1. I first lay this down for an axiom, that there ought to be seen in men’s lives an agreement with their doctrines. For it is not so necessary that the pleader (as Aeschines has it) and the law speak one and the same thing, as that the life of a philosopher be consonant to his speech. For the speech of a philosopher is a law of his own and voluntarily imposed on himself, unless they esteem philosophy to be a game, or an acuteness in disputing invented for the gaining of applause, and not—what it really is—a thing deserving our greatest study.
1. πρῶτον ἀξιῶ τὴν τῶν δογμάτων ὁμολογίαν ἐν τοῖς βίοις θεωρεῖσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω τὸν ῥήτορα κατʼ Αἰσχίνην ταὐτὸ φθέγγεσθαι καὶ τὸν νόμον ὡς τὸν βίον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τῷ λόγῳ σύμφωνον εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ λόγος τοῦ φιλοσόφου νόμος αὐθαίρετος καὶ ἴδιός ἐστιν, εἴ γε δὴ μὴ παιδιὰν καὶ εὑρησιλογίαν ἕνεκα δόξης ἀλλʼ ἔργον ἄξιον σπουδῆς τῆς μεγίστης, ὥσπερ ἔστιν, ἡγοῦνται φιλοσοφίαν.
2. Since then there are in their discourses many things written by Zeno himself, many by Cleanthes, and most of all by Chrysippus, concerning policy, governing, and being governed, concerning judging and pleading, and yet there is not to be found in any of their lives either leading of armies, making of laws, going to parliament, pleading before the judges, fighting for their country, travelling on embassies, or bestowing of public gifts, but they have all, feeding (if I may so say) on rest as on the lotus, led their whole lives, and those not short but very long ones, in foreign countries, amongst disputations, books, and walkings; it is manifest that they have lived rather according to the writings and sayings of others than their own professions, having spent all their days in that repose which Epicurus and Hieronymus so much commend. Chrysippus indeed himself, in his Fourth Book of Lives, thinks there is no difference between a scholastic life and a voluptuous one. I will set down here his very words: “They who are of opinion that a scholastic life is from the very beginning most suitable to philosophers seem to me to be in an error, thinking that men ought to follow this for the sake of some recreation or some other thing like to it, and in that manner to spin out the whole course of their life; that is, if it may be explained, to live at ease. For this opinion of theirs is not to be concealed, many of them delivering it clearly, and not a few more obscurely.” Who therefore did more grow old in this scholastic life than Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Diogenes, Zeno, and Antipater, who left their countries not out of any discontent, but that they might quietly enjoy their delight, studying, and disputing at their leisure. To verify which, Aristocreon, the disciple and intimate friend of Chrysippus, having erected his statue of brass upon a pillar, engraved on it these verses:This brazen statue AristocreonTo’s friend Chrysippus newly here has put,Whose sharp-edged wit, like sword of champion,Did Academic knots in sunder cut.Such a one then was Chrysippus, an old man, a philosopher, one who praised the regal and civil life, and thought there was no difference between a scholastic and voluptuous one.
2. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν ὡς ἐν ὀλίγοις αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν ἐν δὲ τοῖς βίοις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν εὑρεῖν οὐ στρατηγίαν, οὐ νομοθεσίαν, οὐ πάροδον εἰς βουλήν, οὐ συνηγορίαν ἐπὶ δικαστῶν, οὐ στρατείαν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος, οὐ πρεσβείαν, οὐκ ἐπίδοσιν· ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ ξένης ὥσπερ τινὸς λωτοῦ γευσάμενοι σχολῆς τὸν πάντα βίον οὐ βραχὺν δε στοιξορυμ ρεπυγναντιις. ἀλλὰ παμμήκη γενόμενον διήγαγον ἐν λόγοις καὶ βιβλίοις καὶ περιπάτοις· οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι τοῖς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων γραφομένοις καὶ λεγομένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ὑφʼ αὑτῶν ὁμολογουμένως ἔζησαν, ἣν Ἐπίκουρος ἡσυχίαν ἐπαινεῖ καὶ Ἱερώνυμος, ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ παράπαν καταβιώσαντες. αὐτὸς γοῦν Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων οὐδὲν οἴεται τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ διαφέρειν· αὐτὰς δὲ παραθήσομαι τὰς λέξεις ὅσοι δʼ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν, ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ λανθάνειν τὴν ὑπόνοιαν αὐτῶν, πολλῶν μὲν σαφῶς τοῦτο λεγόντων οὐκ ὀλίγων δʼ ἀδηλότερον. τίς οὖν μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ σχολαστικῷ βίῳ τούτῳ κατεγήρασεν ἢ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Ἀντίπατρος, οἵ γε καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν κατέλιπον πατρίδας, οὐδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλʼ ὅπως καθʼ ἡσυχίαν ἐν τῷ Ὠιδείῳ καὶ ἐπὶ Ζωστῆρος σχολάζοντες καὶ φιλολογοῦντες διάγωσιν; Ἀριστοκρέων γοῦν ὁ Χρυσίππου μαθητὴς καὶ οἰκεῖος εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἀναστηλώσας ἐπέγραψε τόδε τὸ ἐλεγεῖοντόνδε νέον Χρύσιππον Ἀριστοκρέων ἀνέθηκε,τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα.τοῦτʼ οὖν ὁ Χρύσιππος, ὁ γέρων, ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἐπαινῶν βίον, τὸν δὲ σχολαστικὸν οὐδὲν οἰόμενος τοῦ ἡδονικοῦ διαφέρειν.
3. But those others of them who intermeddle in state affairs act yet more contradictorily to their own doctrines. For they govern, judge, consult, make laws, punish, and honor, as if those were indeed cities in the government of which they concern themselves, those truly counsellors and judges who are at any time allotted to such offices, those generals who are chosen by suffrages, and those laws which were made by Clisthenes, Lycurgus, and Solon, whom they affirm to have been vicious men and fools. Thus even in the management of state affairs are they at war with themselves.
