26. But how full of trouble and contradiction in respect of one another these things are, what need is there to say at present? But the reputation of Arcesilaus, who was the best beloved and most esteemed of all the philosophers in his time, seems to have been no small eyesore to Epicurus; who says of him that, delivering nothing peculiar to himself or of his own invention, he imprinted in illiterate men an opinion and esteem of his being very knowing and learned. Now Arcesilaus was so far from desiring any glory by being a bringer-in of new opinions, and from arrogating to himself those of the ancients, that the sophisters of that time blamed him for attributing to Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and Heraclitus the doctrines concerning the retention of assent, and the incomprehensibility of things; having no need so to do, but only that he might strengthen them and render them recommendable by ascribing them to such illustrious personages. For this therefore thanks to Colotes, and to every one who declares that the Academic doctrine was from higher times derived to Arcesilaus. Now as for the retention of assent and the doubting of all things, not even those who have much labored in the matter, and strained themselves to compose great books and large treatises concerning it, were ever able to stir it; but bringing at last out of the Stoa itself the cessation from all actions, as the Gorgon to frighten away the objections that came against them, they were at last quite tired and gave over. For they could not, what attempts and stirs soever they made, obtain so much from the instinct by which the appetite is moved to act, as to suffer itself to be called an assent, or to acknowledge sense for the origin and principle of its propension, but it appeared of its own accord to present itself to act, as having no need to be joined with any thing else. For against such adversaries the combat and dispute is lawful and just. AndSuch words as you have spoke, the like you mayExpect to hear.For to speak to Colotes of instinct and consent is, I suppose, all one as to play on the harp before an ass. But to those who can give ear and conceive, it is said that there are in the soul three sorts of motions, — the imaginative, the appetitive, and the consenting. As to the imaginative or the apprehension, it cannot be taken away, though one would. For one cannot, when things approach, avoid being informed and (as it were) moulded by them, and receiving an impression from them. The appetite, being stirred up by the imaginative, effectually moves man to that which is proper and agreeable to his nature, just as when there is made a propension and inclination in the principal and reasonable part. Now those who withhold their assent and doubt of all things take not away this, but make use of the appetition or instinct naturally conducting every man to that which seems convenient for him. What then is the only thing that they shun? That in which is bred falsehood and deceit, — that is, opining, and precipitation in giving consent, — which is a yielding through weakness to that which appears, and has not any true utility. For action stands in need of two things, to wit, the apprehension or imagination of what is agreeable to Nature, and the instinct or appetition driving to that which is so imagined; of which, neither the one nor the other is repugnant to the retention of assent. For reason withdraws us from opinion, and not from appetition or imagination. When therefore that which is delectable seems to us to be proper for us, there is no need of opinion to move and carry us to it, but appetition immediately exerts itself, which is nothing else but the motion and inclination of the soul.
26. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅσης ἐστὶ μεστὰ ταραχῆς καὶ μάχης πρὸς ἑαυτά, τί δεῖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι; τοῦ δʼ Ἀρκεσιλάου τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐ μετρίως ἔοικεν ἡ δόξα παραλυπεῖν, ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαπηθέντος μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἴδιον λέγοντά φησιν ὑπόληψιν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώποις ἀγραμμάτοις ἅτε δὴ πολυγράμματος αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ μεμουσωμένος. ὁ δʼ Ἀρκεσίλαος τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τοῦ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαί τι τῶν παλαιῶν, ὥστʼ ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς τότε σοφιστάς, ὅτι προστρίβεται Σωκράτει καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας, οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλʼ οἷον ἀναγωγὴν καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος. ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτου Κωλώτῃ χάρις καὶ παντὶ τῷ τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν λόγον ἄνωθεν ἣκειν εἰς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀποφαίνοντι. τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδʼ οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῆς τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν, ὡς πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη, μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. νόμιμοι γὰρ οἱ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀγῶνές εἰσι, καὶ ὁπποῖὸν κʼ εἴπῃσθα ἔπος, τοῖὸν κʼ ἐπακούσαις. Κωλώτῃ δʼ οἶμαι τὰ περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ συγκαταθέσεως ὄνῳ λύρας ἀκρόασιν εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ τοῖς συνεπομένοις καὶ ἀκούουσιν, ὅτι, τριῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κινημάτων ὄντων, φανταστικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ καὶ συγκαταθετικοῦ, τὸ μὲν φανταστικὸν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἀνελεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη προεντυγχάνοντας τοῖς πράγμασι τυποῦσθαι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπʼ αὐτῶν· τὸ δʼ ὁρμητικὸν ἐγειρόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πρακτικῶς κινεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οἷον ῥοπῆς ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ νεύσεως γινομένης οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ οὖν ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ χρῶνται τῇ ὁρμῇ φυσικῶς ἀγούσῃ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον οἰκεῖον. τί οὖν φεύγουσι μόνον; ᾧ μόνῳ ψεῦδος ἐμφύεται καὶ ἀπάτη, τὸ δοξάζειν καὶ προπίπτειν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, εἶξιν οὖσαν ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας τῷ φαινομένῳ, χρήσιμον δʼ οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν. ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις δυεῖν δεῖται, φαντασίας τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὲν οἰκεῖον ὁρμῆς, ὧν οὐδέτερον τῇ ἐποχῇ μάχεται· δόξης γὰρ οὐχ ὁρμῆς οὐδὲ φαντασίας ὁ λόγος ἀφίστησιν. ὅταν οὖν φανῇ τὸ ἡδὺ οἰκεῖον, οὐδὲν δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐπʼ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ φορὰν δόξης, ἀλλʼ ἦλθεν εὐθὺς ἡ ὁρμή, κίνησις οὖσα καὶ φορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς.
