But though the Romans have arrived at the same result in framing their commonwealth, they have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but through many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting reforms from knowledge gained in disaster.
ἔκτισε δὲ καὶ πόλιν Ὠστίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Τιβέριδος.Πολύβιος ἕκτῳ. [στεπη. βψζ. ϝ. Ὠστία.]
The result has been a constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any existing in my time.... I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their disastrous defeat at Cannae. I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under this constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account of it by the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions;
ὅτι Λεύκιος ὁ Δημαράτου τοῦ Κορινθίου υἱὸς εἰς Ῥώμην ὥρμησε πιστεύων αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι, πεπεισμένος οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον ἕξειν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ [διά] τινας ἀφορμάς, ἔχων γυναῖκα χρησίμην τά τʼ ἄλλα καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιβολὴν πραγματικὴν εὐφυῆ συνεργόν. παραγενόμενος δʼ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ τυχὼν τῆς πολιτείας, εὐθέως ἡρμόσατο πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἀρέσκειαν. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν χορηγίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἐκ παίδων ἀγωγήν, ἁρμόσας τῷ προεστῶτι μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἔτυχε καὶ πίστεως παρʼ αὐτῷ. χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος εἰς τοῦτʼ ἦλθε παραδοχῆς ὥστε συνδιοικεῖν καὶ συγχειρίζειν τῷ Μαρκίῳ τὰ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ πᾶσι γενόμενος καὶ συνεργῶν καὶ συγκατασκευάζων τοῖς δεομένοις ἀεί τι τῶν χρησίμων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου χορηγίᾳ μεγαλοψύχως εἰς τὸ δέον ἑκάστοτε καὶ σὺν καιρῷ χρώμενος, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν ἀπετίθετο χάριν, ἐν πᾶσι δʼ εὔνοιαν ἐνειργάσατο καὶ φήμην ἐπὶ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ καὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἔτυχεν. [ξοδ. τυρον. φολ. 109. εχξ. ϝαλες. π. 9. ξονφερ συιδαμ ϝ. Λεύκιος.]πρᾶγμα ποιῶν φρονίμου καὶ νουνεχοῦς ἀνδρός,τὸ γνῶναι κατὰ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός. [ξοδ. υρβιν. μαργο φολ. 65]τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ἀψευστεῖν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπόθυψίς ἐστι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀληθείας. [ξοδ. υρβιν. μαργο φολ. 65]
nor will they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων οἱ μὲν κτησάμενοι πρὸς τὴν τήρησιν, οἱ δʼ ἕτοιμα παραλαβόντες πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν. [ξοδ. υρβιν. μαργο φολ. 66 ετ εχξ. ϝατ. π. 371μ. 25, 4η.]
What is told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose;
ὅτι πάντα χρὴ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα τοὺς καλῶς ἀσκοῦντας ἐκ παίδων ἀσκεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. [ξοδ. τυρον. φολ. 109. εχξ. ϝαλες. π. 9.]Ὄλκιον, πόλις Τυρρηνίας· Πολύβιος ἕκτῳ.
what is omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being to appear to know more than the writers.
[στεπηαν. βψζ. ϝ. Ὅλκιον.] ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς Ξέρξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προδιευκρινουμένων ἦν καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς Ἀννιβιακοῖς καιροῖς, ἀφʼ ὧν ἡμεῖς εἰς ταῦτα τὴν ἐκτροπὴν ἐποιησάμεθα.
But a good critic should not judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if he detects mis-statement in the latter, he may then feel certain that ignorance accounts for the former;
διὸ καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς συστάσεως αὐτοῦ λόγον ἀποδεδωκότες πειρασόμεθα νῦν ἤδη διασαφεῖν ὁποῖόν τι κατʼ ἐκείνους ὑπῆρχε τοὺς καιρούς, ἐν οἷς λειφθέντες τῇ περὶ Κάνναν μάχῃ τοῖς ὅλοις ἔπταισαν πράγμασιν.οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ διότι τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πολιτείας ὁρμωμένοις ἐλλιπεστέραν φανησόμεθα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἔνια παραλιπόντες τῶν κατὰ μέρος·
but if what he says is accurate, his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to ignorance.
πᾶν γὰρ ἐπιγινώσκοντες καὶ παντὸς πεῖραν εἰληφότες διὰ τὴν ἐκ παίδων τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ νομίμοις συντροφίαν οὐ τὸ λεγόμενον θαυμάσουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ παραλειπόμενον ἐπιζητήσουσιν,
So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal ambition rather than by justice....
οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ὑπολήψονται τὸν γράφοντα παραλιπεῖν τὰς μικρὰς διαφοράς, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἄγνοιαν παρασιωπᾶν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ συνέχοντα τῶν πραγμάτων.
Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand;
καὶ ῥηθέντα μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐθαύμαζον ὡς ὄντα μικρὰ καὶ πάρεργα, παραλειπόμενα δʼ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖα, βουλόμενοι δοκεῖν αὐτοὶ πλέον εἰδέναι τῶν συγγραφέων.δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἀγαθὸν κριτὴν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν παραλειπομένων δοκιμάζειν τοὺς γράφοντας, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων,
if this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than please....
κἂν μὲν ἐν τούτοις τι λαμβάνῃ ψεῦδος, εἰδέναι διότι κἀκεῖνα παραλείπεται διʼ ἄγνοιαν, ἐὰν δὲ πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς ᾖ, συγχωρεῖν διότι κἀκεῖνα παρασιωπᾶται κατὰ κρίσιν, οὐ κατʼ ἄγνοιαν. [εχξ. ϝατ. π. 371μ. 25, 6η; δεῖ δὲ τὸν λιν. 12 — ἄγνοιαν λιν. 18 ηαβετ ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 65 ξυμ ϝι, 10, 14 αρξτε ξοηαερεντια; εχξ. αντ. π. 177.]ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι πρὸς τοὺς φιλοτιμότερον ἢ δικαιότερον ἐπιτιμῶντας τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν. [εχξ. ϝατ. π. 372μ. 25, 30η.]
As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or despotism.
ὅτι πᾶν πρᾶγμα σὺν καιρῷ θεωρούμενον ὑγιεῖς λαμβάνει καὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιτιμήσεις· μεταπεσόντος δὲ τούτου καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας περιστάσεις συγκρινόμενον οὐχ οἷον αἱρετόν, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἀνεκτὸν ἂν φανείη τὸ κράτιστα καὶ ἀληθινώτατα πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν συγγραφέων εἰρημένον. [ιβιδ.]
And no wonder: for if we confine our observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic;
ἦν μὲν δὴ τρία μέρη τὰ κρατοῦντα τῆς πολιτείας, ἅπερ εἶπα πρότερον ἅπαντα· οὕτως δὲ πάντα κατὰ μέρος ἴσως καὶ πρεπόντως συνετέτακτο καὶ διῳκεῖτο διὰ τούτων ὥστε μηδένα ποτʼ ἂν εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι βεβαίως μηδὲ τῶν ἐγχωρίων πότερʼ ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸ πολίτευμα σύμπαν ἢ δημοκρατικὸν ἢ μοναρχικόν.
and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy.
καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰκὸς ἦν πάσχειν. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὴν τῶν ὑπάτων ἀτενίσαιμεν ἐξουσίαν, τελείως μοναρχικὸν ἐφαίνετʼ εἶναι καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅτε δʼ εἰς τὴν τῆς συγκλήτου, πάλιν ἀριστοκρατικόν· καὶ μὴν εἰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἐξουσίαν θεωροίη τις, ἐδόκει σαφῶς εἶναι δημοκρατικόν.
What the exact powers of these several parts were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.
ὧν δʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος μερῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἐπεκράτει, καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἔτι πλὴν ὀλίγων τινῶν ταῦτʼ ἐστίν.
12. The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates, except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters requiring deliberation before it; and see to the execution of its decrees. If, again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under their command while on active service: and they have authority to expend as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in our time, or in that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to what follows.
12. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὕπατοι πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ἐξάγειν τὰ στρατόπεδα παρόντες ἐν Ῥώμῃ πασῶν εἰσι κύριοι τῶν δημοσίων πράξεων. οἵ τε γὰρ ἄρχοντες οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ὑποτάττονται καὶ πειθαρχοῦσι τούτοις πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων, εἴς τε τὴν σύγκλητον οὗτοι τὰς πρεσβείας ἄγουσι. πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις οὗτοι τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν διαβουλίων ἀναδιδόασιν, οὗτοι τὸν ὅλον χειρισμὸν τῶν δογμάτων ἐπιτελοῦσι. καὶ μὴν ὅσα δεῖ διὰ τοῦ δήμου συντελεῖσθαι τῶν πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνηκόντων, τούτοις καθήκει φροντίζειν καὶ συνάγειν τὰς ἐκκλησίας, τούτοις εἰσφέρειν τὰ δόγματα, τούτοις βραβεύειν τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς πλείοσι. καὶ μὴν περὶ πολέμου κατασκευῆς καὶ καθόλου τῆς ἐν ὑπαίθροις οἰκονομίας σχεδὸν αὐτοκράτορα τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς συμμαχικοῖς τὸ δοκοῦν, καὶ τοὺς χιλιάρχους καθιστάναι, καὶ διαγράφειν τοὺς στρατιώτας, καὶ διαλέγειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τούτοις ἔξεστι. πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ζημιῶσαι τῶν ὑποταττομένων ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ὃν ἂν βουληθῶσι κύριοι καθεστᾶσιν. ἐξουσίαν δʼ ἔχουσι καὶ δαπανᾶν τῶν δημοσίων ὅσα προθεῖντο, παρεπομένου ταμίου καὶ πᾶν τὸ προσταχθὲν ἑτοίμως ποιοῦντος. ὥστʼ εἰκότως εἰπεῖν ἄν, ὅτε τις εἰς ταύτην ἀποβλέψειε τὴν μερίδα, διότι μοναρχικὸν ἁπλῶς καὶ βασιλικόν ἐστι τὸ πολίτευμα. εἰ δέ τινα τούτων ἢ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων λήψεται μετάθεσιν ἢ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἢ μετά τινα χρόνον, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν λεγομένην ἀπόφασιν.
