38. He contends much against Epicurus and those that take away providence from the conceptions we have of the Gods, whom we esteem beneficial and gracious to men. And these things being frequently said by them, there is no necessity of setting down the words. Yet all do not conceive the Gods to be good and favorable to us. For see what the Jews and Syrians think of the Gods; see also with how much superstition the poets are filled. But there is not any one, in a manner to speak of, that imagines God to be corruptible or to have been born. And to omit all others, Antipater the Tarsian, in his book of the Gods writes thus, word for word: “At the beginning of our discourse we will briefly repeat the opinion we have concerning God. We understand therefore God to be an animal, blessed and incorruptible, and beneficial to men.” And then expounding every one of these terms he says: “And indeed all men esteem the Gods to be incorruptible.” Chrysippus therefore is, according to Antipater, not one of “all men;” for he thinks none of the Gods, except Fire, to be incorruptible, but that they all equally were born and will die. These things are, in a manner, everywhere said by him. But I will set down his words out of his Third Book of the Gods: “It is otherwise with the Gods. For some of them are born and corruptible, but others not born. And to demonstrate these things from the beginning will be more fit for a treatise of Nature. For the Sun, the Moon, and other Gods who are of a like nature, were begotten; but Jupiter is eternal.” And again going on: “But the like will be said concerning dying and being born, both concerning the other Gods and Jupiter. For they indeed are corruptible, but his parts incorruptible.” With these I compare a few of the things said by Antipater: “Whosoever they are that take away from the Gods beneficence, they attack in some part our preconception of them; and according to the same reason they also do this, who think they participate of generation and corruption.” If then he who esteems the Gods corruptible is equally absurd with him who thinks them not to be provident and gracious to men, Chrysippus is no less in an error than Epicurus. For one of them deprives the Gods of beneficence, the other of incorruptibility.
38. πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον μάλιστα μάχεται καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννοιῶν, ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ θεῶν, εὐεργετικοὺς καὶ φιλανθρώπους ἐπινοοῦντες. καὶ τούτων πολλαχοῦ γραφομένων καὶ λεγομένων παρʼ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔδει λέξεις παρατίθεσθαι καὶ τὸ χρηστοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς προσλαμβάνειν. ὅρα γὰρ οἷα· Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Σύροι περὶ θεῶν φρονοῦσιν, ὅρα τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν πόσης ἐμπέπλησται δεισιδαιμονίας. φθαρτὸν δὲ καὶ γενητὸν οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διανοεῖται θεόν. ὧν ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀφῶ πάντας, Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Ταρσεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ Θεῶν γράφει ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν πρὸ δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος λόγου τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ θεοῦ, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιλογιούμεθα. θεὸν τοίνυν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων εἶτα τούτων ἕκαστον ἀφηγούμενος φησιν οὕτω καὶ μὴν ἀφθάρτους αὐτοὺς ἡγοῦνται πάντες. οὐδεὶς οὖν ἐστι τῶν πάντων ὁ Χρύσιππος κατʼ Ἀντίπατρον· οὐδένα γὰρ οἴεται πλὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμαλῶς καὶ γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους. ταῦτα δὲ πανταχοῦ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ λέγεται. παραθήσομαι δὲ λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου περὶ Θεῶν καθʼ ἕτερον λόγον οἱ μὲν γὰρ γενητοὶ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ λέγονται, οἱ δʼ ἀγένητοι· καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ὑποδείκνυσθαι φυσικώτερον. ἥλιος μὲν γὰρ καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ παραπλήσιον ἔχοντες λόγον γενητοὶ εἰσιν, ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἀίδιός ἐστιν. καὶ πάλιν προελθὼν ὅμοια δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ φθίνειν καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ῥηθήσεται, περί τε τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν καὶ τοῦ Διός· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτοί εἰσι· τοῦ δὲ τὰ μέρη ἄφθαρτα τούτοις ἔτι βούλομαι παραβαλεῖν μικρὰ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου λεγομένων· ὅσοι δὲ περιαιροῦνται τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν, ἀπὸ μέρους προσβάλλουσι τῇ τούτων προλήψει· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ οἱ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς κοινωνεῖν εἴπερ οὖν ἐπίσης ἄτοπος ὁ φθαρτοὺς ἡγούμενος τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ μὴ νομίζοντι προνοητικοὺς εἶναι καὶ φιλανθρώπους, ἐπίσης; διαπέπτωκεν Ἐπικούρῳ Χρύσιππος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εὐποιητικὸν ὁ δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν θεῶν.
39. And moreover, Chrysippus, in his Third Book of the Gods treating of the other Gods being nourished, says thus: “The other Gods indeed use nourishment, being equally sustained by it; but Jupiter and the World are sustained after another manner from those who are consumed and were engendered by fire.” Here indeed he declares, that all the other Gods are nourished except the World and Jupiter; but in his First Book of Providence he says. “Jupiter increases till he has consumed all things into himself. For since death is the separation of the soul from the body, and the soul of the World is not indeed separated, but increases continually till it has consumed all matter into itself, it is not to be said that the World dies.” Who can therefore appear to speak things more contradictory to himself than he who says that the same God is now nourished and again not nourished? Nor is there any need of gathering this by argument; for himself has plainly written in the same place: “But the World alone is said to be self-sufficient, because it alone has in itself all things it stands in need of, and is nourished and augmented of itself, the other parts being mutually changed into one another.” He is then repugnant to himself, not only by declaring in one place that all the Gods are nourished except the World and Jupiter, and saying in another, that the World also is nourished; but much more, when he affirms that the World increases by nourishing itself. Now the contrary had been much more probable, to wit, that the World alone does not increase, having its own destruction for its food; but that addition and increase are incident to the other Gods, who are nourished from without, and the World is rather consumed into them, if so it is that the World feeds on itself, and they always receive something and are nourished from that.
