94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in among them, they separated and took up their positions on different heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was taking place. Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and, in the words of the poet, “some deep design suspecting;” and partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and, killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops and brought them down to the main body. Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy. Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people, for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.
94. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς στενοῖς φυλάττοντες ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν τὰ φῶτα προσβάλλοντα πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολάς, νομίσαντες ταύτῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἀπολιπόντες τὰς δυσχωρίας παρεβοήθουν τοῖς ἄκροις. ἐγγίζοντες δὲ τοῖς βουσὶν ἠποροῦντο διὰ τὰ φῶτα, μεῖζόν τι τοῦ συμβαίνοντος καὶ δεινότερον ἀναπλάττοντες καὶ προσδοκῶντες. ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν λογχοφόρων, οὗτοι μὲν βραχέα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολισάμενοι, τῶν βοῶν αὐτοῖς ἐμπιπτόντων ἔμειναν διαστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων ἀμφότεροι καὶ προσανεῖχον καραδοκοῦντες τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς ἡμέρας διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι γνῶναι τὸ γινόμενον. Φάβιος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπορούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ὀισσάμενος δόλον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεύειν οὐδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῷ χάρακι καὶ προσεδέχετο τὴν ἡμέραν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, προχωρούντων αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, τήν τε δύναμιν διεκόμισε διὰ τῶν στενῶν μετʼ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τὴν λείαν, λελοιπότων τοὺς τόπους τῶν παραφυλαττόντων τὰς δυσχωρίας. ἅμα δὲ τῷ φωτὶ συνιδὼν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις ἀντικαθημένους τοῖς λογχοφόροις ἐπαπέστειλέ τινας τῶν Ἰβήρων, οἳ καὶ συμμίξαντες κατέβαλον μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς χιλίους, ῥᾳδίως δὲ τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν εὐζώνους ἐκδεξάμενοι κατεβίβασαν. Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐκ τοῦ Φαλέρνου ποιησάμενος τὴν ἔξοδον, λοιπὸν ἤδη στρατοπεδεύων ἀσφαλῶς κατεσκέπτετο καὶ προυνοεῖτο περὶ τῆς χειμασίας ποῦ καὶ πῶς ποιήσεται, μέγαν φόβον καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεστακὼς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνθρώποις. Φάβιος δὲ κακῶς μὲν ἤκουε παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς ἀνάνδρως ἐκ τοιούτων τόπων προέμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, οὐ μὴν ἀφίστατό γε τῆς προθέσεως. καὶ ἀναγκασθεὶς δὲ μετʼ ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐπί τινας ἀπελθεῖν θυσίας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην παρέδωκεν τῷ συνάρχοντι τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ πολλὰ χωριζόμενος ἐνετείλατο μὴ τοσαύτην ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἡλίκην ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτοὺς παθεῖν δεινόν. ὧν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν νῷ τιθέμενος Μάρκος ἔτι λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν.
95. While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.
95. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν διάθεσιν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσιν Ἀσδρούβας ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας στρατηγὸς κατηρτικὼς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ τὰς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ καταλειφθείσας τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ δέκα προσπεπληρωκὼς ἄλλας, ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας ἀνήχθη τετταράκοντα ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως, προχειρισάμενος Ἀμίλκαν τοῦ στόλου ναύαρχον. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πεζὴν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ἡθροικὼς δύναμιν ἀνέζευξε· καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλόν, σπεύδων ἀμφοτέραις ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καταζεῦξαι πρὸς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν. Γνάιος δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς συλλογιζόμενος τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλετο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν. ἀκούων δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς παρασκευῆς τὸ μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἀπαντᾶν ἀπεδοκίμασε, συμπληρώσας δὲ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ πεζικοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἄνδρας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβατικὴν χρείαν ἀνήχθη καὶ κατῆρε δευτεραῖος ἐκ Ταρράκωνος εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν τόπους. καθορμισθεὶς δὲ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν ἀποστήματι περὶ τοὺς ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους προαπέστειλε κατασκεψομένας δύο ναῦς ταχυπλοούσας Μασσαλιητικάς· καὶ γὰρ προκαθηγοῦντο καὶ προεκινδύνευον οὗτοι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀποτόμως σφίσι παρείχοντο τὴν χρείαν. εὐγενῶς γάρ, εἰ καί τινες ἕτεροι, κεκοινωνήκασι Ῥωμαίοις πραγμάτων καὶ Μασσαλιῶται, πολλάκις μὲν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἀννιβιακὸν πόλεμον. διασαφούντων δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν ἐκπεμφθέντων ὅτι περὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμβαίνει τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὁρμεῖν στόλον, ἀνήγετο κατὰ σπουδήν, βουλόμενος ἄφνω προσπεσεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις.
