1. I AM aware that some will be at a loss to account for my interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on me by the nature of my original design; and I pointed this out with special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination of a constitution should be conducted in the same way: and therefore being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its constitution for this place.... What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for success or failure the form of its constitution; for from this as from a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed, but attain their consummation.
1. στήσαντες δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων τὴν διήγησιν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας συστησόμεθα λόγον, ᾧ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὑποδείξομεν ὅτι μέγιστα συνεβάλετʼ αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότης πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν δυναστείαν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἰβήρων προσλαβεῖν καὶ Κελτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς. [πολψβ. ιιι, 2, 6]. ὅταν δὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀλυμπιάδα γενομένας διεξιόντες ἐπιστῶμεν τοῖς καιροῖς τούτοις, τότʼ ἤδη προθέμενοι ψιλῶς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον, νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκείαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξήγησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν [ιδεμ ιιι, 118, 11]. καὶ τί δήποτʼ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἀπορήσαι τις ἄν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες ⟨οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι⟩ τῶν ὅλων καὶ πολλαπλασίαν ἔχοντες ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν οὔτʼ ἂν πληρῶσαι τοσαύτας ναῦς οὔτʼ ἀναπλεῦσαι τηλικούτοις στόλοις δυνηθεῖεν; οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σαφῶς ἐξέσται τὰς αἰτίας κατανοεῖν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἔλθωμεν. [ιδεμ ι, 64, 1]. ὑπὲρ τούτου δὲ τοῦ μέρους εἴρηται πρότερον ἡμῖν διὰ πλειόνων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. [ιδεμ χ, 16, 7]. τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηται, τῶν τριῶν ἓν σύστημα, διʼ ὧν συμβαίνει τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας θυσίας ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ συντελεῖσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. [ιδεμ χχι, 1013, 11].
2. ... Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak, whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the distinctive features of this constitution. Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they designate kingship, aristocracy, democracy. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as being the only ones, or as the best. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that we must regard as the best constitution that which partakes of all these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we admit that these are the only forms: for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy.
2. οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν οὖν διότι τινὲς διαπορήσουσι πῶς ἀφέμενοι τοῦ συνάπτειν καὶ προστιθέναι τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς διηγήσεως, εἰς τοῦτον ἀπεθέμεθα τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς προειρημένης πολιτείας ἀπολογισμόν· ἐμοὶ δʼ ὅτι μὲν ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως, ἐν πολλοῖς οἶμαι δῆλον αὐτὸ πεποιηκέναι, μάλιστα δʼ ἐν τῇ καταβολῇ καὶ προεκθέσει τῆς ἱστορίας, ἐν ᾗ τοῦτο κάλλιστον ἔφαμεν, ἅμα δʼ ὠφελιμώτατον εἶναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπιβολῆς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῇ πραγματείᾳ τὸ γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν οὐδʼ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔπεσεν, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός. κεκριμένου δὲ τούτου καιρὸν οὐχ ἑώρων ἐπιτηδειότερον εἰς ἐπίστασιν καὶ δοκιμασίαν τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ νῦν ἐνεστῶτος. καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ κατʼ ἰδίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν φαύλων ἢ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν ποιούμενοι τὰς διαλήψεις, ἐπειδὰν ἀληθῶς πρόθωνται δοκιμάζειν, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀπεριστάτου ῥᾳστώνης κατὰ τὸν βίον ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπισκέψεις, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις περιπετειῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις κατορθωμάτων, μόνον νομίζοντες εἶναι ταύτην ἀνδρὸς τελείου βάσανον τὸ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς μεταβολὰς τῆς τύχης μεγαλοψύχως δύνασθαι καὶ γενναίως ὑποφέρειν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρὴ θεωρεῖν καὶ πολιτείαν. