14. Such indeed he frequently is; but in his disputations against others he takes not the least care of speaking things contrary and dissonant to himself. For in his books of Exhorting, reprehending Plato, who said, that to him who has neither learned nor knows how to live it is profitable not to live, he speaks in this manner: “For this speech is both repugnant to itself, and not at all persuasive. For first insinuating that it is best for us not to live, and in a sort counselling us to die, he will excite us rather to any thing else than to be philosophers; for neither can he who does not live philosophize, nor he who shall live long wickedly and ignorantly become wise.” And going on, he says that it is convenient for the wicked also to continue in life. And afterwards thus, word for word: “First, as virtue, barely taken, has nothing towards our living, so neither has vice any thing to oblige us to depart.” Nor is it necessary to turn over other books, that we may show Chrysippus’s contradictoriness to himself; but in these same, he sometimes with commendation brings forth this saying of Antisthenes, that either understanding or a halter is to be provided, as also that of Tyrtaeus, “Come nigh the bounds of virtue or of death.” Now what else will this show, but that to wicked men and fools not to live is more profitable than to live? And sometimes correcting Theognis, he says, that the poet should not have written, “From poverty to fly;—” but rather thus,From wickedness to fly, into the deepThrow thyself, Cyrnus, or from rocks so steep. What therefore else does he seem to do, but to set down himself those things and doctrines which, when others write them, he expunges; condemning, indeed, Plato for showing that not to live is better than to live viciously and ignorantly; and yet counselling Theognis to let a man break his neck or throw himself into the sea, that he may avoid vice? For having praised Antisthenes for directing fools to an halter, he again blames him, saying that vice has nothing that should oblige us to depart out of life.
14. πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς,· ἑτέρους ἀντιλογίαις ἥκιστα φροντίζει τοῦ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ καὶ διάφωνον. ἐν γοῦν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπιλαμβανόμενος, λέγοντος ὅτι τῷ μηδὲ μαθόντι μηδʼ ἐπισταμένῳ ζῆν λυσιτελεῖ μὴ ζῆν, ταῦτʼ εἴρηκε κατὰ λέξιν ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος καὶ ἑαυτῷ μάχεται καὶ ἥκιστʼ ἐστὶ προτρεπτικός. πρῶτον γὰρ παραδεικνύων ὅτι κράτιστον ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ζῆν καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀποθνήσκειν ἀξιῶν, πρὸς ἕτερά τινα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς προύτρεψεν ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μὴ ζῶντα φιλοσοφεῖν οὐδὲ μὴ πολὺν χρόνον ἐπιζήσαντα κακῶς; καὶ ῥᾳθύμως φρόνιμον γενέσθαι. καὶ προελθὼν δέ φησιν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις καθήκει μένειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν· εἶτα κατὰ λέξιν πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψιλῶς οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἡμᾶς, οὕτω δʼ οὐδʼ ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἕτερα δεῖ βιβλία διειλῆσαι, τοῦ Χρυσίππου τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐνδεικνυμένους μάχην· ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ Ἀντισθένους ἐπαινῶν φαίνεται τὸ δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον καὶ τοῦ Τυρταίου τὸ πρὶν ἀρετῆς πελάσαι τέρμασιν ἢ θανάτου· καίτοι τί ταῦτα βούλεται δηλοῦν ἄλλο, πλὴν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ζῆν λυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν τοῖς κακοῖς καὶ ἀνοήτοις; ποτὲ δὲ τὸν Θέογνιν ἐπανορθούμενος οὐκ ἔδει φησὶν εἰπεῖν χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα, μᾶλλον δὲχρὴ κακίαν φεύγοντα, καὶ ἐς βαθυκήτεα πόντονῥιπτεῖν καὶ πετρῶν, Κύρνε, κατʼ ἠλιβάτων.τί οὖν ἄλλο δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν ἢ ταὐτὰ πράγματα καὶ δόγματα παρεγγράφειν αὐτός, ἑτέρων δὲ γραφόντων ἐξαλείφειν, Πλάτωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν ὅτι τοῦ κακῶς ζῆν καὶ ἀμαθῶς τὸ μὴ ζῆν ἀποδείκνυσι λυσιτελέστερον, Θεόγνιδι δὲ συμβουλεύων κατακρημνίζειν καὶ καταποντίζειν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν κακίαν; Ἀντισθένη μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινῶν ὅτι τοὺς μὴ νοῦν ἔχοντας εἰς βρόχον συνήλαυνεν, αὑτὸν αὐτὸς ἔψεγεν, εἰπόντα μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν.
