24. In his Third Book of Dialectics, having said that Plato, Aristotle, and those who came after them, even to Polemon and Straton, but especially Socrates, diligently studied dialectics, and having cried out that one would even choose to err with such and so great men as these, he brings in these words: “For if they had spoken of these things cursorily, one might perhaps have cavilled at this place; but having treated of dialectic skill as one of the greatest and most necessary faculties, it is not probable they should have been so much mistaken, having been such in all the parts of philosophy as we esteem them.” Why then (might some one say to him) do you never cease to oppose and argue against such and so great men, as if you thought them to err in the principal and greatest matters? For it is not probable that they writ seriously of dialectics, and only transitorily and in sport of the beginning, end, Gods, and justice, in which you affirm their discourse to be blind and contradictory to itself, and to have a thousand other faults.
24. ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ τῆς Διαλεκτικῆς ὑπειπὼν ὅτι Πλάτων ἐσπούδασε περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων οἱ ἄχρι Πολέμωνος καὶ Στράτωνος μάλιστα δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ἐπιφωνήσας ὅτι καὶ συνεξαμαρτάνειν ἄν τις ἐθελήσειε τούτοις τοσούτοις καὶ τοιούτοις οὖσιν ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ παρέργου περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρήκεσαν, τάχʼ ἄν τις διέσυρε τὸν τόπον τοῦτον· οὕτω δʼ αὐτῶν ἐπιμελῶς εἰρηκότων ὡς ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δυνάμεσι καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάταις αὐτῆς οὔσης, οὐ πιθανὸν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διαμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις ὄντας οἵους ὑπονοοῦμεν τί οὖν σύ, φήσαι τις ἄν, αὐτὸς ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις καὶ τοσούτοις οὐδέποτε παύσῃ μαχόμενος οὐδʼ ἐλέγχων, ὡς νομίζεις ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις διαμαρτάνοντας; οὐ γὰρ δήπου περὶ μὲν διαλεκτικῆς ἐσπουδασμένως ἔγραψαν, περὶ δʼ ἀρχῆς καὶ τέλους καὶ θεῶν καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐκ παρέργου καὶ παίζοντες, ἐν οἷς τυφλὸν αὐτῶν ἀποκαλεῖς τὸν λόγον καὶ μαχόμενον αὑτῷ καὶ μυρίας ἄλλας ἁμαρτίας ἔχοντα.
25. In one place he says, that the vice called Ἐπιχαιρεκακία, or the rejoicing at other men’s harms, has no being; since no good man ever rejoiced at another’s evils. But in his Second Book of Good, having declared envy to be a sorrow at other men’s good,—to wit, in such as desire the depression of their neighbors that themselves may excel,— he joins to it this rejoicing at other men’s harms, saying thus: “To this is contiguous the rejoicing at other men’s harms, in such as for like causes desire to have their neighbors low; but in those that are turned according to other natural motions, is engendered mercy.” For he manifestly admits the joy at other men’s harms to be subsistent, as well as envy and mercy; though in other places he affirms it to have no subsistence; as he does also the hatred of wickedness, and the desire of dishonest gain.
25. τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν ὅπου μὲν ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναί φησιν ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν ἀστείων οὐδεὶς ἐπʼ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς χαίρει, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδεὶς χαίρει τὸ παράπαν ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Ἀγαθοῦ τὸν φθόνον ἐξηγησάμενος ὅτι λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπʼ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, ὡς δήποτε, βουλομένων ταπεινοῦν τοὺς πλησίον, ὅπως ὑπερέχωσιν αὐτοί, συνάπτει τὰ τῆς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας· ταύτῃ δὲ συνεχὴς ἡ ἐπιχαιρεκακία γίγνεται, ταπεινοὺς βουλομένων εἶναι τοὺς πλησίον διὰ τὰς ὁμοίας αἰτίας, καθʼ ἑτέρας δὲ φυσικὰς φορὰς ἐκτρεπομένων, ὁ ἔλεος γίγνεται. δῆλος γάρ ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν ὑπαρκτὴν ὥσπερ τὸν φθόνον καὶ τὸν ἔλεον ἀπολιπών, ἣν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναί φησιν ὥσπερ τὴν μισοπονηρίαν καὶ τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν.
26. Having in many places said, that those who have a long time been happy are nothing more so, but equally and in like manner with those who have but a moment been partakers of felicity, he has again in many other places affirmed, that it is not fit to stretch out so much as a finger for the obtaining momentary prudence, which flies away like a flash of lightning. It will be sufficient to set down what is to this purpose written by him in his Sixth Book of Moral Questions. For having said, that neither does every good thing equally cause joy, nor every good deed the like glorying, he subjoins these words: “For if a man should have wisdom only for a moment of time or the last minute of life, he ought not so much as to stretch out his finger for such a short-lived prudence.” And yet men are neither more happy for being longer so, nor is eternal felicity more eligible than that which lasts but a moment. If he had indeed held prudence to be a good, producing felicity, as Epicurus thought, one should have blamed only the absurdity and the paradoxicalness of this opinion; but since prudence of itself is not another thing differing from felicity, but felicity itself, how is it not a contradiction to say, that momentary happiness is equally desirable with eternal, and yet that momentary happiness is nothing worth?