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρῶν ποίαν ἄν τις ὀξυτέραν ἢ μείζονα λάβοι μεταβολὴν τῶν καθʼ ἡμᾶς τῆς γε Ῥωμαίοις συμβάσης, εἰς τοῦτον ἀπεθέμην τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπολογισμόν· γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις τὸ μέγεθος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἐκ τούτων. ζήτει ἐν τῷ περὶ στρατηγίας. [εχξ. ϝατ. π. 369 μαι. 24, 4 ηεψς.] ὅτι τὸ ψυχαγωγοῦν ἅμα καὶ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐπιφέρον τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρία καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν ἑκάστοις αἵρεσις. μεγίστην δʼ αἰτίαν ἡγητέον ἐν ἅπαντι πράγματι καὶ πρὸς ἐπιτυχίαν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν τῆς πολιτείας σύστασιν· ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης ᾗπερ ἐκ πηγῆς οὐ μόνον ἀναφέρεσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἐπινοίας καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῶν ἔργων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συντέλειαν λαμβάνειν. [εχξ. ϝατ. π. 370 μ. 24, 30 η.] τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐν τῷ ψεύδει μόνον οὐδʼ ἀπολογίαν ἐπιδέχεται τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. [ξοδ. υρβιν. μαργο φολ. 61] τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἑλληνικῶν πολιτευμάτων ὅσα πολλάκις μὲν ηὔξηται, πολλάκις δὲ τῆς εἰς τἀναντία μεταβολῆς ὁλοσχερῶς πεῖραν εἴληφε, ῥᾳδίαν εἶναι συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν προγεγονότων ἐξήγησιν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀπόφασιν· τό τε γὰρ ἐξαγγεῖλαι τὰ γινωσκόμενα ῥᾴδιον, τό τε προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος στοχαζόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων εὐμαρές. περὶ δὲ τῆς Ῥωμαίων οὐδʼ ὅλως εὐχερὲς οὔτε περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐξηγήσασθαι διὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς πολιτείας, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος προειπεῖν διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ αὐτοὺς ἰδιωμάτων καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν. διόπερ οὐ τῆς τυχούσης ἐπιστάσεως προσδεῖται καὶ θεωρίας, εἰ μέλλοι τις τὰ διαφέροντα καθαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ συνόψεσθαι. συμβαίνει δὴ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν βουλομένων διδασκαλικῶς ἡμῖν ὑποδεικνύειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τρία γένη λέγειν πολιτειῶν, ὧν τὸ μὲν καλοῦσι βασιλείαν, τὸ δʼ ἀριστοκρατίαν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημοκρατίαν. δοκεῖ δέ μοι πάνυ τις εἰκότως ἂν ἐπαπορῆσαι πρὸς αὐτούς, πότερον ὡς μόνας ταύτας ἢ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ ὡς ἀρίστας ἡμῖν εἰσηγοῦνται τῶν πολιτειῶν. κατʼ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκοῦσι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀρίστην μὲν ἡγητέον πολιτείαν τὴν ἐκ πάντων τῶν προειρημένων ἰδιωμάτων συνεστῶσαν· τούτου γὰρ τοῦ μέρους οὐ λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ πεῖραν εἰλήφαμεν, Λυκούργου συστήσαντος πρώτου κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πολίτευμα. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὡς μόνας ταύτας προσδεκτέον· καὶ γὰρ μοναρχικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς ἤδη τινὰς τεθεάμεθα πολιτείας, αἳ πλεῖστον διαφέρουσαι βασιλείας παραπλήσιον ἔχειν τι ταύτῃ δοκοῦσιν· ᾗ καὶ συμψεύδονται καὶ συγχρῶνται πάντες οἱ μόναρχοι καθʼ ὅσον οἷοί τʼ εἰσὶ τῷ τῆς βασιλείας ὀνόματι. καὶ μὴν ὀλιγαρχικὰ πολιτεύματα καὶ πλείω γέγονε, δοκοῦντα παρόμοιον ἔχειν τι τοῖς ἀριστοκρατικοῖς, ἃ πλεῖστον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διεστᾶσιν. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ δημοκρατίας.
4. I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot hold every absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the justest and wisest men selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders, obedience to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more allied forms, I mean despotism, oligarchy and mob-rule. The first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and adjustment, comes kingship; which degenerating into the evil form allied to it, by which I mean tyranny, both are once more destroyed and aristocracy produced. Again the latter being in the course of nature perverted to oligarchy, and the people passionately avenging the unjust acts of their rulers, democracy comes into existence; which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer mob-rule. No clearer proof of the truth of what I say could be obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis, and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to recur. This method I have assumed to be especially applicable to the Roman constitution, because its origin and growth have from the first followed natural causes.