13. The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls. The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every lustrum for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed, help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them, are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they had with Rome was settled by the Senate.
13. καὶ μὴν ἡ σύγκλητος πρῶτον μὲν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ταμιείου κυρίαν. καὶ γὰρ τῆς εἰσόδου πάσης αὕτη κρατεῖ καὶ τῆς ἐξόδου παραπλησίως. οὔτε γὰρ εἰς τὰς κατὰ μέρος χρείας οὐδεμίαν ποιεῖν ἔξοδον οἱ ταμίαι δύνανται χωρὶς τῶν τῆς συγκλήτου δογμάτων πλὴν τὴν εἰς τοὺς ὑπάτους· τῆς τε παρὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ὁλοσχερεστάτης καὶ μεγίστης δαπάνης, ἣν οἱ τιμηταὶ ποιοῦσιν εἰς τὰς ἐπισκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς τῶν δημοσίων κατὰ πενταετηρίδα, ταύτης ἡ σύγκλητός ἐστι κυρία, καὶ διὰ ταύτης γίνεται τὸ συγχώρημα τοῖς τιμηταῖς. ὁμοίως ὅσα τῶν ἀδικημάτων τῶν κατʼ Ἰταλίαν προσδεῖται δημοσίας ἐπισκέψεως, λέγω δʼ οἷον προδοσίας, συνωμοσίας, φαρμακείας, δολοφονίας, τῇ συγκλήτῳ μέλει περὶ τούτων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἴ τις ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν διαλύσεως ἢ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ἐπιτιμήσεως ἢ βοηθείας ἢ φυλακῆς προσδεῖται, τούτων πάντων ἐπιμελές ἐστι τῇ συγκλήτῳ. καὶ μὴν εἰ τῶν ἐκτὸς Ἰταλίας πρός τινας ἐξαποστέλλειν δέοι πρεσβείαν τινʼ ἢ διαλύσουσάν τινας ἢ παρακαλέσουσαν ἢ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ἐπιτάξουσαν ἢ παραληψομένην ἢ πόλεμον ἐπαγγέλλουσαν. αὕτη ποιεῖται τὴν πρόνοιαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παραγενομένων εἰς Ῥώμην πρεσβειῶν ὡς δέον ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ὡς δέον ἀποκριθῆναι, πάντα ταῦτα χειρίζεται διὰ τῆς συγκλήτου. πρὸς δὲ τὸν δῆμον καθάπαξ οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν προειρημένων. ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ὁπότε τις ἐπιδημήσαι μὴ παρόντος ὑπάτου, τελείως ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεθʼ ἡ πολιτεία. ὃ δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσι, διὰ τὸ τὰ σφῶν πράγματα σχεδὸν πάντα τὴν σύγκλητον κυροῦν.
14. After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human society are held together: for where the distinction between them is not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only court to decide matters of life and death; and even in-cases where the penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious, and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement has been duly ratified on oath. Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse. These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief power in the state was the people’s, and that the constitution was a democracy.
14. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τίς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐπιζητήσειε ποία καὶ τίς ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τῷ δήμῳ καταλειπομένη μερὶς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, τῆς μὲν συγκλήτου τῶν κατὰ μέρος ὧν εἰρήκαμεν κυρίας ὑπαρχούσης, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὑπʼ αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς εἰσόδου καὶ τῆς ἐξόδου χειριζομένης ἁπάσης, τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν ὑπάτων πάλιν αὐτοκράτορα μὲν ἐχόντων δύναμιν περὶ τὰς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευάς, αὐτοκράτορα δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ἐξουσίαν; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καταλείπεται μερὶς καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ καταλείπεταί γε βαρυτάτη. τιμῆς γάρ ἐστι καὶ τιμωρίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνος ὁ δῆμος κύριος, οἷς συνέχονται μόνοις καὶ δυναστεῖαι καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος. παρʼ οἷς γὰρ ἢ μὴ γινώσκεσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ἢ γινωσκομένην χειρίζεσθαι κακῶς, παρὰ τούτοις οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κατὰ λόγον διοικεῖσθαι τῶν ὑφεστώτων· πῶς γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐν ἴσῃ τιμῇ [ὄντων] τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοῖς κακοῖς; κρίνει μὲν οὖν ὁ δῆμος καὶ διαφόρου πολλάκις, ὅταν ἀξιόχρεων ᾖ τὸ τίμημα τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς τὰς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐσχηκότας ἀρχάς. θανάτου δὲ κρίνει μόνος. καὶ γίνεταί τι περὶ ταύτην τὴν χρείαν παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἄξιον ἐπαίνου καὶ μνήμης. τοῖς γὰρ θανάτου κρινομένοις, ἐπὰν καταδικάζωνται, δίδωσι τὴν ἐξουσίαν τὸ παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι φανερῶς, κἂν ἔτι μία λείπηται φυλὴ τῶν ἐπικυρουσῶν τὴν κρίσιν ἀψηφοφόρητος, ἑκούσιον ἑαυτοῦ καταγνόντα φυγαδείαν. ἔστι δʼ ἀσφάλεια τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἔν τε τῇ Νεαπολιτῶν καὶ Πραινεστίνων, ἔτι δὲ Τιβουρίνων πόλει, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, πρὸς ἃς ἔχουσιν ὅρκια. καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δῆμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἀξίοις· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κάλλιστον ἆθλον ἐν πολιτείᾳ καλοκἀγαθίας. ἔχει δὲ τὴν κυρίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν νόμων δοκιμασίας, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης οὗτος βουλεύεται καὶ πολέμου. καὶ μὴν περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βεβαιῶν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ κύρια ποιῶν ἢ τοὐναντίον. ὥστε πάλιν ἐκ τούτων εἰκότως ἄν τινʼ εἰπεῖν ὅτι μεγίστην ὁ δῆμος ἔχει μερίδα καὶ δημοκρατικόν ἐστι τὸ πολίτευμα.
15. Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts can, when they choose, oppose or support each other. The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration of the business in hand; still be has need of the support both of people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes, nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans. And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory, and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit, For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the eyes of the citizens by what are called “triumphs.” But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or in some cases celebrate at all, unless the Senate concurs and grants the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before, that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an account of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of the people.
15. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον διῄρηται τὰ τῆς πολιτείας εἰς ἕκαστον εἶδος εἴρηται· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ἀντιπράττειν βουληθέντα καὶ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοις πάλιν ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν δύναται νῦν ῥηθήσεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὕπατος, ἐπειδὰν τυχὼν τῆς προειρημένης ἐξουσίας ὁρμήσῃ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, δοκεῖ μὲν αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τῶν προκειμένων συντέλειαν, προσδεῖται δὲ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς συγκλήτου, καὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἐπὶ τέλος ἄγειν τὰς πράξεις οὐχ ἱκανός ἐστι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς δεῖ μὲν ἐπιπέμπεσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ἀεὶ τὰς χορηγίας· ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ τῆς συγκλήτου βουλήματος οὔτε σῖτος οὔθʼ ἱματισμὸς οὔτʼ ὀψώνια δύναται χορηγεῖσθαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ὥστʼ ἀπράκτους γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων, ἐθελοκακεῖν καὶ κωλυσιεργεῖν προθεμένης τῆς συγκλήτου. καὶ μὴν τό γʼ ἐπιτελεῖς ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐπινοίας καὶ προθέσεις τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ κεῖται· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπαποστεῖλαι στρατηγὸν ἕτερον, ἐπειδὰν ἐνιαύσιος διέλθῃ χρόνος, ἢ τὸν ὑπάρχοντα ποιεῖν ἐπίμονον, ἔχει τὴν κυρίαν αὕτη. καὶ μὴν τὰς ἐπιτυχίας τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐκτραγῳδῆσαι καὶ συναυξῆσαι καὶ πάλιν ἀμαυρῶσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι τὸ συνέδριον ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν· τοὺς γὰρ προσαγορευομένους παρʼ αὐτοῖς θριάμβους, διʼ ὧν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἄγεται τοῖς πολίταις ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡ τῶν κατειργασμένων πραγμάτων ἐνάργεια, τούτους οὐ δύνανται χειρίζειν, ὡς πρέπει, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ συντελεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ συνέδριον συγκατάθηται καὶ δῷ τὴν εἰς ταῦτα δαπάνην. τοῦ γε μὴν δήμου στοχάζεσθαι καὶ λίαν αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, κἂν ὅλως ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τύχωσι πολὺν τόπον ἀφεστῶτες· ὁ γὰρ τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ συνθήκας ἀκύρους καὶ κυρίας ποιῶν, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὗτός ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀποτιθεμένους τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τούτῳ δεῖ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέχειν τῶν πεπραγμένων. ὥστε κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ὀλιγωρεῖν μήτε τῆς συγκλήτου μήτε τῆς τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας.