27. It is their own saying, that a man must only have sense and be flesh and blood, and pleasure will appear to be good. Wherefore also it will seem good to him who withholds his assent. For he also participates of sense, and is made of flesh and blood, and as soon as he has conceived an imagination of good, desires it and does all things that it may not escape from him; but as much as possibly he can, he will keep himself with that which is agreeable to his nature, being drawn by natural and not by geometrical constraints. For these goodly, gentle, and tickling motions of the flesh are, without any teacher, attractive enough of themselves — even as these men forget not to say — to draw even him who will not in the least acknowledge and confess that he is softened and rendered pliable by them. “But how comes it to pass,” perhaps you will say, “that he who is thus doubtful and withholds his assent hastens not away to the mountain, instead of going to the bath? Or that, rising up to go forth into the market-place, he runs not his head against the wall, but takes his way directly to the door?” Do you ask this, who hold all the senses to be infallible, and the apprehensions of the imagination certain and true? It is because the bath appears to him not a mountain, but a bath; and the door seems not a wall, but a door; and the same is to be said of every other thing. For the doctrine of retention does not pervert the sense, nor by absurd passions and motions work in it an alteration disturbing the imaginative faculty; but it only takes away opinions, and for the rest, makes use of other things according to their nature. But it is impossible, you will say, not to consent to things that are evident; for to deny such things as are believed is more absurd than neither to deny nor affirm. Who then are they that call in question things believed, and contend against things that are evident? They who overthrow and take away divination, who say that there is not any government of Divine Providence, who deny the sun and the moon — to whom all men offer sacrifices and whom they honor and adore — to be animated. And do not you take away that which is apparent to all the world, that the young are contained in the nature of their parents? Do you not, contrary to the sense of all men, affirm that there is no medium between pleasure and pain, saying that not to be in pain is to be in the fruition of pleasure, that not to do is to suffer, and that not to rejoice is to be grieved?
27. καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν γε τούτων ὡς αἴσθησιν ἔχειν δεῖ καὶ σάρκινον εἶναι, καὶ φανεῖται ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ἐπέχοντι ἀγαθὸν φανεῖται καὶ γὰρ αἰσθήσεως μετέχει καὶ σάρκινός ἐστι· καὶ λαβὼν ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ὀρέγεται καὶ ὁρμᾷ, πάντα πράττων ὅπως οὐ διαφεύξεται αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἀεὶ συνέσται τῷ οἰκείῳ, φυσικαῖς, οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἑλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις ἄνευ διδασκάλου γὰρ αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα καὶ λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν οὗτοι, καὶ τὸν πάνυ μὴ φάσκοντα μηδʼ ὁμολογοῦντα κάμπτεσθαι καὶ μαλάσσεσθαι τούτοις. ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐκ εἰς ὄρος ἄπεισι τρέχων ὁ ἐπέχων ἀλλʼ εἰς βαλανεῖον, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς θύρας ἀναστὰς βαδίζει, βουλόμενος εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθεῖν; τοῦτʼ ἐρωτᾷς, ἀκριβῆ τὰ αἰσθητήρια λέγων εἶναι καὶ τὰς; φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς; ὅτι φαίνεται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ βαλανεῖον οὐ τὸ ὄρος ἀλλὰ τὸ βαλανεῖον, καὶ θύρα οὐχ ὁ τοῖχος ἀλλʼ ἡ θύρα· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. ὁ γὰρ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος οὐ παρατρέπει τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀλόγοις πάθεσιν αὐτῆς καὶ κινήμασιν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιεῖ διαταράττουσαν τὸ φανταστικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δόξας μόνον ἀναιρεῖ χρῆται τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς πέφυκεν ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τοῖς ἐναργέσι τὸ ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ πεπιστευμένα τοῦ μήτʼ, ἀρνεῖσθαι μήτε τιθέναι παραλογώτερον. τίς οὖν κινεῖ τὰ πεπιστευμένα καὶ μάχεται τοῖς ἐναργέσιν; οἱ μαντικὴν ἀναιροῦντες καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπάρχειν θεῶν φάσκοντες μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον εἶναι μηδὲ τὴν σελήνην, οἷς πάντες ἄνθρωποι θύουσι καὶ προσεύχονται καὶ σέβονται τὸ φύσει περιέχεσθαι τὰ τεκόντα τῶν γειναμένων οὐχὶ πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἀναιρεῖτε; τὸ δὲ πόνου καὶ ἡδονῆς μηδὲν εἶναι μέσον οὐκ ἀποφαίνεσθε παρὰ τὴν πάντων αἴσθησιν, ἥδεσθαι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ μὴ … λέγοντες;
28. But to let pass all the rest, what is more evident and more generally believed by all men, than that those who are seized with melancholy distempers, and whose brain is troubled and whose wits are distracted, do, when the fit is on them and their understanding altered and transported, imagine that they see and hear things which they neither see nor hear? Whence they frequently cry out:Women in black arrayed bear in their hands,To burn mine eyes, torches and fiery brands.And again:See, in her arms she holds my mother dear.These, and many other illusions more strange and tragical than these, — resembling those mormos and bugbears which they themselves laugh at and deride, as they are described by Empedocles to be, “with winding feet and undivided hands, bodied like ox and faced like man,” — with certain other prodigious and unnatural phantoms, these men have gathered together out of dreams and the alienations of distracted minds, and affirm that none of them is a deception of the sight, a falsity, or inconsistence; but that all these imaginations are true, being bodies and figures that come from the ambient air. What thing then is there so impossible in Nature as to be doubted of, if it is possible to believe such reveries as these? For these men, supposing that such things as never any mask-maker, potter, carver of wonderful images, or skilful and all-daring painter durst join together, to deceive or make sport for the beholders, are seriously and in good earnest existent, — nay, which is more, affirming that, if they are not really so, all firmness of belief, all certainty of judgment and truth, is for ever gone, — do by these their suppositions and affirmations cast all things into obscurity, and bring fears into our judgments, and suspicions into our actions, — if the things which we apprehend, do, are familiarly acquainted with, and have at hand are grounded on the same imagination and belief with these furious, absurd, and extravagant fancies. For the equality which they suppose to be in all apprehensions rather derogates from the credit of such as are usual and rational, than adds any belief to those that are unusual and repugnant to reason. Wherefore we know many philosophers who would rather and more willingly grant that no imagination is true than that all are so, and that would rather simply disbelieve all the men they never had conversed with, all the things they had not experimented, and all the speeches they had not heard with their own ears, than persuade themselves that any one of these imaginations, conceived by these frantic, fanatical, and dreaming persons, is true. Since then there are some imaginations which may, and others which may not be rejected, it is lawful for us to retain our assent concerning them, though there were no other cause but this discordance, which is sufficient to work in us a suspicion of things, as having nothing certain and assured, but being altogether full of obscurity and perturbation. For in the dissensions about the infinity of worlds and the nature of atoms and individuums and their inclinations, although they trouble and disturb very many, there is yet this comfort, that none of all these things that are in question is near us, but rather every one of them is far remote from sense. But as to this diffidence, perplexity, and ignorance concerning sensible things and imaginations (whether these be true or false), found even in our eyes, our ears, and our hands, what opinion does it not shock? What consent does it not turn upside down? For if men neither drunk, intoxicated, nor otherwise disturbed in their senses, but sober, sound in mind, and professedly writing of the truth and of the canons and rules by which to judge it, do in the most evident passions and motions of the senses set down either that which has no existence for true, or that which is existent for false, it is not to be wondered that a man should be silent about all things, but rather that he should give his assent to any thing; nor is it incredible that he should have no judgment about things which appear, but rather that he should have contrary judgments. For it is less to be wondered, that a man should neither affirm the one nor the other but keep himself in a mean between two opposite things, than that he should set down things repugnant and contrary to one another. For he that neither affirms nor denies, but keeps himself quiet, is less repugnant to him who affirms an opinion than he who denies it, and to him who denies an opinion than he who affirms it. Now if it is possible to withhold one’s assent concerning these things, it is not impossible also concerning others, at least according to your opinion, who say that one sense does not exceed another, nor one imagination another.