39. καὶ μὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ὁ Χρύσιππος περὶ τοῦ τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τάδε λέγει τροφῇ τε οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι θεοὶ χρῶνται, παραπλησίως συνεχόμενοι διʼ αὐτήν· ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ κόσμος καθʼ ἕτερον τρόπον ἀναλισκομένων καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς γινομένων ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀποφαίνεται πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τρέφεσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ Διός· ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Προνοίας τὸν Δία φησὶν αὔξεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι ἂν εἰς ἑαυτὴν καταναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον τίς ἂν οὖν ἐναντιώτερα λέγων ἑαυτῷ φανείη τοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν νῦν μὲν αὔξεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ τρέφεσθαι λέγοντος; καὶ τοῦτʼ οὐ δεῖ συλλογίζεσθαι· σαφῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γέγραφεν αὐτάρκης δʼ εἶναι λέγεται μόνος ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸ μόνος ἐν αὑτῷ πάντʼ ἔχειν ὧν δεῖται· καὶ τρέφεται ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ αὔξεται, τῶν ἄλλων μορίων εἰς ἄλληλα καταλλαττομένων οὐ μόνον οὖν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἀποφαίνων τρεφομένους, πλὴν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ Διός, ἐν τούτοις δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον λέγων τρέφεσθαι, μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτόν· ἀλλʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸν κόσμον αὔξεσθαί φησιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τρεφόμενον. τοὐναντίον δʼ εἰκὸς ἦν τοῦτον μόνον μὴ αὔξεσθαι τὴν αὑτοῦ φθίσιν ἔχοντα τροφήν, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἔξωθεν τρεφομένοις ἐπίδοσιν γίγνεσθαι καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς τούτους καταναλίσκεσθαι τὸν κόσμον, εἲ γʼ ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τούτοις δʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνου λαμβάνειν ἀεὶ τι καὶ τρέφεσθαι συμβέβηκε.
40. Secondly, the conception of the Gods contains in it felicity, blessedness, and self-perfection. Wherefore also Euripides is commended for saying:For God, if truly God, does nothing want,And all these speeches are but poets’ cant.But Chrysippus in the places I have alleged says, that the World only is self-sufficient, because this alone has in itself all things it needs. What then follows from this, that the World alone is self-sufficient? That neither the Sun, Moon, nor any other of the Gods is self-sufficient, and not being self-sufficient, they cannot be happy or blessed.
40. δεύτερον τοίνυν ἡ τῶν θεῶν ἔννοια περιέχει τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον καὶ αὐτοτελές. διὸ καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἐπαινοῦσιν εἰπόνταδεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστʼ ὀρθῶς; θεός,οὐδενός· ἀοιδῶν οἵδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.ἀλλʼ ὅ γε Χρύσιππος, ἐν οἷς παρεθέμην, αὐτάρκη μόνον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον φησὶ διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐν αὑτῷ πάντʼ ἔχειν ὧν δεῖται. τί οὖν ἕπεται τῷ μόνον αὐτάρκη τὸν κόσμον εἶναι; τὸ μήτε τὸν ἣλιον αὐτάρκη μήτε τὴν σελήνην εἶναι μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν θεῶν, αὐτάρκεις δὲ μὴ ὄντες οὐκ ἂν εἶεν εὐδαίμονες οὐδὲ μακάριοι.
41. He says, that the infant in the womb is nourished by Nature, like a plant; but when it is brought forth, being cooled and hardened by the air, it changes its spirit and becomes an animal; whence the soul is not unfitly named Psyche because of this refrigeration (ψύχειν). But again he esteems the soul the more subtile and fine spirit of Nature, therein contradicting himself; for how can a subtile thing be made of a gross one, and be rarefied by refrigeration and condensation? And what is more, how does he, declaring an animal to be made by refrigeration, think the sun to be animated, which is of fire and made of an exhalation changed into fire? For he says in his Third Book of Nature: “Now the change of fire is such, that it is turned by the air into water; and the earth subsiding from this, the air exhales; the air being subtilized, the ether is produced round about it; and the stars are, with the sun, kindled from the sea.” Now what is more contrary to kindling than refrigeration, or to rarefaction than condensation? For the one makes water and earth of fire and air, and the other changes that which is moist and earthy into fire and air. But yet in one place he makes kindling, in another cooling, to be the beginning of animation. And he moreover says, that when the inflammation is throughout, it lives and is an animal, but being again extinct and thickened, it is turned into water and earth and corporeity. Now in his First Book of Providence he says: “For the world, indeed, being wholly set on fire, is presently also the soul and guide of itself; but when it is changed into moisture, and has changed the soul remaining within it in some sort into a body and soul, so as to consist of these two, it is then after another manner.” Here, forsooth, he plainly says, that the inanimate parts of the world are by inflammation turned into an animated thing, and that again by extinction the soul is relaxed and moistened, being changed into corporeity. He seems therefore very absurd, one while by refrigeration making animals of senseless things, and again, by the same changing the greatest part of the world’s soul into senseless and inanimate things. But besides this, his discourse concerning the generation of the soul has a demonstration contrary to his own opinion; for he says, that the soul is generated when the infant is already brought forth, the spirit being changed by refrigeration, as by hardening. Now for the soul’s being engendered, and that after the birth, he chiefly uses this demonstration, that the children are for the most part in manners and inclinations like to their parents. Now the repugnancy of these things is evident. For it is not possible that the soul, which is not generated till after the birth, should have its inclination before the birth; or it will fall out that the soul is like before it is generated; that is, it will be in likeness, and yet not be, because it is not yet generated. But if any one says that, the likeness being bred in the tempers of the bodies, the souls are changed when they are generated, he destroys the argument of the soul’s being generated. For thus it may come to pass, that the soul, though not generated, may at its entrance into the body be changed by the mixture of likeness.