26. ἐν πολλοῖς εἰρηκὼς ὅτι παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπίσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον εὐδαιμονίας μετασχοῦσιν ἐν πολλοῖς πάλιν εἴρηκεν ὡς οὐδʼ ἂν τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκοι προτεῖναι χάριν ἀμεριαίας φρονήσεως, καθάπερ ἀστραπῆς διερχομένης. ἀρκέσει δὲ παραθεῖναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν Ζητημάτων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων· ὑπειπὼν γὰρ ὡς οὔτε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίσης εἰς χαρὰν πίπτει οὔτε πᾶν κατόρθωμα εἰς σεμνολογίαν ἐπενήνοχε ταῦτα καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον μέλλοι ἀμερῆ χρόνον ἢ τὸν ἔσχατον ἕξειν φρόνησιν, οὀδʼ ἂν τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκοι ἐκτεῖναι ἕνεκα τῆς οὕτω παρεσομένης φρονήσεως, καίπερ παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονούντων οὐδὲ τῆς ἀιδίου εὐδαιμονίας αἱρετωτέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὴν ἀμεριαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγεῖτο ποιητικὸν εἶναι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀγαθὸν ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, αὐτῆς ἔδει μόνον τῆς ἀτοπίας καὶ παραδοξολογίας ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ δόγματος· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κατʼ αὐτὸν ἀλλʼ εὐδαιμονία, πῶς οὐ μάχεται τὸ λέγειν ἐπίσης μὲν αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμεριαίαν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀίδιον, μηδενὸς δʼ ἀξίαν τὴν ἀμεριαίαν;
27. Chrysippus also says, that the virtues follow one another, and that not only he who has one has all, but also that he who acts according to any one of them acts according to them all; and he affirms, that there is not any man perfect who is not possessed of all the virtues, nor any action perfect to the doing of which all the virtues do not concur. But yet in his Sixth Book of Moral Questions he says, that a good man does not always act valiantly, nor a vicious man always fearfully; for certain objects being presented to the fancies, the one must persist in his judgments, and the other depart from them; and he says that it is not probable a wicked man should be always indulging his lust. If then to act valiantly is the same thing as to use fortitude; and to act timorously as to yield to fear, they cannot but speak contradictions who say, that he who is possessed of either virtue or vice acts at the same time according to all the virtues or all the vices, and yet that a valiant man does not always act valiantly nor a vicious man timorously.
27. τὰς ἀρετάς φησιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν οὔτε γὰρ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετάς οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν Ζητημάτων ὁ Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἀεί φησιν ἀνδρίζεσθαι τὸν ἀστεῖον οὐδὲ δειλαίνειν τὸν φαῦλον, ὡς δʼ ἐν φαντασίαις ἐπιφερομένων τινῶν, τὸν μὲν ἐμμένειν τοῖς κρίμασι τὸν δʼ ἀφίστασθαι. πιθανὸν δέ φησὶ μηδʼ ἀκολασταίνειν ἀεὶ τὸν φαῦλον εἴπερ οὖν τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ χρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ δειλαίνειν οἷον δειλίᾳ χρῆσθαι, μαχόμενα λέγουσι λέγοντες κατὰ πάσας μὲν ἅμα τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα, μὴ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ἀστεῖον ἀνδρίζεσθαι μηδὲ δειλαίνειν τὸν φαῦλον.
28. He defines Rhetoric to be an art concerning the ornament and the ordering of a discourse that is pronounced. And farther in his First Book he has written thus: “And I am not only of opinion that a regard ought to be had to a liberal and simple adorning of words, but also that care is. to be taken for proper delivery, as regards the right elevation of the voice and the compositions of the countenance and hands.” Yet he, who is in this place so curious and exact, again in the same book, speaking of the collision of the vowels, says: “We ought not only to let these things pass, minding somewhat that is better, but also to neglect certain obscurities and defects, nay, solecisms also, of which others, and those not a few, would be ashamed.” Certainly, in one place to allow those who would speak eloquently so carefully to dispose their speech as even to observe a decorum in the very composition of their mouth and hands, and in another place to forbid the taking care of defects and obscurities, and the being ashamed even of committing solecisms, is the property of a man who little cares what he says, but rashly utters whatever comes first into his mouth.
28. τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὁρίζεται τέχνην, περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν· ἔτι δʼ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ ταῦτα γέγραφεν οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου καὶ ἀφελοῦς κόσμου δεῖν οἴομαι ἐπιστρέφεσθαι κἀπὶ τῶν λόγων ᾧ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὑποκρίσεων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβαλλούσας τάσεις τῆς φωνῆς καὶ σχηματισμοὺς τοῦ τε προσώπου καὶ τῶν χειρῶν οὕτω δέ τις φιλότιμος ἐνταῦθα περὶ τὸν λόγον γενόμενος πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ περὶ τῆς τῶν φωνηέντων συγκρούσεως ὑπειπών οὐ μόνον φησὶ ταῦτα παρετέον τοῦ βελτίονος ἐχομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰς ἀσαφείας καὶ ἐλλείψεις καὶ νὴ Δία σολοικισμούς, ἐφʼ οἷς ἄλλοι ἂν αἰσχυνθείησαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τὸ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν ἄχρι χειρῶν καὶ στόματος εὐπρεπείας ἐπιχωρεῖν τοῖς λέγουσιν ἐν κόσμῳ τὸν λόγον διατίθεσθαι· ποτὲ δὲ μήτʼ ἐλλείψεων ἐπιστρέφεσθαι καὶ ἀσαφειῶν μήτε σολοικίζοντας αἰσχύνεσθαι τελέως ὅ τι ἂν ἐπίῃ λέγοντός ἐστιν.