16. As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the senators,— for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate’s traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and offices, or even actually cutting down their property,— even in such cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law. But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot neglect the feelings of the people.
16. ἥ γε μὴν σύγκλητος πάλιν, ἡ τηλικαύτην ἔχουσα δύναμιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν ἀναγκάζεται προσέχειν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ δήμου, τὰς δʼ ὁλοσχερεστάτας καὶ μεγίστας ζητήσεις καὶ διορθώσεις τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων κατὰ τῆς πολιτείας, οἷς θάνατος ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ πρόστιμον, οὐ δύναται συντελεῖν, ἂν μὴ συνεπικυρώσῃ τὸ προβεβουλευμένον ὁ δῆμος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην ἀνηκόντων· ἐὰν γάρ τις εἰσφέρῃ νόμον, ἢ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἀφαιρούμενός τι τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τῇ συγκλήτῳ κατὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς ἢ τὰς προεδρίας καὶ τιμὰς καταλύων αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία ποιῶν ἐλαττώματα περὶ τοὺς βίους. πάντων ὁ δῆμος γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων καὶ θεῖναι καὶ μὴ κύριος. τὸ δὲ συνέχον, ἐὰν εἷς ἐνίστηται τῶν δημάρχων, οὐχ οἷον ἐπὶ τέλος ἄγειν τι δύναται τῶν διαβουλίων ἡ σύγκλητος, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ συνεδρεύειν ἢ συμπορεύεσθαι τὸ παράπαν — ὀφείλουσι δʼ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν οἱ δήμαρχοι τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ μάλιστα στοχάζεσθαι τῆς τούτου βουλήσεως — διὸ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων χάριν δέδιε τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ προσέχει τῷ δήμῳ τὸν νοῦν ἡ σύγκλητος.
17. In like manner the people on its part is far from being independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account both collectively and individually. For contracts, too numerous to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some. purchase the contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether, if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand, grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public or private, in which the charges are heavy. Consequently, all citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to their absolute authority on a campaign.
17. ὁμοίως γε μὴν πάλιν ὁ δῆμος ὑπόχρεώς ἐστι τῇ συγκλήτῳ, καὶ στοχάζεσθαι ταύτης ὀφείλει καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν. πολλῶν γὰρ ἔργων ὄντων τῶν ἐκδιδομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τιμητῶν διὰ πάσης Ἰταλίας εἰς τὰς ἐπισκευὰς καὶ κατασκευὰς τῶν δημοσίων, ἅ τις οὐκ ἂν ἐξαριθμήσαιτο ῥᾳδίως, πολλῶν δὲ ποταμῶν, λιμένων, κηπίων, μετάλλων, χώρας, συλλήβδην ὅσα πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, πάντα χειρίζεσθαι συμβαίνει τὰ προειρημένα διὰ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῖς ὠναῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐργασίαις ταῖς ἐκ τούτων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀγοράζουσι παρὰ τῶν τιμητῶν αὐτοὶ τὰς ἐκδόσεις, οἱ δὲ κοινωνοῦσι τούτοις, οἱ δʼ ἐγγυῶνται τοὺς ἠγορακότας, οἱ δὲ τὰς οὐσίας διδόασι περὶ τούτων εἰς τὸ δημόσιον. ἔχει δὲ περὶ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων τὴν κυρίαν τὸ συνέδριον· καὶ γὰρ χρόνον δύναται δοῦναι καὶ συμπτώματος γενομένου κουφίσαι καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀδυνάτου τινὸς συμβάντος ἀπολῦσαι τῆς ἐργωνίας. καὶ πολλὰ δή τινʼ ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς καὶ βλάπτει μεγάλα καὶ πάλιν ὠφελεῖ τοὺς τὰ δημόσια χειρίζοντας ἡ σύγκλητος· ἡ γὰρ ἀναφορὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνεται πρὸς ταύτην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐκ ταύτης ἀποδίδονται κριταὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα μέγεθος ἔχει τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. διὸ πάντες εἰς τὴν ταύτης πίστιν ἐνδεδεμένοι, καὶ δεδιότες τὸ τῆς χρείας ἄδηλον, εὐλαβῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀντιπράξεις τῶν τῆς συγκλήτου βουλημάτων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὑπάτων ἐπιβολὰς δυσχερῶς ἀντιπράττουσι διὰ τὸ κατʼ ἰδίαν καὶ κοινῇ πάντας ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνων πίπτειν ἐξουσίαν.
18. The result of this power of the several estates for mutual help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever any danger from without compels them to unite and work together, the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works, privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and, as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances, more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part being checked by its fear of the other....
18. τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης τῆς ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ καὶ βλάπτειν καὶ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοις, πρὸς πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς περιστάσεις δεόντως ἔχειν τὴν ἁρμογὴν αὐτῶν, ὥστε μὴ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι ταύτης εὑρεῖν ἀμείνω πολιτείας σύστασιν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τις ἔξωθεν κοινὸς φόβος ἐπιστὰς ἀναγκάσῃ σφᾶς συμφρονεῖν καὶ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τηλικαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολι τεύματος ὥστε μήτε παραλείπεσθαι τῶν δεόντων μηδέν, ἅτε περὶ τὸ προσπεσὸν ἀεὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ταῖς ἐπινοίαις ἁμιλλωμένων, μήτε τὸ κριθὲν ὑστερεῖν τοῦ καιροῦ, κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἑκάστου συνεργοῦντος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου συντέλειαν. διόπερ ἀνυπόστατον συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι καὶ παντὸς ἐφικνεῖσθαι τοῦ κριθέντος τὴν ἰδιότητα τοῦ πολιτεύματος. ὅταν γε μὴν πάλιν ἀπολυθέντες τῶν ἐκτὸς φόβων ἐνδιατρίβωσι ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ περιουσίαις ταῖς ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ἀπολαύοντες τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, καὶ ὑποκολακευόμενοι καὶ ῥᾳθυμοῦντες τρέπωνται πρὸς ὕβριν καὶ πρὸς ὑπερηφανίαν, ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, τότε καὶ μάλιστα συνιδεῖν ἔστιν αὐτὸ παρʼ αὑτοῦ ποριζόμενον τὸ πολίτευμα τὴν βοήθειαν. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐξοιδοῦν τι τῶν μερῶν φιλονεικῇ καὶ πλέον τοῦ δέοντος ἐπικρατῇ, δῆλον ὡς οὐδενὸς αὐτοτελοῦς ὄντος κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, ἀντισπᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ παραποδίζεσθαι δυναμένης τῆς ἑκάστου προθέσεως ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲν ἐξοιδεῖ τῶν μερῶν οὐδʼ ὑπερφρονεῖ. πάντα γὰρ ἐμμένει τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὰ μὲν κωλυόμενα τῆς ὁρμῆς, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεδιότα τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πέλας ἐπίστασιν. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 66 εχξ. αντ. π. 177.] ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δʼ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δʼ ἔστιν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός, οὗ κατασταθέντος παραχρῆμα διαλύεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν διαστολήν. [πολψβ. ιιι, 87, 7.]
19. After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years’, and ten from those who had ten years’, service. All citizens must serve ten years in the cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of their age, except those rated below four hundred asses. The latter are employed in the navy; but if any great public necessity arises they are obliged to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one can hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of military service.... When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they give public notice of the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must appear. This is done every year. When the day has arrived, and the citizens fit for service are come to Rome and have assembled on the Capitoline, the fourteen junior tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they were appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four divisions, because the primary division of the forces thus raised is into four legions. The four tribunes first appointed are assigned to the legion called the 1st; the next three to the 2d; the next four to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first are assigned to the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th.
19. ἐπειδὰν ἀποδείξωσι τοὺς ὑπάτους, μετὰ ταῦτα χιλιάρχους καθιστᾶσι, τετταρασκαίδεκα μὲν ἐκ τῶν πέντʼ ἐνιαυσίους ἐχόντων ἤδη στρατείας, δέκα δʼ ἄλλους σὺν τούτοις ἐκ τῶν δέκα. τῶν λοιπῶν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς δέκα, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς ἓξ καὶ δέκα δεῖ στρατείας τελεῖν κατʼ ἀνάγκην ἐν τοῖς τετταράκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτεσιν ἀπὸ γενεᾶς πλὴν τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς τετρακοσίας δραχμὰς τετιμημένων· τούτους δὲ παριᾶσι πάντας εἰς τὴν ναυτικὴν χρείαν. ἐὰν δέ ποτε κατεπείγῃ τὰ τῆς περιστάσεως, ὀφείλουσιν οἱ πεζοὶ στρατεύειν εἴκοσι στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους. πολιτικὴν δὲ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔξεστιν οὐδενὶ πρότερον, ἐὰν μὴ δέκα στρατείας ἐνιαυσίους ᾖ τετελεκώς. ἐὰν δὲ μέλλωσι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν καταγραφὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν οἱ τὰς ὑπάτους ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, προλέγουσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ δεήσει παραγενέσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις Ῥωμαίους ἅπαντας. ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν. τῆς δʼ ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης καὶ τῶν στρατευσίμων παραγενομένων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἁθροισθέντων εἰς τὸ Καπετώλιον, διεῖλον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς οἱ νεώτεροι τῶν χιλιάρχων, καθάπερ ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου κατασταθῶσιν ἢ τῶν στρατηγῶν, εἰς τέτταρα μέρη διὰ τὸ τέτταρα παρʼ αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδα τὴν ὁλοσχερῆ καὶ πρώτην διαίρεσιν τῶν δυνάμεων ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρώτους κατασταθέντας τέτταρας εἰς τὸ πρῶτον καλούμενον στρατόπεδον ἔνειμαν, τοὺς δʼ ἑξῆς τρεῖς εἰς τὸ δεύτερον, τοὺς δʼ ἑπομένους τούτοις τέτταρας εἰς τὸ τρίτον, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς τελευταίους εἰς τὸ τέταρτον. τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων δύο μὲν τοὺς πρώτους εἰς τὸ πρῶτον, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς δευτέρους εἰς τὸ δεύτερον τιθέασι στρατόπεδον, δύο δὲ τοὺς ἑξῆς εἰς τὸ τρίτον, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς τελευταίους εἰς τὸ τέταρτον [τῶν πρεσβυτέρων].