28. ἀλλʼ ἵνα τἄλλα ἐάσω, τί μᾶλλον ἐναργὲς οὕτως ἐστὶ καὶ πεπιστευμένον, ὡς τὸ παρορᾶν καὶ παρακούειν ἐν πάθεσιν ἐκστατικοῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς ὄντα, ὅταν ἡ διάνοια τοιαῦτα πάσχῃ καὶ ταράττηται αἳ δέ με δᾳδοφόροι μελανείμονες ὄμμα πυροῦσι καὶἔχουσα;ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἕτερα τραγικώτερα τοῖς Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐοικότα τεράσμασιν, ὧν καταγελῶσιν, εἱλίποδʼ ἀκριτόχειρα καὶ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα, καὶ τίνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄψιν ἢ φύσιν ἔκφυλον εἰς ταὐτὸ συνενεγκόντες ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τῶν παρακοπῶν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασι παρόραμα τούτων οὐδὲ ψεῦδος οὐδʼ ἀσύστατον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς ἁπάσας καὶ σώματα καὶ μορφὰς ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀφικνουμένας. εἶτʼ ἔστι τί τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον ἀπιστεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα πιστεύεσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἃ γὰρ οὐδεὶς σκευοποιὸς ἢ πλάστης θαυμάτων ἢ γραφεὺς δεινὸς ἐτόλμησε μῖξαι πρὸς ἀπάτην εἰκάσματα καὶ παίγνια, ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχειν ἀπὸ σπουδῆς τιθέμενοι, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ὑπάρχοι, πίστιν οἴχεσθαι καὶ βεβαιότητα καὶ κρίσιν ἀληθείας φάσκοντες αὐτοὶ καταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἀσάφειαν πάντα πράγματα καὶ ταῖς κρίσεσι φόβους καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὑποψίας ἐπάγουσιν, εἰ τὰ πραττόμενα καὶ νομιζόμενα καὶ συνήθη καὶ ἀνὰ χεῖρας ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῆς· αὐτῆς φαντασίας καὶ πίστεως ὀχεῖται τοῖς μανι κοῖς καὶ ἀτόποις καὶ παρανόμοις ἐκείνοις φάσμασιν. ἡ. γὰρ ἰσότης, ἣν ὑποτίθενται πᾶσι, τῶν νενομισμένων ἀφίστησι μᾶλλον ἢ προστίθησι τοῖς παραλόγοις τὴν πίστιν. ὅθεν ἴσμεν οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν φιλοσόφων ἥδιον ἂν θεμένους τὸ μηδεμίαν ἢ τὸ πάσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν οἷς οὐ παρατυγχάνουσι διαπιστήσαντας ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἁπλῶς ἅπασιν ἢ μίαν ἐκείνων ἀληθῆ καὶ ὑπάρχουσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν πεισθέντας, ἃς λυττῶντες ἢ κορυβαντιῶντες ἢ κοιμώμενοι λαμβάνουσιν. ἃ τοίνυν ἔστι μὲν ἀναιρεῖν, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπέχειν περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τήν γε διαφωνίαν ταύτην λαβόντας αἰτίαν ἀποχρῶσαν ὑπονοίας πρὸς τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐδʼ οὕτως; ὑγιὲς οὐδέν, ἀσάφειαν δὲ καὶ ταραχὴν ἔχοντα πᾶσαν. ταῖς μέν γε περὶ κόσμων ἀπειρίαις καὶ ἀτόμων φύσεως καὶ ἀμερῶν καὶ παρεγκλίσεων διαφοραῖς, εἰ καὶ πάνυ πολλοὺς διαταράττουσιν, ἔνεστιν ὅμως παραμυθία, τὸ μηδὲν ἐγγὺς εἶναι, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως ἐπέκεινα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπῳκίσθαι τῶν ζητουμένων ἕκαστον· ἡ δʼ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αὕτη καὶ ἀκοαῖς καὶ χερσὶν ἀπιστία καὶ ἄγνοια καὶ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰς φαντασίας, εἴτʼ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν εἴτε ψευδεῖς, τίνα δόξαν οὐ σαλεύει; ποίαν δʼ οὐκ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιεῖ συγκατάθεσιν καὶ κρίσιν; εἰ γὰρ οὐ κραιπαλῶντες οὐδὲ φαρμακῶντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ παρακόπτοντες, ἀλλὰ νήφοντες καὶ ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων, ἐν τοῖς ἐναργεστάτοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἢ τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἡγοῦνται τἀληθές, οὐκ εἰ περὶ πάντων ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀλλʼ εἴ τισιν ὅλως ἀνθρώποις συγκατατίθενται, θαυμάζειν ἄξιον· οὐδʼ ἄπιστον, εἰ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν ἔχουσι περὶ τῶν φαινομένων, ἀλλʼ εἰ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔχουσι. τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀντικείμενα τὸ μὴ τιθέναι μηδέτερον, ἀλλʼ ἐπέχειν περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἧττον ἄν τις θαυμάσειεν· ὁ γὰρ μήτε τιθεὶς μήτʼ ἀρνούμενος ἀλλʼ ἡσυχάζων καὶ τῷ τιθέντι τὴν δόξαν ἧττον μάχεται τοῦ ἀρνουμένου καὶ τῷ ἀρνουμένῳ τοῦ τιθέντος εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπέχειν, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδύνατον, κατὰ γʼ ὑμᾶς, αἴσθησιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ φαντασίαν φαντασίας οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν διαφέρειν ἡγουμένους.