15. Moreover, in his books against the same Plato, concerning Justice, he immediately at the very beginning leaps into a discourse touching the Gods, and says, that Cephalus did not rightly avert men from injustice by the fear of the Gods, and that his doctrine is easily misrepresented, and that it affords to the contrary many arguments and probabilities impugning the discourse concerning divine punishments, as nothing differing from the tales of Acco and Alphito (or Raw-Head and Bloody-Bones), with which women are wont to frighten little children from their unlucky pranks. Having thus traduced Plato, he in other places again praises him, and often alleges this saying of Euripides:Howe’er you may deride it, there’s a Jove,With other Gods, who sees men’s woes above.And likewise, in his First Book of Justice citing these verses of Hesiod,Then Jove from heaven punishments did send,And plague and famine brought them to their end,he says, the Gods do these things, that the wicked being punished, others admonished by these examples may less dare to attempt the doing of such things. Again, in his book of Justice, subjoining, that it is possible for those who make pleasure a good but not the end to preserve also justice, he said in express terms: “For perhaps if we leave this to pleasure, that it is a good but not the end, and that honesty is one of those things which are eligible for themselves, we may preserve justice, making the honest and the just a greater good than pleasure.” So much he says in this place concerning pleasure. But in his book against Plato, accusing him for seeming to make health a good, he says, that not only justice, but also magnanimity, temperance, and all the other virtues will be taken away, if we make pleasure, health, or any thing else which is not honest, to be a good. What therefore is to be said for Plato, we have elsewhere written against him. But here his contradicting himself is manifest, when he says in one place, that if a man supposes that with honesty pleasure also is a good, justice is preserved, and in another, accuses those who make any thing besides honesty to be a good of taking away all the virtues. But that he may not leave any means of making an apology for his contradictions, writing against Aristotle concerning justice, he affirms him not to have spoken rightly when he said, that pleasure being made the end, justice is taken away, and together with justice, every one also of the other virtues. For justice (he says) will indeed be taken away; but there is nothing to hinder the other virtues from remaining and being, though not eligible for themselves, yet good and virtues. Then he reckons up every one of them by name. But it will be better to set down his own words. “For pleasure,” says he, “appearing according to this discourse to be made the end, yet all this seems not to me to be contained in it. Wherefore we must say, that neither any of the virtues is eligible nor any of the vices to be avoided for itself, but that all these things are to be referred to the proposed scope. Yet nothing, according to their opinion, will hinder but that fortitude, prudence, continence, and patience may be good, and their contraries to be avoided.” Has there ever then been any man more peevish in his disputes than he, who has blamed two of the principal philosophers, the one for taking away all virtue, by not making that only to be good which is honest, and the other for not thinking all the virtues except justice to be preserved, though pleasure is made the end? For it is a wonderful licentiousness that, discoursing of the same matters, he should when accusing Plato take away again those very things which himself sets down when reprehending Aristotle. Moreover, in his demonstrations concerning justice, he says expressly, that every good deed is both a lawful action and a just operation; but that every thing which is done according to continence, patience, prudence, or fortitude is a good deed, and therefore also a just operation. Why then does he not also leave justice to them to whom he leaves prudence, fortitude, and continence; since whatever they do well according to the said virtue, they do also justly?
15. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνάλλεται τῷ περὶ θεῶν λόγῳ καί φησιν οὔτʼ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον, εὐδιάβλητὸν τʼ εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, διʼ ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν οὕτω δὲ διασύρας τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπαινεῖ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ προφέρεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ταυτὶ πολλάκιςἀλλʼ ἔστι, κεἴ τις ἐγγελᾷ λόγῳ,Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη·καὶ ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης τὰ Ἡσιόδεια ταυτὶ προενεγκάμενοςτοῖσιν δʼ οὐρανόθεν μέγʼ ἐπήλασε πῆμα Κρονίων,λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν· ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅπως κολαζομένων τῶν πονηρῶν οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν πάλιν ἐν μὲν τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ὑπειπὼν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τέλος τιθεμένους τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται σῴζειν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, θεὶς τοῦτο κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε τάχα γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῆς ἀπολειπομένης τέλους δὲ μή, τῶν δὲ διʼ αὑτῶν αἱρετῶν ὄντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, σῴζοιμεν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἡδονῆς. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τούτοις περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα κατηγορῶν αὐτοῦ δοκοῦντος ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ὑγίειαν, οὐ μόνον τὴν δικαιοσύνην φησὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. ἃ μὲν οὖν ῥητέον ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος, ἐν ἄλλοις γέγραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνταῦθα δ’ ἡ μάχη καταφανής ἐστιν, ὅπου μέν, ἂν μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ τις ὑποθῆται καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, σῴζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην λέγοντος ὅπου δὲ πάλιν τοὺς μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπόντας αἰτιωμένου τὰς ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας ἀναιρεῖν. ἳνα δὲ μηδʼ ἀπολογίαν ὑπολίπῃ τοῖς ἐναντιώμασιν, Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς τέλους οὔσης ἀναιρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη τὴν μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τὰς δʼ ἄλλας ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύειν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ καὶ μὴ διʼ αὑτὰς αἱρετὰς ἀλλʼ ἀγαθὰς γοῦν καὶ ἀρετὰς ἐσομένας· εἶθʼ ἑκάστην ἐξ ὀνόματος προσαγορεύει. βέλτιον δὲ τὰς ἐκείνου λέξεις ἀναλαβεῖν τῆς γὰρ ἡδονῆς φησὶν ἐμφαινομένης τέλους κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον, τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτο πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ οὐκ ἐμπεριλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ ῥητέον μήτε τῶν ἀρετῶν τινα διʼ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴν εἶναι μήτε τῶν κακιῶν φευκτήν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα δεῖν ἀναφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπόν· οὐδὲν μέντοι κωλύσει κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μὲν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὰς ὁμοίας ταύταις ἀρετὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δʼ ἐναντίας ὑπάρχειν φευκτάς. τίς οὖν τούτου πρὸς λόγους ἰταμώτερος γέγονεν, ὃς δυεῖν τῶν ἀρίστων φιλοσόφων ἐγκέκληκε τῷ μὲν ὅτι πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀναιρεῖ, μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀπολιπών· τῷ δʼ ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς τέλους οὔσης οὐ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἄνευ τῆς δικαιοσύνης σῴζεσθαι νομίζει; θαυμαστὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐξουσία περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων διαλεγόμενον, ἃ τίθησιν αὐτὸς ἐγκαλῶν Ἀριστοτέλει, ταῦτʼ ἀναιρεῖν πάλιν Πλάτωνος κατηγοροῦντα. καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσι λέγει ῥητῶς ὅτι πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι· τὸ δὲ γε κατʼ ἐγκράτειαν ἢ καρτερίαν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πραττόμενον κατόρθωμά ἐστιν· ὥστε καὶ δικαιοπράγημα πῶς οὖν, οἷς ἀπολείπει φρόνησιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν, οὐκ ἀπολείπει δικαιοσύνην, εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ὅσοι κατορθοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀρεταῖς καὶ δικαιοπραγούντων;
16. Moreover, Plato having said, that injustice, as being the corruption and sedition of the soul, loses not its power even in those who have it within them, but sets the wicked man against himself, and molests and disturbs him; Chrysippus, blaming this, affirms that it is absurdly said, “A man injures himself;” for that injustice is to another, and not to one’s self. But forgetting this, he again says, in his demonstrations concerning justice, that the unjust man is injured by himself and injures himself when he injures another, becoming to himself the cause of transgressing, and undeservedly hurting himself. In his books indeed against Plato, contending that we cannot speak of injustice against one’s self, but against another, he has these words: “For men cannot be unjust by themselves; injustice requires several on opposite sides, speaking contrary one unto another. But no such thing extends to one alone, except inasmuch as he is affected towards his neighbor.” But in his demonstrations he has such discourses as these, concerning the unjust man’s being injurious also to himself: “The law forbids the being any way the author of transgression, and to act unjustly will be transgression. He therefore who is to himself the author of acting unjustly transgresses against himself. Now he that transgresses against any one also injures him; therefore he who is injurious to any one whomsoever is injurious also to himself.” Again: “Sin is a hurt, and every one who sins sins against himself; every one therefore who sins hurts himself undeservedly, and if so, is also unjust to himself.” And farther thus: “He who is hurt by another hurts himself, and that undeservedly. Now that is to be unjust. Every one therefore that is injured, by whomsoever it is, is unjust also to himself.”