20. This division and assignment of the tribunes having been settled in such a way that all four legions have an equal number of officers, the tribunes of the several legions take up a separate position and draw lots for the tribes one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it from time to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as possible. These four are brought forward, and the tribunes of the first legion picks out one of them, those of the second another, those of the third another, and the fourth has to take the last. When the next four are selected the tribunes of the second legion have the first choice, and those of the first the last. With the next four the tribunes of the third legion have the first choice, those of the second the last; and so on in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion gets men of much the same standard. But when they have selected the number prescribed,—which is four thousand two hundred infantry for each legion, or at times of special danger five thousand,—they next used to pass men for the cavalry, in old times after the four thousand two hundred infantry; but now they do it before them, the selection having been made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three hundred for each legion.
20. γενομένης δὲ τῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ καταστάσεως τῶν χιλιάρχων τοιαύτης ὥστε πάντα τὰ στρατόπεδα τοὺς ἴσους ἔχειν ἄρχοντας, μετὰ ταῦτα καθίσαντες χωρὶς ἀλλήλων κατὰ στρατόπεδον κληροῦσι τὰς φυλὰς κατὰ μίαν καὶ προσκαλοῦνται τὴν ἀεὶ λαχοῦσαν. ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἐκλέγουσι τῶν νεανίσκων τέτταρας ἐπιεικῶς τοὺς παραπλησίους ταῖς ἡλικίαις καὶ ταῖς ἕξεσι. προσαχθέντων δὲ τούτων λαμβάνουσι πρῶτοι τὴν ἐκλογὴν οἱ τοῦ πρώτου στρατοπέδου, δεύτεροι δʼ οἱ τοῦ δευτέρου, τρίτοι δʼ οἱ τοῦ τρίτου, τελευταῖοι δʼ οἱ τοῦ τετάρτου. πάλιν δʼ ἄλλων τεττάρων προσαχθέντων λαμβάνουσι πρῶτοι τὴν αἵρεσιν οἱ τοῦ δευτέρου στρατοπέδου καὶ ἑξῆς οὕτως, τελευταῖοι δʼ οἱ τοῦ πρώτου. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἄλλων τεττάρων προσαχθέντων πρῶτοι λαμβάνουσιν οἱ τοῦ τρίτου στρατοπέδου, τελευταῖοι δʼ οἱ τοῦ δευτέρου. [καὶ] αἰεὶ κατὰ λόγον οὕτως ἐκ περιόδου τῆς ἐκλογῆς γινομένης παραπλησίους συμβαίνει λαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν στρατοπέδων. ὅταν δʼ ἐκλέξωσι τὸ προκείμενον πλῆθος — τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν εἰς ἕκαστον στρατόπεδον πεζοὶ τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ διακόσιοι, ποτὲ δὲ πεντακισχίλιοι, ἐπειδὰν μείζων τις αὐτοῖς προφαίνηται κίνδυνος — μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ὑστέρους εἰώθεσαν δοκιμάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τετρακισχιλίοις διακοσίοις, νῦν δὲ προτέρους, πλουτίνδην αὐτῶν γεγενημένης ὑπὸ τοῦ τιμητοῦ τῆς ἐκλογῆς· καὶ ποιοῦσι τριακοσίους εἰς ἕκαστον στρατόπεδον.
21. The roll having been completed in this manner, the tribunes belonging to the several legions muster their men; and selecting one of the whole body that they think most suitable for the purpose, they cause him to take an oath that he will obey his officers and do their orders to the best of his ability. And all the others come up and take the oath separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the first man. At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at which the men selected must appear. The cities then enrol their troops with much the same ceremonies as to selection and administration of the oath, and appoint a commander and a paymaster. The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest to form the Velites, the next to them the Hastati, while those who are in the prime of life they select as Principes, and the oldest of all as Triarii. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only as to their ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such proportions that the senior men, called Triarii, should number six hundred, the Principes twelve hundred, the Hastati twelve hundred, and that all the rest as the youngest should be reckoned among the Velites. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally, except those of the Triarii, which is always the same.