3. ὅσοι δʼ ἄλλοι πολιτείᾳ προσίασιν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐναντιοῦνται τοῖς αὑτῶν δόγμασι· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχουσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ συμβουλεύουσι καὶ νομοθετοῦσι καὶ κολάζουσι καὶ τιμῶσιν ὡς πόλεων οὐσῶν ἐν αἷς πολιτεύονται, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ δικαστῶν ἀεὶ τῶν λαγχανόντων, στρατηγῶν δὲ τῶν χειροτονουμένων, νόμων δὲ τῶν Κλεισθένους καὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Σόλωνος, οὓς φαύλους καὶ ἀνοήτους γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. ὥστε καὶ πολιτευόμενοι μάχονται.
4. Indeed Antipater, in his writings concerning the difference between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, has related that Zeno and Cleanthes would not be made citizens of Athens, lest they might seem to injure their own countries. I shall not much insist upon it, that, if they did well, Chrysippus acted amiss in suffering himself to be enrolled as a member of that city. But this is very contradictory and absurd, that, removing their persons and their lives so far off amongst strangers, they reserved their names for their countries; which is the same thing as if a man, leaving his wife, and cohabiting and bedding with another, and getting children on her, should yet refuse to contract marriage with the second, lest he might seem to wrong the former.
4. καὶ μὴν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς ἱστόρηκεν, ὅτι Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι γενέσθαι, μὴ δόξωσι τὰς αὑτῶν πατρίδας ἀδικεῖν. ὅτι μέν, εἰ καλῶς οὗτοι, Χρύσιππος οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐποίησεν ἐγγραφεὶς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, παρείσθω· πολλὴν δὲ μάχην καὶ παράλογον ἔχει τὸ τὰ σώματα καὶ τοὺς βίους οὕτω μακρὰν ἀποξενώσαντας τὰ ὀνόματα ταῖς πατρίσι τηρεῖν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὴν γαμετὴν ἀπολιπών, ἑτέρᾳ δὲ συζῶν καὶ συναναπαυόμενος καὶ παιδοποιούμενος ἐξ ἑτέρας, μὴ συγγράφοιτο γάμον, ὅπως ἀδικεῖν μὴ δοκῇ τὴν προτέραν.
5. Again, Chrysippus, writing in his treatise of Rhetoric, that a wise man will so plead and so act in the management of a commonwealth, as if riches, glory, and health were really good, confesses that his speeches are inextricable and impolitic, and his doctrines unsuitable for the uses and actions of human life.
5. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων οὕτω ῥητορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς; ὑγιείας, ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνεξόδους εἶναι καὶ ἀπολιτεύτους καὶ τὰ δόγματα ταῖς χρείαις ἀνάρμοστα καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
6. It is moreover a doctrine of Zeno’s, that temples are not to be built to the Gods; for that a temple is neither a thing of much value nor holy; since no work of carpenters and handicrafts-men can be of much value. And yet they who praise these things as well and wisely said are initiated in the sacred mysteries, go up to the Citadel (where Minerva’s temple stands), adore the shrines, and adorn with garlands the sacraries, being the works of carpenters and mechanical persons. Again, they think that the Epicureans, who sacrifice to the Gods and yet deny them to meddle with the government of the world, do thereby refute themselves; whereas they themselves are more contrary to themselves, sacrificing on altars and in temples, which they affirm ought not to stand nor to have been built.
6. ἔτι δόγμα Ζήνωνός ἐστιν ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἰκοδομεῖν ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οὐκ ἔστιν· οἰκοδόμων δʼ ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων οὐδέν ἐστι πολλοῦ ἄξιον. οἱ δὲ ταῦτʼ ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς εὖ ἔχοντα μυοῦνται μὲν ἐν ἱεροῖς, ἀναβαίνουσι δʼ εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, προσκυνοῦσι δὲ τὰ ἕδη καὶ στεφανοῦσι τοὺς ναούς, οἰκοδόμων ὄντας ἔργα καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων. εἶτα τοὺς Ἐπικουρείους ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκοῦσι θύοντας θεοῖς, αὐτοὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐλέγχονται θύοντας ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν, ἃ μήτʼ εἶναι μήτʼ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι δεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν.
7. Moreover, Zeno admits (as Plato does) several virtues with various distinctions—to wit, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice—as being indeed inseparable, but yet divers and different from one another. But again, defining every one of them, he says that fortitude is prudence in executing, justice prudence in distributing, as being one and the same virtue, but seeming to differ in its relation to various affairs when it comes to action. Nor does Zeno alone seem to contradict himself in these matters; but Chrysippus also, who blames Ariston for saying that the other virtues are different habits of one and the same virtue, and yet defends Zeno, who in this manner defines every one of the virtues. And Cleanthes, having in his Commentaries concerning Nature said, that vigor is the striking of fire, which, if it is sufficient in the soul to perform the duties presented to it, is called force and strength; subjoins these very words: “Now this force and strength, when it is in things apparent and to be persisted in, is continence; when in things to be endured, it is fortitude; when about worthiness, it is justice; and when about choosing or refusing, it is temperance.”
7. ἀρετὰς; ὁ Ζήνων ἀπολείπει πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων, οἷον φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην, ὡς ἀχωρίστους μὲν οὔσας ἑτέρας δὲ καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων. πάλιν δὲ ὁριζόμενος αὐτῶν ἑκάστην τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν φησὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι ἑν ὑπομενετέοις τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν αἱρετέοις τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην φρόνησιν ἐν ἀπονεμητέοις, ὡς μίαν οὖσαν ἀρετὴν ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσεσι κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν. οὐ μόνον δʼ ὁ Ζήνων περὶ ταῦτα φαίνεται αὑτῷ μαχόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χρύσιππος Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι, Ζήνωνι δὲ συνηγορῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένῳ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἑκάστην. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐν Ὑπομνήμασι Φυσικοῖς εἰπὼν ὅτι πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστί, κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν ἡ δʼ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος, ὅταν μὲν ἑν τοῖς φανεῖσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν, ὅταν δʼ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ δικαιοσύνη περὶ δὲ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις σωφροσύνη.