29. Moreover, in his Natural Positions having warned us not to trouble ourselves but to be at quiet about such things as require experience and investigation, he says: “Let us not think after the same manner with Plato, that liquid nourishment is conveyed to the lungs, and dry to the stomach; nor let us embrace other errors like to these.” Now it is my opinion, that to reprehend others, and then not to keep one’s self from falling into those things which one has reprehended, is the greatest of contradictions and shamefullest of errors. But he says, that the connections made by ten axioms amount to above a million in number, having neither searched diligently into it by himself nor attained to the truth by men experienced in it. Yet Plato had to testify for him the most renowned of the physicians, Hippocrates, Philistion, and Dioxippus the disciple of Hippocrates; and of the poets, Euripides, Alcaeus, Eupolis, and Eratosthenes, who all say that the drink passes through the lungs. But all the arithmeticians refel Chrysippus, amongst whom also is Hipparchus, demonstrating that the error of his computation is very great; since the affirmative makes of the ten axioms one hundred and three. thousand forty and nine connections, and the negative three hundred and ten thousand nine hundred fifty and two.
29. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Θέσεσι περὶ τῶν ἐμπειρίας καὶ ἱστορίας δεομένων διακελευσάμενος τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, ἂν μή τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἐναργέστερον ἔχωμεν λέγειν, ἵνα φησὶ μήτε Πλάτωνι παραπλησίως ὑπονοήσωμεν τὴν μὲν ὑγρὰν τροφὴν εἰς τὸν πλεύμονα φέρεσθαι τὴν δὲ ξηρὰν εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν, μήθʼ ἕτερα παραπλήσια γεγονότα τούτοις διαπτώματα δοκῶ δὴ τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν ἑτέροις εἶτα περιπίπτειν αὐτὸν οἷς ἐγκαλεῖ καὶ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, τῶν ἐναντιωμάτων μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ τῶν διαπτωμάτων αἴσχιστον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸς τὰς διὰ δέκα ἀξιωμάτων συμπλοκὰς πλήθει φησὶν ὑπερβάλλειν ἑκατὸν μυριάδας οὔτε διʼ αὑτοῦ ζητήσας ἐπιμελῶς οὔτε διὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων τἀληθὲς ἱστορήσας. καίτοι Πλάτων μὲν ἔχει τῶν ἰατρῶν τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους μαρτυροῦντας, Ἱπποκράτην Φιλιστίωνα Διώξιππον τὸν Ἱπποκράτειον, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Εὐριπίδην Ἀλκαῖον Εὔπολιν Ἐρατοσθένην, λέγοντας ὅτι τὸ ποτὸν διὰ τοῦ πνεύμονος διέξεισι· Χρύσιππον δὲ πάντες ἐλέγχουσιν οἱ ἀριθμητικοί, ὧν καὶ Ἵππαρχός ἐστιν ἀποδεικνύων τὸ διάπτωμα τοῦ λογισμοῦ παμμέγεθες αὐτῷ γεγονός· εἴγε τὸ μὲν καταφατικὸν ποιεῖ συμπεπλεγμένων ἀξιωμάτων μυριάδας δέκα καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τρισχίλια τεσσαράκοντα ἐννέα, τὸ δʼ ἀποφατικὸν ἐννακόσια πεντήκοντα δύο πρὸς τριάκοντα καὶ μιᾷ μυριάσι.
30. Some of the ancients have said, that the same befell Zeno which befalls him who has sour wine which he can sell neither for vinegar nor wine; for his “things preferred,” as he called them, cannot be disposed of, either as good or as indifferent. But Chrysippus has made the matter yet far more intricate; for he sometimes says, that they are mad who make no account of riches, health, freedom from pain, and integrity of the body, nor take any care to attain them; and having cited that sentence of Hesiod, “Work hard, O God-born Perses,”he cries out, that it would be a madness to advise the contrary and say, “Work not, O God-born Perses.” And in his book of Lives he affirms, that a wise man will for the sake of gain live with kings, and teach for money, receiving from some of his scholars his reward beforehand, and making contract with others of them; and in his Seventh Book of Duties he says, that he will not scruple to turn his heels thrice over his head, if for so doing he may have a talent. In his First Book of Good Things, he yields and grants to those that desire it to call these preferred things good and their contraries evil, in these very words: “Any one who will, according to these permutations, may call one thing good and another evil, having a regard to the things themselves, and not wandering elsewhere, not failing in the understanding of the things signified, and in the rest accommodating himself to custom in the denomination.” Having thus in this place set his preferred things so near to good, and mixed them therewith, he again says, that none of these things belongs at all to us, but that reason withdraws and averts us from all such things; for he has written thus in his First Book of Exhortations. And in his Third Book of Nature he says, that some esteem those happy who reign and are rich, which is all one as if those should be reputed happy who make water in golden chamber-pots and wear golden fringes; but to a good man the losing of his whole estate is but as the losing of one groat, and the being sick no more than if he had stumbled. Wherefore he has not filled virtue only, but Providence also, with these contradictions. For virtue would seem to the utmost degree sordid and foolish, if it should busy itself about such matters, and enjoin a wise man for their sake to sail to Bosphorus or tumble with his heels over his head. And Jupiter would be very ridiculous to be styled Ctesius, Epicarpius, and Charitodotes, because forsooth he gives the wicked golden chamber-pots and golden fringes, and the good such things as are hardly worth a groat, when through Jupiter’s providence they become rich. And yet much more ridiculous is Apollo, if he sits to give oracles concerning golden fringes and chamber-pots and the recovering of a stumble.
30. τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινές, ἃ τῷ τὸν ὀξίνην ἔχοντι συνέβαινε μήθʼ ὡς ὄξος ἀποδόσθαι δυναμένῳ μήθʼ ὡς οἶνον, ἔφασαν τῷ Ζήνωνι συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ προηγμένον αὐτῷ μήθʼ ὡς ἀγαθὸν μήθʼ ὡς ἀδιάφορον ἔχειν διάθεσιν. ἀλλʼ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ πρᾶγμα δυσδιάθετον πεποίηκεν ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ φησι μαίνεσθαι τοὺς τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν ἀπονίαν καὶ τὴν ὁλοκληρίαν τοῦ σώματος ἐν μηδενὶ ποιουμένους μηδʼ ἀντεχομένους τῶν τοιούτων ὁτὲ δὲ παραθέμενος τὰ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος· ἐπιπεφώνηκεν ὅτι τἀναντία παραινεῖν μανικόν ἐστι, τὸ μὴ ἐργάζευ, Πέρση, δῖον γένος. καὶ τὸν μὲν σοφὸν ἐν τοῖς περὶ βίων καὶ βασιλεῦσι συνέσεσθαί φησιν ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ καὶ σοφιστεύσειν ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ, παρʼ ὧν μὲν προλαμβάνοντα πρὸς οὓς δὲ συντιθέμενον τῶν μαθητῶν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τοῦ Καθήκοντος καὶ κυβιστήσειν τρὶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαβόντα τάλαντον ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τἀναντία, ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστιν εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακόν, ἐπὶ γʼ αὐτὰ φερόμενος τὰ πράγματα καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἀποπλανώμενος, ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. οὕτω δὲ τὸ προηγμένον τἀγαθῷ συναγαγὼν ἐγγὺς ἐνταῦθα καὶ συμμίξας ἐν ἑτέροις πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φησι τούτων καθόλου πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἀποσπᾶν τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀποστρέφειν ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι γέγραφεν. ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως μακαρίζεσθαί φησιν ἐνίους βασιλεύοντας καὶ πλουτοῦντας, ὅμοιον εἰ χρυσαῖς ἀμίσι χρώμενοι καὶ χρυσοῖς κρασπέδοις ἐμακαρίζοντο· τῷ δʼ ἀγαθῷ τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν οἱονεὶ δραχμὴν ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ τὸ νοσῆσαι οἷον προσκόψαι. Διὸ τῶν ἐναντιωμάτων τούτων οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναπέπληκεν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ μικρολόγος ἐσχάτως φανεῖται καὶ ἀνόητος περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένη καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα πλεῖν εἰς Βόσπορον κελεύουσα καὶ κυβιστᾶν τὸν σοφόν, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς γελοῖος εἰ Κτήσιος χαίρει καὶ Ἐπικάρπιος καὶ Χαριδότης προσαγορευόμενος, ὅτι δηλαδὴ χρυσᾶς ἀμίδας καὶ χρυσᾶ κράσπεδα χαρίζεται τοῖς φαύλοις, τοῖς δ’ ἀγαθοῖς ἄξια δραχμῆς, ὅταν πλούσιοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς πρόνοιαν· ἔτι δὲ γελοιότερος ὁ Ἀπόλλων, εἰ περὶ χρυσῶν κρασπέδων καὶ ἀμίδων κάθηται θεμιστεύων καὶ περὶ προσκομμάτων ἀπολύσεως.
31. But they make this repugnancy yet more evident by their demonstration. For they say, that what may be used both well and ill, the same is neither good nor bad; but fools make an ill use of riches, health, and strength of body; therefore none of these is good. If therefore God gives not virtue to men,—but honesty is eligible of itself, —and yet bestows on them riches and health without virtue, he confers them on those who will use them not well but ill, that is hurtfully, shamefully, and perniciously. Now, if the Gods can bestow virtue and do not, they are not good; but if they cannot make men good, neither can they help them, for except virtue nothing is good and helpful. Now to judge those who are otherwise made good according to virtue and strength … is nothing to the purpose, for good men also judge the Gods according to virtue and strength; so that they do no more aid men than they are aided by them. Now Chrysippus neither professes himself nor any one of his disciples and teachers to be virtuous. What then do they think of others, but those things which they say, —that they are all mad, fools, impious, transgressors of the laws, and in the utmost degree of misery and unhappiness? And yet they say that our affairs, though we act thus miserably, are governed by the providence of the Gods. Now if the Gods, changing their minds, should desire to hurt, afflict, overthrow, and quite crush us, they could not put us in a worse condition than we already are; as Chrysippus demonstrates that life can admit no greater degree either of misery or of unhappiness; so that if it had a voice, it would pronounce these words of Hercules:I am so full of miseries, there isNo place to stow them in.Now who can imagine any assertions more repugnant to one another than that of Chrysippus concerning the Gods and that concerning men; when he says, that the Gods do in the best manner possible provide for men, and yet men are in the worst condition imaginable?
31. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἐναντίωμα ποιοῦσι φανερώτερον. γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς, τοῦτό φασι μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μήτε κακόν. πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ καὶ ῥώμῃ σώματος κακῶς χρῶνται πάντες οἱ ἀνόητοι· διόπερ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων ἀγαθόν. εἴπερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἀρετὴν μὲν οὐ δίδωσιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν αὐθαίρετόν ἐστι, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς δίδωσιν, οὐκ εὖ χρησομένοις δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ κακῶς, τουτέστι βλαβερῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ὀλεθρίως καίτοι εἰ μὲν δύνανται τὴν ἀρετὴν παρέχειν οἱ θεοί, οὔκ εἰσι χρηστοὶ μὴ παρέχοντες· εἰ δὲ μὴ δύνανται ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, οὐδʼ ὠφελεῖν δύνανται, μηδενός γε τῶν ἄλλων ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ μηδʼ ὠφελίμου. τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλως γενομένους ἀγαθοὺς … κρίνειν κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἢ ἰσχὺν οὐδέν ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κρίνουσι κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἰσχύν· ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ μὴν οὔθʼ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. τί οὖν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φρονοῦσιν ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγουσι; μαίνεσθαι πάντας, ἀφραίνειν, ἀνοσίους εἶναι, παρανόμους, ἐπʼ ἄκρον ἥκειν δυστυχίας, κακοδαιμονίας ἁπάσης· εἶτα προνοίᾳ θεῶν διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθʼ ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἀθλίως πράττοντας; εἰ γοῦν οἱ θεοὶ μεταβαλόμενοι βλάπτειν ἐθέλοιεν ἡμᾶς καὶ κακοῦν καὶ διαστρέφειν καὶ προσεπιτρίβειν, οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο διαθεῖναι χεῖρον ἢ νῦν ἔχομεν, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει μήτε κακίας ὑπερβολὴν ἀπολείπειν μήτε κακοδαιμονίας τὸν βίον ὥστʼ, εἰ λάβοι φωνήν, εἰπεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους γέμω κακῶν δή, κοὐκέτʼ ἔσθʼ ὅπου τεθῇ. τίνας οὖν ἄν τις εὕροι μαχομένας μᾶλλον ἀλλήλαις ἀποφάσεις τῆς περὶ θεῶν Χρυσίππου καὶ,τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων, τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔνι βέλτιστα προνοεῖν τοὺς δ’ ὡς ἔνι χείριστα πράττειν λέγοντος;
32. Some of the Pythagoreans blame him for having in his book of Justice written concerning cocks, that they are usefully procreated, because they awaken us from our sleep, hunt out scorpions, and animate us to battle, breeding in us a certain emulation to show courage; and yet that we must eat them, lest the number of chickens should be greater than were expedient. But he so derides those who blame him for this, that he has written thus concerning Jupiter the Savior and Creator, the father of justice, equity, and peace, in his Third Book of the Gods: “As cities overcharged with too great a number of citizens send forth colonies into other places and make war upon some, so does God give the beginnings of corruption.” And he brings in Euripides for a witness, with others who say, that the Trojan war was caused by the Gods, to exhaust the multitude of men. But letting pass their other absurdities (for our design is not to enquire what they have said amiss, but only what they have said dissonantly to themselves), consider how he always attributes to the Gods specious and kind appellations, but at the same time cruel, barbarous, and Galatian deeds. For those so great slaughters and carnages, as were the productions of the Trojan war and again of the Persian and Peloponnesian, were no way like to colonies unless these men know of some cities built in hell and under the earth. But Chrysippus makes God like to Deïotarus, the Galatian king, who having many sons, and being desirous to leave his kingdom and house to one of them, killed all the rest; as he that cuts and prunes away all the other branches from the vine, that one which he leaves remaining may grow strong and great. And yet the vine-dresser does this, the sprigs being slender and weak; and we, to favor a bitch, take from her many of her new born puppies, whilst they are yet blind. But Jupiter, having not only suffered and seen men to grow up, but having also both created and increased them, plagues them afterwards, devising occasions of their destruction and corruption; whereas he should rather not have given them any causes and beginnings of generation.