29. The doctrine then of retaining the assent is not, as Colotes thinks, a fable or an invention of rash and lightheaded young men who please themselves in babbling and prating; but a certain habit and disposition of men who desire to keep themselves from falling into error, not leaving the judgment at a venture to such suspected and inconstant senses, nor suffering themselves to be deceived by those who hold that in uncertain matters things which do not appear are credible and ought to be believed, when they see so great obscurity and uncertainty in things which appear. But the infinity you assert is a fable, and so indeed are the images you dream of; and he breeds in young men rashness and self-conceitedness, who writ of Pythocles, not yet eighteen years of age, that there was not in all Greece a better or more excellent nature, that he admirably well expressed his conceptions, and that he was in other respects like a woman, — praying that all these extraordinary endowments of the young man might not work him hatred and envy. But these are sophisters and arrogant, who write so impudently and proudly against great and excellent personages. I confess indeed, that Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Democritus contradicted those who went before them; but never durst any man besides Colotes set forth with such an insolent title as this against all at once.
29. οὐ μῦθος οὖν οὐδὲ θήρα μειρακίων λαμυρῶν καὶ προπετῶν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος ἐστίν, ὡς οἴεται Κωλώτης, ἀλλʼ ἕξις ἀνδρῶν καὶ διάθεσις φυλάττουσα τὸ ἀδιάπτωτον καὶ μὴ προϊεμένη ταῖς διαβεβλημέναις οὕτω καὶ δυστατούσαις αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν μηδὲ συνεξαπατωμένη τούτοις, οἳ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων πίστιν ἔχειν φάσκουσιν, ἀπιστίαν τοσαύτην καὶ ἀσάφειαν ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις ὁρῶντες. ἀλλὰ μῦθος μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα, προπέτειαν δὲ καὶ λαμυρίαν ἐμποιεῖ νέοις ὁ περὶ Πυθοκλέους οὔπω γεγονότος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γράφων οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὸς τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα πάντα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανίσκου σοφισταὶ δʼ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀλαζόνες οἱ πρὸς ἄνδρας ἐλλογίμους οὕτως ἀσελγῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως γράφοντες;, καίτοι Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ Δημόκριτος ἀντειρήκασι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν· βιβλίον δὲ τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχον ὁμοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐξενεγκεῖν ἐτόλμησεν.
30. Whence it comes to pass that, like to such as have offended some Divinity, confessing his fault, he says thus towards the end of his book: “Those who have established laws and ordinances and instituted monarchies and other governments in towns and cities, have placed human life in great repose and security and delivered it from many troubles; and if any one should go about to take this away, we should lead the life of savage beasts, and should be every one ready to eat up one another as we meet.” For these are the very words of Colotes, though neither justly nor truly spoken. For if any one, taking away the laws, should leave us nevertheless the doctrines of Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Heraclitus, we should be far from mutually devouring one another and leading the life of beasts. For we should fear dishonest things, and should for honesty alone venerate justice, the Gods, our superiors, and magistrates, believing that we have spirits and Daemons who are the guardians and superintendents of human life, esteeming all the gold that is upon and within the earth not to be equivalent to virtue; and doing that willingly by reason, as Xenocrates says, which we now do by force and through fear of the law. When then will our life become savage, unsocial, and bestial When, the laws being taken away, there shall be left doctrines inciting men to pleasure; when the world shall be thought not to be ruled and governed by Divine Providence; when those men shall be esteemed wise who spit at honesty if it is not joined with pleasure; and when such discourses and sentences as these shall be scoffed at and derided:For Justice has an eye which all things sees;and again:God near us stands, and views whate’er we do;and once more: “God, as antiquity has delivered to us, holding the beginning, middle, and end of the universe, makes a direct line, walking according to Nature. After him follows Justice, a punisher of those who have been deficient in their duties by transgressing the divine law.” For they who contemn these things as if they were fables, and think that the sovereign good of man consists about the belly, and in those other avenues by which pleasure is admitted, are such as stand in need of the law, and fear, and stripes, and some king, prince, or magistrate, having in his hand the sword of justice; to the end that they may not devour their neighbors through their gluttony, rendered confident by their atheistical impiety. For this is the life of brutes, because brute beasts know nothing better nor more honest than pleasure, understand not the justice of the Gods, nor revere the beauty of virtue; but if Nature has bestowed on them any point of courage, subtlety, or activity, they make use of it for the satisfaction of their fleshly pleasure and the accomplishment of their lusts. And the wise Metrodorus believes that this should be so, for he says: “All the fine, subtle, and ingenious inventions of the soul have been found out for the pleasure and delight of the flesh, or for the hopes of attaining to it and enjoying it, and every act which tends not to this end is vain and unprofitable.” The laws being by such discourses and philosophical reasons as these taken away, there wants nothing to a beast-like life but lions’ paws, wolves’ teeth, oxen’s paunches, and camels’ necks; and these passions and doctrines do the beasts themselves, for want of speech and letters, express by their bellowings, neighings, and brayings, all their voice being for their belly and the pleasure of their flesh, which they embrace and rejoice in either present or future; unless it be perhaps some animal which naturally takes delight in chattering and garrulity.