96. But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken twenty-five of the enemy’s ships. In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design that they should command the sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.
96. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, σημηνάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἅμα τὰς πεζικὰς ἐξέταττον δυνάμεις παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν καὶ τοῖς πληρώμασι παρήγγελλον ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σύνεγγυς ὄντων, σημήναντες πολεμικὸν ἀνήγοντο, κρίναντες ναυμαχεῖν. συμβαλόντες δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις βραχὺν μέν τινα χρόνον ἀντεποιήσαντο τῆς νίκης, μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κλίνειν ὥρμησαν. ἡ γὰρ ἐφεδρεία τῶν πεζῶν ἡ περὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν οὐχ οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὤνησε, θάρσος παριστάνουσα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ὡς ἔβλαψε τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας ἑτοίμην παρασκευάζουσα. πλὴν δύο μὲν αὐτάνδρους νῆας ἀποβαλόντες, τεττάρων δὲ τοὺς ταρσοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας ἔφευγον ἐκκλίναντες εἰς γῆν. ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς ἐκθύμως, τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἐξέβαλον εἰς τὸν αἰγιαλόν, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἀποπηδήσαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων ἐσῴζοντο πρὸς τοὺς παρατεταγμένους. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τολμηρῶς συνεγγίσαντες τῇ γῇ καὶ τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι τῶν πλοίων ἀναδησάμενοι μετὰ χαρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀπέπλεον, νενικηκότες μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, κρατοῦντες δὲ τῆς θαλάττης, εἴκοσι δὲ καὶ πέντε ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν πολεμίων. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἰλήφει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰς ἐλπίδας διὰ τὸ προειρημένον κατόρθωμα. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ γεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, παραχρῆμα πληρώσαντες ἑβδομήκοντα νῆας ἐξαπέστειλαν, κρίναντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. αἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς Σαρδόνʼ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πίσας τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας προσέβαλον, πεπεισμένων τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων συμμίξειν ἐνθάδε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀναχθέντων ἐπʼ αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥώμης ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς, πυθόμενοι τὸν ἀνάπλουν οὗτοι μὲν αὖθις ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Σαρδόνα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰς Καρχηδόνα. Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος ἔχων τὸν προειρημένον στόλον ἕως μέν τινος ἐπηκολούθει τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, συνάψειν πεπεισμένος, πολὺ δὲ καθυστερῶν ἀπέγνω. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῆς Σικελίας Λιλυβαίῳ προσέσχε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταπλεύσας τῆς Λιβύης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Κερκινητῶν νῆσον καὶ λαβὼν παρʼ αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν ἀπηλλάγη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀνάπλουν γενόμενος κύριος νήσου Κοσσύρου καὶ φρουρὰν εἰς τὸ πολισμάτιον εἰσαγαγὼν αὖθις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον κατῆρε. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὗτος μὲν αὐτοῦ συνορμίσας τὸν στόλον μετʼ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὸς ἀνεκομίσθη πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις·
97. When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia, and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia, effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance. When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum, they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their fleet was coasting down parallel with them.