41. τὸ βρέφος ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ φύσει τρέφεσθαι νομίζει καθάπερ φυτόν· ὅταν δὲ τεχθῇ, ψυχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ στομούμενον τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλειν καὶ γίγνεσθαι ζῷον· ὅθεν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τὴν ψυχὴν ὠνομάσθαι παρὰ τὴν ψῦξιν αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον ἡγεῖται μαχόμενος ἑαυτῷ. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε λεπτομερὲς ἐκ παχυμεροῦς καὶ ἀραιὸν γενέσθαι κατὰ περίψυξιν καὶ πύκνωσιν; ὃ δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πῶς περιψύξει γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀποφαινόμενος ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ μεταβαλούσης; λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· διʼ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου, γῆς ὑφισταμένης, ἀὴρ ἀναθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ, οἱ δʼ ἀστέρες ἐκ θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνάπτονται τί οὖν ἀνάψει περιψύξεως ἐναντιώτερον ἢ διαχύσει πυκνώσεως; τὰ μὲν ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος ποιεῖ, τὰ δʼ εἰς πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα τρέπει τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ γεῶδες. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ὅπου μὲν τὴν ἄναψιν ὅπου δὲ τὴν περίψυξιν ἀρχὴν ἐμψυχίας ποιεῖ. καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, διόλου ζῆν καὶ ζῷον τὸν κόσμον εἶναί φησι σβεννύμενον δʼ αὖθις καὶ παχυνόμενον εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τρέπεσθαι. λέγει δʼ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Προνοίας διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἴς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον ἐνταῦθα δήπου σαφῶς τῇ μὲν ἐκπυρώσει καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα τοῦ κόσμου φησὶν εἰς τὸ ἔμψυχον τρέπεσθαι· τῇ δὲ σβέσει πάλιν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνίεσθαι καὶ ἀνυγραίνεσθαι, μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς τὸ σωματοειδές. ἄτοπος οὖν φαίνεται τῇ περιψύξει νῦν μὲν ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ποιῶν ἔμψυχα, νῦν δʼ εἰς ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἄψυχα μεταβάλλων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς γενέσεως αὐτῷ λόγος μαχομένην ἔχει πρὸς τὸ δόγμα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. γίγνεσθαι μὲν γάρ φησι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῇ, καθάπερ στομώσει τῇ περιψύξει τοῦ πνεύματος μεταβαλόντος· ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι μάλιστα τῷ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσι. βλέπεται δʼ ἡ τούτων ἐναντίωσις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀποκυήσεως ἠθοποιεῖσθαι, γιγνομένην μετὰ τὴν ἀποκύησιν ἢ συμβήσεται, πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι ψυχήν, ὁμοίαν εἶναι ψυχῇ, τουτέστι καὶ εἶναι τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ μὴ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μήπω γεγονέναι. εἰ δὲ φήσει τις ὅτι, ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων ἐγγιγνομένης τῆς ὁμοιότητος, αἱ ψυχαὶ γενόμεναι μεταβάλλουσι, διαφθείρει τὸ τεκμήριον τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ἀγένητον οὖσαν, ὅταν ἐπεισέλθῃ, μεταβάλλειν τῇ κράσει τῆς ὁμοιότητος.
42. He says sometimes, that the air is light and mounts upwards, and sometimes, that it is neither heavy nor light. For in his Second Book of Motion he says, that the fire, being without gravity, ascends upwards, and the air like to that; the water approaching more to the earth, and the air to the fire. But in his Physical Arts he inclines to the other opinion, that the air of itself has neither gravity nor levity.
42. τὸν ἀέρα ποτὲ μὲν ἀνωφερῆ καὶ κοῦφον εἶναί φησι, ποτὲ δὲ μήτε βαρὺν μήτε κοῦφον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Κινήσεως τό τε πῦρ ἀβαρὲς ὂν ἀνωφερὲς εἶναι λέγει καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου τοῦ δʼ ἀέρος τῷ πυρί ἐν δὲ ταῖς Φυσικαῖς Τέχναις ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν ῥέπει δόξαν, ὡς μήτε βάρος ἐξ αὑτοῦ μήτε κουφότητα τοῦ ἀέρος ἔχοντος.