16. τοῦ δὲ Πλάτωνος; εἰπόντος τὴν ἀδικίαν ὡς διαφθορὰ ψυχῆς; οὖσα καὶ στάσις οὐδʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀποβάλλει τὴν δύναμιν ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συμβάλλει καὶ συγκρούει καὶ ταράττει τὸν πονηρόν, ἐγκαλῶν Χρύσιππος ἀτόπως φησὶ λέγεσθαι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν εἶναι γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἀδικίαν· ἐπιλαθόμενος γὰρ τούτων αὖθις ἐν ταῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης Ἀποδείξεσιν ἀδικεῖσθαί φησιν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα καὶ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν, ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ, γιγνόμενον ἑαυτῷ τοῦ παρανομεῖν αἴτιον καὶ βλάπτοντα παρʼ ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν. ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα ταῦτʼ εἴρηκε περὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀδικίαν λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· οὐ γὰρ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἄδικοι συνεστήκασιν ἐκ πλειόνων δὲ τοιούτων τἀναντία λεγόντων, καὶ ἄλλως τῆς ἀδικίας λαμβανομένης ὡς ἂν ἐν πλείοσι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἕνα μηδενὸς διατείνοντος τοιούτου, καθʼ ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον ἔχει οὕτως· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀποδείξεσι τοιούτους ἠρώτηκε λόγους περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἄδικον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν· παραίτιον γενέσθαι παρανομήματος ἀπαγορεύει ὁ νόμος, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστι παρανόμημα· ὁ τοίνυν παραίτιος γενόμενος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν παρανομεῖ εἰς ἑαυτόν· ὁ δὲ παρανομῶν εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἐκεῖνον· ὁ ἄρα καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀδικῶν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ πάλιν τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν βλαμμάτων ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων παρʼ ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνει· πᾶς ἄρʼ ὁ ἁμαρτάνων βλάπτει ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ὁ βλαπτόμενος ὑφʼ ἑτέρου ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑαυτὸν βλάπτει; τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὁ ἄρʼ ἀδικούμενος καὶ ὑφʼ ὁτουοῦν πᾶς ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ.
17. He says, that the doctrine concerning good and evil which himself introduces and approves is most agreeable to life, and does most of all reach the inbred prenotions; for this he has affirmed in his Third Book of Exhortations. But in his First Book he says, that this doctrine takes a man off from all other things, as being nothing to us, nor co-operating any thing towards felicity. See now, how consonant he is to himself, when he asserts a doctrine which takes us off from life, health, indolence, and integrity of the senses, and says that those things we beg of the Gods are nothing to us, though most agreeable to life and to the common presumptions. But that there may be no denial of his speaking contradictions, in his Third Book of Justice he has said thus: “Wherefore also, from the excellence of their greatness and beauty, we seem to speak things like to fictions, and not according to man or human nature.” Is it then possible that any one can more plainly confess his speaking things contrary to himself than this man does, who affirms those things which (he says) for their excellency seem to be fictions and to be spoken above man and human nature, to be agreeable to life, and most of all to reach the inbred prenotions?
17. τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναί φησι τῷ βίῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων· ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Προτρεπτικῶν εἴρηκεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησὶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀφέλκειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ συνεργούντων πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδέν. ὅρα τοίνυν, πῶς αὑτῷ σύμφωνὸς ἐστι, τὸν ἀφέλκοντα τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας καὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὁλοκληρίας καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ταῦτα φάσκοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἃ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αἰτούμεθα, μάλιστα συμφωνεῖν τῷ βίῳ καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς προλήψεσιν ἀποφαινόμενος. ἀλλʼ ἵνα μηδʼ ἄρνησις τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν, ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης ταῦτʼ εἴρηκε διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ τε μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ κάλλους πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἄν τις ἐξομολογήσαιτο σαφέστερον τἀναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἢ οὗτος, ἃ διʼ ὑπερβολήν φησι πλάσματα δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν λέγεσθαι, ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν τῷ βίῳ φάσκων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων;
18. In every one of his natural and ethical books, he asserts vice to be the very essence of unhappiness; writing and contending that to live viciously is the same thing as to live unhappily. But in his Third Book of Nature, having said that it is profitable for a fool to live rather than to die, though he is never to become wise, he subjoins: “For such is the nature of good things among men, that evil things are in some sort preferred before indifferent ones.” I let pass therefore, that having elsewhere said that nothing is profitable to fools, he here says that to live foolishly is profitable to them. Now those things being by them called indifferent which are neither bad nor good, when he says that bad things precede them, he says nothing else but that evil things precede those that are not evil, and that to be unhappy is more profitable than not to be unhappy; and if so, he esteems not to be unhappy to be more unprofitable—and if more unprofitable, more hurtful—than to be unhappy. Desiring therefore to mitigate this absurdity, he adds concerning evils: “But it is not these evils that are preferred, but reason; with which it is more convenient to live, though we shall be fools.” First therefore he says that vice and things participating of vice are evil, and that nothing else is so. Now vice is something reasonable, or rather depraved reason. For those therefore who are fools to live with reason, is nothing else but to live with vice. Thence to live being fools is to live being unhappy. In what then is this preferred to indifferent things? For he surely will not say that with regard to happiness unhappiness is to be preferred. But neither, say they, does Chrysippus altogether think that the remaining in life is to be reckoned amongst good things, or the going out of it amongst bad; but both of them amongst indifferent ones, according to Nature. Wherefore also it sometimes becomes meet for the happy to make themselves away, and again for the unhappy to continue in life. Now what greater repugnance can there be than this in the choice and avoiding of things, if it is convenient for those who are in the highest degree happy to forsake those good things that are present, for the want of some one indifferent thing? And yet they esteem none of the indifferent things either desirable or to be avoided; but only good desirable, and only evil to be avoided. So that it comes to pass, according to them, that the reasoning about actions regards neither things desirable nor things refusable; but that aiming at other things, which they neither shun nor choose, they make life and death dependent on these.