4. ὅτι δʼ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τούτων συμφανές. οὔτε γὰρ πᾶσαν δήπου μοναρχίαν εὐθέως βασιλείαν ῥητέον, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ἐξ ἑκόντων συγχωρουμένην καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ τὸ πλεῖον ἢ φόβῳ καὶ βίᾳ κυβερνωμένην· οὐδὲ μὴν πᾶσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίαν νομιστέον, ἀλλὰ ταύτην, ἥτις ἂν κατʼ ἐκλογὴν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαιοτάτων καὶ φρονιμωτάτων ἀνδρῶν βραβεύηται. παραπλησίως οὐδὲ δημοκρατίαν, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν πλῆθος κύριόν ἐστι ποιεῖν ὅ, τι ποτʼ ἂν αὐτὸ βουληθῇ καὶ πρόθηται παρὰ δʼ ᾧ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ σύνηθες θεοὺς σέβεσθαι, γονεῖς θεραπεύειν, πρεσβυτέρους αἰδεῖσθαι, νόμοις πείθεσθαι, παρὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις συστήμασιν ὅταν τὸ τοῖς πλείοσι δόξαν νικᾷ, τοῦτο καλεῖν δεῖ δημοκρατίαν. διὸ καὶ γένη μὲν ἓξ εἶναι ῥητέον πολιτειῶν, τρία μὲν ἃ πάντες θρυλοῦσι καὶ νῦν προείρηται, τρία δὲ τὰ τούτοις συμφυῆ, λέγω δὲ μοναρχίαν, ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὀχλοκρατίαν. πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἀκατασκεύως καὶ φυσικῶς συνίσταται μοναρχία, ταύτῃ δʼ ἕπεται καὶ ἐκ ταύτης γεννᾶται μετὰ κατασκευῆς καὶ διορθώσεως βασιλεία. μεταβαλλούσης δὲ ταύτης εἰς τὰ συμφυῆ κακά, λέγω δʼ εἰς τυραννίδʼ, αὖθις ἐκ τῆς τούτων καταλύσεως ἀριστοκρατία φύεται. καὶ μὴν ταύτης εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐκτραπείσης κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ὀργῇ μετελθόντος τὰς τῶν προεστώτων ἀδικίας, γεννᾶται δῆμος. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου πάλιν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ἀποπληροῦται σὺν χρόνοις ὀχλοκρατία. γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις σαφέστατα περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστιν οἷα δὴ νῦν εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὰς ἑκάστων κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς ἐπιστήσας. ὁ γὰρ συνιδὼν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὡς φύεται, μόνος ἂν οὗτος δύναιτο συνιδεῖν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἑκάστων καὶ τὸ τέλος, πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ ποῦ καταντήσει πάλιν· μάλιστα δʼ ἐπὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας τοῦτον ἁρμόσειν τὸν τρόπον ὑπείληφα τῆς ἐξηγήσεως διὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς εἰληφέναι τήν τε σύστασιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν.
5. Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one form of government into another are perhaps discussed with greater accuracy by Plato and some other philosophers. But their treatment, from its intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only within the capacity of a few. I will therefore endeavour to give a summary of the subject, just so far as I suppose it to fall within the scope of a practical history and the intelligence of ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed, the details contained in what is immediately to follow will amply atone for what is left for the present unsolved. What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it produced? Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such causes the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things we are told have happened, and it is reasonable to think will happen again. Suppose accordingly all knowledge of social habits and arts to have been lost. Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds, the race of man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable to suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek those of their own kind to herd with. And in that case too, as with the animals, he who was superior to the rest in strength of body or courage of soul would lead and rule them. For what we see happen in the case of animals that are without the faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats, and cocks,—among whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take the lead, —that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among men was this,—herding together like animals and following the strongest and bravest as leaders. The limit of this authority would be physical strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism. But as soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and justice and their reverse.
5. ἀκριβέστερον μὲν οὖν ἴσως ὁ περὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν μεταβολῆς τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰς ἀλλήλας διευκρινεῖται λόγος παρὰ Πλάτωνι καί τισιν ἑτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων· ποικίλος δʼ ὢν καὶ διὰ πλειόνων λεγόμενος ὀλίγοις ἐφικτός ἐστιν. διόπερ ὅσον ἀνήκειν ὑπολαμβάνομεν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πραγματικὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐπίνοιαν, τοῦτο πειρασόμεθα κεφαλαιωδῶς διελθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἐλλείπειν τι δόξῃ διὰ τῆς καθολικῆς ἐμφάσεως, ὁ κατὰ μέρος λόγος τῶν ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένων ἱκανὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ποιήσει τῶν νῦν ἐπαπορηθέντων. ποίας οὖν ἀρχὰς λέγω καὶ πόθεν φημὶ φύεσθαι τὰς πολιτείας πρῶτον; ὅταν ἢ διὰ κατακλυσμοὺς ἢ διὰ λοιμικὰς περιστάσεις ἢ διʼ ἀφορίας καρπῶν ἢ διʼ ἄλλας τοιαύτας αἰτίας φθορὰ γένηται τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους, οἵας ἤδη γεγονέναι παρειλήφαμεν καὶ πάλιν πολλάκις ἔσεσθʼ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ, τότε δὴ συμφθειρομένων πάντων τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ τεχνῶν, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν περιλειφθέντων οἷον εἰ σπερμάτων αὖθις αὐξηθῇ σὺν χρόνῳ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων, τότε δήπου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων συναθροιζομένων — ὅπερ εἰκός, καὶ τούτους εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγελάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένειαν — ἀνάγκη τὸν τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ διαφέροντα, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν ἀδοξοποιήτων ζῴων θεωρούμενον τοῦτο χρὴ φύσεως ἔργον ἀληθινώτατον νομίζειν, παρʼ οἷς ὁμολογουμένως τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους ὁρῶμεν ἡγουμένους, λέγω δὲ ταύρους, κάπρους, ἀλεκτρυόνας, τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς εἰκὸς τοιούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίους, ζῳηδὸν συναθροιζομένων καὶ τοῖς ἀλκιμωτάτοις καὶ δυναμικωτάτοις ἑπομένων· οἷς ὅρος μέν ἐστι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἰσχύς, ὄνομα δʼ ἂν εἴποι τις μοναρχίαν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ τοῖς συστήμασι διὰ τὸν χρόνον ὑπογένηται συντροφία καὶ συνήθεια, τοῦτʼ ἀρχὴ βασιλείας φύεται, καὶ τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις.