97. οἱ δʼ ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς προτέρημα διὰ τοῦ Γναΐου περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ νομίσαντες χρήσιμον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μὴ προΐεσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀλλʼ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὔξειν, προχειρισάμενοι ναῦς εἴκοσι καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσαντες Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἐξαπέστελλον μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Γνάιον, κοινῇ πράξοντα μετʼ ἐκείνου τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. πάνυ γὰρ ἠγωνίων μὴ κρατήσαντες Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν τόπων ἐκείνων καὶ περιποιησάμενοι χορηγίας ἀφθόνους καὶ χεῖρας ἀντιποιήσωνται μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ὁλοσχερέστερον, συνεπιθῶνται δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, στρατόπεδα πέμποντες καὶ χρήματα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. διόπερ ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον ἐξαπέστειλαν τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. ὃς καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ συμμίξας τἀδελφῷ μεγάλην παρεῖχε χρείαν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. οὐδέποτε γὰρ πρότερον θαρρήσαντες διαβῆναι τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν, ἀλλʼ ἀσμενίζοντες τῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε φιλίᾳ καὶ συμμαχίᾳ τότε διέβησαν καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρρησαν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῶν πέραν πραγμάτων, μεγάλα καὶ ταὐτομάτου συνεργήσαντος σφίσι πρὸς τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιρούς. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διάβασιν οἰκοῦντας τῶν Ἰβήρων ἧκον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν, ἀποσχόντες σταδίους ὡς τετταράκοντα περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν, λαβόντες τόπον εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρός τε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκ θαλάττης χορηγίαν· ὁμοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν στόλον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν παράπλουν. ἔνθα δὴ γίνεταί τις πραγμάτων περιπέτεια τοιάδε.
98. Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, from the Iberian towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx, who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen, and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now crossed the Iber, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it, and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this; but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in heaping favours on the author of such a service.” By these and similar arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.
98. καθʼ οὓς καιροὺς Ἀννίβας ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἠπίστησε τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ὅμηρα τοὺς υἱεῖς τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν· οὓς πάντας εἰς τὴν Ζακανθαίων ἀπέθετο πόλιν διά τε τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπολειπομένων ἐπʼ αὐτῆς ἀνδρῶν πίστιν. ἦν δέ τις ἀνὴρ Ἴβηρ, Ἀβίλυξ ὄνομα, κατὰ μὲν τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου περίστασιν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος Ἰβήρων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν πολύ τι διαφέρειν δοκῶν τῶν ἄλλων. οὗτος θεωρῶν τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐλπίδας, συνελογίσατο παρʼ ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων προδοσίας συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν. πεισθεὶς γὰρ διότι δύναται μέγας γενέσθαι παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις προσενεγκάμενος ἐν καιρῷ πίστιν ἅμα καὶ χρείαν, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ παρασπονδήσας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐγχειρίσαι τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Βώστορα τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, ὃς ἀπεστάλη μὲν ὑπʼ Ἀσδρούβου κωλύσων τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμόν, οὐ θαρρήσας δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀνακεχωρηκὼς ἐστρατοπέδευε τῆς Ζακάνθης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς θάλατταν μέρεσιν, τοῦτον μὲν ἄκακον ὄντα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πρᾷον τῇ φύσει, πιστῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενον, ποιεῖται λόγους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμήρων πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ διαβεβήκασι Ῥωμαῖοι τὸν ποταμόν, οὐκέτι δύνασθαι Καρχηδονίους φόβῳ συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, προσδεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τῆς τῶν ὑποταττομένων εὐνοίας· νῦν οὖν ἠγγικότων Ῥωμαίων καὶ προσκαθεζομένων τῇ Ζακάνθῃ, καὶ κινδυνευούσης τῆς πόλεως, ἐὰν ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς ὁμήρους ἀποκαταστήσῃ τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκλύσειν μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὴν φιλοτιμίαν· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζειν ἐκείνους πρᾶξαι, κυριεύοντας τῶν ὁμήρων· ἐκκαλέσεσθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἰβήρων πάντων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὔνοιαν, προϊδόμενον τὸ μέλλον καὶ προνοηθέντα τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων ἀσφαλείας. τὴν δὲ χάριν αὐξήσειν ἔφη πολλαπλασίαν, αὐτὸς γενόμενος χειριστὴς τοῦ πράγματος. ἀποκαθιστάνων γὰρ εἰς τὰς πόλεις τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον τὴν παρʼ αὐτῶν εὔνοιαν ἐπισπάσεσθαι τῶν γεννησάντων ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν, ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τιθεὶς διὰ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τὴν Καρχηδονίων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους αἵρεσιν καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν. προσδοκᾶν δʼ αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσε καὶ δώρων πλῆθος ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τῶν τὰ τέκνα κομιζομένων· παραδόξως γὰρ ἑκάστους ἐγκρατεῖς γινομένους τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἅμιλλαν ποιήσεσθαι τῆς εἰς τὸν κύριον τῶν πραγμάτων εὐεργεσίας. παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἕτερα καὶ πλείω πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαλεχθεὶς ἔπεισε τὸν Βώστορα συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις.
99. Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought, in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.
99. καὶ τότε μὲν ἐπανῆλθε, ταξάμενος ἡμέραν, ᾗ παρέσται μετὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἀνακομιδὴν τῶν παίδων. παραγενηθεὶς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον καὶ συμμίξας τισὶ τῶν συστρατευομένων ἐκείνοις Ἰβήρων διὰ τούτων εἰσῆλθε πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς. ἐκλογιζόμενος δὲ διὰ πλειόνων τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ μετάπτωσιν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἰβήρων, ἐὰν ἐγκρατεῖς γένωνται τῶν ὁμήρων, ἐπηγγείλατο παραδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς παῖδας. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ὑπερβολῇ προθύμως δεξαμένων τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ μεγάλας ὑπισχνουμένων δωρεάς, τότε μὲν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπηλλάγη, συνθέμενος ἡμέραν καὶ καιρὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς ἐκδεξομένους αὐτὸν ὑπομένειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραλαβὼν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τῶν φίλων ἧκε πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα καί, παραδοθέντων αὐτῷ τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῆς Ζακάνθης, νυκτὸς ποιησάμενος τὴν ἔξοδον, ὡς θέλων λαθεῖν, παραπορευθεὶς τὸν χάρακα τῶν πολεμίων ἧκε πρὸς τὸν τεταγμένον καιρὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ πάντας ἐνεχείρισε τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν Ῥωμαίων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἐτίμησάν τε διαφερόντως τὸν Ἀβίλυγα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τῶν ὁμήρων εἰς τὰς πατρίδας ἐχρήσαντο τούτῳ, συμπέμψαντες τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. ὃς ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰς πόλεις καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀποκαταστάσεως τιθεὶς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρᾳότητα καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων ἀπιστίαν καὶ βαρύτητα καὶ προσπαρατιθεὶς τὴν αὑτοῦ μετάθεσιν πολλοὺς Ἰβήρων παρώρμησε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν. Βώστωρ δὲ παιδικώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν δόξας ἐγκεχειρικέναι τοὺς ὁμήρους τοῖς πολεμίοις οὐκ εἰς τοὺς τυχόντας ἐπεπτώκει κινδύνους. καὶ τότε μέν, ἤδη τῆς ὥρας κατεπειγούσης, διέλυον εἰς παραχειμασίαν ἀμφότεροι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἱκανοῦ τινος ἐκ τῆς τύχης γεγονότος συνεργήματος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τοῦ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας πρὸς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ἐπιβολάς. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν.
100. Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither byway of Mount Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword; but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade. Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every day was very great.
100. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ὅθεν ἀπελίπομεν, πυνθανόμενος παρὰ τῶν κατασκόπων πλεῖστον ὑπάρχειν σῖτον ἐν τῇ περὶ τὴν Λουκαρίαν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον Γερούνιον χώρᾳ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν συναγωγὴν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὸ Γερούνιον, κρίνας ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραχειμασίαν, προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸ Λίβυρνον ὄρος ἐπὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ Γερούνιον, ὃ τῆς Λουκαρίας ἀπέχει διακόσια στάδια, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς διὰ λόγων τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας εἰς φιλίαν προυκαλεῖτο καὶ πίστεις ἐδίδου τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος, πολιορκεῖν ἐπεβάλετο. ταχὺ δὲ γενόμενος κύριος τοὺς μὲν οἰκήτορας κατέφθειρε, τὰς δὲ πλείστας οἰκίας ἀκεραίους διεφύλαξε καὶ τὰ τείχη, βουλόμενος σιτοβολίοις χρήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν παραχειμασίαν. τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως παρεμβαλὼν ὠχυρώσατο τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. γενόμενος δʼ ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ μὲν δύο μέρη τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὴν σιτολογίαν ἐξέπεμπε, προστάξας καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τακτὸν ἀναφέρειν μέτρον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ τάγματος τοῖς προκεχειρισμένοις ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταύτην, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ μέρει τήν τε στρατοπεδείαν ἐτήρει καὶ τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι παρεφήδρευε κατὰ τόπους. οὔσης δὲ τῆς μὲν χώρας τῆς πλείστης εὐεφόδου καὶ πεδιάδος, τῶν δὲ συναγόντων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀναριθμήτων, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἀκμαζούσης πρὸς τὴν συγκομιδήν, ἄπλετον συνέβαινε καθʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῦ σίτου τὸ πλῆθος.
