ τάγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ σιτίου καὶ φαρμάκου τἀγαθὸν, καὶ νὴ Δία πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν; εἰ δʼ ἕτερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἵππον τρέχειν λέγομεν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἐξαιμάξει πικρῶς ὁ Στίλπων, τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων μηδεμίαν ἀπολιπὼν συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενου, ἀλλʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, εἰ μὴ κομιδῇ ταὐτὸν ᾧ συμβέβηκε λέγεται, μηδʼ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς οἰόμενος δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι, φωναῖς τισι δυσκολαίνων καὶ πρὸς τὴν συνήθειαν ἐνιστάμενος, οὐ τὸν βίον ἀναιρῶν οὐδὲ τὰ πράγματα δῆλός ἐστι.
24. Colotes then, having got rid of the old philosophers, turns to those of his own time, but without naming any of them; though he would have done better either to have reproved by name these moderns, as he did the ancients, or else to have named neither of them. But he who has so often employed his pen against Socrates, Plato, and Parmenides, evidently demonstrates that it is through cowardice he dares not attack the living, and not for any modesty or reverence, of which he showed not the least sign to those who were far more excellent than these. But his meaning is, as I suspect, to assault the Cyrenaics first, and afterwards the Academics, who are followers of Arcesilaus. For it was these who doubted of all things; but those, placing the passions and imaginations in themselves, were of opinion that the belief proceeding from them is not sufficient for the assuring and affirming of things; but, as if it were in the siege of a town, abandoning what is without, they have shut themselves up in the passions, using only it seems, and not asserting it is, of things without. And therefore they cannot, as Colotes says of them, live or have the use of things. And then speaking comically of them, he adds: “These deny that there is a man, a horse, a wall; but say that they themselves (as it were) become walls, horses, men,” or “are impressed with the images of walls, horses, or men.” In which he first maliciously abuses the terms, as calumniators are usually wont to do. For though these things follow from the sayings of the Cyrenaics, yet he ought to have declared the fact as they themselves teach it. For they affirm that things then become sweet, bitter, lightsome, or dark, when each thing has in itself the natural unhindered efficacy of one of these impressions. But if honey is said to be sweet, an olive-branch bitter, hail cold, wine hot, and the nocturnal air dark, there are many beasts, things, and men that testify the contrary. For some have an aversion for honey, others feed on the branches of the olive-tree; some are scorched by hail, others cooled with wine; and there are some whose sight is dim in the sun but who see well by night. Wherefore opinion, containing itself within these impressions, remains safe and free from error; but when it goes forth and attempts to be curious in judging and pronouncing concerning exterior things, it often deceives itself, and opposes others, who from the same objects receive contrary impressions and different imaginations.
24. γενόμενος δʼ οὖν ὁ Κωλώτης ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν τρέπεται πρὸς τοὺς καθʼ ἑαυτὸν φιλοσόφους, οὐδενὸς τιθεὶς ὄνομα· καίτοι καλῶς εἶχε καὶ τούτους ἐλέγχειν ἐπʼ ὀνόματος ἢ μηδὲ τοὺς παλαιούς. ὁ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην τοσαυτάκις θέμενος ὑπὸ τὸ γραφεῖον δῆλός ἐστιν· ἀποδειλιάσας πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας, οὐ μετριάσας ὑπʼ αἰδοῦς, ἣν τοῖς κρείττοσιν οὐκ ἔνειμε. βούλεται δὲ προτέρους μέν, ὡς ὑπονοῶ, τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς ἐλέγχειν, δευτέρους δὲ τοὺς περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον Ἀκαδημαϊκούς. οὗτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἐν αὑτοῖς τιθέντες οὐκ ᾤοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων πίστιν εἶναι διαρκῆ πρὸς; τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις· ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποστάντες, εἰς τὰ πάθη κατέκλεισαν αὑτούς, τὸ φαίνεται τιθέμενοι τὸ δʼ ἐστί μηκέτι προσαποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐκτός. διό φησιν αὐτοὺς ὁ Κωλώτης μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν εἶτα κωμῳδῶν οὗτοι φησὶν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ ἵππον καὶ τοῖχον οὐ λέγουσιν, αὑτοὺς δὲ τοιχοῦσθαι καὶ ἱπποῦσθαι καὶ ἀνθρωποῦσθαι πρῶτον αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οἱ συκοφάνται, κακούργως χρώμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. ἕπεται μὲν γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔδει δέ, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι διδάσκουσι, δηλοῦν τὸ γιγνόμενον γλυκαίνεσθαι γὰρ λέγουσι καὶ πικραίνεσθαι καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ φωτίζεσθαι καὶ σκοτίζεσθαι, τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἑκάστου τὴν ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον ἔχοντος· εἰ δὲ γλυκὺ τὸ μέλι καὶ πικρὸς ὁ θαλλὸς καὶ ψυχρὰ ἡ χάλαζα καὶ θερμὸς ὁ ἄκρατος καὶ σκοτεινὸς ὁ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀήρ, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖσθαι, καὶ θηρίων καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν μὲν δυσχεραινόντων τὸ μέλι, τῶν δὲ προσιεμένων τὴν θαλλίαν καὶ ἀποκαομένων ὑπὸ τῆς χαλάζης καὶ καταψυχομένων ὑπʼ οἴνου καὶ πρὸς ἣλιον ἀμβλυωττόντων καὶ νύκτωρ βλεπόντων. ὅθεν ἐμμένουσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ δόξα διατηρεῖ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον, ἐκβαίνουσα δὲ καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα τῷ κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς αὑτήν τε πολλάκις ταράσσει καὶ μάχεται πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντία πάθη καὶ διαφόρους φαντασίας λαμβάνοντας.
25. And Colotes seems properly to resemble those young children who are but beginning to learn their letters. For, being accustomed to learn them where they see them in their own horn-books and primers, when they see them written anywhere else, they doubt and are troubled; so those very discourses, which he praises and approves in the writings of Epicurus, he neither understands nor knows again, when they are spoken by others. For those who say that the sense is truly informed and moulded when there is presented one image round and another broken, but nevertheless permit us not to pronounce that the tower is round and the oar broken, confirm their own passions and imaginations, but they will not acknowledge and confess that the things without are so affected. But as the Cyrenaics must say that they are imprinted with the figure of a horse or of a wall, but do not speak of the horse or the wall; so also it is necessary to say that the sight is imprinted with a figure round or with three unequal sides, and not that the tower is in that manner triangular or round. For the image by which the sight is affected is broken; but the oar whence that image proceeds is not broken. Since then there is a difference between the impression and the external subject, the belief must either remain in the impression, or else — if it maintains the being in addition to the appearing — be reproved and convinced of untruth. And whereas they cry out and are offended in behalf of the sense, because the Cyrenaics say not that the thing without is hot, but that the impression made on the sense is such; is it not the same with what is said touching the taste, when they say that the thing without is not sweet, but that some impression and motion about the sense is such? And for him who says that he has received the apprehension of an human form, but perceives not whether it is a man, whence has he taken occasion so to say? Is it not from those who affirm that they receive an apprehension of a bowed figure and form, but that the sight pronounces not that the thing which was seen is bowed or round, but that a certain effigies of it is such? Yes, by Jupiter, will some one say; but I, going near the tower or touching the oar, will pronounce and affirm that the one is straight and the other has many angles and faces; but he, when he comes near it, will confess that it seems and appears so to him, and no more. Yes certainly, good sir, and more than this, when he sees and observes the consequence, that every imagination is equally worthy of belief for itself, and none for another; but that they are all in like condition. But this your opinion is quite lost, that all the imaginations are true and none false or to be disbelieved, if you think that these ought to pronounce positively of that which is without, but those you credit no farther than that they are so affected. For if they are in equal condition as to their being believed, when they are near or when they are far off, it is just that either upon all of them, or else not upon these, should follow the judgment pronouncing that a thing is. But if there is a difference in the being affected between those that are near and those that are far off, it is then false that one sense and imagination is not more express and evident than another. Therefore those which they call testimonies and counter-testimonies are nothing to the sense, but are concerned only with opinion. So, if they would have us following these to pronounce concerning exterior things, making being a judgment of opinion, and what appears an affection of sense, they transfer the judicature from that which is totally true to that which often fails.