6. The way in which such conceptions originate and come into existence is this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of nature, and the result is the birth of children. Now, if any one of these children who have been brought up, when arrived at maturity, is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was nurtured, but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is plain that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and have seen the care and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture and bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of reasoning powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct is not likely to escape their observation; but that they will remark it when it occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will have an eye to the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the same occurring to each of themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued or helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know it: sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case. Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of justice. Similarly, again, when any one man stands out as the champion of all in a time of danger, and braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with marks of favour and pre-eminence from the common people; while he who acted in a contrary way would fall under their contempt and dislike. From this, once more, it is reasonable to suppose that there would arise in the minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the honourable, and of the difference between them; and that one should be sought and imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the leading and most powerful man among his people ever encourages such persons in accordance with the popular sentiment, and thereby assumes in the eyes of his subject the appearance of being the distributor to each man according to his deserts, they no longer obey him and support his rule from fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and soul, and fighting against all who form designs against his government. In this way he becomes a king instead of a despot by imperceptible degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and bodily strength from their supremacy.
6. ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν εἰρημένων τοιόσδε. πάντων γὰρ πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας ὁρμώντων κατὰ φύσιν, ἐκ δὲ τούτων παιδοποιίας ἀποτελουμένης, ὁπότε τις τῶν ἐκτραφέντων εἰς ἡλικίαν ἱκόμενος μὴ νέμοι χάριν μηδʼ ἀμύναι τούτοις οἷς ἐκτρέφοιτʼ, ἀλλά που τἀναντία κακῶς λέγειν ἢ δρᾶν τούτους ἐγχειροίη, δῆλον ὡς δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν εἰκὸς τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τῶν γεννησάντων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κακοπάθειαν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν τούτων θεραπείαν καὶ τροφήν. τοῦ γὰρ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν προειρημένην διαφοράν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἀλλʼ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει. καὶ μὴν ὅταν που πάλιν ἅτερος ὑπὸ θατέρου τυχὼν ἐπικουρίας ἢ βοηθείας ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς μὴ νέμῃ τῷ σώσαντι χάριν, ἀλλά ποτε καὶ βλάπτειν ἐγχειρῇ τοῦτον, φανερὸν ὡς εἰκὸς τῷ τοιούτῳ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν τοὺς εἰδότας, συναγανακτοῦντας μὲν τῷ πέλας, ἀναφέροντας δʼ ἐφʼ αὑτοὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον. ἐξ ὧν ὑπογίνεταί τις ἔννοια παρʼ ἑκάστῳ τῆς τοῦ καθήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος δικαιοσύνης. ὁμοίως πάλιν ὅταν ἀμύνῃ μέν τις πρὸ πάντων ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ὑφίστηται δὲ καὶ μένῃ τὰς ἐπιφορὰς τῶν ἀλκιμωτάτων ζῴων, εἰκὸς μὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπισημασίας τυγχάνειν εὐνοϊκῆς καὶ προστατικῆς, τὸν δὲ τἀναντία τούτῳ πράττοντα καταγνώσεως καὶ προσκοπῆς. ἐξ οὗ πάλιν εὔλογον ὑπογίνεσθαί τινα θεωρίαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχροῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορᾶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ φυγῆς. ἐν οἷς ὅταν ὁ προεστὼς καὶ τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχων ἀεὶ συνεπισχύῃ τοῖς προειρημένοις κατὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν διαλήψεις, καὶ δόξῃ τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις διανεμητικὸς εἶναι τοῦ κατʼ ἀξίαν ἑκάστοις, οὐκέτι τὴν βίαν δεδιότες, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ τὸ πλεῖον εὐδοκοῦντες, ὑποτάττονται καὶ συσσῴζουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ, κἂν ὅλως ᾖ γηραιός, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπαμύνοντες καὶ διαγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοῦ τῇ δυναστείᾳ. καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βασιλεὺς ἐκ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος, ὅταν παρὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος μεταλάβῃ τὴν ἡγε μονίαν ὁ λογισμός.