101. When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him, and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near, and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it. At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but, after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn: being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his cavalry.
101. Μάρκος δὲ παρειληφὼς τὰς δυνάμεις παρὰ Φαβίου τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντιπαρῆγε ταῖς ἀκρωρείαις, πεπεισμένος ἀεὶ περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς συμπεσεῖσθαί ποτε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀκούσας δὲ τὸ μὲν Γερούνιον τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἤδη κατέχειν, τὴν δὲ χώραν σιτολογεῖν, πρὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως χάρακα βεβλημένους στρατοπεδεύειν, ἐπιστρέψας ἐκ τῶν ἀκρωρειῶν κατέβαινε κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία κατατείνουσαν ῥάχιν. ἀφικόμενος δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν, ἣ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Λαρινάτιδος χώρας προσαγορεύεται δὲ Καλήνη, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ ταύτην, πρόχειρος ὢν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. Ἀννίβας δὲ θεωρῶν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὲν τρίτον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως εἴασε σιτολογεῖν, τὰ δὲ δύο μέρη λαβὼν καὶ προελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἑκκαίδεκα σταδίους πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπί τινος βουνοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρασκευάζειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, γεωλόφου τινὸς ὑπάρχοντος μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων, ὃς εὐκαίρως καὶ σύνεγγυς ἐπέκειτο τῇ τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολῇ, τοῦτον ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐξαποστείλας περὶ δισχιλίους τῶν λογχοφόρων κατελάβετο. οὓς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς ἡμέρας συνιδὼν Μάρκος ἐξῆγε τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ προσέβαλε τῷ λόφῳ. γενομένου δʼ ἀκροβολισμοῦ νεανικοῦ, τέλος ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ὅλην στρατοπεδείαν μετεβίβασαν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τόπον. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἕως μέν τινος διὰ τὴν ἀντιστρατοπεδείαν συνεῖχεν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφʼ αὑτόν. πλειόνων δὲ γενομένων ἡμερῶν, ἠναγκάζετο τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν νομὴν τῶν θρεμμάτων ἀπομερίζειν τοὺς δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν σιτολογίαν, σπουδάζων κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρόθεσιν μήτε τὴν λείαν καταφθεῖραι τόν τε σῖτον ὡς πλεῖστον συναγαγεῖν, ἵνα πάντων ᾖ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν δαψίλεια τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, μὴ χεῖρον δὲ τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς ἵπποις· εἶχε γὰρ τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας τῆς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ τῶν ἱππέων τάγματι.
102. It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of the enemy scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments, sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter. This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground, repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended, and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging; while the Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and recklessness.