21. Ἐπιτελεσθείσης δὲ τῆς καταγραφῆς τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, ἁθροίσαντες τοὺς ἐπειλεγμένους οἱ προσήκοντες τῶν χιλιάρχων καθʼ ἕκαστον στρατόπεδον, καὶ λαβόντες ἐκ πάντων ἕνα τὸν ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐξορκίζουσιν ἦ μὴν πειθαρχήσειν καὶ ποιήσειν τὸ προσταττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων κατὰ δύναμιν. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ὀμνύουσι καθʼ ἕνα προπορευόμενοι, τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ποιήσουσι πάντα καθάπερ ὁ πρῶτος. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὰς ὑπάτους ἀρχὰς ἔχοντες παραγγέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἐξ ὧν ἂν βούλωνται συστρατεύειν τοὺς συμμάχους, διασαφοῦντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν τόπον, εἰς ὃν δεήσει παρεῖναι τοὺς κεκριμένους. αἱ δὲ πόλεις παραπλησίαν ποιησάμεναι τῇ προειρημένῃ τὴν ἐκλογὴν καὶ τὸν ὅρκον ἐκπέμπουσιν, ἄρχοντα συστήσασαι καὶ μισθοδότην. οἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ χιλίαρχοι μετὰ τὸν ἐξορκισμὸν παραγγείλαντες ἡμέραν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ τόπον, εἰς ὃν δεήσει παρεῖναι χωρὶς τῶν ὅπλων, τότε μὲν ἀφῆκαν. παραγενομένων δʼ εἰς τὴν ταχθεῖσαν ἡμέραν διαλέγουσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν νεωτάτους καὶ πενιχροτάτους εἰς τοὺς γροσφομάχους, τοὺς δʼ ἑξῆς τούτοις εἰς τοὺς ἁστάτους καλουμένους, τοὺς δʼ ἀκμαιοτάτους ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτάτους εἰς τοὺς τριαρίους. αὗται γάρ εἰσι καὶ τοσαῦται διαφοραὶ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τῶν ὀνομασιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν καθοπλισμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ στρατοπέδῳ. διαιροῦσι δʼ αὐτοὺς τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστʼ εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρεσβυτάτους καὶ τριαρίους προσαγορευομένους ἑξακοσίους, τοὺς δὲ πρίγκιπας χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους, ἴσους δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ἁστάτους, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς καὶ νεωτάτους γροσφοφόρους. ἐὰν δὲ πλείους τῶν τετρακισχιλίων ὦσι, κατὰ λόγον ποιοῦνται τὴν διαίρεσιν πλὴν τῶν τριαρίων. τούτους αἰεὶ τοὺς ἴσους.
22. The youngest soldiers or Velites are ordered to carry a sword, spears, and target (parma). The target is strongly made, and large enough to protect the man; being round, with a diameter of three feet. Each man also wears a headpiece without a crest (galea); which he sometimes covers with a piece of wolfs skin or something of that kind, for the sake both of protection and identification; that the officers of his company may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has a wooden haft of about two cubits, and about a finger’s breadth in thickness; its head is a span long, hammered fine, and sharpened to such an extent that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and cannot be used by the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be available for both sides alike.
22. καὶ τοῖς μὲν νεωτάτοις παρήγγειλαν μάχαιραν φορεῖν καὶ γρόσφους καὶ πάρμην. ἡ δὲ πάρμη καὶ δύναμιν ἔχει τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ μέγεθος ἀρκοῦν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν· περιφερὴς γὰρ οὖσα τῷ σχήματι τρίπεδον ἔχει τὴν διάμετρον. προσεπικοσμεῖται δὲ καὶ λιτῷ περικεφαλαίῳ· ποτὲ δὲ λυκείαν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιτίθεται, σκέπης ἅμα καὶ σημείου χάριν, ἵνα τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόσι προκινδυνεύοντες ἐρρωμένως καὶ μὴ διάδηλοι γίνωνται. τὸ δὲ τῶν γρόσφων βέλος ἔχει τῷ μὲν μήκει τὸ ξύλον ὡς ἐπίπαν δίπηχυ, τῷ δὲ πάχει δακτυλιαῖον, τὸ δὲ κέντρον σπιθαμιαῖον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐξεληλασμένον καὶ συνωξυσμένον ὥστε κατʼ ἀνάγκην εὐθέως ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἐμβολῆς κάμπτεσθαι καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἀντιβάλλειν· εἰ δὲ μή, κοινὸν γίνεται τὸ βέλος.