25. ὁ δὲ Κωλώτης; ἔοικε ταὐτὸ πάσχειν τοῖς νεωστὶ γράμματα μανθάνουσι τῶν παίδων, οἳ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐν τοῖς πυξίοις ἐθιζόμενοι λέγειν, ὅταν ἔξω γεγραμμένους ἐν ἑτέροις ἴδωσιν, ἀμφιγνοοῦσι καὶ ταράττονται καὶ γὰρ οὗτος, οὓς ἐν τοῖς Ἐπικούρου γράμμασιν ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ λόγους, οὐ συνίησιν οὐδὲ γιγνώσκει λεγομένους ὑφʼ ἑτέρων. οἱ γάρ, εἰδώλου προσπίπτοντος ἡμῖν περιφεροῦς ἑτέρου δὲ κεκλασμένου, τὴν μὲν αἴσθησιν ἀληθῶς τυποῦσθαι λέγοντες, προσαποφαίνεσθαι δʼ οὐκ ἐῶντες ὅτι στρογγύλος ὁ πύργος ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ κώπη κέκλασται, τὰ πάθη τὰ αὑτῶν καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα βεβαιοῦσι τὰ δʼ ἐκτὸς οὕτως ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐκείνοις τὸ ἱπποῦσθαι καὶ τὸ τοιχοῦσθαι λεκτέον οὐχ ἵππον οὐδὲ τοῖχον, οὕτως ἄρα τὸ στρογγυλοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ σκαληνοῦσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ σκαληνὸν οὐδὲ στρογγύλον ἀνάγκη τὴν κώπην καὶ τὸν πύργον λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ εἴδωλον, ὑφʼ οὗ πέπονθεν ἡ ὄψις, κεκλασμένον ἐστίν· ἡ κώπη δʼ ἀφʼ ἧς τὸ εἴδωλον οὔκ ἐστι κεκλασμένη. διαφορὰν οὖν τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐκτὸς ἔχοντος, ἢ μένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ πάθους δεῖ τὴν πίστιν ἢ τὸ εἶναι τῷ φαίνεσθαι προσαποφαινομένην ἐλέγχεσθαι. τὸ δὲ δὴ βοᾶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὡς οὐ λέγουσι τὸ ἐκτὸς εἶναι θερμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθος γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον· ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ λεγομένῳ περὶ τῆς; γεύσεως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς οὒ φασιν εἶναι γλυκὺ πάθος δέ τι καὶ κίνημα περὶ αὐτὴν γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον; ὁ δὲ λέγων ἀνθρωποειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δʼ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πόθεν εἴληφε τὰς ἀφορμάς; οὐ παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων καμπυλοειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ καμπύλον ἐστί, μὴ προσαποφαίνεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν μηδʼ ὅτι στρογγύλον, ἀλλʼ ὅτι φάντασμα περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τύπωμα στρογγυλοειδὲς γέγονε; νὴ Δία, φήσει τις, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τῷ πύργῳ προσελθὼν καὶ τῆς κώπης ἁψάμενος ἀποφανοῦμαι τὴν μὲν εὐθεῖαν εἶναι τὸν δὲ πολύγωνον· ἐκεῖνος δέ, κἂν ἐγγὺς γένηται, τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι, πλέον δʼ οὐδὲν ὁμολογήσει. ναὶ μὰ Δία σοῦ γε μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὁρῶν καὶ φυλάττων, τὸ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν ὁμοίως ἀξιόπιστον ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀλλʼ ἐπίσης ἔχειν. σοὶ δʼ οἴχεται τὸ πάσας ὑπάρχειν ἀληθεῖς, ἄπιστον δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ μηδεμίαν, εἰ ταύταις μὲν οἴει δεῖν προσαποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκείναις δὲ … τοῦ πάσχειν πλέον οὐδὲν ἐπίστευες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπίσης ἔχουσιν ἐγγύς τε γενόμεναι καὶ μακρὰν οὖσαι πρὸς πίστιν, ἢ πάσαις δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ μηδὲ ταύταις ἕπεσθαι τὴν προσαποφαινομένην τὸ εἶναι κρίσιν εἰ δὲ γίγνεται διαφορὰ τοῦ πάθους ἀποστᾶσι καὶ προσελθοῦσι, ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ μήτε φαντασίαν μήτʼ αἴσθησιν σιν ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ὑπάρχειν καθάπερ ἃς λέγουσιν ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις καὶ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις οὐθέν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν· ὥστʼ εἰ ταύταις ἑπομένους ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς κελεύουσι, τῆς δόξης κρῖμα τὸ εἶναι τῆς δʼ αἰσθήσεως πάθος τὸ φαινόμενον ποιοῦντες, ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντως ἀληθοῦς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διαπῖπτον πολλάκις μεταφέρουσιν.