8. Against him, who said, “Give not thy judgment till both sides are heard,”Zeno on the contrary made use of such an argument as this: “If he who spake first has plainly proved his cause, the second is not to be heard, for the question is at an end; and if he has not proved it, it is the same case as if being cited he did not appear, or appearing did nothing but wrangle; so that, whether he has proved or not proved his cause, the second is not to be heard.” And yet he who made this dilemma has written against Plato’s Commonweal, dissolved sophisms, and exhorted his scholars to learn logic, as enabling them to do the same. Now Plato has either proved or not proved those things which he writ in his Commonweal; but in neither case was it necessary to write against him, but wholly superfluous and vain. The same may be said concerning sophisms.
8. πρὸς τὸν εἰπόνταμηδὲ δίκην δικάσῃς, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθονἀκούσῃςα ʼντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων, τοιούτῳ τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος εἴτʼ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπών, οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος, πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴτʼ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μηδʼ ὑπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ ὑπακούσας ἐτερέτισεν· ἤτοι δʼ ἀπέδειξεν ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν, οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐρωτήσας αὐτὸς ἀντέγραφε μὲν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα, καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. καίτοι ἢ ἀπέδειξε Πλάτων ἢ οὐκ ἀπέδειξε τὰ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, κατʼ οὐδέτερον δʼ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντιγράφειν ἀλλὰ πάντως περιττὸν καὶ μάταιον. τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.
9. Chrysippus is of opinion, that young students should first learn logic, secondly, ethics, and after these, physics, and likewise in this to meddle last of all with the disputes concerning the Gods. Now these things having been often said by him, it will suffice to set down what is found in his Fourth Book of Lives, being thus word for word: “First then, it seems to me, according as it has been rightly said by the ancients, that there are three kinds of philosophical speculations, logical, ethical, and physical, and that of these, the logical ought to be placed first, the ethical second, and the physical third, and that of the physical, the discourse concerning the Gods ought to be the last; wherefore also the traditions concerning this have been styled Τελεταί/, or the Endings.” But that very discourse concerning the Gods, which he says ought to be placed the last, he usually places first and sets before every moral question. For he is seen not to say any thing either concerning the ends, or concerning justice, or concerning good and evil, or concerning marriage and the education of children, or concerning the law and the commonwealth; but, as those who propose decrees to states set before them the words To Good Fortune, so he also premises something of Jupiter, Fate, Providence, and of the world’s being one and finite and maintained by one power. None of which any one can be persuaded to believe, who has not penetrated deeply into the discourses of natural philosophy. Hear what he says of this in his Third Book of the Gods: “For there is not to be found any other beginning or any other generation of Justice, but what is from Jupiter and common Nature. From thence must every such thing have its beginning, if we will say any thing concerning good and evil.” And again, in his Natural Positions he says: “For one cannot otherwise or more properly come to the discourse of good and evil, to the virtues, or to felicity, than from common Nature and the administration of the world.” And going farther on, he adds: “For to these we must annex the discourse concerning good and evil, there being no other better beginning or relation thereof, and the speculation of Nature being learned for nothing else, but to understand the difference between good and evil.” According to Chrysippus, therefore, the natural science is both before and after the moral; or rather, it is an inversion of order altogether absurd, if this must be put after those things none of which can be comprehended without this; and his contradicting himself is manifest, when he asserts the discourse of Nature to be the beginning of that concerning good and evil, and yet commands it to be delivered, not before, but after it. Now, if any one shall say that Chrysippus in his book concerning the Use of Speech has written, that he who applies himself to logic first needs not absolutely to abstain from the rest, but should take as much of them as shall fall in his way, he will indeed say the truth, but will withal confirm the fault. For he oppugns himself, one while commanding that the science concerning God should be taken last and for a conclusion, as being therefore also called Τελετή, and again, another while saying that this is to be learned together with the very first. For order is at an end, if all things must be used at all times. But this is more, that having made the science concerning the Gods the beginning of that concerning good and evil, he bids not those who apply themselves to the ethics to begin with that; but learning these, to take of that also as it shall come in their way, and then to go from these to that, without which, he says, there is no beginning or entrance upon these.
9. ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται δεῖν τῶν λογικῶν πρῶτον ἀκροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν φυσικῶν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τούτοις τὸν περὶ θεῶν λόγον ἔσχατον παραλαμβάνειν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τούτων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων, ἀρκέσει παραθέσθαι τὰ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων ἔχοντα κατὰ λέξιν οὕτω· πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημένα τρία γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τὰ δʼ ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ φυσικά· εἶτα τούτων δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικὰ δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικὰ τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς προσηγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις. ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔσχατόν φησι δεῖν τάττεσθαι, περὶ θεῶν, ἔθει προτάττει καὶ προεκτίθησι παντὸς ἠθικοῦ ζητήματος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τελῶν οὔτε περὶ δικαιοσύνης οὔτε περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὔτε περὶ γάμου καὶ παιδοτροφίας οὔτε περὶ νόμου καὶ πολιτείας φαίνεται τὸ παράπαν φθεγγόμενος, εἰ μή, καθάπερ οἱ τὰ ψηφίσματα ταῖς πόλεσιν εἰσφέροντες προγράφουσιν Ἀγαθὴν Τύχην, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς προγράψειε τὸν Δία, τὴν Εἱμαρμένην, τὴν Πρόνοιαν, τὸ συνέχεσθαι μιᾷ δυνάμει τὸν κόσμον ἕνα ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένον. ὧν οὐδὲν ἔστι πεισθῆναι μὴ διὰ βάθους ἐγκραθέντα τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις. ἄκουε δʼ ἃ λέγει περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδʼ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομεν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν πάλιν ἐν ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσιν οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδʼ οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδʼ ἐπʼ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως. προελθὼν δʼ αὖθις δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδʼ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδʼ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν γίγνεται τοίνυν ἅμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω τῶν ἠθικῶν ὁ φυσικὸς λόγος κατὰ Χρύσιππον μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως ἄπορος ἡ περιτροπὴ τῆς τάξεως, εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα τακτέον ἐκεῖνον, ὧν καταλαβεῖν οὐδὲν ἐκείνου χωρὶς ἔστιν· καὶ πρόδηλος ἡ μάχη τοῦ τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον ἀρχὴν μὲν εἶναι τοῦ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τιθεμένου, κελεύοντος δὲ μὴ πρότερον ἀλλʼ ὕστερον ἐκείνων παραδίδοσθαι. εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ γεγραφέναι τὸν Χρύσιππον ἐν τῷ peri\ lo/gou xrh/sews, ὡς οὐ καθάπαξ ἀφεκτέον ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ τὴν λογικὴν ἀναλαμβάνοντι πρώτην, ἀλλὰ κἀκείνων μεταληπτέον κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον, ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐρεῖ βεβαιώσει δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν· μάχεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ὅπου μὲν ἔσχατον τὸν περὶ θεῶν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνειν κελεύων καὶ τελευταῖον, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τελετὴν προσαγορευόμενον, ὅπου δὲ πάλιν ἐν πρώτοις ἅμα καὶ τούτου μεταληπτέον εἶναι λέγων οἴχεται γὰρ ἡ τάξις, εἰ πάντων ἐν πᾶσι μεταλαμβάνειν δεήσει. τὸ δὲ μεῖζον, ὅτι τοῦ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγου τὸν περὶ θεῶν ἀρχὴν πεποιημένος οὐκ ἀπὸ τούτου κελεύει τὸν ἠθικὸν ἀρξαμένους ἀναλαμβάνειν, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀναλαμβάνοντας τούτου μεταλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὸ διδόμενον, εἶτα μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀπʼ ἐκείνων, οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνον οὐδʼ ἔφοδον εἶναί φησι.
10. As for disputing on both sides, he says, that he does not universally reject it, but exhorts us to use it with caution, as is done in pleadings, not with a design really to disprove, but to dissolve their probability. “For to those,” says he, “who endeavor a suspension of assent concerning all things, it is convenient to do this, and it co-operates to what they desire; but as for those who would work and establish in us a certain science according to which we shall professedly live, they ought, on the contrary, to state the first principles, and to direct their novices who are entered from the beginning to the end; and where there is occasion to make mention of contrary discourses, to dissolve their probability, as is done in pleadings.” For this he hath said in express words. Now that it is absurd for philosophers to think that they ought to set down the contrary opinion, not with all its reasons, but like pleaders, disabling it, as if they contended not for truth but victory, we have elsewhere spoken against him. But that he himself has, not here and there in his disputations, but frequently, confirmed the discourses which are contrary to his own opinions,—and that stoutly, and with so much earnestness and contention that it was not for every one to understand what he liked,—the Stoics themselves affirm, who admire the man’s acuteness, and think that Carneades said nothing of his own, but that catching hold of those arguments which Chrysippus alleged for the contrary opinion, he assaulted with them his positions, and often cried out, “Wretch, thy own strength will thee undo,”as if Chrysippus had given great advantages against himself to those who would disturb and calumniate his doctrines. But of those things which he has written against custom they are so proud and boasting, that they fear not to affirm, that all the sayings of all the Academics together, if they were collected into one body, are not comparable to what Chrysippus has writ in disparagement of the senses. Which is an evident sign of the ignorance or self-love of the speakers; but this indeed is true, that being afterwards desirous to defend custom and the senses, he was inferior to himself, and the latter treatise was much weaker than the former. So that he contradicts himself; for having always directed the proposing of an adversary’s opinions not with approbation, but with a demonstration of their falsity, he has showed himself more acute in opposing than defending his own doctrines; and having admonished others to take heed of contrary arguments, as withdrawing comprehension, he has been more sedulous in framing such proofs as take away comprehension, than such as confirm it. And yet he plainly shows that he himself feared this, writing thus in his Fourth Book of Lives: “Repugnant arguments and probabilities on the contrary side are not rashly to be proposed, but with caution, lest the hearers distracted by them should let go their conceptions, not being able sufficiently to apprehend the solutions, but. so weakly that their comprehensions may easily be shaken. For even those who have, according to custom, preconceived both sensible objects and other things depending on the senses quickly forego them, being distracted by Megarian interrogatories and by others more numerous and forcible.” I would willingly therefore ask the Stoics, whether they think these Megarian interrogatories to be more forcible than those which Chrysippus has written in six books against custom; or rather this should be asked of Chrysippus himself. For observe what he has written about the Megarian reason, in his book concerning the Use of Speech, thus: “Some such things fell out in the discourse of Stilpo and Menedemus; for, whereas they were renowned for wisdom, their disputing has turned to their reproach, their arguments being part clumsy, and the rest violently sophistical.” And yet, good sir, you fear lest those arguments which you deride and term the disgrace of their proposers, as having a manifest faultiness, should divert some from comprehension. And did not you yourself, writing so many books against custom, in which you have added whatever you could invent, ambitiously striving to exceed Arcesilaus, expect that you should perplex some of your readers? For neither does he use slender arguments against custom; but as if he were pleading, he with some passion in himself stirs up the affections of others, telling his opponent that he talks foolishly and labors in vain. And that he may leave no room to deny his speaking of contradictions, he has in his Natural Positions written thus: “It may be lawful for those who comprehend a thing to argue on the contrary side, applying to it that defence which the matter itself affords; and sometimes, when they comprehend neither, to discourse what is alleged for either.” And having said in his book concerning the Use of Speech, that we ought no more to use the force of reason than of arms for such things as are not fitting, he subjoins this: “For they are to be employed for the finding out of truths and for the alliance of them, and not for the contrary, though many men do it.” By “many” perhaps he means those who withhold their assent. But these philosophers, comprehending neither, argue on both sides, believing that, if any thing is comprehensible, thus only or chiefly does truth afford a comprehension of itself. But you, who accuse them, and do yourself write contrary to those things which you comprehend concerning custom, and exhort others with assurance to do the same, confess that you wantonly use the faculty of disputing, out of vain ambition, even on unprofitable and hurtful things.