43. He says that the air is by nature dark, and uses this as an argument of its being also the first cold; for that its darkness is opposite to the brightness, and its coldness to the heat of fire. Moving this in his First Book of Natural Questions, he again in his treatise of Habits says, that habits are nothing else but airs; for bodies are contained by these, and the cause that every one of the bodies contained in any habit is such as it is, is the containing air, which they call in iron hardness, in stone solidness, in silver whiteness. These words have in them much absurdity and contradiction. For if the air remains such as it is of its own nature, how comes black, in that which is not white, to be made whiteness; and soft, in that which is not hard, to be made hardness; and rare, in that which is not thick, to be made thickness? But if, being mixed with these, it is altered and made like to them, how is it a habit or power or cause of these things by which it is subdued? For such a change, by which it loses its own qualities, is the property of a patient, not of an agent, and not of a thing containing, but of a thing languishing. Yet they everywhere affirm, that matter, being of its own nature idle and motionless, is subjected to qualities, and that the qualities are spirits, which, being also aerial tensions, give a form and figure to every part of matter to which they adhere. These things they cannot rationally say, supposing the air to be such as they affirm it. For if it is a habit and tension, it will assimilate every body to itself, so that it shall be black and soft. But if by the mixture with these things it receives forms contrary to those it has, it will be in some sort the matter, and not the cause or power of matter.
43. τὸν ἀέρα φύσει ζοφερὸν εἶναι λέγει, καὶ τούτῳ τεκμηρίῳ χρῆται τοῦ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι πρώτως· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ζοφερὸν πρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν πρὸς τὴν θερμότητα τοῦ πυρός. ταῦτα κινῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων πάλιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς· ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα· καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν ἕξει συνεχομένων ὁ συνέχων αἴτιος ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ πυκνότητα δʼ ἐν λίθῳ λευκότητα δʼ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσι, πολλὴν ἀτοπίαν καὶ μάχην τούτων ἐχόντων· εἰ μὲν γὰρ μένει ὁποῖὸς γʼ ἐστι φύσει, πῶς τὸ μέλαν ἐν τῷ μὴ λευκῷ λευκότης γίγνεται καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν ἐν τῷ μὴ σκληρῷ σκληρότης καὶ τὸ μανὸν ἐν τῷ μὴ πυκνῷ πυκνότης; εἰ δὲ μιγνύμενος ἐν τούτοις ἐξίσταται καὶ συνομοιοῦται, πῶς ἕξις ἐστὶν ἢ δύναμις ἢ αἰτία τούτων, ὑφʼ ὧν κρατεῖται; πάσχοντος γάρ ἐστιν, οὐ δρῶντος οὐδὲ συνέχοντος ἀλλʼ ἐξασθενοῦντος, ἡ τοιαύτη μεταβολή, καθʼ ἣν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς αὑτοῦ ποιότητας, καίτοι πανταχοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις, οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης, εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἔνεστι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, τὸν ἀέρα φύσει τοιοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένοις· ἕξις γὰρ ὢν καὶ τόνος αὑτῷ συνεξομοιώσει τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον, ὥστε μέλαν εἶναι καὶ μαλθακόν· εἰ δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κράσει τὰς ἐναντίας λαμβάνει μορφὰς αἷς ἔχειν πέφυκεν, ὕλη τρόπον τινὰ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ αἴτιον οὐδὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν.
44. It is often said by Chrysippus, that there is without the world an infinite vacuum, and that this infinity has neither beginning, middle, nor end. And by this the Stoics chiefly refute that spontaneous motion of the atoms downward, which is taught by Epicurus; there not being in infinity any difference according to which one thing is thought to be above, another below. But in his Fourth Book of Things Possible, having supposed a certain middle place and middle region, he says that the world is situated there. The words are these: “Wherefore, if it is to be said of the world that it is corruptible, this seems to want proof; yet nevertheless it rather appears to me to be so. However, its occupation of the place wherein it stands cooperates very much towards its seeming to be incorruptible, because it is in the midst; since if it were thought to be anywhere else, corruption would absolutely take hold of it.” And again, a little after: “For so also in a manner has essence happened eternally to possess the middle place, being immediately from the beginning such as it is; so that both by another manner and through this chance it admits not any corruption, and is therefore eternal.” These words have one apparent and visible contradiction, to wit, his admitting a certain middle place and middle region in infinity. They have also a second, more obscure indeed, but withal more absurd than this. For thinking that the world would not have remained incorruptible if its situation had happened to have been in any other part of the vacuum, he manifestly appears to have feared lest, the parts of essence moving towards the middle, there should be a dissolution and corruption of the world. Now this he would not have feared, had he not thought that bodies do by nature tend from every place towards the middle, not of essence, but of the region containing