18. οὐσίαν κακοδαιμονίας ἀποφαίνει τὴν κακίαν, ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ καὶ ἠθικῷ γράφων καὶ διατεινόμενος ὅτι τὸ κατὰ κακίαν ζῆν τῷ κακοδαιμόνως ζῆν ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὑπειπὼν ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα μᾶλλον, ἢ μὴ βιοῦν, κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιλέγει τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰρηκὼς ἐν ἑτέροις μηδὲν εἶναι λυσιτελὲς τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐνταῦθά φησι λυσιτελεῖν τὸ ἀφρόνως ζῆν, ἀφίημι. τῶν δʼ ἀνὰ μέσον λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς μήτε κακῶν ὄντων μήτʼ ἀγαθῶν, τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν λέγων οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγει πλὴν τῶν μὴ κακῶν τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν καὶ τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν λυσιτελέστερον εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἀλυσιτελέστερον ἡγεῖται τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν· εἰ δʼ ἀλυσιτελέστερον, καὶ βλαβερώτερον τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἄρα βλαβερώτερον τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν βουλόμενος οὖν ταύτην ἐπιλεαίνειν τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπιλέγει περὶ τῶν κακῶν ἔστι δʼ οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος, μεθʼ οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον, καὶ εἰ ἄφρονες ἐσόμεθα πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ κακὰ κακίαν λέγει καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδέν· ἡ δὲ κακία λογικόν ἐστι μᾶλλον δὲ λόγος ἡμαρτημένος· οὐδὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ μετὰ λόγου βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας ἢ τὸ μετὰ κακίας βιοῦν ἔπειτα τὸ βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας βιοῦν ἐστι κακοδαιμονεῖν ὄντας. πρὸς τί οὖν προτερεῖ τοῦτο τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον; οὐ γὰρ πρός γε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν φήσει προτερεῖν τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὅλως, φασίν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὔτʼ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίγνεταί ποτε καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῆν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. εἶτα τί τούτου μεῖζὸν ἐστιν ὑπεναντίωμα πρὸς αἳρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, εἰ τοῖς ἐπʼ ἄκρον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἀφίστασθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων καθήκει; καίτοι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων οὐδὲν αἱρετὸν οὐδὲ φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱρετὸν τἀγαθὸν καὶ μόνον φευκτὸν ἡγοῦνται τὸ κακόν. ὥστε συμβαίνει κατʼ αὐτοὺς μὴ πρὸς τὰ αἱρετὰ μηδὲ πρὸς τὰ φευκτὰ τοὺς τῶν πράξεων γίγνεσθαι λογισμούς, ἑτέρων στοχαζομένους ἃ μήτε φεύγουσι μήθʼ αἱροῦνται, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν.
19. Chrysippus confesses that good things are totally different from bad; and it must of necessity be so, if these make them with whom they are present miserable to the very utmost point, and those render their possessors in the highest degree happy. Now he says, that good and evil things are sensible, writing thus in his First Book of the End: “That good and evil things are perceptible by sense, we are by these reasons forced to say; for not only the passions, with their species, as sorrow, fear, and such others, are sensible; but we may also have a sense of theft, adultery, and the like, and generally, of folly, cowardice, and other vices not a few; and again, not only of joy, beneficence, and many other dependences on good deeds, but also of prudence, fortitude, and the other virtues.” Let us pass by the other absurdities of these things; but that they are repugnant to those things which are delivered by him concerning “the wise man that knows nothing of his being so,” who does not confess? For good, when present, being sensible and having a great difference from evil, is it not most absurd, that he who is of bad become good should be ignorant of it, and not perceive virtue when present, but think that vice is still within him? For either none who has all virtues can be ignorant and doubt of his having them; or the difference of virtue from vice, of happiness from misery, and of a most honest life from a most shameful one, is little and altogether difficult to be discerned, if he who has exchanged the one for the other does not perceive it.
19. τἀγαθὰ πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχειν διαφορὰν ὁμολογεῖ Χρύσιππος· καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, εἰ τὰ μὲν ἐσχάτως ποιεῖ κακοδαίμονας εὐθὺς οἷς ἂν παρῇ, τὰ δʼ ἐπʼ ἄκρον εὐδαίμονας. αἰσθητὰ δʼ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά φησιν, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ περὶ Τέλους ταῦτα γράφων ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. τούτων τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ἀτοπίαν ἀφῶμεν, ὅτι δὲ μάχεται τοῖς περὶ τὸν διαλεληθότα σοφόν, τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν; αἰσθητοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τἀγαθοῦ καὶ μεγάλην πρὸς τὸ κακὸν διαφορὰν ἔχοντος, τὸν ἐκ φαύλου γιγνόμενον σπουδαῖον ἀγνοεῖν τοῦτο καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι παρούσης ἀλλʼ οἴεσθαι τὴν κακίαν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀτοπώτατον; ἢ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖν ἢ ἀπιστεῖν δύναται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων ἁπάσας, ἢ μικρὰ τίς ἐστι καὶ παντάπασι δυσθεώρητος ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὴν κακίαν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν καὶ τοῦ καλλίστου βίου πρὸς τὸν αἴσχιστον, εἰ ταῦτά τις ἀντʼ ἐκείνων κτησάμενος ἑαυτὸν λέληθε.