30. ὅθεν, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον πλημμελήσαντες, ἐξαγορεύων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κακὰ τελευτῶντος ἤδη τοῦ βιβλίου φησὶν ὅτι τὸν βίον οἱ νόμους διατάξαντες καὶ νόμιμα καὶ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καταστήσαντες εἰς πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἔθεντο καὶ θορύβων ἀπήλλαξαν εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα ἀναιρήσει, θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα καὶ ὁ προστυχὼν τὸν ἐντυχόντα μονονοὺ κατέδεται τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ Κωλώτης αὐταῖς λέξεσιν ἐκπεφώνηκεν, οὐ δικαίως οὐδʼ ἀληθῶς. ἂν γὰρ ἀνελών τις τοὺς νόμους τὰ Παρμενίδου καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Πλάτωνος ἀπολίπῃ δόγματα, πολλοῦ δεήσομεν ἀλλήλους κατεσθίειν καὶ θηρίων βίον ζῆν· φοβησόμεθα γὰρ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τιμήσομεν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ δικαιοσύνην, θεοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δαίμονας ἔχειν τοῦ βίου φύλακας ἡγούμενοι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν χρυσὸν ἀρετῆς ἀντάξιον μὴ τιθέμενοι καὶ ποιοῦντες ἑκουσίως διὰ τὸν λόγον, φησι,Ξενοκράτης, ἃ νῦν ἄκοντες διὰ τὸν νόμον. πότʼ οὖν ἔσται θηριώδης καὶ ἄγριος καὶ ἄμικτος ἡμῶν ὁ βίος; ὅταν ἀναιρεθῶσι μὲν οἱ νόμοι, μένωσι δʼ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν παρακαλοῦντες λόγοι, πρόνοια δὲ θεῶν μὴ νομίζηται, σοφοὺς δʼ ἡγῶνται τοὺς τῷ καλῷ προσπτύοντας, ἂν ἡδονὴ μὴ προσῇ χλευάζωσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ γελῶσιν ἔστιν Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὃς τὰ πάνθʼ ὁρᾷ καί πέλας γὰρ ἑστὼς ὁ θεὸς ἐγγύθεν βλέπει καὶ ὁ μὲν θεός, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος τῷ δʼ ἕπεται Δίκη, τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τιμωρὸς τοῦ θείου νόμου. οἱ γὰρ τούτων καταφρονοῦντες ὡς μύθων καὶ περὶ γαστέρα τἀγαθὸν ἡγούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους διʼ ὧν ἡδονὴ παραγίνεται, νόμου δέονται καὶ φόβου καὶ πληγῆς καὶ βασιλέως τινὸς καὶ ἄρχοντος ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντος, ἵνα μὴ τοὺς πλησίον κατεσθίωσιν ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἀθεότητι θρασυνομένης. καὶ γὰρ ὁ τῶν θηρίων βίος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἐπίσταται κάλλιον οὐδὲ δίκην θεῶν οἶδεν οὐδὲ σέβεται τῆς τὸ κάλλος, ἀλλʼ εἴ τι θαρραλέον αὐτοῖς ἢ πανοῦργον ἢ δραστήριον ἐκ φύσεως ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν σαρκὸς καὶ ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀρέξεως· χρῆται· καθάπερ οἴεται δεῖν ὁ σοφὸς Μητρόδωρος, λέγων τὰ καλὰ πάντα καὶ σοφὰ καὶ περιττὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξευρήματα τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς ὑπὲρ ταύτης συνεστάναι καὶ πᾶν εἶναι κενὸν ἔργον, ὃ μὴ εἰς τοῦτο κατατείνει. τούτοις τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς καὶ φιλοσοφήμασιν ἀρθέντων τῶν νόμων, ὄνυχες λύκων ἐνδέουσι καὶ δόγματα; λεόντων καὶ γαστέρες βοῶν καὶ τράχηλοι καμήλων καὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ δόγματα λόγων καὶ γραμμάτων ἀπορίᾳ τὰ θηρία βρυχήμασι καὶ χρεμετισμοῖς καὶ … καὶ πᾶσα φωνὴ γαστρός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονὴν ἀσπαζομένη καὶ σαίνουσα παροῦσαν ἢ μέλλουσαν, εἰ μή τι φύσει φιλόφωνὸν ἐστι καὶ κωτίλον.
31. No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: “We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.” And yet again, these other words are theirs: “There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh.” And yet in the constitution of laws and policy, which Colotes so much praises, the first and most important article is the belief and persuasion of the Gods. Wherefore also Lycurgus heretofore sanctified the Lacedaemonians, Numa the Romans, the ancient Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion universally all the Greeks, through prayers, oaths, oracles, and omens, rendering them devout and affectionate to the Gods by means of hopes and fears at once. And if you will take the pains to travel through the world, you may find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without houses, without wealth, without money, without theatres and places of exercise; but there was never seen nor shall be seen by man any city without temples and Gods, or without making use of prayers, oaths, divinations, and sacrifices for the obtaining of blessings and benefits, and the averting of curses and calamities. Nay, I am of opinion, that a city might sooner be built without any ground to fix it on, than a commonweal be constituted altogether void of any religion and opinion of the Gods, — or being constituted, be preserved. But this, which is the foundation and ground of all laws, do these men, not going circularly about, nor secretly and by enigmatical speeches, but attacking it with the first of their most principal opinions, directly subvert and overthrow; and then afterwards, as if they were haunted by the Furies, they come and confess that they have grievously offended in thus taking away the laws, and confounding the ordinances of justice and policy, that they may not be capable of pardon. For to err in opinion, though it be not the part of wise men, is at least human; but to impute to others the errors and offences they commit themselves, how can any one declare what it is, if he forbears to give it the name it deserves?