7. This then is the natural process of formation among mankind of the notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; and this is the origin and genesis of genuine kingship: for people do not only keep up the government of such men personally, but for their descendants also for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from and educated by men of this kind will have principles also like theirs. But if they subsequently become displeased with their descendants, they do not any longer decide their choice of rulers and kings by their physical strength or brute courage; but by the differences of their intellectual and reasoning faculties, from practical experience of the decisive importance of such a distinction. In old times, then, those who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the security of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the necessaries of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their family, and they found every necessary for security ready to their hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support, then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that rulers must needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence, however unlawful the source, without fear of denial. These things having given rise in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship became a tyranny: the first step in disintegration was taken; and plots began to be formed against the government, which did not now proceed from the worst men but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous, because these are the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts of their rulers.
7. αὕτη καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου πρώτη παρʼ ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φύσιν ἔννοια καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, αὕτη βασιλείας ἀληθινῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ γένεσις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ διαφυλάττουσι τὰς ἀρχάς, πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ἐκ τοιούτων γεγονότας καὶ τραφέντας ὑπὸ τοιούτοις παραπλησίους ἕξειν καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις. ἐὰν δέ ποτε τοῖς ἐγγόνοις δυσαρεστήσωσι, ποιοῦνται μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ βασιλέων οὐκέτι κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς καὶ θυμικὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς τῆς γνώμης καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαφοράς, πεῖραν εἰληφότες ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν παραλλαγῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν παλαιὸν ἐνεγήρασκον ταῖς βασιλείαις οἱ κριθέντες ἅπαξ καὶ τυχόντες τῆς ἐξουσίας ταύτης, τόπους τε διαφέροντας ὀχυρούμενοι καὶ τειχίζοντες καὶ χώραν κατακτώμενοι, τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀσφαλείας χάριν, τὸ δὲ τῆς δαψιλείας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς ὑποτεταγμένοις· ἅμα δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες ἐκτὸς ἦσαν πάσης διαβολῆς καὶ φθόνου διὰ τὸ μήτε περὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα μεγάλας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραλλαγὰς μήτε περὶ τὴν βρῶσιν καὶ πόσιν, ἀλλὰ παραπλήσιον ἔχειν τὴν βιοτείαν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁμόσε ποιούμενοι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀεὶ τὴν δίαιταν. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ διαδοχῆς καὶ κατὰ γένος τὰς ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἕτοιμα μὲν εἶχον ἤδη τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἕτοιμα δὲ καὶ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι διὰ τὴν περιουσίαν ἐξάλλους μὲν ἐσθῆτας ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἡγουμένους τῶν ὑποταττομένων, ἐξάλλους δὲ καὶ ποικίλας τὰς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαύσεις καὶ παρασκευάς, ἀναντιρρήτους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείας καὶ συνουσίας. ἐφʼ οἷς μὲν φθόνου γενομένου καὶ προσκοπῆς, ἐφʼ οἷς δὲ μίσους ἐκκαιομένου καὶ δυσμενικῆς ὀργῆς, ἐγένετο μὲν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς, ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς ἡγουμένοις· ἣν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν χειρίστων, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτάτων, ἔτι δὲ θαρραλεωτάτων ἀνδρῶν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τοὺς τοιούτους ἥκιστα δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν ἐφεστώτων ὕβρεις.
8. But as soon as the people got leaders, they cooperated with them against the dynasty for the reasons I have mentioned; and then kingship and despotism were alike entirely abolished, and aristocracy once more began to revive and start afresh. For in their immediate gratitude to those who had deposed the despots, the people employed them as leaders, and entrusted their interests to them; who, looking upon this charge at first as a great privilege, made the public advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds of business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But when the sons of these men received the same position of authority from their fathers,—having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up from the first under the shadow of their fathers’ authority and lofty position,—some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice and unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an aristocracy into an oligarchy. But it was not long before they roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befell the tyrants.
8. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους, ὅτε λάβοι προστάτας, συνεπισχύοντος κατὰ τῶν ἡγουμένων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μοναρχίας εἶδος ἄρδην ἀνῃρεῖτο, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας αὖθις ἀρχὴν ἐλάμβανε καὶ γένεσιν. τοῖς γὰρ καταλύσασι τοὺς μονάρχους οἷον εἰ χάριν ἐκ χειρὸς ἀποδιδόντες οἱ πολλοὶ τούτοις ἐχρῶντο προστάταις καὶ τούτοις ἐπέτρεπον περὶ σφῶν. οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀσμενίζοντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν οὐδὲν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος, καὶ κηδεμονικῶς καὶ φυλακτικῶς ἕκαστα χειρίζοντες καὶ τὰ κατʼ ἰδίαν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τοῦ πλήθους. ὅτε δὲ διαδέξαιντο πάλιν παῖδες παρὰ πατέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξουσίαν, ἄπειροι μὲν ὄντες κακῶν, ἄπειροι δὲ καθόλου πολιτικῆς ἰσότητος καὶ παρρησίας, τεθραμμένοι δʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ταῖς τῶν πατέρων ἐξουσίαις καὶ προαγωγαῖς, ὁρμήσαντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ μέθας καὶ τὰς ἅμα ταύταις ἀπλήστους εὐωχίας, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν ὕβρεις καὶ παίδων ἁρπαγάς, μετέστησαν μὲν τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ταχὺ δὲ κατεσκεύασαν ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσι πάλιν τὰ παραπλήσια τοῖς ἄρτι ῥηθεῖσι· διὸ καὶ παραπλήσιον συνέβαινε τὸ τέλος αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῆς καταστροφῆς τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἀτυχή μασιν.
9. For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and hatred existing in the citizens against them emboldened some one to oppose the government by word or deed, than he was sure to find the whole people ready and prepared to take his side. Having then got rid of these rulers by assassination or exile, they do not venture to set up a king again, being still in terror of the injustice to which this led before; nor dare they intrust the common interests again to more than one, considering the recent example of their misconduct: and therefore, as the only sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves, they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the constitution from an oligarchy to a democracy, and took upon themselves the superintendence and charge of the state. And as long as any survive who have had experience of oligarchical supremacy and domination, they regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and freedom as of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children’s children, long association weakens their value for equality and freedom, and some seek to become more powerful than the ordinary citizens; and the most liable to this temptation are the rich. So when they begin to be fond of office, and find themselves unable to obtain it by their own unassisted efforts and their own merits, they ruin their estates, while enticing and corrupting the common people in every possible way. By which means when, in their senseless mania for reputation, they have made the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue of democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a government of violence and the strong hand. For the mob, habituated to feed at the expense of others, and to have its hopes of a livelihood in the property of its neighbours, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until, after losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a master and a despot. This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and return again to their original stage. If a man have a clear grasp of these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to natural causes will owe its decay. My subsequent narrative will be the best illustration of what I say.
9. ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις συνθεασάμενος τὸν φθόνον καὶ τὸ μῖσος κατʼ αὐτῶν τὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις ὑπάρχον, κἄπειτα θαρρήσῃ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν τι κατὰ τῶν προεστώτων, πᾶν ἕτοιμον καὶ συνεργὸν λαμβάνει τὸ πλῆθος. λοιπὸν οὓς μὲν φονεύσαντες, οὓς δὲ φυγαδεύσαντες, οὔτε βασιλέα προΐστασθαι τολμῶσιν, ἔτι δεδιότες τὴν τῶν πρότερον ἀδικίαν, οὔτε πλείοσιν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ κοινὰ θαρροῦσι, παρὰ πόδας αὐτοῖς οὔσης τῆς πρότερον ἀγνοίας, μόνης δὲ σφίσι καταλειπομένης ἐλπίδος ἀκεραίου τῆς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐπὶ ταύτην καταφέρονται, καὶ τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικῆς δημοκρατίαν ἐποίησαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀνέλαβον. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἂν ἔτι σῴζωνταί τινες τῶν ὑπεροχῆς καὶ δυναστείας πεῖραν εἰληφότων, ἀσμενίζοντες τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦνται τὴν ἰσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν· ὅταν δʼ ἐπιγένωνται νέοι καὶ παισὶ παίδων πάλιν ἡ δημοκρατία παραδοθῇ, τότʼ οὐκέτι διὰ τὸ σύνηθες ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενοι τὸ τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν· μάλιστα δʼ εἰς τοῦτʼ ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες. λοιπὸν ὅταν ὁρμήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ φιλαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ δύνωνται διʼ αὑτῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς τυγχάνειν τούτων, διαφθείρουσι τὰς οὐσίας, δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὰ πλήθη κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. ἐξ ὧν ὅταν ἅπαξ δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν, τότʼ ἤδη πάλιν τὸ μὲν τῆς δημοκρατίας καταλύεται, μεθίσταται δʼ εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἡ δημοκρατία. συνειθισμένον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθίειν τὰ ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ ζῆν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας, ὅταν λάβῃ προστάτην μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν, ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τιμίων, τότε δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τότε συναθροιζόμενον ποιεῖ σφαγάς, φυγάς, γῆς ἀναδασμούς, ἕως ἂν ἀποτεθηριωμένον πάλιν εὕρῃ δεσπότην καὶ μόναρχον. αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις, αὕτη φύσεως οἰκονομία, καθʼ ἣν μεταβάλλει καὶ μεθίσταται καὶ πάλιν εἰς αὑτὰ καταντᾷ τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας. ταῦτά τις σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκὼς χρόνοις μὲν ἴσως διαμαρτήσεται λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ πολιτείας, τὸ δὲ ποῦ τῆς αὐξήσεως ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς φθορᾶς ἢ ποῦ μεταστήσεται σπανίως ἂν διασφάλλοιτο, χωρὶς ὀργῆς ἢ φθόνου ποιούμενος τὴν ἀπόφασιν. καὶ μὴν περί γε τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπίστασιν μάλιστʼ ἂν ἔλθοιμεν εἰς γνῶσιν καὶ τῆς συστάσεως καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀκμῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς εἰς τοὔμπαλιν ἐσομένης ἐκ τούτων μεταβολῆς· εἰ γάρ τινα καὶ ἑτέραν πολιτείαν, ὡς ἀρτίως εἶπα, καὶ ταύτην συμβαίνει, κατὰ φύσιν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἔχουσαν τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, κατὰ φύσιν ἕξειν καὶ τὴν εἰς τἀναντία μεταβολήν. σκοπεῖν δʼ ἐξέσται διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων.
10. For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject.
10. νῦν δʼ ἐπὶ βραχὺ ποιησόμεθα μνήμην ὑπὲρ τῆς Λυκούργου νομοθεσίας· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνοίκειος ὁ λόγος τῆς προθέσεως.
That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature;
ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων συννοήσας ἀναγκαίως καὶ φυσικῶς ἐπιτελούμενα καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι πᾶν εἶδος πολιτείας ἁπλοῦν καὶ κατὰ μίαν συνεστηκὸς δύναμιν ἐπισφαλὲς γίνεται διὰ τὸ ταχέως εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν καὶ φύσει παρεπομένην ἐκτρέπεσθαι κακίαν·
and reflected that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one species of power, was unstable;
καθάπερ γὰρ σιδήρῳ μὲν ἰός, ξύλοις δὲ θρῖπες καὶ τερηδόνες συμφυεῖς εἰσι λῦμαι, διʼ ὧν, κἂν πάσας τὰς ἔξωθεν διαφύγωσι βλάβας, ὑπʼ αὐτῶν φθείρονται τῶν συγγενομένων,
because it was swiftly perverted into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in its nature.
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν συγγεννᾶται κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστῃ καὶ παρέπεταί τις κακία, βασιλείᾳ μὲν ὁ μοναρχικὸς λεγόμενος τρόπος, ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δʼ ὁ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας,δημοκρατίᾳ δʼ ὁ θηριώδης καὶ χειροκρατικός, εἰς οὓς οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐ πάντα τὰ προειρημένα σὺν χρόνῳ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταστάσεις κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον.
For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron, wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves;
ἃ προϊδόμενος Λυκοῦργος οὐχ ἁπλῆν οὐδὲ μονοειδῆ συνεστήσατο τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοῦ συνήθροιζε τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἰδιότητας τῶν ἀρίστων πολιτευμάτων,
so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism;
ἵνα μηδὲν αὐξανόμενον ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον εἰς τὰς συμφυεῖς ἐκτρέπηται κακίας, ἀντισπωμένης δὲ τῆς ἑκάστου δυνάμεως ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων μηδαμοῦ νεύῃ μηδʼ ἐπὶ πολὺ καταρρέπῃ μηδὲν αὐτῶν, ἀλλʼ ἰσορροποῦν καὶ ζυγοστατούμενον ἐπὶ πολὺ διαμένῃ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀντιπλοίας λόγον ἀεὶ τὸ πολίτευμα,
in aristocracy it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence;
τῆς μὲν βασιλείας κωλυομένης ὑπερηφανεῖν διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου φόβον, δεδομένης καὶ τούτῳ μερίδος ἱκανῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ,
and to these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have lately shown, inevitably transformed.
τοῦ δὲ δήμου πάλιν μὴ θαρροῦντος καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν γερόντων φόβον, οἳ κατʼ ἐκλογὴν ἀριστίνδην κεκριμένοι πάντες ἔμελλον ἀεὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσνέμειν ἑαυτούς,ὥστε τὴν τῶν ἐλαττουμένων μερίδα διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐμμένειν, ταύτην ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι μείζω καὶ βαρυτέραν τῇ τῶν γερόντων προσκλίσει καὶ ῥοπῇ.