20. He has written one volume of lives divided into four books; in the fourth of these he says, that a wise man meddles with no business but his own, and is employed about his own affairs. His words are these: “For I am of opinion, that a prudent man shuns affairs, meddles little, and at the same time minds his own occasions; civil persons being both minders of their own affairs and meddlers with little else.” He has said almost the same in his book of Things eligible for Themselves, in these very words: “For indeed a quiet life seems to have in it a certain security and freedom from danger, though there are not very many who can comprehend it.” It is manifest that he does not much dissent from Epicurus, who takes away Providence that he may leave God in repose. But the same Chrysippus in his First Book of Lives says, that a wise man willingly takes upon him a kingdom, making his profit by it; and if he cannot reign himself, will dwell with a king, and go to the wars with such a king as was Hydanthyrsus the Scythian or Leucon the Pontic. But I will here also set down his very discourse, that we may see whether, as from the treble and the base strings there arises a symphony in music, so the life of a man who chooses quietness and meddling with little accords with him who, upon any necessity, rides along with the Scythians and manages the affairs of the tyrants in the Bosphorus: “For that a wise man will both go to the wars and live with potentates, we will again consider this hereafter; some indeed upon the like arguments not so much as suspecting this, and we for semblable reasons admitting it.” And a little after: “Not only with those who have proceeded well, and are become proficients in discipline and good manners, as with Leucon and Hydanthyrsus.” Some there are who blame Callisthenes for sailing to Alexander in hopes to obtain the rebuilding of Olynthus, as Aristotle had procured that of Stagira; and commend Ephorus, Xenocrates, and Menedemus, who rejected Alexander’s invitation. But Chrysippus thrusts his wise man headforwards for the sake of gain, as far as Panticapaeum and the desert of the Scythians. And that he does this for the sake of profit and gain, he has showed before, supposing three ways of gaining most suitable for a wise man,—the first by a kingdom, the second by his friends, and the third, besides these, by teaching of philosophy. And yet he frequently even tires us with his praises of this saying: “What need have men of more than these two things?” And in his books of Nature he says, that a wise man, if he has lost the greatest wealth imaginable, seems to have lost but a single groat. But having there thus elevated and puffed him up, he again here throws him down to mercenariness and sophistry; nay, to asking pay and even to receiving it beforehand, sometimes at the very entrance of his scholar, and otherwhiles after some time past. The latter, he says indeed, is the more civil, but to receive beforehand the more sure; delay being subject to sustain injuries. Now he says thus: “All who are well advised do not require their salary in the same manner, but differently; a multitude of them, as opportunity offers, not promising to make their scholars good men, and that within a year, but to do this, as far as in them lies, within a time agreed on.” And again going on, he says: “But he will know his opportunity, whether he ought to receive his recompense presently at the very entrance (as many have done), or to give them time, this manner being more liable to injuries, but withal, seeming the more courteous.” And how is the wise man a contemner of wealth, who upon a contract delivers virtue for money, and if he has not delivered it, yet requires his reward, as having done what is in him? Or how is he above being endamaged, when he is so cautious lest he be wronged of his recompense? For no man is wronged who is not endamaged. Therefore, though he has elsewhere asserted that a wise man cannot be injured, he here says, that this manner of dealing is liable to injury.
20. μία σύνταξις ἡ περὶ Βίων τέτταρα βιβλία· τούτων ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ λέγει τὸν σοφὸν ἀπράγμονὰ τʼ εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν ἔστι δʼ ἡ λέξις αὕτη οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν ὁμοίως τῆς τʼ αὐτοπραγίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων. τὰ δʼ ὅμοια σχεδὸν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν Διʼ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν εἴρηκε ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσι τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τι καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, οὐ πάνυ τῶν πολλῶν δυναμένων τοῦτο συνιδεῖν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιροῦντι διὰ τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης τῆς περὶ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἀπᾴδει, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Βίων βασιλείαν τε τὸν σοφὸν ἑκουσίως ἀναδέχεσθαι λέγει, χρηματιζόμενον ἀπʼ αὐτῆς· κἂν αὐτὸς βασιλεύειν μὴ δύνηται, συμβιώσεται βασιλεῖ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ βασιλέως, οἷος ἦν Ἰδάνθυρσος ὁ Σκύθης ἢ Λεύκων ὁ Ποντικός. παραθήσομαι δὲ καὶ ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὅπως εἰδῶμεν εἰ, καθάπερ ἐκ νήτης καὶ ὑπάτης γίγνεταί τι σύμφωνον, οὕτως ὁμολογεῖ βίος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνην αἱρουμένου καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνην, εἶτα συνιππαζομένου Σκύθαις καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ τυράννων πράττοντος ἐξ οἱασδήτινος ἀνάγκης· ὅτι γάρ φησὶ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ δυναστῶν καὶ βιώσεται, πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τούτων ἐχόμενοι, τινῶν μὲν οὐδὲ ταῦτʼ ὑπονοούντων διὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους ὑπολογισμούς, ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀπολειπόντων διὰ τοὺς παραπλησίους λόγους. καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν οὐ μόνον δὲ μετὰ τῶν προκεκοφότων ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ ἐν ἀγωγαῖς καὶ ἐν ἔθεσι ποιοῖς γεγονότων, οἷον παρὰ Λεύκωνι καὶ Ἰδανθύρσῳ. Καλλισθένει τινὲς ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ὅτι πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἔπλευσεν ἐλπίζων ἀναστήσειν Ὄλυνθον, ὡς Στάγειρα Ἀριστοτέλης· Ἔφορον δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Μενέδημον ἐπαινοῦσι παραιτησαμένους τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ἐς Παντικάπαιον ὠθεῖ καὶ τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν. ὅτι γὰρ ἐργασίας ἕνεκα καὶ χρηματισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, καὶ προδεδήλωκε τρεῖς ὑποθέμενος ἁρμόζοντας μάλιστα τῷ σοφῷ χρηματισμούς, τὸν ἀπὸ βασιλείας καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν ἀπὸ σοφιστείας. καίτοι πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἀποκναίει ταῦτʼ ἐπαινῶνἐπεὶ τί δεῖ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνων,Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματὸς θʼ ὑδρηχόου;ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως λέγει τὸν σοφόν, εἰ τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ἀποβάλοι, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι δόξειν. οὕτω δʼ αὐτὸν ἄρας ἐκεῖ καὶ ὀγκώσας ἐνταῦθα πάλιν εἰς μισθαρνίαν καταβάλλει καὶ σοφιστείαν καὶ γὰρ αἰτήσειν καὶ προλήψεσθαι τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, τὸ δὲ χρόνου τῷ μαθητῇ διελθόντος, ὅπερ εὐγνωμονέστερον εἶναί φησιν, ἀσφαλέστερον δὲ τὸ προλαμβάνειν, ὡς ἀδικήματα τοῦ τόπου ἐπιδεχομένου. λέγει δʼ οὕτως εἰσπράττονται δὲ τὸν μισθὸν οὐ πάντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ὡσαύτως· ἀλλʼ ἄλλως πλῆθος,ὡς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς φέρῃ, οὐκ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ποιήσειν ἀγαθούς, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ταῦτα ποιήσειν πρὸς τὸν συμφωνηθέντα χρόνον καὶ πάλιν προελθών τὸν τε καιρὸν εἴσεται, πότερον εὐθὺς δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν λαμβάνειν ἅμα τῇ προσόδῳ καθάπερ πλείους πεποιήκασιν, ἢ καὶ χρόνον αὐτοῖς διδόναι, τοῦ τόπου τούτου μᾶλλον καὶ ἀδικήματα ἐπιδεχομένου, δόξαντος δʼ ἂν εἶναι εὐγνωμονεστέρου. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη χρημάτων καταφρονητὴς ὁ σοφός, ὑπὸ συγγραφὴν ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν παραδιδούς, κἂν μὴ παραδῷ τὸ μισθάριον εἰσπράττων, ὡς,· πεποιηκὼς τὰ παρʼ αὑτόν; ἢ βλάβης κρείττων, φυλαττόμενος μὴ ἀδικηθῇ περὶ τὸ μισθάριον; ἀδικεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς μὴ βλαπτόμενος· ὅθεν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀποφηνάμενος ἐνταῦθά φησιν ἀδίκημά τι τὸν τόπον ἐπιδέχεσθαι.
21. In his book of a Commonweal he says, that his citizens will neither act nor prepare any thing for the sake of pleasure, and praises Euripides for having uttered this sentence:What need have men of more than these two things,The fruits of Ceres, and thirst-quenching springs?And yet a little after this, going on, he commends Diogenes, who forced his nature to pass from himself in public, and said to those that were present: I wish I could in the same manner drive hunger also out of my belly. What reason then is there to praise in the same books him who rejects all pleasure, and withal, him who for the sake of pleasure does such things, and proceeds to such a degree of filthiness? Moreover, having in his book of Nature written, that Nature has produced many creatures for the sake of beauty, delighting in pulchritude and pleasing herself with variety, and having added a most absurd expression, that the peacock was made for the sake of his tail and for the beauty of it; he has, in his treatise of a Commonweal, sharply reprehended those who bred peacocks and nightingales, as if he were making laws contrary to the lawgiver of the world, and deriding Nature for pleasing herself in the beauty of animals to which a wise man would not give a place in his city. For how can it but be absurd to blame those who nourish these creatures, if he commends Providence which created them? In his Fifth Book of Nature, having said, that bugs profitably awaken us out of our sleep, that mice make us cautious not to lay up every thing negligently, and that it is probable that Nature, rejoicing in variety, takes delight in the production of fair creatures, he adds these words: “The evidence of this is chiefly shown in the peacock’s tail; for here she manifests that this animal was made for the sake of his tail, and not the contrary; so, the male being made, the female follows.” In his book of a Commonweal, having said that we are ready to paint even dunghills, a little after he adds, that some beautify their cornfields with vines climbing up trees, and myrtles set in rows, and keep peacocks, doves, and partridges, that they may hear them cackle and coo, and nightingales. Now I would gladly ask him, what he thinks of bees and honey? For it was of consequence, that he who said bugs were created profitably should also say that bees were created unprofitably. But if he allows these a place in his city, why does he drive away his citizens from things that are pleasing and delight the ear? To be brief,—as he would be very absurd who should blame the guests for eating sweetmeats and other delicacies and drinking of wine, and at the same time commend him who invited them and prepared such things for them; so he that praises Providence, which has afforded fishes, birds, honey, and wine, and at the same time finds fault with those who reject not these things, nor content themselves with “The fruits of Ceres and thirst-quenching springs,” which are present and sufficient to nourish us, seems to make no scruple of speaking things contradictory to himself.
21. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας οὐδὲν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα πράξειν οὐδὲ παρασκευάσεσθαί φησι τοὺς πολίτας· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινεῖ ταῦτα προφερόμενοςἐπεὶ τί δεῖ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνων,Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματὸς θʼ ὑδρηχόου;εἶτα μικρὸν ἀπὸ τούτων προελθὼν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Διογένη τὸ αἰδοῖον ἀποτριβόμενον ἐν φανερῷ καὶ λέγοντα πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας εἴθε καὶ τὸν λιμὸν οὕτως ἀποτρίψασθαι τῆς γαστρὸς ἠδυνάμην τίνʼ οὖν ἔχει λόγον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἐκβάλλοντα τὴν ἡδονὴν ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα τοιαῦτα πράττοντα καὶ τοιαύτης ἁπτόμενον αἰσχρουργίας; γράψας τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκα κάλλους ἡ φύσις ἐνήνοχε, φιλοκαλοῦσα καὶ χαίρουσα τῇ ποικιλίᾳ καὶ λόγον ἐπειπὼν παραλογώτατον ὡς ὁ ταὼς ἕνεκα τῆς οὐρᾶς γέγονε διὰ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς, αὖθις ἐν τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας νεανικῶς ἐπιτετίμηκε τοῖς ταὼς τρέφουσι καὶ ἀηδόνας, ὥσπερ ἀντινομοθετῶν τῷ τοῦ κόσμου νομοθέτῃ καὶ τῆς φύσεως καταγελῶν φιλοκαλούσης περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων, οἷς ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῇ πόλει τόπον οὐ δίδωσι. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς τρέφουσιν ἃ γεννῶσαν ἐπαινεῖ τὴν πρόνοιαν; ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πέμπτῳ περὶ Φύσεως εἰπὼν ὅτι οἱ κόρεις εὐχρήστως ἐξυπνίζουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ οἱ μύες ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἡμᾶς μὴ ἀμελῶς ἕκαστα τιθέναι, φιλοκαλεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε γένοιτο δʼ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταὼ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιφαίνει τὸ ζῷον γεγονέναι ἕνεκα τῆς κέρκου καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν, τῷ δʼ ἄρρενι γινομένῳ οὕτως ἡ θήλεια γοῦν ἠκολούθηκεν. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας εἰπὼν ὅτι ἐγγύς ἐσμεν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς κοπρῶνας ζῳγραφεῖν μετʼ ὀλίγον τὰ γεωργικά φησι καλλωπίζειν τινὰς ἀναδενδράσι καὶ μυρρίναις, καὶ ταὼς καὶ περιστερὰς τρέφουσι καὶ πέρδικας ἵνα κακκαβίζωσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀηδόνας. ἡδέως δʼ ἂν αὐτοῦ πυθοίμην, τί φρονεῖ περὶ μελιττῶν καὶ μέλιτος· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλουθον τῷ τοὺς κόρεις εὐχρήστως τὸ τὰς μελίττας ἀχρήστως; φάναι γεγονέναι εἰ δὲ ταύταις τόπον ἐν τῇ πόλει δίδωσι, διὰ τί τῶν πρὸς ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν ἐπιτερπῶν ἀπείργει τοὺς πολίτας; καθόλου δʼ ὥσπερ ὁ τοὺς συνδείπνους μεμφόμενος ὅτι χρῶνται τραγήμασι καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ ὄψοις, τὸν δʼ ἐπὶ ταῦτα κεκληκότα καὶ ταῦτα παρεσκευασμένον ἐπαινῶν ἄτοπός ἐστιν οὕτως ὁ τὴν μὲν πρόνοιαν ἐγκωμιάζων ἰχθῦς καὶ ὄρνιθας καὶ μέλι καὶ οἶνον παρασκευάσασαν, ἐγκαλῶν δὲ τοῖς μὴ παραπέμπουσι ταῦτα μηδʼ ἀρκουμένοιςΔήμητρος ἀκτῇ πώμασὶν θʼ ὑδρηχόοις,ἅπερ πάρεστι καὶ πέφυχ̓ ἡμᾶς τρέφεινοὐδένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον ἔοικε τοῦ τἀναντία λέγειν ἑαυτῷ.
22. Moreover, having said in his book of Exhortations, that the having carnal commerce with our mothers, daughters, or sisters, the eating forbidden food, and the going from a woman’s bed or a dead carcass to the temple, have been without reason blamed, he affirms, that we ought for these things to have a regard to the brute beasts, and from what is done by them conclude that none of these is absurd or contrary to Nature; for that the comparisons of other animals are fitly made for this purpose, to show that neither their coupling, bringing-forth, nor dying in the temples pollutes the Divinity. Yet he again in his Fifth Book of Nature says, that Hesiod rightly forbids the making water into rivers and fountains, and that we should rather abstain from doing this against any altar. or statue of the Gods; and that it is not to be admitted for an argument, that dogs, asses, and young children do it, who have no discretion or consideration of such things. It is therefore absurd to say in one place, that the savage example of irrational animals is fit to be considered, and in another, that it is unreasonable to allege it.
22. καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ τῶν Προτρεπτικῶν εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μητράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς ἢ θυγατράσιν συγγενέσθαι καὶ τὸ φαγεῖν τι καὶ προελθεῖν ἀπὸ λεχοῦς ἢ θανάτου πρὸς ἱερὸν ἀλόγως διαβέβληται· καὶ πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ τοῖς ὑπʼ ἐκείνων γιγνομένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ μηδὲν ἄτοπον μηδὲ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων· εὐκαίρως γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων παραθέσεις εἰς τὸ μήτε συγγιγνόμενα μήτε γεννῶντα μήτʼ ἐναποθνήσκοντα ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον. ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ πάλιν περὶ Φύσεως λέγει καλῶς μὲν ἀπαγορεύειν τὸν Ἡσίοδον εἰς ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας οὐρεῖν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀφεκτέον εἶναι τοῦ πρὸς βωμὸν οὐρεῖν ἢ ἀφίδρυμα θεοῦ· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι πρὸς λόγον, εἰ κύνες καὶ ὄνοι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καὶ παιδάρια νήπια, μηδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν μηδʼ ἐπιλογισμὸν ἔχοντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ἄτοπον μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐκεῖ μὲν εὔκαιρον εἰπεῖν τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀποθεώρησιν, ἐνταῦθα δʼ ἀπὸ λόγου.