32. ἐγκαλοῦσιν αὐτῷ τινες τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης γράφοντι περὶ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων ὅτι χρησίμως γεγόνασι· ἐπεγείρουσι γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς σκορπίους ἐκλέγουσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς μάχας ἐπιστρέφουσι, ζῆλόν τινα πρὸς ἀλκὴν ἐμποιοῦντες· ὅμως δὲ δεῖ κατεσθίειν καὶ τούτους, ἵνα μὴ τὴν χρείαν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεοττῶν. ὁ δʼ οὕτω καταγελᾷ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγκαλούντων, ὥστε περὶ τοῦ Διός, τοῦ Σωτῆρος καὶ Γενέτορος καὶ πατρὸς Δίκης καὶ Εὐνομίας καὶ Εἰρήνης, ταῦτα γράφειν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ὡς δʼ αἱ πόλεις πλεονάσασαι εἰς ἀποικίας ἀπερῶσι τὰ πλήθη καὶ πολέμους ἐνίστανται πρός τινας, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς φθορᾶς ἀρχὰς δίδωσι· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην μάρτυρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους προσάγεται, τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς ὁ Τρωικὸς πόλεμος ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀπαντλήσεως χάριν τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους γένοιτο· τούτων δὲ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἀτοπίας ἄφες οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἀλλʼ ὅσα πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαφόρως λέγουσιν, ἐξετάσαι μόνον πρόκειται· σκόπει δʼ ὅτι τῷ θεῷ καλὰς μὲν ἐπικλήσεις ἀεὶ καὶ φιλανθρώπους, ἄγρια δʼ ἔργα καὶ βάρβαρα καὶ Γαλατικὰ προστίθησιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀποικίαις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τοσαῦται φθοραὶ καὶ πανωλεθρίαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἵας ὁ Τρωικὸς εἰργάσατο πόλεμος καὶ πάλιν ὁ Μηδικὸς καὶ Πελοποννησιακός, εἰ μή τινας ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἴσασιν οὗτοι πόλεις κτιζομένας, ἀλλὰ τῷ Γαλάτῃ Δηιοτάρῳ ποιεῖ Χρύσιππος; ὅμοιον τὸν θεὸν, ὅς, πλειόνων αὐτῷ παίδων γεγονότων, ἑνὶ βουλόμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολιπεῖν καὶ τὸν οἶκον ἅπαντας ἐκείνους ἀπέσφαξεν, ὥσπερ ἀμπέλου βλαστοὺς ἀποτεμὼν καὶ κολούσας, ἵνʼ εἷς ὁ λειφθεὶς ἰσχυρὸς γένηται καὶ μέγας. καίτοι γʼ ὁ μὲν ἀμπελουργὸς ἔτι μικρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀσθενῶν τοῦτο ποιεῖ τῶν κλημάτων, καὶ ἡμεῖς νεογνῶν καὶ τυφλῶν ὄντων τῶν σκυλακίων ὑφαιροῦμεν τὰ πολλὰ φειδόμενοι τῆς κυνός ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς οὐ μόνον ἐάσας καὶ περιιδὼν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενομένους ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσας αὐτὸς καὶ αὐξήσας ἀποτυμπανίζει, φθορᾶς καὶ ὀλέθρου μηχανώμενος προφάσεις, δέον αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχὰς γενέσεως μὴ παρασχεῖν.
33. However this is but a small matter; but that which follows is greater. For there is no war amongst men without vice. But sometimes the love of pleasure, sometimes the love of money, and sometimes the love of glory and rule is the cause of it. If therefore God is the author of wars, he must be also of sins, provoking and perverting men. And yet himself says in his treatise of Judgment and his Second Book of the Gods, that it is no way rational to say that the Divinity is in any respect the cause of dishonesty. For as the law can in no way be the cause of transgression, so neither can the Gods of being impious; therefore neither is it rational that they should be the causes of any thing that is filthy. What therefore can be more filthy to men than the mutual killing of one another? —to which Chrysippus says that God gives beginnings. But some one perhaps will say, that he elsewhere praises Euripides for saying, “If Gods do aught dishonest, they’re no Gods;” and again, “’Tis a most easy thing t’ accuse the Gods;”as if we were now doing any thing else than setting down such words and sentences of his as are repugnant to one another.
33. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔλαττόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο δὲ μεῖζον· οὐδεὶς; γὰρ φύεται ἀνθρώποις πόλεμος ἄνευ κακίας, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν φιληδονία τὸν δὲ πλεονεξία τὸν δὲ φιλοδοξία τις ἢ φιλαρχία συρρήγνυσιν. οὐκοῦν εἰ πολέμους ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργάζεται, καὶ κακίας, παροξύνων καὶ διαστρέφων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. καίτοι λέγει δʼ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Δικάζειν καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίγνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐστιν· ὃν τρόπον γὰρ οὔτε νόμος τοῦ παρανομεῖν παραίτιος γένοιτʼ ἂν οὔθʼ οἱ θεοὶ τοῦ ἀσεβεῖν, οὕτως εὔλογον μηδʼ αἰσχροῦ μηδενὸς εἶναι παραιτίους. τί οὖν αἴσχιον ἀνθρώποις φθορᾶς ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων γιγνομένης, ἧς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐνδιδόναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεόν; ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία φήσει τις· ἐπαινεῖν πάλιν τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὔκ εἰσιν θεοί καί τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς· ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι νῦν πραττόντων ἢ τὰς ἐναντίας· αὐτοῦ φωνὰς καὶ ὑπολήψεις παρατιθεμένων.