10. τὸ πρὸς τἀναντία διαλέγεσθαι καθόλου μὲν οὔ, φησιν ἀποδοκιμάζειν, χρῆσθαι δὲ τούτῳ παραινεῖ μετʼ εὐλαβείας ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας; ἀλλὰ διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανόν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει φησὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται· τοῖς δʼ ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις καθʼ ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα, τἀναντία στοιχειοῦν καὶ καταστοιχίζειν τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους· ἐφʼ ὧν καιρός ἐστι μνησθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, διαλύοντας αὐτῶν τὸ πιθανόν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις· ταυτὶ γὰρ αὐταῖς λέξεσιν εἴρηκεν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄτοπός ἐστι τοὺς φιλοσόφους τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον οἰόμενος δεῖν τιθέναι, μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως τοῖς δικολόγοις κακοῦντας, ὥσπερ οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ περὶ νίκης ἀγωνιζομένους, εἴρηται πρὸς αὐτὸν διʼ ἑτέρων. ὅτι δʼ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἀλλὰ πολλαχοῦ τοὺς ἐναντίους οἷς δοκιμάζει λόγους κατεσκεύακεν ἐρρωμένως καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοτιμίας τοσαύτης ὥστε μὴ παντὸς εἶναι καταμαθεῖν τὸ ἀρέσκον αὐτῷ, αὐτοὶ δήπου λέγουσι, τὴν δεινότητα θαυμάζοντες τἀνδρός· καὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι λέγειν ἴδιον, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν ἐπεχείρησε Χρύσιππος; εἰς τοὐναντίον, ὁρμώμενον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλάκις παραφθέγγεσθαι δαιμόνιε, φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος, ὡς μεγάλας ἀφορμὰς καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ διδόντα τοῖς κινεῖν τὰ δόγματα καὶ διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Συνηθείας ἐκδοθεῖσιν οὕτω κομῶσι καὶ μεγαληγοροῦσιν, ὥστε τοὺς πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν λόγους εἰς ταὐτὸ συμφορηθέντας οὐκ ἀξίους; εἶναι παραβαλεῖν οἷς Χρύσιππος ἔγραψεν εἰς διαβολὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπειρίας τῶν λεγόντων ἢ φιλαυτίας σημεῖόν ἐστιν· ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἀληθές, ὅτι βουληθεὶς αὖθις συνειπεῖν τῇ Συνηθείᾳ καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐνδεέστερος γέγονεν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸ σύνταγμα τοῦ συντάγματος μαλακώτερον. ὥστʼ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ μάχεσθαι, κελεύοντα μὲν ἀεὶ τἀναντία μὴ μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀλλὰ μετʼ ἐνδείξεως τοῦ ὅτι ψευδῆ ἐστι παρατίθεσθαι, τῶν δʼ ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων κατήγορον ὄντα δεινότερον ἢ συνήγορον, καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μὲν ἑτέροις παραινοῦντα τοὺς εἰς τἀναντία λόγους ὡς περισπῶντας τὴν κατάληψιν, αὐτὸν δὲ τῶν βεβαιούντων τὴν κατάληψιν λόγων φιλοτιμότερον συντιθέντα τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας καίτοι ὅτι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸς φοβεῖται, σαφῶς ὑποδείκνυσιν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων, ταῦτα γράφων οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε δʼ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους ὑποδεκτέον λόγους οὐδὲ προσετέα τἀναντία πιθανὰ ἀλλʼ εὐλαβουμένους μὴ καὶ περισπασθέντες ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τὰς καταλήψεις ἀφῶσιν, οὔτε τῶν λύσεων ἱκανῶς ἂν ἀκοῦσαι δυνάμενοι καταλαμβάνοντὲς τʼ εὐαποσείστως· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ τὴν συνήθειαν καταλαμβάνοντες καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τἄλλα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ῥᾳδίως προΐενται ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Μεγαρικῶν ἐρωτημάτων περισπώμενοι καὶ ὑπʼ ἄλλων πλειόνων καὶ δυναμικωτέρων ἐρωτημάτων. ἡδέως ἂν οὖν πυθοίμην τῶν Στωικῶν, εἰ τὰ Μεγαρικὰ ἐρωτήματα δυναμικώτερα νομίζουσιν εἶναι τῶν ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας ἐν ἓξ βιβλίοις γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῦτο παρʼ αὐτοῦ Χρυσίππου δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι. σκόπει γὰρ οἷα περὶ τοῦ Μεγαρικοῦ λόγου γέγραφεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Λόγου χρήσεως οὗτος οἷόν τι συμβέβηκε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Στίλπωνος λόγου καὶ Μενεδήμου σφόδρα γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ γενομένων αὐτῶν ἐνδόξων, νῦν εἰς ὄνειδος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος περιτέτραπται, ὡς τὸ μὲν παχυτέρων τὸ δʼ, ἐκφανῶς σοφιζομένων εἶτα τούτους μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τοὺς λόγους, ὧν καταγελᾷς καὶ καλεῖς ὀνείδη τῶν ἐρωτώντων ὡς ἐμφανῆ τὴν κακίαν ἔχοντας, ὅμως δέδιας μή τινας περισπάσωσιν ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως· αὐτὸς δὲ τοσαῦτα βιβλία γράφων κατὰ τῆς Συνηθείας, οἷς, εἴ τι ἀνεῦρες, προσέθηκας, ὑπερβαλέσθαι φιλοτιμούμενος τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον, οὐδένα τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ἐπιταράξειν προσεδόκησας; οὐδὲ γὰρ ψιλοῖς χρῆται τοῖς κατὰ τῆς Συνηθείας ἐπιχειρήμασιν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν δίκῃ μετὰ πάθους τινὸς συνεπιπάσχων, μωρολογεῖν τε πολλάκις λέγει καὶ κενοκοπεῖν. ἵνα τοίνυν μηδʼ ἀντίρρησιν ἀπολίπῃ τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσι ταῦτα γέγραφεν ἔσται δὲ καὶ καταλαμβάνοντάς τι πρὸς τἀναντία ἐπιχειρεῖν, τὴν ἐνοῦσαν συνηγορίαν ποιουμένους ποτὲ δʼ οὐδέτερον καταλαμβάνοντας εἰς ἑκάτερον τὰ ὄντα λέγειν. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς τοῦ lo/gou xrh/sews εἰπών, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα χρῆσθαι καθάπερ οὐδʼ ὅπλοις, ταῦτʼ ἐπείρηκε πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν εὕρεσιν δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τούτων συγγένειαν, εἰς τἀναντία δʼ οὔ, πολλῶν ποιούντων τοῦτο πολλοὺς; λέγων ἴσως τοὺς ἐπέχοντας. ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐδέτερον καταλαμβάνοντες εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπιχειροῦσιν· ὡς εἴ τι καταληπτόν ἐστιν οὕτως ἂν μόνως ἢ μάλιστα κατάληψιν ἑαυτῆς τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχουσαν. σὺ δʼ ὁ κατηγορῶν ἐκείνων αὐτός τε τἀναντία γράφων οἷς καταλαμβάνεις περὶ τῆς Συνηθείας ἑτέρους τε τοῦτο ποιεῖν μετὰ συνηγορίας ἀποτρεπόμενος, ἐν ἀχρήστοις καὶ βλαβεροῖς ὁμολογεῖς τῇ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει χρώμενος; ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας νεανιεύεσθαι.
11. They say, that a good deed is the command, and sin the prohibition of the law; and therefore that the law forbids the wicked many things, but commands them nothing, because they cannot do a good deed. But who is ignorant that he who cannot do a good deed cannot also sin? Therefore they make the law to contradict itself, commanding men those things which they cannot perform, and forbidding them those things from which they cannot abstain. For a man who cannot be temperate cannot but act intemperately; and he who cannot be wise cannot but act foolishly. And they themselves affirm, that those who forbid say one thing, forbid another, and command another. For he who says “Thou shalt not steal” at the same time that he says these words, “Thou shalt not steal,” forbids also to steal, and commands not to steal. The law therefore forbids the wicked nothing, unless it also commands them something. And they say, that the physician bids his disciple to cut and cauterize, omitting to add these words, “seasonably and moderately;” and the musician commands his scholar to play on the harp and sing, omitting “tunably” and “keeping time.” Wherefore also they punish those who do these things unskilfully and faultily; for that they were commanded to do them well, and they have done them ill. If therefore a wise man commands his servant to say or do something, and punishes him for doing it unseasonably or not as he ought, is it not manifest that he commanded him to do a good action and not an indifferent one? But if wise men command wicked ones indifferent things, what hinders but the commands of the law may be also such? Moreover, the impulse (called ὁρμή) is according to him, the reason of a man commanding him to do something, as he has written in his book of the law. Is not therefore also the aversion (called ἀφορμή) a prohibiting reason, and a disinclination a disinclination agreeable to reason? Caution therefore is also reason prohibiting a wise man; for to be cautious is proper only to the wise, and not to the wicked. If then the reason of a wise man is one thing and the law another, wise men have caution contrary to the law; but if the law is nothing else but the reason of a wise man, the law is found to forbid wise men the doing of those things of which they are cautious.
11. τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου πρόσταγμα εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα, διὸ τὸν νόμον πολλὰ τοῖς φαύλοις ἀπαγορεύειν προστάττειν δὲ μηδέν· οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν καὶ τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ κατορθοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν; αὐτὸν οὖν αὑτῷ μαχόμενον ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον, προστάττοντα μὲν ἃ ποιεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀπαγορεύοντα δʼ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ δύνανται· ὁ γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενος σωφρονεῖν ἄνθρωπος οὐ δύναται μὴ ἀκολασταίνειν, καὶ ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος φρονεῖν οὐ δύναται μὴ ἀφραίνειν. αὐτοί γε μὴν λέγουσι τοὺς ἀπαγορεύοντας ἄλλο μὲν λέγειν ἄλλο δʼ ἀπαγορεύειν ἄλλο δὲ προστάσσειν· ὁ γὰρ λέγων μὴ κλέψῃς λέγει μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ κλέψῃς, ἀπαγορεύει δὲ κλέπτειν, προστάσσει δὲ μὴ κλέπτειν· οὐδὲν οὖν ἀπαγορεύσει τοῖς φαύλοις ὁ νόμος, εἴ γε μὴ προστάξει τι. καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν τῷ μαθητῇ προστάσσειν λέγουσι τεμεῖν καὶ καῦσαι, κατὰ παράλειψιν τοῦ εὐκαίρως καὶ μετρίως· καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν λυρίσαι καὶ ᾆσαι, κατὰ παράλειψιν τοῦ ἐμμελῶς καὶ συμφώνως· διὸ τοὺς ταῦτα ποιήσαντας ἀτέχνως καὶ κακῶς κολάζουσιν ὡς προσετάχθη γὰρ ὀρθῶς, οἱ δʼ ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἐποίησαν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ σοφὸς τῷ θεράποντι προστάσσων εἰπεῖν τι καὶ πρᾶξαι, κἂν μὴ εὐκαίρως τοῦτο πράξῃ μηδʼ ὡς δεῖ κολάζων, δῆλός ἐστι κατόρθωμα προστάσσων οὐ μέσον· εἰ δὲ μέσα προστάσσουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς φαύλοις, τί κωλύει καὶ τὰ τοῦ νόμου προστάγματα τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι; καὶ μὴν ἡ ὁρμή, κατὰ γʼ αὐτόν, τἀνθρώπου λόγος ἐστὶ προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ Νόμου γέγραφεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀφορμὴ λόγος ἀπαγορευτικός, καὶ ἡ ἔκκλισις εὔλογος ἔκκλισις· καὶ ἡ εὐλάβεια τοίνυν λόγος ἐστὶν ἀπαγορευτικὸς τῷ σοφῷ· τὸ γὰρ εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἴδιον οὐ φαύλων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ λόγος καὶ ἕτερον ὁ νόμος, μαχόμενον τῷ νόμῳ λόγον οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἔχουσιν· εἰ δʼ οὐκ ἄλλο τι νόμος ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ λόγος, εὓρηται νόμος ἀπαγορευτικὸς τοῖς σοφοῖς τοῦ ποιεῖν ἃ εὐλαβοῦνται.