23. To give a solution to the inclinations, when a man seems to be necessitated by exterior causes, some philosophers place in the principal faculty of the soul a certain adventitious motion, which is chiefly manifested in things differing not at all from one another. For when, with two things altogether alike and of equal importance, there is a necessity to choose the one, there being no cause inclining to either, for that neither of them differs from the other, this adventitious power of the soul, seizing on its inclination, determines the doubt. Chrysippus, discoursing against these men, as offering violence to Nature by devising an effect without a cause, in many places alleges the die and the balance, and several other things, which cannot fall or incline either one way or the other without some cause or difference, either wholly within them or coming to them from without; for that what is causeless (he says) is wholly insubsistent, as also what is fortuitous; and in those motions devised by some and called adventitious, there occur certain obscure causes, which, being concealed from us, move our inclinations to one side or other. These are some of those things which are most evidently known to have been frequently said by him; but what he has said contrary to this, not lying so exposed to every one’s sight, I will set down in his own words. For in his book of Judging, having supposed two running for a wager to have exactly finished their race together, he examines what is fit for the judge in this case to do. “Whether,” says he, “may the judge give the palm to which of them he will, because they both happen to be so familiar to him, that he would in some sort seem to bestow on them somewhat of his own? Or rather, since the palm is common to both, may it be, as if lots had been cast, given to either, according to the inclination he chances to have? I say the inclination he chances to have, as when two groats, every way else alike, being presented to us, we incline to one of them and take it.” And in his Sixth Book of Duties, having said that there are some things not worthy of much study or attention, he thinks we ought, as if we had cast lots, to commit the choice of those things to the casual inclination of the mind: “As if,” says he, “of those who try the same two groats in a certain time, some should say this and others that to be good, and there being no more cause for the taking of one than the other, we should leave off making any farther enquiry into their value, and take that which chances to come first to hand; thus casting the lot (as it were) according to some hidden principle, and being in danger of choosing the worse of them.” For in these passages, the casting of lots and the casual inclining of the mind, which is without any cause, introduce the choice of indifferent things.
23. τοῦ κατηναγκάσθαι δοκοῦντος ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰτιῶν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀπόλυσιν πορίζειν, ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπελευστικήν τινα κίνησιν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ κατασκευάζουσιν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπαραλλάκτων μάλιστα γιγνομένην ἔκδηλον· ὅταν γὰρ δυεῖν ἴσον δυναμένων καὶ ὁμοίως ἐχόντων θάτερον λαβεῖν ἀνάγκη, μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀγούσης τῷ μηδὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου διαφέρειν, ἡ ἐπελευστικὴ δύναμις αὕτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπίκλισιν ἐξ αὑτῆς λαβοῦσα διέκοψε τὴν ἀπορίαν. πρὸς τούτους ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀντιλέγων, ὡς βιαζομένους τῷ ἀναιτίῳ τὴν φύσιν, ἐν πολλοῖς παρατίθησι τὸν ἀστράγαλον καὶ τὸν ζυγὸν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλας λαμβάνειν πτώσεις καὶ ῥοπὰς ἄνευ τινὸς αἰτίας καὶ διαφορᾶς ἢ περὶ αὐτὰ πάντως; ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν γιγνομένης· τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλαττομέναις ὑπʼ ἐνίων καὶ λεγομέναις ταύταις ἐπελεύσεσιν αἰτίας ἀδήλους ὑποτρέχειν καὶ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ θάτερα τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀγούσας. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς γνωριμωτάτοις ἐστὶ τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις εἰρημένων. ἃ δὲ τούτοις πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐξ ἐναντίας εἴρηκεν, οὐχ ὁμοίως οὕτως ἐν μέσῳ κείμενα, διʼ αὐτῶν παραθήσομαι τῶν ἐκείνου λέξεων. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ περὶ τοῦ Δικάζειν ὑποθέμενος δύο δρομεῖς ὁμοῦ συνεκπίπτειν ἀλλήλοις διαπορεῖ τί τῷ βραβευτῇ καθήκει ποιῆσαι· πότερον φησίν ἔξεστι τὸν βραβευτὴν τὸν φοίνικα Ο φη Ὀφ ο ὁποτέρῳ βούλεται, ἀποδοῦναι; κἂν τύχωσιν αὐτῷ συνηθέστεροι ὄντες, ὡς ἂν ἐνταῦθα τῶν αὑτοῦ τι χαρισάμενον; τρόπον τινὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς κοινοῦ τοῦ φοίνικος γεγονότος ἀμφοτέρων, οἱονεί τινος κλήρου γινομένου ἀδήλως, κατὰ τὴν ἐπίκλισιν, ὡς ἔτυχε, δοῦναι αὐτόν; λέγω δʼ ἣν ἔτυχεν ἐπίκλισιν, οἵα γίνεται, ὅταν δυεῖν προκειμένων δραχμῶν ὁμοίων κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐπικλίναντες λαμβάνωμεν αὐτήν. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἕκτῳ περὶ Καθήκοντος εἶναί τινα φήσας πράγματα μὴ πάνυ πολλῆς ἄξια ὄντα πραγματείας μηδὲ προσοχῆς ἀφιέναι περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπικλίσει τῆς διανοίας οἴεται δεῖν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀποκληρώσαντας· οἷον φησὶν εἰ τῶν δοκιμαζόντων τάσδε τινὰς δραχμὰς δύο ἐπὶ τοσόνδε οἱ μὲν τήνδε οἱ δὲ τήνδε φαῖεν εἶναι καλήν, δέοι δὲ μίαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν· τηνικαῦτʼ ἀφέντες τὸ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐπιζητεῖν, ἣν ἔτυχε ληψόμεθα, κατʼ ἄδηλὸν τινʼ ἀποκληρώσαντες αὐτὰς λόγον, καὶ εἰ μάλιστα τὴν μοχθηρὰν ληψόμεθα αὐτῶν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀποκλήρωσις καὶ τὸ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπικλῖνον τῆς διανοίας, ἄνευ πάσης αἰτίας εἰσάγει τῶν ἀδιαφόρων λῆψιν.