34. Yet that very thing which is now praised may be objected, not once or twice or thrice, but even ten thousand times, against Chrysippus: “’Tis a most easy thing t’ accuse the Gods.” For first having in his book of Nature compared the eternity of motion to a drink made of divers species confusedly mixed together, turning and jumbling the things that are made, some this way, others that way, he goes on thus: “Now the administration of the universe proceeding in this manner, it is of necessity we should be in the condition we are, whether contrary to our own nature we are sick or maimed, or whether we are grammarians or musicians.” And again a little after, “According to this reason we shall say the like of our virtue and vice, and generally of arts or the ignorance of arts, as I have said.” And a little after, taking away all ambiguity, he says: “For no particular thing, not even the least, can be otherwise than according to common Nature and its reason.” But that common Nature and the common reason of Nature are with him Fate and Providence and Jupiter, is not unknown even to the antipodes. For these things are everywhere inculcated by the Stoics; and Chrysippus affirms that Homer said very well, “Jove’s purposes were ripening,”having respect to Fate and the Nature of the universe, according to which every thing is governed. How then do these agree, both that God is no way the cause of any dishonest thing, and again, that not even the least thing imaginable can be otherwise done than according to common Nature and its reason? For amongst all things that are done, there must of necessity be also dishonest things attributed to the Gods. And though Epicurus indeed turns himself every way, and studies artifices, devising how to deliver and set loose our voluntary free will from this eternal motion, that he may not leave vice irreprehensible; yet Chrysippus gives vice a most absolute liberty, as being done not only of necessity or according to Fate, but also according to the reason of God and best Nature. And these things are yet farther seen in what he says afterwards, being thus word for word: “For common Nature extending to all things, it will be of necessity that every thing, howsoever done in the whole or in any one soever of its parts, must be done according to this common Nature and its reason, proceeding on regularly without any impediment. For there is nothing without that can hinder the administration, nor is there any of the parts that can be moved or habituated otherwise than according to common Nature.” What then are these habits and motions of the parts? It is manifest, that the habits are vices and diseases, covetousness, luxury, ambition, cowardice, injustice; and that the motions are adulteries, thefts, treasons, murders, parricides. Of these Chrysippus thinks, that no one, either little or great, is contrary to the reason of Jupiter, or to his law, justice, and providence; so neither is the transgressing of the law done against the law, nor the acting unjustly against justice, nor the committing of sin against Providence.
34. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ αὐτό γε τοῦτο τὸ νῦν ἐπαινούμενον οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς οὐδὲ τρὶς ἀλλὰ μυριάκις ἔσται πρὸς Χρύσιππον εἰπεῖν τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς. πρῶτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Φύσεως τὸ ἀίδιον τῆς κινήσεως κυκεῶνι παρεικάσας, ἄλλα ἄλλως· στρέφοντι καὶ ταράσσοντι τῶν γιγνομένων, ταῦτʼ εἴρηκεν· οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτʼ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοί. καὶ πάλιν μετʼ ὀλίγον κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην. καὶ μετʼ ὀλίγον ἃπασαν ἀναιρῶν ἀμφιβολίαν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατά μέρος γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. ὅτι δʼ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ Διὸς δʼ ἐτελείετο βουλή, τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν ὀρθῶς, ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, καθʼ ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται. πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν οὐδενὸς αἰσχροῦ παραίτιος ὁ θεός, ἅμα δʼ οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον; ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δήπουθὲν ἐστιν. καίτοι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἁμωσγέπως στρέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ, τῆς ἀιδίου κινήσεως μηχανώμενος ἐλευθερῶσαι καὶ ἀπολῦσαι τὸ ἑκούσιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν κακίαν· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἀναπεπταμένην παρρησίαν αὐτῇ δίδωσιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην ἀλλὰ καὶ· κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πεποιημένῃ τὴν ἀρίστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῦθʼ ὁρᾶται κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχοντα· τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν κατʼ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. τίνες οὖν αἱ τῶν μερῶν σχέσεις εἰσὶ καὶ κινήσεις; δῆλον μὲν ὅτι σχέσεις αἱ κακίαι καὶ τὰ νοσήματα, φιλαργυρίαι φιληδονίαι φιλοδοξίαι δειλίαι ἀδικίαι· κινήσεις δὲ μοιχεῖαι κλοπαὶ προδοσίαι ἀνδροφονίαι πατροκτονίαι. τούτων οἴεται Χρύσιππος οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον εἶναι καὶ νόμον καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν· ὥστε μὴ γίγνεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον τὸ παρανομεῖν μηδὲ παρὰ τὴν δίκην τὸ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ παρὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τὸ κακοποιεῖν.
35. And yet he says, that God punishes vice, and does many things for the chastising of the wicked. And in his Second Book of the Gods he says, that many adversities sometimes befall the good, not as they do the wicked, for punishment, but according to another dispensation, as it is in cities. And again in these words: “First we are to understand of evils in like manner as has been said before: then, that these things are distributed according to the reason of Jupiter, whether for punishment, or according to some other dispensation, having in some sort respect to the universe.” This therefore is indeed severe, that wickedness is both done and punished according to the reason of Jupiter. But he aggravates this contradiction in his Second Book of Nature, writing thus: “Vice, in reference to grievous accidents, has a certain reason of its own. For it is also in some sort according to the reason of Nature, and, as I may so say, is not wholly useless in respect of the universe. For otherwise also there would not be any good.” Thus does he reprehend those that dispute indifferently on both sides, who, out of a desire to say something wholly singular and more exquisite concerning every thing, affirms, that men do not unprofitably cut purses, calumniate, and play madmen, and that it is not unprofitable there should be unprofitable, hurtful, and unhappy persons. What manner of God then is Jupiter,— I mean Chrysippus’s Jupiter,—who punishes an act done neither willingly nor unprofitably? For vice is indeed, according to Chrysippus’s discourse, wholly reprehensible; but Jupiter is to be blamed, whether he has made vice which is an unprofitable thing, or, having made it not un profitable, punishes it.
35. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις πρῶτον δὲ τῶν κακῶν παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον τοῖς προειρημένοις· εἶθʼ ὅτι ταῦτʼ ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἢτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατʼ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δεινόν, τὸ καὶ γίγνεσθαι τὴν κακίαν καὶ κολάζεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον. ἐπιτείνει δὲ τὴν ὑπεναντίωσιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως γράφων τάδε ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα ἴδιὸν τινʼ ἔχει λόγον· γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτή πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνʼ οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. καὶ οὗτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς ἐπίσης πρὸς τἀναντία διαλεγομένοις, ὃς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάντως τι βούλεσθαι καὶ περὶ παντὸς εἰπεῖν ἴδιον καὶ περιττὸν οὐκ ἀχρήστως λέγει βαλλαντιοτομεῖν, συκοφαντεῖν καὶ ἀφραίνειν, οὐκ ἀχρήστως ἀχρήστους εἶναι, βλαβερούς, κακοδαίμονας. εἶτα ποῖός τις ὁ Ζεύς, λέγω δὲ τὸν Χρυσίππου, κολάζων πρᾶγμα μήτʼ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μήτʼ ἀχρήστως γιγνόμενον; ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία πάντως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Χρυσίππου λόγον ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐγκλητέος εἴτʼ ἄχρηστον οὖσαν τὴν κακίαν πεποίηκεν εἴτε, ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχρήστως, κολάζει.
36. Again, in his First Book of Justice, having spoken of the Gods as resisting the injustices of some, he says “But wholly to take away vice is neither possible nor expedient.” Whether it were not better that law-breaking, injustice, and folly should be taken away, is not the design of this present discourse to enquire. But he himself, as much as in him lies, by his philosophy taking away vice, which it is not expedient to take away, does something repugnant both to reason and God. Besides this, saying that God resists some injustices, he again declares plainly the impiety of sins.
36. πάλιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Δικαιοσύνης εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς ἐνισταμένων ἐνίοις ἀδικήμασι, κακίαν δέ φησὶ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἔχει καλῶς; ἀρθῆναι ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν οὑκ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι τὴν ἀνομίαν τὴν ἀδικίαν τὴν ἀβελτερίαν, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστὶ λόγου ζητεῖν· αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν κακίαν, ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀναιρῶν, ἣν οὐκ ἔχει καλῶς ἀναιρεῖν, μαχόμενὸν τι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ θεῷ· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις λέγων ἐνίοις ἀδικήμασιν ἐνίστασθαι τὸν θεὸν ἔμφασιν πάλιν τῆς τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων δίδωσιν ἀνοσιότητος.
37. Having often written that there is nothing reprehensible, nothing to be complained of in the world, all things being finished according to a most excellent nature, he again elsewhere leaves certain negligences to be reprehended, and those not concerning small or base matters. For having in his Third Book of Substance related that some such things befall honest and good men, he says: “Is it because some things are not regarded, as in great families some bran—yea, and some grains of corn also—are scattered, the generality being nevertheless well ordered; or is it that there are evil Genii set over those things in which there are real and faulty negligence” And he also affirms that there is much necessity intermixed, I let pass, how inconsiderate it is to compare such accidents befalling honest and good men, as were the condemnation of Socrates, the burning of Pythagoras, whilst he was yet living, by the Cyloneans, the putting to death—and that with torture—of Zeno by the tyrant Demylus, and of Antiphon by Dionysius, with the letting of bran fall. But that there should be evil Genii placed by Providence over such charges,—how can it but be a reproach to God, as it would be to a king, to commit the administration of his provinces to evil and rash governors and captains, and suffer the best of his subjects to be despised and ill-treated by them? And furthermore, if there is much necessity mixed amongst affairs, then God has not power over them all, nor are they all administered according to his reason.
37. ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἁπάντων παραγομένων, πολλάκις γεγραφὼς ἔστιν ὅπου πάλιν ἐγκλητάς τινας ἀμελείας οὐ περὶ μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα καταλείπει. ἐν γοῦν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Οὐσίας μνησθεὶς ὅτι συμβαίνει τινὰ τοῖς καλοῖς; κἀγαθοῖς τοιαῦτα πότερον φησὶν ἀμελουμένων τινῶν, καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες, τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίγνονται καὶ ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμπτώματα τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷον ἡ Σωκράτους καταδίκη καὶ ὁ Πυθαγόρου ζῶντος ἐμπρησμὸς ὑπὸ τῶν Κυλωνείων καὶ Ζήνωνος ὑπὸ Δημύλου τοῦ τυράννου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος ὑπὸ Διονυσίου στρεβλουμένων ἀναιρέσεις, πιτύροις παραπίπτουσιν ἀπεικάζειν, ὅσης ἐστὶν εὐχερείας, ἐῶ· τὸ δὲ φαύλους δαίμονας ἐκ προνοίας ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστασίας καθίστασθαι πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔγκλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, καθάπερ βασιλέως κακοῖς καὶ ἐμπλήκτοις σατράπαις καὶ στρατηγοῖς διοικήσεις ἐπιτρέποντος καὶ περιορῶντος ὑπὸ τούτων ἀμελουμένους καὶ παροινουμένους τοὺς ἀρίστους; καὶ μὴν εἰ πολὺ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης· μέμικται τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτε κρατεῖ πάντων ὁ θεὸς οὔτε πάντα κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον διοικεῖται.