102. καθʼ ὃν δὴ καιρὸν Μάρκος συνθεωρήσας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τὰς προειρημένας χρείας κατὰ τῆς χώρας σκεδαννύμενον, λαβὼν τὸν ἀκμαιότατον καιρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν καὶ συνεγγίσας τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰ μὲν βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἐξέταξε, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους κατὰ μέρη διελὼν ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς προνομεύουσι, παραγγείλας μηδένα ζωγρεῖν. Ἀννίβας δὲ τούτου συμβάντος εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτώκει μεγάλην· οὔτε γὰρ ἀντεξάγειν τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις ἀξιόχρεως ἦν οὔτε παραβοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεσπαρμένοις. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς προνομεύοντας ἐξαποσταλέντες πολλοὺς τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων ἀπέκτειναν· οἱ δὲ παρατεταγμένοι τέλος εἰς τοῦτʼ ἦλθον καταφρονήσεως ὥστε καὶ διασπᾶν τὸν χάρακα καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας ἦν μὲν ἐν κακοῖς, ὅμως δὲ χειμαζόμενος ἔμενε, τοὺς πελάζοντας ἀποτριβόμενος καὶ μόλις διαφυλάττων τὴν παρεμβολήν, ἕως Ἀσδρούβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας συμπεφευγότας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τὸν περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἧκε παραβοηθῶν. τότε δὲ μικρὸν ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπεξῆλθε καὶ βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας παρεμβαλὼν μόλις ἀπεστρέψατο τὸν ἐνεστῶτα κίνδυνον. Μάρκος δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν χάρακα συμπλοκῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκτείνας, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεφθαρκώς, τότε μὲν ἐπανῆλθεν, μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος. τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἐκλιπόντων τὸν χάρακα τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἐπέβη καὶ κατελάβετο τὴν ἐκείνων παρεμβολήν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας διαγωνιάσας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους μὴ καταλαβόμενοι νυκτὸς ἔρημον ὄντα τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Γερουνίῳ χάρακα κύριοι γένωνται τῆς ἀποσκευῆς καὶ τῶν παραθέσεων, ἔκρινεν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι ταῖς προνομαῖς εὐλαβέστερον ἐχρῶντο καὶ φυλακτικώτερον, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τἀναντία θαρραλεώτερον καὶ προπετέστερον.
103. An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome, and caused excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly, because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement, he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.
103. οἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, προσπεσόντος σφίσι τοῦ γεγονότος μειζόνως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων δυσελπιστίας οἱονεὶ μεταβολήν τινα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτοῖς προφαίνεσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον τὴν ἀπραγίαν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν στρατοπέδων μὴ παρὰ τὴν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀποδειλίασιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος εὐλάβειαν γεγονέναι. διὸ καὶ τὸν μὲν Φάβιον ᾐτιῶντο καὶ κατεμέμφοντο πάντες ὡς ἀτόλμως χρώμενον τοῖς καιροῖς, τὸν δὲ Μάρκον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὖξον διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὥστε τότε γενέσθαι τὸ μηδέποτε γεγονός· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ κἀκεῖνον κατέστησαν, πεπεισμένοι ταχέως αὐτὸν τέλος ἐπιθήσειν τοῖς πράγμασι· καὶ δὴ δύο δικτάτορες ἐγεγόνεισαν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτε συνεβεβήκει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις. τῷ δὲ Μάρκῳ διασαφηθείσης τῆς τε τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένης ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ, διπλασίως παρωρμήθη πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ κατατολμᾶν τῶν πολεμίων. ἧκε δὲ καὶ Φάβιος ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις οὐδὲν ἠλλοιωμένος ὑπὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἔτι δὲ βεβαιότερον μένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλήψεως. θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Μάρκον ἐκπεφυσημένον καὶ πρὸς πάντʼ ἀντιφιλονικοῦντα καὶ καθόλου πολὺν ὄντα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύειν, αἵρεσιν αὐτῷ προύτεινε τοιαύτην, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν ἢ διελόμενον τὰς δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις στρατοπέδοις κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν. τοῦ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἀσμένως δεξαμένου τὸν μερισμόν, διελόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος χωρὶς ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ἀλλήλων, ἀπέχοντες ὡς δώδεκα σταδίους.
104. Partly from observing what was taking place, and partly from the information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking upon what was happening in the enemy’s camp as rather in his favour than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success, Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description, he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy’s foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion, intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.
104. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούων τῶν ἁλισκομένων αἰχμαλώτων, τὰ δὲ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν πραττομένων ᾔδει τήν τε τῶν ἡγεμόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτιμίαν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοδοξίαν τοῦ Μάρκου. διόπερ οὐ καθʼ αὑτοῦ, πρὸς αὑτοῦ δὲ νομίσας εἶναι τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὁρμήν. οὔσης δέ τινος ὑπεροχῆς μεταξὺ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Μάρκου στρατοπεδείας δυναμένης ἑκατέρους βλάπτειν, ἐπεβάλετο καταλαβεῖν ταύτην. σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος κατορθώματος ὅτι παρέσται βοηθῶν ἐκ χειρὸς πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἐπινοεῖ τι τοιοῦτον. τῶν γὰρ τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν λόφον ὑπαρχόντων ψιλῶν μέν, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐχόντων περικλάσεις κοιλότητας, ἐξέπεμψε τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς ἐπιτηδειοτάτας ὑποβολὰς ἀνὰ διακοσίους καὶ τριακοσίους, πεντακοσίους μὲν ἱππεῖς, ψιλοὺς δὲ καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς πάντας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. ἵνα δὲ μὴ πρῲ κατοπτευθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς προνομὰς ἐκπορευομένων, ἅμα τῷ διαυγάζειν κατελάμβανε τοῖς εὐζώνοις τὸν λόφον. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ νομίσας ἑρμαῖον εἶναι παραυτίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ψιλούς, κελεύσας ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ τόπου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς· ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις κατόπιν αὐτὸς ἦγε συνεχῆ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἑκάστων ποιούμενος παραπλήσιον τὸν χειρισμόν.
105. As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the Roman lightarmed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops, but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards, and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and bravado of a soldier, and the farseeing prudence and cool calculation of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more, and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with their preparations for the winter unmolested.
105. ἄρτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας διαφαινούσης, καὶ πάντων ταῖς τε διανοίαις καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι περιεσπασμένων περὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ γεωλόφῳ κινδυνεύοντας, ἀνύποπτος ἦν ἡ τῶν ἐνεδρευόντων ὑποβολή. τοῦ δʼ Ἀννίβου συνεχῶς μὲν ἐπαποστέλλοντος τοῖς ἐν τῷ λόφῳ τοὺς βοηθήσοντας, ἑπομένου δὲ κατὰ πόδας αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, ταχέως συνέβη καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις. οὗ γενομένου, καὶ πιεζομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων εὐζώνων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἱππέων, ἅμα μὲν οὗτοι καταφεύγοντες εἰς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων θόρυβον ἐποίουν, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ συνθήματος ἀποδοθέντος τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, πανταχόθεν ἐπιφαινομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων τούτων, οὐκέτι περὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους μόνον, ἀλλὰ περὶ πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα μέγας κίνδυνος συνειστήκει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Φάβιος θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ διαγωνιάσας μὴ σφαλῶσι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐξῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι. ταχὺ δὲ συνεγγίσαντος αὐτοῦ, πάλιν ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καίπερ λελυκότες ἤδη τὴν ὅλην τάξιν, αὖθις ἁθροιζόμενοι περὶ τὰς σημείας ἀνεχώρουν καὶ κατέφευγον ὑπὸ τὴν τούτων ἀσφάλειαν, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπολελωκότες τῶν εὐζώνων, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἀκεραιότητα καὶ σύνταξιν τῶν παραβεβοηθηκότων στρατοπέδων ἀπέστησαν τοῦ διωγμοῦ καὶ τῆς μάχης. τοῖς μὲν οὖν παρʼ αὐτὸν γενομένοις τὸν κίνδυνον ἦν ἐναργὲς ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὴν Μάρκου τόλμαν ἀπόλωλε τὰ ὅλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν τοῦ Φαβίου σέσωσται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν· τοῖς δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τότʼ ἐγένετο φανερὸν ὁμολογουμένως τί διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικὴ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἑστὼς καὶ νουνεχής. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι διδαχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βαλόμενοι χάρακα πάλιν ἕνα πάντες ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ὁμόσε καὶ λοιπὸν ἤδη Φαβίῳ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τούτου παραγγελλομένοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν μὲν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ βουνοῦ καὶ τῆς σφετέρας παρεμβολῆς διετάφρευσαν, περὶ δὲ τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ καταληφθέντος λόφου χάρακα περιβαλόντες καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπιστήσαντες λοιπὸν ἤδη πρὸς τὴν χειμασίαν ἀσφαλῶς ἡτοιμάζοντο.
106. The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus— who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius,—were invested with pro-consular authority by Aemilius; and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing, as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor Lucius Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular. The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances; but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for courage and prudence.
106. τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ὥρας συνεγγιζούσης, εἵλοντο στρατηγοὺς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι Λεύκιον Αἰμίλιον καὶ Γάιον Τερέντιον. ὧν κατασταθέντων οἱ μὲν δικτάτορες ἀπέθεντο τὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δὲ προϋπάρχοντες ὕπατοι, Γνάιος Σερουίλιος καὶ Μάρκος Ῥήγουλος ὁ μετὰ τὴν Φλαμινίου τελευτὴν ἐπικατασταθείς, τότε προχειρισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀντιστράτηγοι καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ἐξουσίαν ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνώμην τὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τῆς συγκλήτου τὸ μὲν ἐλλεῖπον πλῆθος ἔτι τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν παραχρῆμα καταγράψαντες ἐξαπέστειλαν, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον διεσάφησαν ὁλοσχερῆ μὲν κίνδυνον κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον συνίστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοὺς ὡς ἐνεργοτάτους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ συνεχεστάτους χάριν τοῦ γυμνάζειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν εὐθαρσεῖς τοὺς νέους πρὸς τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἀγῶνας, τῷ καὶ τὰ πρότερον αὐτοῖς συμπτώματα δοκεῖν οὐχ ἥκιστα γεγονέναι διὰ τὸ νεοσυλλόγοις καὶ τελέως ἀνασκήτοις κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις. αὐτοὶ δὲ Λεύκιον μὲν Ποστόμιον, ἑξαπέλεκυν ὄντα στρατηγόν, στρατόπεδον δόντες εἰς Γαλατίαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν ἀντιπερίσπασμα τοῖς Κελτοῖς τοῖς μετʼ Ἀννίβου στρατευομένοις. πρόνοιαν δʼ ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῆς ἀνακομιδῆς τοῦ παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίῳ στόλου, διεπέμψαντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ στρατηγοῖς πάντα τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐγίνοντο παρασκευὰς ἐπιμελῶς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον κομισάμενοι τὰς παρὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐντολὰς πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐχείριζον κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην· διὸ καὶ τὸ πλείω γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρήσομεν. ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἢ μνήμης ἄξιον ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καιροῦ περίστασιν, ἀκροβολισμοὶ δὲ μόνον καὶ συμπλοκαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐγίνοντο πλείους, ἐν αἷς εὐδοκίμουν οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ῥωμαίων· καὶ γὰρ ἀνδρωδῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς ἐδόκουν ἕκαστα χειρίζειν.
107. Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated before, habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.
107. τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν διέμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύοντες ἀλλήλοις· ἤδη δὲ παραδιδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρπῶν χορηγίαν, ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας. κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγορευομένης πόλεως ἄκραν. εἰς γὰρ ταύτην συνέβαινε τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χορηγίας ἁθροίζεσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῶν περὶ Κανύσιον τόπων· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον παρακομίζεσθαι. τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἔτι πρότερον συνέβαινε κατεσκάφθαι, τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄκρας τότε καταληφθείσης, οὐ μικρὰν συνέπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις· οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐδυσχρηστοῦντʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κατειλῆφθαι τὸν προειρημένον τόπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφυῶς κεῖσθαι χώραν. πέμποντες οὖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην συνεχῶς ἐπυνθάνοντο τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐὰν ἐγγίσωσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνησόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων πάντων μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις, οἱ δʼ ἐβουλεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἐπισχεῖν ἔτι διεσάφησαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἐξαπέστελλον. συνέβαινε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας διά τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ μικροῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἀνδρωδῶς ἅμα καὶ συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς πόλεμον. προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὀκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, ὃ πρότερον οὐδέποτʼ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἑκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἄνδρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων. Ῥωμαῖοι γάρ, καθά που καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἀεί ποτε τέτταρα στρατόπεδα προχειρίζονται. τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον πεζοὺς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους. ἐπὰν δέ τις ὁλοσχερεστέρα προφαίνηται χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ ποιοῦσι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους. τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ὡς ἐπίπαν τριπλάσιον. τούτων δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀγῶνας διʼ ἑνὸς ὑπάτου καὶ δύο στρατοπέδων καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου πλήθους τῶν συμμάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἕνα καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕνα χρῶνται κίνδυνον. τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἦσαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τέτταρσιν, ἀλλʼ ὀκτὼ στρατοπέδοις Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὁμοῦ προῄρηντο διακινδυνεύειν.