Lycurgus, I say, saw all this, and accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive features of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly predominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice;
τοιγαροῦν οὕτως συστησάμενος πλεῖστον ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν χρόνον διεφύλαξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν λόγῳ τινὶ προϊδόμενος πόθεν ἕκαστα καὶ πῶς πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἀβλαβῶς συνεστήσατο τὴν προειρημένην πολιτείαν·Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τὸ μὲν τέλος ταὐτὸ πεποίηνται τῆς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καταστάσεως,
and that, each power being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale or decisively out-balance the others;
οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου, διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀεὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς περιπετείαις ἐπιγνώσεως αἱρούμενοι τὸ βέλτιον, οὕτως ἦλθον ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ μὲν Λυκούργῳ τέλος, κάλλιστον δὲ σύστημα τῶν καθʼ ἡμᾶς πολιτειῶν. [ξοδ. υρβ. φολ. 60 εχξ. αντ. π. 174.]
but that, by being accurately adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady like a ship sailing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented from growing insolent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to it an adequate share in the constitution.
ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πολίσματι τούτῳ τίθενται Παλλάντιον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ σφῶν μητροπόλεως· … ὡς δέ τινες ἱστοροῦσιν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ἐπί τινος μειρακίου Πάλλαντος αὐτόθι τελευτήσαντος· τοῦτον δὲ Ἡρακλέους εἶναι παῖδα καὶ Λαύνας τῆς Εὐάνδρου θυγατρός· χώσαντα δʼ αὐτῷ τὸν μητροπάτορα τάφον ἐπὶ τῷ λόφῳ Παλλάντιον ἐπὶ τοῦ μειρακίου τὸν τόπον ὀνομάσαι. [διονψς. α. ρ. ι, 31, 5 π. 83.]
The people in their turn were restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia: the members of which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain to throw their influence on the side of justice in every question that arose;
οὐ γὰρ ἠξίουν ὡς Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης τοσοῦτον μόνον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἔτος τῆς ἑβδόμης ὀλυμπιάδος τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκτίσθαι πείθομαι, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσι κειμένου πίνακος ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου τὴν πίστιν ἀβασάνιστον καταλιπεῖν … [ιδεμ α. ρ. ι, 74 π. 188.]
and thus the party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative tendency was always strengthened and supported by the weight and influence of the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that the Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period of any people with which we are acquainted.
ἱστοροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Ἠλεῖον ὡς ἀπὸ εἰκοστῆς καὶ ἑβδόμης ὀλυμπιάδος ἤρξαντο οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἀναγράφεσθαι, ὅσοι δηλαδὴ νικηφόροι· πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀνεγράφη, ἀμελησάντων τῶν πρότερον· τῇ δὲ εἰκοστῇ ὀγδόῃ τὸ στάδιον νικῶν Κόροιβος Ἠλεῖος ἀνεγράφη πρῶτος· καὶ ἡ ὀλυμπιὰς αὕτη πρώτη ἐτάχθη, ἀφʼ ἧς Ἕλληνες ἀριθμοῦσι τοὺς χρόνους· τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Πολύβιος ἱστορεῖ. [ευσεβιυς ιν ξραμερι ανεξδ. παρις. ϝολ. ιι π. 141, 17. ξονφ. γεοργιυμ σψνξελλυμ π. 195δ — 196ξ.]παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις δέ,
Lycurgus however established his constitution without the discipline of adversity, because he was able to foresee by the light of reason the course which events naturally take and the source from which they come.
ὥς φησι Πολύβιος ἐν τῇ ἕκτῃ, ἀπείρηται γυναιξὶ πίνειν οἶνον, τὸ δὲ καλούμενον πάσσον πίνουσιν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖται μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀσταφίδος καί ἐστι παραπλήσιος πινόμενος τῷ Αἰγοσθενεῖ τῷ γλυκεῖ καὶ τῷ Κρητικῷ· διὸ πρὸς τὸ κατεπεῖγον τοῦ δίψους χρῶνται αὐτῷ. λαθεῖν δʼ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον τὴν γυναῖκα πιοῦσαν οἶνον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδʼ ἔχει οἴνου κυρείαν ἡ γυνή· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φιλεῖν δεῖ τοὺς συγγενεῖς τοὺς ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἕως ἐξανεψιῶν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν καθʼ ἡμέραν, ὁπόταν ἴδῃ πρῶτον. λοιπὸν ἀδήλου τῆς ἐντυχίας οὔσης τίσιν ἀπαντήσει φυλάσσεται· τὸ γὰρ πρᾶγμα κἂν γεύσηται μόνον οὐ προσδεῖ διαβολῆς. [ατηεναευς χ, 56 π. 440ε.]