essence; of which also he has frequently spoken, as of a thing impossible and contrary to Nature; for that (as he says) there is not in the vacuum any difference by which bodies are drawn rather this way than that way, but the construction of the world is the cause of motion, bodies inclining and being carried from every side to the centre and middle of it. It is sufficient to this purpose, to set down the text out of his Second Book of Motion; for having discoursed, that the world indeed is a perfect body, but that the parts of the world are not perfect, because they have in some sort respect to the whole and are not of themselves; and going forward concerning its motion, as having been framed by Nature to be moved by all its parts towards compaction and cohesion, and not towards dissolution and breaking, he says thus: “But the universe thus tending and being moved to the same point, and the parts having the same motion from the nature of the body, it is probable that all bodies have this first motion according to Nature towards the centre of the world,—the world being thus moved as regards itself, and the parts being thus moved as being its parts.” What then ailed you, good sir (might some one say to him), that you have so far forgotten those words, as to affirm that the world, if it had not casually possessed the middle place, would have been dissoluble and corruptible? For if it is by Nature so framed as always to incline towards the middle, and its parts from every side tend to the same, into what place soever of the vacuum it should have been transposed,—thus containing and (as it were) embracing itself,—it would have remained incorruptible and without danger of breaking. For things that are broken and dissipated suffer this by the separation and dissolution of their parts, every one of them hasting to its own place from that which it had contrary to Nature. But you, being of opinion that, if the world should have been seated in any other place of the vacuum, it would have been wholly liable to corruption, and affirming the same, and therefore asserting a middle in that which naturally can have no middle,— to wit, in that which is infinite,—have indeed dismissed these tensions, coherences, and inclinations, as having nothing available to its preservation, and attributed all the cause of its permanency to the possession of place. And, as if you were ambitious to confute yourself, to the things you have said before you join this also: “In whatsoever manner every one of the parts moves, being coherent to the rest, it is agreeable to reason that in the same also the whole should move by itself; yea, though we should, for argument’s sake, imagine and suppose it to be in some vacuity of this world; for as, being kept in on every side, it would move towards the middle, so it would continue in the same motion, though by way of disputation we should admit that there were on a sudden a vacuum round about it.” No part then whatsoever, though encompassed by a vacuum, loses its inclination moving it towards the middle of the world; but the world itself, if chance had not prepared it a place in the middle, would have lost its containing vigor, the parts of its essence being carried some one way, some another.
44. ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ἐκτὸς ἄπειρόν ἐστι, τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε μέσον οὔτε τελευτὴν ἔχει πολλάκις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ λέγεται. καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα τὴν λεγομένην ὑπʼ Ἐπικούρου τῆς ἀτόμου κάτω φορὰν ἐξ αὑτῆς ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἀπείρῳ διαφορᾶς, καθʼ ἣν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω νοεῖται γιγνόμενον. ἀλλʼ ἔν γε τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Δυνατῶν μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσην χώραν ὑποθέμενος ἐνταῦθά φησιν ἱδρῦσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἔστι δʼ ἡ λέξις αὕτη διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου εἰ ῥητέον αὐτὸν φθαρτὸν εἶναι, λόγου οἴομαι δεῖσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐμοὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχειν. οἱονεὶ δʼ εἰς τὴν ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσίαν πολύ τι αὐτῷ συνεργεῖ καὶ ἡ τῆς χώρας; κατάληψις, οἷον διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· ἐπεί, εἰ ἀλλαχῆ νοηθείη ὤν, καὶ παντελῶς ἂν αὐτῷ συνάπτοι ἡ φθορά. καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν αὖθις οὕτω γάρ πως καὶ ἡ οὐσία συντέτευχεν ἀιδίως τὸν μέσον κατειληφυῖα τόπον, εὐθὺς τοιάδε τις οὖσα, ὥστε καθʼ ἕτερον τρόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συντυχίαν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι αὐτὴν φθοράν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἀίδιον. ταῦτα μίαν μὲν ἔχει καταφανῆ καὶ βλεπομένην ἐναντίωσιν, ἐν ἀπείρῳ μέσον τινὰ τόπον καὶ μέσην χώραν ἀπολείποντος· δευτέραν δʼ ἀδηλοτέραν μὲν ἀλογωτέραν δὲ ταύτης;. οἰόμενος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄφθαρτον διαμένειν τὸν κόσμον, εἰ κατʼ ἄλλο μέρος αὐτῷ τοῦ κενοῦ συντέτευχε γενέσθαι τὴν ἵδρυσιν, δῆλός ἐστι δεδιὼς μή, τῶν μερῶν τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερομένων, διάλυσις καὶ φθορὰ τοῦ κόσμου γένοιτο. ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐφοβεῖτο, μὴ φύσει τὰ σώματα φέρεσθαι πανταχόθεν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἡγούμενος οὐ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς περιεχούσης τὴν οὐσίαν χώρας. περὶ οὗ καὶ πολλάκις εἴρηκεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κενῷ διαφοράν, ἣ τὰ σώματα δευρὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δευρὶ προσάγεται· τὴν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου σύνταξιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ νευόντων καὶ φερομένων πανταχόθεν ἀρκεῖ δʼ εἰς τοῦτο παραθέσθαι λέξιν ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου περὶ Κινήσεως. ὑπειπὼν γὰρ ὅτι τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθʼ αὑτὰ εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ διελθὼν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν συμμονὴν καὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν μερῶν πάντων πεφυκότος, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ τὴν θρύψιν; ταῦτʼ ἐπείρηκεν οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανὸν πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὑτόν, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν εἶτα, φήσαι τις ἄν, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τί παθὼν ἐπελάθου τῶν λόγων τούτων, ὥστε τὸν κόσμον, εἰ μὴ τὴν μέσην χώραν ἐκ τύχης κατειλήφει, διαλυτὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἀποφαίνειν; εἰ γὰρ αὐτός γε νεύειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτοῦ μέσον ἀεὶ πέφυκε καὶ τὰ μέρη πρὸς τοῦτο κατατείνειν πανταχόθεν, ὅποι ποτʼ ἂν τοῦ κενοῦ μετατεθῇ, συνέχων ἑαυτὸν οὕτω καὶ περιστέλλων, ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἄθρυπτος διαμενεῖ· τὰ γὰρ θρυπτόμενα καὶ σκεδαννύμενα τοῦτο πάσχει διακρίσει τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστου καὶ διαλύσει πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπορρέοντος σὺ δὴ κατʼ ἄλλο τοῦ κενοῦ τεθέντα τὸν κόσμον οἰόμενος οὕτω παντελεῖ συνάπτεσθαι φθορᾷ καὶ λέγων οὕτω καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μέσον ἐν τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν πεφυκότι μέσον ζητῶν ἀπείρῳ, τὰς μὲν τάσεις καὶ τὰς συνοχὰς καὶ νεύσεις ἐκείνας, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐχέγγυον εἰς σωτηρίαν ἐχούσας, ἀφῆκας, τῇ δὲ καταλήψει τοῦ τόπου τὴν σύμπασαν αἰτίαν τῆς διαμονῆς ἀνέθηκας. καίτοι τοῖς προειρημένοις ταυτὶ συνάπτεις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς σεαυτὸν ἐξελέγξαι φιλοτιμούμενος· ὃν τρόπον δὲ κινεῖται ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων συμφυὲς ὂν τῷ λοιπῷ, εὔλογον οὕτω καὶ καθʼ αὑτὸ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ λόγου χάριν νοήσαιμεν αὐτὸ καὶ ὑποθοίμεθα εἶναι ἐν κενῷ τινι τοῦ κόσμου τούτου· ὡς γὰρ ἂν συνεχόμενον πάντοθεν ἐκινεῖτο ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, μενεῖ ἐν τῇ κινήσει ταύτῃ, κἂν λόγου χάριν ἐξαίφνης περὶ αὐτὸ γένηται κενόν. εἶτα μέρος μὲν ὁτιοῦν ὑπὸ κενοῦ περιληφθὲν οὐκ ἀποβάλλει τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον ἄγουσαν ῥοπήν· αὐτὸς δʼ ὁ κόσμος, ἂν μὴ τὴν μέσην παρασκευάσῃ χώραν αὐτῷ τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀπολεῖ τὸν συνεκτικὸν τόνον, ἄλλοις ἀλλαχόσε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ μέρεσι φερόμενος.
45. And these things indeed contain great contradictions to natural reason; but this is also repugnant to the doctrine concerning God and Providence, that assigning to them the least causes, he takes from them the most principal and greatest. For what is more principal than the permanency of the world, or that its essence, united in its parts, is contained in itself? But this, as Chrysippus says, fell out casually. For if the possession of place is the cause of incorruptibility, and this was the production of chance, it is manifest that the preservation of the universe is a work of chance, and not of Fate and Providence.
45. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει μεγάλας ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον· ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ προνοίας, τὸ τὰ μικρότατα τῶν αἰτίων τούτοις ἀνατιθέντα τὸ κυριώτατον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μέγιστον. τί γάρ ἐστι κυριώτερον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διαμονῆς καὶ τοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡνωμένην τοῖς μέρεσι συνέχεσθαι πρὸς αὑτήν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε συμπέπτωκεν αὐτομάτως κατὰ Χρύσιππον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ τόπου κατάληψις αἰτία τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶν αὕτη δὲ συντυχίᾳ γέγονε, δῆλον ὅτι συντυχίας ἔργον ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν, οὐχ εἱμαρμένης καὶ προνοίας.
46. Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but be repugnant to his doctrine of Fate? For if that is not possible which either is true or shall be true, as Diodorus has it, but every thing which is capable of being, though it never shall be, is possible, there will be many things possible which will never be according to invincible, inviolable, and all-conquering Fate. And thus either Fate will lose its power; or if that, as Chrysippus thinks, has existence, that which is susceptible of being will often fall out to be impossible. And every thing indeed which is true will be necessary, being comprehended by the principal of all necessities; and every thing that is false will be impossible, having the greatest cause to oppose its ever being true. For how is it possible that he should be susceptible of dying on the land, who is destined to die at sea? And how is it possible for him who is at Megara to come to Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?