31. οὐδεὶς οὖν ἔπαινος ἄξιος ἂν γένοιτο τῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τὰ θηριώδη νόμους θεμένων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν. ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα συγχέοντες καὶ καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ πολιτείας ἀφιστάντες αὑτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας; οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες αὐταῖς λέξεσιν, ὅτι λέγειν δεῖ, πῶς τις ἄριστα τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος συντηρήσει καὶ πῶς τις ἑκὼν εἶναι μὴ πρόσεισιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πληθῶν ἀρχάς· καὶ ἔτι ταῦτα πρὸς ἐκείνοις οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ τοὺς Ἕλληνας σῴζειν οὐδʼ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ στεφάνου παρʼ αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν, ἀλλʼ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, ἀβλαβῶς τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένως; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἧς γε καὶ Κωλώτης ἐπαινεῖ διατάξεως τῶν νόμων πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα καὶ μέγιστον, καὶ Λυκοῦργος Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Νομᾶς Ῥωμαίους καὶ Ἴων ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ Δευκαλίων Ἕλληνας ὁμοῦ τι πάντας καθωσίωσαν, εὐχαῖς καὶ ὅρκοις καὶ μαντεύμασι καὶ φήμαις; ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα διʼ ἐλπίδων ἅμα καὶ φόβων καταστήσαντες. εὕροις δʼ ἂν ἐπιὼν πόλεις ἀτειχίστους, ἀγραμμάτους, ἀβασιλεύτους, ἀοίκους, ἀχρημάτους, νομίσματος μὴ δεομένας, ἀπείρους θεάτρων καὶ γυμνασίων ἀνιέρου δὲ πόλεως καὶ ἀθέου, μὴ χρωμένης εὐχαῖς μηδʼ ὅρκοις μηδὲ μαντείαις μηδὲ θυσίαις ἐπʼ ἀγαθοῖς μηδʼ ἀποτροπαῖς κακῶν οὐδεὶς ἐστιν οὐδʼ ἔσται γεγονὼς θεατής· ἀλλὰ πόλις ἄν μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐδάφους χωρὶς; ἢ πολιτεία τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης ὑφαιρεθείσης παντάπασι σύστασιν λαβεῖν ἢ λαβοῦσα τηρῆσαι. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ συνεκτικὸν ἁπάσης κοινωνίας καὶ νομοθεσίας ἔρεισμα καὶ βάθρον οὐ κύκλῳ περιιόντες οὐδὲ κρύφα καὶ διʼ αἰνιγμάτων, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρώτην τῶν κυριωτάτων δοξῶν προσβαλόντες εὐθὺς ἀνατρέπουσιν. εἶθʼ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ποινῆς ἐλαυνόμενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν ὁμολογοῦσι, συγχέοντες τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰς διατάξεις τῶν νόμων ἀναιροῦντες, ἵνα μηδὲ συγγνώμης τύχωσι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν περὶ δόξαν, εἰ καὶ μὴ σοφῶν, ὅμως ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι· τὸ δʼ ἐγκαλεῖν ἑτέροις ἅπερ αὐτοὶ πράττουσι πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι, φειδόμενος τῶν ἀξίων ὀνομάτων;
32. For if, in writing against Antidorus or Bion the sophister, he had made mention of laws, policy, order, and justice, might not either of them have said to him, as Electra did to her mad brother Orestes:Lie still at ease, poor wretch; keep in thy bed,and there cherish thy bit of flesh, leaving those to expostulate and find fault with me who have themselves lived a civil and domestic life? Now such are all those whom Colotes has reviled and railed at in his book. Amongst whom, Democritus in his writings advises and exhorts to the learning of political science, as being the greatest of all, and to the accustoming one’s self to bear fatigues, by which men attain to great wealth and honor. And as for Parmenides, he beautified and adorned his native country with most excellent laws which he there established, so that even to this day the officers every year, when they enter first on the exercise of their charges, are obliged to swear that they will observe the laws and ordinances of Parmenides. Empedocles brought to justice some of the principal of his city, and caused them to be condemned for their insolent behavior and embezzling of the public treasure, and also delivered his country from sterility and the plague — to which calamities it was before subject — by immuring and stopping up the holes of certain mountains, whence there issued an hot south wind, which overspread all the plain country and blasted it. And Socrates, after he was condemned, when his friends offered him, if he pleased, an opportunity of making his escape, absolutely refused to make use of it, that he might maintain the authority of the laws, choosing rather to die unjustly than to save himself by disobeying the laws of his country. Melissus, being captain general of his country, vanquished the Athenians in a battle at sea. Plato left in his writings excellent discourses concerning the laws, government, and policy of a commonweal; and yet he imprinted much better in the hearts and minds of his disciples and familiars, which caused Sicily to be delivered by Dion, and Thrace to be set at liberty by Pytho and Heraclides, who slew Cotys. Chabrias also and Phocion, those two great generals of the Athenians, came out of the Academy. As for Epicurus, he indeed sent certain persons into Asia to chide Timocrates, and had him removed out of the king’s palace, because he had offended his brother Metrodorus; and this is written in their own books. But Plato sent of his disciples and friends, Aristonymus to the Arcadians, to set in order their commonweal, Phormio to the Eleans, and Menedemus to the Pyrrhaeans. Eudoxus gave laws to the Cnidians, and Aristotle to the Stagirites, who were both of them the intimates of Plato. And Alexander the Great demanded of Xenocrates rules and precepts for reigning well. And he who was sent to the same Alexander by the Grecians dwelling in Asia, and who most of all inflamed and stimulated him to embrace and undertake the war against the barbarian king of Persia, was Delius the Ephesian, one of Plato’s familiars. Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, having attempted to kill the tyrant Demylus, and failing in his design, maintained the doctrine of Parmenides, like pure and fine gold tried in the fire, that there is nothing which a magnanimous man ought to dread but dishonor, and that there are none but children and women, or effeminate and women-hearted men, who fear pain. For, having with his own teeth bitten off his tongue, he spit it in the tyrant’s face.
32. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς Ἀντίδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σο· φιστὴν γράφων ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἄν τις εἶπεν αὐτῷ μένʼ, ὦ ταλαίπωρʼ, ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων οἱ οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείτωσαν; εἰσὶ δʼ οὗτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν. ὧν Δημόκριτος μὲν παραινεῖ τήν τε πολιτικήν τέχνην μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν, ἀφʼ ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίγνεται τοῖς; ἀνθρώποις. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδα διεκόσμησε νόμοις ἀρίστοις, ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοὺς πολίτας ἐμμενεῖν τοῖς Παρμενίδου νόμοις. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τούς τε πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζοντας καὶ διαφοροῦντας τὰ κοινὰ ἐξέβαλεν ἐξελέγξας τήν τε χώραν ἀπήλλαξεν ἀκαρπίας καὶ λοιμοῦ, διασφάγας ὄρους ἀποτειχίσας, διʼ ὧν ὁ νότος εἰς τὸ πεδίον ὑπερέβαλλε. Σωκράτης δέ, μετὰ τὴν καταδίκην φυγῆς αὐτῷ μεμηχανημένης ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων, οὐκ ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς νόμους βεβαιῶν, ἀλλʼ ἀδίκως ἀποθανεῖν εἵλετο μᾶλλον ἢ σωθῆναι παρανόμως. Μέλισσος δὲ τῆς πατρίδος στρατηγῶν Ἀθηναίους κατεναυμάχησε. Πλάτων δὲ καλοὺς; μὲν ἐν γράμμασι λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ἀπέλιπε, πολὺ δὲ κρείττονας ἐνεποίησε τοῖς ἑταίροις ἀφʼ ὧν Σικελία διὰ Δίωνος ἠλευθεροῦτο καὶ Θρᾴκη διὰ Πύθωνος καὶ Ἡρακλείδου Κότυν ἀνελόντων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χαβρίαι στρατηγοὶ καὶ Φωκίωνες ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας ἀνέβαινον. Ἐπίκουρος μὲν γὰρ εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λοιδορησομένους, καὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξελῶντας αὐλῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι Μητροδώρῳ προσέκρουσεν ἀδελφὸς ὤν· καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται τοῖς ἐκείνων. Πλάτων δὲ τῶν ἑταίρων ἐξαπέστειλεν Ἀρκάσι μὲν Ἀριστώνυμον διακοσμήσοντα τὴν πολιτείαν, Ἠλείοις δὲ Φορμίωνα, Μενέδημον δὲ Πυρραίοις. Εὔδοξος δὲ Κνιδίοις καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίταις, Πλάτωνος ὄντες συνήθεις, νόμους ἔγραψαν· παρὰ δὲ,Ξενοκράτους Ἀλέξανδρος ὑποθήκας ᾔτησε περὶ βασιλείας· ὁ δὲ πεμφθεὶς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ κατοικούντων Ἑλλήνων καὶ μάλιστα διακαύσας καὶ παροξύνας ἅψασθαι τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πολέμου Δήλιος ἦν Ἐφέσιος, ἑταῖρος Πλάτωνος. Ζήνων τοίνυν ὁ Παρμενίδου γνώριμος ἐπιθέμενος Δημύλῳ τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ δυστυχήσας περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐν πυρὶ τὸν Παρμενίδου λόγον ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἀκήρατον καὶ δόκιμον παρέσχε καὶ ἀπέδειξεν ἔργοις, ὅτι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀνδρὶ μεγάλῳ φοβερόν ἐστιν, ἀλγηδόνα δὲ παῖδες καὶ γύναια καὶ γυναίων ψυχὰς ἔχοντες ἄνδρες δεδίασι· τὴν γὰρ γλῶτταν αὑτοῦ διατραγὼν τῷ τυράννῳ προσέπτυσεν.
33. But out of the school of Epicurus, and from among those who follow his doctrine, I will not ask what tyrant-killer has proceeded, nor yet what man valiant and victorious in feats of arms, what lawgiver, what prince, what counsellor, or what governor of the people; neither will I demand, who of them has been tormented or has died for supporting right and justice. But which of all these sages has for the benefit and service of his country undertaken so much as one voyage at sea, gone of an embassy, or expended a sum of money? What record is there extant of one civil action in matter of government, performed by any of you? And yet, because Metrodorus went down one day from the city as far as the haven of Piraeus, taking a journey of forty stadia to assist Mithres a Syrian, one of the king of Persia’s court who had been arrested and taken prisoner, he writ of it to every one and in all his letters, Epicurus also highly magnifying and extolling this wonderful voyage. What value then, think you, would they have put upon it, if they had done such an act as Aristotle did, who procured the restoration and rebuilding of Stagira, the town of his nativity, after it had been destroyed by King Philip? Or as Theophrastus, who twice delivered his city, when possessed and held by tyrants? Would not the river Nile sooner have given over to bear the paper-reed, than they have been weary of writing their brave exploits? And it is not the greatest indignity, that, of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them any thing of their own; but far worse is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defence of the laws and policy, these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal, — of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence, — and of royalty, that we may shun the living and conversing with kings. Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epaminondas had something of good, but that very little, or μικκόν, for that is the very word they use. They moreover call him iron-hearted, and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a night-cap on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his belly. But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Metrodorus writ in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus: “Some, through an abundance of vanity and arrogance, have so deep an insight into the business of it, that in treating about the precepts of good life and virtue, they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon.” What is this? Was it then vanity and abundance of vanity, to set free the city of Athens, to render Sparta well-policied and governed by wholesome laws, that young men might do nothing licentiously, nor get children upon common courtesans and whores, and that riches, delights, intemperance, and dissolution might no longer bear sway and have command in cities, but law and justice? For these were the desires of Solon. To this Metrodorus, by way of scorn and contumely, adds this conclusion: “It is then very well beseeming a free-born gentleman to laugh heartily, as at other men, so especially at these Solons and Lycurguses.” But such a one, O Metrodorus, is not a gentleman, but a servile and dissolute person, and deserves to be scourged, not with that whip which is for free-born persons, but with that scourge strung with ankle-bones, with which those gelded sacrificers called Galli were wont to be chastised, when they failed of performing their duty in the ceremonies and sacrifices of the Goddess Cybele, the great Mother of the Gods.
33. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων οὐ λέγω τίς τυραννοκτόνος ἢ τίς ἀριστεὺς ἢ τίς νομοθέτης ἢ τίς ἄρχων ἢ βασιλέως σύμβουλος ἢ δήμου προστάτης ἢ βεβασανισμένος ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἢ τεθνηκώς· ἀλλὰ τίς τῶν σοφῶν ἔπλευσεν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ἐπρέσβευσεν, ἀνήλωσε ποῦ γέγραπται πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις ὑμῖν. καίτοι ὅτι Μητρόδωρος εἰς Πειραιᾶ κατέβη σταδίους τεσσαράκοντα Μιθρῇ τινι Σύρῳ τῶν βασιλικῶν συνειλημμένῳ βοηθήσων, πρὸς πάντας ἐγράφετο καὶ πάσας, πάσαις ἐπιστολαῖς μεγαληγοροῦντος Ἐπικούρου καὶ σεμνύνοντος ἐκείνην τὴν ὁδόν. τί οὖν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐπέπρακτο αὐτοῖς οἷον Ἀριστοτέλει, τὴν πατρίδα κτίσαι διεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, Θεοφράστῳ δὲ δὶς ἐλευθερῶσαι τυραννουμένην; οὐκ ἐπιλιπεῖν ἔδει πρότερον φέροντα βύβλους τὸν Νεῖλον ἢ τούτους ἀποκαμεῖν γράφοντας περὶ αὑτῶν; καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν ἐστι, ὅτι τοσούτων ὄντων φιλοσόφων μόνοι σχεδὸν ἀσύμβολοι τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ τραγῳδιῶν ποιηταὶ καὶ κωμῳδιῶν ἀεί τι πειρῶνται χρήσιμον παρέχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας· οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι τοὺς δὲ πολιτικοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ γέλωτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἐσχηκέναι τι λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ μικκόν, οὑτωσὶ τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες, αὐτὸν δὲ σιδηροῦν σπλάγχνον ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τί παθὼν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἴκοι καθῆτο δηλαδὴ περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ὅλος καθεστώς ἃ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας ἐξορχούμενος πολιτείαν γέγραφεν οὐκ ᾤμην δεῖν παρεῖναι λέγει δέ, ὅτι τῶν σοφῶν τινες ὑπὸ δαψιλείας τύφου οὕτω καλῶς συνεῖδον τοὔργον αὐτῆς, ὥστʼ οἴχονται φερόμενοι πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς Λυκούργῳ καὶ Σόλωνι ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ βίων λόγους καὶ ἀρετῆς. τῦφος οὖν ἦν καὶ δαψίλεια τύφου τὸ ἐλευθέρας εἶναι τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τήν Σπάρτην εὐνομεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς νέους μὴ θρασύνεσθαι, μηδʼ ἐξ ἑταιρῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι μηδὲ πλοῦτον καὶ τρυφὴν καὶ ἀσέλγειαν ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ νόμον καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αὗται γὰρ ἦσαν ἐπιθυμίαι Σόλωνος. καὶ λοιδορῶν ὁ Μητρόδωρος ἐπιλέγει τοῖς εἰρημένοις διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει τὸν ἐλεύθερον ὡς ἀληθῶς γέλωτα γελάσαι ἐπί τε δὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς Λυκούργοις τούτοις καὶ Σόλωσιν. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐλεύθερος οὗτος, ὦ Μητρόδωρ, ἐστὶν ἀλλʼ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ ἀνάγωγος, καὶ οὐδὲ μάστιγος ἐλευθέρας δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀστραγαλωτῆς ἐκείνης, ᾗ τοὺς Γάλλους πλημμελοῦντας ἐν τοῖς Μητρῴοις κολάζουσιν.
34. But that they made war not against the lawgivers but against the laws themselves, one may hear and understand from Epicurus. For in his questions, he asks himself, whether a wise man, being assured that it will not be known, will do any thing that the laws forbid. To which he answers: “That is not so easy to determine simply,” — that is, “I will do it indeed, but I am not willing to confess it.” And again, I suppose, writing to Idomeneus, he exhorts him not to make his life a slave to the laws or to the opinions of men, unless it be to avoid the trouble they prepare, by the scourge and chastisement, so near at hand. If then those who abolish the laws, governments, and policies of men subvert and destroy human life, and if Metrodorus and Epicurus do this, by dehorting and withdrawing their friends from concerning themselves in public affairs, by hating those who intermeddle in them, by reviling the first most wise lawgivers, and by advising contempt of the laws provided there is no fear and danger of the whip and punishment, I do not see that Colotes has brought so many false accusations against the other philosophers as he has alleged and advanced true ones against the writings and doctrines of Epicurus.
34. ὅτι δʼ οὐ νομοθέταις ἀλλὰ νόμοις ἐπολέμουν, ἔξεστιν ἀκούειν Ἐπικούρου· ἐρωτᾷ γὰρ αὑτὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφός, ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει· καὶ ἀποκρίνεται οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι κατηγόρημα, τουτέστι πράξω μὲν οὐ βούλομαι δʼ ὁμολογεῖν. πάλιν δέ, οἶμαι, γράφων πρὸς Ἰδομενέα διακελεύεται μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἂν μὴ τὴν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν παρασκευάζωσιν εἴπερ οὖν οἱ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας ἀναιροῦντες τὸν βίον ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ Μητρόδωρος τοῦτο ποιοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν συνήθεις ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν τοῖς δὲ πράττουσιν ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες τῶν δὲ νόμων παρακελευόμενοι περιφρονεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ προσῇ φόβος πληγῆς καὶ κολάσεως· οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσται τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης, ἡλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων κατηγόρηκεν.