12. Chrysippus says, that nothing is profitable to the wicked, that the wicked have neither use nor need of any thing. Having said this in his First Book of Good Deeds, he says again, that both commodiousness and grace pertain to mean or indifferent things, none of which, according to them, is profitable. In the same place he affirms, that there is nothing proper, nothing convenient for a vicious man, in these words: “On the same principle we declare that there is nothing foreign or strange to the good man, and nothing proper or rightfully belonging to the bad man, since the one is good and the other bad.” Why then does he break our heads, writing particularly in every one of his books, as well natural as moral, that as soon as we are born, we are appropriated to ourselves, our parts, and our offspring? And why in his First Book of Justice does he say that the very brutes, proportionably to the necessity of their young, are appropriated to them, except fishes, whose young are nourished by themselves? For neither have they sense who have nothing sensible, nor they appropriation who have nothing proper; for appropriation seems to be the sense and perception of what is proper.
12. τοῖς φαύλοις οὐδὲν εἶναι χρήσιμον ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν οὐδʼ ἔχειν χρείαν τὸν φαῦλον οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Κατορθωμάτων αὖθις λέγει καὶ τὴν εὐχρηστίαν καὶ τὴν χάριν εἰς τὰ μέσα διατείνειν ὧν οὐδέν ἐστι χρήσιμον κατʼ αὐτούς. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ οἰκεῖον οὐδʼ ἁρμόττον οὐδὲν εἶναι τῷ φαύλῳ φησὶν ἐν τούτοις κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀστείῳ ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ οἰκεῖόν οὐδέν ἐστιν· ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν πῶς οὖν ἀποκναίει πάλιν ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ καὶ ἠθικῷ νὴ Δία γράφων ὡς οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα τὰ ἑαυτῶν; ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τὰ θηρία φησὶ συμμέτρως τῇ τῶν ἐκγόνων ᾠκειῶσθαι πρὸς αὐτά, πλὴν τῶν ἰχθύων αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ κυήματα τρέφεται διʼ αὑτῶν ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηθὲν αἰσθητὸν οὔτʼ οἰκείωσις οἷς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον· ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἴσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.
13. And this opinion is consequent to their principal ones. It is moreover manifest that Chrysippus, though he has also written many things to the contrary, lays this for a position, that there is not any vice greater or any sin more grievous than another, nor any virtue more excellent or any good deed better than another; so that he says in his Third Book of Nature: “As it well beseems Jupiter to glory in himself and his life, to magnify himself, and (if we may so say) to bear up his head, have an high conceit of himself, and speak big, for that he leads a life worthy of lofty speech; so the same things do not misbeseem all good men, since they are in nothing exceeded by Jupiter.” And yet himself, in his Third Book of Justice, says, that they who make pleasure the end destroy justice, but they who say it is only a good do not destroy it. These are his very words: “For perhaps, if we leave this to pleasure, that it is a good but not the end, and that honesty is one of those things which are eligible for themselves, we may preserve justice, making the honest and the just a greater good than pleasure.” But if that only is good which is honest, he who affirms pleasure to be a good is in an error, but he errs less than he who makes it also the end; for the one destroys justice, the other preserves it; and by the one human society is overthrown, but the other leaves a place to goodness and humanity. Now I let pass his saying farther in his book concerning Jupiter, that the virtues increase and go on, lest I may seem to catch at words; though Chrysippus is indeed in this kind very sharp upon Plato and others. But when he forbids the praising of every thing that is done according to virtue, he shows that there is some difference between good deeds. Now he says thus in his book concerning Jupiter: “For since each virtue has its own proper works, there are some of these that are more to be praised than others; for he would show himself to be very frigid, that should undertake to praise and extol any man for holding out the finger stoutly, for abstaining chastely from an old woman ready to drop into the grave, and patiently hearing it said that three are not exactly four.” What he says in his Third Book of the Gods is not unlike to this: “For I moreover think that the praises of such things as to abstain from an old woman who has one foot in the grave, and to endure the bite of a fly, though proceeding from virtue, would be very impertinent.” What other reprehender of his doctrines does this man then expect? For if he who praises such things is frigid, he who asserts every one of them to be a great—nay, a very great good deed—is much more frigid. For if to bear the bite of a fly is equal to the being valiant, and to abstain from an old trot now at the pit’s brink is equal to the being temperate, there is, I think, no difference whether a virtuous man is prized for these or for those. Moreover, in his Second Book of Friendship, teaching that friendships are not for every fault to be dissolved, he has these very expressions: “For it is meet that some faults should be wholly passed by, others lightly reprehended, others more severely, and others deemed worthy a total dissolution of friendship.” And which is more, he says in the same book, that we will converse with some more and some less, so that some shall be more and some less friends; and this diversity extending very far, some are worthy of such an amity, others of a greater; and these will deserve to be so far trusted, those not so far, and the like. For what else has he done in these places, but shown the great diversity there is between these things? Moreover, in his book concerning Honesty, to demonstrate that only to be good which is honest, he uses these words: “What is good is eligible; what is eligible is acceptable; what is acceptable is laudable; and what is laudable is honest.” And again: “What is good is joyous; what is joyous is venerable; what is venerable is honest.” But these speeches are repugnant to himself; for either all good is commendable, and then the abstaining chastely from an old woman is also commendable; or all good is neither venerable nor joyous, and his reason falls to the ground. For how can it possibly be frigid in others to praise any for such things, and not ridiculous for him to rejoice and glory in them?
13. καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο τοῖς κυριωτάτοις ἑπόμενὸν ἐστι, καὶ Χρύσιππος, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς τοὐναντίον γέγραφε, δῆλός ἐστι προστιθέμενος τῷ μήτε κακίαν κακίας ἢ ἁμαρτίαν ἁμαρτίας ὑπερέχουσαν εἶναι μήτʼ ἀρετὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ κατόρθωσιν κατορθώσεως· ὃς γέ φησιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὥσπερ τῷ Διὶ προσήκει σεμνύνεσθαι ἐπʼ αὑτῷ τε καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν καί, εἰ δεῖ οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὑψαυχενεῖν καὶ κομᾶν καὶ μεγαληγορεῖν, ἀξίως βιοῦντι μεγαληγορίας· οὕτω τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι ταῦτα προσήκει, κατʼ οὐθὲν προεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός. ἀλλʼ αὐτός γε πάλιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης φησὶν ὅτι τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τέλος ὑποτιθέμενοι τὴν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιροῦσιν· ἔστι δὲ ταυτὶ τὰ κατὰ λέξιν τάχα γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῆς ἀπολειπομένης τέλους δὲ μή, τῶν δὲ διʼ αὑτῶν αἱρετῶν ὄντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, σῴζοιμεν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἀλλʼ εἴπερ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἁμαρτάνει μὲν ὁ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ἀποφαίνων, ἧττον δʼ ἁμαρτάνει τοῦ καὶ τέλος αὐτὴν ποιοῦντος· ἀναιρεῖ οὗτος τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἐκεῖνος δὲ σῴζει· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία φροῦδός ἐστι καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὁ δὲ χρηστότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ χώραν δίδωσιν. ἔτι τὸ μὲν λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς αὔξεσθαι τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ διαβαίνειν ἀφίημι μὴ δόξω τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καίτοι πικρῶς ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῦ Χρυσίππου δάκνοντος. ἐπαινεῖν δὲ μὴ πᾶν τὸ πραττόμενον κατʼ ἀρετὴν κελεύων ἐμφαίνει τινὰ τῶν κατορθωμάτων διαφοράν· λέγει δʼ οὕτως ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργων γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὄντων οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὰ προενεχθέντα καὶ τούτων, οἷον ἀνδρείως τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναι καὶ ἐγκρατῶς ἀποσχέσθαι δυσθανατώσης γραὸς καὶ ἀπροπτώτως ἀκοῦσαι τοῦ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα μὴ εἶναι τελέως τινʼ ἐμφαίνει ψυχρίαν ὁ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινεῖν τινας ἐγχειρῶν καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν ὅμοια δʼ εἴρηται τούτοις ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν· ἔτι γὰρ οἶμαι φησὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἀλλοτριώσεσθαι κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς, οἷον δυσθανατώσης γραὸς ἀποσχέσθαι καὶ καρτερῶς ὑπομεῖναι μυίας δηγμόν τίνʼ οὖν οὗτος ἄλλον κατήγορον περιμένει τῶν αὑτοῦ δογμάτων; εἰ γὰρ ψυχρός; ἐστιν ὁ ταῦτʼ ἐπαινῶν, πολλῷ δήπου ψυχρότερος ὁ τούτων ἕκαστον κατόρθωμα καὶ μέγα καὶ μέγιστον εἶναι τιθέμενος· εἰ γὰρ ἴσον ἐστὶ … τὸ ἀνδρείως δῆγμα μυίας ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ τὸ σωφρόνως ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς γραός, οὐδὲν οἶμαι διαφέρει τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ ἀπʼ ἐκείνων ἐπαινεῖσθαι. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ fili/as διδάσκων ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσι δεῖ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τὰς φιλίας διαλύεσθαι, ταύταις κέχρηται ταῖς λέξεσι προσήκει γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὅλως παραπέμπεσθαι τὰ δὲ μικρᾶς ἐπιστροφῆς τυγχάνειν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μεῖζον τὰ δʼ ὅλως διαλύσεως ἀξιοῦσθαι ὃ δὲ τούτου μεῖζόν ἐστιν, ἐν ταὐτῷ φησιν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῖς δʼ ἐπʼ ἔλαττον συμβαλοῦμεν, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δʼ ἧττον φίλους εἶναι· ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης παραλλαγῆς γενομένης, οἱ μὲν τοσαύτης οἱ δὲ τοσαύτης γίγνονται φιλίας ἄξιοι· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον πίστεως καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων καταξιωθήσονται. τί γὰρ ἄλλο πεποίηκεν ἐν τούτοις ἢ καὶ τούτων μεγάλας διαφορὰς ἀπολέλοιπε; καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ περὶ Καλοῦ, πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τοιούτοις λόγοις κέχρηται τἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν, τὸ δʼ αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν, τὸ δʼ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν, τὸ δʼ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν· καὶ πάλιν τἀγαθὸν χαρτόν, τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν, τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν οὗτοι δʼ οἱ λόγοι μάχονται πρὸς ἐκεῖνον· εἴτε γὰρ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινετόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ σωφρόνως; ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς γραὸς ἐπαινετὸν ἂν εἴη· ἢ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σεμνὸν οὔτε χαρτόν, ἀλλʼ οἴχεται ὁ λόγος. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ μὲν ἄλλους ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινεῖν ψυχρὸν εἶναι, τὸ δʼ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ σεμνύνεσθαι μὴ καταγέλαστον;