46. ὁ δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν λόγος πρὸς τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης λόγον αὐτῷ πῶς οὐ μαχόμενός ἐστιν; εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ὅπερ ἤ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ἔσται κατὰ Διόδωρον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι, κἂν μὴ μέλλῃ γενήσεσθαι, δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἔσται δὲ δυνατὰ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀνεκβίαστον καὶ περιγενητικὴν ἁπάντων, ἢ ἡ εἱμαρμένη τὴν δύναμιν ἀπόλλυσιν ἢ, τοιαύτης, οἵαν ἀξιοῖ Χρύσιππος, οὔσης, τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι πολλάκις εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐμπεσεῖται. καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν ἀνάγκῃ κατειλημμένον· πᾶν δὲ ψεῦδος ἀδύνατον, τὴν μεγίστην ἔχον αἰτίαν ἀντιπίπτουσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς γενέσθαι. ᾧ γὰρ ἐν θαλάσσῃ πεπρωμένον ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν, πῶς ἅμʼ οἷόν τε τοῦτον ἐπιδεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν γῇ ἀποθανεῖν; τί δέ; τὸν Μεγαροῖ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κωλυόμενον;
47. But moreover, the things that are boldly asserted by him concerning fantasies or imaginations are very opposite to Fate. For desiring to show that fantasy is not of itself a perfect cause of consent, he says, that the Sages will prejudice us by imprinting false imaginations in our minds, if fantasies do of themselves absolutely cause consent; for wise men often make use of falsity against the wicked, representing a probable imagination,—which is yet not the cause of consent, for then it would be also a cause of false apprehension and error. Any one therefore, transferring these things from the wise man to Fate, may say, that consents are not caused by Fate; for if they were, false consents and opinions and deceptions would also be by Fate, and men would be endamaged by Fate. Thus the reason which exempts the wise man from doing hurt also demonstrates at the same time that Fate is not the cause of all things. For if men neither opine nor are prejudiced by Fate, it is manifest also that they neither act rightly nor are wise nor remain firm in their sentiments nor have utility by Fate, but that there is an end of Fate’s being the cause of all things. Now if any one shall say that Chrysippus makes not Fate the absolute cause of all things, but only a procatarctical (or antecedent) one, he will again show that he is contradictory to himself, since he excessively praises Homer for saying of Jupiter,Receive whatever ill or goodHe sends to each of you;as also Euripides for these words,O Jove, how can I say that wretched we,Poor mortals, aught do understand? On theeWe all depend, and nothing can transact,But as thy sacred wisdom shall enact.And himself writes many things agreeable to these. In fine, he says that nothing, be it never so little, either rests or is moved otherwise than according to the reason of Jupiter, which is the same thing with Fate. Moreover, the antecedent cause is weaker than the absolute one, and attains not to its effect when it is subdued by others that rise up against it. But he himself, declaring Fate to be an invincible, unimpeachable, and inflexible cause, calls it Atropos, Adrasteia, Necessity, and Pepromene (as putting a limit to all things). Whether then shall we say, that neither consents nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor doing ill is in our power? Or shall we affirm, that Fate is deficient, that terminating destiny is unable to determine, and that the motions and habits of Jupiter cannot accomplish? For the one of these two consequences will follow from Fate’s being an absolute, the other from its being only antecedent cause. For if it is an absolute cause, it takes away our free will and leaves nothing in our power; and if it is only antecedent, it loses its being unimpeachable and effectual. For not once or ten times, but everywhere, especially in his Physics, he has written, that there are many obstacles and impediments to particular natures and motions, but none to that of the universe. And how can the motion of the universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be undisturbed and unimpeached, if these are stopped and hindered? For neither can the nature of man be free from impediment, if that of the foot or hand is not so; nor can the motion of a ship but be hindered, if there are any obstacles about the sails or the operation of the oars. Besides all this, if the fantasies are not according to Fate, neither are they causes of consents; but if, because it imprints fantasies leading to consent, the consents are said to be according to Fate, how is it not contrary to itself, imprinting in the greatest matters different imaginations and such as draw the understanding contrary ways? For (they say) those who adhere to one of them, and withhold not their consent, do amiss: if they yield to obscure things, they stumble; if to false, they are deceived; if to such as are not commonly comprehended, they opine. And yet one of these three is of necessity,—either that every fantasy is not the work of Fate, or that every receipt and consent of fantasy is faultless, or that Fate itself is not irreprehensible. For I do not know how it can be blameless, pro posing to us such fantasies that not the resisting or going against them, but the following and yielding to them, is blamable. Moreover, both Chrysippus and Antipater, in their disputes against the Academics, take not a little pains to prove that we neither act nor are incited without consent, saying, that they build on fictions and false suppositions who think that, a proper fantasy being presented, we are presently incited, without having either yielded or consented. Again, Chrysippus says, that God imprints in us false imaginations, as does also the wise man; not that they would have us consent or yield to them, but only that we should act and be incited with regard to that which appears; but we, being evil, do through infirmity consent to such fantasies. Now the perplexity and discrepancy of these discourses among themselves are not very difficult to be discerned. For he that would not have men consent but only act according to the fantasies which he presents unto them—whether he be God or a wise man knows that the fantasies are sufficient for acting, and that consents are superfluous. For if, knowing that the imagination gives us not an instinct to work without consent, he ministers to us false and probable fantasies, he is the voluntary cause of our falling and erring by assenting to incomprehensible things.
47. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν λεγόμενα νεανικῶς πρὸς τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐναντιοῦται. τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν, εἴρηκεν ὅτι βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανήν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ μεταφέρων ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγῃ μὴ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην γίγνεσθαι τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἔσονται καὶ ψευδεῖς ῖς συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὑπολήψεις καὶ ἀπάται καὶ βλαβήσονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ὁ τοῦ βλάπτειν τὸν σοφὸν ἐξαιρούμενος λόγος ἅμα καὶ τὸ μὴ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀποδείκνυσιν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε δοξάζουσι μήτε βλάπτονται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κατορθοῦσιν οὐδὲ φρονοῦσιν οὐδʼ ὑπολαμβάνουσι βεβαίως οὐδʼ ὠφελοῦνται διὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλʼ οἴχεται τὸ πάντων αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. ὁ δὲ λέγων, ὅτι Χρύσιππος οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ τούτων αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην, ἐκεῖ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἀποδείξει μαχόμενον πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅπου τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγοντα τῷ ἔχεθʼ, ὅττι κεν ὔμμι κακὸν πέμπῃσιν ἑκάστῳ ἢ ἀγαθόν· καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδηνὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺςφρονεῖν λέγοιμʼ ἄν; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,δρῶμέν τε τοιάδʼ, ἃ σύ γε τυγχάνεις φρονῶν.αὐτὸς δὲ πολλὰ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενα γράφει, τέλος δέ φησι μηδὲν ἴσχεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον, ὃν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν προκαταρκτικὸν αἴτιον ἀσθενέστερόν ἐστι τοῦ αὐτοτελοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐξικνεῖται κρατούμενον ὑπʼ ἄλλων ἐξανισταμένων· τὴν δʼ εἱμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον ἀποφαίνων αὐτὸς Ἄτροπον καλεῖ καὶ Ἀδράστειαν καὶ Ἀνάγκην καὶ Πεπρωμένην ὡς πέρας ἅπασιν ἐπιτιθεῖσαν. πότερον οὖν τὰς συγκαταθέσεις μὴ λέγωμεν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι μηδὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς μηδὲ τὰς κακίας μηδὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν μηδὲ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἢ τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγωμεν ἐλλείπουσαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν πεπρωμένην ἀπεράτωτον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Διὸς κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀσυντελέστους; τούτων γὰρ ἕπεται τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτοτελῆ τὰ δὲ τῷ προκαταρκτικὴν μόνον αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. αὐτοτελὴς μὲν γὰρ αἰτία πάντων οὖσα τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον ἀναιρεῖ, προκαταρκτικὴ δὲ τὸ ἀκώλυτος εἶναι καὶ τελεσιουργὸς ἀπόλλυσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δὶς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον δʼ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς γέγραφε ταῖς μὲν κατὰ μέρος φύσεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν ἐνστήματα πολλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κωλύματα, τῇ δὲ τῶν ὅλων μηδέν. καὶ πῶς εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡ τῶν ὅλων διατείνουσα κίνησις, ἐμποδιζομένων καὶ κωλυομένων ἐκείνων, ἀνεμπόδιστος αὐτὴ καὶ ἀκώλυτός ἐστιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τἀνθρώπου φύσις ἀνεμπόδιστος, εἰ μηδʼ ἡ τοῦ ποδὸς ἢ τῆς χειρός· οὐδʼ τῆς νεὼς κίνησις ἀκώλυτος ἂν εἴη, ἂν αἱ περὶ τὸ ἱστίον ἢ τὴν εἰρεσίαν ἐνέργειαι κωλύσεις τινὰς ἔχωσιν. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, εἰ μὲν αἱ φαντασίαι μὴ γίγνονται καθʼ εἱμαρμένην … τῶν συγκαταθέσεων· εἰ δʼ ὅτι ποιεῖ φαντασίας ἀγωγοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, καθʼ εἱμαρμένην αἱ συγκαταθέσεις γίγνεσθαι λέγονται, πῶς οὐ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὴν πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις διαφόρους ποιοῦσα φαντασίας καὶ περισπώσας ἐπὶ τἀναντία τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτε τοὺς προστιθεμένους τῇ ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ ἐπέχοντας ἁμαρτάνειν λέγουσιν· ἂν μὲν ἀδήλοις εἴκωσι, προπίπτοντας· ἂν δὲ ψευδέσι, διαψευδομένους· ἂν δὲ κοινῶς ἀκαταλήπτοις, δοξάζοντας; καίτοι δεῖ, τριῶν ὄντων, ἢ μὴ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν εἱμαρμένης ἔργον ἢ πᾶσαν παραδοχὴν φαντασίας καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἀναμάρτητον ἢ μηδʼ αὐτὴν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀνεπίληπτον οὐκ οἶδα γὰρ ὅπως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι τοιαύτας ποιοῦσα φαντασίας, αἷς τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι μηδʼ ἀντιβαίνειν ἀλλʼ ἕπεσθαι καὶ εἴκειν ἐγκλητόν ἐστι. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος λόγος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήθʼ ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς; ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας, οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης, εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους. αὖθις δέ φησι Χρὺσιππος καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐ συγκατατιθεμένων οὐδʼ εἰκόντων δεομένους ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον καὶ ὁρμώντων ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον· ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. ἡ δὲ τούτων τῶν λόγων ταραχὴ καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ πάνυ δυσθεώρητός ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐ δεόμενος συγκατατιθεμένων ἀλλὰ πραττόντων μόνον, οἷς ἐνδίδωσι τὰς φαντασίας, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε σοφός, οἶδεν ὅτι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἀρκοῦσιν αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ παρέλκουσιν αἱ συγκαταθέσεις· ὡς εἴ γε, γιγνώσκων ὅτι πρακτικὴν ὁρμὴν οὐ παρίστησι φαντασία δίχα συγκαταθέσεως, ψευδεῖς ἐνεργάζεται καὶ πιθανὰς φαντασίας, ἑκὼν αἴτιός ἐστι τοῦ προπίπτειν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀκαταλήπτοις συγκατατιθεμένους.